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Article



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Wook-Dong Kim

Professor Emeritus in the Humanities, Sogang University

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A New Approach to No-Yong Park's Biographical Information

Wook-Dong Kim

Professor Emeritus in the Humanities, Sogang University

With his East Asian background and American training at renowned universities such as Northwestern University, the University of Minnesota, and Harvard University, No-Yong Park, or Park No-yeong (朴魯英), became one of the most widely acclaimed Asian writers, scholars, and lecturers on Far Eastern affairs in the United States. He gained a reputation as being an “Oriental Mark Twain” or an “Asian William Jennings Bryan” for his keen sense of humor and rare gift of expression. With some reservations, Park belonged to what Elaine H. Kim calls “ambassadors of goodwill”—the writers who played an active role as a cultural bridge between the West on the one hand and the East on the other in the early part of the twentieth century.¹ Park wrote a number of outstanding books, some of which were highly recommended by literary critics and the Book-of-the-Month Club. Parts of his writings have been reproduced in Henry Steele Commager’s *America in Perspective*, an anthology of the writings of such notables as Alexis de Tocqueville, James Bryce, Charles Dickens, and Dennis W. Brogan, among many others. In addition, Park was honored by the Freedoms Foundation, a non-profit organization in

¹ Elaine H. Kim, 1982, *Asian American Literature: An Introduction to the Writings and Their Social Context*, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 58.

Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, for his significant achievement in bringing about a better understanding and appreciation of the American way of life.

Surprisingly, while No-Yong Park's life and his writings have received considerable attention, as evidenced by highly favorable reviews, his achievement has rarely been given the recognition it merits in a full assessment of his career. Little if anything is known about No-Yong Park, in Korean academia, as well as in its American counterpart. Despite his remarkable achievement as a prolific writer, scholar of political science and international relations, and celebrated public lecturer, Park has remained largely unknown not only to the public at large but also to historians, both in his home country and in the United States. Almost everything concerning his personal life and his activities in both the Korean peninsula and the United States is shrouded in uncertainty and ambiguity. This is by and large accountable for Park himself, who was forced to change his life details in one way or other for political reasons. It explains in part why there was some obfuscation by Park and scholars regarding his origins and identity.

This uncertainty and ambiguity includes, among other things, his name, his date, and place of birth. Nothing is more ambiguous and profound, however, than his ethnic identity: was he originally of Korean or Chinese descent? Naturalized as a U.S. citizen in 1957, after American citizenship was legally expanded in 1953 to include Asian residents in the United States, Park's ethnic identity has remained open to dispute; the question of whether he was a Korean American or a Chinese American pervades any discussion about Park. Unfortunately, neither scholars nor critics have noticed or even discussed these discrepancies. Through a combination of archival materials, (e)mails, and interviews, I attempt to lift the veil that has obscured one of the most versatile writers, scholars, and public lecturers ever to emerge from the Korean peninsula during the dark era of Japanese colonialism. Descriptive in approach, this article aims to clarify the confusion and ambiguity surrounding Park, thus revealing who he really was. This could provide fodder for an interesting argument on Korean-Americans and identity construction in the Japanese colonial period.

Confusion over No-Yong Park's Names

Commonly claimed to be a mysterious man, No-Yong Park assumed many different names depending on the circumstances in which he found himself. Born into a poor peasant family in Namhae Island, South Kyōngsang Province, located just off the southernmost tip of the Korean peninsula, Park's name was entered as Park Chōngsōn (朴廷善) in the family register that is still kept in his birth place. His father's name was Park Myōngro, and his mother's name was Kim Mosim. Their first son, Park Hongsohn was born in 1884 and died in 1961. No-Yong Park was the second son who was thirteen years junior to his elder brother. Park had two younger brothers, both of whom died young, and two younger sisters, Park Chōngyun and Park Mogyun. The names clearly demonstrate that the male siblings used a generation name (*hangnyōlcha* in Korean) of *sōn* (善) while the female siblings used that of *yun* (允). Some of Park's relatives (mostly his nephews and nieces and their offspring) still live on Namhae and its vicinity, including Sach'ōn, Chinju, Pusan, and P'ohang, as well as in Seoul.

At the age of about thirteen when he left his home on the island, Park, in a highly symbolic gesture, changed his birth name Chōngsōn to Park No-Yong. He ran away from home for two main reasons. Firstly, his parents, short of hands on the farms, forced him to marry at an early age, a custom that prevailed in the early 20th century, particularly in rural districts. He left Namhae Island by a ferry boat in the dead of night just before the wedding was scheduled to occur. Second, Park, eager to learn, was loath to eke out a miserable existence as his father and forefathers had done on the island. Almost a vagrant beggar, he begged for food and lodging in Pusan's streets until he chanced to meet a kind old woman. Aware that his sole ambition was to become a scholar, she introduced him to the members of the T'ongdo Temple, a famous Buddhist monastery founded in the mid-7th century during the kingdom of Silla. Located in Yangsan, South Kyōngsang Province, the temple is approximately 25 kilometers from Pusan. It should be noted in passing that in the 1910s and 1920s several Buddhist temples ran modern proprietary schools for

children who were intelligent but too poor to go to public schools then operated by the Japanese colonial government in Korea. It was fortunate that in T'ongdo Temple Park met Reverend Kuha (九河), the head monk of the temple renowned for his philanthropy and patriotism. Greatly impressed by the young boy's eagerness to learn, Reverend Kuha accepted him as one of his disciples and taught him Chinese classics as well as Buddhist scriptures. It was quickly surmised that due to his excellent intelligence as well as his strong motivation, Park could read and write Chinese classics in a comparatively short period of time. Park seemed to be well versed in Chinese classics because he often cited from the writings of Kongzi (Confucius) and Laozi (Lao Tzu). More importantly, he converted to Buddhism and became a monk. As an apprentice monk, Park was given a Dharma name of Min-o (珉悟), meaning awakening to truth as precious as a gem. At the same time, Park completed a primary course of study at Myōngsin, a modern proprietary school established by T'ongdo Temple.²

One might guess that No-Yong Park stayed in T'ongdo Temple for five years or so. Given that he had left home in Namhae Island at thirteen, he spent most of his teens in the temple from 1911 to 1915. Still avid to expand his knowledge in a bigger city, Park requested that the head priest should send him to Kyōngsōng (Seoul) to pursue a more modern advanced education. Fully aware of Park's rare intelligence and keen desire for learning, the priest wrote to Kim Sōngsu (金性洙), the new owner of private secondary school, Joong-Ang School, to inquire about the possibility of him sponsoring Park. In compliance with the priest's recommendation, Kim decided to sponsor and host Park, who eventually left the temple for Kyōngsōng.³

² The first modern proprietary school, founded in 1906 by Wonhūngsa Temple in Seoul, was Myōngjin School, the predecessor of Hyōhwa College and later Dongguk University. It would not be an exaggeration to argue that Buddhist temples in Korea played a pivotal role in modern education at the turn of the century, particularly in the colonial period.

³ A landlord, journalist, and industrialist among others, Kim Sōngsu is better known for his doctrine of the establishment of Korea on the basis of education. For further details on Kim and his great contribution to modern education in Korea, see Carter J. Eckert, 1991, *Offspring of Empire*:

The records at Joong-Ang School show that the name of No-yong Park was entered when he enrolled in the school with the class of 1914. During his school days, Park used two names interchangeably: Park No-yeong and Park Min-o. Officially, he used the newly adopted name, Park No-yong, for school activities. On the other hand, he used his Dharma name, Min-o, unofficially when he took part in political activities. Park took up his lodgings at Kim Söngsu's house for five years until he left school in 1919, with no diploma for reasons to be discussed in detail later. Park was especially close to Kim as Kim sponsored and hosted him throughout his time at Joong-Ang. Just as Guha envisioned a devout monk for Park, so did Kim a great intellectual for him. As Park's wife, Lanhei Kim Park (金蘭今, née Kim Sun-bu), points out in her autobiography entitled *Facing Four Ways*, Kim Söngsu was "a very important guiding force for [her] late husband throughout his first formal education at Chung-Ang [Joong-Ang] High School."⁴ In *The Ninety-Years' History of Joong-Ang*, Park is listed as being in the 1919 graduating class. Park's classmates include Chang Kiuk (張基郁), Yim Pongsun (任鳳淳), Yi Tongje (李東濟), all of whom participated in the March First Movement. The famed linguist Yi Hüisüng (李熙昇) was Park's one year senior while the noted playwright and director Park Sünghüi (朴勝喜) was his one year junior.

Kim Söngsu was in fact a guiding force not merely for No-Yong Park's advanced knowledge but for his patriotism as well. In early 1919, Joong-Ang School turned out to be the cradle of the Korean independence movement. Inspired by the Fourteen Points outlining the right of national self-determination proclaimed by President Woodrow Wilson, Korean intellectuals and activists called for independence from Imperial Japan. The March First Movement, also commonly known as the Sam-il Movement, was one of the most significant protest movements. Kim

The Koch'ang Kims and the Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism, 1876-1945, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 148-150.

⁴ Lanhei Kim Park, 1984, *Facing Four Ways: The Autobiography of Lanhei Kim Park (Mrs. No-Yong Park)*, ed. Chinn Callan, Oceanside, CA: Orchid Park Press, 293.

Söngsu, together with the leading teachers of Joong-Ang, Song Chinu (宋鎮禹) and Hyön Sangyun (玄相允), worked out behind closed doors the resistance movement. Under the guidance of these teachers, No-Yong Park, under the Dharma name of Min-o, became deeply involved in organizing students at Joong-Ang School for participation in the March First Movement in 1919. Joong-Ang students took a leading role in staging rallies first in the Pagoda Park and then on the streets of Seoul. According to *The Eighty-Years' History of Joong-Ang*, the school was even planning to hold the 1919 class graduation ceremony at the Pagoda Park on March 1—but, unfortunately, to no avail.⁵

At the same time, under the guidance of the distinguished Buddhist poet and activist Han Yongun (韓龍雲), Park Min-o, together with Buddhist School students, notably Paek Sönguk (白性郁) and Kim Pömlin (金法麟), also took part in Buddhist efforts to support the Korean independence movement and the Provisional Government in Shanghai. In addition, Park joined the underground organization Hyöksindan (Society of Innovation), led by Kim Sangok (金相玉), a revolutionary who later attempted to blow-up Chongno Police Station in 1923, and published its underground publication *Hyöksin'gongbo* (Bulletin of the Society of Innovation).⁶ Park Min-o (not Park No-yong) was designated as a political criminal on “Chösen dokuritsu undosha no kenkyo” [Arrests of Korean Independence Activists], a document the Commissioner General of the Government-General of Korea sent in secret to the Japanese Government on May 12, 1921.⁷ As is the case with most important independence activists, No-Yong Park passed himself off under the assumed name Park Min-o (朴玟悟). This explains in part why the Japanese colonial police had difficulty in locating and arresting him. Furthermore, Park Min-o

⁵ Joong-Ang Alumni Association, ed., 1993, *The Eighty-Years' History of Joong-Ang*, Seoul: Joong-Ang Alumni Association, 47-56.

⁶ Wook-Dong Kim, 2019, *Global Perspectives on Korean Literature*, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 158-160.

⁷ “Chösen dokuritsu undosha no kenkyo” 朝鮮獨立運動者 檢舉 [Arrests of Korean Independence Activists] 1921. <https://db.history.go.kr/modern/level.do>. Accessed May 10, 2024.

was often mistaken for Park Chi-o (朴致悟), presumably due to a typographical error, which was common in those days. Undoubtedly, Park played a very active part in the Buddhists' anti-Japanese movement, particularly young Buddhist monks' independence activities, both in Korea and in China.

Ferreted out due to these political activities by the Japanese colonial authorities, No-Yong Park soon fled Korea in September 1919, sailing first to China and then on to the United States via France. After staying in major Chinese cities such as Tianjin, Nanjing, and Shanghai, Park went first to war-ravaged France and then arrived in New York in July 1920. He initially intended to study not in the United States, but in France, as Kim Pömlin did, but soon decided to leave for “the land of the free and the home of the brave,” as described in the national anthem of the United States, “The Star-Spangled Banner.” Regarding this change of mind, Park stated that he found Western civilization had more to offer an Eastern man like him to improve his culture, and added, “As I sank into despair, some friends of mine consoled me by telling me that the center of the Western civilization had shifted from Europe to America during the World War.”⁸

Just prior to his departure for the United States, No-Yong Park changed his name again. The Pickler Memorial Library of Truman State University, formerly North East Missouri College (Northeast Missouri State Teachers College) at Kirksville, Missouri, where Park regularly gave lectures from 1940 through 1974, has an archive of Park's documents and papers. No-Yong Park's papers at the Special Collections Department include the passport he used when he went to the United States: “Passport No. 176 issued to Po Fong by Consulat Général de la République de Chine à Paris (Consulate General of the Republic of China in Paris), July 5, 1920.” Park had his passport visaed by the U.S. Vice-Consul at Paris, on condition that the visa holder must depart on July 10,

⁸ No-Yong Park, 1948, *Chinaman's Chance*, 3rd rev. ed., Boston: Edward K. Meador, 16. The first edition of the book was published in 1940, followed by the second edition in 1943.

1920 through July 25, 1920. Under the visa stamp was another stamp: “Commissariat Spécial Havre le 9 Juil 1920 Vu au Passage (Special Commission Havre July 9 1920 Viewed at Passage).”⁹ Rather surprisingly, the name entered on the passport was neither Park Chōngsŏn nor No-Yong Park nor Park Min-o, but Po Fong, which is inarguably a Chinese name. Bao or Pao, as used by No-Yong Park in the United States, is the pinyin Romanization of two common Chinese surnames, either 鮑 (pinyin: Bào) or 包 (pinyin: Bāo), preferably the former. Po Fong might be a Romanization of 鮑方 or 蒲芳. Park and Pao may be thought of as being in some way analogous to each other at least phonetically, albeit not semantically.

Park’s passport does not indicate the type, but it appears that he obtained a student passport in France when he left for the United States in 1920. All things considered, it is more than likely that Park somehow had his passport forged, using a spurious Chinese name. It was almost impossible for Park, wanted as a person on the blacklist by the Japanese colonial police, to have a Chinese passport issued in France. Nevertheless, the passport, forged or not, once saved his life when he was attacked by the owner of a Chinese restaurant in Canada who considered him to be Japanese and attempted to kill him. Park just managed to survive this crisis by showing him the “passport fully sealed and certified by the Republic of China.”¹⁰

It remains an open question as to how Park could obtain a U.S. visa because immigration from Asia in general and China in particular to the United States had been heavily restricted since the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882. However, as Madeline Y. Hsu cogently claims, students were often exempt from restrictions on the grounds of their potential value—their tremendous potential to contribute to the United States as highly trained, skilled workers. Often considered “Anglo-Saxons of the Orient,” the Chinese were often accepted rather favor-

⁹ Before his death Park made a will bequeathing all his documents to the Pickler Memorial Library. http://library.truman.edu/manuscripts/P4-Park_Papers.asp

¹⁰ For this episode, see Park, *Chinaman’s Chance*, 46.

ably. The American policy makers believed that the United States might need people of knowledge and technical skills for economic purposes. American missionaries, on the other hand, found in Chinese students the great potential to adopt Christianity and become missionaries to China.¹¹

Even so, it is unclear how Park was able to obtain a U.S. visa. Presumably, he was not in position to apply for the student visa although, as he affirmed to an old woman in Pusan in his early teens, his sole ambition was to become a great scholar. Park did not enroll in Alma White College (now Pillar College), an academic institution affiliated with the Pillar of Fire Church, until several months after his arrival in the United States. He knew nothing about this college until a young woman handed him a flyer *The Pillar of Fire* in New York City. It was in the fall of 1922 that Park finally enrolled in Evansville College in Evansville, Indiana. It can be safely inferred that the U.S. consul at Le Havre was generous enough to issue a visa to an apparently promising Chinese student. Besides, Park might have persuaded him with his usual exaggerated statement regarding his academic credentials.

Upon arrival in the United States, No-Yong Park used the Chinese name Po Fong (and its variants Pao Fong and Bao Narong as well), along with No-Yong Park. In *An Oriental View of American Civilization*, the author's name is rather dubiously entered as "No-Yong Park (Pao)." In a document (No. 20697) filed at the U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services in Chicago, his name was even more abnormally listed as "No Young Park, Po Fong." On formal occasions, he used "No Yong Park," "No-Yong Park," or "No-Young Park" as in the forms which he filled out when he applied to the University of Minnesota and Harvard University for admission, and to the Immigration Office for the extension of his visa. On unofficial occasions, however, Park used a Chinese name "Bao Narong." In connection with his Chinese name, Park recalls a very amusing episode in *Chinaman's Chance*:

¹¹ Madeline Y. Hsu, 2015, *The Good Immigrants: How the Yellow Peril Became the Model Minority*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 23-54

The chairman at one dinner-party did not know how to pronounce my Chinese name, “Pao.” I told him it is pronounced “Bow,” as in “Bow-wow” without the “wow.” But when he came to introduce me, he was so nervous that he forgot all about “Bow” and introduced me as “Dr. Wow.”¹²

Obviously, this is a rather exaggerated statement designed to please the audience, and yet there seems to be some truth in it. Many native speakers of English often do find it hard to pronounce Chinese names. This episode clearly indicates that Park used to introduce himself to the audience as Bao Narong, not No-Yong Park.

It deserves mention that No-Yong Park sometimes used his name in Chinese characters. During his school days at Joong-Ang School, his name in Chinese characters was written as “朴魯英.” *The Ninety-Years’ History of Joong-Ang School*, published in 1993 by the Joong-Ang Alumni Association, listed Park’s name in the same Chinese characters. In the United States, however, Park wrote his name in Chinese characters as “鮑訥榮,” pronounced as “Bào nè róng” in Chinese. On the front fly-leaves of the copies of the third revised edition of *Chinaman’s Chance* and the first edition of *An Oriental View of American Civilization*, both of which are in my possession, his Chinese name is inscribed as “鮑訥榮” in his own handwriting. On the China Center homepage at the University of Minnesota, his name is entered as “No-Yong Park 鮑納榮” in simplified Chinese characters.¹³

Confusion over Park’s Birth Date and Place

In addition to the various names No-Yong Park used in Korea, France, and the United States, there is much confusion surrounding his date and place of birth. The China Center homepage at the University of Minneso-

¹² Park, *Chinaman’s Chance*, 105.

¹³ <https://chinacenter.umn.edu/umn-china/history/alumni/distinguished-alumni/park-no-yong>

ta, where Park received a Bachelor of Arts in 1927, lists Park's date of birth as 1899. Park also wrote "October 8th, 1899" on the section of date and place of birth in the application form that he filled out in 1927 when he applied to Harvard University for admission to the graduate program.¹⁴ His date of birth seems to be of no dispute because he signed the document in his own handwriting. However, according to both Park's California driver's license and his FBI Fingerprint and Criminal Record Report from the Missouri State Highway Patrol, his birth date is listed as August 8, 1899.¹⁵ Despite discrepancies in his birth date and month, his birth year is exactly the same.

However, it is not as simple as it appears. The official register of the Park family at Namhae County shows that Park was not born in 1899, but in 1897 (the year of the rooster in the sexagenarian cycle [丁酉年]), one of the most significant years in modern Korean history when King Kojong (r.1863-1907) declared the Korean Empire, marking the end of the Chosŏn dynasty period. This was attested by Lanhei Kim Park, who, in *Facing Four Ways*, listed her husband's birth date as 1897 in the genealogical chart of the Park's family.¹⁶ Moreover, "Arrests of Korean Independence Activists," a confidential document mentioned above, lists twelve Korean independence activists from Kyŏngsang Province, among whom is "T'ongdo Temple Monk Park Min-o (location unknown), 26 years old." In 1921, Park was approximately 23 years old—closer to the estimation the Japanese colonial authorities had made. Driven by a sense of urgency to hide his identity, Park had good reason to change both his birth year age as well as his name. The Japanese colonial police kept a close eye on Korean students studying in the United States and other foreign countries. In *Long Time No See*, a collection of the lectures he gave

¹⁴ Student folder for No Young Park, UAZV 161.201.11 Box 56, Harvard University Archives. Quoted in "Korean Alumni Biographies Project." <https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/koreanalumnibiographiesproject/people/no-yong-park-%EB%B0%95%EB%85%B8%EC%98%81>

¹⁵ No-Yong Park Papers, Ms Collection P4, Special Collections University Archives, Truman State University. http://library.truman.edu/manuscripts/P4-Park_Papers.asp

¹⁶ Lanhei Kim Park, *Facing Four Ways*, xvi.

at Northeast Missouri State Teachers College at Kirksville, as well as in *Chinaman's Chance*, Park makes it clear that he was only thirteen years old when he ran away from home.¹⁷ He had stayed in T'ongdo Temple for four years or so and then spent five years in Joong-Ang School, making his age twenty-three when he departed for the United States. All things considered, Park was born in 1897, not in 1899, as commonly known so far.

No-Yong Park also made Americans believe that he grew up in Manchuria, not on Namhae Island in Korea, as stated above. He begins *Chinaman's Chance* with the unpleasant memory of his childhood in a little farming village in the northeastern corner of Manchuria:

My parents, especially, were stirred by what was happening because they were *originally Koreans* who, during the early stage of [the] Japanese invasion into Continental Asia, had been forced to pack up their meagre belongings and lead *their tender sons* and daughters bare-footed and bare-headed into primitive and undeveloped Manchuria in search of a new home and a new haven from the menace of modernized Japan.¹⁸ [Emphasis added]

What is striking to observe in the passage quoted above is how fully Park attempts to hide his identity. The passage begs the question as to whether Park was born on the Korean peninsula or in Manchuria, a region in Northeast Asia encompassing the entirety of present-day Northeast China and historically parts of the modern-day Russian Far East, often referred to as Outer Manchuria. Was Park included among those he calls “their tender sons” or not? As for his siblings, it should be remembered that Park had one elder brother (thirteen years his senior) and two younger brothers (both of whom died young) as well as two younger sisters. In one way or another the passage leads the reader to think that Park was

¹⁷ No-Yong Park, 1967, *No Time No See: Lectures*, New York: Exposition Press, 102.

¹⁸ Park, *Chinaman's Chance*, 11.

born in colonial Korea, not in Manchuria. Reminiscing about his first arrival in the United States, Park also states, “Having grown up under the shadows of [the] Japanese secret police and Manchurian bandits, I did not know what peace and freedom meant.”¹⁹ To say that he suffered from Japanese colonial authorities is quite right, but to say he suffered from Manchurian bandits sounds preposterous.

No-Yong Park made it quite plain that he was born and raised in Manchuria here and there. No better illustration of this can be found than in *An Oriental View of American Civilization*. In the introduction to the book, Park states, “As America is undertaking the task of reconstructing her culture, I, a Chinese recipient of American kindness and hospitality, pause as a friendly critic and offer some frank criticisms from the Oriental point of view with the hope that they may be of some use to the building of a civilization that will last and perpetuate itself”²⁰ (emphases added). The front flap jacket of *Long Time No See* reads: “Born and reared in Manchuria, and educated in Asia, Europe and America, No-Yong Park has taught at some of our leading universities and colleges, and has written a number of outstanding books.” One of the publicity flyers for his lectures, drawn up by Harry Byrd Kline Celebrity Service in Dallas, Texas, reads similarly: “Born and reared in Manchuria, but now an American citizen, he holds a bachelor of arts degree from the University of Minnesota and M. A. and Ph. D. from Harvard.”

It has by now become evident that No-Yong Park was not only born in Namhae Island, but also spent his most formative years on the Island and in its vicinity. More specifically, his birthplace is Ka'in-ri, Changsŏn-myŏn, Namhae-gun in South Kyŏngsang Province. Namhae Island consists of two main islands: Big Namhae Island and Little Namhae Island. Located on Little Island, Ka'in-ri was a tiny farming and fishing village. In *Chinaman's Chance*, Park wrote that his parents, who somehow found out that their son was in a Buddhist monastery, promised

¹⁹ No-Yong Park, 1951, *A Squint-Eye View of America*, Boston: Meador Press, 27.

²⁰ No-Yong Park (Pao), 1934, *An Oriental View of American Civilization*, Boston: Hale, Cushman & Flint, 9.

to send him to a modern school anywhere in order to prevent him from becoming a monk. Park says, “So I left the peaceful monastery encircled by silent mountains, and went to Nanking, Peking, Seoul, and Tokyo in search of the modern education which seemed so dear to my heart.”²¹ This statement is obviously overstated—so much so that it sounds absurd. Illiterate and poverty-stricken, his parents could not afford to provide him with a modern education, let alone a village school. As to Manchuria, they had never left their homeland Little Namhae Island to migrate to “primitive and undeveloped Manchuria in search of a new home and a new haven from the menace of modernized Japan.” They were in fact too uneducated to be threatened by the menace of Japan’s imperialism.

Park’s Ethnic Identity

The matters regarding No-Yong Park’s different birth dates and places, as well as his diverse names, inevitably lead to the more significant controversy of his ethnic identity. The question of whether he is a Korean American or a Chinese American has, as expected, been a contentious subject among scholars and critics. In a short introductory note to “Cultural Strains” by No-Yong Park, Oscar Handlin and Lilian Handlin, noted for their research on immigration and other social topics in American history, claim, “Born in 1899 in Manchuria to a family that had fled from Korea upon the Japanese invasion, Park became impatient with traditional Chinese society and, influenced by Methodist teachers, came to the United States.”²² What the Handlins say about Park is based to great extent on the biographical information the author gives in *Chinaman’s Chance*. Without the slightest awareness that the author might give a false account of his life story, the renowned historians took what Park

²¹ Park, *Chinaman’s Chance*, 15.

²² Oscar Handlin and Lillian Handlin, eds., 1997, *From the Outer World: Perspectives on People and Places, Manners and Customs in the United States, as Reported by Travelers from Asia, Africa, Australia, and Latin America*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 151.

wrote at face value.

Sau-Ling Cynthia Wong argues that No-Yong Park is a Chinese American autobiographer. In her brief discussion of Chinese American autobiographies, Wong classifies Park's *Chinaman's Chance* as belonging to "another group of works that do devote more space to life in America than in China," considering it a "Chinese-American autobiography."²³ In Wong's view, Park's book is not different in any meaningful way from Huie Kin's *Reminiscences of an Early Chinese Minister* and Anna Chennault's *The Education of Anna*. Kin's book is a memoir of his career as the first Chinese Christian minister in New York and one of the prominent leaders of the local Chinese community. Chennault's book is an intimate story of her life with her husband, General Claire L. Chennault, commander of the American Volunteer Group later known as the "Flying Tigers." Wong asserts that, despite Park's Korean descent, he was raised in Manchuria as a Chinese and later wrote of Chinese matters as a Chinese.

More recently, Xiao-huang Yin, Professor of American Studies at Occidental College, who was educated in Nanjing University in China and then received his M. A. and Ph. D. from Harvard University, also repeats the same mistake the Handlins and Sau-Ling Cynthia Wong make. Yin claims that "Park is sometimes thought to be Korean, perhaps because of the unconventional way he spelled his Chinese surname."²⁴ Yin further claims that Park was one of the "most cultivated Chinese" who attempted to shy away from sensitive issues like race politics. That is why Yin lists Park's name both as "No-Yong Park" and as "Bao Narong" at the same time. Yin further argues that "[w]hat really differentiated Wu [Ting-fang] from other cultivated Chinese such as Park No-yong, howev-

²³ Sau-Ling Cynthia Wong, 1991, "Immigrant Autobiography: Some Questions of Definition and Approach," in *American Autobiography: Retrospect and Prospect*, ed. Paul John Eakin, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 154, 163.

²⁴ Xiao-huang Yin, 2000, *Chinese American Literature Since the 1850s*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 81, footnote 35. Yin transcribed Park's full name as "鮑納榮," not "鮑納榮."

er, was that he spoke openly and clearly against racism.”²⁵ Wu Ting-fang (伍廷芳) was a Chinese diplomat, lawyer, politician, and writer who served as Minister of Foreign Affairs and briefly as Acting Premier during the early years of the Republic of China. Like No-Yong Park, Wu earlier wrote books on American culture and civilization such as *America and the Americans: From a Chinese Point of View* (1914) and *America: Through the Spectacles of an Oriental Diplomat* (1914), both of which were fairly well accepted by American readers. A specialist in Chinese American transnationalism, Yin contributed in a significant way to the spread of Park’s prominence as a Chinese American immigrant writer, scholar, and lecturer.

In addition, the China Center at the University of Minnesota proudly lists Park as one of the distinguished alumni from China: “Park No-Yong, who was born in 1899 in Liaoning, received a bachelor of arts from the University of Minnesota in 1927. Park won the John S. Pillsbury Prize at the University in 1926. After graduating from the University, he enrolled at Harvard University and received a master of arts in 1930 and a doctorate in political science and international relations in 1932.”²⁶ The writer of this entry unusually specifies Park’s birthplace as Liaoning, a northeastern Chinese province located between China proper and Manchuria, bordering North Korea and the Yellow Sea. It is also worthy of notice that his name is given with the family name first, followed by the given name (Park No-Yong), as used in East Asian countries such as Korea, China, and Japan—not the other way around (No-Yong Park) as in the United States and elsewhere.

Even Korean American scholar John Jae-Nam Han also classifies Park as a Chinese author. Like some Chinese American scholars, he

²⁵ Yin, *Chinese American Literature Since the 1850s*, 67. No-Yong Park must have known Wu Ting-fang because in *Chinaman’s Chance* he introduced an episode in which Wu made a comment on high society ladies and gentlemen dancing in a ballroom. Wu asked his American hostess why she did not hire the African Americans to do the dancing instead of making the guests do such a hard labor. For this episode, see *Chinaman’s Chance*, 93; *A Squint-Eye View of America*, 104.

²⁶ <https://chinacenter.umn.edu/umn-china/history/alumni/distinguished-alumni/park-no-yong>

claims that Park was born and grew up in Manchuria. Han further maintains, “The title of the book itself debases Park and his ethnic background.”²⁷ The implication of this sentence would be quite obvious: Park humbled himself in calling his autobiography “Chinaman’s Chance,” since he had a Chinese ethnic background. As he admits in his introduction to the second edition, Park uses the phrase, “Chinaman’s Chance,” in the proverbial sense. Han also argues by way of parenthesis that “Park met Lanhei, a *Chinese* art student at the University of California at Los Angeles”²⁸ (emphasis added). However, this is not true either. Born in 1902 and raised in Pyongyang, Lanhei was as much Korean as Park was. In 1914, Lanhei, together with her sister Milwhachu (Nancy), left Pyongyang for Qiqihar in Manchuria where her father had established a business. After attending Myöngsin Girls’ School in Longjing, she entered Ewha Girls’ School and then Ewha College in Seoul. It should be remembered that Park, at one point in his autobiography, writes, “I must marry one of my own kind with whom I can feel at home even in the ‘Inferno.’”²⁹ A couple of years after Park had met Lanhei in Los Angeles, he proposed to her and they got married in New York City in 1935.

On the other hand, John J. Han seeks a compromise to solve this matter. He has found a middle ground between Park as a Korean American and Park as a Chinese American, hence a “Korean/Chinese American.”³⁰ In an article on No-Yong Park, Han also claims that “one of the earliest American writers of Korean Chinese ancestry, No-Yong Park was born and raised in Manchuria.”³¹ Han further maintains that “[a]s a

²⁷ John J. Han, 2001, “No-Yong Park,” in *Asian American Autobiographers: A Bio-Bibliographical Critical Sourcebook*, ed. Guiyou Huang, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 307-308.

²⁸ Han, “No-Yong Park,” 306-307.

²⁹ Park, *Chinaman’s Chance*, 125.

³⁰ John J. Han, Fall, 2004, “The Impact of the Bible on Asian American Writing: The Cases of Richard E. Kim, Theresa Hak Kyung Cha, and Li-Young Lee,” *Intégrité* 3: 2: 53-62; John J. Han, “No-Yong Park,” 309.

³¹ Han, “No-Yong Park,” 305

young boy, Park attended a backwoods and all-male school in Manchuria, learning ancient Chinese classics, Chinese poetry writing, and calligraphy.”³² What Han proposes, despite his best intentions, seems to be inadequate for no other reason than such phrases as “Korean Chinese ancestry” and “Korean/Chinese American” may be misconstrued as “half Chinese and Korean American.” Those Americans, one of whose parents is of Korean descent and the other of whose parents is of Chinese descent, can be called as such. The case of No-Yong Park, as discussed above, is quite different because his father Park Myōngro and his mother Kim Mo-sim were Koreans to the core.

To say the least, Park is largely responsible for this misunderstanding because he often disguises himself as Chinese since his earliest books. In Chapter 10 of *Chinaman’s Chance*, for instance, he writes, “I had come to America to study Western culture so that I could go back to China to help ‘civilize the benighted people.’”³³ At one point in the autobiography, he calls himself, with some self-congratulation, “a heathen Chinese.” In the wake of Imperial Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, approximately 110,000 Japanese Americans and Japanese who lived along the Pacific coast of the United States were relocated to camps called “War Relocation Camps.” Threatened by what might be termed the “Japanese peril,” Park attached on the lapel of his jacket a small placard saying, “I am Chinese!”

Based on varied materials, however, I have claimed that, despite his self-proclaimed Chinese origins, Park was undoubtedly of Korean descent and later earned recognition as a Korean American writer *per se*.³⁴

³² Han, “No-Yong Park,” 305.

³³ Park, *Chinaman’s Chance*, 70.

³⁴ For my articles and book chapters, see Kim Uk-dong (Wook-Dong Kim), “Park no-yeong ūi chunggukin ūi kihoe: imin chasōjōn ūi kanūngsōng kwa han’gye [Park No-Yong’s Chinaman’s Chance: Possibilities and Limits of Immigrant Autobiography], *Oegukmunhak Yoōn’gu* 32 (2008): 31-49; Kim Uk-dong (Wook-Dong Kim), “Park No-yeong: Munhwajōk tonghwa esō t’aldonghwa ro [No-Yong Park: From Cultural Assimilation to Its Dissimilation], in *Hangukgye miguk imin chasōjōn chakga* [Korean American Immigrant Autobiographers]. Seoul: Somyōng Ch’ulp’an, 2012), 59-103; Kim, “No-Yong Park’s Chinaman’s Chance: A Fictionalized Autobiog-

Park spent most of his youth squarely on the Korean peninsula, rather than in Manchuria in particular and China in general. He lived in Namhae Island, Yangsan, and Seoul before he was forced to leave his mother country for the United States via China and France in 1920. During the period of Japanese colonial rule, Koreans were at least legally Japanese. Thus Park was officially a Japanese although he carried a Chinese passport until he finally adopted the United States as his country. He continued to identify himself as Chinese until he died in Oceanside, California, in 1976, from a severe nervous breakdown that he had suffered from since the 1950s.

It is worth noting in passing that as early as the mid-1930s Park was welcomed as a Korean, not a Chinese, author. In the spring issue of 1934, the *Korean Student Bulletin*, a newspaper published in English by the Korean Student Federation of North America in the 1920s and 1930s, carried a very interesting article, "Our Own Hall of Fame." As its subtitle, "Five New Stars in the Firmament of Korean Scholarship," clearly indicates, the five promising young intellectuals would be expected to pass the torch of civilization to their fellow countrymen in the near future. They included No-Yong Park and Younghill Kang, or Kang Yonghül (姜鏞訖), Charles Choi, Ann Kim, and Horace H. Underwood.³⁵

Chinaman's Chance as a Fictionalized Autobiography

Much of the confusion over No-Yong Park's life in the United States, as well as over his mysterious formative years on the Korean peninsula, emanates from *Chinaman's Chance*, "a delightful autobiography which has thrilled thousands of readers," as the jacket of its third edition puts it. In the book, Park presents a narrative of having grown up in Manchuria and witnessing China's changing society under Western influence at the turn

raphy," in *Global Perspectives on Korean Literature*, 145-172.

³⁵ *Korean Student Bulletin*, 12: 1 (1934), 7. For this matter, see also Kim Uk-dong (Wook-Dong Kim), 2004, *Kang Yonghül: Gü ü sam kwa munhak* [Younghill Kang: His Life and Work], Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 35-36.

of the century. As many reviewers lavishly praised on this book, there is no doubt about its popularity. For instance, James B. Pond, editor of *Program Magazine* published in New York City, argued, “[Park] begins by making you chuckle; he winds up making you ponder.” A reviewer for *Washington Star* pointed out, “His words often sparkle like jewels.” Professor Arthur N. Holcombe, then Chair of the Department of Government at Harvard University, to whom Park dedicated the book, regarded highly the autobiography as “a book of genuine delight.” Most reviewers did not fail to find a good humor, keen wit, and pathos in Park’s book.

However, that *Chinaman’s Chance* is a pleasant, readable, and humorous book well received by the public is one thing; telling the truth about himself in the book is another. A closer scrutiny of the book reveals that it is far from being an autobiography as it has been generally defined—as a biography written by the subject about himself or herself. Written in an autobiographical style, the book tries to conceal, as much as reveal, factual information about the lives of the author and his family. In the book, Park more often than not provides inaccurate, false, and misleading accounts of his biographical data. It might be argued, therefore, that the book is not an autobiography in the strict sense of the word. Therefore, Park’s book may be read as a fictionalized autobiography or even as an autobiographical fiction rather than an autobiography proper as the author wanted it to be regarded.

No-Yong Park distorted not only his life on the Korean peninsula but also his life after his arrival in the United States. His descriptions of how he was born into poverty and how eager he was to learn in his early teens is on the whole accurate. The same holds true for some of his life in the United States. For example, that Park worked his way through the exorbitant American colleges and universities in the United States is by and large accurate. At Evansville College, he devoted himself so indefatigably to the practice of speeches that he could join in 1924 the Chautauqua lecture circuit, a renowned adult education and social movement in the United States that peaked in popularity in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Later at Northwestern University, the University of Minnesota, and Harvard University, where he majored in history, political science,

and international relations, he was able to earn enough money for school through his continued lecturing activities. Park was in fact the first Korean to receive a doctorate from Harvard in the field of international relations in 1932. Directed by Professor Manley Hudson, Park's dissertation was entitled "China in the League of Nations: A Chapter on China's Foreign Relations." Park jokingly once said that the better title might be "The Story of a Little World War" because he often had to fight with his adviser over every line that he wrote.

For all that, *Chinaman's Chance* abounds with grossly exaggerated or fabricated descriptions. At the onset, Park tells us that his first job in Chicago was as a peddler of Chinese incense and Japanese silk stockings (all made in the United States) for it required neither a training of any kind nor special skill "except the art of telling a few lies without blushing."³⁶ He used this art rather freely, often more freely than is expected from an autobiographer. For instance, Park comments at the beginning of the book that an officer from the Immigration Department at Ellis Island came aboard, and after asking a few questions, allowed him to land without further investigation only because he was a first-class passenger. Ellis Island in New York Harbor, as he states, was a frightening place for immigrants, "a spot which [was] as difficult for an Oriental to pass through as it is for a camel to go through the proverbial needle's eye."³⁷ It is hard to imagine that Park, almost penniless and supposedly with a forged passport, travelled first-class.

At the University of Minnesota, Park once fell in love with a beautiful girl of Swedish descent. As he says about his courting of her, "I told her interesting stories about picturesque Japan and alluring China; and I wooed her with songs of love and dreams."³⁸ Korean readers might wonder why Park did not even mention Korea at that time. Located between China and Japan, Korea is no more picturesque and alluring as its neigh-

³⁶ Park, *Chinaman's Chance*, 23.

³⁷ Park, *Chinaman's Chance*, 17.

³⁸ Park, *Chinaman's Chance*, 51.

boring countries. Regarding the American woman, Park says in *An Oriental View of American Civilization*, “she is as agreeable, as yielding, as any Chinese or Japanese woman.”³⁹ Once again, Korean women are excluded from what he calls “our Oriental sisters.” Regretfully, this problem can be applied to all the books by Park, where Korea is almost invisible. Park often uses metaphors which bear features of the cultural heritage of the Chinese nation. For instance, he says as regards American assimilation and multiculturalism, “Indeed, America has been the biggest melting pot and the most cosmopolitan *chop suey house* the world has ever known”⁴⁰ [Emphases Added].

One of the most outrageously misleading pieces of information in *Chinaman’s Chance* is Park’s description of his ethnic identity. Park calls China “my old homeland.” He was so homesick that, despite all the dangers, he dared to find his way “to the edge of civilization on the border of Manchuria and Siberia.”⁴¹ This is far from the truth. In the early 1930s, Park once sneaked into Namhae Island and met his family for only one day because he was being trailed by the Japanese colonial police. He had to flee across the Namhae channel on a private ferryboat at midnight, landing on the Korean mainland and then escaping to China, never to return.

Park not only passed himself off as Chinese in public, but also adopted the Chinese way of living in food, clothing, and shelter. He named in Chinese style his two daughters Chin-lan (金蘭), or Golden Orchid, and Mei-lan (美蘭), or American Orchid, respectively. Thus, Chin-lan naturally thought of herself (and her sister as well) as Chinese until her early twenties. It was by chance that she found out that she was of Korean, not Chinese, descent:

³⁹ Park, *An Oriental View of American Civilization*, 46. Park once mentions Korea in *A Squint-Eye View of America*. Park asks, “What have the rich people in China, Japan, and Korea done for the education and the welfare of their fellow countrymen?” It appears that Park forgot how much he was indebted to Kim Sōngsu, the owner of Joong-Ang School, for his education and custodianship.

⁴⁰ Park, *A Squint-Eye View of America*, 26.

⁴¹ Park, *Chinaman’s Chance*, 70.

To complete my passport application, I needed to indicate the city of my father's birth; he confessed that the [he] was born on the island of Namhai [Namhae] Do, off the southern tip of Korea. "Oh," I surmised, trying to reconcile this new datum, "then you were a Chinese born in Korea?" No, it was revealed, he was a Korean born in Korea, as was my mother. Thus I turned out to be 100% Korean after spending my first two decades nominally Chinese; at the same time, I began to suspect the written word, for I had obtained these erroneous details of my father's Chinese heritage from his autobiography.⁴²

Chin-lan's embarrassment over her father's ethnic identity is quite understandable. At home No-Yong Park wore a loose-fitting white Chinese robe and almost always associated with Chinese. Moreover, Park and his wife raised his children as Chinese, not Koreans—so much so that they found themselves much confused, and even betrayed, by their parents when they, as grown-ups, found out their true ethnic identity. In this strange process, his wife, Lanhei Park, played not an insignificant role. As Chinn Callan (née Chin-lan) indicates, "My mother felt that we should learn Chinese; we ate Chinese food; she tried to match us with Chinese boys."⁴³ As far as Chinese culture and way of life were concerned, Lanhei was far closer to the Chinese tradition than her husband, for her family had resettled in Manchuria at the turn of the twentieth century, and she received part of her secondary education there.

This new discovery of her Korean heritage must have been a great shock to Chin-lan—so much so that she came to distrust the written word itself. Here one is reminded of what Friedrich Nietzsche helped us understand about language: that it may become a tool that conceals rather than reveals the truth. As a matter of fact, Park had never revealed his exact birth place even to his wife Lanhei. She asked him the name and location

⁴² Callan, "Editor's Preface," xviii. Park's second daughter, Mei-lan Shaw, emailed me in the fall of 2005, saying that as far as her ancestry was concerned, she had had the same feeling as her sister. She told me that she was not a little confused when her racial identity was revealed.

⁴³ Chinn Callan, "Editor's Preface," *Facing Four Ways*, xviii.

of the island he was born just a month prior to his death in 1976. But due to severe amnesia he suffered in the mid-1970s, he could not remember anything about it. It was Chinn who told her that her father was born in Namhae Island.

In addition to *Chinaman's Chance*, Park also published books on topics ranging from autobiography, history, international politics, and comparative culture between the United States and East Asia. In these books, his stance on his ethnic identity issues did not significantly change. In a letter to Mrs. Boyd while at the University of Minnesota, Park represented himself as “the Chinese student who made you laugh so much the other day,” referring to a public lecture he had given. In another letter to Mrs. Comiskey, he called himself a “heathen Chinese”—unquestionably a phrase from “The Heathen Chinese,” originally published as “Plain Language from Truthful James,” a narrative poem by American writer Bret Harte.⁴⁴ In fact, Park quotes from the poem for another episode: “for ways that are dark, and for tricks that are vain, the heathen Chinese is peculiar?”⁴⁵

No-Yong Park denied his Korean heritage and represented himself as Chinese for three main reasons: legal, political, and commercial. Whatever his reasons for identifying himself as Chinese, he adhered to his decision. In the first place, he could not call himself Korean simply because Korea had lost its sovereignty to Japanese imperialism and had become a Japanese colony. From 1910 to 1945, Korea was ruled as a part of the Empire of Japan under the name “Chōsen” (朝鮮), the Japanese reading of Chosŏn. “Chōsen” was recognized as Korea’s name internationally until the end of the colonial period. During the colonial period, Koreans living in both the Korean peninsula and the Japanese archipela-

⁴⁴ “Letter to Mrs. Boyd,” February 24 (year unknown), Student folder for No Young Park, 29-31; “Letter to Mrs. Comiskey,” date unknown, Student folder for No Young Park, 27. Quoted in Sungik Yang, “Korean Alumni Biographies Project,” Harvard University. <https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/koreanalumniobiographiesproject/people/no-yong-park-%EB%B0%95%EB%85%B8%EC%98%81>

⁴⁵ Park, *Chinaman's Chance*, 89.

go were officially Japanese imperial subjects. In spite of colonial racism, Japanese law and official discourse decreed ethnic Koreans as Japanese nationals and the “Emperor’s children.”

Second, Park felt constrained to abandon Korean identity for political reasons. Park’s autobiography and other writings are in a sense a vehicle through which he sought to hide his identity. As seen above, he played a very active role in the Korean independence movement as a Buddhist monk as well as a student and then fled to the United States to avoid persecution. Even in the United States, he felt compelled to abandon his Korean heritage because the Japanese colonial authorities kept a careful eye on Korean students studying abroad. Even in *Chinaman’s Chance*, the book he called an autobiography, Park is noticeably silent on his active involvement in the secret society Hyeoksindan as well as in the March First Independence movement. In several books, such as *Chinaman’s Chance*, *Retreat of the West*, *The White Man’s Peace*, and *A Squint-Eye View of America*, Park strongly warned the United States against Japanese aggression; unless Japanese militarism was immediately checked, free and democratic nations, notably the United States, would be in imminent danger. Even so, he did this only from the standpoint of a Chinese political scientist. He often referred to himself as “I Chinese” or “We Chinese.”

Third, Park claimed Chinese identity for the sake of saleability in American society. In the first part of the 20th century, no one knew much about Korea, which was commonly known as the Hermit Kingdom. The Chinese, on the other hand, had become a synonym for East Asians. During the Great Depression, Park once stood in a “soup line” near Chinatown in New York City. An American who stood next to him said, “To tell you the truth, you are the first Chinese that I’ve seen standing here.”⁴⁶ Any East Asian was considered “Charlie,” regardless of his or her ethnic or racial identity. Park’s posing as a Chinese was thus far more marketable, if not prestigious, to the public than an obscure Korean.

⁴⁶ Park, *Chinaman’s Chance*, 68.

Park's "Chinese-ness" certainly helped him gain a reputation as an authority on the Far East. In this sense, he took advantage of his liminal status in the United States.

Conclusion

As socio-cultural transnationalism emerged as a critique of, and a move away from, the assimilationist paradigm to understand how immigrants were changing, a critical study of No-Yong Park is clearly belated but certainly much in order. His immigrant autobiography *Chinaman's Chance*, as well as his books on comparative culture such as *An Oriental View of American Civilization* and *A Squint-Eye View of America*, deserves more scholarly attention. In addition, given emerging geopolitical threats and their concomitant global security issues today, Park's statements on international relations turned out to be somewhat prophetic. For instance, Park predicted the coming of the Pacific era. As early as 1922 while at Evansville College, Indiana, he spoke in one of the earliest speeches ("America and Asia") of the positive role of the United States in East Asia. If the Pacific era, he asserted, is to be blessed with lasting peace and friendship instead of being cursed with hatred and jealousy, the United States must play the vital role of "a modern Moses" in leading millions of awakening Asians. Park also stressed the serious consideration of East Asian affairs and its significance for Western nations, particularly the United States. In his warnings to the United States regarding the dangers of Japanese totalitarianism, Park preceded Syngman Rhee (李承晩), who wrote *Japan Inside Out* with the same warning. Although Rhee's book was published about five months prior to Japan's attack on the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor, Park had given continuous warnings about Japan since the early 1930s.

Despite his notable achievements, one of the reasons for the serious underestimation of No-Yong Park stems to a great extent from the considerable confusion over his biographical details. Accurate biographical information is a prerequisite for any critical research on Park (and any authors, for that matter). One cannot emphasize enough the importance

of reliable information regarding biographical facts. This may be particularly true of Park because there has been, for one reason or another, so much confusion surrounding his name, the date and place of his birth, and his ethnic identity. A first step towards seeking a solution to the problem is to conduct a thorough fact-finding mission based on the available information. Otherwise, scholars will be in serious danger of committing the blunder of building scholarly castles in the air.

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Korea's Sovereignty Restoration Initiatives Surrounding the Russo-Japanese War: Perspectives of the Great Powers

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Asiatic Research Institute, Korea University

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Electricity, Water, and Mining Concessions Granted to Collbran & Bostwick Co. during the Russo-Japanese War*

Heeyeon Kim

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Introduction

In 1884, Horace N. Allen (1858-1932) arrived in the country. He had been stationed in Korea for 20 years. He was the first resident Protestant missionary in Korea and the founder of Chejungwŏn Hospital. However, he spent most of his time in Korea as a diplomat representing the United States. In 1890, he was appointed Secretary of the American Legation in Korea, and he served in that capacity until his departure in 1905. He has been recognized for his contributions to Korea's quest for independence. However, he also faced criticism for his role in Korea relinquishing its lucrative mining rights. Since the early 1880s he had kept his eyes on various lucrative business. He strove to make sure that American interests were represented in the Seoul-Chemulp'o Railway concession, the Unsan Gold Mine mining concession, and electricity and water concession. Among them, this paper focuses on three interests of electricity, water, and mining that American businessmen acquired during his final years in office and during the Russo-Japanese War.

* This translated article is a reviewed and supplemented version of Heeyeon Kim, 「러일전쟁기 고종의 콜브란&보스트워키사에 대한 전기수도·광업 이권 허가 - 계약 내용과 허가를 둘러싼 의혹을 중심으로」, 『역사와 담론』 107 (July, 2023): 213-250.

In May 1902, Allen criticized the current state of Korea and its future direction:

For nearly five years the Koreans have had no overlord; a condition that has not happened before. ... The Koreans are very far from ready for it [self-government] as yet, and the present chaotic state will sooner or later end in interference from the outside, which will probably give to Korea the guiding hand she so greatly needs.¹

However, in February 1905, at the height of the Russo-Japanese War, his tone had changed: “I never enjoyed Korea as I have the past winter, the house having much to do with it. ... My relations with the Japanese and Koreans are all that I could ask, and American interests are promising.”² This abrupt shift was due to the acquisition of three concessions by the US-based company Collbran & Bostwick Co., or C&B. C&B, acting as a subcontractor for the Seoul Electric Company (漢城電氣會社), undertook a range of projects involving streetcars, lighting, waterworks, and communications. Yi Ch’ae-yŏn (1861-1900) had served as the charge d’affaires of the Korean legation in Washington D.C. He was also a prominent figure of the so-called “pro-American” Koreans and a member of the Independent Club. In 1896, he assumed the role of governor of Seoul, akin to the mayor of modern Seoul, where he facilitated numerous initiatives spearheaded by American entrepreneurs.

Allen was proud of the modern transformation of Seoul as a result of his various projects.³ However, following Yi’s premature demise in

¹ Horace N. Allen to John Hay, May 31, 1902, *diplomatic despatch*, no.470 in *Despatches from U.S. Ministers to Korea, 1883-1905 (M134)* (Unless otherwise noted, ‘diplomatic despatch, no. #’ in this article refers to materials in this US State Department records from The National Archives holding in Washington, D.C.); Scott S. Burnett, ed., *Korean-American Relations: Documents Pertaining to the Far Eastern Diplomacy of the United States*, vol. 3: The Period of Diminishing Influence, 1896-1905 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989), 171-172, unless otherwise noted as “Korean-American Relations (KAR).”

² Horace N. Allen to Jennie A. Everett, February 6, 1905, Allen Papers.

³ “We came in last night after dark and arrived at the station amid a crowd of people, with a great

1900, tensions arose between Americans, including Allen, and the aide to King Kojong (r. 1863-1907)⁴ Yi Yongik (1854-1907), encompassing a range of issues. This ultimately led to a disagreement concerning a debt owed by Seoul Electric Company to C&B. The dispute began in 1902 when the Korean government refused to reimburse C&B for services rendered on behalf of the Seoul Electric Company.

After the Russo-Japanese War, Kojong awarded electricity, water, and mining concessions to C&B.⁵ However, the award was kept secret at the time. Shrouded in secrecy, the C&B acquisition remained undisclosed for a significant period before exploding into public awareness. A web of intrigues started to surround the grant of concessions, with questions swirling concerning the signing date, the circumstances of its execution, and the potentially undisclosed connections between Allen and C&B.

There has been something of a dearth of research on the three concessions obtained by the United States in the latter years of Allen's time in Korea.⁶ Prior research has relied on official sources such as *Desp-*

confusion and whistles blowing, electric cars and lights snapping, a great torch light funeral procession going by and confusion everywhere, with porters trying to get our things away from our servants, and the general hubbub of a metropolitan R.[railroad] Station. How utterly strange it seemed. I could not realize that it was Korea. The old slow Korea that we used to know." Horace N. Allen to Harry & Maurice Allen, October 14, 1900, Allen Papers.

⁴ In October 1897, Kojong established the Korean Empire and proclaimed himself emperor. As a result, his title changed from King Kojong to Emperor Kojong. However, for the sake of brevity, I will simply refer to him as Kojong throughout the article.

⁵ C&B, a contracting firm, undertook various projects for Seoul Electric Co. The company required Koreans to settle the accrued expenses, though full payment had not yet been made due to disputed claims.

⁶ Lee Bae Yong, 1971, "Guhanmal Miguk ui Unsan Geumgwang Chaegulgwan hwoekdeuk e daehayeo," *Yoksa hakbo* 50/51: 43-109; _____, 1989, *A Study on the History of Mining Pillage in Modern Korea*, Seoul: Ichogak; No In-hwa, 1980, "A Study on the Seoul Electric Company during the Korean Empire and Aspects of U.S. Concession Interests," *The History Review of Ewha Woman's University* 17; Kim Jae-ho, 1997, "Water Peddlers and Seoul's Waterworks: The Problem of 'Measurement' and Institutional Change," *Review of Economic History* 23; Yang Sang Hyun, 1998, "Management and Operation of the Mines by the Office of Royal Properties during the Korean Empire," *Quarterly Review of Korean History* 27; _____, 2004, "Economic Plunder of the Mines of the Office of Royal Properties by the Imperial Japanese," *The Journal of the Ulsan Historical Society* 11; Kang Chang-seok, 1999, "Mining in Korea before the Establishment of the Residency-General," *Pusan Sahak* 37: 93-125; Nagai (Matsuzaki) Yuko, 2001, "Colonization

atches from U.S. Ministers to Korea, 1883-1905 (M134) and records from the Legation of Japan in Korea. However, these studies have not delved into the role played by Allen or the specific terms of the agreements. Although *Despatches from U.S. Ministers to Korea, 1883-1905 (M134)* includes official records of Allen's reports to his government, they are subject to certain constraints. Diplomats frequently concealed or downplayed their role in real events in order to adhere to Diplomatic Instruction No. 64,⁷ which prohibited diplomats from meddling in the internal affairs of their host countries. This was particularly evident in U.S.-Korean negotiations regarding concessions. As such, it is necessary to look at the entirety of Allen's tenure as a mediator between Korea and the United States and to compare his activities with previous negotiations. Furthermore, through a comprehensive analysis of the accusations made against him during this period, it is possible to get a sense of the realities underlying the relationship between Korea and the U.S. Allen sought to secure American interests in Korea, at times charting an independent course unbeknownst to his fellow Americans. This article examines some of the accusations made against him by Leigh S. J. Hunt (1855-1933) and Raymond E. L. Krumm (1873-1948) regarding his ties with C&B.

This paper uses *Diplomatic Despatches from United States Ministers*

of Korea and Collbran & Bostwick's Concession", PhD diss., University of Nagoya; Oh Jin Seok, 2006, "The Development of the Electricity Industry and the Kyongseong Electric Co. in Modern Korea", PhD diss., Yonsei University; _____, 2021, *A History of Korea's Modern Electric Power Industry, 1898-1961*, Seoul: Purūn Yōksa; Choi In-Young, 2014, "The Meaning & Alteration Patterns of Tram Traffic in the Seoul Area (1899-1968)", PhD diss., University of Seoul; Kim Heeyeon, 2019, "The Seoul Waterworks Concession: The Activities of Horace N. Allen," *Journal of Korean Modern and Contemporary History* 88.

⁷ "The attention of Diplomatic Agents is especially called to the provision of law by which they are forbidden to correspond in regard to the public affairs of any foreign government or in regard to any matter which may be a subject of official correspondence or discussion with the Government to which they are accredited, with any newspaper or other periodical, or with any person other than the proper officer of the United states. It is forbidden to Diplomatic Agents abroad to participate in any manner in the political concern of the country of their residence; and they are directed especially to refrain from public expression of opinions upon local, political, or other questions arising within their jurisdiction." Department of State, *Personal Instructions to the Diplomatic Agents of the United States in Foreign Countries* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1885), 14-15.

to Korea⁸ and the *Horace Newton Allen Papers*⁹ as its source material. It also investigates other pertinent documents and the accusations leveled against Allen at the time. It further attempts to contextualize these analyses by cross-referencing a variety of sources including the *Diplomatic Documents of Germany*.¹⁰ I will begin by looking at the concessions granted to the Americans and the multitude of allegations made regarding the award of the electricity, water, and mining concessions to C&B.

Kojong's Grant of Triple Concession

On January 21, 1904, the Korean government issued a proclamation of neutrality in anticipation of the impending conflict between Russia and Japan.¹¹ Five nations—Britain, the United States, Germany, Denmark, and Italy—responded positively to the declaration of neutrality. Kojong interpreted their responses as an assurance of non-aggression on Korean territory. However, this was not the case. The five countries were simply acknowledging Korea's declaration of neutrality, something which implied no commitment to non-aggression.¹² Subsequently, on February 6, Japanese forces captured Chinhae Bay and took control of the Korean telegraph station. Two days later, they launched an unexpected assault on

⁸ *Despatches from U.S. Ministers to Korea, 1883-1905 (M134)*, US State Department records from The National Archives holdings in Washington, DC. With regard to reference in the footnotes, 'the State Department's instruction to Allen' will be labeled 'diplomatic instruction no.' and 'Allen's report to the State Department' will be labeled 'diplomatic despatch, no.'

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¹⁰ Korea University German Studies Institute, ed., 2019-2021, *Diplomatic Documents of Germany: Korea (1874-1910)*, 15 vols. Seoul: Pogosa.

¹¹ Suh Younghee, 2003, *Daehan jeguk jeongchisa yeongu*, Seoul: Seoul Taehakkyo Ch'ulp'anbu, 179-88; Ku Daeyeol, 2005, "A Damocles Sword? - Korean Responses to the Russo-Japanese War," *Korean Political Science Review* 39, no. 4: 53-72; Boris Dmitrievich Pak, 2010, *Reosia wa Han'guk*, trans. Min Kyoung Hyun, Seoul: Dongbuga Yöksa Chaedan, 664-74.

¹² Horace N. Allen to John Hay, January 30, 1904, diplomatic despatch, no. 653; Burnett, *Korean-American Relations*, vol. 3, 116; Jordan to the Marquess of Lansdowne, telegram, no. 23, January 30, 1904, The National Archives (TNA), 405/146; Jordan to the Marquess of Lansdowne, telegram, no. 26, February 1, 1904, confidential, Then National Archives (TNA), FO 405/147.

Lushun. Then, on February 9, they attacked the Russian cruiser *Varyag* and the gunboat *Korietz* at Chemulp'o (Inch'ŏn). Finally, on the February 11, the Russo-Japanese conflict was formally declared.¹³

On the same day, Kojong dispatched Yi Hakkyun (?-?) and Hyŏn Sanggŏn (1875-1926) to the residence of Henry Collbran, the representative of C&B, with a plea for reconciliation between Russia and Japan.¹⁴ Then, Kojong gave three concessions to C&B.¹⁵ The three concessions were outlined as follows.

Electricity

Collbran and Bostwick agree to commence measures for the incorporation, under the laws of America, of a Company to be known as the AMERICAN-KOREAN ELECTRIC COMPANY. This Company shall possess a capitalization of not less than Yen 1,500,000, or its equivalent in American money. One half of the Capital shares of the American-Korean Electric Company Company shall be delivered to His Majesty, the Emperor of Korea, and the other half shall belong to Collbran and Bostwick. When the American-Korean Electric Company is organized, Collbran and Bostwick will immediately transfer to that Company all of the railway, lighting and telephone plant, trucks, poles, wires, machinery, equipment and buildings, including the main office building at Chong No, but not including any supplies that may be on hand. [Signed February 19, 1904]

Water

The exclusive rights and privileges of building a system of public

¹³ Wada Haruki, 2019, *The Russo-Japanese War: the Origin and Outbreak*, vol. 2, trans. Lee Woong Hyeon, Seoul: Hangilsa, 1098-1143.

¹⁴ Henry Collbran, May 24, 1905, "Remarks in Regard to Opposition Experienced in Connection with Mining Concession Dated Feb. 15th 1904," Allen Papers. While the Allen Documents DB at the Academy of Korean Studies lists the date of the document as February 15, 1904, the date of Collbran's signature suggests that it was written on May 24, 1905.

¹⁵ Nagai (Matsuzaki) Yuko, 2001, "Colonization of Korea and Collbran & Bostwick's Concession," PhD dissertation, University of Nagoya, 88-90.

waterworks for the City of Seoul given to the Americans, Collbran and Bostwick, in the agreement made between them and the Governor of the City, dated December 26th, 1898, confirmed in a second agreement dated July 14th, 1900, and again confirmed by the authority dated September 29th, 1900, bearing the seal of the Home Department of the Korean Government is hereby further approved and renewed. In addition to possessing these rights and privileges, Collbran and Bostwick or their assigns are now hereby given a full and exclusive franchise whereby they are empowered to build, own and operate a system of public works throughout all the districts contained in the City of Seoul and outlying towns and to supply the Imperial Palace and all Government buildings and offices including military barracks and headquarters with water. [Signed December 9, 1903]

Mining

Collbran and Bostwick shall own and operate a mining concession, in a District to be selected by them, and which is to be incorporated into an American-Korean Electric Company. When the Company is incorporated, His Majesty the Emperor of Korea will subscribe one half of the capitalization and receive one half of the shares and profits, but in the event of His Majesty not wishing to subscribe the half capital ... then the capitalization shall be subscribed by Collbran and Bostwick or their representatives, who will then own all the share, but they shall pay to the Korean Government twenty-five percent (25%) of the profits. ... Collbran and Bostwick shall be permitted to choose one from among the Districts reserved for Imperial Korean Department of Household. Collbran and Boswick or their assigns, must inform the imperial Korean Department of Household ... of the place¹⁶ selected as early as many be

¹⁶ In June 1898, the Korean government officially designated mines as being under the purview of the Department of Household (宮內府). Preceding this measure, in January 1898, the Korean government implemented a ban on foreigners engaging in contracts with domestic railroads and mines. Subsequently, in June of the same year, ownership of the primary mines across 43 counties was transferred to the department. Foreigners were not allowed to mine these resources. Further changes occurred in 1901 when an additional eight mines, originally under the jurisdiction of the

convenient to them, but not later than two years from the date or restoration of Peace between the Governments of Russia and Japan. [Signed February 15, 1904].¹⁷

These concessions were the last the United States was to receive. A new protocol between Korea and Japan, signed on February 23, 1904, barred Korea from entering into any further concessions or agreements with foreign entities without Japan's explicit consent.¹⁸ However, the electricity and mining concessions facilitated the establishment of the American-Korean Electric Company and the American Korean Mining Company, with Korea contributing fifty percent of the capital.¹⁹ The con-

Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, were also transferred to the department.

¹⁷ For further information on the electricity concession, see Horace N. Allen to John Hay, March 8, 1904, *diplomatic despatch*, no. 693; Allen Papers, R2-B3-05-001; Burnett, *Korean-American Relations*, vol. 3, 238-239. For the water concession, see Horace N. Allen to John Hay, June 10, 1904, *diplomatic despatch*, no. 755; "Seoul Water Works," Allen Papers, R2-B3-17-001. For the mining concession, see Horace N. Allen to John Hay, March 30, 1905, *diplomatic despatch*, no. 891; Contract for the mining concession 奎23203, Seoul: Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies.

¹⁸ *Kojong sillok*, 8th year of Kwangmu [1904], February 23; Choi Deok-soo et al., 2010, *Choyak ūron han'guk kŭndaesa*, Paju: Yöllin ch'aektŭl, 572.

¹⁹ Electricity Concession:

6. Upon the payment of the Yen 350,000 Collbran and Bostwick agree to commence measures at once for the incorporation, under the laws of America, of a Company to be known as the American-Korean Electric Company.

8. One half of the Capital shares of the American Korean Electric Company shall be delivered to His Majesty, The Emperor of Korea, and the other half shall belong to Collbran and Bostwick.

4. Collbran and Bostwick shall at any time after this date incorporate an American Company which shall own this concession and which shall develop the district selected.

5. This Company shall be called the American Korean Mining Company.

6. The Imperial Korean Household Department will be informed through the United States Legation when this Company is incorporated, and shall if it desires to do so subscribe one-half of the capitalization and receive one-half of the shares issued, and one-half of the profits. The Imperial Korean Household Department shall enjoy this privilege for a period of one hundred (100) days from the date it is informed of the incorporation of the company by the official representative of the United States Government at Seoul, Korea. The capitalization of the Company shall be about one million United States Gold dollars, fully paid up, but this capitalization may be increased at such future dates as may be deemed advisable. For further information on the electricity concession, see Horace N. Allen to John Hay, diplomatic despatch, no. 693, March 8, 1904; Allen Pa-

cept of developing the palace mines through a joint U.S.-Korean company was set out in Hunt's mining plan.²⁰ Korea's share in the company comprised a limited partnership structured under U.S. law, an attempt to safeguard at least half of the mining rights through an American entity. However, Article 18 of the mining rights agreement stated the following:

Should the Imperial Korean Household Department at any time during the life of this concession give mining concessions or make agreements or contracts with any other party or parties which possess greater benefits to the receiver of the concession than are given in this concession, or which provides for a payment less than twenty-five (25%) percent of the profits to the Imperial Korean Household Department, then and in that event, similar benefits shall be given to the owners of this concession.²¹

This provision enabled C&B to reap the benefits of any future mining agreements and potentially reduce its payment to the Household Department of Korea. As with the "most favored nation" clause, which functioned as a poison pill within A Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce and Navigation (Shufeldt Treaty in 1882), this provision was more of a "most favored company" clause. The agreement also gave the Americans the right to renegotiate the concession if mining operations proved unprofitable within 10 years of initiating operations (Article 13). Considering the Germans had on multiple occasions sought to renegotiate their gold concession due to unprofitable operations, this was a significant

pers, R2-B3-05-001.

²⁰ Leigh S. J. Hunt was an American who acquired the Unsan gold mining concession from James R. Morse in 1897 and operated the Oriental Joint Mining Company. Hunt's proposal entailed lending 5,000,000 won to the Korean government at an annual interest rate of 3.5%. They would then establish a company with both American and Korean stakeholders, tasked with the development of any or all mines under the Department of Household for a duration of 50 years. However, the plan ultimately collapsed. Horace N. Allen to John Hay, November 18, 1899, confidential, Enclosure 3: "Horace N. Allen to E. Stein" (October 30, 1899), *diplomatic despatch*, no. 214.

²¹ Horace N. Allen to John Hay, March 30, 1905, Enclosure 3: "American Concession" (February 15, 1904), *diplomatic despatch*, no. 891.

gesture.²² The Americans received favorable conditions in a number of other areas, including gemstones, petroleum, and other oils, as well as gold, silver, copper, and other minerals (Article 16), and the authority to transfer cemeteries, located in these areas, following consultation with the pertinent authorities (Article 24).

The contract for the water-works concession in Seoul was even more biased toward the Americans. C&B secured the rights to build waterworks through two agreements with the governor of Seoul, Yi Ch'aeyŏn, in 1898 and 1900. In contrast to the electricity and mining concession contracts, the water contract did not mandate a joint venture with the Korean government. As a result, C&B had exclusive control over both the business operations and jurisdiction of the company. The agreement included provisions for complete exemption from all taxation, including taxation on revenue generated from water supply. The concession also had a maximum length of 49 years, beginning from the date of the first water supply rather than the date on which the contract was signed. The contract also gave the company a monopoly on water sales, including water for electricity generation. In essence, it proved to be even more disadvantageous to Korea than the existing railroad and mining concessions.

It seems clear that Kojong granted C&B such an exceptional arrangement in anticipation of U.S. support.²³ This view is supported by the manner in which the contract was signed. According to Collbran, Kojong sent Yi Hakkyun and Hyŏn Sanggŏn to his residence to sign the contract under utmost secrecy, and the signing took place clandestinely, circumventing the Foreign Office of Korea, the recognized official diplomatic body of Korea. In addition, Kojong paid the Americans the debt

²² Horace N. Allen to Leigh S. J. Hunt, December 2, 1899, Allen Papers. The German concession in Danghyeon gold mine in Gangwon Province was not successful. After spending 300,000-400,000 taels, the Germans failed to meet their obligations to pay any government taxes. "Miscellaneous," *Chekuk Sinnum* [Imperial Newspaper], May 23, 1900; "Miscellaneous," June 6, 1900, *Chekuk Sinnum*; "Efforts and Gains," *Chekuk Sinnum*, May 1, 1902.

²³ Fred H. Harrington, 1944, *God, Mammon, and the Japanese: Dr. Horace N. Allen and Korean-American Relations, 1884-1905*, Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 192, 198.

owed by the Seoul Electric Company, providing 400,000 won in cash and a promissory note for 350,000 won, a total of 750,000 won.²⁴ Upon learning of the payment, a prominent politician Yun Ch'ihō (1865-1945) criticized the agreement “just to get the American protection falsely promised by Collbran and Bostwick through Lee [Yi Hakkyun].”²⁵ As evidence of the expectation of U.S. protection, several researchers have highlighted Yi Yongik’s remark during an interview with Frederick A. McKenzie who visited Korea to cover the Russo-Japanese War. Yi Yongik stated, “We have the promise of America. She will be our friend whatever happens.”²⁶

While Kojong may have expected the concessions to lead to American protection, subsequent developments indicate that this was not his only objective. He also aimed to cause a rift between the American and Japanese ministers and to enlist American enterprises in his struggle against increased Japanese influence in Korea.²⁷ At Kojong’s behest, the U.S. side remained silent regarding the payment by the Seoul Electric Company, leading to a dispute between the Japanese residency-general of Korea and the U.S. Legation in Tokyo. The following year, after the conclusion of the Korea-Japan Treaty in 1905, Kojong told Collbran that the treaty was illegal and proposed a protectorate of several powers be established to represent Korea. Collbran contacted Allen, who had returned to the United States,²⁸ to locate the legal avenues for contesting the treaty’s

²⁴ Oh, “The Development of the Electricity Industry,” 74; _____, *A History of Korea’s Modern Electric Power Industry*, 101.

²⁵ Yun Ch’ihō, *Yun Ch’ihō’s English Diaries*, vol.5, trans. Bak Mi-gyeong, 2015, Kwach’ōn: National Institute of Korean History, 21-22.

²⁶ Frederick A. McKenzie, 1920, *Korea’s Fight for Freedom*, New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 77-78. See also, Oh, *A History of Korea’s Modern Electric Power Industry*, 98-99; Lee Yoon-sang, 2021, “LeeYong-ik’s Administrative Roles and His Misguided Perceptions of the Economy During the Era of Daehan Empire,” *Journal of History and Culture* 77: 71-72.

²⁷ Allen commented, “The Emperor has the faculty of playing off one against the other.” Horace N. Allen to John Hay, May 31, 1902, *diplomatic despatch* no. 470; Burnett, *Korean-American Relations*, vol. 3, 171-72.

²⁸ However, Allen deemed the proposal unfeasible and disadvantageous for Korea. After corresponding with several lawyers, he notified the U.S. agents that his attempts to appoint legal

illegality.

When signing the triple concession agreement, Allen did not use the title of “United States Minister to Korea.” Instead, he used the term “official representative of the United States government in Korea.” This distinction was significant in that if Japan revoked Korea’s diplomatic autonomy and designated it as a protectorate, it was possible for a consul or other government representative to represent the interests of American companies, making the term used more appropriate.²⁹ It would allow C&B to look after its interests regardless of any change in Korea’s status.

Even, without mentioning the lucrative triple concession agreement with Korea, Collbran also proposed a collaborative venture to the Japanese aimed at establishing a joint enterprise encompassing electricity, streetcars, electric lighting, and communications and water services.³⁰ In late February, the Japanese minister to Korea, Hayashi reported that Kojong had given 400,000 won to Collbran via Yi Yongik.³¹ However, he did not give any details about the negotiations between Kojong and Collbran. Similarly, the German minister to Korea did not grasp the significance of the negotiations. He reported that Kojong’s payment of 400,000 won was “compensation” which resolved the debt dispute, but he failed to see that this laid the groundwork for a collaborative U.S.-Korea venture.³² At the insistence of Allen, U.S.S. *Cincinnati* was dispatched to

 representatives had been unsuccessful. Lee Yeong-mi, 2017, “Horace N. Allen’s View and Action concerning King Kojong’s Attempt to Negotiate with the United States: An Analysis of Horace N. Allen Papers, 1883-1923,” *Journal of Korean Modern and Contemporary History* 82.

²⁹ “As this country is now to be more under the control of Japan than Egypt is under that of England, I think that an Agent and Consul General will soon be more fitting for our representation here than an Envoy Extraordinary, and if such suggestion is acted upon I would be through with my service here.” Horace N. Allen to Edwin V. Morgan, February 26, 1904, Allen Papers.

³⁰ Henry Collbran to Hagiwara Moriichi, March 8, 1904, *Records of the Japanese Legation in Korea*, vol. 25; Hayashi Gonsuke to Komura Jutarō, confidential, no. 24, March 20, 1904, Appendix, “Collbran’s Letter on the Organization of the U.S.-Japan Limited Partnership” (Henry Collbran to Hagiwara Moriichi, March 10, 1904).

³¹ Hayashi Gonsuke to Komura Jutarō, telegram, no. 291, March 10, 1904, *Records of the Japanese Legation in Korea*, vol. 25.

³² Saldern to Bülow, K.No. 28, March 13, 1904, *Diplomatic Documents of Germany: Korea (1874-*

Peng Yang (P'yŏngyang), with a view to bringing refugees from the mines and northern Province of Korea to Seoul. Interestingly, the U.S.S. *Cincinnati* gave passage to Yi Hakkun and Hyŏn Sanggŏn, who negotiated with Collbran under Kojong's secret order, to Shanghai, China.³³ At the behest of Allen, Hayashi granted permission for the American vessel to proceed unhindered, and further apprised Japanese military authorities in the vicinity to refrain from impeding maritime traffic.³⁴ Misconstruing Kojong's strategic gambit, Germany and Japan solely viewed his connection with the U.S. company through an economic lens, thus missing his attempt to leverage this relationship as a diplomatic springboard to solidify Korea's ties with the United States.

Issues Surrounding the Triple Concessions

1. The Contract Date

The concessions raised suspicions in a number of areas. A month after the signing of the agreement, Hayashi, the Japanese minister, discovered that the agreement entailed a 50/50 division of profits between Korea and the United States and that the Americans would oversee the administration of the new electricity company.³⁵ He remarked, "This agreement is fraught with numerous objections pertaining to both its structure and substance, warranting its complete annulment."³⁶ In addition, John N. Jordan (1852-1925), the British minister to Korea, accused the Americans of securing the concessions through deceptive means. He claimed that Kojong

1910), vol. 11, 226,.

³³ Horace N. Allen to John Hay, March 9, 1904, *diplomatic despatch*, no. 696.

³⁴ Hayashi Gonsuke to Komura Jutarō, telegram, no. 285, December 12, 1904, *Records of the Japanese Legation in Korea*, vol. 23; Hayashi Gonsuke to Commander Saito (齋藤司令官) and Consul Mimasu (三増領事), no. 21, March 15, 1904, *Records of the Japanese Legation in Korea*, vol. 23.

³⁵ Hayashi Gonsuke to Komura Jutarō, telegram, no. 305, March 20, 1904, *Records of the Japanese Legation in Korea*, vol. 25.

³⁶ Hayashi Gonsuke to Komura Jutarō, telegram, no. 324, March 25, 1904, *Records of the Japanese Legation in Korea*, vol. 25; Hayashi Gonsuke to Komura Jutarō, telegram, no. 34, March 26, 1904, *Records of the Japanese Legation in Korea*, vol. 25.

had shown him a retroactively dated contract, implying that the U.S. concessions had likely been forged during the early stages of the Russo-Japanese War.³⁷

The retroactive dating of the water concession was certainly suspicious. The contract was officially signed on December 9, 1903, by Yi Hayöng (1558-1929), the acting minister for foreign affairs. It was then signed two days later by Allen, Collbran, and Gordon Paddock, the secretary of the U.S. Legation in Seoul. Appended to the contract was the Black Seal Document 啟字印 dated November 4, 1903. During the Chosön Dynasty, a black Seal with the character kye (啟) was placed on documents that the king had read, reviewed, and approved. Kojong directed Yun Cheong-gu, the councilor of state, to draft a contract for the design of the waterworks and entrusted it to Yi Hayöng, who delivered it to C&B.

I contend that both the contract and the Black Seal Document were retroactively dated. There are several pieces of evidence for this. First, in 1903, Allen started his vacation on June 1 and did not resume his duties until November 20. It seems improbable that the secretary of the legation could have procured the Black Seal Document during Allen's absence. Secondly, Allen was in conflict with the Korean government at the time over the opening of Ŭiju, which he supported, and was also dealing with the unresolved Seoul Electric Company debt dispute. In regard to this, on December 20, Allen wrote, "Ye Yong Ik sent Krumm home [to the U.S.] with Yen 2,000 to 'upset Collbran and Bostwick matters and injured me.'"³⁸ By late December, Allen was advising Collbran to sell the fore-

³⁷ "As illustrating the manner in which documents of this kind were fabricated in the early stages of the war, I may mention that in March last a contract, antedated, signed, and sealed by the Household Minister, and made out in favour of a British subject, was sent to me by the Emperor with a request that I would attest its execution by attaching my signature and the seal of this Legation. When I declined to have anything to do with a transaction which was fictitious on the face of it, the messenger seemed to be genuinely surprised that conscientious scruples should be allowed to stand in the way of British interests." Jordan to the Marquess of Lansdowne, no. 23, very confidential, February 15, 1905, The National Archives (TNA), FO 405/146.

³⁸ Horace N. Allen to Heinrich Weipert, December 20, 1903, Allen Papers.

closed assets, caused as a result of the Korean default, to the Japanese.³⁹ Thus, it appears unlikely that the water rights would have been granted while the debt dispute remained unresolved.

What is more, Allen was quite willing to flout U.S. legislation, including directives from the State Department, if it meant securing monopolies or commercial advantages for American companies in Korea. One example of this is the advice he offered Hawaiian plantation owners looking to import Korean labor on how to sidestep U.S. laws. At the time, the United States prohibited immigrant contract labor in Hawaii and on the mainland to shield its domestic workforce from foreign competition. It was illegal to employ an immigrant before their arrival in the U.S., or for an employer to cover their travel expenses.

Allen set to work persuading Kojong of the advantages of allowing Korean emigration to Hawaii. The Chinese Exclusion Act effectively prohibited further immigration from China, thus opening up opportunities for Koreans.⁴⁰ Eventually, the Korean government established the Department of Emigration of the Empire of Korea (綏民院) on November 16, 1902. Min Yŏnghwan (1861-1905) assumed the role of president, while Sŏ Pyŏnggyu (?-?) was appointed as the chief or general manager of the department.⁴¹

However, Allen did not report this to the State Department until all the formal procedures had been concluded.⁴² He explained to the State Department that he had “inadvertently” broached the immigration topic while responding to a query from Korean officials.⁴³ David W. Deshler

³⁹ “I think your best course is to wait and go in with the Japanese.” Horace N. Allen to Henry Collbran, December 30, 1903, Allen Papers.

⁴⁰ Wayne Patterson, 1988, *The Korean Frontier in America: Immigration to Hawaii, 1896-1910*, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.

⁴¹ *Kojong sillok*, 6th year of Kwangmu [1902], November 16, November 23, and November 27.

⁴² Horace N. Allen to John Hay, December 10, 1902, diplomatic despatch, no. 552; Burnett, *Korean-American Relations*, vol. 3, 180-81.

⁴³ Some contend that Allen employed indirect rather than direct language in his report to obfuscate his direct involvement in the immigration enterprise. See Kim Won Mo, 2003, *Kaehwagi han-mi kyosŏp kwan 'gyesa*, Seoul: Tan'guk taehakkyo ch'ulp'anbu, 918.

ultimately secured the monopoly on immigration to Hawaii from Korea.⁴⁴ Deshler was the adopted son of George K. Nash, the former governor of Ohio, who had played a pivotal role in the appointment of Allen as minister to Korea in 1897.⁴⁵ It would appear that Allen repaid his debt to Nash by arranging the immigration concession to Nash's adopted son five years later.

In this instance, Allen went against both U.S. law and State Department directives, which cautioned against meddling in Korea's internal affairs. This exemplifies how adept Allen was at circumventing legal constraints. He had previously shown this side of his character in 1900 when he procured the seal of the minister of the Foreign Office, Pak Chesun (1858-1916) in the ratification of the Unsan gold mine concession. On that occasion, he had claimed that the whole idea was a "suggestion" from Pak.⁴⁶ Allen's track record suggests that he may have had some involvement in the retroactive dating of the triple concessions with Korea.

The sustained pattern of Kojong's debt defaults motivated Collbran to inform the Japanese of the electricity agreement with Korea. The protracted debt dispute between Kojong and C&B had persisted for over two

⁴⁴ Horace N. Allen to William Irwin, August 16, 1902, Allen Papers.

⁴⁵ David W. Deshler was from Columbus, Ohio, and was the adopted stepson of Ohio governor George K. Nash. In 1895, he went to Yokohama to pursue a career in banking, subsequently expanding his business endeavors to Chemulp'o and other locales in Korea. He played a mediating role in negotiations for projects such as the Seoul-Chemulp'o Railway and Unsan Gold Mine. Tasked with labor recruitment for the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association (HSPA), he founded the East and West Development Company in 1902 to facilitate the recruitment and relocation of Korean immigrants to Hawaii. Deshler entrusted the financial management of these ventures to Deshler Bank. "Advertisement of Deshler Bank," *Hwangsŏng Sinmun* [Imperial Capial Gazzett], December 6, 1902.; "Campaign Launched to Dispatch Workers (to Hawaii)," *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, February 9, 1903; "Deshler Bank," *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, May 15, 1903.; "Navigating Your Way to Hawaii," *Chekok Sinmun*, May 12, 1903. "American Marries a Japanese," *New York Times*, January 23, 1900; Horace N. Allen to Clayton W. Everett, September 19, 1896, Allen Papers; Horace N. Allen to Harry & Maurice Allen, May 12, 1905, Allen Papers, R5-B5-02-016; "Former Columbus Man Now U. S. Minister to That Country," *Ohio State Journal*, January 31, 1904 ; Roberta Chang and Wayne Patterson, 2003, *The Koreans in Hawai'i: A Pictorial History, 1903-2003*, Honolulu : University of Hawai'i Press.

⁴⁶ Horace N. Allen to John Hay, August 30, 1900, Enclosure 5: "A Ratification of the Mining Concession on April 28 and May 16, 1900," *diplomatic despatch*, no. 274.

years, with Kojong making repeated assurances of repayment that went unfulfilled. Collbran clearly believed that Kojong would once more fail to honor his commitment. As such, when he traveled to Japan with a letter of introduction from the Japanese legation, Collbran engaged in negotiations with representatives from the Industrial Bank of Japan and the Mitsui Co., Ltd.⁴⁷ He told them that he believed that the Korean government would not pay the remaining balance of 350,000 won.⁴⁸ Allen had also been skeptical about Kojong's intentions, calling it "a marvel" when Kojong finally paid.⁴⁹ However, this led to the establishment of the American-Korean Electric Company, the successor to the Seoul Electric Company, on July 1, 1904, in Hartford, Connecticut.⁵⁰

Meanwhile, due to these Americans keeping the acquisition of the three concessions secret and even withholding this information from their own government, the Japanese remained unaware of the agreements for some time. Hayashi did not hear of the water contract until May 1904,⁵¹ and he did not report it to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, until June 1904.⁵² It was not until February 1905 that Hayashi himself discovered that a mining contract had been signed between Korea and the U.S.⁵³

⁴⁷ Colbran departed Korea for Japan on March 22 and met with his Japanese counterparts in Tokyo on March 31. Komura Jutarō to Hayashi Gonsuke, telegram no. 331, March 29th, 1904, Records of the Japanese Legation in Korea, vol. 25; Henry Collbran to Hagiwara Moriichi, April, 1, 1904, *Records of the Japanese Legation in Korea*, vol. 25.

⁴⁸ Komura Jutarō to Hayashi Gonsuke, confidential, telegram, no. 33, May 15, 1904, *Records of the Japanese Legation in Korea*, vol. 25.

⁴⁹ Horace N. Allen to James R. Morse, June 7, 1904, Allen Papers.

⁵⁰ Allen to Henry Collbran to [Recipient], May 24, 1905, Allen Papers, R2-B3-08-001.

⁵¹ Hayashi Gonsuke to Komura Jutarō, telegram, no. 453, May 6, 1904 *Records of the Japanese Legation in Korea*, vol. 25.

⁵² Hayashi Gonsuke to Komura Jutarō, telegram no. 546, June 15, 1904, *Records of the Japanese Legation in Korea*, vol. 23; Hagiwara Moriichi to Komura Jutarō, confidential, telegram, no. 62, June 15, 1904, *Records of the Japanese Legation in Korea*, vol. 25. Hayashi became aware of the contract following Allen's objection to the establishment of water works by the Household Department. Kim Heeyeon, "The Seoul Waterworks Concession," 31-34.

⁵³ Hayashi Gonsuke to Komura Jutarō, no. 72, February 23, 1904, *Records of the Japanese Legation in Korea*, vol. 26.

The question persists regarding the rationale behind retroactively dating the waterworks contract to December 9, 1903. Waterworks procurement had been ensured through “reservations” in 1898 and 1900 and the retroactive dating was most probably a ploy to obtain the endorsement of the Minister of the Foreign Office for the contract. Allen knew the significance of the Seal of the Ministry of the Foreign Office, since in 1885, the Korean government had stipulated that all agreements with foreign nations must bear this seal.⁵⁴ If he could attain the seal, it would smooth the process of guaranteeing American interests, regardless of the future direction of Korea. However, the ministry was in a period of flux at the time. Yi Hayōng became acting Minister of Foreign Office on October 5, 1903, but he was succeeded by Yi Chiyong (1870-1928) on December 23, 1903. Then, in March 1904, Cho Pyōngsik (1823-1907) took over, only for Yi Hayōng to be reinstated on April 19 of the same year.⁵⁵ Given that Allen had a close relationship with Yi Hayōng, he would have asked or urged Yi to sign the contract, which was retroactively dated, during Yi’s time in office.

2. The Underlying Motive behind the Deployment of Marines and the Fire in Kyōngun Palace

This section looks at Allen’s request for Marines to guard the U.S. Legation in Seoul⁵⁶ and the theory that the fire in Kyōngun Palace was started to mask Kojong’s escape to the U.S. Legation.⁵⁷ On December 8, 1903, Allen sent a telegram to the State Department asking for the deployment of a warship to safeguard American lives and assets in Korea in the event

⁵⁴ George C. Foulk to Secretary of State Thomas. F. Bayard, August 6, 1885, *diplomatic despatch*, no. 212.

⁵⁵ *Kojong sillok*, 7th year of Kwangmu [1903], October 5 and December 23. See also *Kojong sillok*, 8th year of Kwangmu [1904], March 12 and April 19.

⁵⁶ Horace N. Allen to John Hay, December 8, 1903, telegram received in cipher, *diplomatic despatch*; Horace N. Allen to John Hay, December 9, 1903, *diplomatic despatch*, no. 629.

⁵⁷ Mumm To Bülow, no. 173, May 1, 1904, *Diplomatic Documents of Germany: Korea (1874-1910)*, vol. 11, 228; Saldern to Bülow, K.No.66, May 3, 1904, *Diplomatic Documents of Germany: Korea (1874-1910)*, vol. 11, 254.

that a war broke out between Russia and Japan. He cited the presence of 10,000 “disorderly” Koreans in the capital and emphasized the need for a protective force.⁵⁸ The State Department accepted his request, and Rear Admiral Stirling, temporarily overseeing the Asiatic Fleet, ordered the *Vicksburg* to sail from Shanghai to Chemulp’o. Given the limited Marine contingent aboard the *Vicksburg*, the Americans decided to also deploy a detachment of Marines stationed in the Philippines.⁵⁹

The prevailing view regarding Allen’s request for Marine Corps support posits that he may have exaggerated the severity of the situation in Korea to bolster the case for deploying naval forces. This interpretation suggests that Allen might have seized upon an unsubstantiated rumor as a pretext to mobilize substantial troop reinforcements. He did this as he knew that the presence of U.S. troops would greatly bolster Kojong, who could seek sanctuary in a foreign legation in the event of an emergency.⁶⁰

The problem with this interpretation is that it accepts the date of the contract (December 9, 1903) at face value. However, as previously mentioned, it is probable that this date was retroactively assigned. This inference gains further credence from the fact that by mid-December 1903, Allen anticipated significant gains if the war between Russian and Japan were to ensue.⁶¹ The “disturbances” referenced by Allen as justification for deploying the Marines were not unfounded. Canadian missionaries were also worried by the situation,⁶² while the French minister to Korea

⁵⁸ Horace N. Allen to John Hay, December 8, 1903, telegram received in cipher, Allen Papers; Horace N. Allen to John Hay, December 9, 1903, *diplomatic despatch*, no. 629.

⁵⁹ “Uncle Sam Interested,” Santa Fe New Mexican, December 26, 1903; “Vicksburg Sails For Korea,” *New York Times*, December 27, 1903; “Vicksburg Goes to Korea,” *Madison Daily Leader*, December 28, 1903,.

⁶⁰ Oh, “The Development of the Electricity Industry,” 71-72; _____, *A History of Korea’s Modern Electric Power Industry*, 97-98.

⁶¹ Horace N. Allen to Heinrich Weipert, December 20, 1903, Allen Papers.

⁶² Jordan to the Marquess of Lansdowne, No. 17, January 20, 1904, Enclosure: “Memorandum by Mr. Gale” (January 20, 1904), The National Archives (TNA), FO 405/147,.

feared disturbances were a definite possibility.⁶³ The British minister to Korea reported the arrival of the U.S. Marines and requested a force to protect the legation, and other ministers followed suit.⁶⁴ In fact, every country except Germany and China deployed soldiers from their respective countries.⁶⁵

Out of the 100 U.S. Marines who arrived in January 1904, 36 were accommodated in the U.S. Legation, while the remaining 64 were stationed in the offices of the Seoul Electric Company.⁶⁶ Allen contended that without the immediate presence of the Marines, chaos would have ensued.⁶⁷ During a discussion with an official from the Korean Foreign Office, Allen expressed doubt regarding the reliability of the Korean military. He referred to an incident on September 30, 1903, when Korean soldiers had tried to intervene when an enraged mob attacked a streetcar and attempted to harm Americans, prompting the Japanese Legation to request protection. At the time, Allen had expressed his lack of faith in the ability of the Korean troops to provide an escort for the U.S. Legation.⁶⁸ In 1904, the Minister of Foreign Office, Yi Chiyong, opposed the

⁶³ Fontenay to Delcassé, no. 68, December 24, 1903, *Diplomatic Documents of Modern Korean-French Relations*, vol. 1, ed. Center for Francophone Studies of Sungkyunkwan University, trans. Lee Ji-sun, Bak Gyu-hyeon, Kim Byeong-uk (Seoul: Sönin, 2018), 234-236.

⁶⁴ John N. Jordan to the Marquess of Lansdowne, telegram, no.2, January 2, 1904, *The National Archives* (TNA), FO 405/146; John N. Jordan to the Marquess of Lansdowne, telegram, no. 8, January 8, 1904, *The National Archives* (TNA), FO 405/146..

⁶⁵ Saldern To Bülow, no. 11, February 1, 1904, *Diplomatic Documents of Germany: Korea (1874-1910)*, vol. 11, 213.

⁶⁶ Horace N. Allen to John Hay, January 5, 1904, *diplomatic despatch*, no. 638; Horace N. Allen to John Hay, March 1, 1904, *diplomatic despatch*, no. 687; Burnett, *Korean-American Relations*, vol. 3, 186-187; "Entry of the Captain into Seoul," *Hwangšong Sinmun*, January 5, 1904.

⁶⁷ Horace N. Allen to John Hay, January 14, 1904, *diplomatic despatch*, no. 647; Horace N. Allen to John Hay, January 24, 1904, *diplomatic despatch*, no. 652; Horace N. Allen to John Hay, February 18, *diplomatic despatch*, no. 671; Horace N. Allen to Harry & Maurice Allen, January 24, 1904, Allen Papers.

⁶⁸ "Questions of the Foreign Office, verbal, and verbal replies, written down by the U.S. Minister on January 4, 1904, in connection with dispatch of January 3 regarding Marine Guard." 奎23249; *Old Korean Diplomatic Documents: Correspondences with America* 3, no. 2839, Gordon Paddock to Yi Chunga, October 1, 1903, 508.

dispatch of the U.S. Marines.⁶⁹ Allen was under the belief that the Ministry of Foreign Office was being instigated by Yi Yongik.⁷⁰ He wrote, “Now I am having all sorts of impudence from the Foreign Office which is in the hands of haters of the ‘American party.’”⁷¹ This suggests that there was unresolved conflict between Allen and the Korean government.

In fact, German diplomats were also suspicious regarding the arrival of the U.S. Marines, suspecting that it was related to the evacuation of Kojong. Following a fire at Kyōngun Palace on April 14, 1904, Alfons Mumm von Schwarzenstein, the German minister to Qing China, suggested that Kojong had orchestrated the fire as a pretext to seek sanctuary within the U.S. Legation,⁷² an assertion that was quickly refuted by Conrad von Saldern, the German minister to Korea:

Regarding the dispatch dated the 3rd of this month concerning the origin of the fire at the Emperor’s palace, it is apparent that it relies on confidential intelligence from the Russian Minister to Korea, forwarded to Peking. It comprises unidentified terms procured by the Acting French Minister to Korea. While I acknowledge the perspectives of the Acting French Minister, they appear to be grounded solely in deductive reasoning, which tends to embellish raw facts in a distinctly French fashion. The contention made by the French is contradicted by the actual destruction of significant valuables in the fire. I can confirm that the belongings, valued at 500,000 won, of Lady Ŏm, the consort of Kojong, or the Emperor’s spouse was indeed consumed by the flames. Furthermore, it

⁶⁹ Horace N. Allen to Yi Chiyong, January 4, 1904, *Old Korean Diplomatic Documents: Correspondences with America*, vol. 3, no. 2889; Yi Chiyong to Horace N. Allen, January 4, 1904, *Old Korean Diplomatic Documents: Correspondences with America*, vol. 3, no. 2890; Horace N. Allen to Yi Chiyong, January 5, 1904, *Old Korean Diplomatic Documents: Correspondences with America*, vol. 3, no. 2891, 537-540.

⁷⁰ Horace N. Allen to John Hay, January 5, 1904, *diplomatic despatch*, no. 638.

⁷¹ Horace N. Allen to James R. Morse, January 27, 1904, Allen Papers.

⁷² Mumm to Bülow, no. 173, May 1, 1904, *Diplomatic Documents of Germany: Korea (1874-1910)*, vol. 11, 228; Saldern to Bülow, K.No.66, May 3, 1904, *Diplomatic Documents of Germany: Korea (1874-1910)*, vol. 11, 254.

is known that the wind blew in the direction of the building where the Emperor currently resides and towards the American Legation on that fateful night, posing a threat to these structures. It seems improbable that the Emperor would willingly endanger the place he sought refuge in. It is conceivable that several months ago, in January and February, the Americans devised ambitious plans of such nature. This possibility is not implausible at all. The rationale behind this speculation stems from the perplexity surrounding the sudden deployment of a garrison of 200 soldiers into the otherwise tranquil city of Seoul by the Americans.⁷³

While Saldern dismissed the notion of the fire being deliberate, he confirmed the possibility that the Americans might have attempted to evacuate Kojong in January or February. This was based on Allen's 'dubious' request for the support of U.S. Marines. The fire at Kyōngun Palace was actually sparked by a misfire during the repair of the *ondol* in Hamnyōng Hall (咸寧殿),⁷⁴ which in turn almost destroyed the imperial palace.⁷⁵

The outbreak of the fire provided a pretext for Kojong to seek refuge in Chungmyōng Hall (重明殿), which was adjacent to the U.S. Legation in Seoul. Allen was uncomfortable with the proximity of Kojong to the Legation, remarking, "It looks as if I had stolen the 'Queen Bee.'"⁷⁶ The Japanese minister to Korea made considerable efforts to persuade Kojong to relocate to Ch'angdōk Palace on the east side of Seoul; however, Kojong refused.⁷⁷ Hayashi had made this request due to the close

⁷³ Saldern to Bülow, no. 66, June 1, 1904, *Diplomatic Documents of Germany: Korea (1874-1910)*, vol. 11, 255.

⁷⁴ Hayashi Gonsuke to Komura Jutarō, telegram, no. 382, April 15, 1904, *Records of the Japanese Legation in Korea*, vol. 23; Chōng Kyo, *Taeahan kyenyoŋsa*, vol. 7, trans. Byun Ju-seung. (Seoul: Somyōng, 2004), 75. Hwang Hyeon, *Maecheon yarok*, vol. 2, trans. Im Hyeongtaek et al. (Seoul: Munhak kwa chisōng, 2005), 168; Yun Ch'ihō, *Yun Ch'ihō's English Diaries*, vol. 5, April 15, 1904, 19-20.

⁷⁵ Kim Heeyeon, "The Seoul Waterworks Concession," 32.

⁷⁶ Horace N. Allen to David J. Hill, April 17, 1904, Allen Papers, R4-L7-13-038; Horace N. Allen to Horace Lee Washington, April 17, 1904, Allen Papers, R4-L7-13-039; Horace N. Allen to A. Dufour, April 17, 1904, Allen Papers, R4-L7-13-040.

⁷⁷ Saldern to Bülow, no. 27, strictly confidential, April 20, 1904, *Diplomatic Documents of Ger-*




Figure 1. The Locations of the American Legation in Seoul and Chungmyŏng Hall (重明殿) Horace N. Allen to John Hay, diplomatic despatch, no. 724, April 22, 1904, "Reduction of Marine Guard/Residence of Emperor adjoining Legation," Enclosure 2

proximity of Chungmyŏng Hall to the U.S. Legation.⁷⁸ However, Allen was intent on not politicizing the situation.⁷⁹ To avoid the perception that the U.S. Legation was guarding Kojong, he arranged for 75 of the 100 marines to be dispatched elsewhere.⁸⁰

many: Korea (1874-1910), vol. 11, 222.

⁷⁸ Saldern to Bülow, no. 55, May 18, 1904, *Diplomatic Documents of Germany: Korea (1874-1910)*, vol. 11, 249.

⁷⁹ Horace N. Allen to Henry T. Allen, April 17, 1904, Allen Papers; Horace N. Allen to William W. Rockhill, April 19, 1904, Allen Papers; Horace N. Allen to Edward T. Miller, June 7, 1904, Allen Papers; Horace N. Allen to James R. Morse, June 7, 1904, Allen Papers.

⁸⁰ Horace N. Allen to Jennie, Georgia, and Heber Allen, April 23, 1904, Allen Papers; Horace N. Allen to C. S. Sperry, April 23, 1904, Allen Papers; Hayashi Gonsuke to Komura Jutarō, telegram, no. 419, April 23, 1904, *Records of the Japanese Legation in Korea*, vol. 25.

In fact, Allen did not bring the U.S. Marines in to help Kojong escape to the U.S. Legation. He had been reprimanded in October 1903 by John Hay, the secretary of state, who told him, “Be careful about expressing yourself on public matters as in recent interviews,” after a meeting Allen had with President Roosevelt.⁸¹ In addition, on three occasions after 1904, he informed the State Department of requests by Kojong for asylum at the U.S. Legation while highlighting the fact that there were considerable objections to Kojong’s residence being so close to it.⁸² Additionally, Allen declined Kojong’s request to retain the 300,000 won.⁸³ The last of these requests was in January 1905.

I shall not allow anything of the kind [Kojong’s flight to the Russian Legation] to take place in connection with this Legation, and should the Emperor scale the wall into this compound, I would have to ask him to withdraw and the Japanese would probably, in that event, take him to one of the distant palaces. All of which I fully explained to the messenger of the Emperor today.⁸⁴

Kojong had briefly fled to the Russian Legation in 1896 and the Japanese were concerned that he might attempt another escape. Hayashi was also aware of a plan to relocate Kojong to the French mission, a plan orchestrated by Yi Yongik, Hyŏn Sanggŏn, and other figures,⁸⁵ and it was, in fact, the French Legation that was actively facilitating negotia-

⁸¹ John Hay to Horace N. Allen, “Diplomatic Instruction,” October 28, 1903, telegram received in cipher, Allen Papers; Horace N. Allen, *Allen ūi ilgi: kuhanmal kyŏktonggi pisa*, trans. Kim Won Mo (Seoul: Tan’guk taehakkyo ch’ulp’anbu, 1991), 296.

⁸² Horace N. Allen to John Hay, January 2, 1904, diplomatic despatch, no. 636; Horace N. Allen to John Hay, February 21, 1904, *diplomatic despatch*, no. 673; Horace N. Allen to John Hay, confidential, January 19, 1905, diplomatic despatch, no. 863; Burnett, *Korean-American Relations*, vol.3, 107, 117, 190.

⁸³ Horace N. Allen to James R. Morse, September 30, 1904, Allen Papers.

⁸⁴ Horace N. Allen to John Hay, January 19, 1905, *diplomatic despatch*, no. 863.

⁸⁵ Wada Haruki, *The Russo-Japanese War: the Origin and Outbreak*, vol.2, 1111-1112; Suh, *Taehan cheguk chŏngchi sa yŏngu*, 190.

tions for Kojong's evacuation.

It is improbable that Allen would have sanctioned an evacuation of Kojong to the U.S. Legation. His predecessor, John M. B. Sill (1831-1901) was dismissed for providing shelter to Koreans, and Allen was confident that the State Department had no intention of intervening in Korean affairs. Allen himself had refused a previous request from Kojong for shelter at the U.S. Legation before his flight to the Russian Legation in 1896.⁸⁶ Furthermore, Allen was preoccupied with refuting "Pro-Russia and Anti-Japanese" accusations against him at the time.⁸⁷

If Allen indeed sought to exaggerate the crisis to justify the deployment of the U.S. Marines in Korea, his objective may have been to exert pressure on Korea to open up Ŭiju and address the debt dispute.⁸⁸ This is given some credence by his insistence on establishing a naval base at Chinhae Bay to resolve the debt dispute. Nonetheless, the remaining Marines stayed in Seoul even after the withdrawal of British troops from the British Legation in June 1905, leaving the U.S. as the sole foreign legation in Seoul responsible for its own security.⁸⁹ In addition, Kojong continued to stay at Chungmyŏng Hall until the signing of the Korea-Japan Treaty of 1905 on November 17, 1905. The German minister to Korea summed up the situation as follows:

Among all the white [western] representatives present, those from America wield the most significant influence. American missionaries are dispersed throughout the country, and the American settlements, predominantly inhabited by missionaries, are plentiful. The imperialistic agenda of the United States is also evident in this context and is likely

⁸⁶ Kato Musuo to Ōkuma Shigenobu, confidential, no. 27, May 20, 1897, *Records of the Japanese Legation in Korea*, vol. 11.

⁸⁷ Kim Heeyeon, "Dismissal of U.S. Minister Horace N. Allen," 146-150.

⁸⁸ Harrington also indicated that Allen "called up several score marines ... to deal with the refractory Ye Yong Ik" and "most of the men were quartered on street-car property." Harrington, *God, Mammon, and the Japanese*, 190.

⁸⁹ Hayashi Gonsuke to Komura Jutarō, no. 232, June 21, 1905, *Records of the Japanese Legation in Korea*, vol. 26.

to gain further prominence once the current upheaval subsides. The American Minister to Korea has fulfilled the role of missionary physician in Korea for over twenty years, enjoying the trust of the Korean emperor. He is highly capable and reliable, deserving of the emperor's [Kojong's] trust. On the evening when the Korean imperial palace was engulfed in flames, the emperor [Kojong] sought refuge in a residence adjacent to the American legation, where he has resided ever since. Opposite this improvised imperial residence lies a parcel of land owned by an American missionary. Arrangements were made by the Korean emperor for its acquisition. Still, the premises are still occupied by the American legation guard, with the American flag proudly displayed. This situation was regarded as a source of irritation by the Japanese who made every effort to prevent the Korean monarch from falling under American influence.⁹⁰

It was evident to external observers that American soldiers were accompanying Kojong. This may have given Kojong the impression that he was under the protection of the United States.⁹¹ Following Allen's departure in June 1905, the Marines continued to protect the U. S. Legation until October, just prior to the conclusion of the Korea-Japan Treaty of 1905.⁹² The presence of the Marines probably encouraged external observers to believe that they were protecting Kojong and possibly led Ko-

⁹⁰ Saldern to Bülow, K.No.5, January 10, 1905, *Diplomatic Documents of Germany: Korea (1874-1910)*, vol. 11, 312.

⁹¹ Edwin V. Morgan asked Admiral Train, Commander of the Asiatic Fleet, to dispatch one of his vessels to retrieve the detachment of U.S. Marines. Morgan was wary that "the retention of the guard at the present juncture might also be construed to have a political significance." He also indicated that "the proximity of the guard has tended to encourage His Majesty [Emperor Kojong] in a belief ... that the American detachment is stationed in Seoul and housed virtually within the Palace walls for his personal protection, an impression which is as unfortunate as it is unfounded." Edwin V. Morgan to Elihu Root, *diplomatic dispatch*, no. 21, October 17, 1905; Burnett, *Korean-American Relations*, vol. 3, 146.

⁹² Edwin V. Morgan to Elihu Root, *diplomatic dispatch*, no. 16, September 15, 1905; Edwin V. Morgan to Elihu Root, *diplomatic dispatch*, no. 21, October 17, 1905; Burnett, *Korean-American Relations*, vol. 3, 146.

jong to believe this as well.

3. Ties between Collbran & Bostwick and Allen

Suspicious of ties between Allen and C&B were raised by some of Allen's American partners. Both Raymond Krumm and Leigh Hunt had been assisted by Allen during his time at the U.S. Legation. Allen believed that his removal stemmed from his challenge to the president, the allegations made by Hunt and Krumm, and the political lobbying of his former secretary and successor, Edwin V. Morgan (1865-1834).⁹³ On August 27, 1904, Hunt, the proprietor of the Unsan Gold Mine and manager of OCMC (Oriental Consolidated Mining Company), opposed the favoritism shown to Collbran by the Korean government.⁹⁴ The State Department immediately demanded an explanation from Allen.⁹⁵ According to Collbran, Hunt's accusations were threefold: first, that Collbran had acquired his interests improperly during the Russo-Japanese War; second, that he was not a U.S. citizen⁹⁶ and thus the State Department's involvement is not necessary in this case; and finally, that C&B and Allen had questionable financial connections. Allen responded to these allegations in October 1904.

These matters [concessions recently secured by C&B] were not new and while their settlement was undoubtedly hastened by the approach of the present war, they would have had to be settled had the war not

⁹³ Horace N. Allen to Henry Collbran, May 1, 1905, Allen Papers.

⁹⁴ Hunt also apprised Henry W. Denison, general counsel of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, regarding Collbran's mining investments. Horace N. Allen, "Narrative of Facts Regarding Development of Korean Enterprises," n.d., Allen Papers; Harrington, *God, Mammon, and the Japanese*, 199.

⁹⁵ Alvey A. Adeo to Horace N. Allen, September 1, 1904, *diplomatic instruction*, no. 274.

⁹⁶ Henry Collbran held American citizenship through naturalization. However, his mining enterprise in Korea (OCMC) was not solely American financed. Reports indicated that "considerable British capital was invested in the American ventures by prominent South African magnates," leading to the characterization of the company as an Anglo-American endeavor, albeit registered as an American corporation. "American Gold Mining Interests in Korea," *Arizona Silver Belt*, January 14, 1904.

taken place. Further, the Japanese Authorities know fully of these matters, have copies of the documents, and are likely to become interested financially, in the resulting companies. They have made no objections whatever to these settlements. ... The Koreans, high and low, seem to make no complaint regarding these new acquisitions by the Americans, but seem rather to wish that we would take a greater interest in these matters and acquire other interests, possibly as an offset to the Japanese. ... These concessions cannot but tend greatly to the development of American commercial interests in this land, since every such company constitutes a center for the introduction of "American capital." ... I cannot well conceive therefore of the American Government looking with disfavor upon other Americans acquiring similar large interests in this land where we enjoy the unique advantage of leading in large commercial undertakings."⁹⁷

Allen believed that Hunt harbored resentment against him. In 1899 and 1900, Hunt applied for a monopoly of all the household mines in Korea, but he failed to receive the concession and left Korea. Allen pointed out that "had Hunt remained in Korea as did Collbran and Bostwick, he might have secured at least a part of this."⁹⁸ In 1903, Hunt visited Allen in Geneva and tried to get him to refine support to Collbran and Bostwick. However, Allen assured him he was only doing his official duty and would be obliged to do the same for any American.⁹⁹

Hunt and Allen found themselves in conflict on numerous occasions. In 1896, following the completion of negotiations for the Seoul-Chemulp'o Railway and Unsan Gold Mine, Hunt proposed that Allen grant John M. B. Sill, the U.S. minister to Korea at the time, a share in

⁹⁷ Horace N. Allen to John Hay, October 4, 1904, *diplomatic despatch*, no. 800.

⁹⁸ Horace N. Allen to Clayton W. Everett, September 3, 1904, Allen Papers; Horace N. Allen to Henry Collbran, April 18, 1905, Allen Papers; Horace N. Allen to James R. Morse, April 26, 1905, Allen Papers.

⁹⁹ Horace N. Allen, *Allen ūi ilgi*, 269-270; Henry Collbran, May 24, 1905, Allen Papers, R2-B3-08-001.

the company. He insisted that Allen personally correspond with him, a request Allen deemed unnecessary.¹⁰⁰ In 1901, Allen was forced to deny rumors that he had spoken disparagingly of Hunt, particularly regarding Hunt's purported "fabulous wealth extracted from Korea" and his indulgence in "high-stakes gambling."¹⁰¹ In 1902, when Allen requested materials for a report on the management situation of the mining company in Unsan (Oriental Consolidated Mining Company), Hunt refused. Furthermore, he prevented Allen from compiling any report on the mines, accusing the government of interfering in his business affairs.¹⁰²

Raymond Krumm, a former engineer in the Board of Survey for the Korean government, also accused Allen of unlawful activities.¹⁰³ He alleged that Allen had engaged in fraudulent interference with C&B's business operations and amassed substantial profits through manipulative concession contract and real estate dealings. He also claimed that Allen was responsible for the fire that had engulfed Seoul Electric Company's Chongno Office, where crucial documents pertinent to debt disputes were housed, as well as the untimely demise of a Korean government official, Yi Ch'ae-yŏn. Krumm recommended that Allen be recalled to the United States in light of escalating anti-American sentiment within Korea,¹⁰⁴ highlighting the intense animosity towards Allen, contractors, and Americans among Koreans.¹⁰⁵ In response to a State Department follow up on the allegations, Allen questioned Krumm's character and high-

¹⁰⁰ Horace N. Allen to James R. Morse, May 9, 1896, Allen Papers.

¹⁰¹ Horace N. Allen to Leigh S. J. Hunt, February 19, 1901, Allen Papers.

¹⁰² Horace N. Allen to Harry. F. Meserve, November 3, 1902, Allen Papers.

¹⁰³ Horace N. Allen, *Allen ūi ilgi*, 288; Raymond E. L. Krumm to John M. Hay, April 21, 1904, Allen Papers; Horace N. Allen to John M. Hay, June 13, 1904, Allen Papers; Horace N. Allen to James R. Morse, July 28, 1904.4, Allen Papers.

¹⁰⁴ Allen and Sands suspected that Yi Yongik might have been involved in the sudden demise of Yi Ch'ae-yŏn. Horace N. Allen to William W. Rockhill, January 4, 1904, Allen Papers; William F. Sands, 1930, *Undiplomatic Memories: The Far East 1896-1904*, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 126-127.

¹⁰⁵ Horace N. Allen to John Hay, June 13, 1904, *diplomatic despatch*, no. 758; Horace N. Allen to John M. Hay, June 13, 1904, Allen Papers.

lighted his assault on a Korean Board of Survey member and his menacing behavior towards Deshler, an American entrepreneur.¹⁰⁶ The complaint was ultimately dismissed.¹⁰⁷

Krumm's allegations against Allen were documented in a Japanese publication that was disseminated in diplomatic circles in Seoul at the time. The newspaper in question, *the Japan Daily Advertiser*, published in Yokohama, alluded that approximately 630,000 won belonging to the Seoul Electric Company was unaccounted for, prompting President Roosevelt to ask Allen for an explanation. Hagiwara Moriichi (1868-1911), the acting Japanese minister to Korea, remarked that the incident had gained attraction in Korean newspapers, with reports detailing Krumm's allegations against Allen.¹⁰⁸ Durham Durham W. Stevens, the foreign adviser to Kojong, apprised Allen of the rumor with a comment that the rumor was immediately refuted.¹⁰⁹ The State Department disregarded Krumm's allegations, while Allen remarked, "no decent paper seems to have published it."¹¹⁰

In response to allegations that he was not American, Collbran pointed out that he had completed his naturalization long before the dispute arose. He presented his Final Certificate of Naturalization, dated

¹⁰⁶ In his correspondence to Secretary of State John M. Hay, Krumm misrepresented himself as being "employed by the Koreans," a claim which was unsubstantiated. His contract, due to expire on August 31, 1903, was brought to Allen's attention by Yi Hayōng, then minister for foreign affairs, in April 1903. Yi informed Allen that the Korean government had no intention of extending Krumm's contract, thus indicating his imminent dismissal upon its expiration. Horace N. Allen to John Hay, May 20, 1902, diplomatic despatch, no. 462; Horace N. Allen to John Hay, December 2, 1902 *diplomatic despatch*, no. 545.

¹⁰⁷ Francis B. Loomis to Horace N. Allen, October 11, 1905, Allen Papers, R1-B1-02-008. Francis B. Loomis, the U.S. assistant secretary of state, became acting secretary of state after the death of John Hay on July 1, 1905.

¹⁰⁸ Hagiwara Moriichi to Komura Jutarō, confidential, no. 212, October 21, 1905, *Records of the Japanese Legation in Korea*, vol. 25.

¹⁰⁹ Durham W. Stevens to Horace Allen, October 26, 1905, Allen Papers.

¹¹⁰ Horace N. Allen to Wayne MacVeagh, October 19, 1905, Allen Papers. Still, Krumm continued to level accusations. Charles A. Towne, June 19, 1906, Allen Papers; Wayne MacVeagh to Horace N. Allen, June 27, 1906, Allen Papers; Horace N. Allen to Wayne MacVeagh, July 2, 1906, Allen Papers.

June 20, 1891. In addition, he argued that there were no “applications, negotiations, or manipulations of any kind.” He claimed that the concession was voluntarily “offered” by the Korean government.¹¹¹

Even though Allen and Collbran refuted the accusations, their arrangement was not entirely above board. Although Allen might not have possessed a direct interest in the enterprise, he anticipated an honorarium for his endeavors, akin to his compensation for brokering the Seoul-Chemulp’o Railway concession for James R. Morse and the Unsan gold mining concession for Hunt.¹¹² Collbran & Bostwick also loaned Allen 40,000 won against his Chemulp’o villa, a property he was unable to sell before his return home.¹¹³ In addition, Allen continued to advocate to the State Department for the reconstruction of the Legation, and he procured a cost estimate from C&B for the work.¹¹⁴ If Congress had not overruled him, Allen would likely have awarded the \$50,000 job to C&B. He also urged Collbran to petition the president and vice president to retain him as the U.S. minister to Korea.¹¹⁵ When Harry R. Bostwick learned of Allen’s dismissal, he offered a number of possible strategies to help Allen retain his position.¹¹⁶ In essence, the relationship between Allen and

¹¹¹ Henry Collbran, May 24, 1905, Allen Papers, R2-B3-08-001.

¹¹² In October 1901, Collbran & Bostwick offered Allen one third of their profits from the Seoul water-works concession if he succeeded in securing it. Allen did not accept the offer outright; however, he anticipated accepting an honorarium from them upon successful conclusion of the matter. Horace N. Allen, “Memorandum,” October 1, 1901, Allen Papers. In May 1905, in a letter addressed to his brother-in-law Everett, Allen stated, “I had some money from Morse, Hunt and Fassett and will now expect eventually to have some from the other firm.” Horace N. Allen to Clayton W. Everett, May 2, 1905, Allen Papers.

¹¹³ Lee Yeong-mi, 2018, “Horace N. Allen’s Summer Place: Plan, Building, and Proposal, 1897-1905,” *Journal of Incheon Studies* 29; Horace N. Allen to Collbran & Bostwick, May 24, 1905, Allen Papers. Essentially, Allen had divested himself of ownership of the villa to them. Horace N. Allen to Walter D. Townsend, May 25, 1905, Allen Papers.

¹¹⁴ Horace N. Allen to Edwin V. Morgan, October 5, 1902, Allen Papers; Horace N. Allen to John Hay, April 6, 1903, *diplomatic despatch*, no. 596.

¹¹⁵ Horace N. Allen to Henry Collbran, December 26, 1904.

¹¹⁶ In an effort to retain Allen in office, Bostwick proposed several strategies, including cabling Morse for assistance, asking Yi Hayōng and others to request a cable be sent to Washington in Kojong’s name, and organizing a petition among American residents in Seoul to present to the

C&B was one of mutual vested interest.¹¹⁷

Conclusion

The triple concessions granted by Kojong to American businessman shortly after the onset of the Russo-Japanese War symbolize the final phase of U.S.-Korean relations, just before Korea became a Japanese protectorate. Kojong ended a long-standing debt dispute and made a conciliatory gesture to the American entrepreneurs. He also took refuge in the vicinity of the U.S. Legation, which was guarded by U.S. Marines, creating the impression of his being protected by America. Allen, however, was thoroughly preparing for Korea's imminent change, by using the title of 'official representative of the U.S. government in Korea', instead of 'minister', in the concession contract, so that the American interests would be protected properly.

The triple concessions met with considerable suspicion. Speculation arose regarding the retroactive dating of the contract, Kojong having orchestrated a palace fire as a pretext for his escape to the U.S. Legation, and the alleged connections between C&B and Allen. In this paper, I have looked at the probability of the contract being retroactively dated. I have also argued that Allen was not involved in a plot to evacuate Kojong to the American Legation. However, I have also revealed that despite their denials, Allen and Collbran shared common interests. Meanwhile, the very people Allen had helped charged him with regard to the concessions. This suggests that it is important to look at the clash of personal interests and the competition between individuals, as well as competition among nations, to understand this period.

 U.S. president. Harry R. Bostwick to Horace N. Allen, March 20, 1905, Allen Papers.

¹¹⁷ After Allen became U.S. minister to Korea, Collbran wanted to grant Allen a stake in the Street Railway. However, Allen declined, instead urging Collbran to compensate Deshler, who had played a pivotal role in Allen's promotion. Despite never accepting any remuneration, this interaction constituted a form of transaction between Allen and Collbran. Horace N. Allen to James R. Morse, April 26, 1905, Allen Papers.

In this light, this article offers a fresh perspective on how power relations in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, including the 1905 Korea-Japan Treaty, shaped Allen's role as a mediator between Korea and the United States. This complex interplay of power dynamics also influenced the relationship between the two countries, with Allen at times pursuing an independent course to further his own ambitions. He may have gone against his own government's policies and circumvented legal constraints. Yet did his step ultimately contribute to Korea's independence? Rather, we should look at the ways in which he learned to recognize the differences between the two countries and deploy them to his advantage.

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Russian Minister of Finance Vladimir Kokovtsov and Korean Patriot Ahn Chunggün in Harbin (1906-1909)*

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Introduction

Minister of Finance Kokovtsov, witnessing Ahn Chunggün (1879-1910)'s assassination of Ito Hirobumi on October 26, 1909 during his tour of the Far East, took the lead in handling the precarious situation after Ito's death in Harbin. Kokovtsov's primary concern in the recovery process was the reaction of the Japanese government and the media for he wanted to ensure that the assassination would not deteriorate the Russo-Japanese relations or spark any conflict. Accordingly, Minister of Finance Vladimir Kokovtsov (1853-1943) decided to hand over jurisdiction over Ahn Chunggün to Japan when he was found to be Korean during the interrogation, and allowed the Japanese consul in Harbin to search Korean residences in Harbin in the presence of the Russian police.

It is noteworthy that there were internal complaints about the way he handled the political context of Ahn Chunggün's case according to the political climate of the day. Kokovtsov informed the Foreign Ministry that he had the consent of the Frontier Prosecutor of the local jurisdiction

* This translated article is a reviewed and supplemented version of Deokkyoo Choi, 「러일전쟁 이후 러시아 극동의 방위계획과 재무상과 육군상의 정책대립 - 안중근의 하얼빈의거와 관련하여 -」, 『군사』 120 (September, 2021): 131-171.

in turning Ahn Chunggŭn over to the Japanese authorities. In contrast, the district prosecutor, K. Miller (К. Миллер, ?-?), intuitively realizing that this case was not an accidental incident but a premeditated plot, talked about the practical way to solve the matter in Russia. As for him, it is fair for the Russian authorities, equipped with its local police force in the region, to handle the investigation and trial.

What, then, made Kokovtsev rush to transfer jurisdiction over Ahn Chunggŭn to Japan rather than resolve the case through the normal legal process? The answer has much to do with Russia's shift toward a cooperative diplomacy with Japan in earnest after the Russo-Japanese War. It means that the changing stance of Russia was closely tied to the fact that the post-war shift in its foreign policy from East Asia to Europe placed less weight to the defense of the Far East as the second best plan. This is why the Russian government planned to rebuild the Baltic Fleet, which was destroyed in the Battle of Tsushima (1905) in East Asia, but had no plan for the reconstruction of the Pacific Fleet.¹

Russia's return to the European diplomacy was driven by the financial crisis that the Tsarist government had to face after the Russo-Japanese War. Foreign loans were the prescription to recover the financial crisis of the Tsarist government in the wake of defeat and revolution. France and Great Britain were the main providers of loans to Russia. They did not want Russia to collapse because they wanted to keep the German Empire, which had emerged as a rising imperialist power, in check. Therefore, the Anglo-French Entente in 1904, concluded between Russia's ally France and Japan's ally Britain, and the Triple Entente in 1907, a tripartite treaty adding Russia to the former entente, were part of the construction of the Anti-German Defense Network.

After the Russo-Japanese War, French and British loans became the foundation of Russia's defense rebuilding. The heavy dependence on Anglo-French loans made it difficult for Russia to divert these resources away from Europe to the Far East in the reconstruction of national de-

¹ Щацилло К.Ф. 2000, От Портмутского мира к Первой мировой войне, М, С.95-101.

fense. In order to reassure Anglo-French investors of an economic normalization, Russia had to build up its defense capabilities in Europe while the defense of the Far East had to be addressed through diplomatic compromises with Japan. As a result, the Korean independence movement, centered on Vladivostok after the Russo-Japanese War, was also influenced by the postwar policy of Russia to Japan.

Research on Ahn Chunggün in Korea has developed both quantitatively and qualitatively since liberation to the extent of publishing about 450 academic papers by 2019, and can be characterized as follows. One focuses on Ahn's personal heroic narrative, including his ideas (East Asian Peace Thesis), religion, and court struggles while the other deals with his assassination from the perspective of the anti-Japanese independence movement.² Both of the research orientations have helped to broaden and deepen the scope of studies on Ahn Chunggün whereas it has also revealed the imbalance in the references by relying on Korean and Japanese sources. Therefore, taking the study of Ahn Chunggün to the next level does require a more macro-level and international approach to Ahn's assassination.

This study examines Ahn's assassination in terms of changes in Russia's Far Eastern defense plans after the Russo-Japanese War. I utilize the archives of the Russian Historical Archive (РГИА) that keeps written materials related to Kokovtsov's visit to the Far East.³ These sources enabled me to understand how Korean patriot—Ahn— and Russian and Japanese politicians—Kokovtsov and Ito— came to meet in Harbin and the impact the encounter had on the Korean independence movement in Russian Far East.

² Cho Kwang, 2020, "Current Status and Issues of Recent Research on Ahn Chunggün (2010-2019)," in *Revisiting the March 1 Movement and the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea III - Ahn Jung-geun's Oriental Pacifism*, Northeast Asia History Foundation, 12-36. In the last decade, the topic that has generated the most research on Ahn Chunggün has been his "East Asian Peace Thesis." While more than 200 research papers on Ahn Chunggün were published from the time of liberation until 2009, the last decade from 2009 to 2019 has seen another remarkable quantitative growth with more than 150 research papers. This was due to the 100th anniversary of Ahn Chunggün's birth in 2009 and the 100th anniversary of his demise in 2010.

³ The Russian State Historical Archive (Российский Государственный Исторический Архив: РГИА) Document Group (Фонд) No. 560 and Document Files (Дело) No. 416-424 were utilized.

Russia's Fiscal Crisis and Reorientation of Foreign Policy after the Russo-Japanese War

In the fall of 1909, Russian Minister of Finance Kokovtsov visited the Far East to assess the status of defense rebuilding, remaining at a standstill since the Russo-Japanese War, in the Russian Far East. The visitation was prompted not only by the memorial to the Tzar presented by the Minister of War regarding a significantly tightened budget for the defense reconstruction of the Far East, but also the petition by the Priamursky Governor General regarding the fortification of Vladivostok. Kokovtsov was entitled to identify the reasons for the stagnation of defense reconstruction in the Far East and offer some practical solutions to the military issue in the region.

Since the Russo-Japanese War, Russia's foreign policy had been characterized by a shift of its interest from East Asia to Europe. Why did Russia fail to pay attention to rebuilding its defense forces in the Far East after the Russo-Japanese War? This situation was closely tied to the way the Tsarist government overcame the postwar financial crisis through the French and British loans (1906) after the Russo-Japanese War and the Russian Revolution of 1905. It was difficult for Russia to devote the funds received from France and Britain to the defense of the Far East far from the Anglo-French interest.

The reason France and Britain supported the defeated Russians was to prepare for a competition for European hegemony with the emerging German Empire. France, allied with Russia, feared that Germany would be the sole beneficiary of Russia's chaos and decline. Although France had gained British recognition of Morocco as a sovereign power in 1904, Germany's Wilhelm II took advantage of Russia's defeat in Manchuria and intervened in Morocco. The decline of its ally, Russia created a very awkward situation for France when Germany demanded an equal opportunity for all nations in Morocco. Although the Foreign Minister Théophile Delcassé tried to convince his ministers that Germany would not invade because it would have to go to war with Britain as well as France, French Prime Minister Maurice Rouvier disagreed on the optimistic sce-

nario. Instead, “[T]he British fleet does not have the wheels to come to the rescue of Paris,” the prime minister argued.⁴

The correlation between the Moroccan Crisis in 1905 and 1906 and the Battle of Mukden in 1905 in the Russo-Japanese War starkly illustrated the impact of Russia’s defeat on foreign relations in Europe. The Moroccan Crisis was being resolved through an international conference in June, 1905 under German leadership and this diplomatic climate foretold a nexus between a Russia’s defeat in the Russo-Japanese War and a losing position of France in Europe.⁵ In fact, the decision to convene an international conference in Algeciras, Spain— Algeciras Conference in January, 1906— to discuss the Moroccan Crisis represented a diplomatic defeat of France.⁶

The aftermath of Russia’s defeat was not limited to the weakening of France’s position in Europe. Britain had to make plans to send troops to France in the event of a German attack. From the beginning of the winter in 1905, the British General Staff planned for British troops to land on the European continent and operate jointly with the French Army if Germany violated Belgium’s neutrality.⁷ France, realizing that support from Russia was not possible in the midst of the revolution, was also forced to respond to the British Army’s plan for military cooperation. Britain’s abandonment of its traditional emphasis on naval warfare and

⁴ Кузенцова О.Н. Дальний Восток и развитие русско-французских отношений в 1902 -1905 гг. С.42.

⁵ John C.G.Röhl, *Wilhelm II Into the Abyss of War and Exile, 1900-1941*, 418-436. The International Conference in Algeciras, Spain was held to resolve the First Moroccan Crisis in 1905. Since the crisis began when Germany opposed France’s expansionist policy to protect the independent nation of Morocco, it was expected to weaken the cohesion of Anglo-French negotiations. However, the meeting of 14 countries (Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, Italy, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, the Ottoman Turks, and Morocco) resulted in Germany’s diplomatic isolation. At that time, Russia actively supported France.

⁶ Olga Crisp, 1961, The Russian Liberals and the 1906 Anglo-French Loan to Russia, *The Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol.39, No. 93, 506.

⁷ William J. Philpott, October 2013, The Making of the Military Entente, 1904-1914: France, the British Army, and the Prospect of War, *The English Historical Review*, Vol.128, No.534, 1155-1156.

the deployment of the British Expeditionary Force to continental Europe paradoxically motivated France and Britain to become the most active partners in Russia's postwar recovery. In consequence, Russia's defense rebuilding after the Russo-Japanese War was interlocked with the scale of French and British financial assistance to Russia.

French and British loans to Russia were a crucial way to revitalize the defeated country but their availability came in step with the outcome of the Algiers Conference. Why? It is the Algeciras Conference that came to determine, on top of the introduction of the loans, whether the postwar Russian foreign policy keeps the pro-French position or turns to a pro-German approach.

The tasks of international borrowing and strong support for France fell to former Minister of Finance Kokovtsov. He was recommended by Sergei Witte (1849-1915),⁸ who took the lead in the Siberian Railroad Project and served as plenipotentiary at the Treaty of Portsmouth. Thus, Kokovtsov, dispatched as a reliever, must contrive to introduce the foreign loans and resuscitate his country.

Prior to his departure for France, Kokovtsev was granted an audience with Emperor Nikolai II who ordered Kokovtsev to inform France of Russia's financial condition where Russian will definitely fall down without loan from France. Kokovtsev was also directed to imply Russian support at the Algeciras conference on the Moroccan question.⁹ Thus, carrying with him the leverage of Russia's support for France in the Moroccan question, Kokovtsev departed for Paris on December 30, 1905, to negotiate the loan.

The meeting at the Russian Embassy in Paris on April 16, 1906 between Kokovtsov, the representative of the Russian government and a consortium of French, British, Austrian and Dutch banks gathered shortly

⁸ В.Н.Кокковцов, 1933, Из Моего Прошлого: Воспоминания 1903-1919, Т.1, Париж, С.118 -119.

⁹ В.Н.Кокковцов, Из Моего Прошлого. According to Kokovtsev's memoirs, "The Emperor added that it would add credibility and help to secure the loan if Russia's support for France was conveyed to the French government by the Emperor's envoy Kokopochov himself, rather than through the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Russian Ambassador to France."

after the Algeiras Conference in April, 1906. It was at this meeting that Russia seized the opportunity to redeem itself from the maelstrom of defeat and revolution. An unprecedented loan of 2.25 billion francs (5 per cent interest) was agreed upon.¹⁰

In 1906, the loan was primarily funded by France but Britain agreed to provide a quarter of the loan. This had special significance. Britain was well aware of the impact that the fate of Russia, which was in financial crisis, would make on international relations in Europe if the loan was blocked by Germany. The 1906 loan thus provided an opportunity for Britain to seek improved relations with Russia through France.¹¹

The signing of the Anglo-Russian Agreement in August, 1907 was a natural consequence of the 1906 loan. The Russo-Japanese Treaty in July, 1907 also resulted from a diplomatic compromise on East Asian issues between Russia and Japan, where both countries secretly recognized Korea and South Manchuria as Japanese interests on the one hand and Outer Mongolia and Northern Manchuria as Russian interests on the other.¹² Russia was in a difficult position with regard to Japan's annexation of Korea.¹³ To be certain, this diplomatic change affected the direction and nature of the Korean independence movement in Vladivostok. If Russia and Japan were to move away from the traditional confrontation to a greater cooperation that Britain and France wished, the Russian au-

¹⁰ V.N.Кокковцов, Из Моего Прошлого: Воспоминания 1903-1919, С.162. Russia's financial agent in Paris, Artur Rafalovich (1853-1921), requested an increase in the size of the subsidy to the French press to 200,000 francs from January 1906 until the date of the loan agreement. After the signing of the Portsmouth Reinforcement Treaty, Russia's subsidy to the French press was reduced to 100,000 francs, which the Parisian press attempted to reciprocate by criticizing the loan. J. W. Long, Russian Manipulation of French Press, 1904-1906, *Slavic Review*, Vol. 31-2, 352-353.

¹¹ Olga Crisp, *The Russian Liberals and the 1906 Anglo-French Loan to Russia*, 508. The loan paved the way for the Anglo-Russian compromise on Persia, Central Asia, and Tibet in 1907, ending the long-standing confrontation between Britain and Russia over the entire Asian continent.

¹² Masato Matsui, 1972, The Russo-Japanese Agreement of 1907: Its Causes and the Progress of Negotiations, *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol.6, No. 1. 33.

¹³ The Russo-Japanese Convention has two public provisions and four secret provisions. According to Article 2, Russia undertook not to interfere with the development of existing political relations between Japan and Korea. John A. White, 1995, *Transition to global rivalry: alliance diplomacy and the Quadruple Entente, 1895-1907*, Cambridge University Press, 304-306.

thorities' stance toward the Korean independence movement in Primorye was likely to change.

Kokovtsov, appointed Minister of Finance in 1906 after the successful mission to France,¹⁴ oversaw Russia's finances until 1914. Given that no one else would take on the role during the chaos of defeat and revolution, his long tenure as Minister of Finance was due to favorable domestic and international conditions.¹⁵ Internally, he received the full trust of the emperor while French and British loans to Russia served as a safety valve for his activities in government. The diplomatic development of the Russo-French Alliance into the Anglo-French-Russo-Japanese Quadruple Entente in 1907 helped to create a peaceful external environment.

The Anglo-French loan, in exchange for acting as a check on Germany, allowed Kokovtsov to manage the Tsarist government's finances and normalize the economy from the Russo-Japanese War through World War I. Still, the loan was a debt to be repaid. In response, he took the position that the defense budget had to be cut or made more efficient for stimulating the private sector and securing new sources of revenue. Thus, the Tsarist government's plans for defense reconstruction after the Russo-Japanese War were constantly in tension with the Minister of Finance.

Kokovtsov's 1907 budget, based on the 1906 loan, pursued the principle of balanced budget.¹⁶ As a means of balanced budget, he sought to ensure that new expenditures were approved by the legislature before they were included in the budget. Nevertheless, the domestic situation in

¹⁴ V.N.Коковцов, Из Моего Прошлого: Воспоминания 1903-1919, С.171-173. No one was more pleased with the 1906 agreement than Tsar Nicholas II (r.1894-1917) "You have made a great and unforgettable contribution to Russia and to me even under difficult circumstances. I look forward to hearing from you personally," and wanted to appoint Kokovtsov as Minister of Finance. Kokovtsov declined on health grounds but on May 8, 1906, the day before Russia's first modern parliament (the Duma) convened, what was delivered to him was an imperial letter confirming his appointment as Minister of Finance.

¹⁵ Переписка В.Н.Коковцова Эд.Нецлину, 28 Июля(8.10.)1906 г. Красный Архив, (hereinafter abbreviated as K.A.), 1923 Т. 4. С.133.

¹⁶ Переписка В.Н.Коковцов Эд.Нецлину, 14(27) нояб. 1906 г. Красный Архив, 1923 Т. 4. С.143-146.

Russia proved to be difficult to achieve a balanced budget without a deficit. The internal revenue had not increased so a balanced budget was possible only if expenditures were minimized.

Another unexpected problem that shocked Khrushchev's balanced budget was the massive defense reconstruction program. The Ministry of War wanted to maintain a larger force even before the Russo-Japanese War. This was because the Minister of War, Aleksandr Reodiger (1854-1920) considered the shortage of men and equipment to be the reason for the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War. That is why in October 1906 Reodiger submitted a proposal to the Council of Ministers for a budget of 215 million rubles to rebuild the army with 134,000 standing troops.¹⁷

Kokovtsov's response to the Army's demands was to delegate the review of defense spending to the national congress, or Duma. The idea was to use the power of the legislature to check the military's defense spending. The Minister of Finance's principle of spending legitimate budget expenditures, approved only by the legislature, was also a way to avoid deficit financing. Fiscal rebalancing was also necessary to improve the country's creditworthiness for continued loan. The Army's need for increased defense spending could be realized only through the issuance of government bonds to be approved by parliament.

The fierce confrontation among the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of War and the Ministry of the Navy after the Russo-Japanese War stemmed also from the introduction of a parliamentary system that took control of the budget. Systematically, the finance minister, in response to the military's demands for increased defense spending, set up a structure in which defense budgets pass through legislative approval. The more the Minister of the Navy, Alexey Birilev (1844-1915) and Ivan Dikov (1833-1914)) as well as Reodiger pressured Ministry of Finance to increase the budget, the more Kokovtsov had no choice but to stand up squarely to the pressures. In the end, Kokovtsov proposed the military's own budget

¹⁷ Шацкилло К.Ф. 2000, От Портсмутского мира к Первой мировой войне. М., С. 126-127. The Russian Army operated as a peacetime force of 1% of the 138,100,000 men obliged to military service, so that in January, 1900, the Army's strength was 1,385,061 men.

reductions on the ground that it would be difficult to find additional sources of tax revenue.

When the Ministry of War requested new funding, restructuring was the solution to meet its limited budget. It was also a desperate attempt to reduce the number of troops and use the savings to fund new defense buildup projects.¹⁸ Ultimately, after the decision made by the Council of Ministers to reject the request of the Ministry of War for an additional budget, Reodiger resigned from his post in March, 1909. The nub of the issue here is the demand of the Ministry of Finance to reduce the standing army and reorganize the troops.

The conflict between the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Finance over the defense budget continued as the new Minister of War, Vladimir Sukhomlinov (1848-1926) determined on keeping the policy of his predecessor, Reodiger. At a special cabinet meeting in June, 1909 to review the 1910 budget, organized by Kokovtsov, Sukhomlinov maintained that no reduction in troop strength was possible. Considering the length of the borderlines, the vastness of the territory to be defended, the sparsity of resident population, and the state of transportation, he argues, the Russian army should remain at a size comparable to the combat power of a potential enemy state and even the standing army was not excessive but rather insufficient.¹⁹ This disagreement between the two ministries over the defense budget continued into Kokovtsov's trip to the Far East in the fall of 1909 when the issue of how to fortify Vladivostok came up.

It is the commander of the Priamursky Military District, Pavel Unterberger (1842-1921) who proposed the need for the fortification of Vladivostok. The fortification of Vladivostok and the construction of

¹⁸ М.В.Зайцев. Путешествие из Петербурга во Владивосток: К Вопросу о противоречиях правительстве России по поводу финансирования вооруженных сил накануне первой мировой войны, Изв. Саратовского университета. Нов. История. Международные отношения. 2017. Т. 17, вып. 4. С.447-449. In 1909, the budget of the Ministry of War reached 470 million rubles, or a quarter of the state budget.

¹⁹ Особый Журнал Совета Министров, 6 июня 1909 г.

land and coastal defenses on its outskirts went along in conjunction with his operational plan against Japanese landing and rear attacks. In the event of a new conflict with Japan and Qing China, he would draw up a campaign plan in which the district should hold the line until reinforcements from Europe.²⁰ Thus, the fortification of Vladivostok became a national issue that Kokovtsov had to solve through his field visits.²¹

The fortification project came to emerge when the Minister of War wrote a report to the Tsar and blamed the Minister of Finance for the project's delays. The Minister of War attributed to the fault of the Minister of Finance the disapproval of the budget for the project and the defenselessness of the Far East for three years after the post-war recovery began. Important is that the army had not received any money from the Ministry of Finance to upgrade Vladivostok's defense.

Kokovtsov immediately refuted the critique of the Army by presenting the Council of Ministers with budget documents proving that the budget for the defense of Vladivostok had not been cut by a single penny for the last three years. In the documents, the budget allocated to the Ministry of War three years ago had remained completely unspent. Rather, according to Kokovtsov, the only mistake his ministry made was an inability to oppose new budget allocations to the Ministry of War despite the accumulation of unspent funds. The Ministry of Finance suggested the Ministry of War to utilize the unspent funds from the ministry's own budget²²; otherwise, the only way to secure any budget for urgent projects was to seek parliamentary approval, which entails a highly time-con-

²⁰ P.C. Авиллов, 2016, По Транссибу на Восток. Визит Министра Финансов В.Н.Кокковцова в Приамурский Военный округ, Вестник Томского гос.уни., № 405, С.38-49.

²¹ В.И.Калинин, Н.Б.Аюшин, 2000, Крепость Владивосток, *Россия и АТР*. № 4, С.112- 121.

²² Шацилло К.Ф. 1991, Последние военные программы Российской империи, Вопросы истории, № 7-8, С.224-233. The issue of strengthening the defense of the Far East was part of the modernization of the Russian army. From the Russo-Japanese War to World War I, 1.8 billion rubles were budgeted for the modernization of Russian military equipment, but only 376,500,000 rubles, or one-fifth of the budget, were actually spent by 1914. This was a product of the inefficient bureaucracy of the Russian administration, especially the Army and Navy, rather than a lack of funding or Kokovtsov's personal problems. These, like the Russian military defense industry, suffered from low productivity and were unable to meet budgetary demands in a timely manner.

suming process.²³

Therefore, the first task of Kokovtsov's visit to the Far East was to find out why, despite the funding for Vladivostok's defense, the project had not progressed. The Ministry of Finance had not cut the budget for Far Eastern defense for the past three years and even issued government bonds for the military request.²⁴ This is why Tsar Nikolai II directly sent the Minister of Finance directly to the Far East.

Kokovtsov's Far East Tour and Ahn Chungŭn's Assassination

When the Minister of Finance Kokovtsov planned his trip to the Far East in the fall of 1909, a meeting with Ito Hirobumi at Harbin was not on the agenda. On September 22, 1909, Kokovtsov received Tsar Nikolai II's approval for his plans to visit the Chinese Eastern Railway as well as Khabarovsk and Vladivostok.²⁵ The Minister's tour was conducted in the midst of a busy schedule to finalize the 1910 budget so the time and location of the tour was extremely limited.²⁶ During the five-week tour, Kokovtsov was not to leave the Dongcheng Railway Zone and the Russian Consul General in Beijing, Ivan Korostovets (1862-1933) had to travel to Harbin to meet him.²⁷ Although Kokovtsov had been invited by the Japanese government to visit since the spring of 1909, a trip to Tokyo was not

²³ М.В.Зайцев. Путешествие из Петербурга во Владивосток, 449-450. The emergence of the legislature in accordance with the principle of the separation of powers in the 1906 Russian Constitution (April 23, 1906) revealed the various layers of the process of passing the budget of the executive branch through parliament. The Ministry of War, in particular, had the greatest difficulty in obtaining a budget. This was because the military, especially the army minister, who was a vassal of the Tsar, did not value the role of parliament in defense projects with national significance.

²⁴ М.В.Зайцев. Путешествие из Петербурга во Владивосток, С. 448-449.

²⁵ РГИА. Ф.560. Оп.28. Д.416. Л.6-8. Всеподданнейший доклад министра финансов 9 сентября 1909 г.

²⁶ Переписка В.Н.Коковцов Эд.Нецлину, 21 сентября(4 октября) 1909 г. Красный Архив, 1923 Т. 4. С.155-156.

²⁷ РГИА. Ф.560. Оп.28. Д.416. Л.9. Копия телеграммы Правления Общества КВЖД в Пекине от 10 сентября 1909 г. на имя Коростовца.

on his itinerary. So, the meeting with Ito in Harbin was decided upon after Kokovtsev had embarked on a tour of the Far East.

On October 1, 1909, Kokovtsov began his journey to the Far East. When he arrived at Manchuria Station on October 11, the junction of the Siberian Railway and the Chinese Eastern Railway, he was faced with a decision that would prove to be the most difficult of his Far Eastern tour. He received a telegram from the Russian Financial Agent Grigory Vilenkin (1864-1930) in Japan that delivered a message from Ito Hirobumi via Goto Shinpei (1857-1929) regarding a meeting in Harbin.²⁸

On the same day on October 11, Nikolai Malevskiy-Malevich (1856-1917), the Russian Ambassador to Japan reported more details about Ito's plan to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They can be summarized into the following three points. First, Ito's itinerary to Manchuria will be from Dalian to Shenyang to Harbin to Vladivostok and accompanied by an entourage of about eight people. Second, without any official title, still, Ito, widely known as a pro-Russian figure, wants to meet with Kokovtsov in Harbin. Third, Ito wants to strengthen bilateral relations between Russia and China regarding connection between the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchurian Railway on top of Far Eastern issues in general.²⁹ Two days later (October 13), the ambassador gave a more detailed report on Ito's trip to Manchuria. To summarize, Ito's visit to Harbin was intent on a meeting with Kokovtsov to discuss the recently concluded Jiandao Agreement between the Qing and Japan in September 1909³⁰ and lay the groundwork for reconciling the Russian and Japanese interests in Manchuria. What was expected to be addressed between Kokovtsov and Ito was how to finalize the unfinished agreement

²⁸ РГИА. Ф.560. Оп.28. Д.416. Л.44. Телеграммы Велинкина из Токио на мия Министра Финансов от 28 сентября 1909 г.

²⁹ Там же. Л.61. Секретная телеграмма Малевского-Малевича 28 сент. / 11 октября 1909 г.

³⁰ Там же. Л.77-78. Текст секретной телеграммы Товарища МИДа на имя Коковцова, 30 сентября 1909 г. By the recent Jiandao Agreement, I mean the "Agreement between China and Japan relative to Chientao, and concerning the mines and railways in Manchuria, 4 se,1909" signed by the two countries on September 4, 1909. Here, Jiandao and Chientao can be interchangeably used.

on the transshipment of cargo on the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchurian Railway, and find a solution to Russian demands that Japan had rejected after the Russo-Japanese War. Therefore, Russia believed that Ito's visit to Harbin displays a Japanese aspiration to rapprochement with Russia in resolving the U.S.-Japan conflict emanated from the Jiandao Agreement.

The confidential report from Vilenkin to Kokovtsov in October 14, 1909 is notable for the former's systematic analysis regarding the reasons for Ito's hasty departure to Manchuria without prior consultation.³¹ Vilenkin judged that the ostensible reasons of Ito for visiting Manchuria was to refresh himself and revisit a place he had not been to in a long time but the real purpose was to find a solution to the deteriorating relations between the U.S and Japan over Manchuria. Paying attention to the fact that Manchuria had been the highly controversial issue of the recent U.S.-Japanese relations, he identified Ito's trip to Manchuria as a business travel with a clear purpose. The reason was that the Qing had ceded to Japan Fushun coal mining rights and the coal mining rights along the Tandong-Fengtian railroad reinforcement section through 'Agreement between China and Japan relative to Chientao, and concerning the mines and railways in Manchuria' in September 1909.³²

Ito wanted to meet with Kokotchov immediately after the signing of the 'Agreement between China and Japan relative to Chientao, and concerning the mines and railways in Manchuria' because this step sparked the beginning of the U.S.-Japanese conflict. The U.S. State Department took issue with Japan over the problem of the agreement by claiming that it violated "The Root-Takahira Agreement of 1908" based on the principle of open doors and equal opportunity for Manchuria. Likewise, the U.S.-Japan conflict consisted in the clash of interests between Japan, in pursuit of a monopoly over the South Manchuria after

³¹ РГИА. Ф.560. Оп.28. Д.421. Л.7-15. Доверительное письмо Виленкина Коковцову от 1 октября 1909 г.

³² Foreign Relations of the United States, 1909. 118-120. Japanese-Chinese Agreement concerning Mines and Railways in Manchuria.

the Russo-Japanese War, and the U.S whose aim was to enter the Manchurian market under the slogan of open doors and equal opportunity.

Vilenkin credited Shinpei Goto, the former president of the South Manchuria Railway as the unsung hero of Ito's visit to Harbin. Upon hearing about the Far East tour of the Minister of Finance, he had tried to organize a visit of the Russian minister to Tokyo. But, as the event seemed impossible he persuaded Prime Minister Katsura Taro (1848-1913) to invite Ito to visit Manchuria. As a result, Ito visited the Russian Ambassador to Japan, or Malevich Malevich and proposed a meeting in Harbin and through Goto Shinpei the ambassador instructed Vilenkin to telegraph the proposal to the Minister of Finance.

Ambassador Malevich characterized Ito's offer to meet in Harbin as a gesture of Japan's friendly approach to Russia. The Japanese government, according to Malevich's analysis, endeavored not only to show the United States and China, wary of this Russo-Japanese meeting closely after the Russo-Japanese War, that the two countries were aligned in their interests and in solidarity with each other in Manchuria, but also to secure continued concessions from the Qing. Thus, by placing a stress on the Russo-Japanese partnership, Japan hoped to gain a free hand in Manchuria at the expense of neutralizing the Root-Takahira Agreement that promised the opening of Manchuria and the territorial integrity of the Qing.

So what cards could Japan play to gain access to Russia? The key was the return of Russian ships captured by Japan during the Russo-Japanese War. This incident had been used by the Russian media to foment anti-Japanese sentiment. In response, Russia sought for an unconditional return of three steamships—Manchuria, Argun, and Mukden— owned by the Chinese Eastern Railway for the issue had been left unresolved after the Russo-Japanese War so the matter could be put on the agenda at Harbin.³³ Vilenkin was hopeful that the issue of the return of these vessels

³³ РГИА.Ф.560.Оп.28.Д.416.Л.132-133. Телеграмма Управления дороги Директору Канцелярия Министра Финансов, 9 октября 1909 г. According to the report of the Board of Directors of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Mukden was captured by the Japanese Navy on

(worth 1,759,000 rubles) belonging to the Chinese Eastern Railway, run originally by Russia, would be resolved satisfactorily because Japan wanted to conclude an agreement between the South Manchurian Railway, operated by Japan, and the Chinese Eastern Railway on the transshipment of cargo.

Preparations for the meeting began in earnest when in response to Ito's proposal Khokovtsov informed Ito of his itinerary for his stay in Harbin. Ito was given a choice for their meeting schedule during the inbound trip of Kokovtsov to Vladivostok (October 24-27) or the outbound trip (November 7-9).³⁴ Ito personally visited Ambassador Malevich-Malevich on October 11, confirmed the Japanese Embassy's report on the arrival of Khrushchev at Harbin on October 25, and expressed his hope for a meeting in Harbin.³⁵ On October 14, Financial Commissioner Vilenkin in Japan informed the Japanese that Kokovtsov had agreed to meet with Ito in Harbin; and then Japan confidentially reported that Ito's arrival date in Harbin had been set for October 26. Finally, along with his final report on October 16, 1909 regarding Ito's arrival in Harbin and a list of Ito's entourage, Vilenkin informed the Russian authorities that Ito and his group were scheduled to depart by overnight train on October 25 from Kuancheng to Harbin.³⁶

"Such a meeting in neutral territory would be beneficial," the Tsar wrote on October 15 when approving an official imperial document reporting that Kokovtsov had agreed on a Harbin meeting with Ito.³⁷ Har-

February 7, 1904 at Busan, the Argun on February 8 in the Korean Strait, and the Manchuria on February 17 at Nagasaki.

³⁴ РГИА.Ф.560.Оп.28.Д.421.Л.2. Телеграмма Коковцова Виленкину, 28 сентября 1909 г.

³⁵ РГИА.Ф.560.Оп.28.Д.421.Л.3-3об.: Копия секретной телеграммы Малевского-Малевича, 11 октября 1909 г. Ambassador Malevski-Malevich informed the Russian consul in Dalian, the Russian legation in Peking, and the governor of Priamursky Province about Ito's trip to Manchuria in October.

³⁶ Там же. 16-17об. Письмо Виленкина Коковцову 3 октября 1909 г. Vilenkin's report included nine people in the entourage of Ito. But, he informed that it is unclear whether all of them would accompany Ito.

³⁷ Там же. Л.19. Телеграмма тайного советника Вебера Коковцову, 4 октября 1909 г. "Такая

bin was neither Russian nor Japanese territory, thereby making an ideal place for both countries to discuss some issues of their interest without external influence and interference. That's why Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonov considered the Harbin meeting as an opportunity to handle unresolved issues after the Russo-Japanese War. He was confident that the circumstances, leading the Japanese political tycoon, in spite of his advanced age, to come to Manchuria in person and visit the Russian minister, were in no way unfavorable to Russia.

Ito's itinerary, as understood by Kokovtsov, was to depart Kuancheng on the night of October 25, stay in Harbin for two days (October 26 & 27), and depart for Vladivostok on the night of October 27. Then, Kokovtsov was impelled to telegraph on October 24 to the Primamursky Governor-General Unterberger that he would travel to Vladivostok via Khabarovsk after a meeting with Ito in Harbin but that he could not expect any exact date.³⁸ "I never know how long the meeting with Ito will keep me," he said.³⁹ Thus, Kokovtsov, scheduled originally to arrive in Harbin at 6 m. on October 24 and depart for Vladivostok in the afternoon of October 28, began preparing for the meeting from October 25.⁴⁰

As the highest-ranking official on the scene immediately after Ahn Chunggün's assassination in Harbin in October 26, Kokhovtsov set out to investigate the incident. The most immediate issue he sought to determine was responsibility. The question of who is responsible for the shooting of a Japanese statesman by a Korean in Harbin, belonging to the leased territory of Russia, was inseparable from detecting whether the Russian security was negligent or whether the Japanese Consulate General in Harbin failed to check visitor identification thoroughly.

встреча на нейтральной почве может быть полезна."

³⁸ Там же. Л.21. Телеграмма Приамурского Генерал-Губернатора Коковцова, 4 октября 1909 г. When Unterberger was informed that Ito would be returning home via Vladivostok after a Harbin meeting, he suggested to Kokovtsov that they travel together from Khabarovsk to Vladivostok. This idea was proposed because Kokovtsov would feel more convenient for a Vladivostok visit if seeing Ito first going back to Japan via Vladivostok.

³⁹ Там же. Л.27. Телеграмма Коковцова Унтербергеру, 11 октября 1909 г. из Харбина.

⁴⁰ РГИА.Ф.560.Оп.28.Д.418.Л.56.: Программа.

That is why Kokovtsov summarized Russia's position on the security issue and forwarded it to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonov. In the event that the Russian railroad authorities were criticized for their lack of preliminary screening of guests, Kokovtsov suggested how to refute Russian responsibility by enumerating the mistake made by the Japanese Consulate General that not only confirmed the Chinese Eastern Railway to allow Japanese people to enter freely the welcoming ceremony for Ito without any tickets, but also let An, to whom the slightest attention was paid, in.⁴¹ In short, Kokovtsov made it clear that the blame for the incident lies in the mismanagement of the Japanese consulate thoroughly ill-prepared for keeping close check on visitors.

In addition to a matter of responsibility, another issue that Kokovtsov focused his efforts on to resolve the incident was the Japanese media's and Japanese government's assessment with regard to the assassination. Why? The assassination, partly due to the Japanese Consulate General's failure to escort the Japanese special guests, did occur under Russian jurisdiction and Russia was by no means immune from responsibility. This is why General Dmytro Horvath (1858-1937), the head of the Chinese Eastern Railway Garrison, and Korostovets escorted the wagon train, where Ito's coffin is enshrined, to Kuancheng with the utmost courtesy.⁴² The Minister of Finance was therefore keenly attuned to Japan's reaction to the incident, fearing another possibility of conflict with Japan when his country recovered from the crisis of defeat and revolution.

Kokovtsov's decision to transfer the disposition of Ahn to the Japanese authorities was a desperate measure of self-defense against Japanese public opinion. He informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that all doc-

⁴¹ РГИА.Ф.560.Оп.28.Д.421.Л.38-38об. According to a confidential letter [October 14, 1909 (27)] from Korostovets, Russian Envoy to Qing China, the Russian authorities took measures against the European and Chinese to restrict the entry of the crowds into the Harbin Station but allowed the Japanese to enter without restriction in accordance with the wishes of the Japanese consul. Korostovets attributed this indiscretion to a failure to be careful about the easy entrance of Ahn into the welcoming ceremony for Ito at the Harbin Station. (АВПРИ.Ф.150.Оп.493.Д.1279.Л.44-47об.: Секретное письмо Коростовцаб 14 октября 1909 г.)

⁴² АВПРИ.Ф.150.Оп.493.Д.1279.Л.44-47об.

uments would be transferred to the Japanese consulate since the assassin is a Korean and jurisdiction over all Korean cases belongs to Japan. And, this action was taken in consideration of the fact that despite the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth after the Russo-Japanese War, rumors of a second Russo-Japanese War continued to circulate.⁴³ The expeditious decision was designed to avoid any potential for Russo-Japanese conflict that would have resulted from the failure to prevent the assassination.

Kokovtsov also viewed the arrests of Cho Tosön (1879-?) and Ŭ Töksun (1880-1950) by Russian military police at the Ciajiagou station as vital evidence that would absolve him of responsibility for failing to prevent the incident.⁴⁴ The rationale was, first, that they were accomplices because the ammunition from the revolver pistols seized from them were devastator bullets identical to Ahn's and, second, that their arrest disproved Ahn's statement that he traveled alone from Vladivostok to Harbin and stayed overnight at the station. This is why Korostovets, the Russian Legation to the Qing said, "There is no need to blame ourselves for the lack of security or the lack of preventive measures. The assassination was an unfortunate coincidence."

Meanwhile, Kokovtsov's transfer of Ahn Chunggün to the Japanese authorities on the political pretext of improving Russo-Japanese relations and preventing a recurrence of the conflict with Japan was not acceptable to District Prosecutor Miller. Russian judiciary, Miller reasoned, should exercise its extraterritoriality in Harbin and, then, Ahn's case was also to be investigated under the Russian authorities.⁴⁵

Still, prosecutor Miller was unable to oppose the transfer of this

⁴³ РГИА. Ф.560. Оп.28. Д.421. Л.6-6об.: Русско-Японское Сближение.

⁴⁴ The Consul General of Japan in Harbin, Kawakami Toshitsune (1861-1935), also confirmed that the issuance of free passes to Japanese people for the Ito welcome ceremony was the request that the consulate had made. In response, the district prosecutor Miller pointed out that the Russian Minister of Finance was present at the Harbin station, as well as Ito, and accused the Japanese officials of not caring security issues at all when preparing the welcome ceremony. РГИА. Ф.560. Оп.28. Д.422. Л.41-45. Прокурора Пограничного Округа Суда Миллера Господину Прокурору Иркутской Судебной Палаты, 14 октября 1909 г.

⁴⁵ РГИА. Ф.560. Оп.28. Д.422. Л.23-23об. Записка Прокурора Пограничного Округа. Б/Д.

case to Japan to the end. Why? Paradoxically, there were no Russian victims in Harbin at that time. Ahn Chunggŭn and his comrades used devastator bullets to avoid killing, if unwittingly, any Russians, which paved the way for Japan to claim for its jurisdiction. The use of devastator bullets, as district prosecutor Miller pointed out, did not wound bystanders, specifically Russians around Ito, and for this reason the Russian authorities came to have little legal basis for proactively investigating the Korean suspects.⁴⁶ Thus, what we can see here is a complex diplomatic reality that made the assassination of Ito without any Russian casualties in Harbin treated by political, less than legal, judgment.

The joint Russian-Japanese investigation into the assassination was a desperate attempt of Russia to maintain the amicable relationship with Japan. Despite having a real police force and the ability to exercise its judicial authority, Russia cooperated with Japan by enforcing search & seizure, finding evidence, and handing over investigative materials to Japan.⁴⁷ As a result, the Russo-Japanese cooperation system for the case

⁴⁶ РГИА.Ф.560.Оп.28.Д.422.Л.41-45. Прокурора Пограничного Округа Суда Миллера Господину Прокурору Иркутской Судебной Палаты, 14 октября 1909 г. According to a document reported to the Irkutsk Court by district court prosecutor Miller, “a devastator bullet is lodged in the body of the wounded when fired and if it had not been for the bursting round, Ito would have received only a penetrating wound and Minister of Finance Kokovtsov, walking next to him, would have been wounded due to the close distance.”

⁴⁷ РГИА.Ф.560.Оп.28.Д.422.Л.24-28об. *Ход События, относящихся к убийству Князя Ито после 14 октября 1909 года.* Here are some highlights of the Russian authorities' investigations after the death of Ito. On October 29, the Irkutsk Military Police sent a telegram about the results of their search. A search of the house of an anti-Japanese activist Cho Tosŏn (1879-?)'s lover, Vozaeva, an ethnic Korean living in the Irkutsk ethnic district in Irkutsk, revealed a large number of letters written in Russian and Korean to confirm the close relationship between the Irkutsk Korean community and the Harbin Korean communities. Still, important is that even if Bozayeva and the Koreans at Irkutsk engaged themselves in political activities against Japan, their activities did not violate Russian law so the search was terminated and Japan was not required to be notified. In addition, according to reports from the Irkutsk Military Police, the October 30 raid on a Korean residence in Harbin was conducted by the Japanese consulate with the participation of Russian police. Ahn Chunggŭn was found to have stayed at the home of Kim Tichon (Ким Тихон, Kim Sŏngbaek), the chairman of the Harbin Korean community, the day before the assassination. Later, Kim was released because there was not enough evidence to prove that Kim had arranged the shooting or was involved in the assassination. However, nine other Korean Russians were arrested and handed over to the Japanese authorities.

continued from the following day of the assassination until November 3, 1909 when the search & seizure and findings of the investigation, executed both in Harbin and Irkutsk, were handed over to Mizobuchi Takao (1874-1944), or the Japanese prosecutor of Kwantung District High Court.⁴⁸

Russia's Approach to Japan and the Setbacks to the Russo-Japanese Intelligence Cooperation Initiative

It is Korostovets, escorting Ito's funeral train to Kuancheng, who even suggested Kokovtsov to travel to Tokyo and attend Ito's funeral. This Russian Legation to the Qing believed that even though Ito had traveled to Manchuria, in spite of his advanced age, his assassination on "Russian" soil i.e., in Harbin, could mar the Russian-Japanese relations. The assassination might be interpreted as an expression of Russia's hostile stance toward Japan and what was definitely needed is another plan to attenuate potential conflicts between two countries. Sending a high-level condolence mission was raised as an appropriate solution in clearly conveying to Japan Russia's sympathy for Ito's death. Consequently, Kokovtsov was recommended by Korostovets not only because the former was trusted by the emperor but also because he possessed the ability to fulfill a responsible task.⁴⁹

By the time the condolence plan was discussed in Harbin, however, the Tsarist government had already taken steps to demonstrate its sincerity

⁴⁸ Ibid. It was Mizobuchi who met with the district prosecutor Miller to thank the Russians for their cooperation in the investigation on November 1, 1909. After a two-and-a-half-hour conversation, Mizobuchi, dressed in a military uniform, made three requests before Miller. First, he wanted a handwritten account of what Miller had seen and felt about the murder; second, he wanted a floor plan of the Harbin Station, the specific location of Ahn Chunggün, Consul General Kawakami and Minister of Finance Kokovtsov; and third, he wanted to know more details of the situation since Ito shook hands with Miller before Ahn shot him. Two days after the meeting, Miller handed over some relevant materials to Mizobuchi.

⁴⁹ АВПРИ.Ф.150.Оп.493.Д.1279.Л.44-47об. Секретное письмо Д.С.С. Коростовца. Korostovets believes that Kokovtsov's questioning will be seen as a sign of the strength of Russian-Japanese relations, even by Chinese who have reservations about Russia's Manchurian policy.

ty in restoring amicable relations with Japan. Russian Emperor Nikolai II sent the Emperor of Japan a formal telegram of condolence for the loss of the political magnate Ito.⁵⁰ The telegram did play a crucial role in mending the misunderstandings and mistrust between Russia and Japan caused by the assassination.

Before the imperial condolence messages, Japan was suspicious of Russia, particularly regarding the reasons behind Russia's neglect of security management. The reason is that although the Russian Railways Police monitored and detained two suspicious Koreans at the Ciajiagou station, they took no action to prevent Ahn Chunggün, who had already traveled to Harbin, from entering the welcoming ceremony for the Ito's arrival.⁵¹ The Tsar's telegram to the Japanese emperor, shocked to receive a report from Prime Minister Katsura the assassination of Ito, became the vital catalyst that turned the situation around. Since that time, the two countries stopped blaming each other for the incident and did not engage themselves in recriminations.

Following the Tsar's telegram, Japan was also eager to improve relations with Russia.⁵² The Japanese government tended to focus on the strengthening of the ongoing cooperation with Russia rather than taking a hard line against Russia. The telegrams from Goto Shinpei to the Commercial Attaché Vilenkin and Russian Ambassador to Japan Malevich revealed that the Japanese government did not harbor any regrets toward Russia. The Japanese media also seemed to acknowledge the utmost efforts which Russia made. Furthermore, Goto expressed his willingness to improve bilateral ties between two countries by stating that the Harbin incident would contribute to the strengthening of Russian-Japanese rela-

⁵⁰ РГИА.Ф.560.Оп.28.Д.422.Л.2-2об.: Телеграф О-ва Китайской Восточной железной дороги. 14 окт. 1909 г.

⁵¹ РГИА.Ф.560.Оп.28.Д.421.Л.29-33. Телеграмма Коковцов Послу в Токио, 13 окт. 1909 г. "It is clear that the conspiracy is organized," Kokovtsov telegraphed to the ambassador on the day of the incident, "and yesterday in the Chaga district the Russian police arrested three Koreans in possession of Browning pistols.

⁵² РГИА.Ф.560.Оп.28.Д.421.Л.142.: Телеграмма Коковцова Веберу, 15 октября 1909 г.

tions in the future. Therefore, Kokovtsov decided not to visit Japan as a condolence envoy on October 28 and continued his Far Eastern tour according to the planned itinerary.⁵³

After the visit of the Far East, Kokovtsev went to the Tsar at the Livadia Palace on November 30, 1909 and addressed a memorial to the Tsar.⁵⁴ His memorial consisted of three parts; first, a report on the state of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the situation of the Railway Guard; second, an analysis of the impact of the removal of Vladivostok's free port designation on the Far East's economy; and third, a report on an inspection of the defense situation in the Far East. Since the original Far East visit plan did not include a meeting with Ito, there was no mention of Ahn's assassination.

The memorial paid more heed to economic efficiency from the standpoint of the Minister of Finance than military matters from the point of view of a defense expert. Along this line, it proposed some measures to stabilize the security and economy of the Far East after the Russo-Japanese War with minimal fiscal expenditures.

Kokovtsov's financial principle for the Eastern Railway Company was the implementation of an independent accounting system. The guidelines stated that the state treasury of Russia could not be used to finance public enterprises abroad such as the Dongcheng Railway operating a line through Manchuria. The economy of Russia was still dependent on foreign loans after the Russo-Japanese War so no one would agree to subsidize a company operating in the Qing. Rather, the Minister of Finance posed, the Chinese Eastern Railway should develop into a

⁵³ Там же. Л.124. Копия письма Американского консула в Харбине на имя Российского Генерал Консула 14 октября 1909 г. Gordon Paddock (1865-1932), the U.S. Vice and Deputy Consul in Harbin sent a letter to the Russian Consul General in Harbin that congratulates him on the safety of Kokovtsov rather than mourning Ito's death. reflected the complex trilateral relationship among Russia, Japan, and the U.S over Manchuria. "I wish to express my sincere pleasure that Mr. Kokovtsov and other Russian officials remain safe from yesterday's tragic events and congratulate them on their providential survival in such a dangerous place," his letter reads.

⁵⁴ РГИА.Ф.560.Оп.28.Д.422.Л.1-42. Всподданнейший доклад Министра Финансов по поездке на Дальний Восток осенью 1909.

competitive enterprise able to benefit Russia.

So what are the options for the Chinese Eastern Railway protected by the 29,000-strong Railway Guard of the Zaamursk Military District to survive financially on its own? Kokovtsov's solution to reducing the tremendous budget to maintain the guard force and increasing the business profit of the Chinese Eastern Railway was to sign a reciprocal agreement with Japan's Manchurian Railway Company. The plan was to connect Russia's Chinese Eastern Railway and Japan's South Manchurian Railway together and create conditions for the coexistence of the two railways.⁵⁵ Their connection, which was set up as one agenda of the meeting between Kokovtsov and Ito, was resolved with the signing of the Second Russo-Japanese Treaty on July 4, 1910.

The issue of defense buildup, integral to Kokovtsov's Far East visit, was also approached by the Minister of Finance from the angle of budgetary savings. He was of the opinion that the problem of defense buildup in the Far East, such as the fortification of Vladivostok, stems from psychological factors linked to the memory of the defeat of the Russo-Japanese War.

The demand for stronger defensive reinforcement in the Far East was a reflection of a pathologically sensitive situation subject to local public opinion. Understandably, Japan had recently acquired the right to build a railway between Jilin and Hoeryŏng according to the "Qing-Japanese Convention on Manchuria and Kando" on September 4, 1909, an implicit warning as opposed to the safety of the Chinese Eastern Railway and Vladivostok. The movement heightened social anxiety that Japan could attack Vladivostok from behind with the construction of this new railroad. Kokovtsov believes that not only are these local opinions not based on a correct assessment of the situation, but their insecurity is fueling the demand for security.

Diagnosing the problem of defense buildup in the Far East after the

⁵⁵ Там же. Л.5-5об. the management of the public institutions in Harbin, Kokovtsov asserts, should be financed through taxation of residents, including foreigners living in the area. The South Manchurian Railway ran from Yushun to Ciajiagou, both of which were located south of Harbin.

Russo-Japanese War as psychological, Kokovtsov focused on how to stabilize local public opinion rather than increase military spending. One of the effective actions was to promote a stable political environment aimed at a vigorous economic life in the Far East. Hence, the Minister of Finance reached the conclusion that the best solution to the issue of defense buildup in the Far East, as in the case of the Chinese Eastern Railway, was to (re-)establish friendly relations with Japan.⁵⁶

Meanwhile, after Kokovtsov's visit to the Far East, the Minister of War Sukhomlinov treated the defense of the region from a different angle on the premise that his visit would not lead to a budget increment for the Vladivostok fortification project as well as the defense buildup. While Kokovtsov tended to focus on the establishment of a friendly Russo-Japanese relationship for the psychological comfort of the people in the Far East, Sukhomlinov would take more practical measures for the defense of the Far East.

If the Minister of Finance was reluctant to allocate budget for an increase in defense buildup of the Far East, what would be the corrective action of the Minister of War for the defense improvement of the region? When the Tsarist economy continues to rely on European loans and the Far Eastern defense budget keeps shrinking, how will the Far East be secured in the long term? What eventually emerged was a strategy of establishing a cooperative system with partners who could share anti-Japanese sentiments for the defense of the region.

In a confidential letter to Prime Minister Pyotr Stolypin (1862-1911) on May 24, 1910, Sukhomlinov asserted the need to prepare for a

⁵⁶ РГИА.Ф.560.Оп.28.Д.422.Л.1-42. Всеподданнейший доклад Министра Финансов по поездке на Дальний Восток осенью 1909. The gist of Kokovtsov's rationale for persuading Emperor Nikolai II that his office—the Ministry of Finance—and the Ministry of War were in a constrictive competition was the imbalance between limited budget and ongoing demand for military defense. Even if the Ministry of Finance were to commit to funding and helping revitalize the Russian fleet, getting the congress to approve the maximum amount of the budget for the shipbuilding program would be a challenge. Instead, the Minister of Finance proposed an alternative of fortifying Vladivostok, the country's sole naval base in the Pacific Ocean, as a top national priority and separating the project from general shipbuilding and fortification construction.

military conflict with Japan.⁵⁷ The Minister of War was well aware of the implications of the Japanese railroad concession from Jilin to Hoeryŏng through the Jiandao Convention. He did not want to repeat the mistake of the Russo-Japanese War when the Japanese navy blocked the Russian fortress of Lushun from the sea and the Japanese army crossed the Yalu River to attack from the rear. Likewise, Sukhomlinov thinks, in the case of Vladivostok Fort the Japanese army could press into the rear of Vladivostok from the Jiandao area while the Japanese navy carry out sea blockade. Without doubt, what concerned the Ministry of War was another grim scenario in which a defeat, analogous to the fall of Fortress Lushun, might be repeated at Fortress Vladivostok.

The intransigent anti-Japanese sentiment of the Korean independence movement in Russia, as impressively expressed by Ahn Chunggŭn, had attracted the attention of the Minister of War. He summarized the expected advantages of constructing a united front with the Korean independence movement against Japan in two cases of wartime and peacetime. In peacetime, the Korean resistance could sap the troops and resources of the Japanese military while supporting intelligence collection and counter-intelligence alike; in wartime, Russia could fight a two-frontal war capable of emboldening the Korean resistance movement in order to take arms against Japan in Korea and disturb the Japanese troops in Manchuria from the rear. Thus, Sukhomlinov came up with the idea that Russia could make use of the Korean independence movement as a new solution to the impending challenges of defense buildup in the Far East.

This Russo-Korean cooperation plan as above was based on a report by Lt. Col. Oscar Enkel (1878-1960), an intelligence officer from the military headquarters of the Priamursky Military District.⁵⁸ The report, appraised by Sukhomlinov as logical, was enclosed in a confidential

⁵⁷ РГИА. Ф.1276. Оп.6.1910г. Д. 514. Л.1-2: Секретное письмо Сухомлинова Столыпину, 11 мая 1910 г.

⁵⁸ РГИА Ф.1276 Оп.6, 1910 г. Д. 514. Л.3-6.: Копия докладной записки, полученной в Главном Управлении Генерального Штаба.

letter to the prime minister, which became instrumental in spreading the Korean independence movement in the Far East up to the highest levels of the Russian government. Locating Ahn's assassination in the grand vision of the Korean resistance groups for independence, the colonel recommended that Koreans in the region be actively mobilized for anti-Japanese intelligence and counterintelligence.

Enkel's report was based on his two-year experience of gathering information on Japan from elderly Koreans, including Lee Sangsöl (1870-1917) and Chŏng Chaegwan (1880-1922), in Primorsky Krai. As is well known, the prototype of the Russo-Korea intelligence cooperation was the Shanghai Intelligence Agency (Шанхайская агентура), or Shanghai Service organized by the Russian legation to Korea, Alexander Pavlov (1860-1923) at the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War.⁵⁹ The core operatives of the Korean section of the Shanghai Service were nine state-sponsored Korean students studying in Russia and two of them, Yun Ilbyŏng (?-?) and Kang Hant'aek (?-?) graduated from the Russian Language School in Seoul. They had been assigned to the Russian Army during the Russo-Japanese War and involved in Russo-Korean intelligence cooperation, especially anti-Japanese espionage activities. The commander of this Korean group was Nikolai Biryukov (Н.Н.Бирюков, 1861-1916), a former captain in the Eastern Siberian Artillery Brigade who had been a teacher at the Russian Language School in Seoul. The appointment of Biryukov as Russian Consulate in Ch'ŏngjin, Korea after the Russo-Japanese War in 1907 signaled the reestablishment of Russo-Korean intelligence cooperation against Japan in the Jiando region—one primary concern of the Russian military at that time—, as well as northern Korea.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Dukkyu Choi, 2014, "Emperor Gojong's Independence Movement and the Russian Shanghai Intelligence Service (1904-1909)," *Journal of Korean National Movement History*, No. 81, 43-84.

⁶⁰ ГАРФ. Ф. 818. Оп. 1. Д.164. Л. 43-45об.: Письмо Плансона Извольскому, 14 мая 1907 г. Lev Goyer (1875-1939), a Russian Commercial Attaché reported to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alexander Izvolsky (1856-1919) on May 27, 1907 that "only if the Japanese agree to retreat from the Tumen River and establish a vast neutral zone in the northern part of the Korean Peninsula can their rhetoric of peace be believed" in the belief that the Jiandao issue between Russian and

The information which Biryukov obtained from his Korean sources was shared with Russian intelligence officers in Vladivostok, specifically Lt. Col. Enkel and Lt. Col. Alexey Budberg (1869-1945) at the Vladivostok Fortress Command. Hyōn Sanggōn (1875-1926) acted as a medium among Lieutenant Colonel Budberg, Lee Sangsōl, and the Korean imperial family. And, it is Lev Goyer (1875-1939), the Russian Commercial Attaché from the Ministry of Finance, that wrote the letter of introduction to Hyōn Sanggōn, connected him to Budberg, and rebuilt the Shanghai Intelligence Bureau after the Russo-Japanese War.⁶¹ In this sense, it can be said that the Russo-Korean cooperation as above was manifested through Ahn's assassination in Harbin.⁶²

Nevertheless, the proposal, made by the Ministry of War for the collaboration with the Korean Independence Movement in the defense of the Russian Far East, was never materialized into policies. Prime Minister Stolypin had taken a negative stance for two reasons. First, Russia has been seeking to improve relations with Japan. During the time, Russia

Japan might be a prelude to a second Russo-Japanese war. Under this context, Goyer reactivated the Shanghai Intelligence Bureau, suspended after Pavlov's return on November 30, 1905, and reestablished an intelligence network connecting North Hamgyong Province with Jiandao and Vladivostok.

⁶¹ РГИА. Ф. 560. Оп. 28. Д. 390. Л. 379-387: Письмо Гойера Военному Агенту в Китае, 14 ноя. 1907 г.

⁶² Ahn's assassination was planned by 1) Yun Ilbyōng, a former student of Biryukov and interpreter at the Vladivostok Fortress Command, 2) Lt. Col. Vadim Mikhailov (1872-1929), who had served as chief of the Vladivostok Military Police, 3) and Ahn Chunggūn & Ahn's comrades. Mikhailov was an elite man who graduated from the Orlov Secondary Military School (Орловский кадетский корпус) in 1890 and the Konstantinovsk Military Academy (Константиновское военное училище) in 1892, both of which were attended by high-ranking members of the Russian aristocracy, and served as an officer in the Russian Imperial Guard in Warsaw, Poland. He was appointed captain of the Vladivostok Military Police at the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904. Sergey Volkov, Штаб-офицеры и генералы белых армий [Staff Officers and Generals of the White Armies]. Энциклопедический словарь участников Гражданской войны [Encyclopedic Dictionary of Civil War Participants], Центрполиграф, 2019. 86. The interpreter who escorted him to Vladivostok was Yun Ilbyōng, a Korean graduate of the Russian Language School in Seoul. When Mikhailov was in charge of a reconnaissance mission against Japan in Vladivostok, Yun also served under Biryukov's command on a mission to gather intelligence on the movement of the Japanese military. Therefore, Korea and Russia had been accumulating experience in intelligence cooperation since the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War.

was preparing to sign the Second Russo-Japanese Treaty (July 4, 1910), which mutually recognized Outer Mongolia and Korea respectively as a special interest area of Russia and Japan. Second, there was a government decision that prevents the influx of Asian peoples into the Russian Far East. Stolypin, spearheading the agrarian reforms after the Russo-Japanese War, encouraged the migration of Russian peasants to revitalize the economy in Siberia and the Far East and took a negative stance on Korean migration to Primorsky Krai.⁶³ Therefore, most of the Army's policies to strengthen the defense of the Russian Far East after the Russo-Japanese War remained unfinished under the framework of the Eurocentric quadrilateral—Anglo-French-Russo-Japanese—cooperation system. In short, the lenders of France and the Britain that had financially supported Russia after the Russo-Japanese War wanted Russia's defense to be concentrated in Europe.

In the end, Kokovtsov's visit to the Far East did not improve Russia's defense situation in the Far East. This situation remained at a standstill even in the spring of 1911 when Sukhomlinov's tour of the Far East provoked again heated debate between the Army and the Ministry of Finance. The issue was the unused budget. The Ministry of Finance maintained that it had financed the Vladivostok defense buildup to the best of its ability while the Ministry of War pointed out the difficulty of using up unspent budget due to budgetary rigidity. The Ministry of Finance blamed the Army's budget shortfall on its failure to deal fairly with its budget. The Army, on the other hand, raised the problem of Article 98 of the Constitution prohibiting the use of unexpended budget balances for other emergency defense needs, not foreseen in advance, and stipulating the return of the balances to the national treasury by the end of the fiscal year.

The Ministry of War was one of the departments that failed to respond to the demands for reform of the Russian society after the defeat of

⁶³ РГИА. Ф.1276. Оп.6. 1910 г. Д. 514. Л.14-14об.: Секретное письмо П.Столыпина Унтерберге, 8 июня 1910 г.

the Russo-Japanese War and the Russian Revolution. Particularly, the Army was unable to properly execute the defense reform projects due to a rigid interpretation of Article 96 of the Constitution requiring the Army to spend the budget in the only way that was approved by the national congress.⁶⁴ This stipulation included the unspent budget able to strengthen the defense forces of Primorsky Krai and Vladivostok. The Army allocated 2.286 billion rubles to cover the shortfall of 140 million rubles, which was not covered by the national treasury for the three years (1907-1909), by issuing government bonds at 5 percent per annum; however, 88 million rubles remained unspent. This has become a classic case of wasted budgeting, where the Army had to pay 5% APR interest on unspent budget.

The issue then shifted back to the interpretation of Article 96. The Army contended that the original purpose of the provision was not to eliminate the possibility of using unspent budget balances for unforeseen defense needs. On the contrary, the Ministry of Finance upheld that it could not and did not support the Army's interpretation of Article 96 as its right to disposal of budget approved officially by the congress. As a result, the military buildup of the Far East's defense and the fortification of Vladivostok, which had been called for immediately after the end of the Russo-Japanese War, remained unfinished until World War I.

Conclusion

As mentioned above, the Russian Far East Military buildup project after the Russo-Japanese War was interlinked to a change in the foreign policy of the Tsarist government. The two leading imperialist powers of Britain and France sought to restore Russia by providing large loans to the Tsarist government, imperiled in financial crisis, in order to keep the rising power of German in check. Thus, after the Russo-Japanese War, pursuing

⁶⁴ РГИА.Ф.560.Оп.28.Д.422.Л.1-42. Всеподданнейший доклад Министра Финансов по поездке на Дальний Восток осенью 1909.

the Eurocentric military policy, the Tsarist government placed the Baltic Fleet in priority to all other regions for restoring the Russian Navy; the Pacific Fleet had no opportunity to accomplish the Navy buildup. Defense needs in the Russian Far East came to remain unfinished due to financial shortfalls, or better yet lagged behind the importance of European Russia. Alternatively, the Tsarist government sought to unravel the security issue in the Far East through the establishment of friendly relations with Japan while Korean independence movement exerted itself basing their anti-Japanese struggle in Vladivostok, Primorsky Krai.

As a result, the Korean independence movement in Russia was influenced by the Tsarist government's foreign policy in attempts to emphasize a constructive Russo-Japanese cooperation. In this context, Russia transferred jurisdiction over Ahn's case to Japan despite its experience in intelligence cooperation with some local Korean independent groups since the Russo-Japanese War. The reexamination of how Russia treated Ahn's assassination enabled us to have a better understanding of Russia's policy of appeasement against a larger conflict with Japan and its restrictive effect on the Korean independence movement which had worked in constant cooperation with local Russian intelligence officials. In the end, the policies of the Ministry of War for strengthening the defense of Russian Far East after the Russo-Japanese War remained unfinished until World War I because of the Russo-Japanese détente initiated after Ahn's assassination. However, Ahn's case was resolved politically with the Tsar's immediate condolences to the Japanese emperor and the instantaneous transfer of jurisdiction over to Japan so the investigation into who was behind the incident and who was responsible had not progressed in Russia. Further research is needed to explore the extent to which the Russian authorities had prior knowledge of the assassination plan and the degree to which they were involved.

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Japan's Response to Korea's Dispatch of Special Envoy to The Second Hague Peace Conference

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Introduction

The Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), emanating from a confrontation between Russia and Japan over Korea, led to various changes in world affairs. As a result of this war, Japan's 'preeminent interest' in Korea was confirmed by the Great Powers. It also allowed Japan to become a member of the Eight Great Powers and the dominant power in Northeast Asia. Furthermore, the decline of Russia and the rise of Japan in Northeast Asia triggered a rebalancing of power in international relations.

France, which was allied with Russia, and Britain, which was against it, signed the Entente Cordiale in April 1904 to prevent the Russo-Japanese War from escalating into a full-scale war between the allies. Germany's attempts to expand into the Middle East with its '3B Policy'—a railroad link between Berlin, Byzantium, and Baghdad—also provoked Britain and Russia, the two major powers in these regions. Particularly, the German attempt meant the breakdown of Russo-German relations on the ground that Russia was in the middle of faltering from the defeat of the Russo-Japanese War and domestic revolutions; Russia, then, reoriented its foreign

* This translated article is a reviewed and supplemented version of Sungmin Han, 「제2회 헤이그 만국평화회의의 특使出에 대한 일본의 대응」, 『한일관계사연구』 51 (August, 2015): 361-398.

policy from its previous focus on East Asia back to Europe.

This new development brought out the formation of the Triple Entente system of Britain, France, and Russia with the common goal of keeping Germany in check in Europe and ran in counter to the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy. Extending the confrontation between the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance to the rest of the world, the countries of the Triple Entente entered into agreements with Japan, a newly emerging power in East Asia, to secure their interests in the region, including the Second Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

On a global level, this Triple Entente system was finalized during the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907; in that year, the Franco-Japanese Treaty was signed in June, the First Russia-Japan Secret Agreements in July, and finally, the Anglo-Russian Convention in August. In other words, the Second Peace Conference was ostensibly an international conference for the peaceful resolution of international conflicts, but in reality, it was aimed at reorganizing the contemporary power relations in world politics that engendered the 1907 system under which Japan became the unbeatable hegemon in East Asia. This system would be reset once again in Europe after World War I but in East Asia it functioned as the utmost order until Japan's 'the Mukden Incident' in 1931.

Studies of the Second Hague Peace Conference and the 1907 system in Korea have focused on the significance of the dispatch of envoys to The Hague and their activities in The Hague. With the enforced signing of the Korea-Japan Treaty of 1905, Korea's diplomatic powers were ceded to Japan, and the newly established Resident-General took over Korea's diplomacy through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Two years later, Emperor Kojong (r. 1897-1907) sent Lee Sangsöl (1871-1917), Lee Chun (1859-1907), Lee Wijong (1884-?), and the American H. B. Hulbert (1863-1949) as special envoys to the conference, which was held in The Hague, Netherlands from June 15th to October 18th of 1907, with representatives from 45 countries. This was Kojong's last effort as emperor to maintain Korea's independence.

The issue of Korea's participation in The Hague Peace Conference was a crucial event that could have dealt a major blow to Japan's push

for the annexation of Korea. Korea's formal participation in the conference would not only invalidate the Korea-Japan Treaty of 1905, which stripped Korea of its diplomatic rights, but would also serve as an opportunity for Korea to be recognized as an independent country in the international community. The Japanese government was already aware of this move by the Korean government. In response, the Japanese government sought to align its interests with the western powers to build a systematic way of preventing the Korean envoys from participating in the conference. However, it did not directly interfere with the dispatch of Korean envoys and their public activities in The Hague. This step taken by Japan had significant political implications for Japan's Korean policy.

It has been generally known that Korea secretly dispatched three envoys to The Hague and that even though their participation in the conference was frustrated by Japan's interference, the envoys did not give up their activities and continued to appeal to the international community about the illegality of the Korea-Japan Treaty of 1905. The overlap between the patriotic image of the secret envoys and Lee Chun's tragic death in The Hague had evoked compassionate sentiments towards Korea since then. The heroism of the envoys and their passionate activities were emphasized in the dichotomy of Japanese oppression and Korean resistance in scholarship.¹ This approach, I believe, is significantly limited in terms of characterizing the activities of the Korean delegation that occurred amidst the arrangement of international relations during the peri-

¹ Yu Ja-hu, *Biography of Mr. Lee Joon, Tongbang Munhwasa*, 1947; Shin Ji-hyun, "Appealing to the World: Emperor Gojong's Secret Envoys," in *Modern Korean History* 3, Shin'gu Munhwasa, 1969; Yoon Byeong-seok, *Biography of Lee Sang-seol*, Ilchogak, 1984; Kim Ki-seok, "Emperor Gwangmu's Diplomacy to Defend Sovereignty, 1905-1907: Focusing on the Declaration of Nullity of the Eulsa Treaty," in Lee Tae-jin, ed., *Japan's Occupation of the Korean Empire*, Kkach'i, 1995; Park Hee-ho, 1999, "Dispatch of Special Envoys to the Hague Peace Conference," *Korean History* 43; Yoon Byeong-ui, 2007, "The Family and Activities of Lee Beom-jin, Ki-jong, and Wi-jong," in *The Life and Anti-Japanese Independence Movement of Lee Beom-jin, the First Resident Minister to Russia*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2003; Lee Myung-hwa, "The Influence of the Hague Envoys on Overseas Independence Movements," *Han'guk tongnip'undongsa yon'gu*. 29; Seo Young-hee, 2008, "Emperor Gojong's Diplomatic Strategy and the Dispatch of Envoys to the Second Hague Peace Conference," in Lee Tae-jin et al. eds., *Meeting the Hague Envoys a Hundred Years Later*, T'aehaksa.

od. As the narrative of the heroism of the envoys were emphasized, the response of the Japanese government to this Korean strategy was simplistically left out and portrayed as the dark side of a valorous challenge.

In 2007, around the centennial of the dispatch of the delegation to The Hague, Korean scholarship made various efforts to overcome the limitations of conventional understanding and placed the event under the complex context of international relations of the time.² In the process, they richly explored the dynamics of power relations that prevented Korea from participating in the conference, the policies of the host country Russia, and Japan's response to the diplomatic crisis. However, there is relatively less research on the response of Japan, which had a direct stake in the envoys' activities.

Therefore, this article will examine Japan's response to the Korean delegation in three parts: first, Japan's proactive detection of Kojong's dispatch of the envoys at The Hague; second, the activities of the Korean envoys at The Hague and the response of the Japanese plenipotentiaries; and third, Japan's reinforcement of control over Korea by way of using that case. For this purpose, this study will use Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy for The Hague International Peace Conferences (海牙萬國平和會議日本外交文書), Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy (日本外交文書), which contains diplomatic documents of Japan and related countries related to the Second Hague Peace Conference, and *Osaka Daily News* (大阪毎日新聞), which was the only Japanese media organization at the time to send a correspondent to report on the activities of the Korean envoys. Through this study, I contend, Japan's response to the Korean

² Three international symposia were organized to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the dispatch of The Hague envoys in 2007. The Korean Independence Movement Research Center, the Independence Hall of Korea held the 'International Symposium on the 100th Anniversary of the Korean Delegation to The Hague: The Historical Significance of the Peace Conference and the 100th Anniversary of the Korean Delegation to The Hague.' And, the Centennial Commemoration of Patriotic Martyr Lee Chun Project Committee hosted the 'The Centennial Commemoration of Patriotic Martyr Lee Chun Conference: Lee Chun and the Second Peace Conference.' Last, the Research Institute of Korean Studies, Korea University organized the 'International Conference on the 50th Anniversary of the Research Institute of Korean Studies: The 1907 Hague Peace Conference, the Korean Empire, and the Great Powers.'

delegation and Japan's policy towards Korea, aimed at "annexing Korea," will be more clearly comprehended.

Japan's Proactive Detection of the Korean Delegation's Dispatch to The Hague

The Second Hague Peace Conference was initiated by U.S. President T. Roosevelt in 1904 during the Russo-Japanese War. However, at the request of Russia and with the concession of the United States, Russia hosted the second conference following the first conference in 1898. In this process, consultation between Russia and the United States was of crucial importance since the United States was the original initiator of the second conference.

In April 1906, Russia sent the U.S. State Department a proposal for a second peace conference, in which the main goal was geared towards finding a peaceful solution to international conflicts, and listed 47 countries, including Korea, as invitees.³ At the time, the Russian plan had already been shared with Korea. When Kojong sent a French school teacher, E. Martel (1874-1949) to the Russian ambassador in China at the end of October 1905, Martel was informed that Russia, recognizing the inviolability of the sovereignty of the Empire of Korea, would invite Korean representatives to the conference at The Hague and help raise the voice of Korean independence at the international conference. Additionally, the invitation letter in a form of diplomatic document was already delivered to the Korean Ambassador to Russia on October 3rd and the Russian government informed the Emperor that it still recognizes Lee Pömjin (1852-1911) as a legitimate diplomat of Korea.⁴ This cordial relation between Korea and Russia suggests that the keynote of Russia's East Asian policy—expanding its influence in Asia while keeping Japan in check—

³ Yun Byeong-seok, "The Second Hague Peace Conference and the Historical Significance of the Korean Special Envoy," *Han 'gukdongnip 'undongsa yön 'gu* 29 (2007): 7-8.

⁴ Seo Young-hee, "Emperor Gojong's Diplomatic Strategy and the Dispatch of Envoys to the Second Hague Peace Conference," 69.

had not changed since the Russo-Japanese War and the Korean question assumed the central stage.

The Russian policy, however, changed when A. Izvolsky (1856-1919) took over as Russia's new foreign minister who supported the shift of the focal point of Russian foreign policy back to Europe and sought to improve relations with Japan in East Asia. The issue of Letter of Credence revolving the Consul-General in Korea, G. D. Planson (1824-1919), from early 1906 was resolved and the settlement of the issue became a symbolic event in the shift of Russia's policy toward Japan. Right after the Russo-Japanese War, Russia recognized that Korea lost its diplomatic rights under the Korea-Japan Treaty of 1905 and withdrew the Russian Embassy in Korea. Still, after sending Planson to Korea as a consulate general in charge of protecting Russian people in Korea, the Russians would regard the Emperor of Korea as the recipient of Planson's Letter of Credence on the ground that Korea remained a sovereign nation without diplomatic power of its own. In response, accusing Russia of violating the Treaty of Portsmouth, denying the Korea-Japan Treaty of 1905, and ultimately refusing its loss of Korea's diplomatic rights, Japan strongly demanded that the recipient of the credence be changed to the Emperor of Japan who subrogates Korea's diplomacy. The two sides confronted with each other over the issue for some time. However, after the appointment of Izvolsky as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Russia changed the recipient of the document to the Emperor of Japan at Japan's insistence, sent it to Japan, and ended the diplomatic tension between the two countries.⁵

Coincidentally, Japan was first alerted to Korea's plan to participate in the peace conference by Russia. After the issue of Planson's credential was being finalized, in June 1906, Russia, through G. Bakhmeteff (1847-1928), the Russian legation in Japan, inquired of the Japanese gov-

⁵ Choi Deok-gyu, 2006, "Izvolsky's 'Diplomatic Revolution' and Russia's East Asia Policy (1905-1910): Focusing on the Russo-Japanese Agreements," in *Tongbua yöksanonch'ong* 9; Kim Jong-heon, 2011, "A Study on Planson's Arrival at His Post as the Consul-General in Seoul and Matter of Granting Exequatur," in *Sach'ong* 72.

ernment whether Korea would participate in the Second Peace Conference. Japan replied that Korea would not attend and demanded a guarantee from Russia—the host country of the conference—that Korea would be excluded. On October 9, Bakhemeteff responded that Korea would not be invited.⁶ However, this meant that Korea would not be invited, not that Korea would not be allowed to participate, so the Japanese government decided not to rely on the Russian government's assurances that Korea would be absent in the conference.

In fact, on October 24th, Kusakabe Sankurou (1870-?), the Chargé d'affaires ad interim at the Japanese Embassy to Italy reported that Korea was still listed as an invitee on the list of countries that Russia sent to the Italian government for the peace conference but was classified as a country that had not responded to the invitation. In November, Japan's Ambassador to the United States, Aoki Shuzo (1844-1914), forwarded a similar report.⁷ Based on these reports, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Hayashi Tadasu (1850-1913) once again called on Russia to exclude Korea from the conference.⁸ However, the Japanese government was unable to receive any clear answer from Russia.

In response to the ambiguous Russian attitude, Ito Hirobumi and

⁶ Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ed., 1955, *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy for the Hague International Peace Conferences*, vol. 2, Japan International Association, (hereafter referred to as *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy for the Hague International Peace Conferences*, vol. 2), #62 "Response to the Russian Minister in Japan Regarding Korea's Non-participation in the Second International Peace Conference," #66 "Response Notification Regarding the Method of Accession to the Treaty on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes," #67 "Verification of Japan's Response Concerning the Second International Peace Conference," 112-116.

⁷ *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy for the Hague International Peace Conferences*, vol. 2, #74 "The Russian Government's Proposal Regarding the Second International Peace Conference and the Japanese Government's Response (Part 2)," #82 "Documents Exchanged Between the U.S. and Russian Governments Regarding the Convening of the Second International Peace Conference," 121, 129-130.

⁸ *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy for the Hague International Peace Conferences*, vol. 2, #80 "Response to the Russian Government's Proposal Regarding the Agenda for the Second International Peace Conference and the Method of Accession to the Treaty on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes," 126-127.

the Japanese government were concerned that Russia would use the issue of Korean participation in the conference as a diplomatic leverage to conclude a Russo-Japanese treaty even after the Russo-Japanese War. With the rise of German expansion in West Asia, centered on the ‘3B Policy,’ Russia shifted the focus of its foreign policy back to Europe. Russia approached the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale, designed to isolate Germany internationally, and established the Triple Entente while Russia and France were engaged in a policy of appeasement toward Japan in order to eliminate the threat from Japan in Asia located in the rear part of the Great Containment of Germany. In actuality, France had been engaged in the Franco-Japanese negotiation since November 1906 and Russia in the Russo-Japanese negotiations since February 1907.

Ito sought to take advantage of this situation to secure Japanese control over Korea. Through these negotiations among the Great Powers in Europe, he hoped to secure not only Korea’s exclusion from the conference, but also, if possible, Russia’s recognition of Japan’s annexation of Korea. However, Russia, knowing Japan’s objectives, did not guarantee Korea’s exclusion from the conference but demanded a quid pro quo for the ‘future development’ of relations between Korea and Japan. Specifically, Russia demanded recognition of Russia’s superior status in the Chinese borderlands outside of Mongolia and Manchuria.

As early as August 1906, however, Russia’s new foreign minister, Izvolsky, had warned Planson, appointed consul general in Korea in August 1906, not to interfere in Japan’s Korean policy and not to do anything that would arouse suspicion or displeasure from Japan. Izvolsky, then, instructed Aleksandr Nelidov (1838-1910), the head of the Russian delegation and chairman of the conference, not to contact a Korean envoy. Although Russia took this new step, it never provided the Japanese government with a firm guarantee that the Korean envoy would not be allowed to participate in the peace conference, which is a clear indication that it might use the matter of Korean envoy as a leverage in the new

Russian-Japanese negotiations.⁹

When negotiations with Russia reached an impasse, Ito attempted to exert pressure by finalizing a Franco-Japanese Treaty before the conference.¹⁰ As a consequence, Japan's primary focus in preparing for the conference shifted from originally pursuing peaceful resolution of international conflicts and disarmament, to preventing the Korean envoys' participation and securing the conclusion of the Franco-Japanese Treaty before the conference. In anticipation of the peace conference, the Japanese government established the Preparatory Committee for The Hague Peace Conference. This committee, led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, initiated inquiries with Russia and other relevant countries regarding Korea's invitation to the conference. Additionally, they closely monitored the activities of the suspected Korean figures who were expected to serve as envoys. At that juncture, the Japanese government possessed some foreknowledge of Korea's endeavor to dispatch a special envoy. However, it lacked precise identification of the Korean government's envoy. With the passage of time, it gradually acquired a more comprehensive understanding of the unfolding situation.

On May 19, 1907, Ito dispatched a confidential telegram to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Hayashi concerning the information that he gained. The contents are as follows.:

The covert scheme, orchestrated by the Korean emperor via foreign countries, has been on the move once the preceding year, and he has endeavored to reclaim its sovereignty through exclusive reliance on the

⁹ Park Jong-hyo, ed. and trans., 2002, *Summary of Korea-related Documents in the Russian State Archives, Korea Foundation for International Culture Exchange*, 767; *Diplomatic Documents of Japan*, vol. 40-1, #438 "Report on the Russian Foreign Minister's Remarks Regarding the Korean Emperor's Secret Envoys," 428.

¹⁰ *Diplomatic Documents of Japan*, vol. 40-1, #120 "Report on the Reasons for Delay in the Opponent's Response Regarding the Japan-Russia Treaty," #122 "Request for Clarification Regarding the Division Line of Japanese and Russian Spheres of Influence," #123 "Japanese Proposal Regarding the Japan-Russia Treaty and Russia's Counterproposal," #125 "Opinions Submitted Regarding Mongolia in Russia's Counterproposal to Japan's Proposal for the Japan-Russia Treaty," 120-122.

support of Russia and France... Previously, the French had declined to acquiesce during negotiations mediated by Yi Yongik (1854-1907) while the Russian consul had acceded to the request. By the time the peace conference convened, the Korean government asked both the Russian and French consuls to recommend the American, Hurlburt, funded with a substantial amount of money by the Korean government, to their respective governments. The French consul deemed it a futile stratagem and dismissed it, and this diplomatic reaction aligned with an official order by the French government. However, the Russians purportedly acquiesced to the request... It was by means of intelligence provided by the French Consul General that we could know more clearly about the Korean Emperor's financial and strategic intentions and we also received identical intelligence from other foreign sources... So it is quite unfortunate that we haven't concluded negotiations with Russia and France at this point. It would be very good if (negotiations) could be concluded before the peace conference, especially with France. Thus, it is indeed regrettable that negotiations with Russia and France remain unresolved at present. It would be highly advantageous if such negotiations could be finalized prior to the peace conference, particularly with France. Given the relatively straightforward nature of negotiations with France, I am inclined to endorse the acceptance of the last-minute offer extended by the French Foreign Minister. This issue carries significant sensitivity, yet I beseech you to disseminate it among your cabinet members and esteemed elder statesmen within the government.¹¹

As previously demonstrated, Ito possessed detailed information into the circumstances surrounding Hulbert (1863-1949)'s dispatch to the peace conference, gleaned from Belin, the French consul in Korea, and other foreign entities. Moreover, he deemed the issue significant enough to discuss with the cabinet and esteemed statesmen. In the aforemen-

¹¹ *Diplomatic Documents of Japan*, vol. 40-1, #436 "Dispatch of Korean Emperor's Secret Envoy 'Halbert' to the Hague Peace Conference," 427.

tioned telegram, Ito expressed confidence in the Russian government's willingness to accommodate Korea's request, and ardently advocated for the conclusion of a Franco-Japanese treaty prior to the peace conference. This idea stems from the understanding that a resolution between France and Japan ahead of the peace conference would bolster Japan's stance against Korea, at the conference by way of securing the collaboration of Britain and France—the two principal powers in disarmament matters.

One week later, on the 24th, a notification from Nomura Motonobu, the trade attaché stationed in Vladivostok, Russia, addressed to Tsuruhara Sadakichi (1857-1914), Secretary of State at the Japanese Resident-General of Korea, regarding the dispatch of a different Korean envoy from Hulbert, was transmitted to the Japanese Resident-General of Korea, as follows:

As a result of the meeting with Lee Chun, La Yuseok, Lee Bumyoon, and Lee Sangsöl, the Koreans referred to earlier in Vladivostok resolved to dispatch a delegation to directly petition the Russian government regarding the future of Korea. Three among them—Lee Chun, Lee Sangsöl, and the anonymous son of Cha Seokbo—departed for the Russian capital on the 21st of the current month. ... These delegates will also capitalize on the convening of the Peace Conference in The Hague to advocate for Korean independence to the representatives of the Great Powers.¹²

Despite the detailed report provided by Nomura concerning the Korean envoys, neither the Japanese government nor the Resident-General of Korea applied any pressure on the Korean government to preempt the departure of the envoys or to impede Korea's endeavor to engage in the peace conference. However, they persisted in their endeavor to thwart Korea's dispatch of an envoy. The Japanese government and the Resi-

¹² National Institute of Korean History, ed., *Documents of the Governor-General's Office*, vol. 3, "Regarding the Cooperation of Former Korean Officials Lee Sang-jwa, Lee Joon, and Lee Beom-yun," 168.

dent-General of Korea regarded this matter with utmost significance, indicative of Japan's concerted effort to leverage this incident to bolster its dominance over Korea.

Tsuzuki Keiroku (1861-1923) and Kurachi Tetsukichi (1870-1944) were selected by the Japanese government to tackle this diplomatic issue. Tsuzuki, an esteemed bureaucrat, had been handpicked by Inoue Kaoru (1835-1915) and had garnered recognition from Ito, Inoue, and Yamagata Aritomo (1838-1922)—three paramount figures in Japan's political landscape at the time. He was held in such high regard by Ito that when *Rikken Siyukai* (Association of Friends of Constitutional Government) was established, he was designated by Ito as one of the thirteen founding members. In 1905, he arrived in Korea to aid Ito in his capacity as the general secretary of the Privy Council of Japan, where he played a pivotal role in orchestrating the signing of the Korea-Japan Treaty of 1905. Subsequently, he was also instrumental in crafting the framework for the Resident-General of Korea and its corresponding regional administrative offices.¹³ Kurachi had received acclaim as a distinguished bureaucrat of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ever since his appointment by Tsuzuki. He has concurrently held positions as the secretary of the Resident-General of Korea and as an attaché to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since the inception of the Resident-General of Korea. In this capacity, he has served as a liaison between the two entities, even playing a pivotal role in mediating the 1905-1906 School Dropout Movement led by Korean students, which was financially backed by the Korean imperial house, in Japan. Kurachi also served as Ito's secretary whenever Ito was in Japan, and it was Kurachi who assumed responsibility for managing the aftermath of the assassination of Ahn Chunggün (1879-1910) in 1909; additionally, he was tasked with formulating the subsequent plan for Japan's "annexation" of Korea.¹⁴ In essence, Tsuzuki and Kurachi possessed ex-

¹³ Regarding Tsuchizaki, 1926, please refer to Sawada Akira, *Biography of Tsuchizaki Keiroku*, Kinko-kai.

¹⁴ Regarding Kurachi, please refer to Kurachi Tetsukichi, "The Process of Korean Consolidation," Research Division, Fourth Section, Investigation Department, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Af-

tensive knowledge of international law, exhibited a profound understanding of the core of Korea-Japan relations during that period, and enjoyed a close relationship with Ito.

In August 1906, following discussions with Prime Minister Saionji Kinmochi (1849-1940) and the President of the Privy Council of Japan Yamagata, Hayashi proposed Tsuzuki, the general secretary of the council, as Japan's plenipotentiary for the peace conference. Hayashi charged Tsuzuki with all preparatory tasks, including the selection of the plenipotentiary team, for the conference.¹⁵ Tsuzuki promptly initiated preparations and in November established the Preparatory Committee for the Second Peace Conference within the Japanese government, assuming the role of chairman. He had previously designated Kurachi as one of its members.

Subsequently, Kurachi collaborated with Tsuzuki and played a proactive role in shaping the agenda for the conference. The committee, overseen by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, convened members of the preparatory committee and managers of pertinent ministries once or twice weekly prior to the departure of the Japanese delegation. The purpose was to deliberate on pertinent matters and consolidate Japan's stance on the conference agenda.¹⁶ The Japanese government appointed the following members as plenipotentiaries to represent Japan at the Second Hague Conference in April 1907.¹⁷

fairs, 1939 (Archives of the Diplomatic Documents, #N.2.1.0.4-1); Han Seong-min, 2010, "The Plan Formulation and Activity for the Japanese Annexation of Korea by Kurachi-Tetsukich," in *Han 'guk gŭnhyŏndaesa yŏn'gu* 54, 2010.

¹⁵ Letter from Lin Tong to Tsuchizaki Keiroku, August 9, 1906. This writing is included in Sawada Akira, *Biography of Tsuchizaki Keiroku*, 212.

¹⁶ *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy for the Hague International Peace Conferences*, vol. 2, #163 "Resolution of the Preparatory Committee of the Second International Peace Conference," 218-219. The structure of establishing a preparatory committee, centered on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to make arrangements for international conferences ahead of time has since become a standard practice of the Japanese government. Reference to Tadao Yamakawa, *My Toes*, 1962, 31, *Yamakawa Tadao Related Documents*, Reel NO.5, held at the National Diet Library in Japan, Archives Division.

¹⁷ Official Gazette of Japan, April 20, 1907, "Appointment of Delegates to the Second International

[Table 1] Japanese plenipotentiaries to the Second Hague Peace Conference

Envoy Status	Incumbency	Name	Notes
First Delegate Plenipotentiary	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary	Tsuzuki Keiroku	
Second Delegate Plenipotentiary	Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at The Hague	Sato Aimaro	Minister Plenipotentiary to the Netherland
Technical Delegate	Major General of the Army	Akiyama Yoshihuru	
	Rear Admiral of the Navy	Shimamura Hayao	
	Legal Advisor to Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs	H. W. Denison	
Secretary of the Delegation	Councilor to Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs	Kurachi Tetsukichi	Lead Secretary
	Councilor of Imperial War Ministry	Yoshimura Yasozo	
	Councilor of Imperial Navy Ministry	Yamakawa Tadao	
Secretary of the Delegation	Commander, Naval Attache to the Imperial Embassy	Moriyama Keisaburou	
	Major	Takatsuka Ksuyoshi	
	First Secretary of the Imperial Embassy at Paris	Tatsuke Shichita	Affiliated to the Embassy of Japan in France
	Third Secretary of the Imperial Legation at The Hague	Nagaoka Haruzaku	Affiliated with the Embassy of Japan in the Netherlands

As per the arranged scheme, Tsuzuki was appointed as ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary while Kurachi was designated as the delegation's principal attendant. The initial directive outlined in their or-

 Peace Conference.”; *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy for the Hague International Peace Conferences*, vol. 2, #172 “Submission of Imperial Commissioner Appointments for Participation in the Second International Peace Conference,” 224-226.

ders stipulated that “Korea would be prohibited from asserting its independent status at the Second Peace Conference.”¹⁸

In this way, Japan was well aware of Korea's move to send an envoy, and the first article of the Japanese delegation's instructions was to prevent Korea from participating in the Peace Conference. Nevertheless, the Japanese Resident-General of Korea and the Japanese government refrained from intervening to dissuade Emperor Kojong from sending an envoy to The Hague. There also appears to have been a pragmatic acknowledgment of the challenge posed by the Korean strategy. Despite Japan's rigorous surveillance of Emperor Kojong and the Korean government, it was virtually unfeasible for Japan to detect and intercept every dispatch of Korean envoys through diverse channels. There existed no practical means for Japan to impede the Korean diplomatic initiative, particularly if they were to dispatch a foreigner like Hulbert as their envoy. Hence, instead of preemptively obstructing the envoy's dispatch, Japan concentrated its endeavors on establishing a framework to prohibit anyone from attending the conference, irrespective of the identity of the appointed Korean envoy. Japan deliberately overlooked the actions of the Korean envoy, thereby leveraging this circumstance to bolster its authority over Korea.

Reactive Activities of the Japanese Plenipotentiaries at The Hague

The Japanese plenipotentiary embarked from Tokyo on April 27, 1907, traversing Russia and Germany *en route* to The Hague in the Netherlands, the venue of the Peace Conference, where they arrived on June 2nd. Shortly after inaugurating their offices, Tsuzuki and Kurachi embarked on week-long business trips to London and Paris. Tsuzuki provided a straightforward rationale for the journey, stating it was primarily for

¹⁸ *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy for the Hague International Peace Conferences*, vol. 2, #174 “Request for Discussion on the Draft Instructions for Delegates and Alternate Delegates to the Second International Peace Conference, and Decision Thereon,” 226-227.

consultations regarding an upcoming meeting.¹⁹ However, upon reaching The Hague, the Japanese plenipotentiaries proceeded to travel to the third countries—Great Britain and France— after not having received confirmation from either the chair country, Russia, or the host country, the Netherlands, regarding the fundamental mandate that Korea would be barred from participating in the conference. This hasty itinerary suggests a profound and multifaceted purpose behind the trip.

In this context, the actions of Kurachi and Tsuzuki prior to the departure of the Japanese Plenipotentiary warrant attention. Kurachi undertook a sudden trip to Korea in late March and early April. Given the transportation conditions of that era, the Japanese Plenipotentiaries had to begin their journey from Japan no later than April to ensure arrival in The Hague before June 15th, the commencement date of the Peace Conference. The gravity of the circumstances can be seen by an immediate telegram from the Japanese Foreign Ministry on April 2nd to Kurachi, who remained in Korea on a business excursion, urging his prompt return home. This urgency stemmed from the imminent Peace Conference scheduled for June 15th, even though his departure date had not yet been finalized.²⁰ This marked the period during which Japan's stance on the Peace Conference was being solidified by the Preparatory Committee for the Peace Conference while the official designation and departure date of the Japanese Plenipotentiary were being determined. It is significant that Kurachi, a member of the Preparatory Committee for the Peace Conference and the chief attendant of the Plenipotentiary, stayed in Korea at the pivotal juncture. On April 22nd, before the departure of the Japanese Plenipotentiary, Tsuzuki submitted the following request to the Foreign Minister:

¹⁹ *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy for the Hague International Peace Conferences*, vol. 2, #184 “Report on the Departure of the Imperial Commissioners and Their Delegation to The Hague for the Second International Peace Conference, and Their Business Arrangements Including Their Visit to London and Paris,” 260-261.

²⁰ *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy for the Hague International Peace Conferences*, vol. 2, #161 “Response Regarding the Date of the Second International Peace Conference and the Departure Date of the Japanese Delegates to the Conference,” 218.

When journeying to The Hague for the forthcoming Second Peace Conference, which will convene in the Netherlands, individuals, myself included, within the plenipotentiary mission may necessitate travels to London and Paris for consultations, alongside selected members of the expert committee and entourage accompanying the mission; moreover, should any business matters arise during the conference proceedings, individuals, including myself, may be required to travel to diverse locations intermittently; such requests may also be granted prior approval.²¹

In the aforementioned official document, Tsuzuki petitioned the Japanese government for the authority to undertake frequent travels, including discretionary trips to locations beyond his designated jurisdiction, at any juncture during the Peace Conference. Importantly, he sought exemption from the obligation of pre-reporting the purpose of such travels to the Japanese government. It is profoundly perplexing that an ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, designated with the specific task of attending the Peace Conference, would petition the government for discretionary authority to travel beyond his designated duties, especially five days before his scheduled departure. Furthermore, considering that Tsuzuki and Kurachi promptly traveled to London and Paris upon their arrival in The Hague, with only a brief notification, it appears that the Japanese government acquiesced to this perplexing request.

During this period, Britain strongly advocated for the Triple Entente involving Britain, France, and Russia, aiming to isolate Germany in Europe while securing Japan's cooperation alongside France and Russia. Ito and heads of the Japanese government shared the objective of finalizing both the Russo-Japanese Treaty and the Franco-Japanese Treaty, envisioning a resolution to the Korean question and the issuance of Japanese government bonds in France. Particularly, Japanese Resident-General Ito was eager for a swift conclusion of the Franco-Japanese Treaty, es-

²¹ *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy for the Hague International Peace Conferences*, vol. 2, #175 "Request Concerning the Temporary Business Trips of the Delegation during the Participation in the Second Peace Conference," 253.

pecially given the impasse in Russo-Japanese negotiations due to Japan's insistence on 'the future development of relations between Japan and Korea' and Russia's insistence on 'Russia's superior status in Outer Mongolia.' When it comes to the Franco-Japanese agreement, its progress was hindered until April due to the unresolved issue of determining the sphere of influence over Fujian Province in Qing China.

Due to the constraints of available sources, it remains elusive to ascertain the precise purpose or details of Kurachi's visit to Korea and Tsuzuki's frequent travel requests. Nevertheless, considering the context of the Franco-Japanese and Russo-Japanese negotiations, along with Ito's urgency in concluding the Franco-Japanese Treaty, we can generally deduce the underlying motives behind the perplexing actions of Kurachi and Tsuzuki prior to their departure. It can be inferred that Kurachi traveled to Korea to receive confidential directives from Ito endeavored to expedite the resolution of the Franco-Japanese negotiations and address the handling of the Korean delegation while Tsuzuki made the aforementioned requests to facilitate the execution of these instructions. Hence, it is surmised that their journey to London and Paris aimed to swiftly finalize the Franco-Japanese Treaty and secure diplomatic support from Great Britain as Japan's ally and have France, through the conclusion of the treaty, to oppose Korea's attendance in the conference.

Shortly following their journey, the Franco-Japanese Treaty was signed on June 10th, 1907.²² Upon Tsuzuki and Kurachi's return to The Hague, the Japanese delegation engaged themselves in diplomatic endeavors to sway Russia and the Netherlands into obstructing Korea's participation in the peace conference. On the eve of the conference's commencement, confirmation was received from Russia that Korea had never been extended an invitation to the conference.²³ Despite the assurances

²² *Diplomatic Documents of Japan* 40-1, #88 "Report on the Conclusion of the Japan-France Agreement," 84.

²³ *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy for the Hague International Peace Conferences*, vol. 2, #197 "Report on the Signing of the Protocol of the 60th Article of the Treaty for the Peaceful Resolution of International Disputes," 269-270.

provided by Russia, the Japanese plenipotentiaries remained vigilant regarding any developments concerning the Korean delegation. By the opening day of the conference on June 15th, there had still been no updates.

The Korean delegation arrived in The Hague around the 25th, 10 days after the commencement of the peace conference. On the 27th, they dispatched a Notice of Appeal to the plenipotentiaries representing all participating nations except Japan and its ally Great Britain. In this communication, they sharply denounced the legality of the Korea-Japan Treaty of 1905 and decried Japanese aggression, acting in the capacity of the Korean Plenipotentiary.²⁴ The Japanese plenipotentiaries were informed of the arrival of the Korean envoy in The Hague by way of intelligence provided by a correspondent, Takaishi Shingoro (1878-1967), who was the sole journalist dispatched from the entire Japanese press corps to cover the Second Peace Conference, from the *Osaka Daily News*.

Around June 28th, when the official notification from the Korean delegation was likely dispatched to the plenipotentiaries of the participating countries,²⁵ Takaishi was engaged in reporting on the activities of the British and American plenipotentiaries. During this time, he fielded a query from a correspondent from the *New York Herald* concerning the arrival of a Korean delegation. Concerned, he inquired once more about their location and identities but was unable to obtain any specifics. However, recalling a remark made by Shimamura Hayao (1858-1923), an expert of the Japanese Plenipotentiary Delegation, regarding the potential dispatch of a Korean delegation, Takaishi promptly approached Kurachi, the Lead Attendant of the Japanese Plenipotentiary, for clarification. Kurachi's response mirrored almost exactly his initial reply following the inquiry from the reporter of the *New York Herald*. He canvassed the ho-

²⁴ *Diplomatic Documents of Japan* 40-1, #439 "Regarding the Efforts of Three Koreans Who Arrived in The Hague to Attend the Peace Conference as Representatives," 428-429.

²⁵ *Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy for the Hague International Peace Conferences*, vol. 2, #197 "Report on the Signing of the Protocol of the 60th Article of the Treaty for the Peaceful Resolution of International Disputes," 269-270.

tels in downtown of The Hague, then a small city with a population of 150,000, and located the lodging of the Korean delegation within mere 30 minutes.²⁶

The arrival and endeavors of the Korean delegation in The Hague were promptly communicated via telegram to the Japanese government and the Resident-General of Korea on July 29th by the Japanese Plenipotentiary. Subsequently, on July 3rd, this information was disseminated to the broader Japanese populace through the *Osaka Daily News*.²⁷ During that period, the primary focus of the news concerning the Korean delegation revolved around its arrival, the dispatch of the Notice of Appeal to the plenipotentiaries of the participating countries, save Great Britain, and the presence of three unidentified Korean individuals in it.²⁸

Upon being informed of the arrival of the Korean delegation at The Hague on July 2nd via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ito petitioned the ministry to ascertain the identities of the three Korean envoys, their association with Hulbert, and the connection between their activities and the intentions of the Korean emperor. Ito even endeavored to exploit this diplomatic situation as a pretext to wrestle control from Korea over matters of taxation, jurisdiction, or military authority.²⁹ Even before receiving Ito's request, the Japanese plenipotentiary in The Hague had already identified the Korean envoys and obtained knowledge of the contents of the notice, their travel itineraries to The Hague, and their then locations. This information was relayed to Japan on June 30th, and surveillance of their activities was maintained thereafter.³⁰

²⁶ *Osaka Mainichi Newspaper*, January 22, 1930, "The Incident of Prince Yi's Secret Envoy - The Important Role I Played (Part 1)".

²⁷ *Osaka Mainichi Newspaper*, July 3, 1907, "Telegram from The Hague - Korean Activities" / "Appeal of a Fallen Nation" and July 4, "Telegram from The Hague - Continued Report on Korean Activities".

²⁸ *Diplomatic Documents of Japan* 40-1, #439 "Regarding the Efforts of Three Koreans Who Arrived in The Hague to Attend the Peace Conference as Representatives," 428-429.

²⁹ *Diplomatic Documents of Japan* 40-1, #443 "Inquiry Regarding the Names and Qualifications of the Korean Emperor's Secret Envoys in The Hague and Measures Concerning Korea," 430-431.

³⁰ *Collection of Confidential Documents of the Japanese Government Related to the Hague Peace*

The Japanese Plenipotentiaries responded to the Korean protest through two distinct approaches. Initially, they leveraged diplomatic channels to methodically obstruct the participation of the Korean envoys in the peace conference. Additionally, they established indirect communication with the Korean envoys through Takaishi, aiming to surveil their activities and discern their intentions and future plans. Most significantly, the Japanese delegation engaged in discussions with the government of the Netherlands, the Russian delegation, and other influential delegations from major countries in order to secure their rejection of the Korean appeal. Furthermore, upon establishing contact with individuals who had been approached by the Korean envoys, Japanese diplomats commenced thorough investigations into 1) the nature of the relationship between the Korean envoys and Hulbert, 2) any potential direct involvement of the Korean emperor in this affair, and 3) if such involvement existed, whether the envoys possessed credentials from the Korean emperor. Throughout this investigative process, the Japanese plenipotentiaries refrained from direct engagement with the Korean envoys; rather, this responsibility fell to Takaishi.

From the moment he discerned the presence of the Korean envoys, Takaishi made regular visits to the De Jong Hotel, where the envoys were quartered, to confer with them and provide the Japanese plenipotentiary with updates on their activities. Additionally, Kurachi tasked Takaishi with the two objectives of 1) authenticating the letter of credence carried by the Korean envoys and, if available, obtaining photographs of them, and 2) persuading the Korean envoys to request a meeting with the Japanese plenipotentiaries. However, Takaishi's endeavors proved futile as the Korean delegation adamantly refused to comply with the latter request.³¹

Conference, "Telegram Received No. 2651," page 35 and "Telegram Received No. 2648," page 37; *Diplomatic Documents of Japan* 40-1, #442 "Investigation into the Actions of the Korean Emperor's Secret Envoys in The Hague," 430.

³¹ *Osaka Mainichi Newspaper*, July 6th: "Telegram from The Hague - Status of Korean Trust," July 8th: "Telegram from The Hague - Mr. Kurachi and Koreans," and January 23, 1930: "The Inci-

The Japanese plenipotentiaries were unsuccessful in substantiating the authenticity of the credentials as incriminating evidence against the Korean government, nor were they able to sway the envoys to align with Japanese interests. However, this setback did not deter the Japanese plenipotentiaries from dissociating the diplomatic activities of the Korean envoys from the Japanese agenda in the peace conference. On July 3rd, Tsuzuki conveyed to Ito and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that due to the Korean envoys' deliberate avoidance of Japanese diplomats, direct meetings with them were currently improbable. Nevertheless, he proposed to enact all conceivable preliminary measures to ensure that neither the Dutch government nor the various delegations would entertain their appeals. He reported to Ito and Ministry of Foreign Affairs that this strategy also helped mitigate any potential adverse repercussions for Japan in The Hague.³²

Takaishi's daily reports on the precise schedule and movements of the Korean envoys enabled the Japanese plenipotentiaries to anticipate their forthcoming actions, proactively respond to them, and effectively thwart the Korean envoys' endeavors to engage in the peace conference.

The Korean envoys' endeavors to unequivocally assert Korea's sovereignty and advocate for Korea's representation at the Second Peace Conference were impeded by Japanese interference in the end. As the Korean envoys shifted to an alternate strategy, geared toward publicizing the illegality of the Korea-Japan Treaty of 1905 through media channels, Japanese sabotage extended to include the media outlets that began to take notice of the Korean envoys.

The primary media that exhibited considerable interest in the Korean envoys at that time was the *Courrier de la Conference*, which was published in The Hague by the pro-Russian British journalist William T. Stead (1849-1912). With Stead's assistance, the Korean envoys were undeterred by their exclusion from the peace conference. Instead, they re-

 dent of Prince Yi's Secret Envoy - The Important Role I Played (Part 2).”

³² *Diplomatic Documents of Japan* 40-1, #446 “Report on the Arrival in The Hague of Koreans and the Relationship with ‘Halbert’ and the Korean Emperor,” 432.

mained active in the media, composing letters to the editor of the newspaper to raise their voice regarding the illegality of the Treaty of Versailles. Furthermore, they participated in public rallies attended by influencers and social activists from various countries. In response, the Japanese plenipotentiaries employed a combination of appeasement and pressure tactics on Stead and the press.

In particular, on July 7th, Tsuzuki corresponded with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stating that he had taken “precautionary measures to hamper his pro-Russian stance that led him to become anti-Japanese.”³³ He did not delineate the proactive measures, but their nature can be reasonably inferred. At the time, Stead was in The Hague accompanied by his son, Alfred Stead (1877-1933), who, unlike his pro-Russian father, held the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in high regard.³⁴ This time was the final stage of the First Russo-Japanese Secret Agreement. In light of these circumstances, it seems that the preliminary steps here included both persuasion from Alfred Stead and pressure from the British and Russian governments on Stead.

Following the Japanese pre-emptive measures, Stead eventually reassured Tsuzuki of his sole intention of expressing sympathy towards the Korean envoys, subsequently disclosing information about them to the Japanese plenipotentiaries. During a public assembly on the 9th, he declared, “I extend my sympathies to the Koreans, but we have to give up on the mice under the cat’s chin. Don’t make the cat angry anymore”, aiming to thwart the anti-Japanese resolution pursued by the Korean envoys.³⁵

Japan’s efforts to obstruct Korea’s involvement in the peace conference were meticulously orchestrated. The Japanese plenipotentiaries

³³ *Diplomatic Documents of Japan* 40-1, #452 “Regarding the Actions of the Korean Emperor’s Secret Envoys in The Hague,” 434.

³⁴ *Osaka Mainichi Newspaper*, July 6, 1907, “Emperor of Korea’s Envoys and the Peace Conference”.

³⁵ *Collection of Confidential Documents of the Japanese Government Related to the Hague Peace Conference*, “Telegram Received No. 2808,” 105 and “Telegram Received No. 2814,” 108.

found themselves under immense strain, as they were inundated with inquiries from global newspaper correspondents and compelled to partake in a series of diverse gatherings hosted throughout the duration of the conference, in addition to engaging in conference negotiations. Consequently, the entourage of the Japanese plenipotentiaries became overburdened with numerous investigative tasks, resulting in the unfortunate demise of the two members.³⁶ This record provides a hint regarding the magnitude of Japanese sabotage during that period.

Nevertheless, what stands out significantly regarding the Japanese delegation's sabotage is the observation that, despite their vigorous efforts to obstruct the Korean delegation's involvement in the peace conference, they refrained from directly impeding the Korean delegation's operational endeavors. So, although the Korean diplomats were barred from accessing the peace conference, they nonetheless conducted their political affairs openly and without hindrance. The Korean delegation hoisted the national flag of Korea at the De Jong Hotel as a symbolic assertion of their status as representatives of Korea. Additionally, they engaged with numerous media outlets and notable figures to assert Korea's stance while denouncing Japan's unlawful aggression, particularly highlighting the unjustness related to the Korea-Japan Treaty of 1905.³⁷

On July 7th, Tsuzuki dispatched the subsequent telegram to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in response to the endeavors of the Korean delegation.

In accordance with Article 1 of the Korea-Japan Treaty signed on November 17, 1905, I deem it reasonable to promptly summon the Koreans to this location and request an explanation for their actions. [But, even if] They would decline to either appear at the (Japanese) Legation or provide their letters of credence, I will refrain from bringing to the attention of the Dutch Government the absence of valid official

³⁶ *Biography of Tsuchizaki Keiroku*, 210.

³⁷ *Osaka Mainichi Newspaper*, "Telegram from The Hague," July 1907 article reference.

credentials on their part. Furthermore, I will not request them to cease their agitation even if such a request was feasible.³⁸

In summary, the Japanese delegation actively campaigned with the governments of numerous participating countries, including the host country, the Netherlands, and the presiding country, Russia, to hinder Korea's participation in the conference. However, as indicated in Tsuzuki's statement, Japanese diplomacy adopted a stance whereby direct engagement with the Korean delegation was avoided and direct interference with their activities in The Hague was refrained. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Hayashi, adhering to Tsuzuki's strategic approach, instructed him to shun any action beyond admonition, assuring that appropriate measures would be enacted in due course.³⁹

Consolidating Control over Korea by Japan

Japan took no measures to obstruct the arrival of the Korean delegation at The Hague, nor did it intervene directly in their proceedings there. It seems to me that the Japanese response was driven by two political motives. First, by preventing the Korean delegation from participating in the conference, itself would have been a recognized endorsement of Japan's deprivation of Korea's diplomatic rights within the international community. Japan did revoke Korea's diplomatic privileges in accordance with the Treaty of Portsmouth. However, the extent of Japan's "protection, guidance, and supervision" over Korea, as stipulated in the treaty, remained ambiguous and thus insufficient to justify the immediate deprivation of Korea's diplomatic rights. Furthermore, since the legality of the Korea-Japan Treaty of 1905 had been internationally contested since its inception, Japan sought to garner international recognition of Korea as a

³⁸ *Diplomatic Documents of Japan* 40-1, #451 "Request for Instructions Regarding the Examination of the Korean Emperor's Trust Status Among Koreans in The Hague," 433-434.

³⁹ *Diplomatic Documents of Japan* 40-1, #457 "Instructions Regarding the Handling of the Korean Emperor's Secret Envoys in The Hague," page.

legitimate protectorate. Consequently, the issue of Korea's participation in the peace conference presented a favorable opportunity for Japan to address its concerns without necessitating special diplomatic consultations with the major world powers at that time.

The Hague Peace Conference could be described as a global assembly convened for the formulation and enforcement of international law. The primary aim driving the participation of numerous countries at The Hague was to institute legal frameworks on an international scale that would mitigate armed conflicts and foster global peace. As a result, the countries participating in these conferences are recognized as sovereign states under international law. Conversely, a country, neither invited nor able to participate, ceased to be recognized as a sovereign state and instead was regarded as a colony or its equivalent.⁴⁰ Hence, the omission of Korea from the peace conference was intended to serve as a formal and public affirmation by the Great Powers of Korea's status as a Japanese protectorate. Japan could thus exploit this diplomatic juncture to exert pressure on the Korean government and advance its efforts to solidify control over Korea.

Although the actions of the Korean delegation in The Hague laid bare Japan's direct and excessive meddling in Korea's internal and external affairs, there was no notable reaction from the Great Powers. This lack of attention indicated their tacit endorsement of Japan's policy towards Korea. Concurrently, in early July 1907, significant developments unfolded, including the Franco-Japanese Treaty signed in June as a supplement to the British-French-Russian Triple Entente. Moreover, there was optimistic anticipation of the first Russo-Japanese Secret Agreement following the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905. Consequently, Japan endeavored to take advantage of the silence of the Great Powers and expand its influence over Korea, with Resident-General Ito spearheading these efforts most assertively.

⁴⁰ Choi Jeong-soo, 2008, "The Second Hague Peace Conference and the U.S. World Peace Strategy: International Police and Weak State Question," *Han'guksa hakppo* 30: 426-427.

Upon learning of the arrival of the Korean delegation in The Hague, instead of expressing concern over potential repercussions, Ito promptly articulated his view that the dispatch of the Korean delegation presented “an opportune moment to alter the situation in Korea, enabling Japan to assert direct authority over matters such as taxation, jurisdiction, and military affairs.” Subsequently, once Japanese authorities confirmed the identities of the individuals dispatched as Korean representatives to The Hague, Ito initiated the process of solidifying the scheme aimed at consolidating Japanese dominion over Korea.

Initially, on July 6th, Ito summoned Yi Wan'yong (1858-1926), the prime minister of Korea, and issued a threat, stating, “Emperor Kojong himself bears responsibility for this incident. This action constitutes a breach of the treaty, demonstrating overt hostility towards Japan, thereby granting Japan the prerogative to declare war against Korea.” Ito demanded that Lee report this to Emperor Kojong. Additionally, he sought an official directive from the Japanese government outlining the protocol for managing affairs pertaining to Korea as follows:

Special Classification No. 57

To Prime Minister Saionji:

Concluding Remarks

[W]ith regards to the strategies and approaches to be pursued by our government, such as negotiating a treaty with Korea which would have it relinquish certain aspects of internal governance to us, I request that the government solicit opinions and provide counsel. We must exercise great caution regarding any covert actions taken by Korea, such as the abdication of Emperor Kojong, to absolve Japan of any responsibility for this kind of impulsive action. However, in my opinion, I believe that if we let this go on, we will never be able to stop the Emperor's plots and schemes. This issue is of utmost gravity and I implore elder statesmen and high-ranking dignitaries to deliberate upon it and bring it to the

attention of His Majesty.⁴¹

In this official document, Ito explicitly referenced ‘abdication’ while stipulated that the decision must undergo approval by the Emperor of Japan subsequent to deliberation by both the Cabinet and the Privy Council. Essentially, Ito advocated for a unified determination by the entirety of the Japanese government regarding the abdication of Emperor Kojong. This represents a rather uncommon instance of Ito’s execution of Korean policy since the inception of the Resident-General of Korea. At that time, Ito held the highest position within the Japanese government with the greatest authority concerning Korean affairs. Throughout his tenure as Resident-General of Korea, all Japanese policies pertaining to Korea were entrusted to him, with minimal interference from the Japanese government.⁴² Consequently, the abdication of Emperor Kojong emerged as a significant event.

However, the context of the above document suggests that abdication was not a priority in the first place. While Ito is confident that he will ‘pay close attention’ to the issue of the abdication and ‘not let the responsibility fall back on Japan’, it was such a burdensome matter that he had to worry about ‘the responsibility falling back on Japan.’ Thus, the earlier part of the above-quoted passage, coupled with the statement that ‘the emperor’s intrigues and schemes cannot be stopped if this is allowed to continue.’ suggests that Ito’s first consideration for dealing with Korea at this time was to deprive Korea of any rights over its internal affairs and to create a mechanism to constrain the emperor’s behavior.

In the meantime, the Japanese government prioritized its control over Korean internal affairs regarding the abdication of Emperor Kojong.

⁴¹ *Diplomatic Documents of Japan* 40-1, #473 “Request for Decision on Severe Warning to the Korean Emperor Regarding the Dispatch of Envoys to The Hague and Policy Towards Korea,” 454-455.

⁴² Kurachi Tetsukichi, “The Process of Korean Consolidation.” Research Division, Fourth Section Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1939. (held at the Archives of the Diplomatic Documents, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, #N.2.1.0.4-1), 1.

Terauchi Masatake (1852-1919) stood alone in advocating to stop this, while Yamagata Aritomo (1838-1922) and the entire cabinet opposed the proposal. The Japanese government resolved that ‘the Imperial Government is determined not to let slip the current opportunity to assert complete control over the internal affairs of Korea, entrusting the execution of this matter solely to the Resident-General of Korea, in accordance with the prevailing circumstances in Korea.’ The specifics of this directive were classified and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Hayashi was instructed to personally travel to Korea and brief Ito on the required course of action. The decision, sanctioned by the Emperor, was dispatched to Ito on July 12th, along with the pertinent instructions as follows:

Main Plan Outline

- Proposal 1: Entrust the Resident-General of Korea with the power to implement internal and political policies that belong originally to the Emperor of Korea.
- Proposal 2: Secure a commitment from the Korean government to ensure that significant decisions regarding internal affairs are made in consultation with the Resident-General of Korea and, additionally, seek guidance from the Resident-General of Korea in enhancing governance practices.
- Proposal 3: Appoint Japanese officials to the Minister of War and of Finance.

The Second Plan Outline

Require the Emperor of Korea to abdicate in favor of the Crown Prince. This measure is deemed necessary to prevent potential future tensions. Nonetheless, it would be preferable for the Korean government to undertake this action autonomously. Neither the monarch nor the government of Korea shall enact public policies without the co-signature of the Resident-General of Korea (who should hold the title of viceroy or regent).

Key administrative departments in Korea will be overseen by officials dispatched by the Japanese government, who will be appointed as acting

or deputy ministers.⁴³

The aforementioned “plan outlines” were not intended to be mutually exclusive options according to the circumstances prevailing in Korea. The latter proposal was briefly designated as the Second Plan Outline, in addition to the Main Plan Outline. It appears that this succinct annotation reflects the viewpoint of Terauchi who, stood alone in advocating for the abdication of the Crown. The Main Plan Outline was not preferred in comparison to the Second Plan Outline but rather constitutes a ‘treatment plan’ contingent upon implementation. In essence, the removal of Emperor Kojong was not a proactive strategy of the Japanese government at this juncture.

Nevertheless, the circumstances underwent a profound shift. With the *Osaka Daily News* reporting on the Korea delegation at The Hague and disseminating the specifics of their endeavors throughout Japanese society, public sentiment in Japan towards Korea plummeted drastically. At that moment, Japanese public opinion perceived the Korea delegation’s actions as ‘a betrayal that disregarded Japan’s earnest benevolence toward Korea and brought humiliation upon Japan before the Great Powers.’ Consequently, there was a clamor for an apology from Emperor Kojong and an insistence on his abdication.⁴⁴ Public sentiment swiftly pivoted, laying blame on the Japanese government for its inability to preempt the actions of Korea, and called for more resolute measures against Korea in response to this incident.⁴⁵

Having endured the Hibiya Riots just two years prior as a response to the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, the Japanese government found it-

⁴³ *Diplomatic Documents of Japan* 40-1, #474 “Notification of the Policy Directive on Handling Korea Regarding the Korean Emperor’s Dispatch of Secret Envoys,” 455-456.

⁴⁴ *Osaka Mainichi Newspaper*, July 5th: “Incident of Peace Envoy Secret Mission,” July 9th: “Opportunity for Decisive Action Against Korea,” July 11th: “Issue of Responsibility of the Korean Emperor,” and July 13th 1907: “Stubbornness of the Korean Emperor.”

⁴⁵ *Osaka Mainichi Newspaper*, July 12th: “The Korean Emperor and Governor-General Ito,” July 14th: “Great Courage and Great Resolve,” and July 17th 1907: “Disposition of Korea - Change the Form of Preservation of Sovereignty.”

self compelled to take more robust action against Korea in order to deflect the vehement criticism directed at the government. Nonetheless, the Japanese government also harbored concerns about the reaction of the Great Powers, which was surprisingly easy to resolve. Shortly after Hayashi's departure for Korea, the British, French, and American ambassadors to Japan visited the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to inquire about Japan's stance toward Korea. In response, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Chinda Sutemi (1856-1929) formally stated that the decision would be made in consultation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs Hayashi and the Resident-General of Korea Ito. However, astoundingly, the ambassadors of the three countries unanimously asserted that 'whatever Japan chooses to do, it is unavoidable.'⁴⁶ Bolstered by the responses of the major powers, the Japanese government promptly directed Hayashi to 'reach a decision expeditiously after consulting with Ito, while considering the unexpectedly hardline shift in domestic public opinion.'⁴⁷ In short, it entailed an instruction to enact the Second Plan Outline. Ito compelled Emperor Kojong to abdicate on the 19th of 1907, citing the dispatch of the Korean delegation and their anti-Japanese activities. Five days later, the Third Korea-Japan Treaty of 1907, which divested Korea of its internal governance, was ratified.

Meanwhile, I believe the second political aim of the Japanese government was to demonstrate that Japan had not been properly exercising its authority to "protect, guide, and supervise" Korea, as acknowledged by the Great Powers. Moreover, Japan aimed to showcase its advancement to a level where it could offer Korea appropriate guidance, akin to the civilizing missions undertaken by the Great Powers or Western countries.

In The Hague, the Korean delegation asserted that the Korea-Japan Treaty of 1905 was an illegitimate agreement imposed by Japan through

⁴⁶ *Diplomatic Documents of Japan* 40-1, #482 "Visit of Ambassadors of Great Britain, France, and the United States in Relation to Foreign Minister Hayashi's Visit to Korea," 459-460.

⁴⁷ *Collection of Confidential Documents of the Japanese Government Related to the Hague Peace Conference*, "Telegram Received No. 1967," 187.

coercion, resulting in the deprivation of Korea's status as an independent nation. The Japanese representatives, led by Tsuzuki, intentionally permitted the Korean delegation to engage in anti-Japanese activities before the global audience, which sympathized with Korea at the time. By doing so, Japan overtly unveiled Korea's autonomous status enough to publicly declare their position. This ultimately symbolized a supposedly civilized approach to Japanese guidance for Korea, analogous to the colonial policies adopted by Western powers. Hence, the Japanese plenipotentiaries meticulously curated the media coverage from Western powers, encompassing Europe and the United States, regarding the Korean delegation and Japan's reaction. These reports were then relayed to the Japanese government and the Resident General of Korea.⁴⁸ Even so, Tsuzuki declined Ito's directive to personally meet with the Korean delegation to verify the authenticity of their credential. During that period, Tsuzuki made every effort to prevent the public from perceiving Japan as applying pressure on Korea.

During that period, Japan's ambassador to the United Kingdom, Komura Jutarō (1855-1911), penned in *The Times*, "if Japan handles Korea wisely with firmness, skill, and patience, it may succeed in persuading the dissenters within Korea to support the notion of foreign governance for the betterment of the indigenous populace, similar to what the British accomplished in Egypt."⁴⁹ The writing provides a compelling ra-

⁴⁸ *Documents of the Governor-General's Office*, National Institute of Korean History, 1998-2000, vol. 5., (11) "Telegram No. 133, Report on the New York 'Herald' Paris Edition Article Regarding the Korean Emperor's Secret Envoy," 6; (32) "Telegram No. 153, Report on German Newspaper Commentary Regarding Japan's Policy Towards Korea Related to the Korean Emperor's Secret Envoy," 14-15; (61) "Telegram No. 160, Report on French Newspaper Commentary and Public Opinion Regarding the Korean Issue, Transmitted Letter from Ambassador Sone to France," 27-28; (63) "Telegram No. 162, Report on American Newspaper Commentary on the Korean Issue, Transmitted Letter from Ambassador Aoki to the United States," 29; (112) "Telegram No. 2, Report on German Newspaper Commentary on the Korean Issue," 55-56; (113) "Telegram No. 3, Regarding the Above Document (2)," 56-57.

⁴⁹ Murase Shinya. "Telegram from Ambassador Komura Jutarō to Foreign Minister Rintarō Komura" in "Revisiting the 1907 Hague Peace Conference - Envoys of the Korean Emperor (II)," *Diplomatic Forum* (July 2007): 70.

tionale for Japan's tolerance of the actions of the Korean delegation, without any overt obstruction or interference.

Japan seized upon the episode of the Korean delegation at The Hague to reinforce its authority over Korea and reaffirm its entitlement to safeguard Korea against the Great Powers. However, it's important to acknowledge that Japan's strategic maneuvering couldn't simply overshadow the efforts of the Korean envoys. The Korean delegation assertively represented an independent country on the global stage, fearlessly confronting Japan's unlawful and forceful interventions in Korea. Had it not been for their endeavors, the international community might have misconstrued Korea and its people as embracing Japan's purported narrative of a civilizing mission that masked the intricate machinery of a colonial project. It might have been perceived that Korea was undergoing civilizing and modernization under Japan's supposed benevolent guidance, as propagated by the Resident-General of Korea and the Japanese government.⁵⁰

Conclusion

Japan nullified Korea's diplomatic privileges in accordance with the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905. However, the extent of Japan's 'protection, guidance, and supervision' over Korea, as outlined in this treaty, remained ambiguous and thus insufficient to serve as a legal foundation for stripping Korea of its diplomatic rights from the outset. Recognizing the legal vulnerability of the treaty, Emperor Kojong dispatched Yi Sangsöl, Yi Chun, Yi Wijong, and Hulbert as special envoys to the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907. Korea's formal participation in the conference would not only have invalidated the Korea-Japan Treaty of 1905, which

⁵⁰ Japan had been generating reports on Korean reforms since the establishment of the Resident-General of Korea, disseminating them to Western legations. *The Annual Report on Reforms and Progress in Chosen*, initially published in English by the Bureau from 1907, underwent a name change to *The Annual Report on Administration in Chosen* in 1923 before its discontinuation in 1938.

deprived Korea of its diplomatic privileges, but also would have represented a stride toward acknowledgment as a sovereign entity in the international arena. Upon arriving in The Hague ten days after the peace conference commenced, the Korean delegation commenced their activities by issuing a Notice of Appeal to the plenipotentiaries of the participating countries—excluding Japan and its ally Great Britain—and denounced the illegitimacy of the Korea-Japan Treaty of 1905.

Meanwhile, if the Korean representative were denied participation in the conference, it would present an opportunity for Japan to formally assert its control over Korea within the international community. In anticipation of the conference, the Japanese government prioritized two key objectives of preventing the Korean delegation's participation in the conference and finalizing the Franco-Japanese Treaty prior to the conference. The latter objective aimed to support Japan's standing in the international arena by solidifying the Triple Entente System comprising Britain, France, and Russia as partners in Northeast Asia. To achieve these goals, the Japanese government established a plenipotentiary committee led by Tsuzuki Keiroku and Kurachi Tetsukichi, tasking the Japanese delegation with the primary mission of ensuring that "Korea will not be permitted to represent itself at the Second Peace Conference." Specifically, the Japanese plenipotentiaries pursued two strategies in response to the activities of the Korean delegation. Firstly, they utilized diplomatic channels to systematically thwart any Korean participation in the peace conference. Secondly, they enlisted the assistance of Takaishi Shingoro, the only journalist there, employed by the *Osaka Daily News*, from the entire Japanese press corps sent to The Hague to cover the peace conference, and had him take closer note of the delegation's activities, and gained insight into their perspectives and future plans. Despite their concerted efforts to methodically interrupt the Korean representatives from attending the conference, they refrained from directly interfering with the Korean activities. There were two political objectives involved. First, they intended to further consolidate Japanese control over Korea. Second, they intended to show the international community that Japan was capable of governing its colonies in the same way as the Western powers, since Ja-

pan was providing liberal and civilized guidance to Korea, even to the point of allowing openly anti-Japanese activities by the Korean envoys.

In the end, through the successful exclusion of the Korean representative from the Peace conference, Japan reclaimed acknowledgment from the Great Powers of its authority to safeguard Korea and achieved its objective of further solidifying its control over Korea. However, the Korean delegation, protesting the illegitimacy of the Korea-Japan Treaty of 1905 signed under Japanese coercion, stood resolutely as representatives of an independent country amidst an international conference. What cannot be overlooked is the dynamic interplay between Korea's anti-Japanese strategy, undeterred by Japan's organized and persistent interference, and Japan's counterstrategy, orchestrated by the Japanese government to secure international recognition of its colonial policy over Korea, at The Hague.

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Preface

Sung Min Woo

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Preface

Sung Min Woo

Northeast Asian History Foundation

The Northeast Asian History Foundation, in collaboration with the Korea University Institute of East-Asia Cultural Exchange, hosted the Korea-Japan History Education Forum on July 10. The forum aimed to address and bridge historical perception gaps between Korea and Japan as represented in textbooks, with the objective of fostering a forward-looking relationship.

Under the primary theme ‘Challenges and Prospects of Korea-Japan History Textbook Narratives,’ the event featured four sessions:

- 1) ‘Exploring Innovative Approaches to Textual Narratives,’
- 2) ‘Narratives of Ancient Korea-Japan Exchanges from the Perspective of East Asian History,’
- 3) ‘Medieval and Early Modern Historical Narratives: An Analysis of Concepts and Terminology,’
- 4) ‘History Education and Textbook Writing.’

The 16 participants, eight history textbook authors from each country, included highly influential scholars and history teachers. They shared the latest advancements in history education in Korea and Japan across various periods, from ancient to modern times, and emphasized the importance of ongoing academic and educational exchanges between the

two countries. Additionally, they highlighted the need for reflective attitudes toward their respective histories and the recognition of balance and diversity in history education. With the expectation that this forum will provide an opportunity for both countries to deepen their understanding of each other's history and culture, and to enhance mutual respect and cooperation, we introduce the main points and significance of the papers by the five Japanese scholars presented at the forum.

The Basic Structure of Japanese High School World History Textbooks: Issues and Perspectives

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The Basic Structure of Japanese High School World History Textbooks: Issues and Perspectives

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In today's presentation, I will elucidate two principal features of the world history textbooks used in Japanese high schools, critically assess the respective challenges, and subsequently explore the development of a new framework for world history education that could address these issues.

Features of Current World History Textbooks

Fostering National Identity: Differentiating 'Japanese History' from 'World History'

Since World War II, history education in Japan has been divided into two subjects: Japanese history and world history. This division represents a clear distinction between 'Japanese History,' which covers the national history of Japan, and 'World History,' which primarily encompasses the histories of other countries and regions. In 2018, the Japanese government announced a new course, '*Comprehensive History*,' intended for first-year high school students, and has implemented the course since April 2022. This course is groundbreaking as it is the first to integrate Japanese history and world history together. However, Japanese students are still required to choose between 'Japanese History Inquiry' and 'World History Inquiry' for further study after completing this first-year

integrated course. Given that high school history teachers often specialize exclusively in either Japanese or world history, teaching a unified ‘history’ poses significant challenges. Consequently, the traditional divide in history education between Japanese and world history is likely to persist for the foreseeable future.

Japanese high school history textbooks must be composed according to guidelines from the ‘Curriculum Guidelines,’ which is revised by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (hereafter, MEXT) around every ten years. Manuscripts prepared by publishers must undergo a review process by MEXT textbook inspectors before they can be approved for use. Revisions to the ‘Curriculum Guidelines’ reflect advancements in historical research which call for updates and refinements in the textbooks’ content. However, the fundamental objectives of history education and the overarching narrative structure of world history in high schools remain mostly unchanged.

First, let us consider the significance of history education in high schools. The 2018 ‘Curriculum Guidelines’ delineates three primary goals for ‘Exploring World History,’ one of which is as follows:

“By learning about various key events in world history, students will cultivate a willingness to independently consider issues and an attitude conducive to the realization of a better society. Through comprehensive historical analysis and in-depth understanding, they will deepen their self-awareness as Japanese citizens, foster an appreciation for their country’s history, and recognize the importance of respecting other countries and their cultures.”

As articulated in this goal, the primary mission of history education is to nurture the Japanese identity. This fact remains unchanged through the various revisions to the ‘Curriculum Guidelines.’ Given that the courses are formulated by the Japanese government and MEXT, this mission is self-explanatory and inherent. The dual structure of history education in Japan is therefore crucial. By delineating the history of Japan (Japanese history) from the histories of other countries (world history)

and then integrating their study, students develop a heightened awareness of the uniqueness of their own country and its historical identity. As a side note, the practice of dividing of history education into Japanese and foreign history has been established since the late 19th century, when history was first introduced into (modern) school education. The difference between foreign history education before and after 1945 is that, prior to 1945, foreign history was categorized into Eastern and Western history, without a unified world history curriculum. Nonetheless, the fundamental division between Japanese and foreign history has long existed.

A Collection of Vertical Histories: Assembling Diachronic Narratives of National and Regional Pasts

Next, I shall examine the contents of contemporary world history textbooks. Pre-modern history is presented as a collection of distinct and chronological narratives detailing the development of unique cultures in various regions of the world, such as East Asia and Europe. Although the extent of coverage varies, it provides a comprehensive overview of the world's past. Conversely, the post-16th-century narrative contrasts the history of European expansion with the histories of other regions, thereby showing that the latter were profoundly impacted by Europe's political, economic, social, and cultural developments. This approach highlights the interactions between an active Europe and a passive—and later 'resistant'—non-Europe. As in earlier periods, the history of non-European regions is organized according to cultural spheres.

This dual narrative underlies the textbooks' presentation of post-16th century world history. However, it must be acknowledged that, upon closer examination, both the European and non-European narratives consist of national histories, following a 'vertical' model of history. Naturally, there are constraints in detailing the histories of numerous countries within a single textbook. While the pasts of countries influential to Japanese history, such as the United Kingdom, France, and China, are explored comprehensively, the histories of countries with minimal historical contact with Japan, such as Ukraine, Argentina, and Algeria, receive less coverage. Thus, it would not be right to assert that the textbooks uni-

formly represent the world's history. Nonetheless, it is important to emphasize that there have been meaningful efforts to incorporate the histories of foreign countries with limited connections to Japan, for this approach differs markedly from that of European history textbooks.

Reflective Attitudes toward World History Education in Japan

Japan's past is concisely addressed within the broader context of 'East Asian cultures.' Similarly, Japan features briefly in the narrative of pre-modern world history. However, if Japan's modern history is also conflated with that of China and the Korean Peninsula, how can we discern the distinct paths that these three countries have pursued since the modern era? This issue is significant and self-evident.

In short, Japan's world history curriculum incorporates different units of narrative for premodern and modern history: premodern history is structured around cultural spheres, whereas modern history is presented through 'vertical histories' of individual countries. This fundamental style has remained unchanged since the formal establishment of world history as a subject after World War II.

Because countries and regions serve as the units of narrative, textbook authors must specialize in the histories of specific countries or regions, such as China, Britain, or the Islamic world. They are each responsible for writing their respective sections based on current trends and perspectives in historical research in their fields. These individual manuscripts are subsequently compiled by the publisher into a single textbook. Editors at the publisher oversee the coordination of these manuscripts; however, their responsibilities are largely confined to harmonizing details such as terminology, without fully aligning interpretations or explanations.

Issues with Current World History Textbooks

As summarized above, the two principal characteristics of Japanese world history textbooks are 'fostering the Japanese people' and the 'integration of vertical histories.' While I expect that this holds true for Kore-

an textbooks as well, I will reserve that inquiry for a later discussion. Considering that the ultimate purpose of elementary and secondary education, beginning in the 19th century, was to establish a sovereign nation-state and cultivate a strong national identity to support it, the current organization of world history textbooks appears to align with this objective. However, in our continually globalizing world, is cultivating a sense of national identity sufficient for a world history curriculum? It is crucial to recognize that national identity alone is inadequate for addressing contemporary global challenges such as climate change, international terrorism, big data and AI, pandemics, and more; in fact, a stubborn national identity may even pose an obstacle to their resolution.

Another more specific issue about the current world history curriculum concerns the inconsistent definitions of the fundamental geographical units of historical narrative. Because modern historiography originated primarily in Germany, France, and other Western European states, the geographical units employed in historical narrative have been shaped according to their perspectives. For instance, textbooks often frame history while defining ‘Europe’ as a single regional and cultural entity. However, questions arise regarding how much of Northern or Eastern European history can be sufficiently encompassed within this framework. Similarly, the applicability to Eastern Europe in the discussions and criticisms of ‘Europe’s’ overseas expansions and imperialist policies must be questioned, considering that Eastern Europe was itself often the target of ‘Europe’s’ expansion.

In essence, the definition of ‘Europe’ as one of the fundamental units of description in our world history textbooks is an ideological rather than a purely geographical idea. The same statement applies to the definition of regions like the ‘Islamic World,’ which is equally ideological in nature. These definitions contrast with the simple geographical categorization of other regions such as East Asia, South Asia, and the Americas. Such differences arise from the influence of Western European perspectives in defining the geographical boundaries within historical narratives.

Another practical issue is that textbooks that compile manuscripts from multiple authors inevitably bring forth inconsistencies. Moreover,

we must remain conscious of the risk that dry sentences and lists of historical terms designed for college entrance exam preparation could continually discourage students from engaging deeply with history.

History of Residents of the Earth: World History Moving Forward

Finally, I will propose strategies to address the above-identified issues with current world history textbooks.

As discussed in Part 2, an emphasis on cultivating national identity alone is insufficient for addressing the myriad challenges of the contemporary world. There must be a robust sense of belonging to this world at large, whereby individuals acknowledge and take responsibility for pressing global issues beyond their own countries. Historically, the study of national histories has been designed to foster national identities. Could not this same approach be applied to instill a sense of identity as residents of the earth? Just as the histories of individual nation-states like France, Japan, and China have profoundly influenced their respective national identities, why not develop a comprehensive global history to cultivate a sense of being a residents of the earth? This paradigm should be the new long-term goal of world history education.

I am not suggesting that a sense of being a residents of the earth should replace national identity. Individuals often have multiple layers of identity, identifying themselves as both Tokyoites and Japanese nationals, or as both Seoulites and Koreans; I argue that a concurrent sense of being a residents of the earth should be added alongside these national affiliations. Moreover, all residents of the earth need not study a single unified global history; rather, it should encompass the diverse experiences of residents of the earth living in different regions worldwide.

For instance, one could focus on the political systems and structures across the globe during the 18th century, examining their regional characteristics to identify commonalities and differences and comparing them to modern global societies. This approach diverges from ‘vertical history,’ which focuses on the history of a single nation-state, and opts

instead for a ‘transversal history’ which associates these characteristics with global movements across the globe as a whole. By repeating this method periodically, perhaps every hundred years, one may capture varying historical trends in global political systems.

Furthermore, tracing the origins and dissemination of significant concepts or institutions, such as the accommodation of the ‘state’ in modern Japan or Korea, can provide a comprehensive history of residents of the earth. This approach differs from vertical history which assumes the primacy of the nation-state.

In modern Japan, where the government dictates the ‘Curriculum Guidelines,’ making fundamental changes to the structure of world history education is challenging. For now, we must observe how the new ‘*Comprehensive History*’ course unfolds in practice and assess its impact. In light of the interconnectedness between Japan and the global community, there is a need for conversations about how to best structure world history education and for a willingness to adapt its current state. These discussions should not only take place within Japan, but must also involve candid exchanges of views between Japanese and Korean scholars. I eagerly anticipate further dialogue on these matters.



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Ancient Japan-Korea Relations, as Narrated in Japanese History Textbook

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Introduction

As an introduction, I shall have a look into the state of history education in Japanese schools. In Japan, the significance of history education as a form of national culture varies between elementary, middle and high school.

The focus of elementary school history education is placed on biographies: Students are not required to learn about history or foreign relations comprehensively. In middle school, history courses focus on Japanese history. They do cover world history, but the subject is currently the least prioritized among the required subjects and provides only the minimum level of understanding for students to understand national culture. The inclusion of world history is a large benefit of middle school history, as it offers a broader perspective on East Asian history.

In contrast, high schools require students to take world history, while they allow students to choose whether to take Japanese history. Students have tended to avoid the latter as a subject of the university entrance exam because it imposes a heavier burden of memorizing facts. Before the recent curriculum reform, there was a division between *Japanese History A* and *Japanese History B*. Japanese history A focuses on modern and contemporary history and provides a simplified version

of pre-modern history whereas *Japanese history B* provides a comprehensive history of Japan.

In 2018, the *Governmental Instructions on High School Study* was revised, establishing new subjects and merging old ones. Previously, there had been four subjects in high school history education: *World History A*, *World History B*, *Japanese History A*, and *Japanese history B*. These were reduced into three subjects: *Comprehensive History* (required), *World History Inquiry* (optional), and *Japanese History Inquiry* (optional). The required *Comprehensive History* course is reputed to be a course on world history with a focus on modern and contemporary history while the optional course of *Japanese History Inquiry* includes the following sections on ancient history: (1) The Japanese Archipelago and its Historical Environment in the Dawn Period, (2) Historical Findings and a View of Primitive and Ancient Times, and (3) Development of Ancient States and Societies and Turning Points (Interpretation, Explanation, and Description of History).

The division between world history and Japanese history in high schools, unlike in middle school history, makes it difficult to fully grasp the overall history of East Asia, including Korea. Furthermore, world history traditionally describes oriental history as if centered around the history of China, treating the states on the Korean Peninsula or Japan as secondary.

Historical Awareness of Japan-Korea Relations

The *Kojiki* (古事記), compiled in 712 (5th year of the Wado Era), and the *Nihon Shoki* (日本書紀), compiled in 720 (4th year of the Yoro Era), are the two most important historical records compiled before the establishment of the Ritsuryo (律令) system. However, both records were compiled in the 8th century with the purpose of providing historical evidence for the legitimacy of the Ritsuryo state and imperial rule. Thus, when considering them as historical records compiled in later periods, we need caution in how we interpret them. Therefore, when examining the historical records before the Ritsuryo system, it is necessary to consider them in

conjunction with epigraphic inscriptions and historical records from China and Korea, which, though fragmentary, are excellent contemporary records.

In historical studies after the Second World War, there were flourishing attempts to view East Asia as a single historical world—a complete ‘region’ in itself—, position Japanese history within it, and finally overcome its self-righteous national history of the pre-war period. Research on international relations in East Asia has developed on two main theories: the theory of international order centered on China (‘The Chinese Suzerainty System (冊封体制論)’ and the ‘international impetus theory,’ which posits that international interactions mediated by transportation as well as internal conflicts were to be independent impetuses toward the forming of ancient states. But the overcoming of ‘its own proper national history’ based upon the model of modern nation state has not been fully achieved. The theory of Chinese suzerainty has contributed to simplifying the political order of East Asia as centered on China. Yet, in positing Sino-centric order, it neglects the independent trends of surrounding countries and the existence of the ‘Another Center (Small China)’ ideology. The ‘international impetus theory’ has clarified the inseparable relationship between internal and external affairs, but it has not overcome the limit that it is a state-building theory built on the premise of ‘Mimana (任那) rule.’ There have been many arguments that implicitly assume the existence of historically formed states, citizens, nationalities, and borders, and the recent issue of the ‘Mimana-Nihonfu’ is no exception.

Before the end of the Second World War, it was generally believed that the Yamato Court, on the premise of internal unification, had advanced militarily into the Korean Peninsula by the 4th century and taken control of the area, and that there had been repeated conflicts and confrontations with the Korean states over control and management of the southern part of the peninsula. Thus, it was viewed that diplomacy with China had been conducted in response to this situation, and that Japan had lost its previous ‘rights and interests’ after its defeat in ‘The Battle of Paekch’ on River’ (白村江). This pre-war view, which emphasizes ‘control

of the southern part of the Korean Peninsula' and 'the role of the Japanese envoys to Tang China,' was due to the 'invention' of the 'ancient' period as a self-portrait when constructing the 'epic of the nation-state' after the Meiji Restoration.

There has been a scholarly emphasis on similarities between the ancient and modern periods with regard to the historical trends since the Meiji restoration: the adoption of foreign laws, the development of diplomacy, subjugations of different races, overseas military expeditions, and the adoption of foreign cultures. The emphasis is merely a projection of Japan's modern national ideals—which aimed to adopt Western culture, abolish unequal treaties, and advance into the peninsula—onto the ancient era. Naturally, the focus regarding ancient diplomatic relations are placed on China, which is analogous to modern Western powers, while exchanges with Silla and Palhae during the Nara Period are relegated to the periphery. Even today, due to the framing of the Japanese nation-state as a 'single race,' the independent histories of the neighboring ancient Korean states, together with those of the Ainu and Ryukyu, are not fully discussed. This presupposition must be overcome.

On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the claims of 'Korean colonial settlements in Japan,' 'Korean migrants into Japan,' and 'Korean cultural influence within Japan,' which were made in Korea after the Second World War, excessively emphasized the cultural superiority and benevolence of the ancient Korean states. These were a kind of a reversal of the claim of the 'common ancestry of Japan and Korea,' the assertion of which had implicitly rationalized modern colonial rule and its claim to be a civilizing force. These claims, which stress Korean cultural superiority and ethnic independence, can be said to be an 'epic of the nation-state.' The claim that the Monument of King Kwanggaet'o was tempered with, which is now being disproven by the detailed chronology of the original stone rubbings, was also aimed at denying Japan's invasion of Korea in ancient times.

In recent years, the claim for Mimana-Nihonfu being a base for territorial control in the southern part of the Korean Peninsula, as was put forth in the *Nihon Shoki*, has been rejected. Meanwhile, a more convinc-

ing view has been brought forth: that they might have been temporary envoys or military diplomatic missionaries from Wa State, operating under recognition of independence and self-reliance from the Kaya states. Nevertheless, this is just one of various views on the issue and there is no single view that can be called the prevailing theory. The same holds true for the identity of the people buried in the keyhole-shaped tombs in the Yōngsan River basin.

There were many assumptions implicit in the traditional interpretations of ancient Japan-Korea relations: the existence of clear-cut national borders, citizens and nationalities based on the concept of modern nation-state, military and diplomatic power embodied in a single monarch, and the separation of internal and external affairs. At least, however, in ancient times, there were royal powers and states made up of a variety of clans. The presence of borderless beings that served the King of Paekche, the Great King (大王), and the Otomo Clan (大伴氏), as typified by the Nichira (日羅) during the Bidatsu (敏達) period, have also been confirmed. Furthermore, it can be observed that the various forms of military and diplomatic authority were expressed in ‘bribes (賂)’ and ‘offerings (別獻物),’ and the relative nature of internal and external affairs was seen from the forms of marriage and the similarities between ‘Tax of Tōgoku (東国の調)’ and ‘Tax of Mimana (任那の調).’ And, given that diplomacy is the imposition of its self-centered worldview, it is clear that, unlike Sil-la’s attitude of compromise, ‘Tax of Mimana’ was nothing other than a ‘collective illusion’ in the court of Wa State that managed to distribute tributes within itself.

Issues in the History of Japan-Korea Relations and Textbook Narratives

Based on the scholarly situation described above, I shall turn to the ancient history section of the Teikoku Shoin (帝國書院) version of the middle school history textbook that I wrote, and point out the key points and problems in its description of the ancient Korea-Japan relations. I would like to indicate in advance that the content could not be fully described

due to the *Curriculum Guidelines of the Governmental Instructions* and its restriction of one-theme-per-spread.

(1) Regarding the spread of Yayoi culture, the textbook describes wet rice farming and metal utensils, introduced from the Korean Peninsula, as well as dolmens and bronze bells. Although there is a description of the route of migration, there is little explanation of historical trends in East Asia that prompted the migration. There is no mention of the origin of the dolmens.

<Origin of Rice Cultivation>

Toward the end of the Jomon period, people who came to Kitakyushu from China and from the Korean Peninsula introduced rice cultivation, and rice cultivation spread from western Japan to eastern Japan. The people who arrived at this time interacted with the Jomon people little by little, and the Japanese people and culture that would become known later were formed.

<Origin of Bronze Bells>

Along with rice cultivation, bronze and iron tools were also introduced from China and Korea.

(2) There is no mention of Wajin (倭人) sending envoys to Nangnang Commandery (樂浪郡) or Queen Himiko paying tribute to Wei (魏) Dynasty through Taebang Commandery (帶方郡), but it is described as direct negotiations with China.

<Nangnang Commandery/Taebang Commandery>

Han dynasty gave seals to kings of surrounding states and recognized their rule. On the other hand, surrounding states established diplomatic relations as vassals of the emperor.

A historical book from the mid-1st century [*Book of Later Han dynasty* (後漢書)] states that the king of Nakoku (奴国, near present-day Fukuoka

City) sent a messenger to the Han Dynasty and was given a gold seal by the emperor.... [A]ccording to the Biography of Wa State in *Book of Wei* (魏志, 倭人伝), they sent envoys to China in an attempt to gain an advantage over other nations by receiving rare gifts and the status of king.

(3) In the Kofun period (古墳時代), the culture of horizontal stone chambers, horse harnesses, and Sueki were introduced from the Korean Peninsula. In recent years, there have been conflicting interpretations of key-hole-shaped tombs in the Yöngsan River basin in Korea.

<Relations with the Kaya States' Confederacies>

In order to enrich their states, the local warlords tried to strengthen their ties with the Yamato court, which had connections with the Korean Peninsula. In exchange for providing the warlords with iron and technology from the Korean Peninsula, the Yamato royal court required them to make tributes and mobilize soldiers.

(4) In the negotiations with the states of the Korean Peninsula, various issues were discussed, such as: the Seven-Branched Sword (七支刀) brought from Paekche, tempering with in the Inscription of King Kwanggaet'o, the conflict with Koguryo, the interpretation of 'Wa (倭)' and 'subjects (臣民),' and the interpretation of 'Title of Shogun (將軍),' Kaihō (海北) or Kaihoku (辺隸) in the titles of King Mu of Wa, the naming of the Kaya states, and their relationship with the Wa state. In recent years, the extent of the Kaya states' maturity and self-reliance has become a point of contention in relation to the Mimana-Nihonfu theory. 'Mimana' is a name specific to the *Nihonshoki*. Topics such as 'misgovernment,' 'advance,' 'territorial possession,' and 'reconstruction' tend not to be described in detail.

<Establishment of the Three Kingdoms of Korea> <Inscription of King Kwanggaet'o>

The kingdom of Koguryo expanded its territory to the north of the

Korean Peninsula between the 3rd and 4th centuries, and small states were consolidated to form Paekche and Silla in the south. According to the Monument of King Kwanggaet'o, the Yamato Dynasty, which was established in the Yamato region of the country of Wa (southeast of the Nara Basin in Japan), strengthened its ties with the Kaya states at the southern tip of the Korean Peninsula. It then fought against Koguryo and Silla, cooperating with Paekche.

<Unrest on the Korean Peninsula>

In the 6th century, Wa State lost its influence on the Korean Peninsula as the Kaya states, which it had allied with, fell apart and Paekche and Silla strengthened their influence.

<Five Kings of Wa>

Defeated in battles on the Korean Peninsula, the Yamato monarchy was unable to secure stable access to iron. Thus, the Yamato dynasty often sent messengers to the emperor of the southern dynasty of China and sought to gain an advantage over the states on the Korean Peninsula by using its power to secure iron.

(5) The acquisition of advanced culture, technology, and iron resources are pointed out, but it is also necessary to address domestic agricultural production and development.

<Acquisition of Iron Resources>

Since the later period of the Yayoi, the use of iron cutting edges for plows and hoes became popular in Japan, as it greatly increased productivity. The production of iron weapons was also popularized. At that time, however, the Japanese Archipelago did not yet have the technology to produce iron, and iron was brought from the Korean Peninsula in the form of slabs.

(6) The position of immigrants (naturalized people) is discussed in relation to the Buminsi (部民制), Shinabae (品部) · Zakko (雑戸), migration

to Tōgoku (東國) and its development, the fall of Paekche and the surname given to the Paekche kings due to the defeat at the ‘Battle of the Paekch’ on River,’ and the construction of Korean style walls by the surviving Paekche vassals, the ratio of Shoban (諸番) recorded in Shinsen Shōjiroku (新撰姓氏錄), etc. The textbook needs to describe, with a focus on the claim of Korean cultural influence in Japan, mutual exchanges between Japan and Korea, including Nichira (日羅) engaging in both Wa state and Paekche, *karakuni no umare* (韓子) of mixed blood, Paekche officials of Wa descent, remains of Wa origin, etc. There are few clear explanations as to when and why immigrants were introduced. And it needs to annotate ‘naturalized people (Kikajin, 帰化人)’—which means the people who returned to the king’s virtue—in the Nihon Shoki and explain the subordinate position of immigrants to the royal authority, as seen from Shinabe (品部) · Zakko (雑戸) and the organization of Hans (Shoban, 諸番), etc. Immigrants (Torai jin, 渡来人) are more frequently employed than ‘naturalized people,’ so that it seems proper to refer to the ethnic complexity of the nation rather than its uniqueness.

<Immigrants> <Use of Kanji (漢字)>

During this period, people who immigrated to the country of Wa from war-torn China and the Korean Peninsula were called immigrants (渡来人). The immigrants passed on many techniques that were useful in daily life, such as the manufacture of earthenware (Sueki) and ironware, weaving, and kanji. Furthermore, they played an active role in diplomacy, politics, and finance in the Yamato kingdom. In the 6th century, Buddhism and Confucianism were introduced, greatly influencing the beliefs and culture of the Japanese people.

<Battle of the Paekch’ on River> <Korean-style Mountain Fortress>
<Paekche Exiles>

On the Korean Peninsula, Tang Dynasty, allied with Silla, attacked Paekche, so Wa State sent a large army to support Paekche and fight against the combined forces of the Tang and Silla. However, in 663 the army of Wa suffered a crushing defeat at the Paekch’ on River and

retreated from the Korean Peninsula. After that, the Korean Peninsula was unified by Silla. In order to strengthen its defense against attacks from Tang and Silla, Wa established the city of Dazaifu (大宰府), responsible for the politics and defense of the Kyushu region, and built amountain fortress throughout western Japan. They also promoted state-building by incorporating the knowledge and skills of the Paekche people who fled to the Japanese Archipelago. They then embarked on full-fledged domestic reforms, including the creation of a nationwide family register for the first time in Japan's history.

(7) Regarding the Asuka Culture, the textbook describes its influence on the style of Buddhist statues and temples. There are few references to Hakuho Culture (白鳳文化). There is no mention of the relationship between the trade goods of the Silla envoys and the Shosoin (正倉院) treasures in the Tenpyo Culture (天平文化). It seems necessary to devise ways to understand Kanji, Confucianism, Buddhism, etc. as cultural traditions common to East Asia.

<Asuka Culture>

When Buddhism was introduced from Paekche in the mid-sixth century, the Soga (蘇我) Clan worked to spread it within Japan.

After Buddhism was introduced, Buddhist statues and scriptures were brought to Japan via the Korean Peninsula. Buddhism, which was believed to cure diseases and preached reincarnation after death, was a new and advanced addition to Japanese culture, and played a major role in helping the ruling class of the time maintain ties with powerful local families.

(8) After the unification of Silla, the textbook narrates little about it. The focus shifts to China, with Japan's rivalry fully exposed: There are no mention of events within Silla. After the rivalry between Japan and China takes the foreground of the textbooks' narrative, there is no further mention of events within Silla. In light of this deficiency, it seems necessary to make additions showing that, during the Tenmu (天武) Reign, ex-

changes with Silla were in fact more frequent than with China. Furthermore, the textbook does not provide a discussion of how international relations and foreign preconceptions between Japan and Silla affected each state's attitude toward dealing with envoys. Finally, Japan's state control of trade—specifically, the relationship between the treatment of Silla merchants and xenophobia—does not receive coverage in the textbook, even though it has recently become a subject of much scholarly attention.

<Erection of the Great Buddha Statue>

When the Great Buddha statue was completed, monks from a variety of countries, including China, participated, and music from Tang, Koguryo, and Vietnam was played.

<Fall of Tang Dynasty>

Around the same time as the fall of Tang, Koryō arose and destroyed Silla on the Korean Peninsula.

<National Culture>

In the 9th century, with the decline of the Tang and the collapse of stability in East Asia, surrounding states ceased their formal exchanges with China and began to move on their own in terms of politics and culture. Japan also stopped sending envoys to the Tang, but merchants and monks from the Song dynasty continued to bring books, ceramics, medicine, and other Chinese artifacts to Japan.

(9) Japan's friendly exchanges with Palhae are described in more detail than those with Silla, but Palhae's own internal institutions, such as the chieftain system, are not mentioned.

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Concepts for Understanding Premodern History: *Modern and Contemporary History and Advanced Japanese History*

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Concepts for Understanding Premodern History: *Modern and Contemporary History* and *Advanced Japanese History*

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Introduction: Isolated Japanese History or Pre-modern History?

In *Modern and Contemporary History*, a newly established high school subject in Japan, students are required to raise ‘questions that survey each era.’ Currently, the education system and the field of Japanese history research generally divide Japanese history into four (or five) eras: ancient, middle, early modern, and modern (or modern and contemporary). Both the *Curriculum Guidelines* provided by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (hereafter, MEXT) and the contents of Japanese history textbooks reflect this division.

In a Q&A session hosted by MEXT regarding their 2018 revisions to their high school *Curriculum Guidelines for Geography and History*, the following question was posed: ‘Are there any differences in the ‘questions that survey each era’ in *Advanced Japanese History* as opposed to those in *Modern and Contemporary History* or *Advanced World History*?’¹ In response to this question, the following general guideline

¹ According to the ‘Curriculum Guideline for Senior High School Revised in 2018, English Translation of Subject Names’ (retrieved 18th August 2024 from <https://www.mext.go.jp/component/>)

was cited: ‘Under the context of *Advanced Japanese History*, ‘questions that survey each era’ refer to those that examine historical changes within certain eras and how these changes influenced subsequent eras and the overall course of history.’ Whereas in *Advanced Japanese History* and *Advanced World History* questions are generally expected to be asked whenever a student harbors any curiosity about the course contents, in *Advanced Japanese History* students are expected to first learn about and understand the turning points in each era and then to raise questions that anticipate the characteristics of subsequent eras. As one can imagine, these questions presuppose the aforementioned divisions of Japanese history into eras such as ancient, middle and modern, etc. However, the *Curriculum Guidelines* do not describe the specific reasons for these divisions: for instance, they do not divulge why the period from the 12th to 16th century should be denoted the ‘Middle Ages.’ Instead, students could grope for the reasons only by posing questions about characteristics unique to each era. Thus, the withholding of these concrete descriptions and the emphasis on encouraging ‘questions that survey each era’ can be considered a kind of tautology.

Modern and Contemporary History is another new subject and is required for first-year high school students. It combines Japanese and world history and focuses on three major themes: modernization in the 19th century, popularization (and shifts in the international order) in the early-to-mid 20th century, and globalization in the late 20th century. In contrast to older textbooks that prioritized the memorization of historical facts, new *Modern and Contemporary History* textbooks emphasize an exploration of the historical connections between Japan, its surrounding regions, and the rest of the world, the impact of which remains signifi-

 a_menu/education/micro_detail/___icsFiles/afieldfile/2019/07/08/1417610_001.pdf) issued by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology, the English translation of *Rekishu Sogo* (歴史総合), which literally translates to comprehensive history, is ‘*Modern and Contemporary History*’ and *Nihonshi Tankyu* (日本史探究), which literally translates to Japanese history inquiry, is ‘*Advanced Japanese History*.’ Textbooks from many companies have also adopted these translations. The author believes that these translations do not reflect the aims of new subjects and so are not appropriate, but uses them for the convenience of the reader in this paper.

cant and influential to our daily lives. To this end, students are required to inquire, understand and apply the highly abstract concepts of modernization, popularization and globalization in their history education (*Curriculum Guidelines*). *Modern and Contemporary History* does not necessarily present Japanese and world history as a single, unified narrative. In practice, however, the key ‘questions that survey each era’ are built upon concepts that feature jointly in *Advanced World History* and *Modern and Contemporary History*, such as popularization or globalization. This contrasts with *Advanced Japanese History*, which inherits the existing Japan-specific period divisions from the older Japanese History B course and focuses on Japan-specific concepts such as the ancient Ritsuryo state (律令国家) and the early modern feudal domain system (幕藩体制). Naturally, *Advanced Japanese History* does not explore abstract concepts that are shared by *Modern and Contemporary History* and *Advanced World History*. Thus, *Advanced Japanese History* (premodern Japanese history) is isolated from other subjects in history.

Periodization of Japanese History

The practice of periodizing Japanese history originates from the Edo era; their timeline progressed from the ‘era of the court nobles’ (Nara and early Heian periods) through the transition period (Kamakura and Muromachi Shogunate Periods), when the court’s power declined and court nobles and samurai warriors coexisted, to the ‘Era of the warriors’ (Edo period). This periodization became the prototype for the three-part division of ancient, medieval and early modern periods, to which the modern era was added after the Meiji Restoration deemed a ‘restoration’ of the ancient imperial rule.

In this four-part periodization, one can see the post-Meiji restoration perspective on the imperial system and the history of Japan as a nation. For example, the new Meiji government adopted a two-government with six-minister system, based on the Ritsuryo (律令) government system, and established Ōkura-shō (大藏省) (renamed Zaimu-shō 財務省 in 2001, but both have the same English translation: the Ministry of Fi-

nance). The fact that this structure was ideologically modeled upon the Ritsuryo is a principal reason for Japanese history textbooks' abundant and detailed explanations of the Ritsuryo system, such as the diagram of the two departments and eight ministries of the Nara period. Furthermore, despite the current research (as will be discussed below) revealing that the ruling class of the Middle Ages was made up of diverse elements—including the nobility, samurai warriors, and the power of temples and shrines—the conventional image of the 'Era of Samurai' still has a strong hold on the public. The *Curriculum Guidelines* also considers the establishment and development of the warrior government as an axis of understanding the Middle Ages, showing how deeply embedded the conventional image of that period is.

The development of modern historical studies brought forth attempts to connect Japanese history with world history. The first such attempt was to apply the same concept of 'Feudalism' as in the Western medieval ages to the warrior system of the Japanese Middle Ages. Prior to this, at the end of the Edo period, there were disputes as to whether this Japanese system of the same period should be classified as either *gunken* (郡縣, a centralized system in which the monarch dispatches bureaucrats to govern local areas) or *hōken* (封建, a decentralized system in which the ruler delegates local governance to feudal lords) according to traditional Chinese definitions. The term *hōken* (封建) was adopted as the translation of 'feudalism,' which refers to a lord-vassal relationship mediated by land, despite some discrepancies between the two concepts: *hōken* and 'feudalism' [Ishii 2005]. The emphasis placed by Japanese history textbooks on 'gratitude (御恩) and service (奉公)' between the Shogun and his vassals, characteristic of a *hōken* (封建)—and thus, by way of the aforementioned translation, feudalist—system, reflects an attempt to liken the Japanese warrior system to Western feudalism. In addition, the Japanese concept of the 'Middle Ages (中世)' was named after the Western concept of the 'Medieval Ages' although, as mentioned above, a similar concept had already emerged in the Edo period. The Edo era was also designated as 'Early Modern (近世)' accordingly.

Marxist Historiography, which became mainstream in historical

studies after World War II, proposed the theory that history does progress in developmental stages based on production. The concept of stages of development from ancient to feudal to modern were applied to the existing four divisions of Japanese history. The concept of feudalism, a social system based on serfdom, was adapted into to the study of Japanese history as the ‘theory of local lordship (在地領主制).’ Samurai warriors were conceptualized as ‘local lords’ who ruled over subservient farmers and were responsible for managing their estates. Additionally, the Kamakura shogunate was reinterpreted as a regime that organized local lords based on the lord-vassal relationship.

Thus, the inception of the Kamakura Shogunate was established to be the event that marks the beginning of the Middle Ages (as will be discussed below, the period of the cloistered emperors (院政期) is now considered to be the start of the Middle Ages). This period division stems from the emphasis on the growth of the lordship in terms of the Marxist theory on the stages of social development. Textbooks often heighten the importance of local lords’ manors, their rule, and their invasion of shōen(autonomous estates) because they had assumed that the local lordship system, rather than the warrior government, is the defining characteristic of the Middle Ages. Meanwhile, the Edo period (Early Modern Period) is considered fundamentally separate from the Middle Ages because there was no the system of local lords, despite the continuing debate over whether it is ‘feudal’ or not. Thus, a new Western concept of feudalism was adopted, even as the traditional periodization of history was preserved, with its foundations remaining robust.

In the Curriculum Guidelines for *Advanced Japanese History*, the stress on the development of the local feudal system has diminished. This reflects a lack of research interest in the local feudal system since the 1990s. Nevertheless, elements such as the dominance of warrior still remain in the textbooks and even newer textbooks include the term ‘Feudal System’ in their main text and side notes (Yamakawa Shuppansha 山川出版社, Daiichi Gakushūsha 第一学習社). These are often overlooked, yet they are a legacy of comparing medieval histories between Japan and Europe and positioning Japanese history—albeit from a Western perspec-

tive—within the context of ‘world history.’

The actual periodization of history is no longer discussed directly in the current Japanese history academic community. Due to the broad consensus of equating the Middle Ages with the era of the Shōen system, current textbooks take the period of the retired emperors in the 12th century, when the Shōen system was established, as the start of the Middle Ages. However, it is undeniable that there is an inertia in the research and education system with regard to Japanese history.

To begin with, the Middle Ages in Japanese history is very difficult to define [Sakurai 2013]. In contrast to the study of the Ancient and Early Modern ages, which are concretely defined by the Ritsuryo system and the Shogunate system respectively, there is no reliable framework to guide the study of the Middle Ages. To solve this problem, Kuroda Toshio (黒田俊雄) proposed the ‘Kenmon System Theory (権門体制論)’ in 1963 [Kuroda 1994]. The theory is often criticized for being ‘too flexible,’ but the more research into the Middle Ages has progressed, the more evident it has become that the Middle Ages itself is a complex period that cannot be neatly defined by a single concept or system. Thus, while students in *Advanced Japanese History* are asked to pose ‘questions that survey each era,’ even researchers are not able to share such questions with one another. This situation could be attested to the gap between research and education.

What types of ‘questions that survey each era’ are possible with the content of Japanese medieval history at the high school level, and how can we incorporate concepts that are also relevant to *Modern and Contemporary History* and *Advanced World History*?

Revisiting the Middle Ages

If we were to borrow some universal questions and concepts from world history and apply them to Japanese history, in the case of the Ancient period, we would ask about the formation of the state, then explore concepts such as ‘the spread of ancient civilizations to the periphery’ and ‘the independence of peripheral states’ (in the Shimizu Shoin (清水書院)

textbook, this concept is explored under the category of ‘cultural nationalization (国風化) in East Asia’ [Yoshimura et al. eds. 2021]). In the case of the early modern era (Edo period), the theory of ‘early modernization (近世化)’ has already gained popularity in the academic community since the beginning of the 21st century [Kishimoto 2021][Shimizu ed. 2015]; this theory seeks to capture ‘shared experiences’ of the East Asian world from the 16th century onwards, on the premise that early modern nation-states varied greatly from one another. Although *Modern and Contemporary History* covers the world from the 19th century onwards, it should also consider the world after the 16th and 17th centuries onwards, global circumnavigation emerged as a result of the Age of Exploration.

How about the Middle Ages, then? As previously mentioned, the Middle Ages of Japanese history were heavily imbued with Western ideas of historical progress and Marxist progressivism, on top of the pre-existing assumption that it was a transitional period from the court nobles to the Samurai. What is more, there have been other theories that contextualized Japanese history in an entirely Western perspective. For example, Marc Bloch, in *Feudal Society* (1939/40), writes that ‘Feudalism’ was phenomenon unique to the periphery of ancient civilizations (Western Europe and Japan), rather than a universal occurrence in human history [Sato 2010]. The framing of universal concepts such as ‘the shrinking of ancient states’, ‘the development of peripheral regions’ and ‘decentralizing tendency of peripheral regions,’ though old ideas, could help connect Japanese history to world history in a more appropriate manner. One needs no more than a high school history education to see that that the heightened international tensions of the 7th and 8th centuries influenced the construction of Japan’s Ritsuryō state, and that the Middle Ages (except for the time of the Mongol invasions) was a relatively less tense period in terms of foreign relation. Moreover, a comparison of the existence of warriors such as samurai and knights could also be a great topic for students. After these comparisons have been made, it may be possible to re-utilize the concept of ‘Feudalism’ (which, fortunately or unfortunately, still appears in some textbooks) while taking care not to become too Western-centric.

Another potentially useful topic is climate change, which has gained growing interest in academic community in recent years. Japan's Middle Ages happened to coincide with a period of intense climate change on a global scale. The impact of that change on the transformation of ancient society into medieval one is attracting academic attention [Nakatsuka et al. 2021][Nakatsuka 2022]. High school textbooks cover the great famine of the Kamakura period. It can be inferred that the chronic famines during the Middle Ages caused frequent conflicts and affected the role of religion.

As mentioned above, the Shōen system, which is regarded as the defining characteristic of the Middle Ages, can also be established as a reflection of the decentralizing trends and 'Feudalization' during the Heian (平安) Period (794-1180s). Some scholars have recently illuminated the redevelopment of abandoned farmland as the cause for the establishment of manors; for example, the manor of Nitta-no-sho in Kozuke Kōzuke Province (上野国新田荘) was established to recover from the damage caused by the eruption of Mt. Asama (浅間山) in 1108 [Kamakura 2009], and this event is introduced in recent supplementary teaching materials. This case demonstrates how linking the roots of the manorial system to the climate change and natural disasters during the Heian Period could deepen our understanding of the Middle Ages.

Refining the Concepts and Rethinking the Present

The textbooks published by Shimizu Shoin (清水書院), to which the author also contributed, provide variegated materials about the period of the Mongol Invasions and offer questions that encourage students to discern the characteristics of the Middle Age [Hattori 2014]. One of the aims of the textbook is to convey the fact that the Middle Ages was not just the era of Samurai, but also the pluralistic time when the nobility, samurai, the powers of temples and shrines, and various forces stood separate. In particular, the temples and shrines forces was greatly influential. From the end of the Middle Ages to the beginning of the early modern state, the relationship between politics (secular powers) and religion changed

significantly under the influence of the ‘Ikkō-ikki’ (一向一揆) religious movement, Christian forces, and the ban on Christianity.

Because the Shimizu Shoin textbooks follow the policy of containing each topic within two facing pages, they are only able to provide the minimum amount of necessary materials. Had this limitation not existed, they would have contained more materials related to prayers for good harvest and peace, which were recited each year. As Taira Masayuki (平雅行) (author of *Jikkyo Shuppan* (実教出版) textbooks) emphasizes, Buddhism in the Middle Ages was regarded just like science in the modern era, permeating all aspects of society and facilitating prayers for good harvest and peace for the people [Taira 2010]. As mentioned above, the Middle Ages also saw significant climate change, which resulted in famines and conflicts: one can see, then, why the presence of Buddhism and the shrine forces became even more significant during this period.

Another point of emphasis in the textbooks is that, contrary to the popular preconception of Japan’s Middle Age as one of weakened political power and a divided ruling class, external crises such as the Mongol invasions prompted a strengthening of internal authority. This implies that the relatively lower external tensions in the Japanese archipelago from the 10th to the 16th centuries made a centralized and strong state system somewhat ‘unnecessary’ in certain respects.

Modern historical studies have a tendency to regard a strong state system as the ideal form of government and to look down on periods of weak state power as ‘declining times’. One must question, however, whether a strong state system (including military system) is necessary in the absence of external crises. World history textbooks also tend to regard the eras and regions with weak national systems as inferior. If a real external crisis were to occur, a rapid centralization of power could happen in a short period, as in the case of the Kamakura Shogunate during the Mongol Invasions.

Then, what can we derive from studying the medieval Japanese state that could challenge our definitions of an ‘early state’ or a ‘modern state’? We may reconsider whether a strong state is truly necessary and thus reexamine our current assumptions about ‘the state.’ Instead of

needlessly adding new concepts to emphasize the difference between a state in its early and modern stages, we can use the Middle Ages (or pre-modern) as a place to re-examine and refine the concepts that students must have learned in *Modern and Contemporary History* (a required first-year subject before *Advanced Japanese History*).

The last point is about commerce. Many textbooks state that private trade with China continued, despite the Mongol Invasions. This explanation is based on the premise that the Southern Song Dynasty, which was destroyed by the Mongols, had actively traded with Japan, specifically with many Zen monks traveling back and forth and that the expansion of Mongol power followed trade routes and the first Mongol invasion, or ‘The Battle of Bun’ei (文永の役)’ was part of the strategy to conquer the Southern Song. These points show that, although medieval Japan was isolated in terms of official diplomacy, the interchange of religious figures and merchants across the East China Sea remained active, as one can see from the import and distribution of Chinese coins in Japan. In brief, Japan was tied to China’s economic sphere.

Concerning the Heian Period and particularly national culture, the textbooks explain that an environment was created in which cultural artifacts from the East Asian continent could be imported without official state-to-state diplomacy, such as the Envoyship to Tang China. Yet, due to the concision required in Japanese high school textbooks, they could only explain the change itself and its historical causes, giving less attention to the question of how long such a change lasted and the manner in which it maintained itself. Still, the textbooks may be able to compensate for this limitation by at least showing that the East China Sea maritime network functioned until the Ming Dynasty’s maritime trade ban policy around the late 14th century [Enomoto 2020]. In addition, we could raise questions about the international environment that defined the Middle Ages and compare it with the ancient and early modern periods. We can also investigate the time were comparable to those in Europe’s medieval age or in Southeast Asian port-polity and, using knowledge from *Modern and Contemporary History*, raise questions about how they differ from modern ‘globalization,’ where goods, capital, and information can move

across national boundaries.

Taken altogether, in this presentation, I have introduced aspects of the Middle Ages beyond the negative image of weak state in premodern times. Nonetheless, weak state control meant a regress in state security. From the textbook descriptions, we can see the significant presence of religion and religious people who assumed roles of ‘publicness’ [Taira 2018], such as the Eison (叡尊) sect’s rescue of lower-class people and the activities of the Kanjin-hijiri (勸進聖), or religious practitioners who collected donations. How did people ensure social stability during the Japanese Middle Ages? This question remains relevant to us, who live in the post-modern era—often referred to as the ‘new Middle Age.’

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Challenges and Prospects of Textbooks in Japanese History

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Challenges and Prospects of Textbooks in Japanese History

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Introduction: The Direction of the New Curriculum Guidelines in Textbooks

In the new curriculum guidelines of Textbooks in Japanese History, ‘active, interactive, and deep learning’ is emphasized to enhance the quality of knowledge understanding and to cultivate qualities and abilities. This is summarized in the following three points.

- 1) Knowledge and Skills
- 2) Thinking Skills, Judgment, and Expression
- 3) Ability to Engage in Learning, and Humanity

Based on the above three pillars is envisioned the learning of Japanese History for the high school students through textbooks. Based on this, six key points for improvement and enhancement in the Japanese history textbook, *Japanese History Inquiry*, used in high school education are as follows.

1. Enhancing learning activities based on historical perspectives and ways of thinking about social phenomena
2. Development of history learning structured around ‘themes’ and

‘questions’

3. Development of history learning that emphasizes the coherence of units and content
4. Placing greater emphasis on deep understanding of knowledge and concepts through ‘interpretation, explanation, and discussion of history’ and on the development of ‘thinking skills, judgment skills, and expressive skills’ through history education
5. Learning which utilizes historical sources to master the methods of studying history
6. Examination of contemporary issues in Japan based on historical context

In terms of the curriculum for history (Japanese history and world history), it would be as follows. First, it is about moving away from an overemphasis on knowledge acquisition through history learning in high school. Traditionally, the biggest issue with high school history education is its positioning as a subject focused on memorization. Now, the challenge is how to transform old method of history teaching into a subject from which students can gain meaningful learning. This does not imply a denial of the acquisition of knowledge.

Second, it involves a discussion-based learning process in which students formulate hypotheses based on acquired knowledge and verify their validity through dialogue while sharing their ideas with one another. Therefore, textbooks need to encourage the development of thinking skills to explain history based on knowledge, and the judgment skills to assess the validity of these explanations. Additionally, communication with others is essential in this process, and there is an emphasis on a sincere attitude toward learning and the respect for others’ opinions.

Third, it involves nurturing creativity by resolving the first and second challenges, where students compare textbooks, their own ideas, and others’ opinions to discover issues by themselves and derive original insights to address those historical issues. This is understood as ‘deep learning’ in historical education.

Based on the above points, I would like to introduce the current

state of Japanese history textbooks and initiatives in *Japanese History Inquiry*.

Challenges in the Textbook Curriculum Guidelines

Historiography as a Premise

After World War II, the new Japanese historiography began shortly after the war in 1949 when ‘The Historical Science Research Association’ selected ‘Basic Contradictions in Various Social Structures of Japan’ as the central theme for its conference (Presenters: Shinhachiro Matsumoto, Koyohachiro Takahashi, Shobei Shioda). The direct result of the conference was published as *The Basic Laws of World History*, marking the new beginning of the Japanese history field. The main characteristic of the Japanese historiography lies in trying to identify historical development stages as universal across the world history. In Japanese history, there has been an ambitious effort to elucidate Japan’s place within world history under the perspective of how these ‘basic laws’ manifest in Japanese history.

But it did not progress as expected by many scholars at that time. The fundamental reason for this failure can be attributed to the attempt by Japanese historians to generalize the diverse historical characteristics of regions in Japanese history under the concept of ‘basic laws.’ The problem arose from treating the historically variable ‘nation’ and its history as immutable. For example, Hokkaido became part of ‘Japan’ as a result of long-term interactions from ancient times to the early modern period, and it was incorporated into modern Japan after it was established in 1869 through Meiji restoration. In that sense, is the history of the Watarishima and Ezochi, both of which are located in modern Hokkaido, in pre-modern times considered as part of ‘Japanese history’? This raises the further question of whether history should be narrated as something that culminates in the present day, or viewed as a series of passages involving integration and separation amidst diverse regional interactions.

However, in Japanese historiography, this issue in post-war history remained as an unresolved task for the future without solving unclear

scholarly challenges (Nagahara Keiji, 2001). In place of this, Nishijima Sadao shifted Japanese historiography by proposing the ‘East Asian world system,’ which examines Japan’s relationships with the world in history, a form different from the ‘basic laws of world history.’ (Nishijima Sadao, 1962). Here, Japanese historiography established itself as a national history which positioned as a subject of the ‘basic laws,’ and from that moment it began to be criticized for its departure from that framework.

Textbook Curriculum Guidelines and the ‘World History Perspective’

On this premise, the challenge in Japanese history is how to grasp the relationship with the world organically and how to reflect this in education. The teaching guidelines for *Japanese History Inquiry* set four major categories: ‘Primitive and Ancient Japan and East Asia,’ ‘Medieval Japan and the World,’ ‘Early Modern Japan and the World,’ and ‘Modern and Contemporary Regions, Japan, and the World.’ In high school education, Japanese history is divided into four periods: ancient, medieval, early modern, and modern/contemporary. With a focus on East Asia during the ancient period, this division emphasizes the relationship with the world.

In this regard, the teaching guidelines set the goal of fostering ‘the qualities and abilities of citizens necessary to be active and effective builders of a peaceful and democratic nation and society, living autonomously in an increasingly globalized international society.’ To achieve this, the guidelines emphasize the need for a comprehensive understanding of the various phenomena related to the development of our (Japan’s) history, in relation to geographical conditions and global historical contexts. They promote learners to ‘examine comprehensively the characteristics and transitions of each era from a global historical perspective’ and ‘to grasp our country’s history broadly, considering the continuity within the timeline, the spatial awareness of regions, Japan, and the world, as well as the political, economic, social, cultural, and international environments, and the characteristics and transitions of each era from various aspects.’

However, a question arises here. What exactly does ‘global histori-

cal perspective,’ as mentioned in the teaching guidelines, mean? At first glance, keywords such as ‘spatial awareness of the world’ or ‘international environment’ seem relevant, but these are merely factors for learners to grasp Japanese history. Ultimately, if understanding each era requires understanding the global situation during a certain period, then leaving world history and Japanese history disconnected will lead to perceiving Japan within the world as meaningless in an increasingly globalized international society.

The Relationship between Traditional Japanese History Textbooks and the ‘World History Perspective’

The way textbooks describe ‘Japan’ as the subject of Japanese history and its interactions with the outside world has long history. In fact, the human inhabitants of the Japanese archipelago originally arrived from outside world. This indicates that the movements and interactions between the Japanese archipelago and the outside world are fundamentally integrated and not exceptional. However, if the textbook once viewed from the perspective of ‘Japan’ as a main criterion in explaining the history, the interaction history between Japan and outside world tends to be forgotten, and Japan’s interactions with the other states in East Asia are perceived as exceptional occurrences in history. This perception makes it difficult for learners to acquire a ‘world history perspective.’ In this context, it is problematic that while medieval, early modern, and modern-contemporary Japan are ‘compared with the world in the aforementioned main topics, ancient Japan is categorized solely as ‘East Asia.’ This classification stems from the notion that, in ancient times, connections were limited to a narrower regional context (East Asia), with broader global connections not being recognized as established.

It should not be assumed that all periods are interconnected in the same way. However, textbooks should avoid portraying Japan as inherently closed off within East Asia from the outset. Ancient East Asia was not a closed entity. For example, a single glass vessel was discovered in the Okchŏn M1 tomb of the Okchŏn Tombs in Hapch’ŏn, South Kyongsang Province, Korea (photo on the left). In Japan too, a glass bowl was

found in Tomb No. 126 of the Niizawa Chizuka Tombs (photo on the right). While the exact correlation between these two items are unclear, both are dated to the 5th century. It has been suggested that the Japanese item is a product of the Sasanian Empire (Abe and Nakai, 2012). This suggests a structure of exchange between West Asia and East Asia, as well as circulation within East Asian World.



The so called ‘World history perspective’ entails not merely juxtaposing Japan with other regions during the same period in history, but rather considering its structural implications in this manner. Alternatively, considering the learners’ level, it should be seen as a starting point for them to imagine and hypothesize why and how connections occur. This process allows learners to develop their understanding through discussions about the validity of their hypotheses.

The Description of Japan-Korea Exchanges in the Textbook *Japanese History Inquiry*

The writing policy

I was one of the authors who are responsible for writing the textbook *Nihonshi Tanshū* (*Japanese History Inquiry* published by Daiichi Shuppan). Based on the textbook guidelines outlined in the beginning, the approach of writing was designed to present learners with main text, illustrations, and historical sources. Learners use those contents as clues to formulate basic hypotheses in response to historical questions posed in

each unit, and then verify those hypotheses through discussion. By providing many chances to explore questions such as ‘why’ and ‘how’ in history, learners are able to enhance their understanding and perception of history.


In particular, it emphasized the development of insights that allow learners to recognize the tendency to be confined by narrow perspectives influenced by existing biases, capturing the gap between traditional views and modern understanding without being bound by pre-conceptions.

One example is the use of gold seals. By examining the explanatory text and illustrations, learners who initially assumed that seals were used with vermilion ink on paper come to understand that the Golden Seal was actually employed with clay, serving a purpose distinct from its modern applications. This recognition of the divergence between traditional practices and contemporary understanding enables learners to better contextualize their own knowledge and perspectives.

The Narrative of Japan-Korea Relations

Textbook narratives are heavily constrained by space limitations. Within these constraints, the challenge lies in how to incorporate history research findings while adhering to the aforementioned principles. Below, I would like to introduce the achievements and challenges regarding the narrative of Japan-Korea relations in the ancient section of the textbook *Nihonshi Tanshū*, published by Daiichi Shuppan, in which I was involved.

First, Japan and the Korean Peninsula are the closest neighboring countries, and their interactions have been active since ancient times.



ic relations between Southern parts of the Korea and ancient Japan during this period, the introduction of the Seven-Branched Sword is also mentioned on the history materials page.


Among the history of interactions between ancient Japan and Korea, a particularly controversial issue is the Kwanggaet'o Stele (King Kwanggaeto Stele). The caption of the figure explains the position of Koguryo, which erected the stele, as follows:

Koguryo seemed to be strongly aware of Wa (Japan), emphasizing its victories in battles against Wa.

This textbook narration is based on the research of Lee Söngsi (1994). Here, by incorporating a dual perspective on the military conflicts between Wa (Japan) and Koguryo, Nihonshi Tanshu achieves a multi-faceted view that is not one-sided, enabling a comprehensive understanding of ancient Japan and its relations with Korea.

Furthermore, the history of exchanges was not limited to diplomatic relations between ancient Japan and Korea. For instance, it was described that before Japan's wars with Koguryo, horses were not originally present in ancient Japan. But, due to the wars between two states, there was





beginning of active horse breeding, and horse gear started to appear as a burial items in ancient tombs of Japan. This explanation serves to make the learners aware that the presence of horses was never a given, bridging the gap mentioned earlier.

It also aims to demonstrate that international exchanges are not merely diplomatic but also reflect on domestic political structures. Additionally, by displaying a simple illustration of horse gear, it enables learning about how horse gear consists of various components.

Regarding the fact that horses were originally absent in ancient Japan which was noted in the *Records of Wei in History of Three Kingdoms (Sanguozhi Weishu)*, but I couldn't introduce that issue in the textbook. If this issue had been included, it could have fostered the development of critical thinking skills about the unfolding of the era and awareness of new issues (such as where the horses were brought from). This is something that could be expected to be enhanced through revision opportunities.

I would like to address the so-called 'The Cession of Mimana Four Counties Incident' in the 6th century. Azuma Ushio points out the persistence of the ancient Japan's control ideology in textbooks (Azuma Ushio, 2022), highlighting this controversial historical issue between ancient Japan and Korea. Recent research has clarified that the expansion of Paekche's territory is not related to the involvement of Wa State in Mimana regions. So matters like the 'The Cession of Mimana Four Counties Incident' and 'Mimana Japan Prefectures,' which have already been refuted in academic research, should be excluded from the textbook description. Instead, the textbook shows the peninsula's developments on a

historical map and describes how such fluctuations in the Korea Peninsula's situation, for instance, are connected to the transmission of Buddhism from Paekche to Wa (Japan).

The 7th century in Nihonshi Tanshū marked the peak of international changes in East Asia. In Chapter 1, Section 2, Paragraph 4, there are many historical events: The concentration of power through internal coups in various states during the 640s, 'The Battle of Paekgang' following 'The fall of Paekche Kingdom' in 660, and 'The fall of Koguryo Kingdom' in 668. However, there is also an increasing need to cover many historical events within Wa State. Particularly, 'The Taika Reforms' are often discussed as the initiation of the Imperial government by adopting the Tang China political institution, but academic research has shown significant influences from the institutions and culture of the Korean Peninsula (such as the Sangi system and the hyang system). Incorporating those historical facts properly into textbook is a future challenge.

Furthermore, in previous textbooks, the situation on the Korean Peninsula after the Battle of Paekgang was omitted. However, by meticulously describing this part, it was deemed that one could understand East Asia more clearly in the 8th century, so I have described the Battle of Sila and Tang Dynasty as follow.

やまじろ国

倭国は唐の襲来に備えて西日本各地に山城を造営し、九州北部に

さきもり
防人を設置して防衛体制を整えた。この間に唐と新羅は668年に高

(→ p.49)

句麗を滅ぼしたが、朝鮮半島の支配をめぐる対立するようになり、

(← p.34)

672年から戦争状態になった。676年に新羅が唐を半島から追い出し、朝鮮半島の統一に成功した。

Wa State prepared fortresses throughout western Japan in anticipation of Tang's future invasion of Japan, stationed Sakimori in northern Kyushu, and established a defensive system. Meanwhile, Tang and Silla jointly

conquered Kingdom of Koguryo in 668, but they became antagonistic over control of the Korean Peninsula and entered a state of war against each other from 672 onwards. In 676, Silla expelled the Tang armies and successfully unified the Korean Peninsula.

In Chapter 1, Section 2, Paragraph 7, which covers the 8th century, *Nihonshi Tanshu* mentions that East Asia was comprised of Japan, Silla, and Palhae, and discusses the diplomatic conflicts arising from Japan that considered Silla as a subordinate state. However, the textbook's coverage of Silla and Palhae history is restricted to their eventual downfall, as presented in Chapter 1, Section 3, Paragraph 3. This indicates that there is insufficient coverage of the international exchanges between ancient Japan and other states in East Asia. In the 9th century, ancient Japan's diplomatic relations with Silla faces significant decline in textbook description. It is generally believed there was no diplomatic relations between these states in 9th century, but there were still trade exchanges between Chang Pogo and ancient Japan. However, as mentioned earlier, there is no narrative describing these exchanges in textbook. Incorporating such exchange history between ancient Japan and Korea into future revised textbook appropriately will be a future task.

In Chapter 1, Section 3, Paragraph 3, *Nihonshi Tanshu* explains the collapse of Silla and Palhae states, and the establishment of Koryō Dynasty along with the arrival of Joseon merchants. However, the narrative regarding East Asia during the so-called Heian Period in Japanese history (794 to the end of the 12th century) is limited to this section only. A prevailing notion in general Japanese history is that 'after Sugawara no Michizane's abolition of the Tang envoys in 894, ancient Japan's interactions with other East Asian states became extremely limited, leading to the flourishing of kokufu bunka (national culture).' Criticism against the concept of 'kokufu bunka' in Japanese history has been advancing in recent research (Kimura Shigemitsu, 1997; Kawauchi Haruto, 2018; Yoshimura Takehiko et al., eds., 2021), but integrating this new research into history education has been a slow process for the future.

Conclusion

In the contemporary world where military conflicts are frequent in various global regions, understanding the historical causes and backgrounds of these conflicts holds significant importance. This is not an exception in East Asia. Through history education, it is crucial to acquire a global perspective that transcends national boundaries in order to deepen mutual understanding.

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'Early Modern Period' in *Comprehensive History*

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'Early Modern Period' in *Comprehensive History*

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Introduction

I was involved in Jikkyo Publishing's textbooks for the new subject *Comprehensive History*, which has been implemented in Japanese high schools since 2023, and contributed to the writing and editing of *Detailed Comprehensive History* and *Selected Comprehensive History*. In the field of history textbooks for Japanese high schools, Japanese history had long been divided into two separate courses, *Japanese History A* and *Japanese History B*. However, a recent revision to the curriculum introduced *Japanese History Inquiry*, which directly inherits the approach of *Japanese History A* and *Japanese History B*, along with *Comprehensive History*, which integrates world history beyond Japan. This second addition in particular represents an attitudinal shift from a separation between Japanese history (national history) and world history, which had previously been common practice, to an understanding of the two subjects as an inseparably interconnected whole. It is a new approach that has not been seen before in Japanese high school history education. For this reason, there are still few or no precedents accumulated for new textbooks for this course. In other words, this implies that the content of *Comprehensive History* textbooks over these next few years will establish precedents for future editions. It is important to note that *Comprehensive*

History is currently undergoing its first round of revisions.

A defining characteristic of the new *Comprehensive History* course is its coverage of modern periods. The periods covered by *Comprehensive History* primarily span from the 19th century to the present day. This approach seeks to foster an understanding of the new global dynamic, in which diverse regions of the world, previously forming distinct unities and orders, have become interconnected, mutually influential, and inseparable. The adoption of a new framework integrating Japanese history and world history together serves this same purpose. But, even if this basic structure were to be maintained, it must be noted that there are other important periods beyond the modern era, including the 17th to 18th centuries. Although *Comprehensive History* is designed to focus on the modern era, it cannot commence solely from that period, as this approach would impede the understanding of the various underlying premises or foundations of historical phenomena in the modern era.

This era, often referred to as the ‘Early Modern Period,’ largely corresponds to the Edo period (1603-1868) in Japanese history and is prominently featured at the beginning of *Comprehensive History* as a crucial precursor to the modern era. For example, of the 65 total chapters in Jikkyo Publishing’s *Detailed Comprehensive History*, the first 20 chapters describe developments in each region leading up to the modern age. I was responsible for writing several chapters of them in *Detailed Comprehensive History* and in charge of editing (supervision) for *Selected Comprehensive History*. In this report, I will address the following characteristic matters regarding *Detailed Comprehensive history* in particular, based on my experience contributing to it: (1) new historical content that were consciously and intentionally included in the textbook during the writing process, (2) issues and difficulties that were encountered during the work, and (3) unique problems that arose from the connection between Japan’s early modern and modern periods, for which I was responsible, during the writing process.

New Content Included during the Writing Process

East Asian Network

While writing for the *Comprehensive History* textbook, which as previously explained integrates Japanese history and world history together, I was responsible for the sections on Japanese history, particularly focusing on the late Edo Period (Early Modern Era) and the end of the Tokugawa Shogunate (1853-1868). The Japanese foreign policy of the Edo period is generally characterized as closed, and is often referred to as 'Sakoku' or 'National Isolation.' Jikkyo Publishing's *Comprehensive History*, while acknowledging the 'Sakoku' policy of the late Edo Period, also discusses the 'Four Gateways' of Edo Japan (Matsumae, Tsushima, Nagasaki, Kagoshima), which served as significant external gateways for foreign trade with Chosŏn Korea at the Pusan trade post and diplomatic visits to Edo and so on by ambassadors from Chosŏn Korea, the Kingdom of Ryukyu, the Netherlands, and Ainu.

Development of transportation (distribution) infrastructure and population changes in Japan

During the Edo period, there was a certain level of ongoing exchange and interaction between Japan and the outside world. At the same time, it also featured a period of markedly improved social cohesion and unity in Japanese society as compared to earlier times. The existence of a dynastic political system in Japan and the people living there do not directly correlate with our current idea of 'Japan' or 'Japanese.' Still, in some regards, the Edo period saw the inception of a national identity closer to what we currently imagine as 'Japanese' (proto-citizens). Keeping in mind these characteristics of the Edo Period, I strove to show how the Japanese population changed over the long Edo period and to discuss the origins of the 'National Character' attributed to the modern Japanese people, such as diligence, frugality, and the pursuit of simplicity and self-discipline.

The Tokugawa Shogunate as a military government

The Edo period was characterized by long-term peace ('Pax Tokugawa'), a rarity even in world history. This era saw a centralized military government enduring for approximately 700 years, reaching the height of its prosperity in its final phase. From a global historical perspective, the persistence of the Japanese military government for centuries, outlasting contemporary literati states or dynasties, holds significant historical importance. I emphasized the continued importance of self-awareness of its identity as a military government in this regard. Additionally, I discussed the military parading aspect of 'Sankin Kotai,' which is typically explained in the context of the Tokugawa Shogunate's control over the Daimyo (Illustration 1).

The discussion of the 'Opening Country' policy toward foreign powers by Bakufu Officials

The Meiji Restoration, considered the starting point of modern Japan, is often depicted as a process in which anti-shogunate factions like the Satsuma and Choshu clans toppled the Tokugawa Shogunate and ushered in a new era. It is also widely understood that Satsuma and Choshu initially advocated for 'Sonno Joi' (Revere the Emperor, Expel the Barbarians), but they soon recognized the imprudence of this stance and subsequently evolved into anti-shogunate factions. However, during this period, some officials of the Tokugawa Shogunate had long advocated for a systematic 'Open Contry' policy toward Western Powers and had effectively averted the crisis of external warfare at the situation of diplomatic negotiations. In my chapters in the textbook, I described the origins and characteristics of the 'Open Contry' policy promoted by these Tokugawa Shogunate officials, which had never been previously highlighted (Illustration 2).

Challenges and Difficulties during the Work Process

Distance from precedents of the history

Because high school history textbooks have a very high level of public influence, their content and structure are carefully reviewed before com-

pletion. As a result, recent academic research or new scholarly theories are not immediately incorporated into their contents. This applies to the author's research as well. It is often said that it can take up to 30 years for the results of recent research, after undergoing rigorous verification, to become established theories and be reflected in textbook narratives. Meanwhile, numerous studies have emerged in recent years in the field of early modern and modern Japanese history, becoming increasingly refined and diversified. Consequently, I have encountered the following structural issues during the writing and editing process for the textbook.

The fact that *Comprehensive History* is a newly established history subject

Because *Comprehensive History* was a newly established subject and lacked any precedents, its structure and content had to be built up from the beginning. As a result, in the first year after the subject was commissioned, the differences in textbook style among publishers were particularly noticeable. One publisher, for example, boldly integrated and simplified the narratives of Japanese and world history pertaining to the Meiji Restoration period. However, this unique approach caused confusion in the educational field and led to low sales rates. On the other hand, Jikkyō Publishing Company took a relatively conservative approach in composing the textbook by adopting an alternating structure between Japanese and world history sections. But this approach limited the textbook's content to a mere transplantation and repetition of the existing narratives of 'Japanese history' and 'world history' respectively; despite covering a newly established history subject, the textbook merely reiterated existing narratives from other history subjects.

The situation of the textbook after the collapse of ambitious theories

Until the 1990s, the structure of Japanese historical studies was such that specific histories were depicted within the larger flow of a grand narrative. For example, regarding the Meiji Restoration period, there existed a common understanding, or grand theory, that served as the foundation for specific research topics. However, with the clear decline of Marxist his-

torigraphy, history research became more individualized and independent. In studies examining the Meiji Restoration, various different theories abound without any kind of theoretical coherence, resulting in the mere accumulation of individual observations and isolated studies. Because of the general consensus among the academic community that grand and overarching theories are no longer suitable, scholars have not been able to establish a new historical framework of similar scale and coherence. Currently, we are facing a dilemma in which we must decide whether to abandon the narrative aspect of history (causal relationships connecting eras and phenomena) or to continue propagating outdated understandings that no longer function as premises of the history.

The Unique Problems that Arose from the Connection between Japan's Early Modern and Modern Periods during the Writing Process

The independence of early modern Japanese history

Japan's 'modernization' can be broadly described as a transition from the early modern era (Edo period) to the modern era (after the Meiji Restoration), largely centered on the Meiji Restoration. It is important for *Comprehensive History*, which as mentioned before focuses mainly on the modern era, to explore the connections and developments from previous eras in order to investigate the characteristics of modernization in each country and region. Consequently, with regard to Japanese history, it is essential to elucidate the historical context in which Japanese modernization commenced, identify features that distinguish it from modernization in other countries—particularly neighboring ones—and examine the factors that contributed to these developments. However, there is a structural discontinuity between Japan's early modern history and modern history, formed over several decades, in history research and history education.

The main cause of this discontinuity is the 'independence of early modern history.' When modern historiography and systematic history education first emerged during the Meiji era, their main purpose was to elu-

cidate how Japan had reached its current state at that point in time (which we now perceive as modern history), just like our own *Comprehensive History*. As a result, the Edo period was initially established as the most significant immediate precursor to the modern era in Japanese history. Of course, the 'developmental stages' theory in history research also backed the idea that the early modern period should be considered the prelude to the modern era in Japanese history.

But, around the 1960s, criticisms arose asserting that early modern history had become subordinate to modern history under this framework. As a result, scholars like Asao Naohiro began advocating for the 'independence of early modern history' in Japanese history research. This sparked a new movement towards redefining the early modern era as an independent subject worthy of being studied individually, rather than a mere prelude to the modern era. Since then, the study of Japanese early modern history has made significant advancements, uncovering previously unknown historical facts, exploring new issues and themes, and contributing greatly to the progress of history research as a whole.

The significant improvement in research standards following this 'independence of early modern Japanese history' has, on the other hand, led to issues in connecting the studies of early modern history and modern history. As the historical research regarding the two periods became more detailed and specialized, they gradually drifted apart as separate and independent subjects of study. This phenomenon has led to ambiguity in the connections between the early modern and modern eras, including modernization. Therefore, one of the significant challenges that *Comprehensive History* must address is not only to find a way integrate the research developments that have been made for each respective period since the separation, caused by 'the independence of early modern history,' but also to depict causal relationships between the two periods in such a way that does not merely subsume the early modern era into a simple prelude.

Review Article



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**New Perspectives on the Study of
Korean Diplomatic History:
*Diplomatic Documents of
Korea (2009-2018) and
Korea's Foreign Relations and
Diplomatic History (2019)***

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New Perspectives on the Study of Korean Diplomatic History: *Diplomatic Documents of Korea (2009-2018) and Korea's Foreign Relations and Diplomatic History (2019)*¹

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A History of Research on Korean Diplomatic History

‘Diplomatic history’ refers to the academic study of the history of relations between nations, including treaties, wars, trade, based on the analysis of diplomatic documents.² The historical narrative on international relations can be found in ancient historical texts such as the *Chunqiu* (Spring and Autumn Annals) or the *Peloponnesian War*, but the establishment of diplomatic history as a distinct academic discipline with its own methodology occurred in the late 19th century with Leopold von Ranke. One of Ranke’s major contributions was transforming historical narrative from amateur literature writing into an organized realm of scholarly inquiry conducted by historians equipped with specialized skills in analyzing historical documents, rather than mere literary endeavors. Further-

¹ The portion of this article that describes the history and challenges of research on Korean diplomatic history is a revised and supplemented excerpt from the author’s essay ‘*Professor Kim Yong-gu on Korean Diplomatic History*,’ in *Kim Yong-gu Research Reflections* (Seoul: Yönamsoğa 2021).

² Kelly Boyd, ed, *Encyclopedia of Historians and Historical Writings* (Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn, 1999), 314-315.

more, he established the subject of history as nations and peoples, and advocated for the relative superiority of political diplomacy over all other social domains such as economics, culture, and religion. Consequently, Ranke and his students believed that the truth of history lay in the historical documents hidden within state archives, and thus devoted themselves to the excavation and empirical study of such documents. The traditional understanding that diplomatic history research should fundamentally rely on official archival materials is derived from Ranke.³

The First World War (1914-1918) became a significant turning point in the development of modern diplomatic history by providing the opportunity for the mass publication of diplomatic document collections. In 1917, the newly established Soviet Union shocked European nations by mass-publishing secret treaties and diplomatic documents from the era of Imperial Russia to validate the legitimacy of its regime amidst the First World War. In the aftermath of the war, victorious and vanquished nations alike began systematically compiling and publishing diplomatic documents from the war. This phenomenon expanded to the publication of personal documents of main policy-makers such as their diaries, memoirs, and letters. Diplomatic documents that were once concealed in national secret archives and could only be accessed by a handful of government officials became abundantly available to the public. As a result, diplomatic history research experienced a surge in vitality and rapid development.

This phenomenon also spread to East Asia. In the 1930s, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs began to publish *Kyujyōyakuisan* (The Compilation of Old Treaties) and *Dainihongaikōbunsho* (Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy), a collection of diplomatic documents from the Meiji era. Japanese universities also began earnestly engaging in diplomatic history research and education. For example, the first course on diplomatic history was established in the Faculty of Law at Tokyo Impe-

³ Kim Jong-Hak, "The Ethos of Modern Japanese Positive Historiography and Tabohashi Kiyoshi's Studies on Korean History," *Korean Cultural Studies*, Issue 34, 2018.

rial University in 1904. However, the content of the lectures mainly focused on international legal topics such as treaties and international institutions at that time. In the 1930s, led by Tabohashi Kiyoshi, young emerging scholars like Watanabe Katsumi, Osatake Takeki, and Yano Jin'ichi began to publish new research findings on Korean-Japanese and Sino-Japanese relations based on the positive analysis of diplomatic documents. During the same period, Chinese scholars like Jiang Tingfu, Wang Yunsheng, Shao Xunzheng, and Wang Chenzhong began studying the diplomatic history of Sino-Japanese relations, the Sino-French War, and the Sino-Japanese War.

What of diplomatic history research in Korea? It is easy to imagine that research on Korean diplomatic history conducted by Korean scholars would have been practically difficult under Japanese rule. In 1924, Keijo Imperial University was founded, and in 1928, a course on diplomatic history was established within the university. However, study on diplomatic history at Keijo Imperial University had remained the exclusive research area of Japanese scholars such as Okudaira Takehiko and Tanaka Naokichi.⁴ Furthermore, as evidenced by the fact that Professor Tabohashi Kiyoshi of Keijō Imperial University was commissioned by the *Chōsensihensyūkai* (Chosŏn History Compilation Committee) to oversee the compilation of Volume 6 of *Chosŏn History* [covering the reigns from King Sunjo (r. 1800-1834) to Kojong (r.1864-1907)], these Japanese scholars virtually monopolized Korean historical sources against the backdrop of the administrative power of the Chosŏn Government-General. Even the Kyujanggak and Changsŏgak archives became the exclusive primary sources for Japanese scholars' research, leaving Korean researchers with only the option of citing Japanese research or catching glimpses of them through Japanese publications. On the other hand, there were also studies on Korean diplomatic history conducted by Western scholars, missionaries, and journalists from the Anglo-American academ-

⁴ Ito Shin'ya, *The Diplomatic Arena and Diplomatic History of Modern Japan* (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyoronsha, 2011).

ic community. However, those studies heavily relied on their own country's diplomatic sources, presupposing an understanding of Korean diplomacy from the standpoint of Western governments without question.⁵

The liberation of Korea from Japanese colonial rule in 1945 promised Korean scholars academic freedom, access to domestic materials, and the possibility of discovering new documents. Immediately after the liberation of Korea, major universities in Korea, including Seoul National University (known as Kyōngsōng University from 1945 to 1946), established courses related to diplomatic history, such as 'Diplomatic History,' 'Korean Diplomatic History,' 'Theory of International Organizations,' 'Colonial Theory,' 'East Asian Diplomatic History,' 'Western Diplomatic History,' and 'International Law.'⁶ Additionally, research books on Korean diplomatic history were written by Moon Il-pyung, Lee Ki-beom, Kang Deok-soo, Min Tae-won, Kim Sang-gi, and Yoo Ja-hoo, while textbooks on diplomatic history were authored by Shin Ki-seok, Park Bong-yang, Kang Sang-woon, and Park Kwan-sook. Along with this, many Western books on late Chosŏn dynasty's diplomatic history, including F.A. McKenzie's *Tragedy of Korea* (1908, with the first Korean translation published in 1946), began to be translated.

Research on Korean diplomatic history remained at a standstill due to the Korean War. Above all, research in diplomatic history is a discipline made feasible only under the condition of having extensive diplomatic materials organized and available, more so than in other fields of study. However, the reality within the Korean scholarly community was that not only were diplomatic documents, including unpublished documents from various countries, lacking, but also even those related to Korea were not adequately available.⁷

⁵ Lee Yonghee, ed., "Preface," in *Complete Catalogue of Modern Korean Diplomatic Documents: Foreign Section* (Seoul, National Assembly Library of the Republic of Korea, 1966).

⁶ Son Je-seok, "Trends in Research and University Education in International Politics," *Journal of the Korean Association of International Studies*, Vol. 2, 1967.

⁷ Hong Soon-ho, "Issues and Directions in Diplomatic History Research," *Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 30, No. 2, 1991.

What troubles us in diplomatic history research today is not only an inevitable aspect of our national history, which has never taken control over the course of our long history, but also the fact that our political and diplomatic studies cannot afford to be overly reliant on foreign sources. Moreover, both political history and international politics, as fundamental components of the broader field of political science, encounter the challenge of being primarily reliant on foreign subjects. This exacerbates the issue of securing essential research materials.⁸

This is a citation from a 1975 article published in a scholarly journal. However, the issue of securing primary sources for diplomatic history, which forms the basis of research in Korean political history or diplomatic history, is still difficult to consider resolved. In other words, identifying and collecting the scattered diplomatic history materials lost during the political and social upheavals of the late periods of the Chosŏn Dynasty (1392-1910), Japanese colonial rule, and the Korean War, and finally organizing them into published collections of Korean diplomatic history documents still remain an unfinished task. In this sense, recent publications such as the *Diplomatic Documents of Korea* and the series *Korea's Foreign Relations and Diplomatic History*, sponsored by the Northeast Asian History Foundation, have provided significant value as pioneering attempts in Korean diplomatic history research and have opened up new in this field. The former is a collection of diplomatic documents, including unpublished ones, both domestic and foreign, concerning Korea's external relations during the modern period (1863-1910), while the latter is a vast historical work that narrates the comprehensive history of Korean diplomacy from ancient to the modern era.

⁸ Park Bong-sik, "Issues and Problems in the Study of International Political History," in *Collected Papers from the Joint Academic Conference of Korean Political Scientists in North America*, 1975, 393.

Diplomatic Documents of Korea, 13 Volumes, 2009-2018

Diplomatic Documents of Korea (hereafter referred to as DDK) is a collection of diplomatic documents from the Chosŏn Dynasty to the Korean Empire (established in 1897), spanning from 1864 to 1910. These documents include policy documents of major powers such as China, Japan, the United Kingdom, Russia, the United States, France, and Germany concerning the Korean Peninsula. As of now, a total of 13 volumes have been published. The practical challenge faced by scholars studying modern Korean history or East Asian international politics and diplomatic history centered around the Korean Peninsula is the difficulty in accessing primary sources. These documents are often dispersed and not systematically organized in each country's archives. In this regard, *DDK*, which includes around 3,400 documents, including approximately 1,000 unpublished ones, can be considered an extremely valuable resource for researchers of modern East Asian and Korean diplomatic history.

The Compilation Committee of *DDK* was chaired by Kim Yong-gu, a renowned scholar in the field of Korean diplomatic history and an honorary professor at Seoul National University. The committee included prominent researchers in political science, diplomatic history, and general history in Korea, such as Kim Jong-Hak, Kim Hyeong-jong (Seoul National University), Kim Heung-soo (Hongik University), Shin Wook-hee (Seoul National University), Woo Cheol-gu (Yeungnam University), Lee Geun-wook (Sogang University), Lee Sang-chan (Seoul National University), Jang In-sung (Seoul National University), Choi Deok-gyu (Northeast Asian History Foundation), Choi Deok-soo (Korea University), Choi Hee-jae (Dankook University), and Hwang Ki-woo (Sungkyunkwan University). They have conducted archival research not only in Korea but also in various foreign countries over several years. For example, they have visited the National Archives I (Washington, DC), National Archives II (College Park, MD), The Library of Congress (Washington, DC), New York Public Library (New York, NY), University of Rochester (Rochester, NY), and Navy Archives (Washington, DC) in the

United States. In France, they accessed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives (Courneuve) and the National Archives (Paris). In Taiwan, they utilized the Institute of Modern History Archives, Guo Tingyi Library, Humanities and Social Sciences Library, Fu Sinian Library, Institute of Historical Language Research Archives, and Palace Museum Archives. In Japan, they explored the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Archives (Tokyo), National Diet Library Constitutional Materials Room (Tokyo), Ministry of Defense Defense Research Institute Library (Tokyo), National Diet Library (Tokyo), and Kyoto University (Kyoto). In the United Kingdom, they visited The National Archives (London), National Maritime Museum (Greenwich), British Library (St. Pancras), and the Department of Manuscripts and University Archives (Cambridge University). Additionally, they accessed the State Archive of the Russian Federation (RGIA) in Russia.

In addition to compiling scattered diplomatic documents related to Korea from various countries' archives into a unified collection, the usefulness of this book lies in converting handwritten 19th-century documents into printed format, making them easily accessible for modern researchers. One of the greatest challenges in dealing with 19th-century diplomatic documents is that reading and interpreting the primary sources is not an easy task for modern scholars. For example, English diplomatic documents written with a typewriter only began to appear after the 1890s. In case of Chinese documents, they follow a unique format called 'liwen' (吏文), while Japanese documents at that time used a classical style called 'Sorobun' (候文), which is different from modern Japanese. Furthermore, most of these documents are written in undecipherable cursive script (草書), rather than in formal script (正書). Therefore, deciphering these diplomatic history documents requires extensive training to read and understand, in addition to knowledge of 'liwen' and 'Sorobun.' German documents are also written in a unique font called 'Fraktur,' so in order to read them, one must become familiar with this typeface itself. Furthermore, the *DDK* adopts a chronological arrangement of documents based on major diplomatic events or topics, using a narrative style compilation method. This is believed to be helpful in understanding the caus-

al relationships between the diplomatic policies of major powers towards the Korean Peninsula within the context of modern Korean political and diplomatic history. Furthermore, it is expected that providing basic information such as sender-receiver, date of dispatch-receipt, document title, etc., for each document by the Compilation Committee will greatly alleviate the efforts of researchers.

As mentioned earlier, the DDK has been published in a total of 13 volumes so far. The topics of each volume and the future publication plans are as follows.

(1) Phase 1

- Volume 1 General Sherman Incident of 1866/ French Campaign against Korea of 1866
- Volume 2 Oppert Incident of 1867/ United States Expedition to Korea of 1871
- Volume 3 Korea-Japan Treaty of 1876
- Volume 4 Korea-United States Treaty of 1882
- Volume 5 Korea-United Kingdom Treaty of 1882, 1883

(2) Phase 2

- Volume 6, 7 Imo Military Revolt of 1882
- Volume 8-11 Kapsin Coup of 1884
- Volume 12, 13 Port Hamilton Incident, 1885-1887

(3) Phase 3 (Future publication plans)

- Volume 14, 15 Park Jong-yang as the First Ambassador to the United States
- Volume 16-19 Sino-Japanese War, 1894-1895
- Volume 20 Triple Intervention of 1895
- Volume 21-23 Assassination of Empress Myōngsōng of 1895 / Korea Royal Refuge at the Russian Legation, 1896-1897
- Volume 24-28 Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
- Volume 29-32 Loss of National Sovereignty and Diplomacy for Independence

The compilation of the *DDK* was the first attempt by Korean academia to collect modern Korean diplomatic documents scattered both domestically and internationally and compile them into a unified collection of diplomatic documents. There are similar works, including the publication of the *Compilation of Old Korean Treaties* in three volumes (1964-1965) by the National Assembly Library. This compilation includes original texts and translations of treaties concluded with foreign countries from Chosŏn Dynasty to the era of the Korean Empire. Additionally, the National Institute of Korea History published the facsimile edition of the late Chosŏn (1788-1881)'s *Tongmun hwigo* in four volumes in 1978. Furthermore, the Asiatic Research Institute at Korea University, sponsored by the Ford Foundation, has published facsimile editions of the *Old Korean Diplomatic Documents and Supplementary Documents of Old Korean Diplomacy*, which are housed in Kyujanggak at Seoul National University. Apart from these, there are works such as *Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials Relating to Korea, 1866-1886* (Shin Mun Dang, 1982) and *Anglo-American and Chinese Diplomatic Materials Relating to Korea, 1887-1897* (Pusan National University, 1984), compiled by Dr. Park Il-Keun; a 45-volume collection titled *Collection of Korea-UK Diplomatic History Primary Sources* (Tonggwang Publishing, 1997), which includes documents related to Korea from UK-China records (F.O. 405), UK-Japan records (F.O. 410 and 371), and UK-Korea records (F.O. 523) housed in the Public Record Office; and a 50-volume series titled *Comprehensive Collection of Unpublished Secret Korean-Japanese Diplomatic Primary Sources* (Asia Cultural Press, 1995-1996), compiled by Professor Kim Yong-gu, which reproduces documents missing from the Japanese Diplomatic Documents stored in the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. However, these are merely reproductions or reprints of related files and cannot be considered collections of diplomatic documents at an international standard.

The large-scale compilation project of *DDK* has drawn the academic community's attention to diplomatic documents related to Korea that are located overseas. Since then, joint research projects to discover, organize, and translate these documents have significantly increased in the

Korean academic community, with the support of organizations such as the Korea Research Foundation and the Academy of Korean Studies. For instance, notable achievements include *Annotated Old Korean Diplomatic Documents Qing Records* (6 volumes, 2017-present) by the Institute of Incheon Studies at Incheon National University, *German Diplomatic Documents on Korea* (15 volumes, 2019-present) by the Institute of German Culture at Korea University, *Modern East Asian Diplomatic Documents* (27 volumes, 2017) by the Institute of Korean History at Korea University and the Institute of International Affairs at Dongguk University, *Modern Korean-French Diplomatic Materials* (3 volumes, 2018) by the Institute of French Studies at Sungkyunkwan University, and *French Foreign Ministry Materials on the Korean War* (6 volumes, 2021) compiled by the same institute. Along with this, the DDK compilation project has also achieved the unexpected success of nurturing the next generation of scholars. Graduate students who participated as research assistants in this project later submitted twelve doctoral dissertations on the subject of modern Korean diplomatic history.⁹ These scholars are ex-

⁹ Park Joon-hyung, *The Reorganization of Spatial Structures and the Establishment of Colonial Mixed-Residence Spaces in Modern Korea: Focusing on the Legal Status of Qing Nationals and the Qing Concessions* (Tokyo: Waseda University, 2011); Min Hoi-soo, *A Study on the Supervisory Offices of Modern Korean Open Ports and Markets* (Seoul: Seoul National University, 2013); Kim Jong Hak, *The origin of Gaehwa-dang and its secret diplomacy, 1879-1884* (Seoul: Seoul National University, 2015); Han Seung-hoon, *A Study on Joseon's Policy Toward Britain in the Late 19th Century (1874-1895): Establishing and Disrupting the Relationship Between Joseon's Balance Policy and Britain's Intervention Policy* (Seoul: Korea University, 2015); Park Han-min, *A Study on the Establishment and Operation of the Japan-Korea Treaty System (1876-1894)* (Seoul: Korea University, 2017); Jo Guk, *The Reality of 'Opened Japan' During the Concession Era (1859-1899) and the 'Foreigners': Focusing on the Status and Management Issues of Qing Residents* (Tokyo: Waseda University, 2017); Han Bo-ram, *A Study on the Reform Forces in the Early Reign of King Kojong* (Seoul: Seoul National University, 2019); Lee Kyung-mi, *National Discourse in Colonial Korea Under Imperial Japan: The Development of Non-Sovereign Subjectivity* (Seoul: Seoul National University, 2019); Jin Ching, *The Joseon Maritime Customs and the Reforms of H. F. Merrill in the 1880s* (Seoul: Seoul National University, 2020); Cho Byung-sik, *A Study on the Tianjin Judicial Office During the Late Qing Dynasty's New Policies Period* (Seoul: Seoul National University, 2021); Bae Min-jae, *Western Perceptions of Korea During the Modern Transition: Focusing on the Knowledge Classification in Literature Lists from the 18th to Early 20th Century* (Seoul: Seoul National University, 2021); Han Dong-hoon, *Mutual Perceptions and Diplomatic Policies Between Joseon and Russia in the Late 19th Century* (Seoul: Korea University, 2022).

pected to play leading roles in the future research of Korean diplomatic history.

The first phase (2007-2010) of the *DDK* compilation project was supported by the Northeast Asian History Foundation, and the second phase (2011-2015) was carried out with financial support from the Basic Research Infrastructure Project of the Korea Research Foundation. However, one regrettable aspect of the *Modern Korean Diplomatic Documents* project is that the follow-up work planned after volume 13, 'The Kōmundo Incident,' was discontinued. I hope that the *Modern Korean Diplomatic Documents* Project will resume promptly, and that diplomatic documents from both domestic and international sources, spanning from the Sino-Japanese War to the forced annexation of Korea by Japanese Imperial power, will be unearthed, thereby fully illuminating the entirety of modern Korean diplomatic history. The documents from volumes 1 to 5 of the *DDK*, sponsored by the Northeast Asian History Foundation, can be viewed with brief summaries through the Northeast Asian History Net (<http://contents.nahf.or.kr>).

Korea's Foreign Relations and Diplomatic History **(4 Volumes of the Pre-modern Period, 3 Volumes of the Modern Period, 2019)**

In July 2015, the Northeast Asian History Foundation formulated a plan to compile a comprehensive history of Korea's foreign relations and diplomacy by consolidating the research capabilities of domestic academia. The aim of this project is to elucidate the diplomatic concepts and practices of the Korean people from ancient times to the present, the changing relationships with neighboring countries including China and Japan, and the national identity of the Korean people that has been formed within this context. This project bore fruit with the publication of *Korea's Foreign Relations and Diplomatic History* in 2019, consisting of a total of 7 volumes. *The Korea's Foreign Relations and Diplomatic History* not only provides an extensive volume that is difficult to find in any of the previous works on Korea's foreign relations and diplomatic history, but

also draws attention as a groundbreaking project in Korean academia, with the participation of over 50 renowned Korean political scientists and historians.

Especially, despite dealing with the specialized field of diplomatic history, this book is written in a straightforward manner and with content accessible to undergraduate students. Unlike in the United States, where diplomatic history is considered part of the discipline of history, diplomatic history lacks a firm standing in either political science or history in Korean academia, remaining on the periphery of major disciplines. As a result, *Korea's Foreign Relations and Diplomatic History* was originally developed to address academic shortcomings in Korea and serve as a textbook at a level that enables undergraduate students majoring in international relations and related fields to prepare for careers as diplomats and easily understand Korean diplomatic history.

The Northeast Asian History Foundation publication series, *Korea's Foreign Relations and Diplomatic History*, consists of four volumes on the pre-modern period and three volumes on the modern period. The compilation committee for the pre-modern volumes was chaired by Ku Dae-yeol, an emeritus professor at Ewha Womans University and a renowned scholar in the field of Korean diplomatic history. Professors, Gong Seok-gu from Hanbat National University, Lee Jin-han from Korea University, Han Myeong-gi from Myongji University, and Kim Jong-Hak were responsible for the ancient, Koryŏ Dynasty, Chosŏn Dynasty, and modern periods, respectively. A total of 42 researchers in Korean history participated as authors: 10 for the ancient period, 10 for the Koryŏ dynasty, 10 for the Chosŏn dynasty, and 12 for the modern period.

The critical perspective of this book series is well reflected in the 'General Introduction' written by the chief editor, Professor Ku Dae-yeol. According to the 'General Introduction' by him, diplomatic history is not merely the 'history of diplomacy' but can be considered a repository of knowledge and experience accumulated through major domestic and international events. Furthermore, the reality of international politics does not exist in an abstract state, but is formed through the complex and dynamic international environment and the diplomatic actions that nations

choose and execute within their foreign relations. However, the key concepts used by East Asians today to interpret international political phenomena are nothing but interpretations and conceptualizations based solely on the unique historical experiences of the West. Therefore, *Korea's Foreign Relations and Diplomatic History* signifies the establishment of a new foundation for the advancement of Korean international politics by systematizing the facts and actions that have emerged in Korean history from the perspective of Koreans themselves. Additionally, it is worth noting that among the four volumes of the pre-modern period the ancient, Koryŏ, and Chosŏn volumes are reported to be undergoing English translation in the form of separate summaries for foreign Korean studies researchers.

The modern section covering South Korea's diplomatic history after the liberation of Korea from Japanese colonial rule in 1945 consists of three volumes, covering the 1950s, the 1960s to 1970s, and the 1980s to 1990s. Furthermore, unlike the pre-modern volumes, it adopted a format of case studies, selecting about 30 major diplomatic events in South Korea and conducting in-depth analyses rather than providing a comprehensive historical narrative. According to the 'General Introduction' written by Ha Young-sun, honorary professor at Seoul National University and the chief editor of the modern section, the reasons for the weakness in the study of South Korea's diplomatic history lie in the difficulty of securing relative autonomy for Korean diplomacy in its relations with surrounding major powers, the limited maneuvering space for South Korean diplomacy within the reality of the North-South division, and, finally, unnecessary and consuming debates caused by domestic ideological conflicts, which have hindered diplomacy. In light of this critical reflection, the following principles were established for the compilation:

First, this collaborative research goes beyond traditional, revisionist, anti-revisionist, and recent global historical approaches, utilizing a new analytical framework of the tripartite complex system consisting of the international system, the division system of North and South Korea, and the domestic system. This endeavor seeks to analyze to what extent South Korea's diplomacy is influenced by the international system led by

major powers, how the unique reality of North-South division constrains its diplomacy, and finally, it aims to clarify how changes in the domestic system, such as industrialization and democratization, have impacted modern South Korean diplomacy.

Second, to ensure objectivity and persuasive power, as many primary sources as possible, particularly diplomatic documents, are utilized. Especially extensive reviews of diplomatic documents from socialist countries, including the Soviet Union, that have been publicly available since the post-Cold War era are conducted. Additionally, diplomatic documents from the United States, including those from the Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson Center, are also compared and analyzed.

Third, rather than describing the development of modern South Korean diplomacy through a textbook format, the approach mainly focuses on selected major diplomatic cases from each period of South Korea for concentrated analysis. This decision stems from the judgment that understanding the characteristics and development process of South Korean diplomacy is more effectively achieved through in-depth analysis of representative diplomatic case studies rather than a comprehensive narrative. Therefore, selected 30 major diplomatic events of South Korea from 1945 to the 1990s are chosen for case studies in the modern section of this book series.

After establishing these principles, the authors presented their research findings at monthly study meetings, conducted mutual reviews, and further developed them through exchanges with the international academic community. In 2016, a first round of discussions was held with Japanese scholars specializing in modern Korean history at the University of Tokyo, followed by a second round of discussions with Chinese scholars specializing in modern Korean history at the Cold War International History Research Center led by Professor Shen Zhihua at East China Normal University. After these discussions, the first draft manuscript was prepared. Subsequently, in 2017, an international workshop was held in Japan with experts from South Korea, Japan, the United States, and China to review the current research trends in South Korean modern dip-

lomatic history within the global academic community. In 2018, after holding discussions with researchers specializing in modern Korean diplomatic history from Japan and China in Tokyo, the final manuscript underwent revisions. As a result, the table of contents for the modern section of *Korea's Foreign Relations and Diplomatic History* is as follows.

(1) Volume 1

- Liberation Politics (Resolutions to the Korean Peninsula Issue by the US and the Soviet Union before and after the liberation of Korea from the Japanese colonial period: Trusteeship and Division Occupation, 1943-1945 / Advance to and Withdrawal from the Korean peninsula by the Soviet Union / Post-Liberation Nation-Building Efforts in Korea and the United States: The Korean Preparatory Committee as Defined in US-Japan Relations) - Lee Wan-beom (The Academy of Korean Studies)
- Korean War (Background History and Outbreak of the Korean War / Involvement and Roles of the US, China, and the Soviet Union during the Korean War / Korean War Armistice Talks and the Establishment of the Post-War Regime) - Jung Byung-joon (Ewha Womans University)

(2) Volume 2

- 1960s Diplomacy (From Northern Expedition to Nation-Building: Early 1960s US Policy and Interaction with Korean Politics / The Vietnam War and Korean Diplomacy / National Security Crisis on the Korean Peninsula in the Late 1960s and the Triangular Relationship between South Korea, North Korea, and the United States) - Ma Sang-yoon (Catholic University of Korea), Hong Seok-ryul (Sungshin Women's University)
- Korea-Japan Relations (Diplomacy of Settlement of Japanese Colonial Legacy under the Lee Seung-man Government: Initiating the Demand for Reparations from Japan / Diplomacy of Reparations towards Japan under the Park Chung-hee Government / Historical Diplomacy towards Japan under the Kim Young-sam Government) - Lee Won-deok (Kookmin University)

(3) Volume 3

- 1980s South Korea-US, Inter-Korean, and Northward Relations (South Korea-US Cooperation in the Early 1980s under the Chun Doo-hwan and Reagan Administrations / North Korea Strategy and Diplomatic Strategy of the Chun Doo-hwan Government / Northward Policy of the Roh Tae-woo Government and Changes in Inter-Korean Relations) - Jeon Jae-seong (Seoul National University)
- 1980s Korea-Japan Relations and Diplomatic Diversification (Origins of Diplomacy between the Chun Doo-hwan Government and Japan and the Initiation of Korea-Japan Security-Economy Cooperation / Diplomatic Diversification of the Chun Doo-hwan Government: Presidential Visits to ASEAN, Africa, and Southwestern Asia / Chun Doo-hwan Government's Diplomacy with Japan and Korea-Japan Historical Disputes: the Issue of Distorted Japanese Textbooks in 1982) - Cho Yang-hyun (Korea National Diplomatic Academy)
- Korea-China Diplomacy (Progress towards Normalization of Diplomatic Relations between Korea and China in the 1980s / Background, Process, and Issues of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between Korea and China in 1992 / South Korea's Diplomacy towards China and North Korea in the 1990s) - Lee Dong-yul (Dongduk Women's University)
- 1990s Diplomacy (North Korea Nuclear Diplomacy and Inter-Korean Relations under the Kim Young-sam Administration in the 1990s / Globalization Policy and External Policy in Response to the Financial Crisis in the 1990s / United States' East Asia Strategy and Changes in the US-Korea Alliance in the 1990s) - Hwang Ji-hwan (Seoul City University)

As mentioned earlier, more than 50 renowned researchers from the Korean academic community participated in the writing of the *Korea's Foreign Relations and Diplomatic History*. In that regard, it would not be an exaggeration to say that this book reflects the academic standards of the current Korean academic community. Due to the typical peninsula's geographical conditions in East Asia, Korean history has evolved within

the East Asian historical space, interacting with and developing alongside China, Japan, Russia, and others for thousands of years. In particular, there have been frequent instances where Korea has inevitably adopted a passive stance in response to the influence of the formidable power of China. This has led to a passive historical perspective in Korea, as it historically found itself caught in the competition and negotiation among neighboring major powers, due to the inherent limitations of research necessitating dependence on foreign sources to study Korean diplomatic history.

Regardless of the pre-modern or modern period, it is undeniable that the international environment, or the influence exerted from the ‘outside,’ has played a crucial role in shaping and developing the course of Korean history. Korean Diplomatic history was not merely a peripheral aspect of Korean history; rather, it was an essential factor that propelled its developmental process. In this sense, the publication of the *Korea's Foreign Relations and Diplomatic History* will serve as an opportunity to correct biases and distorted perceptions regarding Korean diplomatic history in both domestic and international academic circles. Furthermore, it will stimulate interdisciplinary research between international politics and history.

The Future Tasks and Missions of Korean Diplomatic History Research

The tasks and missions faced by Korean diplomatic history research since the liberation from Japanese colonial rule can be broadly categorized into three main challenges. The first challenge is the discovery and organization of domestic and international diplomatic documents, particularly classified documents, which form the foundation of diplomatic history research. The issue is that it is not limited to diplomatic sources within Korea alone. In international politics, a small or weak country is one where external influences overshadow internal political changes. Therefore, researching Korean diplomatic history requires analyzing the policy documents of major powers that have shaped the international po-

litical environment concerning Korea. Moreover, from the perspective of major powers, the Korean Peninsula was considered less important compared to China or Japan, resulting in numerous instances where documents related to Korea were omitted from their diplomatic archives or misclassified in their document repositories. As a result, Korean researchers should directly work in the archives to discover classified documents or correct any misclassifications.

The second challenge is to establish a tradition of empirical Korean diplomatic history research based on domestic and international diplomatic documents. Due to the geographical conditions of the Korean Peninsula, which is adjacent to major powers such as China, Japan, and Russia, Korean history has developed with a close interconnection between domestic politics and foreign relations. In that sense, Korean diplomatic history cannot be relegated to a peripheral aspect of Korean history; rather, it can be considered an essential element for a comprehensive understanding of Korean history as a whole. It has been the survival strategy of Korea to confront China, with humility, cunningness, and sometimes forcefulness, to preserve its national identity. The issue lies in the inevitable passivity and reliance on sources from neighboring countries that emerged in this process, leading to the creation of a passive historical perspective that depicts Korea historically as merely a subject of competition and negotiation among neighboring major powers. As mentioned earlier, it is likely that the current tendency for diplomatic history to be situated within the periphery of political science and history departments in Korean universities is related to such historical biases.

The third challenge is related to criticisms raised within the international academic community regarding the study of diplomatic history itself. Starting from the 1960s, the overall interest in historiography gradually shifted from political history to social, economic, cultural, intellectual history, and other areas. Among these, the most vehement criticism of diplomatic history came from the Annales School in France. They criticized diplomatic history as merely events driven by chance of ‘*histoire événementielle*,’ advocating instead for attention to structural changes evolving gradually over the long term, known as the ‘*longue durée*’ per-

spective. As historiography shifted its focus from traditional political and diplomatic history to social, economic, cultural, and intellectual history, diplomatic historians had to both refine traditional research methods based on diplomatic documents and redefine the significance of diplomatic history research. As a result, some diplomatic historians began to adopt the concerns and methodologies of social history or international relations, focusing on economic, social, cultural, and military factors that influence diplomatic policy decisions.

The aforementioned tasks have been developed simultaneously due to the outstanding contributions of scholars in the Korean academic community. It is necessary to establish the intellectual tradition of Korean diplomatic history and further explore its distinctive and creative academic development in line with the general trend of development in the international academic community. Both *Diplomatic Documents of Korea* and *Korea's Foreign Relations and Diplomatic History* represent the solutions proposed by the Korean academic community. With the publication of these series, it is hoped that Korean diplomatic history research will take another qualitative leap forward.

Notes for Contributors

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