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# Article

## **ABOUT THE JOURNAL OF NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY**

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**One War, A Divided Peninsula, and  
Three Conflicting Images  
: The Korean War as Historical  
Memory in South Korea, China, and  
the United States**

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# One War, A Divided Peninsula, and Three Conflicting Images : The Korean War as Historical Memory in South Korea, China, and the United States

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## Three Shades of Historical Memory about the Korean War

The Korean War was not just the first “hot” war of the Cold War. Even after it ended inconclusively through an armistice which did not satisfy Koreans, Chinese, or Americans, a controversy over the war has endured in three conflicting visions of it, as seen from South Korea, China, and the United States. Even after seven decades have past, contentions over the war still retain fervent heat in the three countries. Why is it that historical memories about the Korean War in these countries remain alive and contentious? This article draws on diverse scholarship on the Korean War and related events, i.e., the cultural Cold War in Korea and the April Third Massacre, depictions of the war in each country’s museums and memorials, and scholarship on the Korean War before and after the publication of *The Origins of the Korean War* and *Zhongwai Lishi Gangyao*, a newly revised Chinese middle school history textbook, to examine the nature and role of the historical memory of the War in South Korea, the United States, and China.

After briefly examining the link between historical memories, historical consciousness, and nationalism, I will examine how this link expresses itself in South Korean, Chinese, and American memories of the

Korean War. More specifically, this paper will first examine how historical memory informs nationalist discourses and then apply this understanding to the Korean War as historical memory in South Korea, China, and the United States. I will argue that the persistence of controversy surrounding the war is primarily rooted in a debate over how the general structure of the war ought to be remembered. This debate is deeply influenced by nationalist thoughts and differing geopolitical interests involved in the war. The debate over the war — whether the Korean War was a defensive war against North Korean Communism, a forgotten war, or a war to prevent potential American aggression and secure national borders amidst an ongoing project of national reconstruction — has had a profound influence, such that the involvement of nationalist passions and “ideological correctness” in shaping such divergent memories has become the fundamental root of the continuing controversy over what constitutes “correct” historical memories of the war.

If historical memory is a “vital means to recollect the past” and is “collective,” because it cannot have substance outside its social context, as N. Gedi and Y. Elam and B. Schwartz argue, it cannot be “disconnected from the language and symbolic system molded by society.” And fundamentally, as Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann argue, reality is a social construct in which nature sets the limits of the world and the world reacts to nature, meaning that people have to necessarily interact with such a reality. Past experiences are inherently reconstructions from social contexts in the present.<sup>1</sup> Since historical memory obtains its corporeal essence and means to express itself through thoughts and emotions from a particular nation, conflicting images and interpretations of an event might not just begin and end with the question of what the “proper” di-

<sup>1</sup> Noa Gedi and Yigal Elam, Spring-Summer, 1996, “Collective Memory—What is It?” *History and Memory*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 33; Barry Schwartz, 1982, “The Social Context of Commemoration: A Study in Collective Memory,” *Social Forces*, Vol. 61, No. 2, 374; Maurice Halbwachs, 1992, *On Collective Memory*, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press; Amos Funkenstein, Spring-Summer, 1989, “Collective Memory and Historical Consciousness,” *History and Memory*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 7; Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, 1966, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*, Penguin Books, 204.

rection of a historical narrative must be. It is a communal reflection of how a nation generally remembers the event based on national cultural values and norms.<sup>2</sup> The formation of a historical memory also involves asking the equally important question of which elements of the event help maximize chances of the most accurate understanding of the event’s procession, since it is possible that collective memory can obscure the relevance of a certain historical moment to the formation of socio-cultural identities in the present.<sup>3</sup> In short, historical memory is socio-cultural and selective in nature because the importance it ascribes to the past always has to mirror some degree of consciousness about the past’s relevance and its importance to the present.

In the case of the Korean War, there has been a fundamental shift from the old question, “Who started the war?” to the new question, “Which motivations provide the most ideological and political legitimacy for the decision to fight the enemy, and who precisely was the enemy?” Three conflicting answers to the new question from South Korea, China, and the United States shed light on the continuing controversy over the Korean War. From South Korea’s perspective, it was imperative to defend the nation against North Koreans. And that motive was guided by the patriotism and anti-Communism, which informed the social construction of South Korean national identity as distinct from the North Korean one. In China, a radical shift from the traditional emphasis on *Kangmei Yuanchao* (“Resist America and Assist North Korea”) to a reinterpretation of the Korean War as a Chinese Communist victory over American “imperialism” has become dominant to the extent that a nationally endorsed

<sup>2</sup> Jan Assmann and John Czaplicka, Spring-Summer, 1965, “Collective Memory and Cultural Identity,” *New German Critique*, No. 65, 125-133; Anthony D. Smith, 1996, “Culture, Community, and Territory: The Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism,” *International Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3, 445-458; Sunghoon Han, 2015, “The Ongoing Korean War at the Sinch’on Museum in North Korea,” *Cross Currents*, No. 14, 153; Alberto Melucci, 1995, “The Process of Collective Identity” in Hank Johnston and Bert Klendermans eds., *Social Movements and Culture*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 42-45.

<sup>3</sup> Geoffrey Cubbit, 2007, *History and Memory*, Manchester England: Manchester University Press, 17; Michel-Rolph Trouillot, 1995, *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History*, Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press, 16.

middle-school textbook mandates this reinterpretation to be the standard narrative about Chinese heroism during the war. Finally, in the United States, there is a rapid movement to take away the old lens of “a forgotten war” through the establishment of numerous memorials, but the old framework of Communism versus anti-Communism still remains in the scholarly community that the debate over revisionism — which Bruce Cumings sought to end through the publication of *The Origins of the Korean War* — is still unfinished. The reason why the revisionist question remains open comes from a persistent contention over whether the slightest indication that the Korean War began as a southern civil war might mean a complete negation of the “orthodox reality” that North Korea initiated the war on June 25, 1950.

In short, the involvement of nationalist passions and discourse in shaping such divergent memories of one war is the fundamental root of the continuing controversy over what constitute “correct” historical memories about the Korean War. As long as nationalism retains its allure in the three countries, the contest of these three conflicting images over one war that divided a peninsula into two separate states continues to have no end in sight.

## Literature Review and Methodology

Scholarly treatment of intersections between historical memory and the Korean War is still in a developmental stage. Concerning English-language scholarship on the war, there have been holistic narratives of the Korean War from Max Hastings and David Halberstam, both of which concentrate on depicting how battles were fought and how the conclusion of the war through an incomplete armistice has left scars on the Korean Peninsula. Yet, these narratives are mostly focused on how the war was fought; there is very little discussion about how the war as a historical memory has shaped Korean, Chinese, and American public discourses following the war.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Max Hastings, 1987, *The Korean War*, New York: Simon and Schuster; David Halberstam, 2008,

There have also been attempts to place the Korean War in an international context from Wada Haruki, William Stueck, Callum McDonald, and Masuda Hajimu, but these scholars pay attention to the global geopolitics of the war and focus on how the war ought to be understood within the milieu of the international Cold War during the late 1940s and 1950s. They do not devote much discussion to how the war as a historical memory has shaped different interpretations of the war and how such interpretations remain contested into the 21st century.<sup>5</sup>

Many recent Korean and English-language studies of the war have investigated a diverse array of topics, such as the outbreak, progress, and conclusion of the war, the division of the Korean Peninsula as a trauma, “small wars” in villages during the war, the legacies of the war, the strategies and weapons used during the war, naval battles, American propaganda during the war, a synthesis of historical methods on studying the war, interrogation camps, and Sino-Taiwanese attempts to change the keyword of the war, from anti-Communism vs. Communism to prisoner-of-war camps. Yet, these studies have largely concentrated on interpreting the political significance of the Korean War strictly in a phenomenological fashion.<sup>6</sup> The dominant assumption that understanding North Ko-

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*The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War*, New York: Hachette Books.

<sup>5</sup> Wada Haruki, 2014, *The Korean War: An International History*, New York: Rowman and Littlefield; William Stueck, 2002, *Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press; Callum MacDonald, 1986, *The War Before Vietnam*, New York: The Free Press; Masuda Hajimu, 2015, *Cold War Crucible: The Korean Conflict and the Postwar World*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

<sup>6</sup> Hak-joon Kim, 2010, *Hankuk Chŏnchaeng: Wŏnin, Kwachŏng, Hyuchŏn, Yŏngnyang (The Korean War: Causes, Process, Stalemate, Influences)* Seoul, Korea: Parkyoung Publishing; Jeong-ki Kim, 2011, *Hankuk Chŏnchaengkwa Puntanŭi Trauma (The Korean War and the Trauma of Division)*, Seoul, Korea: Sunin Publishing; Ch'ansŭng Park, 2013, *Maŭllo Kan Hankuk Chŏnchaeng: Hankuk Chŏnchaengkŭ Maŭl esŏ Pŏlŏchin Chakŭn Chŏnchaengtŭl (When the Korean War Went to Villages: Small Wars in Villages During the Korean War)* Seoul, Korea: Tolpekae; The Association for Korean War Studies ed., 2000, *T'al Naengchŏn Sitaek Hankuk Chŏnchaengŭi Chaechomyŏng (A Reappraisal of the Korean War in the Post-Cold War Era)*, Paeksansŏtang; Youngdae Lim, 2010, *Hankuk Chŏnchaeng: Chŏllyak, Chŏnsul, Muki (The Korean War: Strategy, Tactics, and Weapons)* Seoul, Korea: Sowatang; Tae-gyun Kim, 2005, *Hankuk Chŏnchaeng (The Korean War)* Seoul, Korea: Ch'aekkwŭ Hamkke; Pyŏng-chun Chŏng, 2006, *Hankuk Chŏnchaeng: 38Sŏn Ch'ungtolkwa Chŏnchaengŭi Hyŏngsŏng (The Korean War: Clashes Along the 38th Parallel and*

rean agency is more important than that of South Korea has led scholars such as Suzy Kim and Harrison Kim to study post-liberation North Korean society and the prison system in North Korea. However, they are also politically oriented in their attempts to understand North Korean system and leave no room for reflections on the Korean War as a historical memory.<sup>7</sup>

Chinese-language scholarship exhibits a trend similar to its English-language counterpart. Although Chinese scholars have moved away from questioning who was to blame for beginning the war, and begun to examine the importance of human agency, historians such as Zhang Min and Meng Zhaohui still adhere to the Communist orthodox view that South Korea was more responsible for the outbreak of the war than North Korea and that Washington created the manichean milieu of the Cold War.<sup>8</sup> Historians such as Shen Zhihua and Yang Kuisong have examined Mao Zedong's conversations with Stalin and noted that Stalin allowed Kim Il-sung to invade South Korea because he hoped to secure a warm-water port and Mao Zedong wanted to use the momentum of the Korean War to accomplish a far more important task that was left incomplete after the Chinese Civil War: China's "unification" with Taiwan.<sup>9</sup> Historian

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*the Formation of Battle Lines*) Seoul, Korea: Tolpekae; Malcolm Cagle and Frank Manson and Sin Hyōng-sik trans, 2003, *Hankuk Chōnchaeng Haechōnsa (A History of Naval Battles During the Korean War)* Seoul, Korea: 21-Seki Kunsu Yōnkuso; Steven Casey, 2008, *Selling the Korean War: Propaganda, Politics and Public Opinion*, Oxford University Press, 2008; Steven Casey ed., 2012, *The Korean War at Sixty: New Approaches to the Study of the Korean War*, Routledge; Monica Kim, 2019, *The Interrogation Rooms of the Korean War: The Untold History*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press; David Cheng Chang, 2020, *The Hijacked War: The Story of Chinese POWs in the Korean War*, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

<sup>7</sup> Suzy Kim, 2013, *Everyday Life in the North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press; Harrison Kim, 2018, *Heroes and Toilers: Work as Life in Postwar North Korea, 1953-1961*, New York: Columbia University Press.

<sup>8</sup> Zhang Min, 2001, "Lun Chaoxian Zhanzheng de Qiyuan he Jiejue" (The Origins and Outcome of the Korean War), Dangde Wenxian (Party Documents) No. 2; Meng Zhaohui, "Chaoxian Zhanzheng Zhenyang Daqilai" (How Did the Korean War Begin?)

<sup>9</sup> Shen Zhihua, 1995, *Chaoxian Zhanzheng Jiemi (Secrets of the Korean War Revealed)* Hong Kong: Tiandi Tushu Youxian Gongsi; Shen Zhihua, 1996, "Zhong Su Lianmeng yu Zhongguo Chubing Chaoxian de Jueche: Dui Zhongguo he Eguo Wenxian Ziliao de Bijiao Yanjiu" (The Sino-Soviet

Niu Jun also supports Yang's interpretation, arguing that Mao was more concerned about the possibility of the United States deploying the Seventh Fleet to Taiwan amidst the chaos of the Korean War, suggesting the need for future Chinese scholarship to link Sino-Taiwanese relations during the early Cold War with the Korean War.<sup>10</sup>

In general, Chinese scholarship has made significant progress towards analyzing Mao Zedong's interactions with Stalin and linking the Chinese Civil War's aftermath with the Korean War, despite relatively rigid institutional resistance against criticizing North Korea's role in the war. Yet, even the most up-to-date Chinese historiography's extensive use of Russian archives to supplement limited Chinese documents has yet to inspire Chinese scholars to explore the roles of historical memory concerning the Korean War, largely due to the fact that many Communist Party archives have not released crucial documents to allow scholars to critically examine the Communist Party's precise plans and debates before the Korean War. There has yet to be an original attempt to show why the Korean War has an enduring contemporaneous importance into the 21st century, or what we could call the "meta-psychological importance." While it may be true that the war's history as a physical political contest ended with an incomplete armistice, it is insufficient to explain the war's enduring, if problematic, appeal as a controversial historical memory.

To do justice to the complexity of different recollections of a single event, it is essential to understand what kinds of emotions interact, what informs the formation of such emotions, and finally, how these factors in-

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Alliance and China's Decision to Dispatch Troops to Korea: A Comparative Study of Chinese and Russian Materials), *Dangdai Zhongguoshi Yanjiu (Studies on Contemporary Chinese History)*, No. 5; Yang Kuisong, Fall, 2010, Sidalin Weishenme Zhichi Chaoxian Zhanzheng? Du Shen Zhihua Zhu Mao Zedong, Sidalin yu Chaoxian Zhanzheng (Why Did Stalin Support the Korean War? Reading Shen Zhihua's Mao Zedong, Stalin, and the Korean War), cited in Steven M. Goldstein, "Chinese Perspectives on the Korean War: An Assessment at Sixty," *International Journal of Korean Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 2, 46-70.

<sup>10</sup> Niu Jun, "Chaoxian Zhanzheng Zhong Zhong-Mei Juece Bijiao Yanjiu," (A Comparative Study of Chinese and American Decision-Making in the Korean War) cited in Goldstein, "Chinese Perspectives on the Korean War," 59.

fluence perceptions of national identity and national historical consciousness to remain relevant today. Therefore, the following three sections will examine the unique characteristics of historical memory about the Korean War in South Korea, China, and the United States. By so doing, it will show how historical memory of the Korean War continues to have influence after the end of the war, illustrating the war's enduring psychological importance to the three countries. This article will examine how bitterness and animosity against Communism continue to shape South Korean national identity by considering museums, public memorials, and history books. Also, it will examine how the transformation of the Chinese paradigm on the war, from *Kangmei Yuanchao* (Resist America and Assist North Korea) to an emphasis on heroism and sacrifice, has heightened Chinese nationalistic rhetoric by analyzing *Zhongwai Lishi*, a middle-school history textbook. Finally, it will also look into how the unearthing of a long-forgotten war has brought forth apprehensions about including the Korean War's civil war phase into the mainstream discussion because of concerns about "revisionism" in the United States, by considering the main scholarly works on the Korean War and war memorials.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Although it would have been desirable to maintain methodological consistency by considering war memorials and museums on the Korean War for China, having limited myself to mostly English-language articles and books on historical memory concerning the Korean War, I have not found a robust analysis or discussion on the Korean War as a historical memory among Chinese scholars. Although Shuguang Zhang wrote about Mao Zedong's thoughts and approaches to war in *Mao's Military Romanticism* and Shen Zihua wrote on Sino-North Korean and Sino-Soviet relations during the Korean War and Chen Jian wrote about Chinese strategy and thinking about the Korean War, their books and articles do not exclusively deal with the Korean War as a historical memory, so I do not discuss them in this article. Also, as a non-Chinese scholar, I do not have access to Communist Party documents on the war, so although it is by no means representative, I will concentrate on analyzing the rhetoric of *Zhongwai Lishi* to gauge the kind of public historical memory regarding the Korean War that China wishes to portray to Chinese citizens.

## Between Bitterness and Animosity: The Korean War, Ideology, and South Korean Identity

The greatest lingering psychological impact of the Korean War can be found in South Korea, where narratives of victimhood and anti-Communism meld together to form a distinct South Korean national identity. As Roy Grinker observes, the war's clearest and most ominous legacy is the continuation of ideological tensions after the end of the global Cold War. Discourses surrounding the Korean War revolved around the question of how closely Korean nationalism ought to be linked with anti-Communism, to differentiate the nation from the North Korean enemy. On the one hand, North Korea has been vilified based on a comparison between South Korea's Democracy and North Korea's personality cult, but on the other hand, North Korea has been praised among some South Koreans for preserving Korea's traditional culture and values. Such "otherness" has even been extended to be viewed as a challenge to be overcome through unification, by encouraging South Korea to understand unification as a process of homogenization, without entertaining any possibility for understanding and accepting heterogeneity and differences. In short, the Korean War's enduring philosophical challenge is an encouragement of comparisons and homogenization, which, by relying on "otherness," has hindered rather than promoted Korea's unification.<sup>12</sup>

Even into the 21st century, the vestiges of anti-Communism and its influence on informing South Korean national identity still remain very visible in war museums, which generally foreground this theme. While

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<sup>12</sup> Roy R. Grinker, March, 1998, "Elementary Forms of Korean Historical Representation: School Textbooks in South Korea," *Social Analysis*, Vol. 42, No. 1, 89-90; Grinker, 1998, *Korea and Its Futures: Unification and the Unfinished War*, New York: St. Martin's Press. Grinker based his assessment on how the Korean War has been studied on surveys and therefore, some of his assertions, such as his view of South Korean public opinion on North Korea, are not entirely accurate or representative. For a different assessment of sympathetic responses to North Korea, see Choongnam Kim, Spring/Summer, 2003, "The Management of the ROK-U. S. Relations in the Post-Cold War Era," *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, Vol. 17, No. 1, 52-92 and Heon Joo Jung, September/October, 2010, "The Rise and Fall of Anti-American Sentiment in South Korea: Deconstructing Hegemonic Ideas and Threat Perception," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 50, No. 5, 946-964.

the persistence of such a strong emphasis on ideological nationalism must not lead to Nam-hee Lee's generalization that South Korea is an "anti-Communist society," which is too much of a stretch, it does illustrate that the Cold War has not completely met its demise in Korea, despite the fact that the Cold War "officially" ended in the global sense in 1991.<sup>13</sup> As Suk-young Kim shows, war memorials and museums continue to emphasize North Korea's invasion as the definitive origin of the war, without allotting much space to discussions about the civil war phase. Despite the publicly proclaimed goal of promoting peace and reconciliation between Pyongyang and Seoul, the Demilitarized Zone's (i.e., DMZ) war museum continues to preserve the ideological antagonism of the Cold War by suggesting that North Korea's only fate is an eventual and certain absorption by South Korea. The war museum employs a "technology of memory": a stark contrast between enlarged portraits of Joseph Stalin, Mao Zedong, and Kim Il-sung and a message of cooperation and peace printed in small letters for the textual narrative aims to convince the viewers that overcoming and defeating the immutable, totalitarian, and monolithic Communist North Korea is the only method to realize unification.

There is an irony lying in the fact that visitors are also introduced to weapons and vehicles used during the war in another exhibit and are even offered the experience of operating them, encouraging visitors to feel a paradoxical desensitization to the tragedy of war. The method to overcome war and its antagonistic message from the portraits are immediately belied by the introduction to methods for killing people on the battlefield, however indirect such an experience may be.<sup>14</sup> The gulf between the DMZ as a symbol of peace and the DMZ as an essential no-man's-land is reinforced by a museum which ironically teaches viewers

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<sup>13</sup> Nam-hee Lee, 2002, "Anti-Communism, North Korea, and Human Rights in South Korea: 'Orientalist' Discourse and Construction of South Korean Identity," in Mark Bradley ed., *Truth Claims: Representation and Human Rights*, Rutgers University Press.

<sup>14</sup> Suk-young Kim, October, 2011, "Staging the 'Cartography of Paradox': The DMZ Special Exhibition at the Korean War Memorial, Seoul," *Theatre Journal*, Vol. 63, No. 3, 381-402.

that conquest is the primary means to achieve peace and unification.

It is not just museums which directly reflect the ideological tension of the Korean War. Cities such as Cheorwon represent a physical site of destruction for those who participated in the war. Cheorwon, located between the South and North Korean border and home to the Korean Workers' Party before Korea's liberation, became the site of an intense and bloody battle between the South Korean Army and the North Korean People's Army. Unlike museums, Cheorwon is now also a tourist attraction irrelevant to its former symbolism for those who consider the Korean War a distant event. As Keun-sik Jung argues, the meeting of newcomers and tourists to the city and veterans of the war who continued to preserve memories of the brutal battles in Cheorwon created a "hybridization of war memory" that saw a mixing of two identities. It is simultaneously a city whose cultural heritage is largely derived from its historical value as a site which preserved the scars and wounds of war and a city which has acted as a symbol and an "outpost for unification" since the end of the Kim Dae-jung Administration. A city once known for its "gray" status as a buffer zone between Communists and anti-Communists during the Korean War is slowly making a positive turn towards becoming a "gray" site for reconciling the painful memory of the war and the wounds it left with a hope for progress, healing, and reunification in the Korean Peninsula.<sup>15</sup>

Of course, beyond these important public displays of the Korean War, many scholars have tried to either examine the impact of the war by observing the war's influence on both sides of the Korean Peninsula or understand the Cold War moment in the modern Korean history through non-political lenses such as culture. For example, B. Koh has highlighted that the war not only caused an immense number of civilian deaths and property damage amounting to the total GNP of South Korea in 1949, but that it saw the rise of anti-Communism and military dictatorships in

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<sup>15</sup> Keun-sik Jung, December, 2017, "On the Ruins: Forgetting and Awakening Korean War Memories at Cheorwon," *Development and Society*, Vol. 46, No. 3, 523-555.

South Korea, which closely paralleled the rise of a Communist personality cult around Kim Il-sung in North Korea. In contrast to South Korea's reliance on American and Japanese financial aid to reconstruct its economy, North Korea utilized societal mobilization, ideological indoctrination, and anti-Americanism to facilitate the rebuilding of a national industry based on heavy machinery, chemicals, and nuclear weapons.<sup>16</sup> In short, the Korean War had a devastating and drastic impact on every aspect of the Korean Peninsula: it caused immense physical and psychological damage in both north and south, while political and economic developments in the Korean Peninsula closely mirrored the ideological divide which largely characterized the Cold War.

Charles Armstrong has studied the "cultural Cold War" in the Korean Peninsula, in which both American and Soviet officials during the late 1940s encouraged films as the primary medium for propagandizing the superiority of Democracy over Communism and vice versa, while also unearthing talented Korean musicians, filmmakers and producers to encourage the discovery of "native music" and the production of nationalistic films. By highlighting the strong undercurrents of "Americanization" pitted against "nationalization" in the making of modern culture in the two Koreas, Armstrong shows the enduring influence of the Cold War even near its end in the 1990s and afterwards, as both Koreas search for a definition of native Korean culture amidst the global influence of American culture.<sup>17</sup>

Yet, despite his success in blending Cumings' emphasis on the civil war phase with an original introduction of culture as a non-political venue of analysis in a field dominated by political studies, the framework of Armstrong's study does not diverge greatly from the basic assumption of Korea as a divided country. There have been several notable attempts to address controversial legacies of the Korean War as a civil war by focus-

ing on reconciliation, through analyses of the April Third Massacre from scholars such as Myung-lim Park and Hun Joon Kim, who have argued for the need for reconciliation, an apology from the South Korean government, and an understanding of the Massacre as a human rights problem. Yet, such attempts are still in the early stages of development. New sources on the Massacre are still being unearthed and scholars have yet to dig deeper into Record Groups 59 and 554 to analyze the collaboration of the South Korean police, the South Korean military, and the American military in unleashing the Massacre.<sup>18</sup> Full historical accounts of the Massacre have yet to be written because much of the focus is on reconciliation and the Massacre's aftermath, rather than its origins and unfolding from 1948 to 1954. More extensive use of American military government documents are necessary to get a complete picture of the historical memory of the Massacre, which, through its continuation of the Left-Right skirmishes which served as the Korean War's theme, was another war beyond the Korean War in itself.

In summary, both popular and scholarly representations of historical memory about the Korean War in South Korea have yet to come to terms with an anti-Communist nationalism which focuses exclusively on blaming North Korea, while leaving very little room either for Cumings' re-foregrounding of the civil war or for the agency of reconciliation around the April Third Massacre. Although Korean War museums and memorials have recently emphasized a felt need to realize unification soon, these attempts have shied away from answering the critical question of how to achieve that goal and what kinds of historical memories must be shared between the two Koreas to raise an awareness for the need for reconciliation and eventually lead to unification.

<sup>16</sup> B. Koh, Spring, 1993, "The War's Impact on the Korean Peninsula," *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 57-76.

<sup>17</sup> Charles K. Armstrong, February, 2003, "The Cultural Cold War in Korea, 1945-1950," *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 62, No. 1, 71-99.

<sup>18</sup> Myung-lim Park, April, 2018, "Towards a Universal Model of Reconciliation: The Case of the Jeju 4.3 Incident," *Journal of Korean Religions*, Vol. 9, No. 1, 105-130; Hun Joon Kim, 2013, *Massacres at Mt. Halla: Sixty Years of Truth Seeking in South Korea*, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

## Between *Kangmei Yuanchao* and the Rise of China as a Great Power: The Emergence of a “New History” of the Korean War, *Zhongwai Lishi Gangyao*, and Making China Great Again

The idea of victimhood is particularly appealing, especially if the intruding enemy’s force is much greater than that of a defending nation, but nationalist passions can easily bind with a necessity for ideological “correctness,” if the immorality of the offender is emphasized to magnify the honor and valor of the defender. In contrast to South Korea, where the persistence of ideological divide has produced a Manichean society which outlives the Cold War, China has sought to radically eliminate all traces of an ideological divide by emphasizing the patriotic cause behind China’s victory over the “imperialistic” United States. The rise of a “New History” of the Korean War, in which greater emphasis is laid on sacrifice, honor, and anti-imperialism in the face of American aggression, is most markedly promoted by the Chinese government through the establishment of Korean War memorials and the publication of *Zhongwai Lishi Gangyao* (Concise History of China’s Foreign Relations). Both emphasize that Chinese soldiers showed valor and courage on the battlefield and sacrificed their lives to clinch a decisive victory against “American imperialists,” while criticizing the U. S. for starting the international war with their direct invasion of North Korea. Since the arrival of U.S. armed forces threatened China’s national security and also jeopardized China’s chances of finishing its civil war with Taiwan, China had no choice but to aid North Korea to resist American imperialism. The memorials and textbook share the claim that this act of resistance not only consolidated Chinese patriotism but also displayed the prowess of a “new” China which could independently fend off imperialism.<sup>19</sup>

China promotes the memorials and *Zhongwai Lishi* as containing

<sup>19</sup> Keun-sik Jung, 2015, “China’s Memory and Commemoration of the Korean War in the Memorial Hall of the ‘War to Resist U. S. Aggression and Aid Korea,’” *Cross-Currents*, No. 14; *Zhongwai Lishi* Vol. 1, 158.

the latest definitive account of the Korean War’s origins taught at the high-school level. However, considering the textbook’s adherence to the traditional Chinese emphasis on the war as a civil war without explaining its background, *Zhongwai Lishi* preserved the original approach of absolving China from as much responsibility as possible for invading Korea, by highlighting that it was the two Koreas which initiated the war. In contrast to Cumings’ purpose of showing that the war began as a civil war which mushroomed into an international one, the Chinese government’s version of the “civil war thesis” has a more nationalistic purpose of emphasizing the anti-American and therefore “anti-imperialistic” nature of the war. Due to the high importance of this purpose, *Zhongwai Lishi* also follows the precedent of not explaining the background to the civil war, as that allows the textbook to better emphasize the American invasion of North Korea and play down China’s role in invading South Korea. Furthermore, unlike South Korea and the United States, which view the war’s conclusion as indecisive, *Zhongwai Lishi* presents the war as a victory for China, going as far as omitting mention of the sacrifices made on the Chinese side.<sup>20</sup> In essence, heroism and victory over imperialism and America are emphasized to the point that the Korean War appears truncated and imbalanced, both in terms of the event’s overall progression and its nature as a war, which inevitably entails casualties for all participants in reality.

This approach is to be expected, given that it is their appeal to nationalism that provides school history textbooks with the stature and authority of delivering “definitive” historical accounts for public education. As Laura Hein, Mark Selden, and several other scholars have pointed out, since school history textbooks have an inherent public function of educating citizens about the “official” narrative of an event, they also serve to mitigate opposition and debates through a “sanitization” process.<sup>21</sup> By framing the war as a struggle against anti-imperialism, the

<sup>20</sup> Chinese Ministry of Education, 2019, *Zhongwai Lishi Gangyao* (Concise History of China’s Foreign Relations), Vol. 1, 158.

<sup>21</sup> Lin Lin, Yali Zhao, Masato Ogawa, John Hoge, and Bok Young Kim, 2009/2010, “Whose His-

Chinese government aims to foster nationalism and patriotism, as well as underline the legitimacy of maintaining Communism by stressing China's "moral and ideological" opposition to the United States in the war. Moreover, as Peter Gries, Jennifer L. Prewitt-Freilino, Luz-Eugenia Cox-Fuenzalida, and Qingmin Zhang (2009) and Philip West (1992) have pointed out, Chinese students in the 21st century and Chinese literature on the Korean War continue to fully adhere to the image of a "war to resist America and aid Korea." Such phenomena not only demonstrate the enduring appeal of the old Maoist narrative of a Chinese "victory" over the United States and prove that "China as a victim" is not replacing the Maoist narrative, but also show that stories about the past strongly impact beliefs and perceptions about it, especially if the past is central to shaping nationalism.<sup>22</sup>

In summary, a nationalist account of the Korean War in China endures not only because the Chinese government wants to strengthen its legitimacy through an appeal to nationalism by "homogenizing" war memories reflected in "hard" mediums, but also because Chinese students strongly perceive and believe that such an account is not only accurate but necessary to heighten their patriotism.<sup>23</sup> A socio-political consensus is the core engine of anti-American nationalism in China with regard to the Korean War.

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tory? An Analysis of the Korean War in History Textbooks from the United States, South Korea, Japan, and China," *The Social Studies*, 223; Laura Hein and Mark Selden ed., 2000, *Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany, and the United States*, Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe. See also Tessa Morris-Suzuki, 2009, "Remembering the Unfinished Conflict: Museums and the Contested Memory of the Korean War," *Japan Focus*, Vol. 7, No. 4, 1-24.

<sup>22</sup> Peter Hays Gries, Jennifer L. Prewitt-Freilino, Luz-Eugenia Cox-Fuenzalida, and Qingmin Zhang, September-December, 2009, "Contentious Histories and the Perception of Threat: China, the United States, and the Korean War—An Experimental Analysis," *Journal of East Asian Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 3, 433-465; Philip West, 2008, "The Korean War and the Criteria of Significance in Chinese Popular Culture," *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Winter, 1992), 383-408; Zheng Wang, "National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 52, No. 4, 783-806.

<sup>23</sup> Jung, "China's Memory and Commemoration of the Korean War," 64.

That patriotism, anti-imperialism, and anti-Americanism constituted the public stance of China is predicated on the fact that such values received widespread support from the Chinese public. However, as Masuda Hajimu has vividly shown, the public still had mixed opinions about Communism after the end of the Chinese Civil War and there was strong opposition, dissent, and apathy against China's intervention in Korea. Despite the state's efforts to censor and control information about world affairs, Chinese newspapers often published reports and cartoons showing the United States to actually be technologically superior than China's propagandized image of a "paper tiger."<sup>24</sup> Therefore, *Zhongwai Lishi's* claim that Chinese soldiers fought with valor, for honor and patriotism, must be understood as reflecting what the Chinese government wants contemporary Chinese citizens to believe, rather than what Chinese citizens before and during the Korean War actually felt. The gulf between reality and rhetoric in the consistent concentration on nationalism, patriotism, and anti-imperialism is still large and until more is learned about reactions to the war from the Chinese Communist Party's inner circle, *Zhongwai Lishi's* coverage of the Korean War leaves open a major question about the degree and presence of unity between society and the state in China during the Korean War.

### "The Forgotten War," American Patriotism, and the Debate over "Revisionism" in the United States

That two major participants could perceive themselves as the principal victims in a war points to the existence of another participant with power sufficient to oppress the victims. Yet, because greater military strength also implies the possession of an ability to swiftly conclude the war, it may be easier for the great power to forget the war rather than to remember it. This phenomenon may be especially true if the strong nation had

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<sup>24</sup> Masuda Hajimu, Summer, 2012, "The Korean War through the Prism of Chinese Society," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 3, 3-38.

to fight the war in a foreign country which it knew nothing of.

In the United States, the Korean War remained as a forgotten war throughout the first two decades following the armistice, largely because it was the first example of a limited war that did not prove Communist “rollback” to be successful, and was, as historian Paul Pierpaoli puts it, “wedged between the Second World War and the Vietnam War.”<sup>25</sup> Early attempts to shed light on the war’s unfolding as a contest between North and South Korea did succeed in conveying the gravity of the war as the first “hot” war which signaled the genuine arrival of the Cold War in East Asia. Clay Blair, Callum McDonald, Max Hastings, and David Halberstam had written about the military operations and battles, giving realistic and vivid accounts of the Korean War’s brutality and chaos and explaining the war’s importance to the Cold War.<sup>26</sup> Yet, the war remained largely “forgotten” to the American public, not helped by a general reliance on Western sources up until the 1990s.<sup>27</sup> This reliance reflected a failure to properly account for the Korean agency in the making of the Korean War by carefully considering the war’s origins as a Korean national affair and as a Korean civil war, chiefly because many American military government documents were unreleased to scholars until very recently.

It was not until Bruce Cumings published *The Origins of the Korean War* that the civil war phase of the Korean conflict became widely known, in which the conservative Syngman Rhee was occupied with defeating a disgruntled South Korean Leftists, which sought to remove pro-Japanese collaborators and landlords in the Rhee Administration,

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<sup>25</sup> Paul Pierpaoli Jr., 2001, “Beyond Collective Amnesia: A Korean War Retrospective,” *International Social Science Review*, Vol. 76, No. 3/4, 92-93; see also Robert Jervis, December, 1980, “The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 24, No. 4, 563-592.

<sup>26</sup> Clay Blair, 1986, *The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953* (Times Books, 1987); Callum MacDonald, *Korea: The War Before Vietnam*, Palgrave-MacMilan; Max Hastings, 1987, *The Korean War*, New York: Simon and Schuster; David Halberstam, 2007, *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War*, New York: Hyperion.

<sup>27</sup> Priscilla Roberts, Spring, 2000, “New Light on a ‘Forgotten War’: The Diplomacy of the Korean Conflict,” *OAH Magazine of History*, Vol. 14, No. 3, 10.

while the Soviets were busy supporting North Korea’s land reforms and removal of “reactionary” and “counterrevolutionary” elements. Yet, despite the fact that many new archival materials were released in South Korea and the National Archives at College Park, Maryland since the 1990s, Cumings’ emphasis on the Korean War’s origins as a civil war met cold and harsh responses from scholars such as William Stueck and Kathryn Weathersby, who still emphasized the importance of Great Power competition and minimized the Korean agency.<sup>28</sup> They believed that Cumings went too far in downplaying the Chinese and Soviet involvement in the war, to the extent that he was writing an unwelcome “revisionist” history. This point of view still has its adherents, such as J. Campbell misinterpreting Cumings’ intention as identifying how the Korean War morphed from an implementation of a “containment” to a “rollback” strategy, without trying to appreciate Cumings’ effort in understanding how the Korean War originally was a Korean national affair.<sup>29</sup>

Although the fundamental question about why the Korean War ought to be referred to as such is not properly answered in the traditional emphasis on Great Power politics, there is still a widespread and persistent tendency to emphasize Chinese or Soviet involvement in the war at the expense of downplaying Korean agency at play in enlarging a civil war rooted in Left-Right tensions across the 1940s. Given that the Korean War has only managed to find its place in American history textbooks since the early 2000s, it is unsurprising that the traditional emphasis on North Korea’s preemptive invasion as the origin of the war remains popular among American historians and in public historical memory about the war in the United States.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Lester Brune, October, 1998, “Recent Scholarship and Findings about the Korean War,” *American Studies International*, Vol. 36, No. 3, 5.

<sup>29</sup> Joel R. Campbell, 2014, “The Wrong War: The Soviets and the Korean War, 1945-1953,” *International Social Science Review*, Vol. 88, No. 3, 9.

<sup>30</sup> Roger Dingman, Spring, 1992, “Korea at Forty-plus: The Origins of the Korean War Reconsidered,” *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 137-143; William Stueck,

This strong tendency to emphasize Northern aggression is most noticeable in several Korean War memorials, which concentrate more on American casualties and activities in Korea aimed at driving out North Korean troops from South Korea. Because there is greater emphasis on veterans' memories of the war, there is almost no mention of prisoners of war and Korean civilians who died in the war, with the aim of invoking American national pride about having participated in a "good war."<sup>31</sup> For the sake of maintaining a positive public impression of Korean War veterans, memorials mention nothing about the crimes committed by Americans in South Korea, such as the April Third Massacre and the No-Gun-Ri Massacre. Yet, as Young-hwa Hong argues, throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s, active discussion about these massacres have led to extensive campaigns to unearth documents and establish memorials in Korean provinces, and some of the archival sources have also been introduced to the United States, making it difficult for Americans to ignore the existence of the massacres.<sup>32</sup>

Although the memorials pay great attention to American soldiers who died in battles, they do not reveal much about American prisoners of war or atrocities committed by American soldiers, primarily because popular coverage of the war neglected the prisoners and atrocities. Reporting also generally omitted racial tensions, miscommunication due to language barriers, and the anecdotes of North Koreans providing hospitality regardless of ideological difference. As Judith Keene illustrates, American prisoners of war, despite being veterans who had performed the same duty of fighting against North Korean soldiers, did not receive any decorations or celebrations, and were mostly subject to "turncoat

trials" for being prisoners of the Chinese. Regardless of the sacrifice and hardship the veterans had to endure, the prisoners were not only shunned by the American public but by the American military itself, misjudged as being "passive, of poor caliber, and bereft of loyalty and patriotism." The veterans were continuously subject to FBI surveillance, intense questioning during government hearings, and interrogations by the Joint Intelligence Processing Boards, and only in 1982, nearly 30 years after the end of the Korean War, did the former prisoners of war receive proper acknowledgements as patriots who had justly served their country.<sup>33</sup>

Put differently, as Thibaud Daniel observes, bodies are "relational," for they represent boundaries between knowledge and experience, which require mediation, and therefore, are products of relations based on characteristics and qualities of people's identities.<sup>34</sup> The resuscitation of their honor in service of the hardship they had to endure as soldiers before they became prisoners took three decades – three long decades of battle against a political segregation between war veterans and prisoners of war, despite all being men who fought for their country.

Likewise, American atrocities in Korea has come to enjoy increased awareness, but still, the atrocities are being largely neglected in most American war memorials. As Suhi Choi has argued, the No Gun Ri Massacre received partial coverage in the U.S. media, but it was largely confined to describing American actions with little reference to the Korean victims, the difficulty of communicating with American soldiers, and cultural biases against Asians which led to misunderstandings and killings. Moreover, the fact that some North Koreans offered help to the South Korean refugees to No Gun-Ri village by extricating and feeding them, which American soldiers had denied, suggests that a major reason behind

2002, *The Korean War: An International Diplomatic History*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press; Kathryn Weathersby, 1993, "Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945-1950: New Evidence from Russian Archives," Woodrow Wilson Center Working Paper No. 8, 5-37.

<sup>31</sup> Suhi Choi, Winter, 2012, "Mythologizing Memories: A Critique of the Utah Korean War Memorial," *The Public Historian*, Vol. 34, No. 1, 61-82.

<sup>32</sup> Young-hwa Hong, 2019, "Towards Archival Justice: The Case of Nogun-ri Massacre During the Korean War," *The iJournal*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 14-27.

<sup>33</sup> Judith Keene, Summer, 2011, "Lost to Public Commemoration: American Veterans of the 'Forgotten' Korean War," *Journal of Social History*, Vol. 44, No. 4, 1095-1113.

<sup>34</sup> Thibaud Daniel, 2017, "Bodies of War and Memory: Embodying, Framing, and Staging the Korean War in the United States," *Miranda*, Vol. 15, 3. See also David Harvey, 2000, *Spaces of Hope*, Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh University Press.

the American public's unawareness about such incidents is the reluctance and negligence of the U.S. media to use North Korean sources on the incident and to present a story of some North Koreans which goes against the popular collective American memory of North Korea — Communist and totalitarian — despite the fact that ideology did not play a significant role in the North Koreans' decision to help the villagers. In short, forgetfulness is always complemented by some degree of remembering, however insignificant the latter may be to the former, such that memories produced by witnesses can serve to “optimize the subversive qualities of counter-memories.”<sup>35</sup>

## Conclusion

Although more than seven decades have passed since the Korean War has ended, the controversial nature of the war still haunts historical memories of the war in South Korea, China, and the United States in three different ways. In South Korea, a strong current of anti-Communism still pervades historical recollections of the war, which is expressed not only in school history textbooks but also memorials and museums, which concentrate on portraying North Korea as a static, evil, and corrupt society that can only be corrected through an absorptive unification led by South Korea's emphasis on human rights. In the United States, the war is slowly rising from a long slumber as a “forgotten war,” but debates ensuing from the publication of *The Origins of the Korean War* have centered on whether it is legitimate to present the civil war between the South Korean Left and Right as the starting place of the war. This phenomenon, along with the recent moves to rehabilitate prisoners of war in memorials, demonstrate the deeply bifurcated nature of how the war was “forgotten” over a long period of time: an external forgetting of the war's Korean origins and an internal forgetting of American prisoners of war who

had equally fought against North Korea. Finally, in China, the Communist Party's influence casts a long shadow over memorials and history textbooks, both of which are forbidden from challenging the official narrative of China's heroic, anti-imperialistic, and nationalistic resistance against “American imperialism.” Although this emphasis largely omits the Korean War's fundamental nature as a civil war, the allure of the Chinese government's logic is largely due to Chinese students' willingness to embrace patriotism and nationalism, which shows that propaganda alone is not responsible for the lasting influence of the Maoist narrative.

What these three different images of the Korean War ultimately show is that the enduring debate around the Korean War as a historical memory primarily reflects sharp differences between how South Koreans, Americans, and Chinese people imagine and understand the origins of the war. Despite the fact that the war has ended, albeit inconclusively through an incomplete armistice, the continued invocation of nationalist passions in dictating what constitutes an “ideologically correct,” and therefore, “politically acceptable” memory of the Korean War suggests that as long as nationalism is inextricably tied to the question of what must be remembered about the Korean War and how one must remember the Korean War, the divergence of historical memories surrounding the war into three or possibly more directions will become more pronounced. Whether a conclusive end to the war would mean an end to the ongoing controversy over political correctness and historical memory is still uncertain. The longer the Korean Peninsula has to wait for a decisive ending to the war, the more elusive a true international consensus between South Korea, the United States, and China over the war's nature would be, for the emergence of a clear ending is by no means the emergence of a firm agreement on the self-evident nature of the beginning.

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<sup>35</sup> Suhi Choi, Fall, 2008, “Silencing Survivors' Narratives: Why Are We ‘Again’ Forgetting the No Gun Ri Story?” *Rhetoric and Public Affairs*, Vol. 11, No. 3, 367-388.

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# Special Topic

# **A Prelude to Joseon-Qing Relations: Joseon's Relations with the Later Jin**

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Jungsoo Jang

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# Preface

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## Preface

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Research on international relations in Joseon Korea (1392-1910) has revolved around the relations with Ming China (1368-1644) and Qing China (1644-1911). Significant efforts have been made to examine diplomatic rituals, based on the tribute-investiture system, and offer macroscopic explanations regarding the Sino-Korean relationship at that time. However, we need to think more about how to unveil actual issues, lying underneath formalistic rituals, and elucidate the complex and strategic stance of the three states towards various political forces of the others. In this context, the diplomatic line which Joseon maintained with the Later Jin (1616-1636), a Jurchen state before the advent of the Qing, should not be treated as a merely transitional phase but an important preparatory stage for the future Joseon-Qing relationship covered in the ritualistic repertoire of the Joseon-Ming relationship. This special issue contains three papers on Joseon's interstate relations with the Later Jin that became a prelude to its relations with the Qing. The first paper covers how Joseon reorganized its relations with the Jurchens prior to the Later Jin's establishment. The second paper deals with the process through which Hong Taiji (r. 1626-1636) consolidated his rule over the Later Jin as its khan. The third paper not only examines the way Hong Taiji orchestrated an invasion of Joseon once the Later Jin's relations with Joseon fell apart during the Later Jin's transformation into the Qing, but

also scrutinizes how documentation of such events was tampered with. In so doing, the three papers feature Joseon's relations with the Later Jin from different perspectives. While the first presents the relations from Joseon's perspective that regarded the Later Jin as a Jurchen polity, the second focuses on the Later Jin's policy towards Joseon, and the third traces how the Joseon-Later Jin relations became restructured into the Joseon-Qing relations as the former fell apart. These diverse angles will help offer a more comprehensive understanding about the reality of Joseon's relations with the Later Jin, lead to new interpretations about Joseon's relations with the Qing, and ultimately encourage further research regarding the historical structure and pattern of international relations in Northeast Asia.

## Joseon's Dual Approach toward the Jurchens and the Regulations for Boundary Jurchens in the Early Seventeenth Century

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# Joseon's Dual Approach toward the Jurchens and the Regulations for Boundary Jurchens in the Early Seventeenth Century\*

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## Introduction

Since its establishment, Joseon (朝鮮, 1392-1910) maintained close relations with the Jurchens (K. *yeojin* 女眞). Such relations were basically formed as Joseon granted titles and stipends to Jurchens who settled down in Joseon territory. By the reign of King Myeongjong (明宗, r. 1545-1567), barbarians residing near the Six Garrisons (K. *yukjin* 六鎭) along Joseon's northern border were referred to as the Boundary Jurchens (K. *beonho* 藩胡) and they were recognized as a buffer against threats from the north by the “deep-dwelling” barbarians (K. *simcheo yain* 深處野人).<sup>1</sup> Regardless of their proximity to its borders, Joseon continued to regard all Jurchens as potential threats that required military precautions.

From the sixteenth century, Jurchens began to come less frequently to Joseon and stopped altogether after the Japanese Invasions between

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\* This translated article is a reviewed and supplemented version of Jungsoo Jang, 「17세기 초 조선의 이원적 대외적 교섭과 변호규례」, 『명청사연구』 54 (October, 2020): 177-226.

<sup>1</sup> Han Seong-joo, 2010, “Joseon jeongi dumangang yuyeok yeojin beonli beonho ui hyeongseong gwa seonggyeok” [The Formation and Characteristics of ‘Jurchen Fence · boundary Jurchens’ in Tumen River Basin], *Hanguksa hakbo* 41, 163-201.

1592 and 1598, commonly known as the Imjin War.<sup>2</sup> Jurchens thereafter started to invade Joseon's borderlands along the Amnok (C. Yalu) and Duman (C. Tumen) Rivers, causing tension to persist in the areas as Joseon responded by launching punitive expeditions.<sup>3</sup> Around the time, Joseon was also on edge upon learning that Nurhaci (努爾哈赤, 1559-1626) of the Jianzhou Jurchens had been unifying other Jurchen tribes north of the Duman and Amnok Rivers while Joseon had been preoccupied with the Imjin War.

A change thus occurred in Joseon's interactions with the Jurchens. In 1595, Joseon sent Shin Chung-il (申忠一, 1554-1622) as a delegate (差官) to handle Nurhaci's request to negotiate.<sup>4</sup> Although it was an unofficial, one-time affair, the negotiation not only managed to appease Nurhaci's resentment against Joseon but also decreased attacks from the Jurchens including the Wenhewei tribe (溫河衛).<sup>5</sup> At the same time, Joseon sought to stabilize its borderlands by suppressing the boundary Jurchens

around the Six Garrisons who had betrayed Joseon.<sup>6</sup>

Near the end of King Seonjo's reign (宣祖, r. 1567-1608), Joseon's policy toward the Jurchens was shaken to its core as the Hülun (扈倫) began to target the boundary Jurchens.<sup>7</sup> The Hülun chieftain Bujantai (布占泰, ?-1618) invaded Joseon's borderlands and soon demanded to be bestowed a title. In response, Joseon attacked a Hülun fortress in Geontoe (件退) across from Jongseong (鍾城) in far northeast Joseon, but suffered a crushing defeat. Joseon was forced to adjust its defense position and made peace with the Hülun by accepting its demand for the Joseon government to bestow titles to it.<sup>8</sup>

Meanwhile, in its report to the Ming (明, 1368-1644), Joseon claimed that the Jianzhou Jurchens (K. *geonju yeojin* 建州女眞) had been behind the incident. This prompted Nurhaci to not only explain his position to Joseon and the Ming public office in Liaodong (C. *Liaodong yamen* 遼東衙門), but to use the occasion as an excuse to attack Bujantai.<sup>9</sup> In 1607, Nurhaci defeated the Hülun forces in Ogalam (烏碯巖) and conquered the areas adjoining the Duman River.<sup>10</sup> With the Hülun in check,

<sup>2</sup> Park Jung-min, 2014, "Imjin waeran gwa yeojinin 'raejo' ui jongeon" [The End of the Imjinwaeran and Jurchen Mission to Hanyang], *Manju yeongu* 18: 7-34.

<sup>3</sup> Kim Soon-nam, 2010, "Joseon jungjongdae ui bukbang yain guchuk" [The Joseon Dynasty's Strategy of Pushing Back the Jurchens Militarily during the Reign of King Jungjong], *Joseon sidaesa hakbo* 54: 53-88; Kim Soon-nam, 2011, "Joseon jeongi 5jin beonho donghyang ui chui" [Beonho(藩胡) Chieftains under the Five Garrisons during Early Joseon], *Yeoksawa silhak* 46: 71-101; Jungsoo Jang, 2013, "Seonjodae daeyeojin bangeo jeollyak ui byeonhwa gwajeong gwa uimi" [The Transformation and Significance of Defense Policy toward Jurchen Tribes During Seonjo's Reign], *Joseon sidaesa hakbo* 67: 169-213; Han Seong-joo, 2015, "Imjin waeran jeonhu yeojin beonho ui joseon chimgu yangsang gwa Joseon ui daeung bunseok" [Aspects of Invading Joseon by Boundary Jurchens, and Responses of Joseon in the before and after of the Imjin War], *Dongyang sahak yeongu* 132: 101-45; Park Jung-min, 2019, "Onhawi ui seryeok hwakdae wa Joseon ui daeung" [Growing Power of Wenhewei and Joseon], *Manju yeongu* 28: 179-205.

<sup>4</sup> Jungsoo Jang, 2016, "16segi mal-17segi cho Joseon gwa geonju yeojin ui bachu gyoseop gwa Sin Chung-il ui yeokhwal" [The Behind-the-Scenes Negotiations between Joseon and Jianzhou Jurchen and Role of Shin Chung-il: 1595-1619], *Hanguk inmulsa yeongu* 25: 133-83.

<sup>5</sup> Park Jung-min, 2018, "Imjin waeran ijeon onhawi ui geojuji geomto" [Study of the Residing Place for Onha-Wi, before the War with Japan (1592-1599)], *Yeoksa wa hyeonsil* 109: 305-38; Lee Jae-kyung, 2018, "Myeongjong-Seonjodae amnonggang bangmyeon yeojinjok jipdaedul gwa Joseon" [Joseon Dynasty and the Jurchens of the Yalu River Valley in Late 16th Century], *Hanguk munhwa* 83: 265-307.

<sup>6</sup> Jang, "Seonjodae daeyeojin bangeo jeollyak ui byeonhwa gwajeong gwa uimi"; Jungsoo Jang, 2016, "Seonjodae mal yeojin beonho rotun ui geonju yeojin gwibu wa Joseon ui daeung" [Submission of Boundary Jurchen, Lotun to Jianzhou Jurchen at the End of King Seonjo's Reign and Joseon's Response], *Joseon sidaesa hakbo* 78: 7-49.

<sup>7</sup> Holon (忽溫) and Holoan (忽剌溫) in historical sources from the Joseon period are transliterations of the Hülun (扈倫). The Hülun is a term that often refers to a confederation of four Jurchen tribes, but in historical sources from the Joseon period, it specifically refers to a tribe called the Ula (烏拉) that belonged to the Hülun confederation. The leadership of the Ula was from the main line of descent of the Nara (納喇) clan which linked the leadership of all tribes in the confederation. Refer to Jungsoo Jang, 2019, "Seonjodae mal Joseon ui daemyeong 'nojeong' bogo wa geu yeopa" [Circumstances of Jurchens in the Tumen River Basin in the Late Reign of King Seonjo and Joseon's Reporting to the Ming], *Myeongcheongsa yeongu* 51: 65-70.

<sup>8</sup> Jang, "Seonjodae daeyeojin bangeo jeollyak ui byeonhwa gwajeong gwa uimi"; Han Seong-joo, 2016, "Joseon seonjodae huban holoan bujantai ui chimip yangsang" [The Invasion Aspect of Holoan Bujantai in Joseon Late Seonjo], *Yeoksawa gyeonggye* 100: 271-300.

<sup>9</sup> Jang, "Seonjodae mal Joseon ui daemyeong 'nojeong' bogo wa geu yeopa."

<sup>10</sup> Park Jung-min, 2014, "Nurhaci ui dumangang yuyeok jinchul gwa Joseon ui beonho sangsil" [Advance to the Tumen River Basin of Nurhaci and Lose the Boundary Jurchens of Joseon], *Inmungwahak yeongu* 43: 179-206; Han Seong-joo, 2016, "Nurhaci ui Dumangang yuyeok beonho chimtal gwa Joseon ui daeung gochal" [A Study about the Nurhaci's Invasion to the Boundary

Nurhaci went on to claim jurisdiction over the boundary Jurchens and completely changed the circumstances. Unlike its lukewarm reaction toward Joseon's report thus far, the Ming public office in Liaodong took Nurhaci's side so that the boundary Jurchens ended up officially falling under the Jianzhou Jurchens' control. Joseon thereby lost its influence over the Boundary Jurchens.<sup>11</sup>

As such, Joseon's policy toward the Jurchens encountered a turning point near the end of King Seonjo's reign due to the Hūlun and the Jianzhou Jurchens. Joseon had no choice but to acknowledge the Jianzhou Jurchens' jurisdiction over the boundary Jurchens and the Jurchens stopped coming to Joseon. With the boundary Jurchens' absence, Joseon had to devise a new policy toward the Jianzhou Jurchens and the Hūlun. And its separate negotiations with the two forces relied on the regulations that used to be applied to the boundary Jurchens.

Few studies have been devoted to how the transition of Joseon's policy toward the Jurchens went through in the early seventeenth century. This is because most studies tend to examine how Joseon's external relations were changed by the Japanese Invasions (1592-1598) and the Manchu Invasion (1636-1637). Perhaps such studies have been searching for the cause behind the change only within the rise of the Qing dynasty (清, 1636-1912) rather than tracing how Joseon's relations with the Jurchens changed over the long term.<sup>12</sup> In other words, most studies have focused

Jurchens in Tumen River Basin, *Response of Joseon*, *Manju yeongu* 22: 127-63.

<sup>11</sup> Jang, "Seonjodae daeyojin bangeo jeollyak ui byeonhwa gwajeong gwa uimi"; Nam Eui-hyeon, 2014, "16-17segi Dumangang byeongyeong jidae yeojin ui seongjang gwa gukje jilseo ui byeonhwa deung yeojinjok tonghap gwajeong eul jungsimeuro" [Growth of the Jurchens (女眞) in the Tumen River (豆滿江) in 16th and 17th Centuries and Changing International Order], *Myeongcheongsa yeongu* 41: 67-106.

<sup>12</sup> Representative studies include Inaba Iwakichi, 1933, *Kōkaikun jidai no mansen gakari* [Manchu-Joseon Relations during King Gwanghaegun's Reign], Tokyo: Osaka yago shoten; Yi In-yeong, 1954, "Cheongjo ui heunggi" [The Rise of the Qing Dynasty], in *Hanguk Manju gwangyesa ui yeongu* [A Study on Korean-Manchu Relations], Seoul: Eulyu munhwasa. On the rise of the Qing dynasty, refer to Hong Sung-ku, 2009, "Cheongsa gongjeong ui cheongjo heunggisasa seosul banghyang" [The Qing History Project's Guideline on Describing the Rise of the Qing Dynasty], in *Jungguk yeoksa hakgye ui cheongsa yeongu donghyang: Hanguk gwallyeon buya reul jungsimeuro*

on how Joseon reacted to an external situation called the Ming-Qing transition when its relations with the Qing had in fact been formed more gradually, first with the Jurchens, then with the Later Jin (後金, 1616-1636), and finally the Qing.<sup>13</sup> Joseon's dual policy in the early seventeenth century based on the regulations for boundary Jurchens served as a stepping stone to establishing diplomatic relations with the Later Jin.

Apart from Byung-kuk Suh's study that closely examined Joseon's negotiations with the Jurchens during King Seonjo's reign and Ku-jin Kim's study on Jurchen tribes that came into contact with Joseon, previous studies on Joseon's external relations tended to revolve around the rise and fall of the Ming and Qing dynasties.<sup>14</sup> Byung-kuk Suh discussed in detail the boundary Jurchens' voluntary and involuntary breakaway from Joseon but limited the study's temporal scope to the first half of the Joseon era. As a result, the study fails to cover Joseon's relations with the Jurchens during the period between the boundary Jurchen system's collapse near the end of King Seonjo's reign and the beginning of Joseon's negotiations with the Later Jin.<sup>15</sup> Sung-kyun Kim's study that reviewed Joseon's overall relations with the Jurchens and the Manchus between the reigns of King Seonjo and King Injo also failed to cover the period when Joseon maintained separate relations with the Jianzhou Jurchens

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[A Study on Qing History Research Trends in China: Focusing on Research Involving Korea]  
Seoul: Dongbuga yeoksa jaedan.

<sup>13</sup> Jungsoo Jang, 2017, "Byeongja horan ijeon Joseon ui dae Hujeum (Cheong) bangeo jeollyak ui surip gwajeong gwa geu silsang" [The Progress and Reality of Joseon's Defense Strategy Making against the Late Jin(Qing) before The Second Manchu Invasion(1636-1637)], *Joseon sidaesa hakbo* 81: 51-54.

<sup>14</sup> Suh Byung-kuk, 1970, *Seonjo sidae yeojin gyoseopsa yeongu* [A Historical Study on Negotiations with the Jurchens During King Seonjo's Reign], Seoul: Gyomunsa; Kim Ku-jin, 1984, "Joseon jeongi dae yeonjin gwangye wa yeojin sahoe ui siltae" [Joseon's Relations with the Jurchens and the Reality of the Jurchen Society During the First Half of the Joseon Dynasty], *Dongyanghak* 14 : 513-21; Kim Ku-jin, 1988, "13-17c Yeojin sahoe ui yeongu: Geum myeolmang ihu Cheong geomguk ijeon kkaji yeojin sahoe ui jojik eul jungsimeuro" [A Study on the 13-17th Century Jurchen Society: Focusing on the Jurchen Social System Between the Fall of the Later Jin and the Establishment of the Qing], Doctoral dissertation, Korea University.

<sup>15</sup> Suh Byung-kuk, 1990, "Joseon jeongi dae yeonjin gwangyesa" [Joseon's Relations with the Jurchens during the First Half of the Joseon Dynasty], *Guksagwan nonchong* 14: 118-47.

and the Hūlun.<sup>16</sup>

Research on Sino-Korean relations advanced to the next level in the 1990s when major studies were published on Joseon's early relations with the Qing.<sup>17</sup> Such studies made it possible to construct detailed causal explanations about Joseon's relations with the Later Jin as well as the Ming and Qing dynasties. Empirical approaches on Joseon's policy toward the Jurchens, on the other hand, experienced something of a setback. The tendency to examine changes in Joseon's external policies in association with the rise of the Qing dynasty naturally forced the discussion of the boundary Jurchens to the periphery. Research on relations with the Jurchens during the first half of the Joseon era came to be classified as part of the history of the northern tribes while relations with the Qing during the second half of the Joseon era came to fall under the history of Sino-Korean relations. The Japanese and Qing invasions that took place in between have been considered separate research topics, making it difficult to gain an overall grasp of how relations with the Jurchens changed throughout the entire Joseon period.

As notable studies on the Jurchens as a 'protective fence' (K. *beonli* 藩籬) or 'screen' (K. *beonbyeong* 藩屏) came out in the late 2000s, new findings on Joseon's relations with the Jurchens emerged.<sup>18</sup> As a result, the concepts of the boundary Jurchens and the deep-dwelling Jurchens became clarified.<sup>19</sup> More details were uncovered about how Nurhaci and

<sup>16</sup> Kim Sung-kyun, 1978, "Joseon junggi ui daeman gwangye" [Relations with the Manchus during the Mid-Joseon Period], *Baeksan hakbo* 24: 3–44.

<sup>17</sup> Choi Ho-gyoon, 1995, "Joseon junggi dae yeonjin gwangye ui yeongu" [A Study on Relations with the Jurchens During the Mid-Joseon Period], Doctoral dissertation, Sungkyunkwan University; Choi So-ja, 1997, *Myeong Cheong sidae jung-han gwangyesa yeongu* [A Study on Sino-Korean Relations During the Ming, Qing Dynasties], Seoul: Ehwa Womans University Press; Kim Jong-won, 1999, *Geunse dong Asia gwangyesa yeongu* [A Study on Modern East Asian Relations], Seoul: Hyeon; Han Myung-gi, *Imjin waeran gwa hanjung gwangye* [The Imjin War and Sino-Korean Relations] (Seoul: Yeoksa bipyeongsa, 1999).

<sup>18</sup> Chong Da-ham, "Joseon chogi yain gwa daemado e daehan beonli beonbyeong insik ui hyeongseong gwa gyeongchagwan pagyeon" [Creating Chosŏn's Suzerainty over Jurchen and Tsushima and the Dispatch of Kyŏngchagwan (敬差官)], *Dongbang hakji* 141 (2008): 221–66.

<sup>19</sup> Kim, "Joseon jeongi 5jin beonho donghyang ui chui"; Adam Bohnet, 2015, "Debating Tumen

Bujantai targeted the boundary Jurchens and how Joseon reacted near the end of King Seonjo's reign.<sup>20</sup> Delving into Joseon's relations with the Jurchens between the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries revealed that a sense of crisis hit Joseon when the Jianzhou Jurchens took over the boundary Jurchens. In retrospect, this fact supports the existing view that Joseon's relations with the Jianzhou Jurchens had remained relatively amicable from King Seonjo's reign until the first half of King Gwanghaegun's (光海君, r. 1608-1623) reign.<sup>21</sup>

Despite such progress made through research, there are still questions that need to be answered. A closer examination is yet to be done on how Joseon specifically handled the crisis once the Jianzhou Jurchens gained control over the Hūlun and conquered the areas along the Duman River. Explanations are yet to be given on exactly how Joseon interacted with the Jianzhou Jurchens and the Hūlun or how the dynamics changed after Nurhaci went his own way by incorporating the Hūlun and establishing the Later Jin.

Bearing such questions in mind, this paper covers changes that occurred in the early seventeenth century when Joseon's border policy regarding the Jurchens became replaced by its diplomatic policy toward the Later Jin. The paper will first examine the changes in Joseon's relations with the Jianzhou Jurchens and the Hūlun to explain why Joseon adopted a dual approach based on the regulations for boundary Jurchens. It will then examine how such regulations were applied and how they became nominal after the Jianzhou Jurchens consolidated the Hūlun. This should

Valley Jurchens during the Late Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries," *Korean Studies* 39: 23–44; Seong-joo Han, 2018, *Joseon siade beonho yeongu* [A Study on Boundary Jurchens During the Joseon Period] Paju: Kyungin munhwasa.

<sup>20</sup> Jang, "Seonjodae daeyeojin bangeo jeollyak ui byeonhwa gwajeong gwa uimi"; Park, "Nurhaci ui Dumangang yuyeok jinchul gwa Joseon ui beonho sangsil"; Han, "Nurhaci ui Dumangang yuyeok beonho chimtal gwa Joseon ui daeung gochal"; Han, "Joseon Seonjodae huban holaon Bujantai ui chimip yangsang."

<sup>21</sup> Kim, *Geunse Dong Asia gwangyesa yeongu*, 39; Han, *Imjin waeran gwa hanjung gwangye*, 228–229; Noh Ki-shik, 2001, "Manju ui heunggi wa Dong Asia jilseo ui byeondong" [The Rise of the Manchus and Changes in the East Asian Order], *Jungguksa yeongu* 16: 13–14.

be able to offer clues as to how Joseon's relations with the Jurchens morphed into its relations with the Later Jin and the Qing.

### Joseon's Agreement with the Hūlun and the Formation of Regulations for Boundary Jurchens

After subjugating the boundary Jurchens along the Duman River near the end of King Seonjo's reign, the Jianzhou Jurchens and the Hūlun demanded that they should be bestowed with the titles and the stipends that the Joseon government used to offer the boundary Jurchens. Joseon officially refused and instead reported the situation to the Ming office in Liaodong, hoping that the Ming government would intervene. Yet, Joseon knew that the odds of receiving help from the Ming government were low, which is why it continued to engage in negotiations with the Jianzhou Jurchens and the Hūlun from behind the scenes.

Such negotiations signified a change in Joseon's relations with the Jianzhou Jurchens and the Hūlun. Despite being pressured by them, there was almost no prospect for Joseon to revive its system of the boundary Jurchens. Joseon had bestowed government positions and stipends so that the boundary Jurchens would serve as a buffer against the deep-dwelling barbarians such as the Jianzhou Jurchens and the Hūlun.

Joseon could no longer maintain its previous policy toward the Jurchens when the Jianzhou Jurchens and the Hūlun were quoting the regulations for boundary Jurchens although they were not the boundary Jurchens under Joseon's control. At the time, the Jurchens were accustomed to taking such an approach with Joseon or the Ming and had no reason to look for alternatives. For Joseon, stipends were not a new expense and even if the government had to spend a bit more on stipends, the cost would have been worth it in terms of eliminating the threat to its border. Besides, titles and stipends were a good excuse to form amity with the 'barbaric' Jurchens as a measure of containment.<sup>22</sup> The demand for titles

<sup>22</sup> On the Hūlun's demand for titles, the Minister of Public Works Yun Hyeong mentioned in the

had in fact been aimed at receiving stipends or gaining profits from trade so Joseon was able to reach an agreement with the Jianzhou Jurchens and the Hūlun without much trouble.

Joseon thus switched from adopting individual policies for different Jurchen forces to a dual policy toward the Jianzhou Jurchens and the Hūlun and referred to the regulations it used to apply to the Boundary Jurchens. Such regulations remained in use to a certain degree until Joseon devised a unified policy toward the Jurchens and thereafter became forced to newly establish relations with the Later Jin founded by Nurhaci.

In 1605, the Hūlun chieftain Bujantai became the first deep-dwelling Jurchen to be bestowed with a title from the Joseon government. The same year he was given the title *Cheomji jungchubusa* (僉知中樞府事), a senior third-ranked officer of the Joseon government agency called *Jungchubu* (中樞府), Bujantai asked for one hundred more titles to be granted to each of the generals under his command.<sup>23</sup> The titles were subsequently issued in the fifth lunar month of the following year along with three thousand rolls of cloth as their stipend, on one condition.<sup>24</sup> Referring to *hyangguk giseong* (向國之誠), which was the idea of showing sincerity toward one's country, Joseon asked Bujantai to return one Joseon abductee for each title. In Joseon, this exchange was construed as the king's gesture of benevolence toward the barbarians.

Previously, Nurhaci had also cited the regulations for the "northern Boundary Jurchens" in his request for a Joseon government position. The

ninth lunar month of 1603 that "the loose rein policy is a good plan that doesn't reject a king who approaches and doesn't pursue one who leaves. Considering the circumstances our enemies are in nowadays, however, it seems quite clear that they won't be satisfied with such a policy and will seek friendly relations, which is why I've dared to offer my opinion." ("羈縻之術 本是帝王 來不拒去不追之長策 而以今日賊情觀之 羈縻不已 終至講和 明者視之 有若觀火 特臣僚不敢先發耳" from *Seonjo sillok* [Veritable Records of King Seonjo], vol. 166, the third day of the ninth lunar month in 1603 (Year 36 of King Seonjo's Reign). This comment shows how complicated the situation was and implies that while forming friendly relations with deep-dwelling Jurchens couldn't be justified, it could be portrayed as an extension of the loose rein policy in order to relieve tension.

<sup>23</sup> *Seonjo sillok*, vol. 190 the twenty-ninth day of the eighth lunar month in 1605.

<sup>24</sup> *Seonjo sillok*, vol. 199, the ninth day of the fifth lunar month in 1606.

request was, however, officially denied because he had already received a title from the Ming government.<sup>25</sup> At the time, the Jurchens under Nurhaci's control were given food and other economic benefits when they visited Manpojin (滿浦鎮) in Joseon, but they had never been granted titles from the Joseon government. What had caused Joseon to take such a different approach toward the Jianzhou Jurchens?

Around the fifteenth century, there were many Jurchens who had received titles from both the Joseon and Ming government.<sup>26</sup> Their number, however, gradually decreased over time so that beyond the mid-sixteenth century, Joseon government positions granted to the Jurchens were given almost exclusively to the boundary Jurchens. Moreover, as Joseon grew closer with the Ming through the Imjin War, Joseon began to grow a bit more cautious in its approach toward the Jurchens. The Jianzhou Jurchens were sharing a border with the Ming and Manpojin, their point of communication with Joseon, so they were not quite out of the Ming's sight.

The Hūlun, on the other hand, was geographically distant from the Ming. This was why unlike the Hada (哈達) and Yehe (葉赫) tribes, the Hūlun were unable to engage in direct trade with the Ming. They instead had to trade in places like Kaiyuan (開原) and Liaoyang (遼陽) through the Yehe or Jianzhou Jurchens and they had lost contact with Joseon since the sixteenth century. Compared to the Jianzhou Jurchens or the Hada and Yehe tribes, it was therefore difficult for the Hūlun to secure the economic capacity necessary to grow powerful. Their relative proximity to Joseon was perhaps why Bujantai approached Joseon once he became the Hūlun's leader.

At this point, it seems necessary to examine the Hūlun, referred to as the Ula (烏拉) in Qing records. They reached their prime under Bujantai's rule and clashed with Joseon when they advanced into areas around the Duman River. Unfortunately, records like *Qing taizu shilu* (清太祖實

<sup>25</sup> *Seonjo sillok*, vol. 142, the twenty-third day of the tenth lunar month in 1601.

<sup>26</sup> Han Seong-joo, 2011, *Joseon jeongi sujik yeojinin yeongu* [A Study on Jurchens Bestowed with Titles During the First Half of the Joseon Dynasty], Seoul: Kyungin munhwasa, 117-152.

錄), the Veritable Records of Qing Taizu authored from the Jianzhou Jurchens' perspective, offer few details about the Hūlun.

A testimony by Yi Nan (李難, ?-?) in *Deungnok Yucho* (騰錄類抄), on the other hand, is one of the most detailed descriptions about the Hūlun from an outsider's perspective.<sup>27</sup> Yi Nan was a Joseon soldier stationed in Donggwanjin (潼關鎮) of Jongseongbu. In the eighth lunar month of 1603, he became a captive and was held by the Hūlun for nearly four months. Upon his return, he gave a detailed testimony about what he had observed while being held captive, which offers clues about the Hūlun's interactions with the outside. According to Yi Nan, Bujantai had revealed his desire to obtain a title from Joseon.<sup>28</sup> His interest was not in becoming a government official but rather in using the title as a means to officially initiate trades with Joseon.

Yi Nan's testimony also indicates that the Hūlun frequently went to the border of the Ming to make trade deals. How should this be understood, considering how far away the Hūlun had been from the Central Plains? According to a statement by the Ming's Liaodong Governor Zhang Tao (張濤, 1560-1618), Nurhaci had constantly sought valuables like silk and sable fur produced by "the Jiangyi" (江夷) in the northeast.<sup>29</sup> Jiangyi translates to 'river barbarians', a term used to refer to the Hūlun. The Hūlun were also called the Ula, which refers to a large river in Manchuria. Freshwater pearls and sable fur produced by the Hūlun were distributed in Kaiyuan by the Hada to their south and by the Yehe to their north. In order to monopolize profits from dealing such items, Nurhaci replaced the Hada and Yehe as their broker, eventually causing pearls and sable furs to be supplied to Liaoyang instead of Kaiyuan.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>27</sup> On Yi Nan's testimony, refer to Jang, "Seonjodaec mal Joseon ui daemyeong 'nojeong' bogo wa geu yeopa," 67-74.

<sup>28</sup> *Deungnok yucho* (騰錄類抄), vol. 14 (byeonsa 邊事), the twenty-second day of the fourth lunar month in 1604.

<sup>29</sup> *Chouliiao shuohua* (籌邊碩畫), vol. 2, Discussions on the barbarian movements in the northeast (dongbei luqingyi 東北虜情議).

<sup>30</sup> Mitamura Taisuke, 1972, *Shinchō zenshi no kenkyū* [A Study on China's Pre-Qing History], Kyoto: Toyoshi kenkyukai, 174-177.

Zhang Tao's statement suggests that the Hūlun engaged in trade with the Ming through the Hada, Yehe, or Jianzhou Jurchens without directly establishing relations with the Ming. This may be why it was easier for Joseon to grant Bujantai's request for a title as opposed to Nurhaci's.<sup>31</sup> Even if bestowing a title did end up opening a channel for trade with the Hūlun, it was unlikely to affect Ming's interests. This is the reason why Joseon refrained from immediately reporting to the Ming about the Hūlun attack it suffered. Only after Joseon learned of Nurhaci's involvement in the attack did it report the fact to the Ming. Besides, Jongseong, one of the Six Garrisons where the Hūlun traded with Joseon, was quite far from Manpojin that was more exposed to the Ming.

These were the circumstances under which Joseon began to apply the regulations for boundary Jurchens to the Hūlun. The relationship, however, unfolded rather erratically. The Hūlun was a powerful Jurchen confederation but lacked diplomatic experience due to its distance from Joseon or the Ming. Even after receiving a title from Joseon, Bujantai failed to keep the agreement not to plunder the boundary Jurchens. This was what set him apart from Nurhaci who had far more experience in interacting with outsiders and became the reason why many of the tribes Bujantai had initially won over eventually left to submit themselves to the Jianzhou Jurchens instead.

Bujantai was a typical warrior. Yi Nan's impression of him was that he looked "quite burly and rough."<sup>32</sup> A report drafted in 1605 by the Pyeongan Provincial Army Commander (K. *Pyeongan byeongsa* 平安兵使) Seong Yun-mun (成允文, 1542-1629) quoted the words of a Jurchen who had described Bujantai as a dauntless, fierce man.<sup>33</sup> Other historical records from around the same time also indicate that Bujantai was known as a gallant yet relatively simple-minded figure.

Nurhaci, on the other hand, was known for his craftiness. King

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<sup>31</sup> *Seonjo sillok*, vol. 210, the sixth day of the fourth lunar month in 1607.

<sup>32</sup> *Deungnok yucho*, vol. 14, the twenty-second day of the fourth lunar month in 1604.

<sup>33</sup> *Seonjo sillok*, vol. 189, the sixteenth day of the seventh lunar month in 1605.

Seonjo once mentioned that although Nurhaci was paying tribute to the Ming unlike Bujantai, he was still "evil" for harboring different intentions.<sup>34</sup> This indicates that while years of experience in trading with the Ming had taught Nurhaci to be courteous to the Ming and Joseon, they hadn't been enough to mask his ambitions from the king of Joseon.

Meanwhile, Bujantai lacked diplomacy from having remained in relative isolation. Official histories such as *Manzhou shilu* (滿州實錄) and *Qing taizu shilu* (清太祖實錄) describe him as a highly imprudent character. For instance, his initial tactic was to place pressure on Joseon's border in order to obtain a title. And he continued to be hasty enough to repeatedly make demands for a title whereas Nurhaci did not ask again once his request for a title was denied.<sup>35</sup>

In some ways, however, Bujantai's disposition made it easier for Joseon to negotiate with the Hūlun. Joseon had been facing the dilemma of having to stop its frontier from being attacked without giving the impression that it was succumbing to aggression. Bujantai's impatience ultimately worked in Joseon's favor. According to the stipulations set forth by the Hamgyeong (咸鏡) Provincial Army Commander (K. *Bukbyeongsa* 北兵使) Kim Jong-deuk (金宗得, 1554-?) in the seventh lunar month of 1605, Bujantai was bestowed the title of *Cheomji jungchubusa* on the condition that he defects to Joseon.<sup>36</sup> In other words, Joseon adopted the same policy it had applied to the boundary Jurchens by taking advantage of Bujantai's eagerness to secure a title from Joseon through whatever means necessary.

Stipends paid to the Hūlun were also determined according to the regulations for boundary Jurchens. In the eleventh lunar month of 1605, during a discussion on whether titles could be bestowed to the Hūlun or not, Yi Si-eon(李時言, 1557-1624) the then Hamgyeong Provincial Army

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<sup>34</sup> *Seonjo sillok*, vol. 187, the twenty-ninth day of the fifth lunar month in 1605.

<sup>35</sup> *Sadae mungwe* (事大文軌), vol. 46, the twentieth day of the eleventh lunar month in 1605, Letter from the King of Joseon to the Governor of Liaodong (遼東巡撫) and the Liaodong Regional Commander (遼東總兵).

<sup>36</sup> *Seonjo sillok*, vol. 193, the seventeenth day of the eleventh lunar month in 1605.

Commander, advised Yu Bi (柳斐, 1566-?), the Magistrate of Jongseongbu in charge of negotiations with the Hūlun, that “stipends and attire should always be determined by the regulations for boundary Jurchens who render meritorious services.”<sup>37</sup> Around the fifth lunar month of 1606, Joseon declared that stipends for the Hūlun would be determined according to the regulations for boundary Jurchens, which were also referred to as traditional regulations.<sup>38</sup> Joseon's Border Defense Council (K. *bibyeonsa* 備邊司) also stated that “since they have been granted titles, they are like the boundary Jurchens to us.”<sup>39</sup>

Joseon's policy therefore was to treat the Hūlun like the boundary Jurchens. And Bujantai made no objections, perhaps because he had been ignorant of the formalities and protocol or didn't pay much attention to them. His purpose in seeking a title was mainly to receive stipends and initiate trade with Joseon so there was no reason for him to take issue with formalities when he had already achieved his purpose.

Joseon was aware of this and took advantage of it during negotiations. When court officials were unable to arrive at a consensus on whether to accept Bujantai's request for one hundred titles to be additionally bestowed to the generals under his command, King Seonjo said that “their demands will be endless so we should deal with each depending on the situation at hand... We need to lure the enemy with dozens of titles so that we can keep a loose rein on them.” The reality was that Joseon wasn't powerful enough to reject Bujantai's demand, but King Seonjo stressed that his responsibility as ruler was to coax “the animals” instead of trying to teach them a lesson.<sup>40</sup>

Joseon thus internally justified the issuance of titles to the Hūlun as part of their loose rein policy called *Gimichaek* (羈縻策). The cloth to be bestowed with each title was practically an annual tribute paid to the

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> *Seonjo sillok*, vol. 199, the twelfth day of the fifth lunar month in 1606.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> *Seonjo sillok*, vol. 190, the twenty-fifth day of the eighth lunar month in 1605.

Hūlun, but it was officially called a stipend to justify the cost.

In the process, Joseon took advantage of Bujantai's inexperience in foreign affairs to implement the regulations for boundary Jurchens in its agreement with the Hūlun. The stipulations to their agreement were drafted in Korean, possibly to evade the Ming's attention, and added the Ming era name *Wanli* (萬曆) at the end to defend Joseon's loyalty to the Ming in case the Ming ever happened to take issue with the agreement.

Joseon's relations with the Hūlun were based on the regulations for boundary Jurchens, but its nature was different. Joseon's loose rein policy toward the Boundary Jurchens was to “embrace those who come and not cling to those who leave.”<sup>41</sup> In other words, the relations were unilateral rather than mutual in nature. Joseon's agreement with the Hūlun, however, included stipulations on repatriation, mutual non-aggression in borderlands, and trade. Titles and stipends were given as a formality for a mutual agreement that practically recognized the Hūlun as a political entity.

The fact that the Hūlun made their demands for titles and stipends via letters hints at how they perceived the regulations for boundary Jurchens. Before the Hūlun, Nurhaci had also sent multiple letters to Joseon since 1595. The wording was unrefined, but he mainly used the title *Jianzhou* (K. *geonju* 建州) he had received from the Ming court and bore the official mark of the Jianzhou Left Guard (C. *Jianzhou zuowei* 建州左衛).<sup>42</sup> The two to the three letters sent by the Hūlun were cruder than those from Nurhaci.

Bujantai sent his first letter immediately after the battle in Geontoe in the fifth lunar month of 1605. Joseon court discussions over the letter indicate that having won the battle, Bujantai exuded confidence as he

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<sup>41</sup> *Seongjong sillok* [Veritable Records of King Seongjong], vol. 217, the ninth day of the sixth lunar month in 1488.

<sup>42</sup> Nurhaci used a variety of titles. In documents from 1595 to 1596, he used *zhu* (主) and then referred to himself as *wang* (王) in 1605 and 1607. He also used *nūzhiguo* (女直國) in a document from 1596 and thereafter used the expression *jianzhouguo* (建州國).

asked to be given a title.<sup>43</sup> When Jeong Chung-sin (鄭忠信, 1576-1636) visited the Hūlun the following year, Bujantai apparently mentioned a letter he once sent to demand that Joseon provide him with cloth.<sup>44</sup> The letter Bujantai mentioned may have been referring to his first letter to Joseon or some other letter, but in any case, it confirms that Bujantai had made demands for a title and stipends.

His letter from the seventh month of 1605 was also sent for the same purpose.<sup>45</sup> Joseon referred to the letter as a personal letter (K. *saseo* 私書) because it was too crude to be recognized as an official document. The titles of the sender and the recipient as well as an official mark or a seal were missing from the undated letter. Perhaps it was to be expected since Bujantai had never had any official intercourse with Joseon or the Ming up until then. Nevertheless, the letter must have come across as extremely sloppy to a state like Joseon that emphasized administrative documentation.

Despite their lack of formality, Bujantai's letters carry a significant implication. A letter is bound to have a sender and a recipient and therefore implies that the two were in a mutual relationship. Joseon records indicate that a reply was sent to Bujantai, possibly by a local government official. Joseon had received explicit demands before from the boundary Jurchens, but none of them had sent letters demanding to be granted a title and stipends. This in turn suggests that the regulations Joseon applied to the boundary Jurchens had been specious.

Joseon and the Hūlun began to hold more serious negotiations after the battle at Geontoe in 1605. The agreement they arrived at the following year was typical in that it was made through negotiations but different in that it adopted the regulations for boundary Jurchens. Unfortunately, it turned out to be useless. The Hūlun thereafter continued to subjugate the Boundary Jurchens and create tensions in Joseon's borderlands.

<sup>43</sup> *Seonjo sillok*, vol. 187, the fifteenth day of the fifth lunar month in 1605.

<sup>44</sup> *Seonjo sillok*, vol. 199, the ninth day of the fifth lunar month in 1606.

<sup>45</sup> *Seonjo sillok*, vol. 189, the seventh day of the seventh lunar month in 1605.

Joseon kept referring to the agreement to stop the Hūlun but to no avail. The regulations for boundary Jurchens therefore only proved to be politically useful for Joseon in terms of internally justifying its agreement with the Hūlun.

Joseon nevertheless continued to engage in economic trades with the Hūlun. In exchange for receiving stipends from Joseon, the Hūlun offered marten fur. This practice went on until King Gwanghaegun's reign and was later adopted for the Jianzhou Jurchens.<sup>46</sup> These relations with the deep-dwelling barbarians such as the Hūlun and the Jianzhou Jurchens mimicked diplomatic relations, but they were justified through the implementation of the regulations originally meant for the boundary Jurchens who were no longer part of Joseon.

### Negotiations with the Jianzhou Jurchens and the Implementation of Regulations for Boundary Jurchens

Around the time the aforementioned agreement was being made, the Jianzhou Jurchens' growing influence had pushed their border to adjoin that of Joseon, prompting Joseon to seek change in its relations with the Jianzhou Jurchens. In fact, Joseon already had experience in negotiating with them prior to its negotiations with the Hūlun. Although the negotiation had been a one-time incident involving Manpojin, communication between Joseon and the Jianzhou Jurchens grew frequent thereafter.

Joseon also came into contact with the Jurchens at the upper reaches of the Amnok River. Around 1594, Joseon opened a market at Gaeulpajjin (加乙坡知鎮) in Samsu County to prevent attacks from the Jurchen tribe Wenhewei (溫河衛). In 1600, when the Jurchen chieftain Lotun (老土, ?~?) near the upper Duman River submitted himself to the Jianzhou Jurchens before returning to Joseon's border, Joseon opened a market at

<sup>46</sup> *Gwanghaegun ilgi* [Daily Records of King Gwanghaegun], vol. 114, the first day of the fourth lunar month in 1617.

Musanjin (茂山鎭) to appease Lotun.<sup>47</sup> As Lotun and his people fell under Nurhaci's influence, Joseon and the Jianzhou Jurchens came to share a border across a wide area that included Manpo, Gaeulpiji, and Musan.

Yet, Joseon maintained its stance about keeping its relations with the Jianzhou Jurchens unofficial. It continued to trade with them in its borderlands but kept political interactions with them to a minimum. Joseon's intention was made apparent when it denied Nurhaci's request for a title in 1601. In other words, Joseon struggled to comply with the Ming's ban on forming friendly relations with the Jurchens so that it wouldn't get caught up in diplomatic problems with the Ming.

Joseon's way of interacting with the Jianzhou Jurchens or the Wenhewei was different from the way it treated the boundary Jurchens at the Six Garrisons along the Duman River. While Joseon didn't form friendly relations with the Jurchens who received titles from the Ming government, it did interact with the Jurchens who were beyond the Ming's influence. As such, it reported all matters involving the Jianzhou Jurchens to the Ming office in Liaodong but mentioned nothing about the threats it received from the Hūlun or the troubles it was experiencing with the boundary Jurchens.

To Joseon, Nurhaci's ascent was a reality and a potential threat to its borderlands. The Joseon court gathered information about his movements through various channels. The Jurchens who defected to Manpojin were a source of valuable intelligence that allowed Joseon to plan ahead. Joseon thus remained in contact with the Jianzhou Jurchens in an unofficial capacity. For instance, it provided aids to the Jurchens in Manpo from 1601 to at least 1613. Each year food was given to hundreds or

even thousands of the Jurchens in Manpo who were suffering from famine. It was a gesture of compassion, but political forethought was involved as well.

In 1601, Nurhaci sent his deputy Mangralhap (忙刺哈, ?-?) to Manpojin to convey his desire to receive a title from Joseon. The Joseon Second Deputy Commander (K. cheomsa 僉使) in Manpo turned down the request on the grounds that Nurhaci had already received the Ming title *Longhu jiangjun* (龍虎將軍).<sup>48</sup> Nurhaci then sent a letter asking to borrow grains instead of receiving a title. This request had to do with the widespread famine across Joseon's western and northern borderlands as well as Inner Manchuria.<sup>49</sup> The Jurchens kept coming to the edges of Pyeongan and Hamgyeong provinces, begging for food.<sup>50</sup> Joseon government and military officials stationed along the border had to provide food so as to prevent plundering.

Nurhaci's request for a Joseon title had therefore been motivated by a famine that was threatening his rule. In principle, the shortage of food was supposed to be relieved in the Ming's borderlands, but the amount had not been enough to support the surging Jurchen population. In 1601, Nurhaci faced a serious food shortage as he conquered the Hada, one of the two major clans among the Haixi Jurchens. The incorporation of the Hada not only caused a surge in population but a conflict with the Ming because the Hada was well known as a pro-Ming clan. This is why Nurhaci couldn't rely solely on the Ming to overcome the famine.

At the time, Nurhaci was governing a large population across an expansive territory. However, such a population and territory had been acquired too rapidly before an economic foundation could be prepared.<sup>51</sup>

<sup>47</sup> As Joseon decided to open markets for trade with the Jurchens in Manpo, Gaeulpaji, and Musan, the status of those locations became promoted from a *bo* (保) guarded by a *manho* (萬戶) to a *jin* (鎭) guarded by a *cheomjeoljesa* (僉節制使). See Kim Soon-nam, 2010, "Joseon jeongi Manpojin gwa Manpo cheomsa" [The Manpo Garrison and Manpo Cheomsa during Early Joseon], *Sahak yeongu* 97: 59–60; Park Jung-min, 2016, "Joseon junggi mujang Choi Ho ui bukbang hwaldong" [Choi Ho's Activity as a Military Commander in the Northern District during Middle Joseon Dynasty], *Baeksan hakbo* 10: 98–99; Jang, "Seonjodae mal yeojin beonho rotun ui geonju yeojin gwibu wa Joseon ui daeeung," 37–40.

<sup>48</sup> *Seonjo sillok*, vol. 142, the twenty-third day and the twenty-eighth day of the tenth lunar month in 1601.

<sup>49</sup> *Seonjo sillok*, vol. 142, the twenty-third day of the tenth lunar month in 1601.

<sup>50</sup> *Seonjo sillok*, vol. 144, the twentieth day of the twelfth lunar month in 1601.

<sup>51</sup> The Jianzhou Jurchens struggled with the matter of controlling population growth. When Jianzhou Jurchen chieftains pressed Nurhaci to dispatch troops to the Yehe because of an issue involving an old Yehe maiden, he apparently said "even if we do win, how do you propose we feed all the newly acquired people and livestock? We have no grains stocked. ... Our existing people will

Nurhaci thus had no choice but to turn to the Ming or Joseon for food and believed that a title from Joseon could guarantee a stable supply of food.<sup>52</sup> As he brought the Jurchen tribes around Mount Baekdu under his control, a larger portion of his territory came into contact with that of Joseon. And since he had already negotiated with Joseon before, he must have been somewhat optimistic about the possibility of receiving a title.

Joseon, on the other hand, had no reason to go against the Ming by bestowing a title upon Nurhaci. Yet, it could not turn a blind eye on the Jurchens' food shortage out of concern that they might resort to plundering. Moreover, it was difficult to completely ignore Nurhaci's request when he was constantly expanding his power. Joseon therefore refused to establish official relations by bestowing a title but agreed to supply a limited amount of food. Nurhaci gained what he was ultimately seeking, which is probably why he didn't make any further requests for a title. Despite the financial expenses to supply food, Joseon's solution was effective in preventing conflicts with the Jianzhou Jurchens and left Nurhaci with no reason to be hostile against Joseon.

Meanwhile, Joseon reported to the Ming office in Liaodong about the demand for food it had received from the Jianzhou Jurchens. Although the actual message Joseon sent remains unavailable, the Ming office's reply hints at what the message had conveyed. Joseon had sent a message to a Ming Assistant Regional Commander (C. *canjiang* 參將) in Zhenjiang (鎮江) to inform him that Jurchens were turning up in the border area of Pyeongan province and to ask the general for help in preventing such Jurchens from using military force.<sup>53</sup> The Governor (C. *xunfu* 巡撫) Zhao Ji (趙輯, ?~?) and Regional Commander (C. *zongbing* 總兵) Li

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all starve to death." *Manwen laodang* (滿文老檔), the sixth lunar month of 1615.

<sup>52</sup> Later on, Nurhaci described Joseon's bestowal of titles to the Hūlun as an edict (勅書), which confused both Joseon and Ming. See Sadae *munngwe*, vol. 46, the eighteenth day of the ninth lunar month in 1605 (Letter from the Liaodong Regional Commander to the King of Joseon). The word *edict* must have referred to titles, indicating that the demand for titles by the Jianzhou Jurchens and the Hūlun was actually about the profits to be gained from the titles.

<sup>53</sup> *Yimun deungnok* (吏文騰錄), vol. 10, the first day of the second lunar month in 1602 [The reply a Assistant Regional Commander in Zhenjiang in Jingang (鎮江) sent to the king of Joseon].

Chengliang (李成梁, 1526~1615) of Liaodong also received messages from Joseon and responded that a Ming government official would be sent to the Jianzhou Jurchens to make arrangements for them to come to the Ming's border instead of begging for food.<sup>54</sup>

In the fourth lunar month of 1602, the Liaodong Regional Military Commission (C. *Liaodong duzhihuishisi* 遼東都指揮使司) sent a message to assure Joseon that after talking to Nurhaci and conducting an investigation, it had found nothing to indicate that Nurhaci was trying to invade Joseon.<sup>55</sup> This message documented the initial inquiries Joseon had made along with the detailed records of what each office in Liaodong uncovered from their investigation. According to the message, Nurhaci had mentioned the fact that he took good care of Joseon people who invaded his territory before repatriating them and had asked for his goodwill to be compensated with grains. At the upstream of the Amnok River, Joseon had been distributing food vouchers in the form of a document similar to Records of Public Affairs. However, when food shortage grew severe, Nurhaci threatened to use brute force if necessary to secure food, which meant he could resort to plundering. After launching an investigation into the situation, the Ming office in Liaodong tried to reason with the Jianzhou Jurchens and threatened that the Ming could take military actions if they ever invaded Joseon. Nurhaci argued that Joseon used to provide food to the Jurchens living near the Amnok River, so they naturally followed the local government official's instructions and submitted their food vouchers for grains only to return empty-handed. On the surface, this incident was patched up through the Ming's mediation.

What is interesting about the Ming's aforementioned account of the incident is that titles are never mentioned by Joseon or the Jianzhou Jurchens. According to the Veritable Records of King Seonjo (*Seonjo sillok*

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<sup>54</sup> *Yimun deungnok*, vol. 10, the eleventh day of the second lunar month in 1602 [The reply the governor of Liaodong sent to the king of Joseon, the reply the regional commander of Liaodong (遼東總兵) sent to the king of Joseon].

<sup>55</sup> *Yimun deungnok*, vol. 10, the fourth day of the fourth lunar month in 1602 [The letter from the Liaodong Regional Military Commission (遼東都指揮使司) to the king of Joseon].

宣祖實錄), Nurhaci had demanded a title, which Joseon had understood as an excuse to profit from the adoption of the regulations for boundary Jurchens. Yet, Joseon mentioned nothing about a title in its report to the Ming. What's more important is that while Joseon was reporting the situation to the Ming office in Liaodong, it was still handing food out to the Jurchens in Manpojin. This fact can be confirmed from a 1613 report about food distribution in Manpo written by Jeong Sa-ho (鄭賜湖, 1553-1616), the then Governor (K. *gamsa* 監司) of Pyeongan province. The report states that the practice of food distribution had never been discontinued since it was introduced between 1601 and 1602.<sup>56</sup> As such, the purpose of Joseon's report wasn't to ask the Ming to stop the Jurchens' demand for food or gain the Ming's permission to interact with the Jurchens. The report was a diplomatic, preemptive measure that stressed the challenging position Joseon was in so as to avoid potential accusations from the Ming about separately engaging in exchanges with the Jurchens.

Regardless of titles, providing food aids at Manpo had already settled down as a custom that lasted until the reign of King Gwanghaegun. Manpo thereafter served as a place of negotiations between Joseon and the Jianzhou Jurchens. While Joseon cited the Ming's ban as an excuse not to form friendly relations with the Jurchens and submitted formal reports about the Jurchens to the Ming, it also secretly negotiated with the Jurchens to dodge threats. And this approach worked because the Jianzhou Jurchens had not been preoccupied with establishing friendly relations with Joseon.

Another interesting point is that while negotiating with Joseon in Manpo, Nurhaci sent several letters to Joseon. Since 1595, Nurhaci had attempted to establish friendly relations with Joseon via writings. Joseon responded through the second deputy commander stationed in Manpo. Nurhaci's early letters were unrefined. The letter Shin Chung-il delivered in 1596 bore the stamp mark of the Jianzhou Left Guard (*Jianzhou*

<sup>56</sup> *Gwanghaegun ilgi*, vol. 22, the nineteenth day of the second lunar month in 1613.

*zuowei* 建州左衛) but Nurhaci referred to himself as “*Nuzhiguo jianzhouwei guanshu yiren zhizhu*” (女直國建州衛管束夷人之主 ‘Barbarian Master of the Yeojin State, the Supervisor of Jianzhouwei Barbarian People’). Although there was no state called Nuzhiguo yet, the name was paired with “*jianzhouwei*,” which meant the state was part of the Ming. Nurhaci also seemed to have qualms about using a derogatory phrase like “master of barbarians” to refer to himself.

The letters sent beyond 1605, however, proved to be starkly different. In the letter Nurhaci sent to the second deputy commander in Manpo in 1605, the character for leader (C. *zhu* 主) was replaced by the one standing for king (C. *wang* 王). The letter from 1607 named the King of Joseon as its recipient. Nurhaci used the title *Jianzhou dengchu difang guowang* (建州等處地方國王) in his letter from 1605 and *Jianzhou dengchu difang yiwang* (建州等處地方夷王) in his letter from 1607. Replacing “*Jianzhouwei*” with “*Jianzhou dengchu defang*” made it seem like Jianzhou was an area under Nurhaci's control rather than a Ming garrison. The way Nurhaci described himself as a king or a barbarian king was still rather unrefined and his use of the terms “*Jianzhou dengchu*” (建州等處) and “*guo*” (國) hinted at a notable change in his view. Instead of the master of barbarians in Jianzhouwei, he wished to be regarded as the king of an independence force.<sup>57</sup>

These changes should be taken into consideration while reviewing the negotiations between Joseon and the Jianzhou Jurchens at the beginning of King Gwanghaegun's reign. Nurhaci hinted at his intent to pioneer his own path and Joseon was aware of it. By the time King Gwanghaegun rose to the throne, Nurhaci had turned into a powerful man who not only merged the Hoifa and subdued the Hūlun but brought most of the boundary Jurchens along the Duman River under his influence.

<sup>57</sup> According to Yi Si-bal's report in the third lunar month of 1607, the letters in which Nurhaci referred to himself as king bore a stamp mark (*Seonjo sillok*, vol. 209, the twenty-first day of the third lunar month, 1607). It can therefore be assumed that his letters were drafted in the form of an official document although they no longer bore the stamp mark of the Jianzhou Left Guard (*Jianzhou zuowei* 建州左衛).

For a while, Nurhaci kept his true intentions to himself as he negotiated with Joseon. He must have been conscious of the possibility that Joseon could leak details about his movements to the Ming. Indeed, Joseon did report to the Ming about how Nurhaci was expanding his power by subjugating the tribes around him as well as how he had the audacity to call himself a king in a letter addressed directly to the King of Joseon. The solidarity Joseon had formed with the Ming by sharing such intelligence must have seemed threatening to Nurhaci, which was why he couldn't maintain a hard line toward Joseon or the Ming.

Around that time, Nurhaci began paying tribute to the Ming again.<sup>58</sup> This sudden resumption of a practice that had been discontinued for almost two years indicates that Nurhaci had grown aware of a change in the Ming's attitude and therefore felt the need to directly keep an eye on the Ming's local sentiment. He drastically increased the number of officials to be dispatched in order to directly check the Ming's reaction. The Ming was concerned about Nurhaci's gesture but unless he took military actions, it had no excuse to stop him from paying tribute or not reciprocate his courtesy.

Nurhaci simultaneously expanded trade with Joseon. In addition to negotiating at Manpo, he arranged the trade of marten fur with Joseon. On a trial basis, Joseon proposed that the regulations for boundary Jurchens be adopted, and Nurhaci agreed. Nurhaci quite faithfully complied with such regulations as he exchanged letters with the second deputy commander in Manpo and the magistrate of Hoeryeong (會寧).<sup>59</sup> For someone who had not long ago referred to himself as king and sent a letter addressed directly to the King of Joseon, this was a major shift in atti-

<sup>58</sup> Nurhaci stopped paying tribute to the Ming for about two years from around 1606. He then resumed the practice from 1609 and personally took part in 1611. The Jianzhou Jurchens also seem to have paid tribute in the second lunar month 1615 (*Ming shenzong shilu* [Veritable Records of the Ming Emperor Shenzong], vol. 488, twelfth day of the tenth lunar month in 1611; *Ming shenzong shilu*, vol. 529, the eighteenth day of the second lunar month in 1615).

<sup>59</sup> Nurhaci corresponded with Joseon officials in Hoeryeong and Manpo before sending another letter to the king of Joseon in 1617 (*Gwanghaegun ilgi*, vol. 133, the thirteenth day of the tenth lunar month in 1618).

tude but perhaps not a surprising one considering the wealth of experience Nurhaci already had in dealing with the Ming and Joseon. Nurhaci's priority was to amass financial resources through trade so the means of achieving his goal didn't matter much.

Meanwhile, in reaction to Nurhaci's expanding power, Joseon continued to build a system of military cooperation with the Ming. Yet, Joseon was also aware that doing so could upset its relations with the Jianzhou Jurchens, which is why it kept negotiating with them behind the scenes. Trade served as an unofficial channel of communication and a key to discouraging the Jurchens from attacking Joseon. To handle these contradictory approaches toward the Ming and the Jurchens, Joseon introduced the regulations for Boundary Jurchens just like it had done with the Hülun. It also moved the place of trade with the Jurchens further north from Manpo to Hoeryeong to avoid the Ming's eyes.

In the second lunar month of 1608, right after King Gwanghaegun's enthronement, Nurhaci sent marten furs as an offering and asked for a favor in return. As soon as the Hülun were driven away from the Duman River, the Jianzhou Jurchens made a detour around the river's north side and approached Joseon for trade. Joseon's Border Defense Council decided to "find out what their real intentions are by documenting and paying for the fur with cloth from the province's reserve as per the regulations on marten fur payments to the boundary Jurchens."<sup>60</sup> This description hints that for the first time, Nurhaci had brought fur to Hamgyeong province for the purpose of trade. Joseon's solution of referring to its regulations for boundary Jurchens to deal with the Hülun was repeated at a larger scale with the Jianzhou Jurchens and was sustained throughout King Gwanghaegun's reign. It even lasted until after Nurhaci established the Later Jin and defeated the Joseon-Ming joint forces in the Battle of Sarhū (1619).

Trade thus became central to Joseon's relations with the Jianzhou Jurchens and the Later Jin. Although there are no historical sources men-

<sup>60</sup> *Gwanghaegun ilgi*, vol. 1, the seventeenth day of the second lunar month in 1608.

tioning the scale of such trade, speculations can be made based on the fiscal budget that had been allocated for paying stipends to Jurchens. Stipends were basically paid with cloth and the amount fluctuated depending on the circumstances.<sup>61</sup>

In the early seventeenth century, the stipend paid to the boundary Jurchens equaled the sum of what was paid to thirty officials with titles classified as *dangsanggwan* (堂上官). Apart from stipends, cloth was also supplied as payment for marten fur. The cloths provided as stipends were blue and red cloth procured from the Ministry of Revenue (K. *Hojo* 戶曹) and the Ministry of Defense (K. *Byeongjo* 兵曹) and whatever goods to be bestowed as awards were procured from within Hamgyeong province.<sup>62</sup>

The Hūlun's stipend amount was determined between 1605 and 1606. Those with titles classified as *dangsanggwan* received forty rolls (K. *pil* 疋) of cloth.<sup>63</sup> Joseon had bestowed one hundred titles called *Jeolchung janggūn* (折衝將軍), which was classified as a *dangsanggwan* of the senior third rank. That meant Joseon had to prepare a maximum of four thousand rolls, or eighty *dong* (同) in total but it negotiated the amount with the Hūlun.<sup>64</sup> Bujantai suggested that he be paid two thousand rolls, the equivalent of forty rolls each for fifty titles, and that an additional one thousand rolls, the equivalent of twenty rolls each for the remaining fifty titles, be provided for him to distribute among his men. Joseon turned down his suggestion and informed that it was willing to pay twenty rolls per title as per its traditional practice toward barbarians since the Japanese Invasions of 1592 to 1598.<sup>65</sup> In other words, Joseon drew the line at a total of two thousand rolls, which was less than Bujantai's demand for three thousand.

At the time, a Joseon official named Jeong Chung-sin was working

<sup>61</sup> *Seonjo sillok*, vol. 189, the sixth day of the seventh lunar month in 1605.

<sup>62</sup> *Seonjo sillok*, vol. 164, the twelfth day of the seventh lunar month in 1603.

<sup>63</sup> *Seonjo sillok*, vol. 192, the twenty-sixth day of the tenth lunar month in 1605.

<sup>64</sup> One *dong* (同) amounted to fifty rolls of cloth.

<sup>65</sup> *Seonjo sillok*, vol. 199, the twelfth day of the fifth lunar month in 1606.

at the forefront of the negotiations. He argued that the matter of stipends would be critical in determining the Hūlun's attitude thereafter. If Joseon had no choice but to pay the Hūlun stipends, it would be beneficial for Joseon to grant its request. Governor Yi Si-bal (李時發, 1569-1626) and Provincial Army Commander Yi Si-eon of Hamgyeong province agreed with Jeong's argument for the sake of stabilizing Joseon's frontier. Bibyeonsa thereby reconsidered the matter, stating that "it would not be the first time to pay a stipend of forty rolls if we take into account our traditional rule on paying the boundary Jurchens." Joseon ultimately decided to accede to Bujantai's request for three thousand rolls of cloth.

The stipend Joseon paid Nurhaci would have been similar or higher. This precedent with the Hūlun must have affected Joseon when it chose to implement the regulations for boundary Jurchens in its relations with the Jianzhou Jurchens. After subduing the Hūlun, Nurhaci claimed that the rolls of cloth paid to the Hūlun should be given to him instead, but once the Hūlun recovered its power to a certain degree, it asked for the permission to trade in Joseon's borderlands again. Joseon thus engaged in the trade of marten fur with both sides and its scale gradually increased. Also, apart from the cloth they received as stipends, the Hūlun requested for additional cloth to make official robes, which some estimate to have amounted up to five thousand rolls, or one hundred *dong* per year.<sup>66</sup>

Records confirm that marten fur trade with the Jianzhou Jurchens took place in Joseon's Hamgyeong province in 1614, and particularly in the seventh month, four hundred sheets of marten fur were supplied to the province.<sup>67</sup> This was five times more than what was traded in 1608 and the amount rose to five hundred sheets by the second lunar month of 1619.<sup>68</sup> In addition, other various furs such as red fox fur and squirrel fur appear to have been traded so that in 1616, 2,800 rolls, or 56 *dong* of

<sup>66</sup> *Gwanhaegun ilgi*, vol. 25, the fourteenth day of the second lunar month in 1610.

<sup>67</sup> *Gwanhaegun ilgi*, vol. 75, the eighth day and the sixteenth day of the second lunar month in 1614; *Gwanhaegun ilgi*, vol. 80, the nineteenth day of the seventh lunar month in 1614.

<sup>68</sup> *Gwanhaegun ilgi*, vol. 137, the twenty-fourth day of the second lunar month in 1619.

cloth collected as tax-in-kind was spent on acquiring fur.<sup>69</sup> While it is uncertain whether stipends were sufficient enough to cover the cost of purchasing furs, the amount must have been considerable. Records indicate that in 1620, the Jianzhou Jurchens were provided with four thousand rolls of cloth as stipends.<sup>70</sup>

While negotiations may have taken place in Manpo, Joseon continued to conduct trade and pay stipends in Hoeryeong. In 1617, Nurhaci sent a letter asking whether stipends could be paid in Manpo instead of Hoeryeong but Joseon refused to make the change. According to the discussions held at the Border Defense Council, the reason was because “Manpo is not far from the Central Plains, which means Joseon could be in trouble if Manpo becomes breached.”<sup>71</sup> In other words, Joseon had insisted on trading in Hoeryeong where its activities would stay out of the Ming’s sight. As much as Joseon went on expanding its area of contact with the Jianzhou Jurchens, it still wished to handle matters related to titles and stipends from behind the scenes.

Even as Joseon actively engaged in negotiations with the Jianzhou Jurchens, it took precautions. It shared with the Ming the everyday interactions and food distribution it conducted in Manpo so that they wouldn’t become the source of diplomatic problems. And in Hoeryeong, it adopted the regulations for boundary Jurchens to bestow titles and stipends to the Hūlun and engage in trade with them but chose not to report anything to the Ming. This dual approach toward the deep-dwelling Jurchens helped relieve military tensions and brought temporary stability to Joseon’s borderlands. The approach wasn’t, however, a lasting solution because it could be altered at any moment due to internal dissent, the Ming’s intervention, or failure to maintain a balance between the Jianzhou Jurchens and the Hūlun.

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<sup>69</sup> *Gwanghaegun ilgi*, vol. 106, the twenty-eighth day of the eighth lunar month in 1616.

<sup>70</sup> *Gwanghaegun ilgi*, vol. 148, the first day in the first lunar month of 1620.

<sup>71</sup> *Gwanghaegun ilgi*, vol. 114, the first day in the fourth lunar month of 1617.

## The Jianzhou Jurchens’ Incorporation of the Hūlun and the Demise of the Regulations for Boundary Jurchens

The previous sections have covered how Joseon’s policy toward the Jurchens began to focus on the Jianzhou Jurchens and the Hūlun in the early seventeenth century. These so-called deep-dwelling barbarians subjugated most of the independent Jurchen tribes spread across the mid-to-upstream areas along the Amnok River, Mount Baekdu, and the Duman River, many of which resided in Joseon’s borderlands. Among such independent Jurchens were what Joseon called the boundary Jurchens who were considered a buffer between Joseon and the deep-dwelling barbarians. The Jianzhou Jurchens and the Hūlun made inroads into that buffer, came face to face with Joseon, and complied with the regulations for boundary Jurchens for a while in order to negotiate with Joseon.

Joseon reported to the Ming office in Liaodong that its borderlands were under pressure from the Jianzhou Jurchens and the Hūlun and that the two groups were interconnected through marriages. The reports garnered little attention, but they weren’t entirely meaningless because they gave the Jianzhou Jurchens the impression that Joseon could always form an alliance with the Ming. And keeping the Ming court informed about the Jianzhou Jurchens’ movements implied that Joseon had no choice but to interact with them. In other words, despite the Ming ban on forming relations with the Jianzhou Jurchens or the Hūlun, Joseon had shared its predicament with the Ming court to cite border stability as an excuse for negotiating with the Jurchens. The Ming court had believed that Joseon’s reports were reliable, which meant it had no reason to interfere with Joseon’s negotiations to a certain degree. Hence, by the time Joseon was done reporting to the Ming, its interactions with the Jianzhou Jurchens and the Hūlun had grown routine and trade with them had increased.

The regulations for boundary Jurchens that Joseon had adopted for the Hūlun were also adopted for the Jianzhou Jurchens, enabling Joseon to continue trading with both groups until the early years of King Gwanghaegun’s reign. Nurhaci and Bujantai were, however, rivals. In

Nurhaci's eyes, Bujantai seemed to behave like an erratic child, but in reality, he was still the leader of a traditionally powerful tribe within the Jurchen society. The two men were like oil and water so they would repeatedly clash, reconcile, and grow apart. For this reason, Joseon kept a close eye on their relationship.

Since 1605, Bujantai eagerly subdued boundary Jurchen villages along the Duman River and came face to face with Joseon as he established a small temporary fortress in Geontoe near Jongseong.<sup>72</sup> Bujantai dominated the areas around the Duman River for a while until his power weakened rapidly from being defeated in a battle at Mount Ogalam in 1607. Nurhaci, on the other hand, took the opportunity to take over a clan nearby called the Hoifa and was hugely successful in targeting the tribes of the Donghai Jurchen. He went on to capture the fortress *Ihan alin i hoton* (宜罕阿麟城) near the Hülun capital.<sup>73</sup> Bujantai thus lost his footing along the Duman River and became cut off from Joseon for a while.

Joseon was apparently pleased with the Hülun's defeat because regardless of applying the regulations for boundary Jurchens to their relations, they had still been a threat to Joseon. According to Nurhaci, messengers came from Hoeryeong, Jongseong, and even Manpo to show their gratitude for defeating the Hülun in the battle at Mount Ogalam.<sup>74</sup> The exact context behind such messages remains unknown but to some degree, it seems to support Nurhaci's claim that he helped Joseon by sub-

<sup>72</sup> Around 1609, the Jianzhou Jurchen troops took control of *Geontoe sibe*. Sibe is a Mongol term that refers to a fortress (Ferdinand D. Lessing, *Mongolian-English Dictionary* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1960), 694) and is marked as “時排,” “恃排,” or “時伐” in historical sources from the Joseon period. The term was often used around the six Joseon garrisons in the north. Geontoe sibe was a fortress the Hülun built across from Jongseong to use as a base in targeting the boundary Jurchens and the Six Garrisons. In 1605, Joseon attempted to destroy it to avenge the fall of Donggwanjin to the Hülun but failed. The Hülun thereafter continued to use it whenever they were targeting boundary Jurchens around the Tumen River or negotiating with Joseon.

<sup>73</sup> *Qing taizu shilu* [Veritable Records of the Qing Emperor Taizu], vol. 3, the first day of the ninth lunar month in 1608.

<sup>74</sup> *Sadae mungwe*, vol. 48, the sixth day of the seventh lunar month in 1607 (The letter from the governor of Liaodong to the king of Joseon).

duing Bujantai.<sup>75</sup>

In the third lunar month of 1607, Joseon prepared a guideline for the next potential communication with Nurhaci after the battle at Mount Ogalam. The Border Defense Council pointed out that it was inappropriate for Joseon commanders at the border to say that they would “propose to [Ming] China that Nurhaci be commended.”<sup>76</sup> Historians at the time also mentioned how it was “wrong for border officials to be relieved by the Hülun's defeat and to send spies so that they [the Hülun and the Jianzhou Jurchens] may destroy each other.”<sup>77</sup> These comments suggest that Joseon even attempted to tactically take advantage of the conflict between the Jianzhou Jurchens and the Hülun. They also suggest that Joseon people in the Six Garrisons and other border areas had been somewhat in favor of the Jianzhou Jurchens.

After the Battle of Mount Ogalam, Joseon's relations with the Hülun were severed for almost two years. Joseon instead began trading marten fur with the Jianzhou Jurchens and paid them with cloth according to the regulations for boundary Jurchens just like it had done with the Hülun. It was around this time when Joseon began paying stipends to the Jianzhou Jurchens. The relations, however, soon became threatened. A rumor spread among the Jianzhou Jurchens that the Ming would soon join forces with Joseon to attack them.<sup>78</sup> The rumor in Joseon was that an attack from the Jianzhou Jurchens was imminent.<sup>79</sup> These two rumors had actually been spread by the Ming. Once the Jianzhou Jurchens were perceived as a genuine threat, the Ming chose to drag Joseon in to place pressure on the Jianzhou Jurchens. These circumstances rapidly iced the relations between Joseon and the Jianzhou Jurchens.

<sup>75</sup> *Seonjo sillok*, vol. 209, the twenty-first day of the third lunar month in 1607.

<sup>76</sup> *Seonjo sillok*, vol. 209, the twenty-eighth day of the third lunar month in 1607.

<sup>77</sup> *Seonjo sillok*, vol. 210, the second day of the fourth lunar month in 1607.

<sup>78</sup> *Gwanghaegun ilgi*, vol. 7, the seventh day of the eighth lunar month in 1608; *Gwanghaegun ilgi*, vol. 11, the eighteenth day of the twelfth lunar month in 1608.

<sup>79</sup> *Gwanghaegun ilgi*, vol. 25, the first day, the eighth day, and the eleventh day of the second lunar month in 1610.

In the eighth lunar month of 1608, the Border Defense Council proposed that an interpreter be dispatched to the Jianzhou Jurchens to determine whether there was any truth to the rumored attack and obtained permission to do so from King Gwanghaegun. The person the Border Defense Council had in mind for the mission was Ha Se-guk (河世國, ?-1622), an interpreter in Manpo with plenty of experience in trading with the Jianzhou Jurchens.<sup>80</sup> Trade was possible without having established official relations so it could serve as a good excuse in trying to ascertain the counterpart's situation.<sup>81</sup> Joseon could also offer to satisfy the Jurchens' financial needs, which could help relieve tension in its borderlands. In any case, the fact that the Joseon court had considered sending an interpreter suggests that Joseon had stopped interacting with the Jianzhou Jurchens altogether by then.

Negotiations with the Jianzhou Jurchens and the Hūlun resumed in 1609 when the two groups came to Joseon's border asking for stipends almost at the same time. In the ninth lunar month of 1608, Nurhaci had accepted Bujantai's offer to make peace and gave him his daughter's hand in marriage. Although he'd been responsible for driving Bujantai into a corner, Nurhaci had chosen to patch up their relationship while he had the upper hand instead of eliminating Bujantai. Perhaps he knew that it would've been impossible to conquer the Hūlun all at once and was satisfied with what he had achieved by that point. And once they made peace, the Jianzhou Jurchens and the Hūlun reached out to Joseon.

The Jianzhou Jurchens came to Hoeryeong and the Hūlun to Jongseong to attempt negotiations. They claimed that they had come to pay tribute, but Joseon believed that they'd come to check on where they stood with Joseon. In the first lunar month of 1609, King Gwanghaegun

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<sup>80</sup> *Gwanghaegun ilgi*, vol. 7, the thirtieth day of the eighth lunar month in 1608.

<sup>81</sup> A diplomatic letter the governor of Liaodong sent to Joseon in the second lunar month of 1610 regarding the reopening of a market in Junggang mentioned that "distinguishing the Chinese and the barbarians is originally about territorial borders but engaging in trade is really about communication" (*Gwanghaegun ilgi*, vol. 25, the fourth day of the second lunar month in 1610). The comment was about Ming's relations with Joseon but can be understood as an acknowledgement that trade could serve as a means for minimal communication.

inquired whether he should grant the Hamgyeong provincial army commander's request for guards and weapons, and ordered for troops in the south to be prepared to be sent up north if an emergency happened.<sup>82</sup> While the Border Defense Council worked on a defense plan, it mentioned the fact that the Hūlun was rebuilding its makeshift fortress in Geontoe and stressed that Joseon should be prepared in case they come to the border asking for food. The description that "the Jianzhou Jurchens and the Hūlun have strong armies, making them the most powerful among the tribes" hints that Joseon was still wary of the Hūlun's strength.<sup>83</sup> If the two groups were in solidarity, most in Joseon were likely to consider it as a cause for concern.

A further glimpse into Joseon's situation can be gained from the Border Defense Council appendix drafted in the fourth lunar month of 1609 to report "the enemy's movements" to the Ming envoy Xiong Hua (熊化, 1581-1649). The appendix consisted of five sections. The first and second sections detailed threats from Nurhaci. The third section informed how Nurhaci made peace with Bujantai by giving his daughter's hand in marriage. The fourth section explained how Joseon ended up giving titles and stipends to the Hūlun. The fifth section notified that Joseon was now receiving demands for cloth separately from Nurhaci and Bujantai.<sup>84</sup> Considering that the document had been part of a report to a Ming envoy, it hints that Joseon had indeed been negotiating with the Jianzhou Jurchens and the Hūlun in some way.

The real threat to Joseon was the Jianzhou Jurchens. Joseon was aware of how the Battle of Mount Ogalam had unfolded and anticipated that Nurhaci would eventually subjugate Bujantai one day. The Hūlun was unlikely to be an immediate threat since the Border Defense Council had already agreed to grant them stipends in the third lunar month of 1609, and even if they ended up going to war, Joseon believed it had a

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<sup>82</sup> *Gwanghaegun ilgi*, vol. 12, the eighteenth day in the first lunar month of 1609.

<sup>83</sup> *Gwanghaegun ilgi*, vol. 12, the twenty-first day in the first lunar month of 1609.

<sup>84</sup> *Gwanghaegun ilgi*, vol. 15, the twenty-first day in the fourth lunar month of 1609.

seventy to eighty percent chance of winning. Nurhaci, on the other hand, pretended to faithfully comply with the regulations for boundary Jurchens, but his ambition set him apart from Bujantai in the eyes of Joseon.<sup>85</sup>

What stands out from the Border Defense Council's notes was that Joseon had agreed to give stipends to the Hūlun. Yet, the report to Xiong Hua in the fourth lunar month of the same year merely mentioned that they hadn't been paid at the time. In other words, Joseon relayed to the Ming the demands it received from the Jianzhou Jurchens and the Hūlun as well as the outcomes but omitted the details of what happened in between. Such omissions can also be spotted in Joseon's reports about the barbarians' movements. Internally, Joseon had justified its negotiations with the Jurchens as part of its loose-rein policy to stabilize its borderlands, but it habitually left out details that might be problematic in the reports it submitted to the Ming.

Another notable aspect is that the Jianzhou Jurchens and the Hūlun posed threats in different ways. Whenever the Hūlun made requests for stipends, they were overbearing. It was the same when Joseon gave them stipends in 1609 and Bujantai continued to behave crudely thereafter so that Joseon's relations with the Hūlun were always unstable.<sup>86</sup> Nurhaci, on the other hand, was relatively cordial. His attitude could, of course, change depending on the circumstances, but he was certainly not as impetuous as Bujantai.

Joseon was nevertheless rather vigilant of Nurhaci's prudence. When Bujantai's envoy once came to inform him of the fall of *Dongwanjin* (潼關鎮), one of Joseon's six northern garrisons, Nurhaci told the envoy that the Hūlun should stop causing troubles by attacking

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<sup>85</sup> *Gwanghaegun ilgi*, vol. 14, the tenth day of the third lunar month in 1609.

<sup>86</sup> In the third lunar month of 1609, Bibyeonsa concluded that Bujantai was being pretentious (*Gwanghaegun ilgi*, vol. 14, the tenth day of the third lunar month in 1609). And in 1611, Joseon requisitioned troops from all over the country on account of a military threat from the Hūlun and sent them to its northern border [*Gyeon deungnok* (啓本騰錄), the tenth day of the tenth lunar month in 1611].

Joseon.<sup>87</sup> Fearing that Bujantai's actions might jeopardize his relationship with Joseon, Nurhaci immediately sent a messenger to Manpo to relay what he'd just discussed with Bujantai's envoy. The news was then passed on to the Joseon court through the Pyeongan Governor's report. This incident shows that Nurhaci's disposition and diplomatic skills were different from those of Bujantai. Yet, Joseon had been wary of Nurhaci's submissive attitude because it believed he was hiding his true intentions.

Joseon even anticipated that Nurhaci would soon turn into a source of great distress. In particular, Jang Man (張暎, 1566-1629), the governor of Hamgyeong province, expressed his concern about the power Nurhaci was wielding around the Duman River. Jang Man was well-informed on Jurchen affairs, which is why he suspected that Nurhaci's growing power would lead to the formation of an army.<sup>88</sup> According to an urgent report he submitted to the king, Nurhaci had secured five to six thousand troops from gathering the boundary Jurchens and even if they went on an expedition, Nurhaci was so confident that it would be impossible for Bujantai to take their absence as an opportunity. The Defense Border Council agreed with Jang Man's assessment and believed that once Nurhaci finished consolidating all the tribes around him, he would come after Joseon.

Unlike the impulsive Bujantai, Nurhaci paced himself as he took over the forces around him one by one, adding to Joseon's suspicion of him as a potential threat. What Joseon needed in order to stabilize its borderlands was an ally strong enough to counter the Jianzhou Jurchens. It couldn't expect the Ming to help nor was it in any condition to come up with a plan to fortify itself, which is why it turned its eyes to the Hūlun. The Hūlun were equally threatening to Joseon's border but with conciliation, they could be the contender to check the Jianzhou Jurchens.

In the early days of King Gwanghaegun's reign, Joseon raised little

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<sup>87</sup> *Sadae mungwe*, vol. 46, the seventh lunar month of 1605 (The letters from the king of Joseon to the governor of Jiliao, the governor of Liaodong, the regional commander of Liaodong, Brigade Commander in Zhenjiang, and the Liaodong regional military commission).

<sup>88</sup> *Gwanghaegun ilgi*, vol. 23, the nineteenth day of the twelfth lunar month in 1609.

objection to giving large quantities of cloth to the Hūlun to maintain peace along its border. Despite the Hūlun's menacing demeanor and the belief that it had a better chance of winning if it were to go to war with them, Joseon decided that preventing the Hūlun from falling under the Jianzhou Jurchens' control should be its priority. Joseon needed the Hūlun to stop Nurhaci from gaining more power, which meant it had to maintain friendly relations with them instead of hoping for them to perish.

When the troops of the Jianzhou Jurchens and the Hūlun confronted each other at Mount Ogalam, the Border Defense Council mentioned the need to keep a close eye on changes in either side's forces.<sup>89</sup> Regarding the battle's outcome, a historical essay expressed wariness by mentioning that "Nurhaci's army won't proceed further south until the Hūlun falls. [However,] If the two enemies fight each other, the Hūlun will be defeated and Nurhaci will grow stronger. How could that be beneficial for us?"<sup>90</sup> In other words, Joseon had believed that the two Jurchen groups' rivalry could help maintain peace in its borderlands.

The way Joseon took advantage of the Hūlun was similar to how the Ming would later use the Yehe to keep the Jianzhou Jurchens in check. Before Nurhaci entered the scene, the Yehe were a threat to the Ming's border. Yet, once Nurhaci emerged as an even greater threat, the Yehe became essential to defending the Ming's border. In the same sense, the Hūlun were a potential enemy to Joseon, but could turn into a useful ally when the Jianzhou Jurchens were growing powerful.

The person who particularly highlighted the Hūlun's strategic worth was Jang Man. In discussions on whether Joseon should return to being on friendly terms with the Hūlun, Jang Man submitted an eager memo on why it was essential to be on good terms with them.<sup>91</sup> Jang presumed that the rumor about Nurhaci's solidarity with Bujantai was true but suspect-

<sup>89</sup> *Seonjo sillok*, vol. 209, the twenty-eighth day of the third lunar month in 1607.

<sup>90</sup> *Seonjo sillok*, vol. 210, the second day of the fourth lunar month in 1607.

<sup>91</sup> Jang Man, *Nakseojip* (洛西集), vol. 2, Memo (疏) recommending peace with the Hūlun (請許忽溫和箭).

ed that Bujantai had conceded temporarily. He stressed that since Bujantai still had considerable power, it would be beneficial for Joseon to remain on good terms with him. Jang also suspected that Nurhaci was instigating conflict between Joseon and the Hūlun and believed that Joseon should support the Hūlun so that they could sustain a rivalry with the Jianzhou Jurchens. He hence urged the Joseon court to positively consider the Hūlun's proposal to negotiate if they sent an envoy.

Of course, Jang Man was not suggesting that Joseon should grant the Hūlun's wishes unconditionally. He proposed that Joseon should actively take advantage of their vulnerable situation by waiting for them to court Joseon before granting their wish and then demanding progress on unresolved matters such as the unfinished repatriation of Joseon people. In the second lunar month of 1610, Jang submitted a report to warn about unreasonable economic demands from the Hūlun. At the time, the Hūlun were asking for extra cloth apart from that paid as stipends under the pretense of making official robes for those with the title called baekjang (百將). Jang Man argued that it will be difficult to match all of the Hūlun's demands aimed at increasing the volume of trade and therefore proposed that all of them should be turned down except for rewards in exchange for repatriation. He nevertheless predicted that it would be difficult not to allow trade when Joseon was already issuing titles and Bibyeonsa agreed with his prediction.<sup>92</sup>

Under such circumstances, Joseon implemented the regulations for boundary Jurchens as a formality in its relations with the Hūlun, but their actual application was a different matter. In reality, Joseon frequently resorted to stopgap measures whenever it was pressured by the Hūlun. It also eventually agreed to provide the extra cloth they had demanded for official robes so that the volume of cloth it paid to the Hūlun amounted to five thousand rolls, or one hundred dong each year. Joseon didn't cave in immediately to the request for extra cloth though because the magistrate of Jongseongbu had initially conveyed his refusal to the Hūlun en-

<sup>92</sup> *Gwanghaegun ilgi*, vol. 25, the fourteenth day of the second lunar month in 1610.

voy Šolonggo (小弄耳).

After Jang Man finished serving as the Governor of Hamgyeong province, he again shared with King Gwanghaegun his views on circumstances at the northern border. He told the king that “the Hūlun is too preoccupied with recovering from the tremendous loss it suffered through the battle at Mount Ogalam so it won’t be able to target other countries for the time being.”<sup>93</sup> Jang Man further predicted that even if the Hūlun were to attack, the forces and fortresses in Hamgyeong province were completely prepared to stop it from advancing southward. Yet, he advised that the Hūlun envoy traveling back and forth to Jongseong should be treated well. This implies that while tension along its border was rising due to the Hūlun’s overbearing approach, Joseon hadn’t been acceding to all their demands out of fear.

The assessments Jang Man made during and after his time as the governor of Hamgyeong province were accurate. Although how discussions unfolded thereafter remains unknown, most in the Joseon government appeared to acknowledge the Hūlun’s strategic necessity. According to a report submitted by the Hamgyeong Provincial Army Commander, Šolonggo visited Joseon in the third lunar month of 1611, quite possibly for trade purposes.<sup>94</sup> He had visited in 1609 to negotiate stipends and in 1610 to negotiate for cloth to make official robes, so he’d been dispatched to Joseon for three years in a row.

Around the time, Bujantai was showing signs of defying Nurhaci to make a comeback. In the eighth lunar month of 1611, he distributed cloth to the Hūrha tribe (瑚爾哈) who were, Donghai Jurchen residing in Jakūta (扎庫塔) in exchange for their submission.<sup>95</sup> Most of the cloth he used to win tribes like them over must have been secured through the stipend he’d received from Joseon. And the nearby Donghai Jurchen tribes that submitted themselves to Bujantai again were the ones Nurhaci had tar-

<sup>93</sup> *Gwanghaegun ilgi*, vol. 35, the eighteenth day of the eleventh lunar month in 1610.

<sup>94</sup> *Gwanghaegun ilgi*, vol. 39, the ninth day of the third lunar month in 1611.

<sup>95</sup> *Qing taizu shilu*, vol. 3, the nineteenth day of the eighth lunar month in 1611.

geted since 1610.

Similar instances can be found in the *Daily Records of King Gwanghaegun*. In the sixth lunar month of 1611, the Hamgyeong Provincial Army Commander Yi Si-eon reported information he’d gathered from a Jurchen in Musan named Hong Yi (洪耳) who said “about one hundred brave officers under Nurhaci’s command ran away, making Nurhaci lay an ambush at all the Hūlun’s main roads to apprehend them.”<sup>96</sup> That same year, Jianzhou Jurchen troops went across a fortification called Asanbo (牙山堡) in Gyeongwonbu, Joseon and searched and plundered the boundary Jurchens in the area.<sup>97</sup> According to the *Manzhou shilu* (滿洲實錄), this happened around the time Nurhaci sent Abatai (阿巴泰), Fiongdon (斐揚敦), and Šongkoro Baturu (碩翁科羅巴圖魯) to target the Weji tribe (窩集部), a Donghai Jurchen tribe.<sup>98</sup>

These circumstances suggest that there were an increasing number of Jurchens who were trying to break free from the Jianzhou Jurchens’ control. In the first lunar month of 1612, Joseon’s Ministry of Rites (K. *Yejo* 禮曹) proposed for someone in Hamgyeong province to be sent to the Hūlun to provide them with official robes and obtained permission from King Gwanghaegun.<sup>99</sup> Joseon thus continued to covertly support the Hūlun and once the Jianzhou Jurchens resumed military activity around the Duman River, it sent a vice-minister to oversee the delivery of goods to the Hūlun.

In the second lunar month of 1612, when Yi Su-il (李守一, 1544-1632) was granted an audience with King Gwanghaegun after being appointed as the Pyeongan Provincial Army Commander, he said that “Nurhaci will surely make a move once he incorporates the Yehe and the Hūlun.”<sup>100</sup> Yi Su-il was a veteran who had already served twice as the

<sup>96</sup> *Gwanghaegun ilgi*, vol. 42, the nineteenth day of the sixth lunar month in 1611.

<sup>97</sup> *Gwanghaegun ilgi*, vol. 44, the twelfth day of the eighth lunar month in 1611.

<sup>98</sup> *Manzhou shilu* (滿洲實錄), vol. 3, the seventh month of 1611.

<sup>99</sup> *Gwanghaegun ilgi*, vol. 49, the nineteenth day of the first lunar month in 1612.

<sup>100</sup> *Gwanghaegun ilgi*, vol. 50, the nineteenth day of the second lunar month in 1612.

Hamgyeong Provincial Army Commander and had twice conquered the Jurchens tribes including the Lotun. He too believed that as long as the Hūlun existed, the odds of Joseon being invaded by the Jianzhou Jurchens were low. In the ninth lunar month of the same year, Joseon's Chief State Councilor (K. *Yeonguijeong* 領議政) Yi Deok-hyeong (李德馨, 1561-1613) also mentioned during a court session that "the enemy is preoccupied with fighting the Hūlun so it won't easily attempt to invade our frontier."<sup>101</sup>

The Hūlun's Vice minister Šolonggo once again visited Joseon in the eighth lunar month of 1612. According to the *Daily Records of King Gwanghaegun*, the number of "mounted barbarians" (K. *giho* 騎胡) who accompanied him on horseback at the time amounted to 116.<sup>102</sup> Judging from the fact that the governor of Hamgyeong province mentioned nothing else in his report, the purpose of Šolonggo's visit must have been trade as usual. The volume of trade, however, seems to have been quite large considering the size of his entourage.<sup>103</sup> This visit coincided with when Nurhaci raised troops to punish Bujantai and these circumstances hint at the possibility that Joseon had again secretly helped the Hūlun to stop the Jianzhou Jurchens from growing dominant.

Joseon saw the conflict between the Jianzhou Jurchens and the Hūlun as an advantage in defending its frontier. It implemented the regulations for boundary Jurchens to negotiate with both groups but secretly offered the Hūlun support to keep the more powerful Jianzhou Jurchens in check. The Hūlun's strategic worth to Joseon therefore increased as the Jianzhou Jurchens became more threatening. In other words, what Joseon feared the most was the two groups' integration.

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<sup>101</sup>*Gwanghaegun ilgi*, vol. 57, the eighteenth day of the ninth lunar month in 1612.

<sup>102</sup>*Gwanghaegun ilgi*, vol. 56, the eighth day of the eighth lunar month in 1612.

<sup>103</sup>Later, as Hong Taiji of the Later Jin was asking Joseon to expand trade, he mentioned that "Bujantai, the khan of the Ula (Hūlun), used to plunder your country, but once he made peace and paid tribute every year, he found that be it cows or hemp cloth, everything was available at the market installed every month" (*Injo sillok* [Veritable Records of King Injo], vol. 27, the seventeenth day of the ninth lunar month in 1632). Regardless of whether this comment was true, it does imply that the volume of trade between Joseon and the Hūlun used to be considerable.

Nurhaci took issue with Bujantai's disrespectful attitude and launched two massive attacks on the Hūlun in the ninth lunar month and the twelfth lunar month of 1612. The Jianzhou Jurchen troops slowly made inroads into the Hūlun's territory from the outside and finally captured their capital Ula i hoton (烏喇城) in the first lunar month of 1613. The Jianzhou Jurchens thus took over the Hūlun and their land while Bujantai managed to flee to the Yehe.<sup>104</sup> Nurhaci thereby eliminated a powerful rival to his east and was able to consolidate most of the Jurchens apart from the Yehe.

Joseon soon received news of the Hūlun's fall. Based on what a Jurchen told him, the Hamgyeong Provincial Army Commander Yi Si-eon sent word that Nurhaci had captured the Hūlun's capital and that Bujantai had escaped to the north.<sup>105</sup> Since Nurhaci had incorporated a powerful Jurchen tribe along the Duman River, he could thereafter focus on targeting the Yehe to his west. This signaled an end to the dual approach Joseon had maintained toward the Jianzhou Jurchens and the Hūlun between the end of King Seonjo's reign and the beginning of King Gwanghaegun's reign. Joseon would thereafter have to face a unified Jurchen state.

## Conclusion

Historical research has tended to divide Joseon's external relations into the first and second half of the dynasty. Tremendous change occurred through the 1592-1598 Japanese Invasions and the 1636-1637 Qing Invasion, causing Joseon to form tributary relations with the Qing instead of the Ming. The Ming and Qing dynasties are considered as part of Chi-

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<sup>104</sup>The *Qing taizu shilu* states that Bujantai broke a pledge, which is why Nurhaci used Bujantai's plundering the weiji as an excuse to justify attacking the Hūlun (*Qing taizu shilu*, vol. 4, the first day of the ninth lunar month in 1612). The tribe, however, was originally part of the Hūlun (Ula) before they became subjugated by Nurhaci, leaving a possibility for them to try to break away from the Jianzhou Jurchens if circumstances permitted them. Hence, Nurhaci's true intention was to completely incorporate the Hūlun (Ula).

<sup>105</sup>*Gwanghaegun ilgi*, vol. 63, the thirtieth day of the second lunar month in 1613.

nese history by those studying the history of Sino-Korean relations whereas Joseon's pre-Qing relations with the Jurchens are classified as part of the history of the northern tribes. Joseon's relations with the Qing have been recognized as an extension of Joseon's relations with the Ming, while Joseon's interactions with different Jurchen tribes in between have tended to be treated as part of the history of the Qing's rise. Overall, it still remains uncertain as to where Joseon's relations with the Jurchens fit into the picture, which is what this paper mainly seeks to explore.

Based on these views, Joseon is often portrayed as a passive participant in the transition from Ming to Qing rather than an active polity. Yet, when its western and northern frontiers faced tough challenges in the early seventeenth century, Joseon played a role. As it witnessed Nurhaci and Bujantai compete with each other and pillage the boundary Jurchens, Joseon recognized even before the Ming that the consequences could be serious. It therefore implemented the regulations for boundary Jurchens to justify its negotiations with the Jianzhou Jurchens behind the scenes as well as its friendly relations with the Hūlun. And it selectively shared with the Ming information about its interactions with each group. Joseon also attempted to keep the Jianzhou Jurchens' rise in check by secretly supporting the Hūlun.

Such a dual approach toward the Jurchens only lasted for six to seven years but proved to be an important stage in eventually transitioning into a relationship with the Later Jin. The regulations for boundary Jurchens were implemented because they suited the interests of both Joseon and the Jianzhou Jurchens and remained nominally in place even after the Jianzhou Jurchens merged with the Hūlun.

By the time Joseon's dual approach toward the Jurchens shifted to a single approach toward the Jianzhou Jurchens, Nurhaci established the Later Jin. The integration with the Hūlun brought the stability Nurhaci needed to advance west toward the Yehe. The regulations for boundary Jurchens that had been central to Joseon's dual approach toward the Jurchens survived the establishment of the Later Jin but eventually deteriorated when Nurhaci referred to himself as khan, just like he used to refer

to himself as king in his letters to Joseon. Such references in an official letter to the king of Joseon went directly against the regulations for boundary Jurchens, and yet, Nurhaci relied on such regulations as he continued to make demands for stipends. This placed Joseon in a new predicament of having to either give in to Nurhaci's demands or receive the Ming's assistance to resolve the matter.

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- Ming shenzong shilu* 明神宗實錄 [Veritable Records of the Ming Emperor Shenzong]
- Qing taizu shilu* 清太祖實錄 [Veritable Records of the Qing Emperor Taizu]
- Yimun deungnok* 吏文騰錄
- Gyebon deungnok* 啓本騰錄
- Sadae mungue* 事大文軌
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*Qing Veritable Records*:  
A Critical Analysis of the Records of  
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the 1637 Qing Invasion of  
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## The Qing's Military Deception and Manipulation of the *Qing Veritable Records*: A Critical Analysis of the Records of Diplomatic Contacts on the Eve of the 1637 Qing Invasion of Joseon Korea\*

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### A Question Raised: Did the Qing Actually Deliver Joseon an Ultimatum?

The Manchu/Qing invasion of Joseon Korea, which took place in the 12th lunar month of the 14th year of King Injo's 仁祖 reign and the first year of the Chongde 崇德 (lofty virtue) reign of Hong Taiji, has been remembered as one of the momentous events bringing about crucial changes in the East Asian world order during the first half of the 17th century. In recent years, this war has attracted general public attention as the subject of novels and movies in Korea, against the backdrop of changes in international conditions surrounding the Korean Peninsula, and academia has also responded by presenting higher-level research results than in the past.<sup>1</sup> There was a solid harvest of research publications in 2019 in par-

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<sup>1</sup> Concerning the recent research on the Manchu/Qing invasion of Joseon in early 1637, Han Myeonggi, Oh Soochang, Heo Taegu, Jang Jeongsu and Bumjin Koo are active in Korea, as are Suzuki Kai and Tsuji Yamato in Japan. For a few of Korean scholars' research results, refer to the reference list of monographs introduced in footnote 2 below.

ticular, with several monographs on the Manchu/Qing Invasion of Joseon.<sup>2</sup> Interesting academic discussions have also taken place over the causes of the war's outbreak, as well as the issue of responsibility.<sup>3</sup>

In the discussions until now, the decisive incident that caused the war's outbreak has been seen as either that of the third lunar month of 1636, when the so-called "decree of severing relations" (*jeolhwa gyoseo* 絶和教書) was issued by the Joseon court, and shortly thereafter intercepted by the Later Jin envoys, or that of the fourth lunar month of the same year, when a Joseon embassy led by Na Deokheon 羅德憲 refused the request to kneel down three times, each time making three prostrations (Ch. *San gui jiu koutou* 三跪九叩頭), at the magnificent ceremony in which Hong Taiji assumed his imperial title, thereby seriously damaging

<sup>2</sup> Bumjin Koo 구범진, 2019, *Byeongja horan, Hong Taiji ui jeonjaeng* 병자호란, 홍타이지의 전쟁 [The Manchu/Qing Invasion of Joseon: Hong Taiji's War], Seoul: Kkachi Geulbang; Heo Taegu 허태구, 2019, *Byeongja horan gwa ye, geurigo jungghwa* 병자호란과 예, 그리고 중화 [The Manchu/Qing Invasion of Joseon and Ritual Propriety, and Chinese Civilization] (Seoul: Somyeong Chulpansa; Han Myeonggi 한명기, 2019, *Choe Myeonggil pyeongjeon* 최명길 평전 [A Biography of Choe Myeonggil], Paju: Bori.

<sup>3</sup> Oh Suchang 오수창, 2017, "Byeongja horan e daehan gieok waegok gwa geu hyeonjaejeok uimi" 병자호란에 대한 기억의 왜곡과 그 현재적 의미 [Distorted Memories of the Manchu/Qing Invasion of Joseon, and Their Present Meaning], in *Yeoksa wa hyeonsil* 104; Jo Ilsu 조일수, 2017, "Injo ui dae Jungguk oegyo e daehan bipanjeok gochal" 인조의 대중국 외교에 대한 비판적 고찰 [King Injo's Diplomatic Policy toward China, and a Critical Review of It], in *Yeoksa bipyeong* 121; Han Myeonggi 한명기, 2017, "Myeong Cheong gyoche sigi Han Jung gwangye ui chui" 명청교체 시기 한중관계의 추이 [Trends of Relations between Korea and China during the Ming-Qing Transition], in *Dongyang sahak yeongu* 140, 70–72; Han Myeonggi 한명기, 2019, "Jo Cheong gwangye ui jeongae yangsang gwa gyoryu" 조·청관계의 전개 양상과 교류 [The Evolution of Relations between Joseon and the Qing, and their Interactions], in *Cheong hwangsil ui achim Simyang gogung* 청 황실의 아침 심양 고궁 [The Old Imperial Palace of the Qing in Shenyang], Seoul: Gungnip Gogung Bakmulgwan, 292; Bumjin Koo 구범진, *Byeongja horan, Hong Taiji ui jeonjaeng* 병자호란, 홍타이지의 전쟁, 33–71; Bumjin Koo 구범진, 2019, "Joseon ui dae Hu-Keum, Cheong oegyo wa Byeonja horan ui balbal wonin" 조선의 대(對)후금·청 외교와 병자호란의 발발 원인 [Joseon's Diplomacy toward the Later Jin and the Qing, and the Causes of the Manchu/Qing Invasion of Joseon], in Baek Yeongseo and Jeong Sanggi, eds., *Naeil eul ingneun Han · Jung gwangyesa* 내일을 읽는 한·중관계사 *History of Korea-China Relations for Reading Future*, Seoul: RHK, 163–173; Chae Hongbyeong 채홍병, 2019, "Jeongmyo maengyak (1627) ihu Joseon ui dae Hu-Geum gwangye chui wa patan" 정묘맹약(1627) 이후 조선의 대후금 관계 추이와 파탄 [Trends and Breakup of Joseon's Relations with the Later Jin after the 1627 Pact], M. A. thesis, Korea University.

that ceremony's grandeur.<sup>4</sup> However, it was not until the early 12th lunar month of that year that the war actually broke out. In other words, the 'calm before the storm' lasted as long as eight to nine months before the war's outbreak, and during that time, Joseon and the Qing were by no means idle. In particular, the Joseon side did not give up its diplomatic attempts to avoid war until the very moment it broke out. With regard to the attempts at diplomatic contact on the part of the Joseon court to avoid war, the related facts have become known to a substantial degree through previous researches.<sup>5</sup> Hence, contrary to the Qing claim that it waited months to give Joseon time for 'repentance,' it has been revealed that the Qing had been preparing to send armies to Joseon while waiting for the arrival of winter to ensure the swift movement of its armies and a quick victory in the war,<sup>6</sup> and that the diplomatic negotiations that Joseon attempted during this period had thus had "no prospect for success in the first place."<sup>7</sup> Inasmuch as the facts about the diplomatic negotiations and the Qing's preparations for war have been established, it might seem at first glance to be little need for further inquiries into what happened during this period.

However, when reading through the records of diplomatic contacts between the Qing and Joseon from the fourth lunar month of 1636, one finds puzzling stories that cannot be explained by the findings so far.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Han Myeonggi, who have emphasized the upsurge of anti-Manchu sentiment in the Joseon court and King Injo's decree of severing relations with the Later Jin in the spring of 1636 as causes of the war, argues in a recent work that the "breakup of relations between the two states" took place on the 11th day of the 4th lunar month. See Han Myeonggi, *Choe Myeonggil pyeongjeon* 최명길 평전, 272–276.

<sup>5</sup> Suzuki Kai 鈴木開, "Heishi no ran chokuzen no Chō-Shin kōshō ni tsuite, 1634–1636" 丙子の亂直前の朝清交渉について(1634-1636) [Negotiations between Joseon and the Qing prior to the Manchu/Qing Invasion of Joseon, 1634–1636], in *Sundai shigaku* 159 (2017), 54–57; Han Myeonggi, *Choe Myeonggil pyeongjeon* 최명길 평전 [A Biography of Choe Myeonggil], 279–316.

<sup>6</sup> Bumjin Koo, *Byeongja horan, Hong Taiji ui jeonjaeng* 병자호란, 홍타이지의 전쟁, 90–94.

<sup>7</sup> Bumjin Koo, "Joseon ui dae Hu-Keum, Cheong oegyo wa Byeonja horan ui balbal wonin" 조선의 대(對)후금·청 외교와 병자호란의 발발 원인, 176.

<sup>8</sup> The sources of the facts sketched in this paragraph will be presented later, when each fact is explained in greater detail.

Between the date of Hong Taiji's coronation ceremony on the 11th day of the fourth lunar month of 1636 (May 15, 1636) and the dispatch of the Qing troops to Joseon from Shenyang on the second day of the 12th lunar month of that same year (December 28, 1636), there were only three diplomatic contacts between Joseon and the Qing that were noteworthy and thus documented. The first was in the middle of the fourth lunar month (May, 1636) when Na Deokheon and his retinue left Shenyang and returned home; the second took place early in the ninth month, when the Qing envoy Mafuta 馬夫大 came to the market town of Junggang 中江, situated across the Yalu River from the border town of Uiju 義州, to pay for goods purchased from Joseon; and the third was late in the tenth lunar month (November, 1636), when a Korean interpreter of the Manchu language named Bak Inbeom 朴仁範 visited Shenyang. What is noteworthy is that, the *Qing Taizong shilu* 清太宗實錄 (Qing Veritable Records of Emperor Taizong) records that, in the mid-fourth lunar month, the Qing court notified the above-mentioned Na Deokheon group of the date of the Qing's military expedition against Joseon in advance, while privately-compiled histories of Joseon, such as the *Byeongja rok* 丙子錄 (*Records of the Byeongja War*) by Na Man'gap 羅萬甲, mention that the Qing court announced the expedition date to Bak Inbeom's party. In other words, prior notification of the date of the military expedition was given to the enemy in advance, which can be considered an ultimatum.<sup>9</sup>

Are these stories really true? In other words, did the Qing present Joseon with an ultimatum informing it of the date of its expedition in advance during the period of diplomatic contacts before the war? However, before we delve into this question, we should not miss that there are serious contradictions between these ultimatum-related accounts. One contradiction is that the timeframes of the accounts from the Qing and the

<sup>9</sup> Regarding the Manchu/Qing invasion of Joseon, Tani Yōko said, "The Qing, against a background of issues related to Hong Taiji's recognition as emperor, saw their ultimatum ignored and decided to exercise their power." See Tani Yōko 谷井陽子, 2015, *Hakki seido no kenkyū* 八旗制度の研究 [A Study of the Eight Banners System], Kyoto: Kyoto Daigaku Gakujutsu Shuppankai, 228. This is a remark placing great importance on the existence of the ultimatum on the eve of the war.

Joseon sources do not add up. If the ultimatum was given in the fourth lunar month, as reported by the Qing source, then Joseon's account of its occurring in the tenth lunar month would be false. And vice versa. The other contradiction is that, regardless of which side is correct, the ultimatum accounts conflict with the actual course of events in the war, in which the initial surprise attack of the Qing forces rendered any defense of Joseon meaningless. If the date of the invasion had been notified to Joseon in advance, allowing it time for preparation, it would have been very difficult for the Qing forces to score such a quick victory.

In this study, with the question of 'whether the Qing did indeed give an ultimatum to Joseon' in mind, I will first conduct a critical analysis of the contradictory dates of the ultimatum presented in the two sources, one of which stated that it occurred during the diplomatic contacts in the fourth lunar month and the other in the tenth lunar month. To be more specific, Section II will examine carefully whether the claim in the *Qing Taizong shilu* that Hong Taiji gave an ultimatum to Na Deokheon (hereafter referred to as the 'ultimatum in May' according to the Gregorian calendar) is true or not. Through this examination, it will be revealed that the 'ultimatum in May' was fabricated and later inserted during the compilation of the *Qing Taizong shilu* in the Shunzhi 順治 reign (1644–1661). After that, Section III will review the reliability of the ultimatum account in the *Byeongja rok* that Bak Inbeom received the ultimatum in Shenyang in the late tenth lunar month (hereafter referred to as the 'ultimatum in November'). This review will show that the 'ultimatum in November' account was not untrue per se, but that the proposed date of the military expedition Bak heard from the Qing party was false. It will then be revealed that, contrary to the hopes of Joseon, the Qing used the diplomatic contacts with Joseon on the eve of its invasion as an opportunity to deceive Joseon. The Qing carried out this deceptive scheme in order to increase the chances of success of their surprise attack, by leaking a false deadline and false information to Bak Inbeom, and as a result the Joseon court was led to false hopes that it might be able to avoid war through diplomatic means until the last minute. At the end of this article, as conclusive evidence to confirm the argument this

study sets forth, I will illustrate the realities of the manipulation of historical records committed by the editors of the *Qing Taizong shilu* to conceal what really happened at that time.

### Fabrication of the Ultimatum Notice in the *Qing Veritable Records*

In the entry dated the 15th day of the fourth month of the tenth year of the Tiancong 天聰 (heavenly wisdom) reign (May 19, 1636) in the *Qing Taizong shilu* (Shunzhi edition), after citing a fairly long state letter from Hong Taiji to Injo, a remark by Hong Taiji giving what could be called an ultimatum to Joseon is presented:

(A) [The emperor] again enlightened the envoys from Joseon and said, “If your king admits his fault and sends his son or brother as hostage, there will be an end of the matter. Otherwise, I will mobilize armies at ‘such time of such month’ (某月某時), and will arrive in your land in person. In such an event, it will be too late to regret. I will make you aware of this. . . .”<sup>10</sup>

The “envoys from Joseon” here refer to Na Deokheon and his party, who had damaged the prestige of Hong Taiji’s ceremony four days earlier.<sup>11</sup> On the 15th day of the fourth month, Hong Taiji entrusted the

<sup>10</sup> *Qing Taizong shilu* 清太宗實錄 [Qing Veritable Records of Emperor Taizong: QTZSL hereafter] (Shunzhi Edition), juan 卷 (fascicle) 22, 64a, Tiancong 10/4/15(jichou). It is very inconvenient to use the Shunzhi Edition of QTZSL, preserved only at the Guoli Gugong Bowuyuan 國立故宮博物院 in Taipei, yet the entry related to Joseon on that date (juan 22, 58b–64b) is also included in Zhang Cunwu and Ye Quanhong 張存武 葉象宏, eds., 2000, *Qing ruguan qian yu Chaoxian wanglai guoshu huibian* 清入關前與朝鮮往來國書彙編, 1619–1643 [Collection of State Letters with Joseon before the Qing Entered the Shanhai Pass], Taipei: Guoshiguan, 180–185. I have therefore used that collection for the entry in this study. However, it should be noted in advance that the entry in the *Qing Taizong shilu* (Shunzhi Edition) on the 25th day of the 11th month of the 1st year of the Chongde reign, cited in the conclusion of this study, is not contained in that collection.

<sup>11</sup> On the Joseon envoys’ “commotion” at the imperial coronation ceremony, see Bumjin Koo,

lengthy state letter to Na Deokheon, for delivery to Injo.<sup>12</sup> This was the first state letter sent by Hong Taiji under the title of “Great Qing Emperor of Lenience, Kind-heartedness, Beneficence, and Sacredness” (*Da Qingguo kuan wen ren sheng huangdi* 大清國寬溫仁聖皇帝), and at the same time the last letter sent to Joseon prior to the outbreak of the Manchu/Qing invasion.

After quoting the full text of the state letter, the *Qing Taizong shilu* states that Hong Taiji warned Na Deokheon and his party directly that if the king of Joseon did not send his son or brother as hostage by the deadline of “such time of such month,” he would launch a war and lead his troops to Joseon “in person,” as shown in quotation (A).<sup>13</sup> In other words, Hong Taiji is said to have issued a de facto ultimatum to the enemy and presented the ‘conditions’ and ‘deadline’ of the ultimatum almost eight months prior to the war - something almost unprecedented in premodern warfare.

Any Korean readers well aware of the unearned military victory of the Qing forces’ surprise attack immediately after the war broke out may well ask instantly in anger, “Why was Joseon helplessly defeated by the Qing forces when it had been given this ultimatum as early as eight months before?”<sup>14</sup> However, if one takes a step back and thinks about the

Byeongja horan, *Hong Taiji ui jeonjaeng* 병자호란, 홍타이지의 전쟁, 64–71.

<sup>12</sup> *Qing ruguan qian yu Chaoxian wanglai guoshu huibian* 清入關前與朝鮮往來國書彙編, 180–185. This state letter can also be found in the entries of the *Qing Taizong shilu* (Qianlong Edition) 清太宗實錄, the *Jiu Manzhou dang* 舊滿洲檔 [Old Manchu Archives]/the *Mamwen laodang* 滿文老檔 [Revised Old Manchu Archives], all for the same date. If the same entry can be found in multiple sources as in this case, only one representative source is cited in the footnote.

<sup>13</sup> In the *Qing Taizong shilu* (Qianlong Edition)—the most widely used edition today—on the 15th day of the 4th month of the 10th year of the Tiancong reign, the sentence “又諭來使曰” (“Again [Hong Taiji] spoke to the envoys [from Joseon] to enlighten them”) is changed to “復特頒明旨示之” (“Again [Hong Taiji] specially issued a clear edict to show them [i.e. the envoys]”), with little change therefore in the basic meaning except for the issuance of an edict. In addition, the phrase “某月某時” (such time of such month) is changed to “某月某日” (such day of such month). Unless otherwise indicated, the *Qing Taizong shilu* [= QTZSL] in this study refers to the Qianlong Edition.

<sup>14</sup> For the course of the Manchu/Qing invasion of Joseon, and in particular its surprise attack at the beginning of the war, see Bumjin Koo, *Byeongja horan, Hong Taiji ui jeonjaeng* 병자호란, 홍타이

historical context surrounding the war, this account of ‘the ultimatum in May’ in quotation (A) needs to be reassessed.

In the first place, if there had been an ultimatum, including a deadline, why is it that the *Qing Taizong shilu* does not specify the exact date, instead of just stating vaguely “such time of such month” or more commonly “such day of such month (某月某日),” as expressed in the Qianlong Edition of the *Qing Taizong shilu*?<sup>15</sup> It is possible, for example, that if the deadline had been the winter solstice of that year, at which time Hong Taiji offered a sacrificial service to Heaven in order to announce his expedition to Joseon, it could have been dated as the ‘winter solstice’ or the ‘25th day of the 11th month,’<sup>16</sup> rather than “such day of such month.” It is also possible that, since Hong Taiji commenced his expedition from Shenyang on the ‘second day of the 12th month,’<sup>17</sup> this date could have been cited as the deadline rather than “such day of such month.”

The dubiousness of the ‘ultimatum in May’ account is not limited to concerns about the expression “such day of such month.” The fact that the ultimatum was said to have been issued verbally also raises doubts.<sup>18</sup> This is because it would seem reasonable for the ultimatum to have been included in the state letter entrusted to Na Deokheon on his trip for Han-seong (Seoul).<sup>19</sup>

It may have been only after they had sealed the state letter that it occurred to the Manchus that they should issue an ultimatum. However, if this ‘ultimatum in May’ did exist, considering its enormous importance, shouldn’t there have at least been a mention of it somewhere in Joseon’s records? Furthermore, among the Joseon envoys who supposedly

지의 전쟁, 73–115.

<sup>15</sup> See footnote 13.

<sup>16</sup> *QTZSL*, Chongde 1/11/25(yichou).

<sup>17</sup> *QTZSL*, Chongde 1/12/2(renshen).

<sup>18</sup> In the entry of the *Qing Taizong shilu* (Qianlong Edition), however, the method of delivery of the ultimatum is changed to a written form.

<sup>19</sup> The state letter does not carry the message of the ultimatum. See *Qing ruguan qian yu Chaoxian wanglai guoshu huibian* 清入關前與朝鮮往來國書彙編, 180–185.

heard this ‘ultimatum in May’ from Hong Taiji, some might well have left records of it, but Na Deokheon’s travel account *Bukhaeng ilgi* 北行日記 (Daily Record of the Northern Travel) does not contain any indication of his having met with Hong Taiji on the day when he left Shenyang, let alone any mention of an ultimatum.<sup>20</sup> At most, one can find a story that, when leaving Shenyang, Na was threatened by Inggūldai 英俄爾岱/龍骨大 that if Joseon did not send a response to the state letter, it would be taken as a breach of the two states’ brotherhood pact on the part of Joseon.<sup>21</sup>

The Qing records are no different from Joseon’s in their absence of references to the ‘ultimatum in May.’ Although the *Jiu Manzhou dang* 舊滿洲檔 (Old Manchu Archives) is a chronological record that offers primary sources for compilation of the *Qing Taizong shilu* (in its first edition in the Shunzhi era), its entry on the 15th day of the fourth month of 1636 cites only the long state letter sent to Injo without any reference to quotation (A).<sup>22</sup> Since an account, not included even in the *Jiu Manzhou dang*, suddenly appears in the *Qing Taizong shilu*, it would seem highly likely that quotation (A) is fabricated and later inserted by the editors of *Qing Taizong shilu* during the Shunzhi era.

One might argue that the *Qing Taizong shilu* may have been making up for the omission of the ultimatum in the *Jiu Manzhou dang* with supplements from other historical sources. However, if one looks into the ‘war of words’ between the two parties to the war during the first lunar

<sup>20</sup> According to *Bukhaeng ilgi* 北行日記 [Daily Record of the Northern Travel], Na Deokheon arrived in Shenyang on the 29th day of the 3rd month (May 4th), and met Hong Taiji on the 2nd day of the 4th month (May 6th). See *Bukhaeng ilgi* 北行日記 in *Jang’am yujip* 壯嚴遺集 [Posthumous Literary Collection of Na Deokheon], *gwon* 卷 (fascicle) 2 (Seoul: Kyujanggak Institute of Korean Studies, 古4655-48), 10b–11a. However, Na had no audience with Hong Taiji when he left Shenyang. In the *Qing Taizong shilu*, the date of Na Deokheon’s arrival in Shenyang was the 22nd day of the 3rd month (April 27th), while his departure date (the 25th day of the 4th month, or May 29th) was ten days later than that stated in the *Bukhaeng ilgi*. It is not clear at this time why there is such a difference between the two documents.

<sup>21</sup> *Bukhaeng ilgi* 北行日記 in *Jang’am yujip* 壯嚴遺集, *gwon* 2, 22a–22b.

<sup>22</sup> *Jiu Manzhou dang* 舊滿洲檔, 10 ce (冊), 4739–4751, Tiancong 10/4/5. It is only natural that the entry of the same date of the *Manwen laodang* 滿文老檔, VI, 997–1010 also has no reference to quotation (A).

month of 1637, one can conclude that the ‘ultimatum in May’ of the *Qing Taizong shilu* is merely a fabrication inserted in a later era.

Amid this war of words, Hong Taiji, who had ordered the invasion, said to the Joseon people “It is not really that I want for you to fall into disaster. Your country’s king and his ministers have themselves made you face disaster” and claimed that he had raised up a ‘righteous army’ (Ch. *yibing* 義兵; Ma. *jurgan i cooha*).<sup>23</sup> According to Hong Taiji, it was Joseon itself that had caused the war and he adhered steadfastly to his theory of ‘just war’ (*uijeon* 義戰) to the effect that the Manchu/Qing invasion of Joseon was righteous.<sup>24</sup> There is no doubt that in the *Qing Taizong shilu*, the ‘ultimatum in May’ served as an essential piece of evidence supporting the view of the Manchu/Qing invasion as a just war. Nevertheless, when examining the letters sent by Hong Taiji to Injo in the first lunar month of 1637, which was the height of the war,<sup>25</sup> nowhere in the letter suggests, either explicitly or implicitly, the existence of any ultimatum issued to notify Joseon of the invasion’s date in advance.

<sup>23</sup> “Gaoyu/Goyu” 諭諭 [Edict from Hong Taiji] in *Injo sillok* 仁祖實錄 [Veritable Records of King Injo], Injo 15/1/2(renyin). According to the Qing records, this document was composed in the Manchu language on the 29th day of the 11th month of 1636. See *Manwen laodang* 滿文老檔, VII, 1473–1476; *QTZSL*, Chongde 1/11/29(jisi). However, the date of official issuance of the “Gaoyu/Goyu” 諭諭 delivered to Joseon was the 2nd day of the 12th month. See the *Jochik deungnok* 詔勅勝錄 [Records of Edicts] (Kyujianggak 奎 12904 –2) 1a–2a; and “Yu aguk gwanmin seo” 諭我國官民書 [Edict to our officials and people] in *Dongmun hwigo* 同文彙考 [Collection of Diplomatic Documents of Joseon], special edition 別編, gwon 3, 1a–2a.

<sup>24</sup> Just as Nurhaci of the Later Jin had justified the war against the Ming by invoking the so-called “Seven Grievances” (Ch. *qi dahan* 七大恨), so the Later Jin/Qing during its invasions of Joseon in 1627 and 1637 argued that it had started wars to chastise Joseon for its offenses of various kinds, and therefore that Heaven (Ch. *tian* 天; Ma. *abka*) would take its side. Bumjin Koo, *Byeongja horan, Hong Taiji ui jeonjaeng*, 271, 273.

<sup>25</sup> The state letters sent by Hong Taiji to King Injo in the 1st lunar month of 1637, at the height of the war, are all included in the *Jochik deungnok* 詔勅勝錄 [Records of Edicts] of Joseon Kyujanggak 奎 12904 –2), 2a–8a, as well as in *Man Qing ruguan qian yu Gaoli jiaoshe shiliao* 滿清入關前與高麗交涉史料 [Historical Materials on Relations with Korea before the Manchu/Qing Entered the Shanhai Pass], selected from the *Neige daku dang'an* 內閣大庫檔案 [Grand Secretariat Archives] of the Qing Dynasty (Guoli Beiping Lishi Bowuguan 國立北平歷史博物館, reprinted in 1933), 2–28. In addition, they are also included in *Dongmun hwigo* 同文彙考 (special edition), and *Qing ruguan qian yu Chaosian wanglai guoshu huibian* 清入關前與朝鮮往來國書彙編.

Even in the quarrel over the legitimacy of starting the war, there was no clue suggestive of any ultimatum. Injo, isolated in the mountain fortress of Namhan in the first lunar month of 1637, had been forced into a state of military quandary.<sup>26</sup> Regardless of whether it was true or not, he had to acknowledge Hong Taiji’s claim that Joseon was responsible for causing the war. Injo put the blame for the outbreak of the war on himself in his state letter dated the 13th day of the first month, saying that “I just scold myself, what else can I say?”<sup>27</sup> However, at the same time, he also protested as follows:

(B) When I think of the elder brother’s position towards the younger brother, it is truly appropriate for him to scold the younger one with anger. But if the scolding is too severe, it will go against a righteous brotherhood relationship. [In this case,] how can you not invite a rebuke from Heaven?<sup>28</sup>

No matter how much of a mistake the younger brother had made, Injo protested, “if the scolding is too severe,” such as the sudden mobilization of such a large army, it would violate the “righteous brotherhood” (*hyeongje ji ui* 兄弟之義), sworn officially in 1627, after the Manchus’ first invasion of Joseon, and result in “a rebuke from Heaven.”

Hong Taiji devoted quite an amount of space, in his state letter of the 17th day of the first month, to argue against Injo’s protest:

(C) [Your] letter said that, “if the scolding is too severe, it will go against a righteous brotherhood relationship. [In this case,] how can you not invite a rebuke from Heaven?” ... It was not until the letter [you] sent to your frontier officials was obtained by our envoy Inggūldai that I knew for certain that your country had the will to wage war [against us.]

<sup>26</sup> Bumjin Koo, *Byeongja horan, Hong Taiji ui jeonjaeng* 병자호란, 홍타이지의 전쟁, 117–163.

<sup>27</sup> *Man Qing ruguan qian yu Gaoli jiaoshe shiliao* 滿清入關前與高麗交涉史料, 8–11.

<sup>28</sup> *Man Qing ruguan qian yu Gaoli jiaoshe shiliao* 滿清入關前與高麗交涉史料, 9.

[However,] **I said to your spring and autumn envoys, as well as other merchants**, that “your country’s men have behaved so recklessly that **I have to attack your country** and you may tell your king and his subjects about this on returning to your country.” **I clearly informed them [of the imminent expedition], and did not use deceit for the purpose of this invasion.** Moreover, I moved armies only after announcing to Heaven in writing that it is Joseon that broke the brotherhood oath [of 1627] to wage a war. If I had broken the oath as you did, I ought to be afraid of Heaven’s rebuke. But since you did not honor the oath, the disaster has befallen your country. So why do you try to invoke the word “Heaven” (tian 天) as if you had nothing to do with this.<sup>29</sup> [Emphases are all mine]

Hong Taiji argued that, despite his discovery of Joseon’s intention to wage war against the Qing after obtaining the letter Injo sent to his frontier officials, or the decree of severing relations, he had warned Joseon’s “spring and autumn envoys, as well as other merchants,” of an impending expedition in advance. He also claimed that he had nothing to be ashamed of, as he had moved armies only after announcing to Heaven in writing that it was Joseon that broke the oath of brotherhood. Needless to say, Hong Taiji was articulating his own claim on just war in this state letter.

In 1636, however, the autumn envoy Bak No 朴簪 left Seoul for Shenyang only on the fourth day of the 12th month (December 30, 1636)<sup>30</sup> and it was two days after Hong Taiji’s forces had already left

<sup>29</sup> *Jochik deungnok* 詔勅錄 (Kyujanggak 奎 12904– 2), 4a-4b; *Man Qing ruguan qian yu Gaoli jiaoshe shiliao* 滿清入關前與高麗交涉史料, 11. As to the Manchu translation of this state letter, which later was retranslated into literary Chinese to be included in the *Qing Taizong shilu* (Shunzhi Edition), see Kawachi Yoshihiro 河内良弘, trans. and ed. *Neikokushien Manbun tōan yakuchū: Chūgoku daiichi rekishi tōan kansō, Sūtoku ni san nenbun* 內國史院滿文檔案譯註: 中國第一歷史檔案館藏 崇德二·三年分 [Translation and Annotation of the Manchu Language Archives in the Palace Dynastic History Office, Second and Third Years of the Chongde Reign, 1637, 1638], Kyoto: Shōkōdō, 2010, 39-47.

<sup>30</sup> *Seungeongwon ilgi* 承政院日記 [Daily Records of the Royal Secretariat], Injo 14/12/4(jiaxu).

Shenyang and begun their march toward Joseon. Thus, the reference to the “spring and autumn envoys, as well as other merchants” in quotation (C) cannot be said to match the actual situation. There are other statements that should also not be believed at face value but it is particularly worth noting here that, when claiming that he “did not use deceit for the purpose of this invasion,” Hong Taiji mentioned only that he had warned Joseon envoys and merchants of his invasion, which is not something beyond a simple warning or threat of war. If there had indeed been a full-blown ultimatum before the war, Hong Taiji would have never failed to cite it here, as there could not have been any better evidence than that to support his claim that his invasion was legitimately validated as a just war devoid of any deception.

At this point, it seems safe to conclude that the account of the ‘ultimatum in May’ in the *Qing Taizong shilu* was fabricated and inserted at a later time. But what, then, was the motive of the Qing Taizong shilu’s editors in fabricating this account? I would like to raise some important points here as follows.

The editors’ fabrication of the ‘ultimatum in May’ was part of ‘constructing a narrative of a just war,’ something the Qing had already begun less than one year after the invasion. As previous studies have revealed,<sup>31</sup> the Qing intervened actively in the composition of the inscription on the stele erected on Samjeondo 三田渡 by the Han River. In the first lunar month of 1638 (the third year of the Chongde reign), the contents of the draft inscription prepared by Joseon officials were presented in detail. At that time, Fan Wencheng 范文程 (1597-1666), one of the Qing grand secretaries, reviewed the draft inscription and demanded substantial revisions.<sup>32</sup> More significantly, it was Fan who was later put in charge of supervising the compilation of the *Qing Taizong shilu* during the Shunzhi

<sup>31</sup> Bae Useong 배우성, 2010, “Seoul e on Cheong ui chiksa Mabudae wa Samjeondo bi” 서울에 온 청의 칙사 馬夫大 와 삼전도비 [The Qing Imperial Envoy Mafuta Who Came to Seoul, and the Samjeondo Stele], *Seoul hak yeongu* 38, 235–271.

<sup>32</sup> *Simyang janggye: Simyang eseo on pyeonji* 심양장계: 심양에서 온 편지 [Collection of Reports from Shenyang: Letters from Shenyang], Seoul: Changbi, 2008, 131–133.

era.<sup>33</sup> The document containing the demand for revision by Fan Wencheng has remained to this day,<sup>34</sup> and is referred to as the 'Fan Wencheng's Memorandum.' The part of the demand for revision that seems closely related to the account of ultimatum is the following:

(D) Even though [the emperor] knew that our Joseon had broken the compact, he explained our guilt to us clearly, and with a heart of magnanimity told us the secret that he would launch an expedition on ㉠ **such day of such month of such year**, as if Heaven was teaching us, a father was teaching his son, or an elder brother was teaching his younger brother. ㉡ **If he had really wanted to kill and hurt our people, how could he have been willing to teach us clearly [when he would invade] instead of moving armies unexpectedly to attack us when we were unprepared?** [Nonetheless], our king still did not repent and so the emperor led his armies to chastise us Joseon in person.<sup>35</sup> [Emphases are all mine]

Comparing quotation (D) with the corresponding part of the actual Samjeondo Inscription, it can be seen that ㉠ "such day of such month of such year" (某年月日) was rewritten as "the time of war (師期)" while sentence ㉡ was omitted altogether.<sup>36</sup> At least as far as quotation (D) is concerned, Fan Wencheng's demand was not reflected in the inscription as it finally appeared. However, it should be noted that Fan Wencheng, a grand secretary in charge of literary matters from the time of Hong Taiji's rule, as well as the chief editor of the *Qing Taizong shilu* during the Shunzhi era, had wished to see Hong Taiji's alleged notification in advance of

<sup>33</sup> *Qing Shizu shilu* 清世祖實錄 [Qing Veritable Records of Emperor Shizu], Shunzhi 6/1/8(ding-mao); Shunzhi 9/1/29(xinchou).

<sup>34</sup> *Ming-Qing dang'an cunzhen xuanji chuj* 明清檔案存真選輯初集 [Selected Originals from the Ming-Qing Archives, vol. 1] (Taipei: Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Lishi Yuyan Yanjiusuo 中央研究院歷史語言研究所, 1959), 101.

<sup>35</sup> *Ming-Qing dang'an cunzhen xuanji chuj* 明清檔案存真選輯初集, 101.

<sup>36</sup> See the Samjeondo Inscription contained in *Injo sillok*, Injo 16/2/8(renyin).

his expedition included in the Samjeondo Inscription. Given this situation, it is possible to surmise the motive for the fabrication of the 'ultimatum in May' in *Qing Taizong shilu*, which is not found in the *Jiu Manzhou dang*.

The entire text of the Samjeondo Inscription is also included in the *Qing Taizong shilu*.<sup>37</sup> If quotation (D) of the 'Fan Wencheng Memorandum' had indeed been reflected in the inscription as demanded, fabrication of the 'ultimatum in May' would not have been necessary. Quotation (D) was not, however, reflected in its entirety in the inscription. The editors of the *Qing Taizong shilu* must then have picked the last possible time when Hong Taiji could have met the Joseon envoys prior to the war's outbreak (i.e. the 15th day of the fourth month of 1636) and inserted that as the date of the ultimatum in the above quotation (A).

However, even if the account of the 'ultimatum in May' in the *Qing Taizong shilu* was fabricated and inserted later, it is still too early to conclude that the Qing gave no ultimatum at all before its invasion of Joseon. In his state letter of the 17th day of the first month of 1637, Hong Taiji said that he had warned the Joseon envoys in advance of the impending expedition twice, in the spring and in the autumn, even if those warnings may not have been *bona fide* ultimatums delivered with conditions and deadlines. What has been revealed through our examination above is that the account of the 'ultimatum in May' given to the Joseon spring envoy, Na Deokheon, was a fabrication of a later time. To prove that the Qing never gave any ultimatum whatsoever to Joseon, wouldn't it be necessary to confirm the absence of any ultimatum in autumn as well?

However, as mentioned earlier, Joseon's 1636 autumn envoy, Bak No, left Seoul on the fourth day of the 12th month (December 30, 1636). Thus, there cannot have been any meeting between Hong Taiji and that envoy before the war's launch. Still, it is worth noting that even though they were not official envoys, Joseon did send an interpreter of the Manchu language (*hoyeok* 胡譯), Bak Inbeom, along with others to Shenyang

<sup>37</sup> *QTZSL*, Chongde 4/12/28(gengxu).

in the autumn of 1636 with a letter in the name of the king. If it is not possible to completely rule out the possibility that the 'autumn envoys' mentioned in the Qing state letter was a convenient reference to the Bak Inbeom party, isn't it then necessary to look into what happened at the time of Bak Inbeom's trip to Shenyang?

### Bak Inbeom's Trip to Shenyang, and the Qing's Deceptive Ultimatum Notice

As mentioned earlier, bearing a long state letter entrusted to them by the Qing, Na Deokheon's embassy left Shenyang in the middle of the fourth month of 1636. It was not until Na arrived at Tongyuanbao 通遠堡, on his way back to Joseon, that he opened that letter and discovered that it not only adopted a presumptuous title for Hong Taiji - "Great Qing Emperor of Lenience, Kind-heartedness, Beneficence, and Sacredness" (*Da Qingguo kuan wen ren sheng huangdi* 大清國寬溫仁聖皇帝) - but was also depraved and arrogant in its contents. Na Deokheon therefore left the original letter at his residence in Tongyuanbao and returned home with only a copy of its contents. Upon receiving the handwritten copy of the letter from Na Deokheon, the Joseon court, fearing that the Qing might misunderstand that the state letter in question had actually been delivered to Injo, sent a letter in the name of Na Deokheon to Tongyuanbao, informing the Qing that Na had abandoned the original letter there.<sup>38</sup>

After Na's embassy returned to Joseon, diplomatic contact between the two countries was cut off for a while. Although it was possible that a war might break out at any time, there was nothing remarkable in the atmosphere. Over time, however, realist voices got louder insisting on the prevention or at least delay of the outbreak of war through diplomatic efforts. The opinion favoring diplomatic negotiations then gained strength as the Ming envoys who visited Seoul, Bai Dengyong 白登庸 and Huang Sunwu 黃孫茂, advised maintaining, rather than severing, diplomatic rela-

<sup>38</sup> *Injo sillok*, Injo 14/4/26(gengzi).

tions with the Qing, so as to detect the enemy's situation and any internal divisions that it might be experiencing.<sup>39</sup> Against this backdrop, the Joseon court pressed for diplomatic contacts to restore the brotherly relationship with the Qing, led by Choe Myeonggil and others, who overcame fierce objections from hardliners fervently opposing peace talks. Concerning the progress of diplomatic contacts at that time, the basic facts have already been made known through previous studies.<sup>40</sup>

Among Joseon's attempts at diplomacy, the notification letter (*gyeokseo* 檄書) written on the 17th day of the sixth month of 1636 was the first step toward restoring relations with the Qing. Although that letter was of lower grade than a state letter, it was the first to use the new dynastic title of "Qing State" (Cheongguk 清國), rather than the conventional "Jin State" (Jinguk 金國). It was virtually a reply state letter responding to the Qing state letter abandoned by Na Deokheon at Tongyuanbao. Its main point was to urge the Qing government to maintain the principle of a "state relationship between an elder and a younger brother" (*hyeongje ji guk* 兄弟之國) by emphasizing that Joseon had never broken their brotherhood pact of 1627.<sup>41</sup>

Among the diplomatic attempts of Joseon on the eve of the Manchu/Qing invasion, the second most notable measure after the above-cited notification letter and at the same time the most important diplomatic contact during this period was the visit by Bak Inbeom to Shenyang. As will be mentioned again later, the task given to Bak Inbeom was to deliver a letter from Injo stating the reason for his dispatch along with the notification letter of the 17th day of the sixth month.<sup>42</sup> However, although Bak's dispatch was realized only with great difficulty, against strong opposition, he could not fulfill his mission of delivering the two letters. This was because when Bak arrived in Shenyang on the 27th day of the

<sup>39</sup> *Injo sillok*, Injo 14/7/28(jichou); 14/9/3(jiachen).

<sup>40</sup> See footnote 5.

<sup>41</sup> *Injo sillok*, Injo14/6/17(gengyin).

<sup>42</sup> *Injo sillok*, Injo14/9/19(gengshen).

tenth month (November 24, 1636), the Qing firmly refused to accept the letters.<sup>43</sup>

Nevertheless, Bak Inbeom's trip to Shenyang was not without meaning. While there is only a terse mention of it in the Qing's records, simply stating that Hong Taiji refused to receive the letters from Joseon, many accounts related to Bak's trip to Shenyang are found in Joseon's records, even if they may not be all direct or coherent and are mixture of facts and fiction. Considering the limited space available here, I would like to introduce just two accounts noteworthy, particularly in the context of this study.

The first is an entry in the *Injo sillok*, dated the 13th day of the 11th month of 1636. It says that, upon hearing Bak Inbeom's written and oral reports, the Border Defense Council (Bibyeonsa 備邊司) suggested that, "since it has been revealed that the barbarians do not wish to cut off the [relations] with our country," the court should hurriedly dispatch an official envoy "in order to explore their situation on the one hand and show them that we do not wish to cut off the [relations] on the other." At the same time, it worried that, "since Bak Inbeom's party returned without delivering the letters, the enemy may move its armies at any moment," and insisted that military preparations should be made in anticipation of "a sudden attack after the rivers freeze."<sup>44</sup>

The Joseon government was thus discussing both the dispatch of an official envoy and preparations for military action immediately after Bak Inbeom's return. Given this, it should be considered that Bak's report probably contained the prospect that there was still a hope of preventing catastrophe, as well as information that there could be an invasion in the freezing winter.<sup>45</sup>

<sup>43</sup> *Manwen laodang* 滿文老檔, VII, 1362.

<sup>44</sup> *Injo sillok*, Injo 14/11/13(guichou).

<sup>45</sup> At the royal lecture on the 12th day of the 12th month, Yi Seonggu stated that, "Hearing from the interpreter of Manchu language (hoyeok 胡譯) upon his return, the bandits are ready to move their armies." See *Injo sillok*, Injo 14/11/12(renzi). By this time, moreover, information that war was imminent had been obtained through other channels. For example, prior to Bak Inbeom's report

The other entry that I will introduce here is contained in the *Byeongjarok* 丙子錄 (Records of the Byeongja War), written privately by Na Man'gap, the key parts of which are as follows:

(E) The Khan 汗 of the Jin said to this interpreter (i.e. Bak Inbeom), "if your country will not restore peaceful relations by way of sending its minister and prince [as hostages] before **the 25th day of the 11th month** [of 1636], I shall raise up a large army to send eastward (i.e. to Joseon)." And **his reply letter** stated that . . .<sup>46</sup> [Emphases are all mine]

In other words, Hong Taiji had delivered a verbal ultimatum to Bak Inbeom's party, even stating a deadline of "the 25th day of the 11th month" (December 21, 1636) before which time Joseon should send "minister and prince" as hostages. Moreover, the *Byeongjarok* makes reference to Hong Taiji's "reply letter" and states that "when this humble interpreter delivered these words, the court wanted to send a high official to Shenyang" but dared not bring up the issue because of fierce objection to any peace talks. It is also noted that when Bak No finally left Seoul, only after being delayed by opposition from the contrarian officials, he missed the "deadline set by the Khan of the Jin."<sup>47</sup>

In the records of the Qing, it is stated that a Joseon envoy (meaning Bak Inbeom) arrived in Shenyang on the 27th day of the tenth month (November 24), and so let us call the ultimatum mentioned in quotation (E) the 'ultimatum in November.' Following a round of fierce controversy over the dispatch of an official envoy after Bak Inbeom's return to Joseon, the autumn envoy Bak No then left Seoul on the "fourth day of the 12th month (December 30)."<sup>48</sup> Therefore, if Hong Taiji had indeed set a

upon his return home, there was intelligence that the Qing armies were "fattening horses to come eastward and attack Joseon in the upcoming winter." See *Injo sillok*, Injo 14/11/4(jiachen).

<sup>46</sup> Na Man'gap 羅萬甲, *Byeongjarok* 丙子錄 [Records of the Byeongja War] (Kyujiangak 奎 12493), 6b.

<sup>47</sup> *Byeongjarok* 丙子錄, 6b-7a.

<sup>48</sup> *Seungjeongwon ilgi* 承政院日記, Injo 14/12/4(jiaxu).

deadline of “the 25th day of the 11th month (December 21),” as claimed in quotation (E), Joseon had obviously missed the “deadline set by the Khan of the Jin (i.e. Hong Taiji).”

Compared to the Qing records, which only indicate the deadline vaguely as “such day of such month” at best, the *Byeongjarok* has a specific deadline date of “the 25th day of the 11th month,” and thus more effectively backs the Qing claim of its invasion having been a just war. In addition, if the account of the ‘ultimatum in November’ were true, the ‘ultimatum in May’ in the *Qing Taizong shilu* could not be discarded as complete fabrication on the grounds that it might also be seen as having involved a simple error in dating the ultimatum.

The editors of the *Qing Taizong shilu* might defend themselves in the following way. The ultimatum in the year 1636 was made only verbally, without documentation, and in consequence, only memories of that event remained when the *Qing Taizong shilu* was later compiled and no one could specify whether it had been during the middle of the fourth month (May) or the end of the tenth month (November). Under these circumstances, the editors had had no choice but to select the date when Hong Taiji had been more likely to meet an envoy from Joseon, which was the 15th day of the fourth month, and had inserted that date for the ultimatum.

The deadline of the ‘25th day of the 11th month’ also fits well with the context of the Qing’s preparations for invading Joseon. On the fifth day of the tenth month of 1636 (November 2), Hong Taiji revealed his plan to wait “until after the rivers freeze” and to raise up a large number of troops.<sup>49</sup> On the 16th day of that same month (November 13), Hife 喜福, one of the Qing grand secretaries, was dispatched to the assemblies of *waifan Menggu* 外藩蒙古 (nomadic Mongol nobles) to notify them of the Qing’s plan for an expedition to Joseon when the rivers freeze.<sup>50</sup> By the

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<sup>49</sup> *QTZSL*, Chongde 1/10/5(bingzi).

<sup>50</sup> *QTZSL*, Chongde 1/10/16(dinghai). For the connection between the assemblies of *waifan Menggu* and the Manchu/Qing invasion of Joseon, see Bumjin Koo and Lee Jaegyong 丘凡眞 · 李在瑒, 2017, “Sütoku gennen (ichi roku san roku) no gaihan Mōko kaimei to heishi koran” 崇徳元年

time Bak Inbeom arrived in Shenyang on the 27th day of the tenth month, the Qing had already begun preparing to dispatch troops to Joseon. And on the 11th day of the 11th month (December 7),<sup>51</sup> Hong Taiji sent an order to the Mongol nobles to gather in Shenyang by the 30th day of the 11th month (December 26).<sup>52</sup> On the 19th day of that month, he also ordered the Eight Banners to complete preparations for the expedition and gather by the 29th day (December 25).<sup>53</sup> And on the 25th day of the month, the winter solstice of 1636 (December 21), a sacrificial offering was held to announce the dispatch of troops to Joseon to Heaven as well as to the divine spirit of the Nurhaci shrine.<sup>54</sup> In view of the fact that the sacrificial offering marking the dispatch of troops to Joseon was made on the winter solstice day, about one month after Bak Inbeom’s arrival in Shenyang on the 27th day of the tenth month, it is possible to assume that the ‘25th day of the eleventh month’ (December 21) had been presented as the deadline.

However, it is still too early to acknowledge the ‘ultimatum in November’ detailed in the *Byeongjarok* as an established fact. To begin with, since there is no evidence anywhere else in the Qing or Joseon official records that Hong Taiji did give a reply to Bak Inbeom, the *Byeongjarok*’s mention of Hong Taiji’s “reply letter” in quotation (E) casts doubt on the credibility of its account of the ultimatum notification. The official records of the Qing and Joseon all note that Hong Taiji refused to accept the documents delivered by Bak Inbeom and it seems absurd to suppose that a reply letter was given to a person whose letter had been rejected in the first place. In addition, given that Bak Inbeom was not an official envoy and his letter was not accepted, it seems doubtful that Hong Taiji would have met Bak in person. In fact, according to the Qing records,

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(一六三六)の外藩蒙古會盟と丙子胡亂 [The Assemblies of *Waifan Menggu* in the First Year of the Chongde Reign (1636) and the Manchu/Qing Invasion of Joseon], in *Shirin* 100:6, Kyoto.

<sup>51</sup> *Manwen laodang*, VII, 1362.

<sup>52</sup> *QTZSL*, Chongde 1/11/11(xinhai).

<sup>53</sup> *QTZSL*, Chongde 1/11/19(jiwei).

<sup>54</sup> *QTZSL*, Chongde 1/11/25(yichou).

Hong Taiji merely issued an order on the 27th day of the tenth month (November 24) that the Joseon king's letter not be accepted.<sup>55</sup> In other words, Hong Taiji never actually met a Joseon envoy at that time. But even if Hong Taiji did not meet Bak Inbeom, it is still deemed possible that an ultimatum notification might have been given through a negotiating party, such as Inggūldai, who was certain to have met Bak.<sup>56</sup> In other words, the passage regarding the ultimatum - "if your country will not restore peaceful relations by way of sending its minister and prince [as hostages] before the 25th day of the 11th month [of 1636]" - may well reflect to some extent what actually happened.

Nevertheless, in consideration of certain contradictions, it seems hard to trust the account of the 'ultimatum in November' in the *Byeongjarok* in its entirety. One crucial contradiction is an entry in the *Injo sillok* dated the 13th day of the 11th month (December 9) of 1636, which mentions an episode out of line with the claim of the ultimatum deadline of the '25th day of the 11th month.' It is said there that on the 13th day of the 11th month, the Border Defense Council, fearing that an outbreak of war was imminent, suggested military preparations as follows:

(F) If there is an invasion alarm after the rivers freeze, it will be difficult to muster soldiers from the southern provinces. As we have already ordered that 18,300 soldiers be made ready, now we should order the left and right commanders of Gyeongsang Province, . . . to move the soldiers up to the provinces' borders **by the tenth day of the 12th month**, . . .<sup>57</sup> [Emphasis is mine.]

<sup>55</sup> *Manwen laodang*, VII, 1362.

<sup>56</sup> Inggūldai seems to have been a major contact point with Bak Inbeom, for extensive talks. See "Injo jo gosa bonmal" 仁祖朝故事本末 [Old stories of King Injo's reign] in *Yeollyeosil gisul* 燃藜室記述, *gwon* 25 (Yi Geungik's Private History of the Joseon Dynasty), 11th month of the *byeongja* year; and Jo Gyeongnam 趙慶男, *Sokjamnok* 續雜錄, *gwon* 4 [Sequel to the Miscellaneous Records], 12th month of the *byeongja* year.

<sup>57</sup> *Injo sillok*, Injo 14/11/13(jichou).

It was suggested here that in order to quickly deploy the troops from the southern provinces to the front line in the event of war, the "18,300 soldiers," recruited previously,<sup>58</sup> need to be moved up to the various provinces' borders in advance. One particular point of note here is the date mentioned, which is the 'tenth day of the 12th month (January 5, 1637).' If the deadline date given to Bak Inbeom at Shenyang had been the '25th day of the 11th month,' it seems only natural that the Border Defense Council would have set the deadline for moving up the soldiers from the southern provinces to the provinces' borders as the '25th day of the 11th month' or earlier. Furthermore, the winter solstice fell on the 25th day of the 11th month (December 21) in 1636, already long after winter had begun, so rivers could have been frozen by then. However, the Border Defense Council set the deadline for mobilizing the troops as the tenth day of the 12th month (January 5, 1637), 15 days later than the deadline supposedly given by the Qing. Injo even ordered the Border Defense Council to "take it slow for the time being," in regard to its military preparation measures.<sup>59</sup> This suggests that even the 'tenth day of the 12th month' seemed too early to the King. The deadline of the '25th day of the 11th month' appearing in the 'ultimatum in November' thus seems hardly plausible, in light of Joseon's troop mobilization date in quotation (F) - the tenth day of the 12th month - together with Injo's opinion that even that date was too early.

Moreover, the deadline of the '25th day of the 11th month' also fails to fit well in the context of autumn envoy Bak No's dispatch on the 'fourth day of the 12th month,' finally authorized by the Border Defense Council after fierce opposition. If the Council, which had pursued the dual tracks of diplomatic negotiations and preparations for war after hearing Bak Inbeom's report, had already been informed of the alleged deadline, there would have been no reason for it to dispatch an envoy af-

<sup>58</sup> This recruitment seems to refer to the select 20,000 Sog'o soldiers 東伍軍 of the provinces, suggested by Kim Ryu early in the 7th month in preparation for emergencies. See *Injo sillok*, Injo 14/7/4(bingwu).

<sup>59</sup> See *Injo sillok*, Injo 14/11/13(jichou).

ter Joseon had already missed that deadline. It would have been only rational for the Joseon court to have given up all hopes of peace talks and instead concentrate on military preparations, in line, for example, with the precedent set by the Goryeo dynasty that moved its capital to Ganghwa Island in 1232 to defend against the Mongol invasion.<sup>60</sup>

Hence, the alleged deadline of the '25th day of the 11th month' in the 'ultimatum in November' does not match well with the dates of the 'tenth day of the 11th month' suggested for mobilizing the Joseon forces, or the 'fourth day of the 12th month' on which Pak No left Seoul. In addition, just like the 'ultimatum in May,' the 'ultimatum in November' is not mentioned in the state letter from Hong Taiji, dated the 17th day of the first month of 1637. Therefore, it is difficult to trust the veracity of the 'ultimatum in November'.

Nonetheless, it is still possible that an ultimatum was indeed given by the Qing, in one form or another, on the eve of its invasion of Joseon. Looking at *Yeollyeosil gisul* 燃藜室記述 (Yi Geungik's Private History of the Joseon Dynasty), we find, in addition to its duplication of the *Byeongjarok*'s account of the 'ultimatum in May,' two more stories to the effect that the Qing did notify Joseon of the expedition date in advance. One states that in the tenth month of 1636, Mafuta came to the border town of Uiju and notified Yim Gyeongop of an expedition date of "the 26th day of the 11th month (December 22)," telling him that the troops heading toward Joseon would turn around, at once, if Joseon dispatched an envoy to make a new peace agreement with the Qing before the deadline. The other story states that Hong Taiji, having waited for a Joseon envoy to restore relations with Joseon until the "27th day of the 11th month (December 23)" - a date originally set for an expedition against the Ming - not only decided to invade Joseon instead of the Ming when no envoy from Joseon appeared by the "29th day", but also declared that "we have no choice but to chastise Joseon for its guilt first."<sup>61</sup> Consider-

<sup>60</sup> This seems a possibility in view of the proposals made from early 1636 for the timely evacuation of Seoul. See *Injo sillok*, Injo14/2/29(jiachen), 14/6/13(bingxu).

<sup>61</sup> "Injo jo gosa bonmal" 仁祖朝故事本末 in *Yeollyeosil gisul* 燃藜室記述, *gwon* 25, 10th and 11th

ing the existence of such differing versions of the ultimatum notification, including the 'ultimatum of November' of the *Byeongjarok*, it would seem quite possible that there might have been some event that served as the background basis for them.

It can also be said that, even if the account of a deadline date of the '25th day of the 11th month' may be wrong, this does not mean that there was no deadline given at all. In fact, the troop mobilization date proposed by the Border Defense Council - the 'tenth day of the 12th month (January 5, 1637)' - in quotation (F) from the *Injo sillok* and Injo's opposition to it suggest that with respect to a date for troop mobilization, both the Border Defense Council and the King had in mind a certain deadline date for Joseon's response set by the Qing. Then, the remaining question is when that deadline was. The reason why the 'ultimatum in November' of the *Byeongjarok* conflicts with quotation (F) from the *Injo sillok* is its citing of the '25th day of the 11th month' as the deadline. Hence, supposing that there was indeed an ultimatum and that its deadline was not the '25th day of the 11th month,' the contradiction between the two historical sources may be resolved. With this in mind, let us hypothesize that the Qing did in fact deliver an ultimatum to Bak Inbeom, yet that the deadline stated was the '25th day of the 12th month' instead of the alleged '25th day of the 11th month.' This hypothesis seems possible, considering that in Chinese characters there is a mere one-stroke difference between '11th month' and '12th month.'

Furthermore, Na Man'gap, the author of the *Byeongjarok*, hadn't been in a position to know exactly what had happened in the court until after he entered the Namhan Mountain Fortress to which the Joseon court had fled when the Qing invaded. This is because he had been dismissed during the previous year of 1635, and left Seoul.<sup>62</sup> He would have thus heard about Bak Inbeom's report much later and only secondhandedly.

months of the byeongja year.

<sup>62</sup> Kim Sangheon 金尙憲, "Hyeongjo chamui Na gong Man'gap sindobimyong" 刑曹參議羅公萬甲神道碑銘 [Biographic Inscription of Na Man'gap, Third Minister of the Ministry of Punishments], in *Cheongeum jip* 淸陰集 [Collection of Kim Sangheon's Works], *gwon* 28.

On top of this, misunderstandings and errors caused by individual prejudices may likely be involved in the translation of secondhand news into written words. The error in the *Byeongjarok* stating that Hong Taiji had given Bak Inbeom a “reply letter” must also have been caused by the uncritical duplication of secondhand news. Similarly, NaMan’gap may have erroneously taken the original deadline of the ‘25th day of the 12th month’ as the ‘25th day of the 11th month’ and concluded that it was the correct date because it matched well with the outbreak of the war in the early part of the 12th month. Based on that mistaken date, he might have reached an interpretation that Joseon had failed to prevent the outbreak of war because it had not met the deadline imposed by Hong Taiji.

It may be criticized that this inference seems too far-fetched but the hypothesis that there was an ultimatum notification with a deadline date of the ‘25th day of the 12th month’ (January 20, 1637) makes good sense of the defensive measures taken by the Joseon court after receiving Bak Inbeom’s report on his trip to Shenyang. If the deadline was the ‘25th day of the 12th month,’ then the date of troop mobilization proposed by the Border Defense Council - the ‘tenth day of the 12th month (January 5, 1637)’ - would have been 15 days before that deadline. And Injo’s suggestion - “let’s take it slow for the time being” - is also understandable enough. Moreover, the date of the autumn envoy Bak No’s departure - the ‘fourth day of the 12th month (December 30, 1636)’ - would have been 21 days before the deadline, enough of a time span to travel from Seoul to Shenyang.

Moreover, it has now been revealed that the hypothesis that Bak Inbeom received the ‘25th day of the 12th month’ deadline while in Shenyang is not supported solely by the above inference. As a matter of fact, a Qing deadline of the ‘25th day of the 12th month’ can be ascertained by an entry in the *Seungjeongwon ilgi* 承政院日記 (Daily Records of the Royal Secretariat), an almost real-time official daily record of happenings during the Qing invasion of Joseon and hence a much more reliable source than the *Byeongjarok*, a private history written by Na Man’gap. This entry testifies:

(G) [Jeong Myeongsu, a Joseon-born interpreter from the Qing camp] said, “we (i.e. the Qing) did not make any error but your country made a mistake on its own. ㉠ **Initially, Bak Inbeom was informed in much detail when he left for Joseon** and told to send a [special] embassy by ㉡ **the ‘25th day of the 12th month.’** But your country did not send an embassy on time. ㉢ **Although Bak No was sent, he was a regular envoy as usual.** For this reason, we were obliged to lead [our forces] deep inside...”<sup>63</sup>

Quotation (G) is a report to Injo by Yi Gyeongjik 李景稷, who met the Qing party outside of the Namhan Mountain Fortress on the 20th day of the 12th month of the *byeongja* year (January 15, 1637). Yi stated that according to the Qing side, the reason why the Qing had invaded deep into Joseon at that time was the Joseon side’s failure to meet the conditions and deadline delivered to Bak Inbeom. In what follows, the main points of that report will be expounded.

To begin with, in part ㉠, “when Bak Inbeom... left for Joseon” refers to the date of his departure from Shenyang, which was the 29th day of the tenth month of 1636 (November 26, 1636) according to the Qing records. It should have been Qing working-level officials such as Inggūldai and/or Jeong Myeongsu, rather than Hong Taiji, by whom Bak had been “informed in much detail.” Then comes the most important part, ㉡, in which the deadline for satisfying the conditions (i.e. the dispatch of a special embassy) presented to Bak by the Qing was stated not as the ‘25th day of the 11th month’ (December 21, 1636), but rather the ‘25th day of the 12th month’ (January 20, 1637).

The conversation detailed in quotation (G) took place on the 20th day of the 12th month (January 15, 1637) when there were five days left before this Qing deadline of the ‘25th day of the 12th month.’ And the Joseon court had appointed Bak No as the autumn envoy and dispatched

<sup>63</sup> *Seungjeongwon ilgi* 承政院日記, Injo 14/12/20(gengyin); *Namhan ilgi* 南漢日記 [Daily Records of the Namhan Mountain Fortress] (Kyujanggak 奎 998), 2 *chaek* (冊), 1a; *Namhan ilgi* (National Library of Korea, 古 2154-8-245), 1 *chaek* (冊), 123.

him to Shenyang on the fourth day of the 12th month (December 30, 1636). Joseon negotiator Yi thus had good reason to refute the Qing claim that “your country did not send an embassy on time.” However, Jeong from the Qing side then added immediate clarification to the effect that even though Joseon had dispatched the autumn envoy Bak No before the deadline, he was just a routine envoy dispatched every autumn, less than the kind of special embassy including prince and high-ranking minister as hostages, and Joseon had thus failed to meet the Qing's demands.

In sum, three important facts concerning Bak Inbeom's trip to Shenyang can be derived from quotation (G). First, on the 29th day of the tenth month, when Bak left Shenyang to return home without having completed his original mission of delivering the letters from Injo, he received a verbal ultimatum from the Qing working-level officials, including Inggūldai and/or Jeong Myeongsu. Second, the conditions presented in the ultimatum were the dispatch of a special embassy consisting of Joseon's prince and high-ranking minister as hostages, distinct in nature from the usual spring and autumn envoys.<sup>64</sup> Third, and yet most importantly, the deadline given in the ultimatum was the ‘25th day of the 12th month’ of the byeonja year (January 20, 1637).

<sup>64</sup> On the 15th day of the 12th month of the *byeongja* year (January 10, 1637), Choe Myeonggil, who had gone to the Qing army camp the previous day to buy time for Injo to evacuate to the Namhan Mountain Fortress, returned and reported, “Looking at their words and facial expressions (*sasaek* 辭色), I do not think they have anything else in mind other than settling (*gangjeong* 講定) three issues (*sangeonsa* 三件事).” Injo said, in reply, that “You must have been deceived. How could they have come this far only for those three issues?” See *Injo sillok*, Injo 14/12/15(yiyou). Looking at their conversation, both seem to have known already what the “three issues” were, adding to the two issues of sending one of Injo's sons or brothers and one of his ministers as hostages, the one issue of sending the officials who had led the anti-Manchu opinion in the court. See Suzuki Kai 鈴木開, 2017, “Heishi no ran to Chō-Shin kankei no seiritsu” 丙子の亂と朝清關係の成立 [The Manchu/Qing Invasion of Joseon in 1637, and Establishment of the Joseon-Qing Relationship], in *Chōsenshi kenkyūkai ronbunshū* 朝鮮史研究會論文集 55 [Collection of Papers of the Korean History Research Society], 57. Even though this was the first contact with the Qing army since outbreak of the war, it can be assumed that the three issues were in fact the ‘conditions’ that Bak Inbeom had received from Shenyang, as Injo and Choe Myeonggil had already known of them.

By now, the Qing deadline of the ‘25th day of the 12th month’ should be taken as actual fact, and not a hypothesis. This deadline provides a key to questions that cannot be answered by the deadline of the ‘25th day of the 11th month’ of the *Byeongjarok*. First of all, as mentioned above already, it explains the measures taken by Joseon after Bak Inbeom's return from Shenyang. The deadline date of the ‘25th day of the 12th month’ also answers the question of why Hong Taiji, in his war of words with Injo over the war's legitimacy, mentioned only a preliminary warning given about the outbreak of war without any mention of ultimatum with a definite deadline. As it happened, the Qing had presented an ultimatum to Bak Inbeom's party with a deadline date of the ‘25th day of the 12th month’ (January 20, 1637), yet launched a surprise attack by its forward forces crossing the Yalu River on the 8th day of the 12th month (January 3, 1637), or 17 days ahead of that deadline.<sup>65</sup> In his state letter dated the 17th day of the first month (February 11, 1637), Hong Taiji emphasized that he had “clearly informed” Joseon's envoys before they returned home and did not deceive Joseon. In fact, however, he had deceived the Joseon side into believing in the false deadline date of the ‘25th day of the 12th month.’ For that very reason, he did not in his state letter mention the ultimatum given to Bak Inbeom at Shenyang. He tried to gloss over the false deadline of the ‘25th day of the 12th month’ with deliberate silence. Injo, on the other hand, who was in desperate crisis at that time, could not dare to raise this issue to protest why Hong Taiji had launched a surprise attack well before the deadline delivered to Bak Inbeom. Hong Taiji was thus free to insist on his innocence of deceiving Joseon and could claim that his Joseon expedition was a just war.

<sup>65</sup> Bumjin Koo, *Byeongja horan, Hong Taiji ui jeonjaeng* 병자호란, 홍타이지의 전쟁, 90–100.

## The Reality of Diplomatic Contacts on the Eve of the War: Joseon's Hope versus the Qing's Deception

In the analysis so far, it has been shown that just before the Qing launched its invasion of Joseon, the Joseon court, in hopes of avoiding war, made diplomatic efforts by sending Bak Inbeom to Shenyang but that the Qing took advantage of these hopes to deceitfully offer a false deadline for conciliatory measures by Joseon, viz., the '25th day of the 12th month' (January 20, 1637). The Qing then launched a surprise attack far before the false deadline date given to Bak. In view of the success of that surprise attack in the beginning of the war, it can be said that the Qing enjoyed great benefits from this deception.

As suggested by the title of one book, *Jeonjaeng eun sokimsuda* 전쟁은 속임수다 (War is a Deception),<sup>66</sup> the more you deceive your opponent in a war, the more likely you are to win. When it comes to war, the so-called *SongXiang zhi ren* 宋襄之仁 ([unnecessary] benevolence of Duke Xiang of Song) represents not a virtue but a symbol of incompetence. It is thus rather natural that the Qing would practice deceit against Joseon prior to the invasion. In fact, it is well known that Hong Taiji used a similar stratagem to induce the Ming to kill General Yuan Chonghuan 袁崇煥 (1584–1630),<sup>67</sup> the mainstay of the Ming forces deployed against the Manchus. But why is it that the strategic deception of the Qing before the invasion of Joseon has not received scholarly attention? Isn't it because the narrative of a just war in the *Qing Taizong shilu*, promoted by the Qing court historians, has blinded modern historians to that deception for a long time? As pointed out previously, the *Qing Taizong shilu* covered up the existence of this deception by recording the expedition dispatch date

that Hong Taiji notified Joseon of as simply "such day of such month."

Given that this deceptive stratagem of the Qing, glossed over by the narrative of a just war in the *Qing Taizong shilu*, has been revealed by this study, a new reading of the diplomatic contacts attempted by the Joseon court on the eve of the Qing invasion is now to be called for. To begin with, it is plausible that Bak Inbeom's trip to Shenyang was itself induced by the Qing.

As mentioned previously in this article, a notification letter was written by the Joseon court on the 17th day of the sixth month of 1636, but it was only in the early part of the ninth month that the first practical attempt to deliver this notification letter was made. What follows is the context surrounding these facts, in some detail. Late in the sixth month, Mafuta came to Zhongjiang 中江 (K. Junggang), across the river from Uiju, saying that he would pay the price of the goods that Na Deokheon's party had brought to Shenyang.<sup>68</sup> A meeting with the responsible official on the Joseon side was not realized at that time and Mafuta said he would return to settle the balance in the eighth month. The Joseon court might have surmised that it would be worthwhile trying to deliver the notification letter to Mafuta when he came again,<sup>69</sup> because the Qing official returned and paid the price for the goods even though he "must have known that relations between the two countries had already been cut off."<sup>70</sup> In fact, Mafuta did return to Zhongjiang as promised in the early part of the ninth month, albeit a little late, and this provided a chance for diplomatic contact between the two countries.<sup>71</sup> However, when the Joseon side asked him to receive its notification letter, Mafuta said that he could not by affirming that it had nothing to do with the mission he was

<sup>66</sup> Li Ling 李零, Kim Sungho 김승호, 2012, trans., *Jeonjaeng eun sokimsuda: Li Ling ui Sonja gangui* 전쟁은 속임수다: 리링의 『손자』 강의 [War is a Deception: Li Ling's Lecture on Sunzi] (Paju: Geulhangari). The Chinese title of Li Ling's book is "兵以詐立"(a quotation from *Sunzi bingfa* 孫子兵法 [The Art of War by Sunzi], 軍爭篇), while the title of its Korean translation is "兵者詭道也" (a quotation from 孫子兵法, 始計篇).

<sup>67</sup> *QZSL*, Tiancong 3/11/27(wushen), Tiancong 3/11/29(gengxu).

<sup>68</sup> *Manwen laodang* 滿文老檔, VI, 1158–1159; Jo Gyeongnam 趙慶男, *Sok jammok* 續雜錄, gwon 4, 1st day of the 7th month of 1636. According to Na Deokheon, when he left Shenyang in the 4th month he heard from Inggüldai and Mafuta that they would come to Junggang on the 25th day of the 6th month, to pay the price for the goods. See *Bukhaeng ilgi* 北行日記 in *Jangam urok* 壯巖遺錄, gwon 2, 21b.

<sup>69</sup> *Seungjeongwon ilgi*, Injo 14/8/2(guiyou).

<sup>70</sup> *Injo sillok*, Injo 14/8/2(guiyou).

<sup>71</sup> *Manwen laodang*, VI, 1244; VII, 1281–1282; *Injo sillok*, Injo 14/9/10(xinhai).

in charge of. He added, however, that if Joseon “sincerely wished to send it, Joseon should entrust it to a specially appointed envoy.”<sup>72</sup> On top of this, Mafuta even left a statement that the Qing “regretted the Joseon envoys having been insulted” in the fourth month previously.<sup>73</sup>

For Joseon, this was the first diplomatic contact to restore relations between the brotherly countries (*hyeongje ji guk* 兄弟之國) since the return of Na Deokheon's party. And although Joseon failed to deliver the notification letter, Mafuta's response at that time was seen as a ‘green light’ to keep hopes for negotiations alive. Subsequently, the Joseon court decided to dispatch Bak Inbeom to Shenyang, entrusted with the notification letter left in Uiju, together with a new state letter.<sup>74</sup>

Bak Inbeom's journey to Shenyang was thus decided by the Joseon court in an active response to Mafuta's signals, which were enticing enough to stimulate hope on Joseon's part of restoring the relationship. Before that, Mafuta's returning to settle the balance owed for the goods might have been the overture to a deception, aimed at luring Joseon to send someone to Shenyang. This might be dismissed as excessive suspicion, but at any rate, Bak Inbeom's trip to Shenyang did make it possible for the Qing to deceive Joseon by giving it a false deadline for its expedition.

Further, it appears that the Qing's deception of Joseon did not stop at giving it the false deadline date. According to the *Sok jamnok* 續雜錄 (Sequel to the Miscellaneous Records), which contains several accounts concerning Bak Inbeom's trip to Shenyang, Bak observed that “the barbarians demonstrated their desires to not sever [relations] with our country, in words and attitudes.” In addition, the Qing officials provided false information that might have thwarted Joseon's prompt and correct judgment of the situation. For example, on the 21st day of the tenth month, near Tongyuanbao 通遠堡, Bak Inbeom met a person named Aengnam 鶯男 who had been taken prisoner during the 1627 Manchu invasion of Jo-

<sup>72</sup> *Injo sillok*, Injo14/9/10(xinhai).

<sup>73</sup> *Injo sillok*, Injo14/9/19(gengshen).

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*

seon. When Bak inquired of him about the consequences of the Qing raid against the Ming led by Ajige 阿濟格, Hong Taiji's half-brother, from the sixth to the ninth month of 1636 (hereafter referred to as ‘Ajige's raid’),<sup>75</sup> Aengnam said that he had himself participated in that raid and that the Qing had suffered severe damage, losing “Abatai, the Kahn's younger brother” (sic), thereby causing Hong Taiji to harshly scold the commander Ajige. When asked whether the Qing was planning to invade Joseon, Aengnam replied, “I do not know yet but they always say that they are looking forward to seeing Joseon's high-ranking ministers come to Shenyang.” Bak Inbeom also reported that he had heard through multiple channels, including the Qing officers at Tongyuanbao, that the Qing forces were preparing weapons and equipment for a plan to attack the Shanhai Pass (Shanhaiguan 山海關) with a large number of troops during the 12th month.<sup>76</sup>

Putting aside the actual course of events on Ajige's raid on the Ming,<sup>77</sup> the information from the Qing party that Abatai 阿巴泰/押大 (1589–1646) - Hong Taiji's half-brother - had been killed in action and that Hong Taiji had disciplined Ajige for the serious loss he brought was all a blatant lie.<sup>78</sup> When asked about the plan to invade Joseon, the Qing party also gave false information that the Qing also hopes to restore the diplomatic relationship with Joseon. The information that the Qing army was planning to move to the Shanhai Pass (Shanhaiguan 山海關) in the 12th month was false as well.

At the time, however, the Joseon court could not notice that those pieces of information were false. As a matter of fact, on the 29th day of the tenth month, Yim Gyeong'eop, Magistrate of Uiju, also reported in-

<sup>75</sup> For the Qing's gains from ‘Ajige's raid’ and its connection to the Manchu/Qing invasion of Joseon, see Bumjin Koo, *Byeongja horan, Hong Taiji ui jeonjaeng* 병자호란, 홍타이지의 전쟁, 39–42.

<sup>76</sup> Pyeonggam seojang” 平監書狀 [Report from the Governor of Pyeongan Province], in Jo Gyeongnam, *Sokjamnok, gwon* 4, 23rd day of the 11th month of the *byeongja* year.

<sup>77</sup> According to the Qing records there were only four deaths of officers, and 75 deaths of soldiers. See *Manwen laodang*, VII, 1275.

<sup>78</sup> See footnote 75.

correct intelligence that the Qing invasion had been defeated by the Ming, with one of Hong Taiji's brothers killed in action.<sup>79</sup> It was hence possible for Joseon to gauge that since the Qing had been badly defeated by the Ming in Ajige's raid, there would be little chance for it to attack Joseon. It could also be assumed that if the Qing were preparing for a war, it would probably be for revenge or a (preemptive) defensive action against the Ming, not Joseon.

If such false information flowed into the Joseon court through Bak Inbeom, it seems possible that Bak had fallen into a trap to deceive Joseon set by the Qing, during his journey to and from Shenyang. And in fact, hadn't the Qing used a similar trick to eliminate the Ming general Yuan Chonghuan? Later, Injo, who was besieged in the Namhan Mountain Fortress immediately after the Manchu's Invasion of Joseon began, lamented on the 18th day of the 12th month (January 13, 1637) that "now I see that [the Qing] deceived us with the interpreter's false report of the Qing's defeat by the Ming, in order to [strike an unexpected blow] against us before we could shore up our defenses."<sup>80</sup> He thus belatedly realized that Bak's information was false.

From this, it seems possible to say that Bak Inbeom's trip to Shenyang was used as an opportunity for the Qing to attempt a deception ploy against Joseon. The deadline that the Qing told Bak Inbeom in the ultimatum notification proves to have been a false one. Much of the information collected by Bak on his trip to Shenyang was untrue as well and this is also likely to have been part of the trap of deception set up by the Qing in advance. After Bak returned home, the Joseon government was, on the one hand, wary of an outbreak of war but on the other hand, continued to hope that diplomatic efforts could prevent it. Eventually, it led Joseon hesitant to immediately switch to a war footing until the last minute. It can therefore be said that the Qing achieved the results they desired by carrying out a deception on the occasion of Bak Inbeom's trip to Shenyang.

<sup>79</sup> *Injo sillok*, Injo 14/10/29(gengzi).

<sup>80</sup> *Seungjeongwon ilgi*, Injo 14/12/18(wuzi); *Namhan ilgi* 南漢日記 (National Library of Korea, 古 2154-8-245) 1 *chaek*, 57.

## Concluding Remarks: Traces of the Unerased Truth

To briefly summarize the results of this research so far, here is an answer to the question posed at the beginning of this article: "Did the Qing actually deliver an ultimatum to Joseon?" Yes, the Qing did indeed give Joseon an ultimatum. This was done when Bak Inbeom went to Shenyang in the late part of the tenth month of 1636. However, the deadline that the Qing presented to Bak at that time was the '25th day of the 12th month' (January 20, 1637), a false date given to maximize the effectiveness of their surprise attack in the war, which actually began when the first unit of Qing forces crossed the border on the eighth day of the same month (January 3, 1637). The Qing leaked additional false information as well, such as the report of severe damage suffered during its raid on the Ming just a few months earlier. The Qing conducted a deception stratagem by taking advantage of Bak Inbeom's trip to Shenyang.

Ultimately, the 'calm before the storm,' so to speak, from the break-up of relations between the two countries in the fourth month (May 1636)<sup>81</sup> until the war broke out early in the 12th month (January 1637), meant to Joseon a 'time for peace talks' through which they attempted to avoid a war by restoring peaceful relations based on their brotherhood pact of 1627, whereas for the Qing, who had already determined to go to war,<sup>82</sup> it meant a 'time for deceit' in which it could make the necessary arrangements to enhance the chances of success for their surprise attack. There appeared to have been a calm span on the eve of the storm but the Qing's deceptive operations in the months after the season entered autumn probably signaled that war had already begun.

Nonetheless, despite what has been illustrated so far, it may be asked whether it can be indisputably concluded that the Qing did deceive Joseon based on records of the Joseon side alone. If one wishes to prove

<sup>81</sup> Bumjin Koo, *Byeongja horan, Hong Taiji ui jeonjaeng* 병자호란, 홍타이지의 전쟁, 64-71.

<sup>82</sup> It seems that Hong Taiji had already decided to lead his armies in person in an all-out war by the 11th day of the 4th month. See Bumjin Koo, *Byeongja horan, Hong Taiji ui jeonjaeng* 병자호란, 홍타이지의 전쟁, 64-71.

the charge of the Qing's deception, isn't it essential to present a firm piece of proof or 'smoking gun' from the Qing's own records, something in direct conflict with the just-war narrative of the *Qing Taizong shilu*? It is, however, difficult to find in the Qing's records a smoking gun that determines the existence of the false '25th day of the 12th month' (January 20, 1637) deadline. This is because the Qing documents recorded the expedition date that Hong Taiji supposedly informed Joseon of as "such day of such month," without any specific actual date. If the date had been specified as the '25th day of the 12th month,' the fact that the Qing deceived Joseon would have been easily discovered by modern historians. Furthermore, Hong Taiji's claim, as in his state letter, that he "did not use deceit" to invade Joseon would have turned out to be a lie.

If hopes for a piece of hard evidence of a false deadline are out of the question in the Qing records, we would seem to be facing a dead end. Fortunately, however, there is a 'detour' open to us. The purpose of the Qing's fake deadline was to launch a surprise attack by taking advantage of Joseon's failure to prepare for war. It is inconceivable that we might find a smoking gun directly proving the delivery of a fake deadline of the '25th day of the 12th month' in the Qing records, but there is instead a different type of smoking gun proving that the war was launched at a time when Joseon was not yet prepared for it. What follows presents as a conclusion this smoking gun, along with other examples of record fabrications by the Qing.

As noted above, the fraudulent editing of the 'ultimatum in May' in the *Qing Taizong shilu* from the Shunzhi era is closely related to quotation (D) drawn from 'Fan Wencheng's Memorandum.' The part from quotation (D), relevant to the Qing claim for a 'just war,' reads as follows:

(a) If he (i.e. Hong Taiji) had really wanted to kill and hurt our people, how could he have been willing to teach us clearly [when he would invade] instead of moving armies unexpectedly to attack us when we were unprepared?

Quotation (a) from 'Fan Wencheng's Memorandum' refers to a supposed advance notification by Hong Taiji of the date of his expedition, intending to show that the Qing had not committed an unscrupulous act of launching a surprise attack on an unprepared opponent. If read without knowledge of its fabrication, the account of the 'ultimatum in May' in the *Qing Taizong shilu* will certainly be interpreted as evidence backing the argument set forth in quotation (a).

However, we can have completely different interpretations from the prayer read aloud in the Manchu language on the 25th day of the 11th month (December 21, 1636), when Hong Taiji performed a ritual aimed to notify Heaven of the launch of his expedition.<sup>83</sup> Towards the end of the prayer, Hong Taiji confided his intention to Heaven as follows:

(b) I am aware that the Joseon state changed [its mind], and so I want [to attack it] first before it is ready for war . . . (Ma: bi coohiyān gurun i gūwaliyaka be yargiyalame safi, ini **jabdunggala** bi nendeki seme. . .)<sup>84</sup>  
[Emphasis is mine]

Quotation (b) is an English translation of a passage in the original Manchu language text including the prayer, dated the 25th day of the 11th month, contained in the *Old Manchu Archives* and untouched by the editors of the *Qing Taizong shilu*. In the context of this passage, the Manchu word "*jabdunggala*" means "[to attack it] first before it is ready for war,"<sup>85</sup> making it clear that Hong Taiji was informing Heaven that he was going to launch a surprise attack on Joseon.

Here let us assess the nature of quotations (a) and (b) as historical

<sup>83</sup> According to the Manchu language records describing the prayer ceremony on the 25th day of the 11th month in detail, a Manchu official from the Board of Rites read the prayer on behalf of Hong Taiji and there seems to have been no Chinese translation of it. See *Manwen laodang* VII, 1462–1471.

<sup>84</sup> *Jiu Manzhou dang* 舊滿洲檔, 10 ce (冊), 5332.

<sup>85</sup> In the Japanese translation of the *Manwen laodang*, the passage "*jabdunggala*" is translated as "準備を完了する前に" ("before finishing preparing for the war"). See *Manwen laodang*, VII, 1469.

sources. Quotation (a) is a part of 'Fan Wencheng's Memorandum,' designed to construct the narrative of a just war, while quotation (b) is a prayer read to Heaven under Hong Taiji's name on the 25th day of the 11th month (December 21, 1636). And if the quotations (a) and (b) are contrasted, it is not difficult to recognize their incompatibility. Quotation (a) is a blatant lie,<sup>86</sup> and quotation (b) is a smoking gun that proves it.

Fan Wencheng, chief editor of the *Qing Taizong shilu*, had had attempted to get quotation (a) inscribed on the Samjeondo Stele, and when it did not go the way he wanted, he later did insert a fabricated account of the 'ultimatum in May' into the *Qing Taizong shilu* in order to construct a narrative of just war. Fan would not have left untouched a firm and thus unfavorable piece of evidence like quotation (b) as it was in the Manchu language. The entire text of the inscription of the Samjeondo Stele was included in the *Qing Taizong shilu*,<sup>87</sup> yet quotation (a) was not incorporated into the inscription. Fan thus had no need for concern about the inconsistency between the quotations (a) and (b). Still, another contradiction between the records remained unresolved.

Fan and his assistant editors of the *Qing Taizong shilu* must have noticed the inconsistency between their fabricated account of the 'ultimatum in May' and the Manchu word "*jabdunggal*" ("[to attack it] first before it is ready for war") in the prayer read to Heaven on the winter solstice day. This is because the account of the 'ultimatum in May' was intended to portray the Manchu invasion of Joseon as a just war, with the Joseon side granted an opportunity to prepare for it.<sup>88</sup> It seems certain

<sup>86</sup> From this it can be surmised that the composer of the Samjeondo Inscription, Yi Gyeongseok, refused to include quotation (D) including the part (a), because it appeared to him as an outright falsehood.

<sup>87</sup> *QTZSL*, Chongde 4/12/28(gengxu).

<sup>88</sup> The account of the 'ultimatum in May' in the *Qing Taizong shilu* also includes an episode in which Hong Taiji was advised by Hife, one of his grand secretaries, against informing the Joseon envoys of the date of his expedition in advance, since Hife was worried that Joseon would strengthen its defensive readiness if he did. See the *Qing Taizong shilu* (Shunzhi Edition), *juan* 22, 64a-64b; and *Qing ruguan qian yu Chaoxian wanglai guoshu huibian* 清入關前與朝鮮往來國書彙編, 185. The point of this episode is that Hong Taiji's giving notification of the date of his expedition, which runs contrary to common sense, came from his depth of mind that the ordinary man

that those who participated in compilation of the *Qing Taizong shilu* in the Shunzhi era must have concerned themselves with removing this inconsistency.<sup>89</sup> This is because the author of the memorandum containing quotation (a) and the head of the compilation committee of the *Qing Taizong shilu*, were the same person, namely, Fan Wencheng. But if so, then how did Fan and his assistants strive to solve this problem?

In the *Qing Taizong shilu* compiled in the Shunzhi era, quotation (b) in the Manchu language was translated into the literary Chinese as follows:

(c) I am aware that Joseon violated the brotherhood pact and so I want to dispatch troops and attack Joseon preemptively, before Joseon do so (欲乘其未發而先伐之) . . .<sup>90</sup>

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could not understand.

<sup>89</sup> The *Qing Taizong shilu* (Shunzhi Edition) is known to have been compiled first in the Manchu language, based on such Manchu language materials as the *Manwen yuan dang* (*Jiu Manzhou dang*), and then translated into literary Chinese. See Matsumura Jun 松村潤, 2018, "Junchi shosan Shin Taisō jitsu roku" 順治初纂清太宗實錄 [Shunzhi Edition of the Qing Veritable Records of Emperor Taizong] in *Min Shin shi ronkō* 明清史論考, Tokyo: amakawa Shuppansha, 341. It was from the time of the Kangxi reign that the *Qing shilu* 清實錄 were prepared in literary Chinese first and then translated into the Manchu and Mongolian languages. Endymion Wilkinson, 2013, *Chinese History: A New Manual* (中國歷史新冊), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 833.

<sup>90</sup> *QTZSL* (Shunzhi Edition), *juan* 23, 48b, Chongde 1/11/25(yichou). As early as 1930, Nakamura Hidetaka 中村榮孝 reported the "Shin Taisō Chōsen seitō kokusaimon sōkō" 清太宗朝鮮征討告祭文草稿 [Draft of the Prayer of the Qing Emperor Taizong on the Expedition against Joseon], which he learned of from the documents of the *Neige daku* 內閣大庫 [Grand Secretariat Archives] collection, preserved by Luo Zhenyu 羅振玉. See Nakamura Hidetaka 中村榮孝, 1970, "Shin Taisō no Chōsen seibatsu ni kansuru komonjo" 清太宗の朝鮮征伐に關する古文書 [Old Document about the Qing Emperor Taizong's Expedition against Joseon], in *Nissen kankeishi no kenkyū* 日鮮關係史の研究 [Study on Japan-Korea Relations], vol. 2 Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 613–616. This document, which can be viewed as photographic material (SJ000009753) and as glass film (GF 3348 [25-241-14]) of the National Institute of Korean History, translates the original Manchu language source of quotation (c) as "乘其未發，而欲先發之" in literary Chinese. Comparing the entire document with the original text in the Manchu language and with the translation in the Qing Taizong shilu (Shunzhi Edition), this document seems to have preceded the latter in sequence. It seems that this draft translation was also made in the Shunzhi era.

The meaning of the word “fa” 發 of the compound *weifa* 未發 here is “to dispatch troops” (fabing 發兵). Thus, the whole sentence can be read as saying that ‘the Qing will attack Joseon first before Joseon launches its attack,’ so that it does not conflict with the account of the ‘ultimatum in May.’

But quotation (c) is an obvious misinterpretation. In addition, the Manchus were well aware that Joseon, at that time, had neither the ability nor the intention to make a preemptive attack.<sup>91</sup> Therefore, quotation (c), a translation as meaning that the Qing would launch a preemptive strike before Joseon could launch one, was an intentional misinterpretation to resolve the contradiction caused by fabrication of the account of the ‘ultimatum in May.’ In other words, in order to hide one lie, another lie was told, which can be seen as a smoking gun proving that the Qing court historian of Shunzhi era attempted to cover up their forgery of historical records.

The efforts made by the editors of the *Qing Taizong shilu* in the Shunzhi era to conceal their forgery through an intentional misinterpretation, in combination with the fabricated account of the ‘ultimatum in May,’ present a ‘warning’ to scholars conducting research on the Manchu/Qing invasion of Joseon, that the entries in the *Qing Taizong shilu*, especially those related to its narrative of a just war, should not be trusted at face value. This warning also applies to the following findings illustrated by recent researches: the letter of the Mongol princes sent to Joseon, which is cited in its entirety for the second day of the second month of the tenth year of the Tiancong reign (March 8, 1636) in the *Qing Taizong shilu*, differs substantially from the original letter in the terms used and contents;<sup>92</sup> the imperial edict (*chiyu* 勅諭) of Hong Taiji, cited on the 28th day of the first month of the second year of the Chongde reign (February 22, 1637) in the *Qing Taizong shilu*, is different from the

<sup>91</sup> Bumjin Koo, *Byeongja horan, Hong Taiji ui jeonjaeng* 병자호란, 홍타이지의 전쟁, 41–42.

<sup>92</sup> See the report (1930) by Nakamura Hidetaka 中村榮孝, “Shin Taisō no Chōsen seibatsu ni kansuru komonjo” 清太宗の朝鮮征伐に関する古文書, 607–613.

extant original in many sentences;<sup>93</sup> the imperial edict cited on the 24th day of the first month of the second year of the Chongde reign (February 18, 1637) in the *Qing Taizong shilu* proves to be a fabrication inserted at a later time;<sup>94</sup> and the editors of the *Qing Taizong shilu* deliberately glossed over the facts about smallpox epidemics during the first Manchu invasion in 1627 and the second Manchu invasion in 1637.<sup>95</sup>

Finally, I would like to wrap up this article with an interesting post-script about quotation (c) as it appeared in subsequent redactions of the *Qing Taizong shilu*. If one looks up the text of the prayer to Heaven (*gaotian zhuwen* 告天祝文) in the *Qing Taizong shilu* edited in the Qianlong era - the most widely used edition today - the second sentence in quotation (c) has been revised to the following:

(d) When it (i.e. Joseon) is not yet ready for war, [ I ] want to dispatch troops to subdue it (欲及其未備, 興師致討) . . .<sup>96</sup>

With regard to the Chinese translation of “*jabunggala*” in the original Manchu language prayer, the term *weifa* 未發 of quotation (c) has been revised to *weibei* 未備 (“not yet ready for war”) in quotation (d). And this revision is a slight change to the Kangxi edition of the *Qing Taizong shilu*, which read as follows:

<sup>93</sup> Hong Seonggu 홍성구, “Gungnip jungang doseogwan sojang ‘Cheong Taejong joyu e daehayeo’ 국립중앙도서관 소장 「청태종 조유」에 대하여 [A Study on Qing Taizong’s Edicts, Housed in the National Library of Korea], in *Daegu sahak* 123 (2016) 7–10.

<sup>94</sup> Bumjin Koo 구범진, “Byeongja Horan gwa cheonyeondu” 병자호란과 천연두 [The Manchu/Qing Invasion of Joseon, and Smallpox] in *Minjok munhwa yeongu* 72, 49–50. This fabricated edict is also included in the Manchu Language Archives of the Qing. See Kawachi Yoshihiro 河内良弘, trans. and ed. *Neikokushien Manbun tōan yakuchū: Chūgoku daiichi rekishi tōan kansō, Sūitoku ni san nenbun* 内國史院滿文檔案譯註: 中國第一歷史檔案館藏 崇德二·三年分, 62–65. The document in question points to the need for caution that one should take even in using the Manchu archives.

<sup>95</sup> Bumjin Koo, *Byeongja horan, Hong Taiji ui jeonjaeng* 병자호란, 홍타이지의 전쟁, 270–274.

<sup>96</sup> *QTZSL* (Qianlong Edition), Chongde 1/11/25(yichou).

(e) [When] it (i.e. Joseon) is not yet ready for war, [ I ] want to dispatch troops first (欲其未備而先興師). . .<sup>97</sup>

Quotation (d) from the Qianlong edition of the *Qing Taizong shilu* deleted the word *xian* 先 (“first”) appearing in the Kangxi edition. It seems that the editors viewed that word as redundant, because it was too obvious in the context of Joseon’s unpreparedness for war. Importantly, however, quotations (d) and (e), both from later editions of the *Qing Taizong shilu*, made revisions to quotation (c) from the Shunzhi edition, returning to the original meaning of quotation (b) in the Manchu language. The reason behind these later revisions seems to have stemmed from the Kangxi emperor’s desire to give priority to accuracy of the translations of Manchu language text into literary Chinese. The Kangxi emperor was in fact much concerned with the problem of discrepancies in meaning between the Manchu language texts and their Chinese translations. For example, he recollected that, in the process of editing the Kangxi edition of the *Qing Taizong shilu*, he himself spent two years reviewing the translation drafts under the editorial chiefs, such as grand secretaries Tuhai 圖海 and Du Lide 杜立德, and correcting what appeared to be incorrect translations.<sup>98</sup>

While the editors of the Shunzhi edition of the *Qing Taizong shilu* focused on creating the narrative of a just war by manipulating historical records, their counterparts involved in the Kangxi edition valued accuracy of translation with a result that they inadvertently damaged the consistency of the narrative of a just war against Joseon. Since the editors of the Shunzhi edition were the very authors of the fabricated account of the ‘ultimatum in May,’ they were bound to be sensitive to its contradiction

with the prayer of the 25th day of the 11th month whereas the editors of later editions, unaware of the fabrication of their predecessors, might well have paid little attention to this contradiction. It is of course still an open question whether they decided to put priority on the accuracy of their own translation while being aware of adverse and critical consequences that their revised translation would generate for the narrative of a just war.

<sup>97</sup> *QTZSL* (Kangxi Edition), juan 32, Chongde1/11/25(yichou).

<sup>98</sup> *Qing Shengzu shilu* 清聖祖實錄 [Qing Veritable Records of Emperor Shengzu], Kangxi 45/10/23(dingwei). Considering the Kangxi emperor’s recollections, and the correction of mistranslations in the *Qing Taizong shilu* (Kangxi Edition), it can be surmised that the original text of the prayer in the Manchu version of the *Qing Taizong shilu* (Shunzhi Edition) had not been manipulated, unlike its Chinese translation.

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## The Rule of Hong Taiji and the Use of Policies toward Joseon

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## The Rule of Hong Taiji and the Use of Policies toward Joseon\*

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### Introduction

In the early seventeenth century when Hong Taiji (r. 1626-1643) became khan of the Later Jin (1616-1636),<sup>1</sup> its diplomatic relationship with Joseon, which had been relatively stable during the reign of Nurhaci (r. 1616-1626),<sup>2</sup> deteriorated to the point of two wars, the First Manchu Invasion in 1627 and the Second Manchu Invasion in 1637. The relationship between Qing china (1644-1911) and Joseon has received much attention in scholarly circles.<sup>3</sup> Research on the relationship between the

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<sup>\*</sup> This translated article is a reviewed and supplemented version of Mi-ryung Song, 「천총년간(天聰年間, 1627-1636) 지배체제(支配體制)의 확립과정(確立過程)과 조선정책(朝鮮政策)」, 『중국사연구』 54 (June, 2008); 161-190.

<sup>1</sup> The Later Jin was a Manchurian state based on the Liaodong region prior to the change of the country's name to the Daqing (大清, 1636-1911). At this point, the ruler of the Later Jin, or Khan had no monopoly on political power.

<sup>2</sup> See Chen Jiexian, 2001, "Qing Taizu shiqi Manzhou yu Chaoxian guanxi kao," *Qing shi za bi* 6 (1985); Noh Ki-sik, "Manju ui heunggi wa Dong-Asia jilseo ui byeondong," *Jungguksa yeongu* 16: 1-35.

<sup>3</sup> Kim Jong-won, 1999, *Geunse Dong-Asia gwangyesa yeongu*, Seoul: Hyeon; Liu Jiaqu, *Qing chao chuqi de zhong han guanxi* (Taipei: Wenshizhe Chubanshe, 1986); Zhang Cunwu, *Qing-Han zongfan maoyi, 1637-1894* (Taipei: Zhongyang Yanjiu Yuan Jindai shi Vanjiu suo, 1978); Jeon Hae-

Later Jin-the predecessor of the Qing-and Joseon during the time has focused on how to characterize the nature of the two wars that occurred in a span of ten years and the resultant relationship between the two states. These studies can be grouped into those dealing mainly with the background to the wars and the treaties that followed,<sup>4</sup> those stressing the influence of economic factors in the relationship between the two states,<sup>5</sup> those examining the response of the Joseon court,<sup>6</sup> and those employing a more macroscopic perspective on the change in the East Asian order.<sup>7</sup> They have focused on the relationship between the two states in terms of politics, economics, society, culture, and diplomacy. In particular, studies emphasizing how the war was necessary for the Later Jin have approached the issue from economic and military perspectives. By so doing, they have underlined the fact that the Later Jin used war with Joseon as a means of handling its poor economic situation and removing the danger that Joseon posed against its anti-Ming military operation.

What we should not dismiss is the fact that during the beginning of Hong Taiji's reign, there were also many political changes within the court of the Later Jin and this political change played a crucial role in determining its diplomatic stance toward Joseon. Previous studies, as aforementioned, have tended to pay great attention to how Hong Taiji consoli-

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 jong, 1966, "Han-Jung jogong gwangye go" *Dongyang sahak yeongu* 1: 10-41; Jeon Hae-jong, 1971, "Cheongdae Han-Jung gwangye ui il gochal - Jogongji edo reul tonghayeo bon cheong ui taedo ui byeoncheon e daehayeo," *Dongyanghak* 1: 229-45; Choe So-ja, 1997, *Myeongcheong sidae Jung-Han gwangyesa yeongu*, Seoul: Ihwa Yeoja Daehakgyo Chulpanbu.

<sup>4</sup> Song Huijuan, 2003, "1627-1636 nianjian hou jin yu Chaoxian guanxi yanbian xin tan," *Dongjiang xue kan* 20.2: 97-101; Chen Jiexian, 1980, "Lue lun tian cong nianjian hou jin yu Chaoxian de guanxi," *Dongbang hakji* 24: 331-51; Liu, *Qing chao chuqi de zhong han guanxi* Chap. 1.

<sup>5</sup> Kim Jong-won, 1978, "Jeongmyo Horansi hugeum ui chulbyeong donggi" *Dongyang sahak yeongu* 12-13: 55-93.

<sup>6</sup> Kim Yong-heum, 2006, "Jeongmyo Horan gwa Juhwa-Jeokhwa nonjaeng," *Hanguk sasang sahak* 26: 159-99; Pak Hyeon-mo, 2003, "10 nyeongan ui wigi: Jeongmyo-Byeongja Horangi ui gonglon jeongchi bipan," *Hanguk jeongchihak hoebo* 37.2: 27-46; Jeon, 1975, "Jeongmyo Horan ui hwapyeong gyoseop e daehayeo,"; Choe, "Honan gwa DaemyeongCheong gwangye ui byeoncheon," *Idae sawon* 12: 54; Han Myung-gi, 2000, "Myeong-Cheong gyochehi Dongbuk-A jilseo wa Joseon jibaechung ui daeung," *Yeoksa wa hyeonsil* 37: 124-48.

<sup>7</sup> Noh, "Manju ui heunggi wa Dong-Asia jilseo ui byeondong," 3-14.

dated his rulership against any potential challengers from his Manchurian royal family.<sup>8</sup> The Hong Taiji's reign saw a transformation of political relations from governance, based on collegial deliberation, to the emergence of new political forces in support of Hong Taiji, and finally to the imperium of Hong Taiji. This shift within the court, I think, did affect the policy-making process towards Joseon and led to the two invasions in 1627 and 1637. With this in mind, this article explores how the political situation of the Later Jin in the early seventeenth century was interrelated with diplomatic relationship with Joseon. To do this, the content of this paper will be divided periodically into two distinct periods, the first when the relationship with Joseon deteriorated for a decade from 1626 and the second when the Later Jin was renamed the Great Qing (大清) against Ming China (1368-1644) in 1636.

## Defeating Political Enemies and the Use of Joseon

The campaign against Joseon began merely four months after Hong Taiji was enthroned as khan. There were two immediate reasons for this. One was the unfavorable economic situation of the Later Jin. The other was the need to address the stationing of the Ming troops under General Mao Wenlong (1576-1629) in the Joseon territory. However, notable changes took place within the power structure of the Later Jin court as Hng Taiji eliminated political enemies. The representative example is the treatment of Amin (1585-1640),<sup>9</sup> the son of Šurhaci who was the younger brother of Nurhaci.

To understand the relationship between Hong Taiji and Amin, it is

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<sup>8</sup> Kim Jong-won, Geunse Dong-Asia gwangyesa yeongu, 159-162; Park Hyeon-mo, 2002, "Jeongmyo Horangi ui gungnaeoe jeongchi," *Gugje jeongchi nonchong* 42. 4: 217-35.

<sup>9</sup> Amin was the sixth son of Šurhaci and came under Nurhaci's command after the death of his father. His military accomplishments during the wars with the Ula tribe in 1608 and 1613 earned him a promotion to the rank of taiji (台吉). In 1629, when Hong Taiji advanced close to Beijing, Amin remained in Shenyang to handle government affairs. See Arthur W. Hummel, ed., 1944, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period (1644-1912)*, vol. 1, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 8-9.

important to contextualize the political system of the Later Jin under its founder, Nurhachi. In 1621, Nurhachi proposed a collegial system in which eight *beiles* (Venerable Prince or Notable Lord) would jointly deliberate and decide on state affairs. The following year, he tried to change the system further so that power could not be concentrated in the hands of the khan alone.<sup>10</sup> Even, he reformed the decision-making process so that twenty four judges should discuss state affairs and report their conclusions to Grand Ministers who then should deliberate and report their opinions to the eight *beiles* for the final decision.

Specifically, following Nurhachi's instructions, four *Amba Beiles* of Hong Taiji, Amin, Daišan (1583-1648), and Manggūltai (1587-1633) took turns administering state affairs for one month with the khan presiding over the court council (御殿) twice a month. This led to the expectation that 1) state affairs, including the enthronement and dethronement of the khan, would be determined by the four *Amba Beiles* together,<sup>11</sup> 2) political power should be also shared by the four *beiles* in lieu of any autocracy by the khan himself, and 3) policy decisions went administratively through multiple stages of deliberation by the four *beiles*.

Interestingly, while Hong Taiji took charge of state affairs, the other three *beiles* sat alongside Hong Taiji facing south, which signified no discrimination among the four *beiles* in seat arrangement at the court. This case displayed how they ruled jointly. Moreover, when performing rituals at the Dang zi (堂子), where offerings were made to traditional tribal deities of the Later Jin in the new year, Hong Taiji first bowed to the deities

and finally to his uncles and brothers.<sup>12</sup> This gives a clear indication of the status of the future khan Hong Taiji.

Under these circumstances, Nurhachi did not even name a successor on his deathbed and Hong Taiji became khan.<sup>13</sup> Yoto (?-1638) and Sahaliyan (1604-1636) first discussed the enthronement of Hong Taiji and secured the consent of their father, Daišan. The next day Daišan presided over a meeting and brought up the matter of nominating Hong Taiji to be khan. Amin, Manggūltai, Abatai (1592-1643), Degelei (1597-1635), Jirgalang (1599-1655), Ajige (1605-1651), Dorgon (1612-1650), Dodo (1614-1649), Dudu (1597-1642), and Hooqe (1609-1648) agreed altogether to the decision and asked Hong Taiji to take the throne. What is noticeable is that Amin, even though he was instrumental in the enthronement of Hong Taiji, had no intention of being subject to him. Prior to the above decision, Amin sent an emissary to Hong Taiji and offered his conditional support by stating that "I [Amin] and the other *beiles* will nominate you to be Khan, on the condition that you allow me to leave and live in the Waifan (外藩)." Amin was looking for a way to circumvent the power of Hong Taiji, who refused that offer.

What surprises us is that Hong Taiji sent Amin to attack Joseon during the First Manchu Invasion in 1627.<sup>14</sup> Given that the khan must have had questions about Amin's loyalty, sending him to spearhead the campaign seemed to be a risky action. What made Hong Taiji choose his disobedient uncle to lead the military campaign against Joseon? This question is closely related to the policy-making process of the Later Jin. In or-

<sup>10</sup> For more information regarding the system of the Council of the Eight Manchu Lords (八王合議制), see Guo Songyi, Li Xinda, and Li Shangying, 2002, *Qing chao dianzhang zhidu*, Changchun: Jilin Wenshi Chubanshe, 11-12; Bai Xinliang, 2002, *Qing dai zhongshu juece yanjiu*, Shenyang: Liaoning Renmin Chubanshe: 33; Yang Zhen, 2000, "Hou jin ba wang gongzhi guozheng zhi yanjiu," *Zhongguo shi yanjiu* 1: 122-123.

<sup>11</sup> It has been suggested that the reason why Nurhachi insisted on ruling through the collegial deliberative system was to protect his younger and less powerful sons like Dorgon from any factional strife at the political center. See Bai Xinliang, *Qing dai zhongshu juece yanjiu*, 32-33; Yang Zhen, "Hou jin ba wang gongzhi guozheng zhi yanjiu," 123.

<sup>12</sup> "Ba huangzi jin wen siwei", *Man wen mi dang*, vol. 101, Taipei: Wenhai Chubanshe, 1967, 69-72; "Taizu qi yu si beile" *Man wen mi dang*, 87; 3rd lunar month, 3rd day, 1622, *Qing Taizu shilu*, vol. 4, Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1986.

<sup>13</sup> For more reference to the enthronement of Hong Taiji, see Mitamura Taisuke, 1941, "Shin no taisō no sokui jijō ni tsuite," *Tōyō shi kenkyū* 6.2; Ishibashi Takao, 1944, "Shinsho kōtei ken no keisei katei," *Tōyō shi kenkyū* 53.1; Wang Sizhi, 1984, "Huang Taiji ji li yu zhu beile de maodun," *Lishi dang'an* 3; Okada Hideo, 1972, "Shin no taisō shiritsu no jijō," in *Yamamoto hakase kanreki kinen tōyō shi ronsou*, ed., Yōkyō: Yamakawa Shuppansha; Li Guangtao, 1953, "Qing Taizong duo wei kao," *Dalu zazhi* 6.5; Li Hongbin, 1981, "Hong Taiji jisi de ji ge wenti." *Lishi dang'an* 3.

<sup>14</sup> 1st lunar month, 8th day, 1627, Manbun Rōtō Kenkyūkai, trans. and annot., 1955-1956, *Manbun rōtō*, vol. 4, Tōkyō: Tōyō bunko, 2.

der to mobilize troops for the conquest of Joseon, the khan needed the consent of the four *beiles* who shared power at the time. In such a situation, a conflict with Amin, one member of the four *beiles*, could have worsened an already unstable political system and might have reached the point of disintegration.<sup>15</sup> For that matter, it was difficult for Hong Taiji to oppose the appointment of Amin as the leader of the invasion.

In fact, all four *beiles* had different ideas as to the invasion. Hong Taiji hoped that a successful invasion would help overcome the socioeconomic crises of the Later Jin at the time and consolidate his regal authority. On the other hand, it is likely that Amin saw the invasion as an opportunity to forge an independent path separate from the Later Jin. Daišan, the second son of Nurhaci, and Manggūltai, the fifth son of Nurhaci, for their part, hoped to strengthen their position within the court while exercising political leverage, whenever available, at the court. These competing interests made it practically impossible for Hong Taiji to oppose Amin leading the invasion force, regardless of the risk he was taking. What about the case of Amin?

In two months, the war came to an end. While negotiations between the two states were in progress, however, Amin insisted on marching down to expose his ambition to seize the capital of Joseon and stay there. He even asked Dudu, the son of Cuyen (1580-1615) - the eldest son of Nurhaci and the older brother of Hong Taiji - to move to Joseon and settle down together with him.<sup>16</sup> However, other *beiles* participating in the campaign were not sympathetic to Amin's ambitions. Dudu was enraged greatly by Amin's absurd proposal. Furthermore, Yoto was pressuring Amin a quick retreat with the prisoners captured from Joseon because the Later Jin was simultaneously fighting against the Ming and the Mongols.

<sup>15</sup> Nicola Di Cosmo, 1999, "State Formation and Periodization in Inner Asian History," *Journal of World History* 10.1: 1-40.

<sup>16</sup> When Amin returned after losing Yongping, the first charge listed was his behavior at the time of the Joseon expedition. Dudu said, "That *beile* [Amin] said he would only take me, but what should I do? The *beile* is guilty and I am also guilty." Thus, although Dudu said that he did not know why Amin had chosen him, in reality he seemed to have been aware of Amin's intentions. 6th lunar month, 7th day, 1630, Manbun Rōtō Kenkyūkai, *Manbun rōtō*, vol. 4, 404.

Given this, Amin had the issue of retreat discussed among the ministers of the Eight Banners who had followed him to attack Joseon. Except for the minister under Amin's banner, which was the Bordered Blue Banner (鑲藍旗), the remaining seven ministers wanted to withdraw their forces. After the discussion, Yoto excluded Amin from the negotiations with Joseon<sup>17</sup> and Amin lost the support of the other *beiles*. After all, Hong Taiji's gamble of putting Amin in charge of the invasion paid off. Three years later, Hong Taiji ordered Amin to station in Yongping (永平) and defend the region. Amin lost it due to a counterattack by the Ming army. As a result, Hong Taiji had him arrested and imprisoned. Among the sixteen charges brought against him, the first, second, and tenth charges accused Amin of attempting to desert from the Later Jin and threatening its security.<sup>18</sup>

Hong Taiji eventually was able to eliminate his uncle, who appeared to be his most dangerous political opponent, for two main reasons. The first is the support of the *beiles* dispatched to Joseon. Yoto stood firmly for the enthronement of Hong Taiji and Jirgalang<sup>19</sup>, who was Amin's younger brother, also helped Yoto to conclude peace negotiations with Joseon and enjoyed Hong Taiji's trust. The other reason for Hong Taiji's political victory is connected to the harsh economic situation, deteriorated by severe famines, at the time of Nurhaci's demise and Hong Taiji's enthronement. Most of the *beiles*, such as Yoto and Sahaliyan, felt that Hong Taiji, active and aggressive in disposition, would be more effective at overcoming this crisis than the conservative Daišan. Hong Taiji

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<sup>17</sup> 3rd month, 1627, Manbun Rōtō Kenkyūkai, *Manbun rōtō*, vol. 4, 49-50. The reason why Amin wanted to go to the capital of Joseon was that he would investigate the fortresses of the Ming and Joseon in person. Chen Wenshi, 1991, *Ming Qing zhengzhi shehui shilun*, Taipei: Xuesheng Shuju, 493.

<sup>18</sup> 4th lunar month 7th day, Manbun Rōtō Kenkyūkai, *Manbun rōtō*, vol. 4, 401-16.

<sup>19</sup> After Nurhaci's death, Amin asked Hong Taiji if he would go his own way and Hong Taiji consulted Jirgalang to find out what Amin had planned. After expelling Amin, Hong Taiji handed over the Bordered Blue Banner (鑲藍旗) under Amin to Jirgalang. When Amin announced that he would advance towards the capital of Joseon, Yoto countered that the other banners would not follow Amin and persuaded Amin through Jirgalang. 6th lunar month, 7th day, 1630, Manbun Rōtō Kenkyūkai, *Manbun rōtō*, vol. 4, 401-05.

had also proved himself to be an excellent military commander.<sup>20</sup> This faith was not shaken by Amin's instigation to seek an independent space out of control of the new khan through the Joseon campaign in 1627.

## The Growth of New Political Forces and the Joseon Question

From 1632 to 1633, the bureaucratic groups driving policy decisions in the Later Jin can be divided into the Six Ministries (Liu-bu 六部) and the Literary Office (Wenguan 文館). The two political organizations differed from those at the beginning of Hong Taiji's reign. They emerged simultaneously to exclude Amin and Manggūltai from power.<sup>21</sup> Hong Taiji held Amin accountable for the loss of the Yongping area and incarcerated him in 1631. He also expelled Manggūltai for wielding a sword in his presence during the attack on Dalinghe (大凌河) in 1632. After these events, Daišan, the only remaining members of *Amba Beiles*, gave his consent to cease facing south (南面) and sitting alongside Hong Taiji. In the process, Hong Taiji started pushing forward institutional reforms to strengthen his might within and beyond the Later Jin.

In 1631, Hong Taiji established the Six Ministries at the suggestion of the Han Chinese who submitted themselves to the Later Jin. He then put one *beile* in charge of each ministry. In this way, he brought the *beiles*, who had wielded independent powers based on their banners up to this point, into the central officialdom. The transition did not go smoothly. Some of the *beiles* preferred to conduct business from their home without going to their offices. They also ignored established procedures and were often criticized for making decisions in favor of their own banners. Despite these problems, however, the significance of the new measure taken by Hong Taiji lies in the fact that the *beiles*, who had existed

<sup>20</sup> Chen Wenshi, *Ming Qing zhengzhi shehui shilun*, 431–32.

<sup>21</sup> Manggūltai, the fifth son of Nurhachi, displayed his military talents in the campaign against the Ula tribe in 1612. He was given the Plain Blue Banner (正藍旗) and became one of the four *hošo* (和碩) *beiles* in 1616. Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Qing Period (1644–1912)*, 562.

as independent political and military units of the Manchurian royal family of the Later Jin, were now integrated into the framework of central government. On the other hand, the Literary Office originated during the reign of Nurhachi.<sup>22</sup> It was set up in need of communication between the Manchu ruling elites and the Han Chinese who managed general administration except military affairs.<sup>23</sup> However, the Manchus outnumbered the Han Chinese in the office from the beginning and they petitioned Hong Taiji to appoint a *beile* as the head of the organization.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, Han Chinese bureaucrats working in the Literary Office complained that all the documents were written in Manchu and their Manchu colleagues monopolized information.<sup>25</sup>

The Six Ministries and the Literary Office were connected through an office called the Qixinlang (啓心郎) attached to the Six Ministries and responsible for advice and assistance. Notably, Hong Taiji made the Qixinlang entitled to take his suggestions directly to Hong Taiji himself in the case of rejection by his superior *beile*. At the same time, officials of the Literary Office were authorized to report on the activities of the Qixinlang.<sup>26</sup> The Literary Office itself was in charge of issuing and recording documents, delivering the khan's instructions, and discussing government affairs.<sup>27</sup> The office also did propose the establishment of the Grand

<sup>22</sup> Regarding the establishment of the Literary Office, see Kanda Nobuo, 1960, "Shinsho no bun-kan tsuite," *Tōyō shi kenkyū* 19.3.

<sup>23</sup> Miyazaki Ichisada, 1975, "Shincho ni okeru kuni-go mondai no ichimen," *Ajia kenkyū* 3: 15; Chen Jiexian, 1989, "Cong Qing chu zhongyang jian zhi kan manzhou hanhua," in *Jindai zhongguo chuqi lishi yan tao hui lunwen ji*, vol. 1, Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu Yin Shuguan: 135–136.

<sup>24</sup> "Yang Fangxing tiaochen shizheng zou" 楊方興條陳時政奏 [Yang Fangxing's Memorial on Current Affairs], 11th lunar month, 18th day, 1631, *Tiancong chao chen gong zou yi* (Taipei: Lian Guo Feng Chubanshe, 1969): 41.

<sup>25</sup> "Yang Fangxing tiaochen shizheng zou," 11th lunar month, 18th day, 1631, *Tiancong chao chen gong zou yi*.

<sup>26</sup> 8th lunar month, 8th day, 1632, *Qing Taizong shilu*, vol. 12; "Bao Chengxian Yi kaocha qixinlang youlie zou" 鮑承先議考察啓心郎優劣奏 [Bao Chengxian's Memorial on the Discussion of the Pros and Cons of Qixinlang], *Tiancong chao chen gong zou yi*.

<sup>27</sup> "Wang Wenkui tiaochen shiyi zou" 王文奎條陳時宜奏 [Wang Wenkui's Memorial on the Appropriate Administration], 9th lunar month, 1632, *Tiancong chao chen gong zou yi*; 12th lunar month, 5th day, 1635, *Qing Taizong shilu*, vol. 26; 2nd lunar month, 14th day, 1631, *Qing Taizong*

Secretariat (內閣) to replace the Deliberative Council of Princes & Ministers and the Six Ministries.<sup>28</sup> Without any complete control over the *beile*,<sup>29</sup> still, the dual institutional axes of the Six Ministries and the Literary Office enabled Hong Taiji to manage state affairs, keep the *beiles* in check, and gradually have dominion over the government.

Meanwhile, the issues of tributary goods, sent from Joseon to the Later Jin, and repatriating fugitives from Manchuria became two major reasons for conflict between the two states. From 1633, tensions rose when the Later Jin demanded the repatriation of its fugitives and the Warka people originally from the regions along the Ussuri River. Joseon contended that there were no such people to return. This disagreement was further exacerbated not only by the dissatisfaction of the Later Jin with the quantity of tributary goods from Joseon, but also the reluctance of Joseon to provide troops and ships for the Later Jin against the Ming and to sever diplomatic relationship with the Ming.<sup>30</sup> As a result, the Joseon envoys of 1633 were forced to bring back their tributary goods as the Later Jin refused to accept them.<sup>31</sup>

In the same year, Inggūldai, sent to Joseon as an envoy, reported that Joseon was building a fortress on a mountain peak south of Uiju (義州) under the pretext of defending against Japan. This news received a hostile reception in the Qing court and several officials even argued for a

war with Joseon.<sup>32</sup> At this time, Hong Taiji asked the *beiles* and the ministers for their opinions on which country he needed to conquer first, among the Ming, Joseon, or the Chahars. The majority of officials recommended dealing with the Ming first because once the Ming falls down Joseon would have little choice but to surrender to the Later Jin.

Those who advocated dealing with the Ming first, including Jirgalang and Dorgon, were responsible for the Six Ministries.<sup>33</sup> A substantial number of officials from the Literary Office also favored attacking the Ming. What the officials of the Literary Office saw as merit of attacking the Ming was that it would facilitate the recruitment of talented people and the reform of the established institutions. They also pointed to a variety of issues, including the Han Chinese captured in the Battle of Dalinghe (大凌河) around the Liaoning area, and marked the Shanhai Pass (山海關) as one of the strategic priorities for the conquest of the Ming. Additionally, they went against any peace negotiations with the Ming, inasmuch as these negotiation might be simply a Ming strategy to buy time for military mobilization.<sup>34</sup>

The new political forces, based largely on the Literary Office, started exerting a prominent influence on policy decisions of the Later Jin court in the Hong Taiji's reign, especially with respect to relations with

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*shilu*, vol. 6. In addition to these, the officials of the Literary Office also interpreted Hong Taiji's dreams. 10th month, 16th day, 1635, *Qing Taizong shilu*, vol. 25.

<sup>28</sup> 1st lunar month, 1st day, 1631, *Qing Taizong shilu*, vol. 8; 5th lunar month, 6th day, 1633, *Qing Taizong shilu*, vol. 14; "Ma Guangyuan jingxian yu zhong zou" 馬光遠敬獻愚忠奏 [Ma Guangyuan's Memorial with Humble and Loyal Dedication] 11th lunar month, 28th day, 1632, *Tiancong chao chen gong zou yi*.

<sup>29</sup> Ishibashi Takao, 1997, "Manju (滿洲) ōchō-ron," *Minshin jidai shi no shomondai*, Tōkyō: Kyūko Shoin: 1-32.

<sup>30</sup> Kim Jong-won, *Geunse Dong-Asia gwangyesa yeongu*, 132-424; Chen Jiexian, "Qing tai zu shiqi manzhou yu chaoxian guanxi kao," 332-34.

<sup>31</sup> 1st lunar month, 15th day, 1633, Zhongguo di yi Lishi Dang'an Guan, ed., *Qingchu neiguo shiyuan mamwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1 (Beijing: Guangming Ribao Chubanshe, 1985); 1st lunar month, 25th day, 1633, *Joseon Injo sillok*, vol. 28.

<sup>32</sup> 6th lunar month, 5th day, 1633, Zhongguo di yi Lishi Dang'an Guan, *Qingchu neiguo shiyuan mamwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, 20.

<sup>33</sup> 7th lunar month, 8th day, 1631, *Qing Taizong shilu*, vol. 9; 6th lunar month, 14th day, 1633, *Qing Taizong shilu*, vol. 14, 17.

<sup>34</sup> Jiang xin qing zao jue xi zheng zou 姜新請早決西征奏 [Jiang Xin's Memorial Requesting the Western Conquest], 1st lunar month, 1632, *Tiancong chao chen gong zou yi*, 5-6; Hu gong ming chenyan tu bao zou 胡貢明陳言圖報奏 [Hu Gongming's Memorial on Mapping], 8th lunar month, 1632, *Tiancong chao chen gong zou yi*, 11; Jiang Yunshen yijue he chengfou zou 江云深議決和成否奏 [Jiang Yunshen's Memorial on the Decision to Oppose the Making of Peace], *Tiancong chao chen gong zou yi*, 21; Gaoshi Jun jin chen guan jian zou 高士俊謹陳管見奏 [Gaoshi Jun's Memorial Cordially Presenting His Opinion], *Tiancong chao chen gong zou yi*, 23-24; Li Qifeng jin jin zhongyan zou 李栖風盡進忠言奏 [Li Qifeng's Memorial Giving His Sincere Counsel], 1st month, 29th day, 1632, *Tiancong chao chen gong zou yi*, 26-27. Hong Taiji used a double strategy of peace negotiation and warfare in relation to the Ming. This policy continued throughout his reign. Despite ongoing suggestions of many Han Chinese officials that he attack and capture Beijing, he did not change his mind. See Noh, "Manju ui heunggi wa Dong-Asia jilseo ui byeondong", 25.

Joseon. In the summer of 1633, when the court was debating its response to the tributary goods supplied by Joseon, a Literary Office official advised that the most appropriate course of action would be to accept them.<sup>35</sup> Two days later, Hong Taiji and the *beiles* gathered at Chongzheng Hall (崇政殿) and summoned the envoys from Joseon and examined the goods from Joseon. Shortly thereafter, in a letter given to the Joseon envoy, the court stated that even though it was not pleased with the goods, it had decided to receive them for the sake of peace between the two states.<sup>36</sup> This instance shows the growing impact of the new political forces on the Joseon matter within the Later Jin court.

At the same time, the letter criticized Joseon for not actively seeking to broker peace between the Qing and the Ming and requested Joseon to mediate between the two states.<sup>37</sup> However, this was a strategic feint by the Later Jin. Hong Taiji had ordered the Han Chinese officials in the Literary Office to devise a plan to attack the Ming. One of the tricky issues was to mobilize their armies.<sup>38</sup> In response, they suggested to falsely propose peace with the Ming, thereby buying time to advance troops for attacking the Ming, while the Ming is preoccupied with dissecting their real intentions. To this end, Joseon was used as an intermediary to falseheartedly propose peace with the Ming as a strategic deception.<sup>39</sup> At this juncture, ironically, it is Joseon that became an instrumental factor in the Ming front of the Later Jin and the occupation of its dominant position in Northeast Asia.

<sup>35</sup> Bao chengxian chen chaoxian shi zou 鮑承先陳朝鮮事奏 [Bao Chengxian's Memorial on Joseon Affairs], 5th lunar month, 24th day, 1633, *Tiancong chao chen gong zou yi*, 68.

<sup>36</sup> 6th lunar month, 16th day, 1633, *Joseon Injo Sillok*, vol. 28.

<sup>37</sup> 5th lunar month, 26th day, 1633, *Tiancong chao chen gong zou yi*, vol. 1, 17–18; 6th lunar month, 5th day, *Tiancong chao chen gong zou yi*, 20–21.

<sup>38</sup> 6th lunar month, 5th day, 1632, *Qing Taizong shilu*, vol. 12; “Ning Wanwo Fan Wencheng Ma Guozhu zou yi zhengming” 寧完我范文程馬國柱奏議證明 [Memorial by Ning Wanwo, Fan Wencheng and Ma Guozhu on the Conquest of the Ming], *Man wen mi dang*, 180–81.

<sup>39</sup> Hong Taiji's objective was to maintain a stable relationship with the Ming and keep a firm hold on Liaodong. This strategy impelled him to conduct both peace negotiations and military attacks until the final conquest of the Ming in 1644. See Zhao Yadi, 1996, “Huang Taiji daming chao calue de zhuanbian,” *Lishi jiao xue* 4: 31–33.

## New World Order under Hong Taiji and the Use of Joseon

In 1635, Hong Taiji gathered his officials to discuss the concept of *tianzi* (Son of Heaven 天子) and asked rhetorically if the Han Chinese had referred to the emperor as *tianzi* whether virtuous or not. He contended that only a virtuous individual could be designated *tianzi*, hinting that he was planning a change in how the regime should be perceived.<sup>40</sup> Alongside this, he declared, “Our country originally consisted of the Manchu, Hada, Ula, Yehe, and Hoifa. Those who do not know better often call us Jurchens. From now on, everyone should call our people Manchus. Those who call us Jurchens shall be punished.” This was a departure from Nurhachi's declaration that they were the successors to and descendants of the Jin Dynasty (1115-1234) dating back to the twelfth century.<sup>41</sup> Hong Taiji's step differentiated his regime from the Later Jin, inherited from his father, in both scale and character.<sup>42</sup>

What initially triggered this transformation was the merger of the Chahar Mongols. On becoming khan in 1626, Hong Taiji made alliances with the Mongol tribes opposed to Ligdan Khan (1588-1634) of the Chahars in order to hold the Chahar in check but avoided a direct confrontation with them. He also promoted economic activities by the Mongols in

<sup>40</sup> 5th lunar month, 20th day, 1635, *Qingchu neiguo shiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, vol.1, 167; *Chiu Man chou tang: Tensou 9 nen*, Tōkyō: Tōyō bunko, 1972, 144–45.

<sup>41</sup> Pamela Kyle Crossley, 1999, *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 145. Nurhachi said that they were not only of the same ethnicity as the subjects of the Jin Dynasty, but also lived in the same area, spoke the same language and even belonged to the same clan. He called the Ming the “Southern Dynasty” (南朝), an repetition of the term the Jin employed against the Song Dynasty (960-1279) in the south. For more reference to the declaration of the Manchus, see 10th lunar month, 13th day, 1635, *Qingchu neiguo shiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, 205.

<sup>42</sup> He further developed this idea by creating a Manchu myth related to Bukuri Yongson. Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*, 193–98. This story, which appears at the beginning of the Manchu Annals, became known by Musike (穆希克) who surrendered in the expedition of Hong Taiji toward the Amur region. 5th lunar month, 6th day, 1635, *Qingchu neiguo shiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, 160–61.

the region around the Great Wall and incorporated some Mongol forces, seceding from the Chahars, into the Later Jin. In 1634 when Ligdan passed away, he subjugated the remaining Chahar forces, thus ending the confrontation with the remaining strong Mongols after Nurhaci's campaign against Liaodong.<sup>43</sup> One year later, he hosted a banquet for Ligdan's wife and son.<sup>44</sup> At the banquet, he declared that he had obtained the seal of Mongol Khanate and confirmed his vast influence up to the Amur River.<sup>45</sup> After the celebration, the Han Chinese officials offered their congratulations on the seizure of the seal and proposed to Hong Taiji to publicize this auspicious occasion and to establish an honorary title (尊號) for his reign. However, at this point, Hong Taiji did not accept their request.<sup>46</sup>

On the 4th day of the second month of 1636, Han Chinese officials, this time with the support of the *beiles*, raised the issue once again.<sup>47</sup> They decided to present a memorial to Hong Taiji through the Manchu officials in the Palace Academy for the Advancement of Literature (*nei hongwen yuan* 內弘文院), the Palace Secretariat Academy (*nei mishu yuan* 內秘書院), and the Manchu Qixinlang of the Ministry of Rites.<sup>48</sup> They petitioned Hong Taiji to accept the honorary title on the grounds

<sup>43</sup> Noh Ki-sik, "Manju ui Monggol chahareu byeonghap gwa geu uimi," *Junggukhak nonchong* 14 (2001): 88–90.

<sup>44</sup> 9th lunar month, 25th day, 1635, *Qingchu neiguo shiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, 202.

<sup>45</sup> See Sun Wenliang and Li Zhiting, 1993, *Tian cong han chong de di*, Changchun: Jilin Wenshi Chubanshe; Cho Byeong-hak, 2004, "Hugeum ui heuglyong-gang jubyeon bujuk e daehan pyeongjeong-gwajeong mit boksok jeongchaek," *Monggol hak* 17; Chen Peng, 2004, "Qing Taizong tongyi Heilongjiang liuyu chutan," *Manzu yanjiu* 4: 253–257.

<sup>46</sup> Tiancong 6th year, 10th month, 1st day, *Qingchu neiguo shiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, 202; Tiancong 9th year, 10th month, 1st day, *Chiu Man chou tang*, 306–07.

<sup>47</sup> The description in this section of the event of 12th month, 28th day of Tiancong 9th year is based on the records of 12th lunar month, 28th day, 1635, *Qingchu neiguo shiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, 221–24 and those of the same date in *Chiu Man chou tang*, 369–83.

<sup>48</sup> Many studies on the political system of the Qing dynasty identify April 1636 as the point when the Literary Office was expanded and reorganized into the Three Palace Academies (內三院)—Palace Historiographic Academy (內國史院), Palace Academy for the Advancement of Literature (內弘文院), and Palace Secretariat Academy (內秘書院)—.

that the three Ming generals Kong Youde (?-1652), Geng Zhongming (1604-1649), and Shang Kexi (1604-1676) had already surrendered and the Chahars and other surrounding tribes were now under the control of the Later Jin. What is more, the son of Ligdan Khan had surrendered and the acquisition of the seal proved symbolically to be high time to glorify the zenith of his supreme authority.<sup>49</sup> However, Hong Taiji once again turned down the proposal as he had not yet accomplished his grand undertaking to become the unrivaled leading power of Northeast Asia.

Hong Taiji's reluctance as above might suggest that he was preoccupied with the continuing warfare with the Ming that remained still unconquered. However, considering subsequent developments, Hong Taiji's intentions lay elsewhere. In the face of Hong Taiji's continued refusal to an honorary title, Sahaliyan, a *beile* in charge of the Ministry of Rites, uttered, "The reason the Khan does not receive the honorary title is because we, the *beiles*, have erred." He felt that the relationship between a ruler and subjects had to be settled by taking the oath of allegiance. Upon receiving this report, Hong Taiji was pleased: "What the *Beile* Sahaliyan said truly won my heart." He then stated that he would decide whether to receive the honorary title after the *beiles* had sworn their allegiance. That evening, he called the Manchu officials and Han Chinese officials together and told them, "Several *beiles* have requested the acceptance of an honorary title but it cannot be accepted because the region has not yet been unified and we cannot know the will of Heaven." The Han Chinese officials of the Literary Office transmitted their opinion as follows: "Following the way of Heaven and accepting the people's requests, the honorary title should be determined and the place of the Emperor should be succeeded."

What is clear is that the Han Chinese bureaucrats took the lead in formalizing the issue of how to enhance the regnal title for Hong Taiji and paved a path for a channel where the Manchu *beiles* communicated their views among themselves regarding the matter. The Manchu bureau-

<sup>49</sup> 12th lunar month, 28th day, 1635, *Qingchu neiguo shiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, 221.

crats in the Literary Office also sided with their Han Chinese colleagues. Through the Literary Office, Hong Taiji created a political route where the *beiles*, the most powerful in the court, could participate in the process of adopting a highly elevated title for khan and completely submitting to Hong Taiji himself.

The day after the meeting between Hong Taiji and the officials from the Literary Office, Sahaliyan convened a meeting of *beiles* and conveyed the message that “each should duly make a pledge to reform so that the Khan can accept the honorary title.” All the *beiles* immediately pledged their loyalty to the khan. However, Hong Taiji discovered that due to illness, Daišan was the only *beile* not to pledge loyalty. He therefore instructed Sahaliyan to keep the letters of the pledges of loyalty from the other *beiles* until he received the one from Daišan as well. He also issued instructions that the oath should not mention any previous defiance or disobedience by the *beiles* but rather proclaim that they would fulfill their responsibilities with loyalty in their hearts. At the same time, he made it clear that those who had other intentions would be punished. On hearing this, Daišan was anxious to take his oath and on the 4th day of the second month of 1636; he and the other *beiles* swore allegiance to Hong Taiji.<sup>50</sup>

The matter of adopting honorific title did not end with the oath-taking of the *beile*. The Mongol nobility also wished to be part of the process of obedience to the Manchurian unifier Hong Taiji. Moreover, Hong Taiji raised the issue of sending an envoy to Joseon by saying, “It is appropriate to discuss the issue with the king of Joseon since the king of Joseon and I have a brotherly bond.” Sahaliyan proposed that unlike previous envoys to Joseon, the delegation should include the *beiles* and the Mongol nobility. He also suggested that the delegation to Joseon would show off the fact that the Mongol tribes, whose military force was tremendously strong, had submitted voluntarily to Hong Taiji. Hong Taiji

<sup>50</sup> In *Qingchu neiguo shiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, 222, the entry for the twenty-ninth day of the twelfth lunar month in 1635 includes the expression “the next day.” However, the event is still included in the entry for the twenty-eighth day.

agreed and an unprecedented size of delegation departed for Joseon.<sup>51</sup>

In fact, Hong Taiji had sought the recognition of Joseon for several months even before this diplomatic maneuver. He wanted the Joseon court to admit military prowess of his regime vis-à-vis that of the faltering Ming. In 1635, he sent a letter to the king of Joseon and announced that he attacked the Heilongjiang region, where over 10,000 people surrendered and that he had also attacked the Ningyuan (寧遠) region of the Ming.<sup>52</sup> On the 19th day of the seventh month of 1635, he informed Joseon that all the remaining Chahar Mongols had surrendered, the Ming armies around Songshan (松山), located south of Jinzhou in Liaoning Province, had been severely damaged, and more than 6000 people had surrendered. The triumphant performance of the Qing contrasted with the bad news from the Ming that the Hongwu Emperor's tomb desecrated and the Ming troops fell into disarray.<sup>53</sup> When it comes to the political power, on the 24th day of the eleventh month, 1635, Hong Taiji summoned the envoys from Joseon and showed them the seal of the Mongol Chahar Khan.<sup>54</sup> He also took issue with a letter from the Joseon court: “Why have all the previous letters from Joseon used the character 奉 [feng], but now they use only the character 致 [zhi]? Are they regarding me lightly?” In addition, another document emphasized that the Ming was running out of luck, pointing out that Ming officials were deceiving the emperor.<sup>55</sup>

When arriving in Joseon, the Qing envoys demanded that Joseon acknowledge the recently acquired higher status of Hong Taiji after the Ming lost the will of heaven and affirmed that the Qing received a new

<sup>51</sup> 12th lunar month, 28th day, 1635, *Qingchu neiguo shiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, 223–224.

<sup>52</sup> 5th lunar month, 13th day, 1635, *Qingchu neiguo shiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, 164; 5th month, 18th day, 1635, *Qing Taizong shilu*, vol. 23.

<sup>53</sup> 6th lunar month, 16th day, 1635, *Qingchu neiguo shiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, 170.

<sup>54</sup> 10th lunar month, 15th day, 1635, *Qingchu neiguo shiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, 205.

<sup>55</sup> 12th lunar month, 30th day, 1635, *Joseon Injo sillok*, vol. 31; 12th lunar month, 20th day, 1635, *Qingchu neiguo shiyuan manwen dang'an yibian*, vol. 1, 217–218.

mandate from Heaven (天命).<sup>56</sup> However, Joseon was unwilling to accept Hong Taiji's higher title and the envoys ended up returning with their purpose unfulfilled. When Hong Taiji sent his envoys with large numbers of Mongols, the Joseon court responded, "If he wants to call himself the Son of Heaven and to ascend to the position of Emperor, he can become an emperor in his own country and rule over his own nation." As the court saw it, the reason for this large delegation to Joseon was to threaten them and "to announce to the whole world that Joseon has acknowledged him as the Son of Heaven."<sup>57</sup>

This event precipitated vociferous calls for an invasion of Joseon within the Qing court. However, Hong Taiji went against the hasty opinion by stating that "Let the sons of both the King of Joseon and several of his ministers be sent as hostages. If Joseon sends them, this matter will be concluded. If they do not, then, we will discuss invading Joseon again."<sup>58</sup> So, although the original plan in which Joseon takes part willingly in the process of accepting and affirming the imperial status of Hong Taiji did not go as expected, in the fifth month of 1636 Hong Taiji declared the birth of a new order by renaming the country Great Qing, calling himself emperor, and declaring his reign title as Chongde (崇德).

At this time, he rationalized Joseon's stubborn refusal to be incorporated into the Qing-led order: "The world under Heaven is not a world of one person but a world of peoples." He also underlined that having virtue was a condition for the Son of Heaven and that the mandate of Heaven had moved from the Liao (907-1125) to Jin to Yuan (1206-1368) and Ming Dynasties, and now to the Qing dynasty where virtue now resided.<sup>59</sup> Likewise, Hong Taiji sought to convince Joseon that his new Qing was to be the rightful successor to the Ming, pressure Joseon to recognize his new regime, and leave the Ming behind as an outcast unfit for

the Qing-led world order. Hence, he was entirely dissatisfied with the fact that the recalcitrant Joseon rejected to acknowledge and show respect to his new regime. The last measure was to be taken and that is how the Second Manchu Invasion took place in the twelfth month of 1636.

## Concluding Remarks

The policies of the Later Jin toward Joseon were closely related to the change in power relations within the regime, particularly Hong Taiji's consolidation of power. This change in power relations occurred in three stages. In the first period, Hong Taiji, ascending the throne, shared power with the other three members of the four *Amba beiles*. In the second stage, he made vigorous effort to expel Amin from power to change the status of the existing *beiles* with the help of new political forces within the court. Finally, he managed to strengthen his new regime by receiving a higher honorary title and renaming his state as Great Qing. The Manchu Invasion in 1626 reflected the discord between Hong Taiji and Amin. Although Amin consented to the nomination of Hong Taiji as khan, he had no desire to be controlled by this new khan. It was only during this campaign that the intentions of Amin became evident. At that time, his attempt to tread an independent path was unsuccessful due to opposition from several of his fellow *beiles*. In terms of power struggle within the Later Jin court, therefore, Joseon turned out to be one part of that battlefield especially between Hong Taiji and Amin.

Hong Taiji used Joseon to prevent economic crisis from causing a disintegration of the political unity under his reign and to dismantle, both symbolically and militarily, defense mechanism advantageous to the Ming. The diplomatic relations of the Later Jin with Joseon became further complicated by the recurring issue of repatriating fugitives. From 1634 onwards, veiled conflicts between the two states escalated as the Later Jin demanded the return of escaped Jurchens and the Warka people while Joseon insisted that there are no fugitives to send back. These tensions reached their height when the Later Jin refused to even unpack the

<sup>56</sup> 2nd lunar month, 2nd day, 1636, Manbun Rôtō Kenkyūkai, *Manbun rōtō*, vol. 4, 906–911.

<sup>57</sup> 2nd lunar month, 21st day, 1636, *Joseon Injo sillok*, vol. 32.

<sup>58</sup> 3rd lunar month, 20th day, 1636, Manbun Rôtō Kenkyūkai, *Manbun rōtō*, vol. 4, 966–972.

<sup>59</sup> 4th lunar month, 15th day, 1636, Manbun Rôtō Kenkyūkai, *Manbun rōtō*, vol. 4, 998–999.

tributary goods carried by Joseon envoys. However, although the relationship with Joseon seriously deteriorated, it did not reach a point of war due to the influence of the emerging political force. The increasingly influential Literary Office, dedicated to the consolidation of Hong Taiji's political power, advocated focusing on the war with the Ming. In the fifth month of 1636, renaming his state Great Qing, however, he used once again Joseon to affirm its new imperial status and evince his highest authority in the regional world order beyond the stumbling Ming. When Joseon was reluctant to accept the indubitably leading position of the new Qing under his reign, what remained to be done was to coerce it with armed force.

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# Review Articles

# Population Movements during and after the Imjin War

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## Population Movements during and after the Imjin War

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### Books reviewed:

- (1) Sousa, Lúcio de. *The Portuguese Slave Trade in Early Modern Japan: Merchants, Jesuits and Japanese, Chinese, and Korean Slaves*. Studies in Global Slavery 7. Leiden; Boston: Brill. 2019.
- (2) Bohnet, Adam. *Turning toward Edification: Foreigners in Chosŏn Korea*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 2020.

The repercussions of the Imjin War of 1592-1598 echo through history, marking as it did an era of both forced and voluntary migrations that have long captured scholarly intrigue. Increasing efforts over the last decades have uncovered progressively more aspects of the war's wide-ranging impact, and particularly of the large population movements that formed part of the conflict. Certain facets of this great population upheaval have received more attention, such as the movements and legacies of Korean potters and pottery in Japan, while other aspects remain little understood. While lacunae in the historical source material must necessarily limit how much we can reconstruct – particularly of the stories of tens of thousands of voiceless people affected – there remains much constructive research which can and some which has already been done.

Three distinct avenues beckon scholars seeking to unearth fresh in-

sights: ‘shifting’ – redirecting academic focus towards overlooked domains; ‘expanding’ – fostering cross-border and interdisciplinary connections and exploiting multilingual historical sources, many of which have until very recently been gathering dust in disparate archives; and ‘innovating’ – finding creative ways to prize new insights from the limited material already available, sometimes with the aid of new digital methods. Lúcio de Sousa’s *The Portuguese Slave Trade in Early Modern Japan* and Adam Bohnet’s *Turning toward Edification*, the two books reviewed in this article, exemplify each of these three approaches to varying extents.

Both monographs also respectively address the two directions of population movement when viewed from the Korean perspective: Sousa’s book sheds light on those who left the peninsula (including those who later returned), and Bohnet’s on those who came to settle in Joseon. Unquestionably, these two trajectories of migration were asymmetric in magnitude. Though precise figures may forever elude historians, the overwhelming exodus from the peninsula, whether coerced or voluntary, eclipses the inflow of those from foreign lands seeking settlement in Korea. Consequently, the corpus of scholarly work to date reflects this asymmetry, with a predominant focus on mass abductions of Koreans and the intricate web of associated inquiries.

Those wishing to study the abductions of people from the Korean peninsula in and around the Imjin War can and do approach the question from a multitude of vantage points. The first, and perhaps most pertinent, questions are some of the most basic: How many people were taken? Who and by whom? From where and whither to? The uneven historical record makes answering the question of total numbers frustratingly difficult, although we do have high-level – albeit incomplete – picture of the groups, routes and actors involved, which scholars continue to flesh out, often by looking at individual areas.

Rather than focusing on the broader vista, some studies eschew the macro for the micro, reconstructing the lived experiences of individuals. This is mostly readily achievable through the writings of literati captives who left first-hand accounts, such as Kang Hang and No In. More chal-

lenging is to give voice to the voiceless majority: the illiterate men, women, children captives, who appear to us only in others’ descriptions. An increasing number of scholars are attempting to foreground these people’s experience by piecing together the available evidence. Lúcio de Sousa, for example, has gone on to foreground the experiences of women.

A peculiar aspect of research into Imjin War abductees has been the extraordinarily prominent place historically given to potters and pottery. Due to the more tangible legacy represented by pottery traditions in Japan, for a long time studies focused on potter communities almost to the exclusion of others, who failed to leave such a visible trace of their arrival and survival in Japan. This trend has been corrected by recent studies looking at the diverse identities and journeys of the people involved, including Sousa’s work considered here.

Creative, and digitally assisted, approaches are being applied to try and draw patterns from the sparse official record: for example, by analyzing extant household registers from before and after the Imjin War.

Another angle from which to approach the abductions is to consider the role of local authorities: state responses and attitudes in Korea, the role of central leadership (Toyotomi Hideyoshi) and the *daimyo* (lords) in Japan. The study of the state angle is frequently extended out to after the Imjin War, considering the post-war diplomatic exchanges in which Joseon sought to effect the return of its abducted subjects.

As well as ‘upward’ to those in power, the nature of the trade in humans that took place necessitates the scholars also to expand their gaze ‘outward’ to include the European actors and Southeast Asian context which played integral parts. This is precisely the dimension in which Sousa’s monograph makes its chief contribution.

*The Portuguese Slave Trade in Early Modern Japan*, follows the author’s earlier Spanish-language monograph, *Escravatura e Diáspora Japonesa nos séculos XVI e XVII* (Braga: Núcleo de Investigação em Ciência Políticas e Relações Internacionais, 2014). It is impressive in scope: spanning trafficking practices in East Asia, legislation in Spain and Portugal, and the experiences of trafficked persons worldwide. While

in terms of both time period and demographics it encompasses much more, this broader context is also valuable to understanding the mass abductions on the Korean peninsula during the Imjin War specifically.

The book navigates the complex entanglements between Portuguese traders, Jesuit missionaries, and the enslaved individuals of Japanese, Chinese, and Korean origin, commencing with a vivid portrayal of the Portuguese arrival in Japan. This sets the stage for the subsequent exploration of cultural exchange and economic interplay between the traders and the Japanese populace. It delves into the nuanced tapestry of encounters, shedding light on the evolving relationships and networks established during this period.

Sousa's narrative progresses into a comprehensive examination of the Portuguese merchants' involvement in the slave trade within Japan. Through extensive research and analysis, the book unpicks the web of factors that fueled the demand for slaves and the merchants' roles in facilitating this trade. This section also highlights the economic imperatives that underpinned the trade, elucidating its impact on the broader economic landscape. Sousa also explores the presence and influence of Jesuit missionaries in Japan and their entanglement with the Portuguese traders. The book dissects the moral and ethical quandaries faced by these missionaries amidst their involvement in a trade marked by human bondage, providing insights into the conflicting interests and ethical considerations at play.

A crucial aspect of Sousa's narrative is the examination of the slave trade's dynamics from diverse perspectives, including those of the enslaved individuals themselves. Through an exploration of the experiences of Japanese, Chinese, and Korean individuals subjected to slavery, the book provides a poignant depiction of the human toll and cultural ramifications of the trade. Moreover, Sousa draws our attention to the resistance movements and responses that emerged within the enslaved communities, shedding light on their struggles, resilience, and efforts toward emancipation. Additionally, the book examines the varied responses from local authorities and communities, unveiling the complexities of opposition to the slave trade within Japan.

Beyond the immediate implications, Sousa traces the long-term legacy and impact of the Portuguese slave trade on the socioeconomic and cultural fabric of Japan. The book navigates through the repercussions that reverberated through history, influencing subsequent developments within Japan and beyond its borders.

The contribution of the book is first and foremost to provide a perspective grounded in European history and sources, frequently unavailable to scholars of East Asian history. Moreover, Sousa succeeds in combining a deep understanding of Portuguese and Spanish texts with an ability to handle East Asian primary sources. The reach of the primary-source scholarship is impressive and therefore necessarily informative to any student of slave trades and related issues.

At the same time, the book's chief limitation is that it does not present this broad and deep scholarship in a more accessible way. For example, the author includes extensive quotes in the original Portuguese and Chinese without translation, effectively limiting the readers able to fully appreciate his book to a handful of scholars worldwide simultaneously adept in the contemporary versions of both languages.

Similarly, data is presented in a way that needlessly reduces its usefulness: in one instance, the sources for a table extending over 40 pages are given in an amalgamated list of a hundred publications. Such a presentation means that only a scholar engaged in a fully aligned research project and willing to spend the dozens of hours necessary could verify or meaningfully reuse the data, when individual attributed citations would have allowed a more casual reader to pursue an individual line of interest. Presentation of data as online resources would have been far more accessible, invited more productive collaboration, and thus made more worthwhile the undoubtedly huge scholarly effort underpinning the book.

Ideally, the author could also contextualize the book's findings with secondary scholarship on its broader themes, such as slavery or coercion, commerce, and empire. Yet, each study must have its emphasis, and this book's chief contribution is in its examination of primary sources.

A topic as expansive as intra- and trans-regional human trafficking

presents an enormous challenge in sheer scope, requiring as it does freedom to move between vastly different and highly arcane linguistic, legislative, and socio-historical contexts as well as to map and appreciate the interplay between them. More so than for narrowly concentrated subjects, therefore, collaboration and cross-pollination offer the greatest hope of advancing our common understanding. To foster such collaboration, studies in this area should be as accessible as possible, both linguistically and in terms of presenting their work. Provision of translations and explanations of quotations in secondary languages alone significantly extend a study's readership. By offering a route map through the primary and secondary sources used, scholars can also greatly ease the task of those who would follow in their footsteps, which will lead in turn to more pertinent and insightful contributions from their peers. In an age of increasingly diverse options for sharing data, large appendices of information which risk being largely redundant when presented in a book format can be rendered instantly accessible and manipulable by other scholars if offered as a digital resource alongside the traditional publication.

It is fair to say that *The Portuguese Slave Trade in Early Modern Japan* represents important and hard-won scholarship that ties together sources and contexts unavailable to most scholars working on proximate subjects, but that its scholarship would have an even greater impact if it was communicated in a more accessible format.

While Sousa's gaze is outward across the seas, Adam Bohnet turns to look at the state of Joseon, and specifically, how it treated foreigners that arrived and settled on its territory. The temporal scope of Bohnet's study extends far beyond the Imjin War, and it is in observing evolution over time, rather than contemporaneous connections, that the author's interest lies in. Rather than those who left Korea, Bohnet's focus is on those who arrived and were to greater or lesser extents incorporated into Joseon society. Of the various lines of inquiry outlined above, *Turning to Edification* is a contribution to our understanding of state and societal attitudes and responses to population movements.

The book's introduction takes the narrower scope of empirical enquiry as a launching point for a review of the historiographical debate

around Korean collective political identity in the Joseon period, which succeeds in being both perspicacious and concise. This is a difficult territory for historians to tread, for on one side they must avoid accusations of being 'primordialist' nationalists, projecting back the 19-20th century nationhood onto the past, while on the other side also resist pressure to assert national identity to be a wholly novel invention of the nineteenth century, preceded by a vacuum. On such latter claims of pure modern invention, Bohnet is not sparing his opprobrium, calling them "indefensible" in light of any reading of Joseon dynasty texts (p. 9). Nor does the author shy away from identifying as anachronistic any concept of blood purity in the Joseon period – a focus of Korean nationalism in the twentieth century. Bohnet's conclusion on the nature of collective identity is balanced and nuanced, noting similarities and differences with Song China and other Asian examples, and prioritizing examination of the social structures that encouraged cohesion and the specifics of the imagined community as expressed in contemporary texts.

Faced with the amorphous question of identity, the author also seeks to elucidate what it was and was not by briefly setting it in the wider context of other societies around the world, citing some scholarship on European history. Yet, the heart of the book is an exploration of "why Jurchens, Japanese, and Chinese were categorized together as submitting-foreigners until the mid-eighteenth century, after which Chinese descendants were clearly distinguished from other people with foreign ancestors" (p. 4). As for why this is a subject worthy of our attention, the author juxtaposes examples of earlier discrimination and distrust of Chinese migrants against assumptions that Chinese immigrants would be looked on more favorably, in a political system and society dominated by a Neo-Confucian orthodoxy and which celebrated the Ming as its savior following the Imjin War. Intuitively, one would assume a more favorable regard for Chinese immigrants – at least at the higher levels of the bureaucracy – after the Imjin War, in which the Ming assistance rescued the Joseon state from destruction (the wider populace might have more ambivalent attitudes, having suffered at the hands of marauding Chinese troops). Yet, the author does not cite a great number of historians going

against this assumption and presents an anthropologist as the guilty exemplar.

The main body of the work moves between different communities in Joseon and through time. Chapter 1 sets the scene by reviewing what we know of how foreign communities were treated in the early Joseon period (defined as 1392-1592), while Chapter 5 eventually presents the later changes with which the book is most concerned. In the intervening pages we move between groups, with Chapter 2, for example, looking at how Japanese defectors and Ming deserters were treated following the Imjin War and Chapter 3 considering the fluidity of loyalty and subjecthood for people living at the furthest reaches of state power.

A central argument of the book is that it is not helpful to approach the Joseon state's treatment of foreigners through the lenses of Sinocentrism or the *hwa-yi* (civilized-barbarian) distinction. While he concedes that these were real and highly influential currents of thought, Bohnet argues that such an interpretation is likely to mislead us: as a *Chunghwa*-centered worldview was consistently dominant throughout the Joseon dynasty, we may be deceived into thinking that treatment of foreigners on that basis was also constant, whereas in reality it changed significantly over time. Bohnet points instead to the highly hierarchical and ritualized relations between groups of subjects and state authorities that characterized Joseon society as the most useful way of thinking about the state's treatment of foreigners: ultimately, the Joseon state sought to find the appropriate category, status, and privileges for each group. This call to focus on the ritual order is an important corrective, which may help re-center the student of this period on the sensibilities and priorities of the people they study. At the same time, the ritual relations and statuses which the Joseon state assigned, and different groups negotiated, inevitably represented an interplay between pragmatic considerations and evolving assumptions and world views. It would therefore be equally of interest to pursue in more depth the subtle shifts in Neo-Confucian thought over time – that is, to accompany the history of practice with a more ideational history, that looks beyond the specific treatment of naturalized subjects. Such an ideational exploration would equally serve to dispel the

impression of a constant attitude towards China as the civilized center.

Overall, *Turning toward Edification* is a thoughtful and coherent account of the Joseon state's differential treatment of foreigners that convincingly argues for important evolution in policy over time and the need to understand the ritual designation of Joseon society in its own terms. It presents enough thematic context and some initial directions for comparisons, as well as a careful consideration of the wider question of Joseon's self-identity.

In the wider field of studies on population movements in and out of Korea in the mid-Joseon period, important new works appear with increasing frequency. While critical aspects of the overall picture may ultimately remain frustratingly out-of-focus — not least the most basic question of numbers — recent work by scholars in both East Asia and Europe offers hope of significantly more light being shed on the networks, interactions, and individual experiences that made up these colossal population movements. Greater collation of information, facilitated on the one hand by increasing inter-institutional and multi-disciplinary cooperation, and by digitalization on the other hand, promises to reveal heretofore unrecognized patterns. Undoubtedly, the key to unlocking further insights will be truly transnational approaches, such as the one demonstrated by Sousa, and the ability to appreciate contemporary practices, events, and recorded experiences in their own context of meaning, as Bohnet behooves us to do.

# Two Perspectives on the Land, State and the Environment in Pre-Modern and Modern Korea

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## Two Perspectives on the Land, State and the Environment in Pre-Modern and Modern Korea

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### Books reviewed:

- (1) Kim, Seonmin. *Ginseng and Borderland: Territorial Boundaries and Political Relations between Qing China and Chosŏn Korea 1636-1912*. University of California Press. Oakland, 2017. (Kindle Edition)
- (2) Edited by David Fedman, Eleana J. Kim and Albert L. Park. *Forces of Nature: New Perspectives on Korean Environments*, Cornell University Press. Ithaca and London, 2023.

### Introduction

Research into the Korean Peninsula's environment and the natural world's effects on politics and economics has enjoyed greater examination in recent years. This trend invariably follows global interest into the effects of humans upon the climate and nature in their contemporary era – the so-called *Anthropocene*. Writings on what we term as 'nature' do not always cover the broad spectrum of the environment, but rather focus on the interactions of people and the use of particular biological (e.g., rice or cotton) or non-biological (e.g., minerals or land reclamation) resources and their potentials in the coastlines, land, rivers, and deep seas. Some recently published books illustrate this trend, such as Sven Beck-

ert's *Empire of Cotton: A Global History* (2014) and Peter Francopan's more sweeping look at man's effect on the planet, *The Earth Transformed: An Untold History* (2023). In the realm of East Asian history, the study of the pre-modern and modern Chinese environment has skyrocketed in the last decade, ranging from Micah Musscolino's *The Ecology of War in China: Henan Province, the Yellow River and Beyond, 1938-1950* (2014) to Jonathan Schlesinger's *A World Trimmed with Fur: Wild Things, Pristine Places and the Natural Fringes of Qing Rule* (2019). The number of published articles covering Korean environmental and biological histories have increased significantly but are generally less numerous than studies on neighboring powers. The two texts chosen for this review exemplify the current state of Korean Studies that showcase the effects of the biological and non-biological ecology on politics in the pre-modern, modern, and contemporary worlds.

### *Ginseng and Borderland*

The first text by Seonmin Kim, *Ginseng and Borderland*, surveys the history and use of wild ginseng in the politics of Chosŏn Korea and Qing China between the 16th and 18th centuries (although there are some points on the rapidly transforming 19th century). The contents of the book survey how the value of the ginseng root (K. *insam* 人參) in the mountains of northern Korean Peninsula and southern Manchu heartland (K. *tongsamsaeng* 東三省) became an increasingly contentious point of contact between the established Kingdom of Chosŏn 朝鮮 (王國), which sought to maintain its newly conquered northern border, and an increasingly powerful Jurchen confederation that became the Later Jin Khanate (K. *Hugŭm* 後金 (汗國)) (1616-1636) and Imperial Qing Empire (K. *Chŏng* 清 (帝國)) (1636-1912). According to the author, the root became extremely valuable owing to its perceived medicinal properties and rarity – only growing under ideal climatic conditions and requiring years or decades to grow before harvesting. Ginseng became a political and economic point of contention as the root was presented to the Ming court (C. *myŏng* 明) for tribute, could be traded on the border and into the wealthy

markets of China for silver and other goods, and, in turn, promoted the movements of people across loosely established borders to pilfer the root. The monetary value of the ginseng was of most prevalence to the early Jurchen confederations. But the control of populations' movements and separation of peoples along the borders played a greater role after establishing the Qing, and later proved useful for Chosŏn's claims to maintaining a depopulated and obfuscated northern border for their own concerns.

The table of contents is as follows:

1. "Introduction"  
Manchuria, Korea, and Ginseng/Tributary Relations and Boundaries/  
Territoriality and Sovereignty
2. "From Frontier to Borderland"  
The Liaodong Frontier and Ginseng/ The Jurchens in Ming China's  
Northeast/ The Jurchens in Chosŏn Korea's North/ The Rise of  
Nurhaci/ Jurchen Boundary Making/ The Chosŏn and Trespassing/  
Ginseng for Qing Manchus
3. "Making the Borderland"  
Qing Empire Building/ The Qing Northeast and Ginseng/  
Changbaishan and Paektusan/ The Investigation of the Mountain/  
Mu-Ke Deng's Mission/ Shard Symbol, Separate Boundaries
4. "Managing the Borderland"  
The Willow Palisade/ Ginseng in the Sacred Birthplace/ Multiple  
Boundaries within the Empire/ Trespassing Continued/ The  
Mangniushao Post/ Imperial Authority at the Margins
5. "Movement of People and Money"  
The Chosŏn Tributary Embassy/ Trading Opportunities/ The  
Transportation Business/ "Dishonoring the State"/ The Issue of  
Silver Theft/ Broadening the Investigation
6. "From Borderland to Border"  
Filling the Empty Land/ Korean Subject North of the River/  
Demarcating the Border
7. "Conclusion"

The introduction covers and defines the basic concepts. Although the Qing “[...] was motivated by the goal of securing its profits”, Kim argues that “[...] Chosŏn sought to avoid conflicts over the root with its strong neighbor; but the two countries settled on the same solution of clearing the sensitive areas near the two rivers [with] Chosŏn emphasiz[ing] their asymmetrical relationship” (18-19). The relationship over the root did not develop in Hansŏng, where the Chosŏn court surrendered, or at the Qing court in Beijing, but rather at the political penumbra, the Borderland, that combined aspects of the frontier (“undefined zone between distinct political or social entities”) and border (“defined boundary between two neighboring powers”) and became “a site at which the two neighbors encountered one another and clashed but nonetheless recognized their mutual boundary” (37).

The first chapter surveys the development of the Jurchen confederation, covering the rise of Nurhaci and Hong Taiji where Kim points out that the Ming had lost control of important markets in and around the Liaodong Peninsula “by the mid-sixteenth century” and that “[...] regulations were not respected at all” (55). The amount of silver flowing to the northeast appears to have been phenomenal with Kim citing Nicola Di Cosmo and stating that the total heading to the Jurchen amounted to “[...] a quarter of the total foreign silver imported in China in a single year” (67). Ginseng was a key ingredient in the flow of trade and much of this valuable commodity was found at the borders of the Jurchen and the Chosŏn lands. This inevitably brought each side into conflict with one another and resulted in each side blaming the other for not regulating the border properly (79).

The second chapter looks at the issues of territory and identity, when the Qing Emperor Kangxi sent a garrison to survey the region to finish *The Unified Gazetteer of the Great Qing*. The investigation into the region brought the garrison into an armed conflict with Koreans who had come over the border to look for ginseng, as the region was important for the control of the lucrative market. Boundaries were not just import and demarcations of legitimacy, but also the ethnic and mythological connections of the regions with the origins of the Manchu race. The area around

Changbaishan/Paektusan was sacred to both the Qing Jurchens and Chosŏn Koreans, but the importance placed on the mountains was largely reactionary for the Korean government that was often divided and ambivalent over the mountain. Kim writes, “It was only in the middle of the eighteenth century that the assumption that all of mountains in Chosŏn territory originated from mt. Paektu was extended to the claim that the mountain itself was actually within Chosŏn territory” (105). Ginseng was again an important ecological agent, but territory, place, and state secrets come to the fore in this chapter. Chosŏn’s core goal in the Qing’s investigation of boundaries was “[...] not to leak any domestic information to its neighbor” (114) concerning the boundary and to ensure that Qing knowledge and demarcation remained unclear.

The third chapter covers the movement of people from both the perspective of Qing China and the non-Jurchen (Manchu) population into the Manchu heartland 東三省 and the Chosŏn Korean population across the border into Qing Chinese territory. Ginseng provided an impetus for people to move into the region and even cross the border to Chosŏn and was a core part of Qing Imperial revenue. In particular, the chapter focuses on the rhetoric used by the Chosŏn court to halt the construction of towers and boundary points close to the Yalu River that could infringe (threaten) Chosŏn’s nominal sovereignty. Kim writes, “By highlighting the inferior status of Chosŏn vis-à-vis the Great Qing, the Koreans succeeded in preventing the construction of a Qing military facility on the Yalu River; as the benevolent ruler of the suzerain court, the Qing emperor accepted the Chosŏn’s request to maintain a vacuum at the boundary” (134-135).

The fourth chapter delves into the asymmetrical tributary relationship between the Chosŏn and Qing courts, and the side-trade that occurred with embassies heading to the Qing capital. This allowed the Chosŏn Koreans a legal means by which to cross into and travel through Qing territory and, by means of this travel, make a profit at the same time. As Kim notes, “[the] courts had established a tributary relationship that not only defined the nature of their political ties but also shaped their economic connections” which included “the creation of a variety of trad-

ing opportunities for Qing and Chosŏn merchants”, the creation of “a space and an opportunity for Koreans to make contact with local people in Qing territory” (175-176). The embassies were not without their issues, and the economic connection was built and maintained on the premise of a firm political hierarchy (210).

The last chapter centers on the fall of Qing China’s ginseng monopoly control and the coterminous loss of control over the Manchu heartland 東三省. A largely Han population were now ‘allowed’ to move into the region near the Chosŏn’s northern border as the yield of ginseng declined and the necessity to populate the area in the face of Russian expansion led to a recalibration of the Qing-Chosŏn borders. An increasing interaction between an expanding population to the north of Chosŏn coupled with Chosŏn subjects slipping into Qing territory led to a situation in which “The two states were no longer willing to accept the existence of an unclear buffer zone; instead, they sought to claim the right to rule both the people and the territory demarcated by a clear border” (242). The strength of the boundary coincided with the loss of importance of both Manchu identity, tied to the region, and the importance of ginseng in trade. It also signaled the loss of the Qing’s power, which would eventually fall in 1912. The world was rapidly changing in the late 19th century and Kim clearly states that “The fact that the Chosŏn court demanded field investigations in order to demarcate the boundary demonstrates that the Koreans had begun to recognize the system of international relations in which a country is defined by distinct boundaries and territorial sovereignty” (239).

The book is an excellent introduction to the nature of asymmetrical international relations in Northeast Asia before the advent of more modern political systems. It is highly readable and compact enough to complete in an undergraduate course (especially on Pre-modern Korean International Relations). Its focus on the importance of political, philosophical, and ethnic boundaries allows the reader to understand how the interaction at the borderlands became a moving pendulum that affected and forced the mental and physical boundaries of a people, their origins, histories, and economies. There were two theoretical ‘glues’ that were uti-

lized to keep the cohesive historical narrative – *Ginseng and Borderland*. I would argue that the latter was the stronger concept throughout the book and was better defined from the introduction to the conclusion. This was in part due to the fact that the borderland’s exactness became a more important feature of tribute relations until the end of the 19th century. Ginseng, although connected in each chapter, fell away from the center of discussion as the root itself became scarcer. An expanded discussion of the ginseng trade would have made for a more complete understanding of the root and its impact on the economy and society in Northeast Asia. In particular, the importance of ginseng trade for silver and other goods during the early and late Qing needed to have been clarified. Was ginseng a conduit for cash to fuel the early expanding empire (i.e. weapons) and later to generate silver cash for the empire? Would then a discussion of the world-wide flow of silver also have helped understand ginseng’s global implications and connections? In addition, the market and reasons for the ginseng demand did not seem as well developed as the discussion of borderlands and troubles surrounding trade. Is there any information on the destination of the ginseng once it left the Manchu heartland 東三省 and Chosŏn borders? Its inclusion in the book would have recentered ginseng to the heart of the argument. In addition, an additional discussion on the *hyanghwain* 向化人 would have offered an opposite look into the nature of boundaries when Chosŏn attempted to control its northern borders prior to the Later Jin’s ascent.

### *Forces of Nature: New Perspectives on Korean Environments*

The second text edited by David Fedman, Eleana J. Kim, and Albert L. Park is a collaborative work that combines a wide spectrum of disciplines and eras issued after a conference at the University of California, Irvine in 2018. Unlike a single-author monograph, the collection of works is centered around understanding man’s impact on the Korean Peninsula’s ecology and its effects in a range of societies over time. This leads to a freer range of exploration but limits any in-depth analysis.

There are ten core articles, each with an accompanying introduction (panel chair), and additional writing that act as individual “chapters,” such as David Fedman’s “General Introduction”, Marc Los Huertos and Albert L. Park’s “Geographical Introduction” and Albert L. Park and Eleana J. Kim’s “Epilogue”. Although not part of the main articles, the “General Introduction” and “Geographical Introduction” spell out the purpose and objectives of the edited volume. Fedman clearly and succinctly introduces how and why we interact with the natural world in the Koreas today. According to Fedman, the natural world has been intensely politicized leading, often times, to the erroneous transformation of nature. Although it can act as a ‘passive backdrop’ for the Koreas and the peoples within the states, nature has been swept aside for various projects and has been debated over times owing to internal (e.g., cancer from chemical leaks) and external factors (e.g., world environmental movement) which has given way to increasing numbers of NGOs throughout the country. Be that as it may, there is a great contention between the stability of the ecosystem, the demands and burdens placed upon it, human’s evolving relations with the environment, and, finally, how our imagination can represent a past that never existed (or was unnatural itself). These phenomena are not entirely confined to the contemporary world either. Fedman spells out *three basic facts* essential to understanding the Korean Peninsula’s environment. These are:

1. “Korea’s location at the crossroads of Asia”;
2. “its mountainous topography”;
3. “its regional variation” (13).

The following “Geographical Introduction” gives an excellent overview of the theories of geography, followed by the various rock formations and geological history of the peninsula. Huertos and Park also introduce the climatic variations, bodies of water, and aspects of the soil that could impact life and agriculture on the peninsula. The maps are also very useful and can be referred when reading the main chapters. Both of these ‘introduction’ chapters preceding the main articles are good reads

on their own and offer succinct information on the peninsular biosphere that is not readily available in most history books. Indeed, it feels a shame that these ‘introduction’ chapter were not longer as the information can be used in each subsequent chapters for the book. Namely, maps and graphical information that showcased corresponding information for the subsequent chapters would have better illustrated the contents and placed the core information in an easily shared space. Be that as it may, the first two chapters are a good resource on their own for any introduction of Koreas’ biospheres and ecological history.

The contents of the edited volume, including these aforementioned chapters, are as follows:

1. Ann Sherif, “Foreword”
2. David Fedman, “General Introduction: Whose Nature? Centering the Environment in Korean Studies”
3. Marc Los Huertos and Albert L. Park, “Geographical Introduction: A Biography of the Korean Peninsula in Maps”
4. “Part 1: Imperial Interventions”  
David Fedman, section introduction with articles by:  
John S Lee, “A State of Ranches and Forests: The Environmental Legacy of the Mongol Empire in Korea”,  
Joseph Seeley, “Dammed Fish: Piscatorial Developmentalism and the Remaking of the Yalu River”,
5. “Part 2: Crisis and Response”  
Eleana J. Kim, section introduction with articles by:  
Sooa Im McCormick, “The Politics of Frugality: Environmental Crisis and Artistic Production in Eighteenth-Century Korea”  
Hyojin Park, “Between Memory and Amnesia: Seoul’s Nanjido Landfill, 1978-1993”  
Ewa Eriksson Fortier and Suzy Kim, “North Korea Caught between Developmentalism and Humanitarianism”
6. “Part 3: Processes of Dispossession”  
Albert L. Park, section introduction with articles by:  
Anders Riel Muller (Yeonjun Song), “Rice Fields, Mountains and the

Invisible Meatification of Korean Agriculture”

Lindsay S.R. Jolivette, “The Eco-zombies of South Korean Cinema: Consumerism, Carnivores and Eco-criticism”

7. “Part 4: Reclaiming Life”

Eleana J. Kim, section introduction with articles by:

Yonjae Paik, “Communal Environmentalism in the History of the Organic Farming Movement in South Korea”

Jeongsu Shin, “Gotjawal: The Promise of Becoming Wild”

Nan Kim, “South Korea’s Nuclear Energy Entanglements and the Timelessness of Ecological Democracy”

8. Albert L. Park and Eleana J. Kim, “Epilogue: On Everyday Ecologies and Systems of Mediation”

John S. Lee’s chapter, “A State of Ranches and Forests: The Environmental Legacy of the Mongol Empire in Korea,” plots the environmental impact of the Mongol Invasions of Koryŏ through equine and sylvan cultures. This left, according to Lee, a ‘significant institutional and environmental legacy’ (37) that can still be seen somewhat today with Jeju’s association with horses and the southern isles with pines. First, Lee documents how the Mongols created ranch systems to supply their large numbers of horses – not only transforming the land but also introducing the bureaucratic offices charged with their maintenance. Second, the genetic lineage of the animals, namely Mongolian horses, interbred with Korean and created new breeds. Third, the pines sourced by the Mongols to build their fleets to invade Japan were later protected to service future fleets even after the Mongol Empire had vanished. Last, these pine lands and pastures were related to one another in area and defense, with pines increasing in quality as horse quality fell after the 17th century. These changes were not only Mongolian-driven, but the animals and areas were inherited and changed in Chosŏn to supply their own military needs and even the tribute to the Ming. Thus, the impact was not only foreign driven but became a *palimpsest* with each group contributing to the continued development over the *long durée*. The impact of the invasion is, quoting Lee, “[...] best understood through a centurieslong perspective” that af-

ected the use of land that could be used for horses, government services and the sylvan ecology.

Joseph Seeley’s chapter, “Dammed Fish: Piscatorial Developmentalism and the Remaking of the Yalu River,” covers the building of Sup’ung Dam, its subsequent filling, and the ‘piscatorial developmentalism’ of the Yalu River. The dam’s primary purpose was to create hydroelectric power for developing industrial centers supporting Japan in occupied Korea and the puppet state of Manchukuo. The area for the reservoir impacted both human and animal life. Cleared of its human and animal population before being used, fish not native to the region were transplanted to the reservoir (55). The dam’s construction also had an unexpected effect on the fisheries downstream by polluting the waters and killing native fish population. Thus, the effects went well beyond arresting the flow of water. Under the subsequent communist government, the dam became a site of various competing ideologies that either downplayed its past uses or exalted the “brilliantly” implemented plans (57). Overall, the dam affected both human and aquatic populations in equal measure and each subsequent generation used its existence and memory of the dam to promote output and the idea of state-led development.

In Sooa Im McCormick’s “The Politics of Frugality: Environmental Crisis and Artistic Production in Eighteenth-Century Korea,” we are introduced to effects of the environment on government planning, its measures of frugality and the display of culture between the late 17th and 18th centuries when famines killed up to 33% of the Chosŏn population (1670-1671 and 1695-1696). The “Modest,” “Austere,” and “Restrained” descriptions of this period are, according to the author, less to do with following Neo-Confucian philosophy, but were rather in “response to climatic oddities, ecological change and the economic crises they precipitated” (65). The mass death and lack of foodstuffs led to horrific scenes, and the *sumptuary* laws were implemented by King Yŏngjo ‘in response to the deteriorating ecological conditions’ (71). Her arguments contradict popular presentations of the austere works from the period. The dramatic climatic change led to the protection of local woodlands due to “scarcity and rising costs of wood” (72). In addition, the decline of the sylvan

ecology happened alongside the decline of silk, perhaps from temperature fluctuations that harmed both the silk-worm larva and the mulberry leaf which led Yōngjo to limit the importation of Chinese-produced silk to protect the Chosŏn market (74).

Hyojin Park's "Between Memory and Amnesia: Seoul's Nanjido Landfill, 1978-1993" covers the use and memory of Seoul's (then) largest landfill site that was later converted to the World Cup Stadium. Instead of looking at people's interaction with pristine ecology and the natural environment, Park elegantly portrays this terrible landscape, where groups of workers and waste pickers competed and fought with government entities and gangs. The structure and competition of power with 'no overall control' reflected many of the divisions elsewhere in Korea society during the 1980s and 1990s. The waste site became a center for social change and power when Korea was becoming a democratic state. It was later transformed into an ecological park that has discarded the landfill's memory, by simply covering it up and forgetting the past as it was the anthesis of Seoul's developing image (84-86).

Ewa Eriksson Fortier and Suzy Kim's "North Korea Caught between Developmentalism and Humanitarianism" looks at the terrific crisis in North Korea where short-term paradigms between development and humanitarian aid could not overcome the long-term environmental crises plaguing the North. Following an excellent overview of North Korea's ecology, the authors mention that not only is the land not suited for self-sufficiency, but unexploded munitions litter the fields, and the government sought to rely on its own products in the face of lower yield resulting from climate change that helped lead to the famine of the early 1990s. Be that as it may, the North Korean government has taken a key interest in climate issues and has supported numerous resolutions and the people have contributed to various projects supported by international organizations. Mismanagement has caused many issues, but the problems in North Korea are, according to the authors, a reflection of issues seen around the world including depleted soils and emphasis on monocultures. However, industrial development continues to shape the environment in the north and international organizations are unable to make any of the

necessary long-term projects owing to the Northern government's defense criteria and politics.

Anders Riel Muller (Yeonjun Song)'s article, "Rice Fields, Mountains and the Invisible Meatification of Korean Agriculture," analyzes the massive and largely invisible transformation of Korea's countryside where Korea can produce almost as much meat as Denmark – but on only a quarter of the land (110) with imported feed lessening the transformation of land use in South Korea (111). According to Muller, 'the bifurcation strategy allowed the livestock sector to expand without converting vast tracts of South Korea's agricultural land to pasture and feed production' (112). The strange, and ominous, bifurcation of large swathes of rice fields and relatively few feed lands comes from protection for rice farmers and meat producers, but places South Korea's environmental footprint on a global scale and increases the instability of the protein market if those monocultures are disrupted (121). This liberalization of 'feed' enabled rice to remain protected, the landscape remains seemingly unchanged, and it became a patriotic duty to eat meat. However, this 'biggest agricultural transformation' now connects Korea's protein markets well beyond its own borders and now is dependent on global prices and stability.

Lindsay S.R. Jolivette's "The Eco-zombies of South Korean Cinema: Consumerism, Carnivores, and Eco-criticism" takes a very interesting approach by looking at the relation of eating meat and taking care of the environment through the vehicle of zombie films (133). The author surveys three films in which health and safety of meat intermingle with the zombie genre and "are the manifestations of the anxiety caused by detrimental ecological effects of the booming commercial meat industry and increased meat consumption" (123). The zombies are the embodiment of people's fears and often reflect contemporary concerns (such as the mad-cow crisis). The films' core message is, however, a criticism of the contamination found in foods (largely meats) and the polluting of the environment. These zombies are a reflection of the 'eco-punishment' found in the world wither in the BSE crisis or the recycling of waste back into food until the two are inseparable.

Yonjae Paik's article, "Communal Environmentalism in the History of the Organic Farming Movement in South Korea," covers the history of environmental farming from Park Chung-hee's 'Green Revolution' where fertilizers and monocrops helped create pests and diseases thus necessitating pesticides (140). This issue created a slew of environmental problems and the use of artificial components led to environmental and human health issues that "were a symptom of the exploitative relationships of mainstream agriculture" (141). The two main groups covered in the 1970s include the Chongnonhie and the P'ulmu School, which were later followed by the creation of the Hansalim Cooperative which sought to teach farmers about organic farming and offer a place to sell their goods (144). The government was not supportive of these groups, as the organic farms contradicted the state's intensive developmental model and did not always turn a profit. But each group, most founded in a religious philosophy, Christian or Donghak, created a new ideal of the organic community within South Korea and Paik demonstrates how an indigenous grassroots movement started to question the 'poisoned' capitalism of the 1970s and 80s agriculture.

Jeongsu Shin introduces a new vocabulary to our environment in "Gotjawal: The Promise of Becoming Wild," wherein we find a local village group combating environmental activists over the construction of a safari theme park. The activists argue that the land has become a *Gotjawal* - a naturally reclaimed area "rich in biodiversity" (150). However, the term *Gotjawal* is a relatively new term for the environment which is unique to Jeju on the peninsula. Shin explains that the concept of *Gotjawal* may have come from a variety of earlier Jeju vocabularies and developed conterminously with "[...] native Jeju islanders [not necessarily reading] these patches of land as one total special concept of *Gotjawal*" (157). Yet, the interest in protecting Jeju's natural environment from overexploitation encapsulates the idea of an area of nature rejuvenated specific to Jeju. *Gotjawal* may have existed in the past but its sylvan existence is given new prominence through scientific investigation that first labelled the land *Gotjawal* (159) and the continued use by environmental activists that have cemented its vocabularic reality in the syl-

vian world.

In the last chapter, Nan Kim covers the most powerful manmade force at work in the world today in "South Korea's Nuclear Energy Entanglements and the Timelessness of Ecological Democracy." The paper covers nuclear power facilities in Korea and the local movements that hinder or support facilities connected to the nuclear industry. Nan Kim does an excellent job of covering the development and reasons for nuclear power in Korea. However, the government often must lobby different locations close to established nuclear power stations to create additional capacity which have met both success and stiff resistance. The nuclear crises in Fukushima and corruption in Korea have tainted the industry, but the promise of jobs and investment into neglected areas are used to support the projects' democratic mandate. The city of Kyōngju has constructed a waste storage facility for a mixture of these reasons, but also as a way to ensure that the area does not have to be forced to house more radioactive materials. Rather Kim focuses on the fact that an idea of 'Long-Term Stewardship' remains absent in Korea and that "in their relative haste and expedience can hardly answer for the duration of their impact..." (177).

Overall, the compilation is an excellent addition and the first complete look at Korean ecology in the English language. Each chapter ranges from the 13th century to the present day, but there is a large emphasis on the last 50 years. The addition of works that balanced surveys of both North and South Korea gave a complete picture of the environment from a variety of angles. Although the articles work well individually, I felt that there was room where the chapters in their sections could have overlapped. For example, the nuclear issue and zombie films left open a section for a debate on and reference to the nuclear disaster film *Pandora* (2016) where each side could have spoken on a mutual topic. In addition, Muller's article might have made mention of the rising levels of unused milk in Korea – a byproduct of the *bifurcation*. But these are minor details and are sure to be covered by the authors in the future.

However, many chapters and the epilogue do show a common theme. "The Epilogue" by Albert L. Park and Eleana J. Kim not only ar-

gues how the environment could be approached (181) but also outlines three areas for future studies: critical cultural ecologies, landscapes of militarized modernity, and vernacular climate changes. However, it is argued that Capitalism, as well as Religion and Science, are the main modes of mediation through which people interact with, protect and, more often, exploit nature. In fact, it has been the idea of capitalism and liberalization that has come under criticism throughout the papers in the collection. For many authors, and also in the epilogue, industrial capitalism is argued to be unable to solve long-term environmental issues. The concept of capitalism, however, is unclear in the last chapter as it is often placed alongside and seemingly equated with (military) industrialization. There are of course non-capitalist societies (North Korea) that have equally or more severely abused their environments, but the main differences between the Communist industrialized ideal and Capitalist industrialized ideal, and their subsequent effects on ecology, are not explained in enough detail. Capitalism and industrialism are not the same, but the conclusion seems to treat them as such. The subsequent discussion on religion and its role in environmentalism is also interesting, especially in their capacity to organize people and set out human-nature interactions. But again, there is not enough room to discuss atheistic approaches or non-religious philosophical notions of nature. For example, the epilogue seems to have left out a proper discussion of the global environmental movements such as 'Just Stop Oil.' Lastly, the role of technology is introduced, but the great eco-economic changes, such as electrification of transportation is also strangely absent. This above all indicates how Eco-capitalism can influence world markets and politics and is a combination of the three mediations. Be that as it may, the volume offers the most complete and diverse picture of the Korean environment published so far and should be a basic reading in all courses on Korea.

# Notes for Contributors

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