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3 requests to readers from the author

This book viewed the Korea-Japan history of relations in transition during the 20-year period from Japan’s opening of its ports through Joseon’s opening (1853-1876) from a new perspective, centering around the theory of Joseon invasion (theory of Korea conquest). The following three things should be remembered before reading “Theory of Joseon Invasion in Early Years of Meiji Restoration.”

Educational book series “Theory of Joseon Invasion in Early Years of Meiji Restoration”

First, there has not been research into the Korea-Japan history of relations from Japan’s opening of ports to Joseon’s opening sequentially. This might stem from the fact that studies of their friendly relations in Japan’s shogunate period and Japan’s hostility in the Meiji period were understood separately. So this book tried to explain the process of “exchanges based on truth and trust” being perceived as “old evils (abuses in the Meiji period).” I would be thankful if readers showed interest in this and understood the continuity while they read.

Second, it’s about Dongnaebu office’s attitude toward Tsushima’s intentions to “reform old evils.” According to existing research results, the general perception was that “Joseon coldly treated envoys reporting the imperial restoration without any inclination to discuss from its obstinate closed-door policy.” That Joseon expected the role of Tsushima, persuaded friendship and entertained envoys sincerely in the midst of upheaval remains hidden. Aware that Joseon’s failure to serve some ships that betrayed principles has been understood merely as all, readers need to figure out Tsushima’s logic to maintain the role of a bridge with Joseon and Dongnaebu’s logical response.

Third, it’s necessary to take note of the period after Hanabusa left after visiting Waegwan in September 1872 to repeal “daegwanso” and appoint a foreign ministry official as “gwansu.” Some studies claim that Waegwan was plundered at the time, but this is not true. As the Giyu Agreement system was denied unilaterally, the degree of diplomatic contact was lowered; nevertheless, their relationship went on steadily. Waegwan was under the jurisdiction of Dongnaebu as ever and walls, buildings, and docks were repaired amid continuing patrol. The repatriation of castaways continued, albeit in different forms, and imports of weapons and gunpowder were pushed with trade remaining intact. The atmosphere must have been dreary because Waegwan, which used to be crowded with 500 people, was inhabited by only 70. Readers need to keep in mind that Waegwan was not breached, but was waning owing to the collapse of the Giyu Agreement. In the meantime, Japanese diplomats’ logic was on a head-on collision with Joseon’s logic. Joseon cherished spiritual civilization and did not want the West’s material civilization, but it was not an unenlightened country.

Things about the theory of Joseon invasion, which is this book’s title, are explained in Chapter 1-4, Chapter 2-4, Chapter 3-2 and 4, and Chapter 4-3 and 5, as can be seen on the table of contents. This is because the author tried to analyze and explain claims of the theory of Joseon invasion six times requiring attention in accordance with Japan’s changing circumstances. I hope that readers who choose this book just because of the title will peruse these parts intensively.

Book written with a critical mind about history

While reading Tsushima’s historical data written when the Russian warship Possadnick anchored in Tsushima in my preparation for a master’s thesis in Japan, I discovered that Japan’s conventional wisdom was different from the truth. The common view was: “The Possadnick had intentions to occupy Tsushima and Britain tried to seize the island in response. As the island faced the crisis of being colonized, the ruling class carried out a movement to transfer its fief to Kyushu to leave Tsushima in fear; but none but the masses resisted this.” But this didn’t agree with the historical data of the shogunate and Tsushima. It might have been “created history.” “Political actions” could be felt. I began my path of knowledge with criticism of “History of Reformation,” records of the Meiji government, from the beginning. I received a degree in March 1995 with “Research into Political History in Tsushima in Later Years of Edo Shogunate;” in 2003, I published “Tsushima Clan in Late 19^th Century and Korea-Japan Relations” (Kookhak Jaryowon) by gathering my research results. However, I confess that there were a lot of parts in which I couldn’t figure out overall connections until then. Afterward, I participated in a project to analyze textbooks of the Japanese Government-General of Korea for a long time at the Northeast Asian History Foundation. This enabled me to understand the relationship between political power and historical studies and concurrently have a critical mind about Korean history and textbooks on Korean history. As a scholar having specialized in the later years of the shogunate and the port opening period in Japan, I found myself naturally interested in Joseon’s foundation and opening of ports. Japan emphasized that Joseon’s ruling circles were incompetent and corrupt to justify its rule over Joseon. Joseon’s independent agonies and decisions died out and were disregarded while Japan’s role was underlined. Since then, Korean intellectuals also regard national foundation merely as Japan’s process of aggression. It occurred to me that a modern history that describes only the process of aggression while independent agonies and decisions are disregarded may prompt us to lose the precious historical lessons that could be earned through failures. And I began to be aware that it would be my duty to rewrite the Korea-Japan history of relations from Japan’s opening of ports through Joseon’s opening.

This prompted me to work out a plan to write. I tentatively envisioned that Part 1 would be about Japan’s opening of ports and Tsushima; Part 2 would be about the establishment of the Meiji government and Waegwan; and Part 3 would be about narratives concerning the opening of ports (establishment process of opening system). While working on the project, I was asked to write an educational book concerning “Meiji Restoration and Theory of Joseon Invasion” from the Northeast Asian History Foundation. What a delightful request! It was indeed a good opportunity to receive evaluations about whether this book could be persuasive to the general public before publishing a specialized book. I presented the scripts after condensing Parts 1 and 2 as planned and highlighting the theory of Joseon invasion. Needless to say, the scripts went through a lot of modification. While a lot of issues I believed to be important as a researcher were removed, explanations were added to what I took for granted; and these processes were a lesson to me. But I think that there are still some parts ordinary people find difficult to read. As I took my first step, however, I have no doubt that I will be able to write a lot easier and more interesting history books in the future.

I am deeply grateful to staffers at the Northeast Asian History Foundation for endeavoring to publish the book; my special thanks go to Hong Eun-a of Chunga Publishing Co. who helped me write sentences more easily. Any errors found from the book are wholly the writer’s responsibility. I humbly beg for corrections from readers.