뉴스레터

Written by Yun Hyeon-ju

Shin Ju-baek, director of the Institute of Korean Independence Movement Studies, Independence Hall of Korea

Having graduated from Sungkyunkwan University, Shin Ju-baek received a doctorate in literature at the department of history in the same graduate school. He worked as senior researcher at the Institute for Social Development and Policy Research of Seoul National University, as HK research professor at Yonsei University's Institute of Korean Studies, and as visiting researcher at China's Yanbian University, Japan's Tokyo and Kyoto Universities, and Taiwan's Academia Sinica. Having served on the second Joint Committee on Korea-Japan History Research, the fact-finding committee on forced mobilization victims during Japan's colonial period, and a committee intended to help the comfort women of the Japanese military, Shin is currently a member of a committee related to creating a park in Yongsan. He authored more than 140 dissertations in such fields as the Korean independence movement history, East Asian education history, and Korea's modern academic history. His books include “Korean People's History in Manchuria (1920-45)”, “Historical Reconciliation and Creation of an East Asian Future”, “Origin of Korean Historical Studies”, and “East Asia's Modern and Contemporary History Written Together by Korea, China, and Japan 1.2” (co-authorship).

The aspiration for independence sparked by the March First Independence Movement caused the whole region of Joseon to be imbued with patriotism and spread abroad beyond Joseon. Of all things, the “armed struggle against Japan”, which was intended to achieve independence by fighting the Japanese military, means a great deal. We would thus like to look back on the meaning of the armed struggle against Japan in Korea's independence movement history, marking the centennial of the Fengwudong and Qingshanli Battles. To this end, we met with Shin Ju-baek, director of the Institute of Korean Independence Movement Studies at the Independence Hall of Korea.

Q

Marking the centennial of the March First Independence Movement last year, you must have been very busy. Please give us a brief introduction of your institute and share your plan for this year.

A

First, let me give a brief introduction of the Independence Hall of Korea and our institute. In 1982, Japan's distortion of history textbooks initially prompted the Korea-Japan history conflict. The Independence Hall of Korea was established in 1987 to cope with the history conflict, and our institute was founded concurrently at the time. Boasting a history of more than 30 years, the institute has three divisions and two task force teams in which 47 researchers, myself included, have been conducting research, data collection, and publication commensurate with the founding philosophy. This year the institute will hold two academic conferences at home and abroad to mark the centennial of the Fengwudong and Qingshanli Battles and one international academic conference to mark the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Korean Liberation Army. We will also host a symposium on the March First Independence Movement every year starting in March this year. The March First Independence Movement is the first historic event in which the broader populace on the Korean Peninsula formed a consensus on one specific issue since the beginning of the history of the Korean Peninsula. Because the March First Independence Movement is the widow’s cruse of our history, it is necessary to delve into its meaning from diverse angles, not treating the movement as a one-time event. We will also continue our writings on independence activists while holding popular lectures to boost research and communication.

Q

It seems that you'll be very busy in 2020. As you mentioned, this year marks the centennial of the Fengwudong and Qingshanli Battles. When it comes to talking about the armed struggle, we cannot overlook the role of the Heroic Corps. Furthermore, 2019 was the centennial of the Heroic Corps. Unlike the centennial of the March First Independence Movement, however, the Heroic Corps was plagued by the “red-bait” controversy. How do you see this as a historian?

A

The Heroic Corps is an important organization not missed in the history of independence movement, and its activity is quite meaningful in the independence movement history. Nevertheless, that the “red-bait” controversy erupted over Kim Won-bong who was heading the Heroic Corps shows the reality that Korean society is not yet free from the divided system, the legacy of the Cold War. This is evidence that Korean society is still split by ideology although the global Cold War has dissolved. Of course, Kim deserves no credit as an independence activist if present regulations are applied. Yet it is doubtful indeed whether it is right to apply the present regulations to something related to the independence movement history. This may be a typical case showing historical perceptions going back against the flow. That is because the doctrines presented by several organizations that were active until Kim Won-bong returned in 1945 were clearly different from those of the Communist Party. Seeing Kim as a leftist itself is excessive of the ideology. In understanding Kim Won-bong, there are definite differences between the perspective of rewarding patriotism and the context of the independence movement history.

Q

There were many organizations devoted to armed struggle. Are there any groups for careful scrutiny?

A

The Korean Liberation Army and the Northeast Anti-Japan United Army are second to none when it comes to armed struggle. The two groups are so different in ideology and activity space that it is impossible to choose one of them, so I will talk about both. The Korean Liberation Army, which was active in and around Xian, was a nationalism-oriented armed unit, whereas the Northeast Anti-Japan United Army in Manchuria, a unit commanded by the Chinese Communist Party, was an armed socialist group to which many Korean socialists belonged. The Korean Liberation Army was active in the 1940s, but the Northeast Anti-Japan United Army was active in the mid and late 1930s; both risked lives for national salvation in conducting the armed struggle.

Q

The patriotism that enhanced rapidly following the March First Independence Movement was expressed by means of armed struggle. What prompted the independence movement to shift to armed struggle?

A

I think that the social background of the armed struggle should be found from the attributes of Japanese imperialism. Japan had no intention of pulling out of the colony in Joseon. Independence activists were aware of this and realized that to achieve independence, there was no other way but to fight and defeat Japan. Here fighting and defeating Japan did not mean strikes or tenant disputes. It meant fighting with guns at the risk of lives. That is the armed struggle. Adding to this, independence activists then called it the “independence war”. After the army disbanded in 1907, a newspaper carried an article worrying about “how our activity against Japan should be named”. Two options were suggested in that process. They were the French Revolution and America's Independence War, and more people supported the Independence War. As the United States achieved independence from the United Kingdom by fighting with guns, they claimed, we also should go to war. Yet the independence war in the minds of those who preferred America's Independence War had two implications. One was the independence war as the method of struggle, and the other was the theory of the independence war as a broader and higher strategy than this.

Q

Armed struggle is not always feasible even if the public wishes, correct? Combat is possible only when there are well-trained combatants and weapons. I would like to know how they prepared for this.

A

Earlier, I mentioned briefly that there was no other way but to fight against Japan and win to achieve independence. As these perceptions took shape, preparations for the independence war began. What was done first in the 1910s was to foster talent, a case in point being the Shinheung Military Academy. The number of troops in the independence army never exceeded 10,000. The Japanese army permanently stationed in Joseon was equivalent to two divisions. There were at least 20,000 soldiers. Although there were 10,000 independence soldiers, it would be impossible to defeat the Japanese army. Thus Manchuria drew attention, as the region was free from Japan's ruling power and offered a venue for military exercises.

It was different according to the period, but there were two ways to mobilize troops broadly. Some young people volunteered to fight, and others joined the independence army after having been conscripted by the Japanese military and deserting. Because they formed the backbone of the independence army, there had to be limitations. Because there was no basic ability to produce weapons, they had to be purchased or provided by someone. China's Kuomintang troops provided the Korean Liberation Army with weapons. All military uniforms and basic supplies were offered by China's Kuomintang. There were Koreans who took part in the Siberian Civil War, since Siberia was engulfed in a civil war in 1919-20. Thus the independence army then procured arms through Koreans who had fought in the civil war or from Russians. In the 1930s, the independence army in Manchuria bought weapons from Russia on the one hand, while on the other, it received support from China's warlords. Procurement methods of arms were very diverse according to the period.

Q

Well-known independence fighters played a part in Korea's independence movement history, but when it comes to armed struggle, the grass roots groups were second to none. In the movie “The Battle: Roar to Victory”, there are stories of how numerous grass roots groups joined the independence army to fight. What part did Korean grass roots groups play in the armed struggle?

A

As heroism-centered history is frequently talked about, the unnamed people who joined to make history faded out in many cases. In such a context, the movie suggests certain implications in historical research. The role of grass roots groups accounted for much in the independence movement. To begin, a considerable number of people who fought as members of the righteous army made up grass roots groups. The number of troops in the independence army was much smaller than that of the large-scale Japanese military. Weapons were not superior, either. Nonetheless, grass roots participated in the independence war merely with the will to defend independence, and fought at risk of their lives. It was also the grass roots who solved the basic necessities for the independence war. Some of them disposed of their fortunes to subsidize the independence movement, and others risked their lives to provide information on how the Japanese military moved. The grass roots prepared clothing and food for the independence army as well. The young people who joined the army were no small number. The general public helped them to fight in the rear so that the larger number of people could live and be fed and clothed. Thus, I think that the independence movement would not have been sustainable without their voluntary cooperation and support. The thing is, it is not easy to prove that they made such efforts. That is why it is essential to conduct research into the grass roots' efforts for independence and their history.

Q

Do you mean that the role of the grass roots groups has not yet been scrutinized in the armed struggle?

A

One of the blind spots in the research implemented so far into the Fengwudong and Qingshanli Battles is this point. There has been no thesis properly noting the role of the grass roots during the period of the two battles. That is likely because the studies to date have not been free from the hero-centered historical viewpoint. While trying to write history centered on specific figures, efforts to remember those unnamed people who joined to make history have been neglected. I believe, therefore, that the direction to remember the Fengwudong and Qingshanli Battles in the 21st century should be somewhat different. We have to ponder how we are to remember those who participated in and supported the battle. Another blind point in the research into the two battles is regarding the fact that troops had moved. That is why there must be an approach from the perspective of military science. This raises the need to fully scrutinize the military's unique deployment method that cannot be ascertained by civilians, mobility method, tactics, and method of utilizing geographical features. Based on this, we could make a historical reinterpretation. Thus, our institute plans to deal with these two aspects intensively in the symposiums in May and October.

Q

Considering that arguments of historical revision like the colonial modernization theory have been raised in some parts of society, the Independence Hall of Korea and the Northeast Asian History Foundation have a lot to do in many respects. Is there any area in which the two can collaborate? If so, please inform us on that briefly.

A

The Foundation has invited public participation to publish a collection of books on the Japanese Empire's invasion history this year, and one of our researchers is taking part in the project as an editor. Under our tacit division of roles, we deal mainly with the history of resistance, and the Foundation deals with the history of invasions. Our visible collaboration is likely to proceed in this manner. Even without such cooperation, we are obliged to work together continuously. One of the important characteristics of the independence movement is that it was conducted in a few regions abroad. The independence movement took place even in the Americas and in Russia, to say nothing of Japan, mainland China, and Manchuria. This means that the independence movement was affected by the situation in the country or region. One of the crucial missions of the Northeast Asian History Foundation is certainly the elucidation of the history of the entire Northeast Asian region and the reinforcement of our historical awareness through this. In other words, the Foundation has no other choice but to focus on the region. It is likewise with our institute. It is impossible to elucidate the independence movement history without paying attention to the region. Thus, I personally think that there would be an area where we can collaborate with the Foundation in the historical space called the region or from the aspect of regional history. The two organizations are funded by taxpayer money and concurrently centered on the axis of history. As historical problems are related to the identity of the Republic of Korea, there could be bilateral collaboration in this area as well. In fact, our concern regarding collaboration has been mild so far. However, I basically have a desire to collaborate with the Northeast Asian History Foundation in these three areas.