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Historical dialogue in East Asia is a challenge because there is marked asymmetry among the countries, unlike in Europe made up of similar countries."

Although exchanges across East Asia are on the rise, conflicts caused by differences in the perception of history remain unresolved. At the core, there is a conflict between the self-reflective and self-important views of history. With the self-reflective view of history, a country would reflect on the violence it used on its neighbors. With the self-important view of history, on the other hand, a country would refuse to do so, often denying the independence of the history of its neighbors for the glory of the history of their own.

Such conflict in the perception of history may be resolved through dialogue, and we call it historical dialogue. It was first attempted in Europe over the aggression of Nazi Germany, and it succeeded, eliminating one of obstacles to the birth of the European Union. In East Asia, on the other hand, historical dialogue wasn't attempted until the 2000s, almost half a century later.

Channels for dialogue opened at non-governmental levels first, notably between the Korean Society for the History Textbook and the Japanese Society for History Education (1997-2006), between the Korean National Association of History Teachers and the Japanese Council of History Educators (2001-2006), and the China-Japan-Korea Common History Text Tri-National Committee (2001-2012). Organizing or supporting non-governmental dialogues has been the job of the Northeast Asian History Foundation and the UNESCO Korean Committee for years. There have been also official channels for dialogue at government levels: the Korea-Japan Joint Committee for History Research (2002-2005) and the China-Japan Joint Committee for History Research (2006-2009). The results of their activities have been published into common textbooks or reports.

These efforts, however, are only the beginning. Between Korea and China, in particular, there are no such channels for dialogue, whether at government or non-governmental levels. But short-term dialogues have been quite productive and significant, especially at non-governmental levels. We should use them as stepping stones for moving forward slowly but surely. Historical dialogue in East Asia is a challenge because there is marked asymmetry among the countries, unlike in Europe made up of similar countries.

One of the noteworthy fruits of historical dialogues at government levels is that 'Mimana Nihonfu,' the hypothetical colonial outpost of Japan in Mimana which had denied the independence of the ancient Korean history, was negated by the Korea-Japan Joint Research Committee. This is significant because one of the big pillars that Imperialist Japan created to support the perception of the ancient Korean and Japanese history has been toppled down. But short-term dialogues have their limits in bridging gaps in perception, as long as the system of perception which designed that pillar remains intact. Another fruit is that Japan's aggressive war from the Manchurian Incident (1931) onward was acknowledged as a fact by the China-Japan Joint History Committee. This is progress made on the part of the Japanese academia's perception of history, although, of course, Korea and China are insisting that the scope of the aggressive wars should be expanded to include the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars as well. The Husosha/Jiyusha textbooks and the Japanese right-wing forces who support them are not even making such acknowledgement.

To advance historical dialogue, political leadership is no less important than historical research. The Murayama Statement (1995) is thought to represent the highest level of self-reflection because it acknowledged Japan's "colonial rule and aggression," specified them as "wrongdoing for which Japan is responsible as a nation" and expressed "repentance and apology." But the Statement did not specify the scope of aggression and rule. Perhaps it is only referring to the period from the Manchurian Incident onward. This is in contrast with all the Japanese textbooks which proudly describe how Japan had become a civilized empire like Western powers by colonizing Taiwan and Joseon (Korea) through the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars.

As such, both the academia and the Prime Minister's statement of Japan view that Japan's expansion during the Meiji period was an act of civilization whereas Japan's expansion during the Showa period was an act of aggression. Why such a fractured and convenient perception of history? Here is an explanation by Mizoguchi Yuuzo (溝口雄三), a professor emeritus at the University of Tokyo. While comparing itself with the advanced Western powers, modern Japan got satisfaction out of comparing itself with the relatively less developed China and Japan. To civilize China and Korea was the guiding principle of modern Japan's national activities, and the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars were the stepping stones for Japan to do so. The moment Japan admits that those wars were acts of aggression, the entire modern history of Japan would be denied. Mizoguchi's insightful explanation captures the essence of how Japan describes and perceives their history based on the imperialistic view of history. But this still doesn't explain why Japan acknowledges their aggression from the Machurian Incident onward.

In fact, during the Tokyo Trial (1946-48), the scope of Japan's war responsibility was actually limited by the United Stated to the Attack on Pearl Harbor (1941) onward. But in January 1946, the scope was modified and moved back to the Manchurian Incident at the request of the government of the People's Republic of China. In other words, the academia and political leader of Japan acknowledge the scope of repentance and apology only in the context of what was decided at, or in the wake of, the Tokyo Trial. Note that the People's Republic of China, along with the United States, was the one who defined that scope. At that time, the government of the People's Republic of China refused their U.S. counterpart's request to send 50,000 troops to jointly occupy Japan, saying that it could give the Soviet Union an excuse to send their troops, too. As one of the four countries, including the U.S., the U.K. and the Soviet Union, which drafted the Charter of the United Nations, and a member of the UN Committee for the Control of Japan, the People's Republic of China had the authority and responsibility to clear up Japan's militarism, but gave up exercising them for anti-communism. With the establishment of diplomatic ties with Japan in 1972, the People's Republic of China kept silent about issues concerning Japan's war responsibility, and didn't start demanding indemnification, compensation, and apology from the Japanese government and corporations until 1995, the 50th anniversary of China's victory against Japan. That's how the Murayama Statement came about that year.

However, unlike dialogue, statements are unilateral announcements and not effective in conveying messages. One (Japanese) government official even commented that not specifying 'when' and 'which country' was a good idea. This ambiguous Murayama Statement contrasts with the letter of apology written and sent directly by the Japanese Prime Minister to the U.K. This is why Mizoguchi pointed out that the Prime Minister's Statements were only for domestic purposes, to confirm to the Japanese people that 'we had made another apology,' and hidden behind them was Japan's perception of the war that their surrender had been to the U.S. and the U.K., not to China. China disagrees; their version of modern history is all about their victory in the war against Japan, as if there was only the winner, but not the loser. Could China still have thought so if they had sent troops to work together with the U.S. on occupying Japan?

Now that they are back to power as one of the G2 countries, China has a grave responsibility to play roles in historical dialogue in East Asia while looking back on the past. This means that the Sino-centric view of history needs to be addressed and made relative through academic efforts permitted within the country so that China can develop their own 'Mizoguchis.' The Sino-centric view of history assumes that there is only one imperial country in the world, and regards the neighboring countries in history no more than as local governments. But how much is this view different from Japan's imperialist view of history that takes it for granted that Japan is a sacred and inviolable empire that rules over their neighbors? They have something in common; with the rise of the one and the decline of the other, they both distorted and damaged the independence of the history of their neighbors, especially Korea. And there is massive asymmetry in relationship between China/Japan, countries that had claimed to be the only absolute center, and their neighbors.

But opportunities to rise above this challenge of asymmetry are coming, as the large system of the perception of history that had persisted for the last 100 years or so are shaken up and showing cracks. The rise of China is seen to Japan as the Shock of China comparable to the mid-19th century Shock of the West. This shock will certainly work to undermine the Japanese system of perceiving Asian history based on the imperialist view of history. We are now at a turning point; whether the Chinese version of Asian history based on the Sino-centric view of history will emerge and replace the Japanese version, or a new regional history of East Asia of peace and coexistence will be written remains to be seen. The history community of Korea is experimenting on the newly established subject of East Asian History, and I hope that they will serve as a balance between China's self-centered view and Japan's imperialist view.