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# Special Topic

# Seasonal Migrations of the Early Uighur Rulers, 747-780

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# Seasonal Migrations of the Early Uighur Rulers, 747-780 *

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## Introduction

Pastoral nomadism (遊牧) refers to a mode of livelihood based on patterned seasonal migrations around the steppe, where nomadic peoples engage in livestock raising as their primary economic activity without building permanent shelters for both humans and animals.[1] In general, such pastoral nomads (牧民) customarily tend to repeat the migrations between fixed summer and winter camps. When faced with environmental pressures, however, such migrations can be readjusted not only in summer and winter, but also in spring and autumn as well. The seasonal migrations of nomadic peoples have remained a crucial element in understanding the nature of nomadic communities, as well as a key to understanding the nomadic empires in the northern Asian steppe.[2]

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* This translated article is a revised and supplemented version of Jaehun Jeong, "위구르 카를룩 카간(747~759)의 季節的 移動과 그 性格," 중앙아시아연구 11 (2006): pp.1-28.

1 A. Khazanov, trans. Kim Hodong 金浩東, *Yumok sahoe eui gujo* [Structure of nomadic society] (Seoul: Jisik saneop sa, 1990), p.50; Sima Qian 司馬遷 referred to '*youmu*' 遊牧 (nomadism) as '*zhuanyi*' 轉移 (moving around) in his "Xiongnu liechuan" 匈奴列傳 [Biographies of the Xiongnu] of *Shiji* 史記 [Records of the historian].

2 Yoshida Junichi 吉田順一, "モンゴルの遊牧における移動の理由と種類について" [Reasons and types

Drawing on the limited extant materials, several scholarly attempts have been made to explore the seasonal migrations of past steppe rulers. Topics in clude, the seasonal movement of the Northern Wei 北魏 in association with imperial tours (*xungxing* 巡幸),[3] the Qïtaň Liao's 契丹 moving court (*nabo* 捺鉢) depicted in mural paintings and historical sources,[4] and the Mongol emperors' imperial tours[5] between the two capital cities of Shangdu 上都 and Dadu 大都.[6] In particular, the Yuan emperors' seasonal

of nomadic migrations in Mongolia], 早稻田大學大學院文學研究科紀要 28 (1983), pp.327-342; B. Chinbat, *The nomadic movement of Mongolian herdsmen* (Ulaanbaatar, 1989).

3 Sato Chisui 佐藤智水, "北魏皇帝の行幸について" [Imperial tour of the Northern Wei emperors], 岡山大學文學部紀要 5 (serial volume 45) (1984), 39a-53.

4 Fu Yuehuan 傅樂煥, "遼代四時捺鉢考" [Study on the seasonal imperial tours of the Liao dynasty], 歷史語言研究所集刊 10-2 (1942), 223-347; Yi Yongbeom 李龍範, "Yodae chunyu go" 遼代春遊考 [Study on the imperial spring tour of the Liao dynasty], Dongguk sahak 東國史學 5 (1957). Reprint in Jungse Manju Monggo sa eui yeon'gu 中世滿州·蒙古史의 研究 [Study on the histories of Manchu and Mongol], (Seoul: Donghwa chulpan gongsa, 1988); Bai Junrui and Li Bo 白俊瑞·李波, "析契丹語的'捺鉢,'" [Analysis of the Qïtaň term 'nabo'], 內蒙古大學學報 1998-4, pp.70-74; Huang Fengqi 黃鳳岐, 契丹史研究 [A study of the history of the Qïtaň], (赤峰: 內蒙古科學技術出版社, 1999), pp.81-114; Li Xihou 李錫厚, "論遼朝的政治體制" [Discussion on the political system of the Liao dynasty], 臨潢集, (保定: 河北大學出版社, 2001), pp.8-14; Li Xihou 李錫厚, "遼中期以後的捺鉢及其與幹魯朵中京的關係" [The imperial tours of the mid and late Liao in relation to its capital], *Ibid.*, pp.73-85; Gu Wengshuang 谷文雙, "遼代捺鉢制度研究" [Study on the imperial tour system of the Liao dynasty], 黑龍江民族叢刊 2002-3, pp.93-98; Wang Xinying 王新迎, "從遼聖宗前期捺鉢看南京城的職能及地位" [Function and position of the Southern Capital of the Liao seen through the imperial tour of the early era of Liao Emperor Shengzong], 首都師範大學學報 (2004), pp.40-45; Hu Tingrong 胡廷榮, "遼中京至廣平甸捺鉢間驛館考略," 中國邊疆史地研究 2004-1, pp.52-55; Huang Fengqi 黃鳳岐, "契丹捺鉢文化探論" [Research on the culture of imperial tour of the Liao], 社會科學輯刊 2004-4, pp.99-103; You Li 尤李, "遼金元捺鉢研究評述" [Review of the study on the imperial tours of the Liao, Jin and Yuan dynasties], 中國史研究動態 2005-2, pp.9-16.

5 Yoshida Junichi 吉田順一, "モンゴル帝國時代におけるモンゴル人の牧地と移動" [Mongolians' pastures and migrations during the Mongolian empire], 內陸アジア, 西アジアの社會と文化[Society and culture of Inner and Western Asia], Mori Masao, ed., 護雅夫 編, (東京: 山川出版社, 1983), pp.233-253; Honda Minobu 本田實信, "イルハンの冬營地.夏營地" [Winter and summer camps of the Ikhanate], モンゴル時代史研究 [Study on the Mongol history] (東京: 東京大學出版會, 1993), p.376.

6 Dong Hu 東湖, "元朝帝王巡幸上都的原因" [Reason for the Yean emperors' tour of Shangdu], 中國歷史地理叢 1994-3, pp.251-252; Ye Xinmin 葉新民, "都巡幸制與上都的宮廷生活" [The system of touring two capitals and the court life at Shangdu], 元上都研究, (內蒙古大學出版社, 1998), pp.37-54.





movement between the two capitals in the fourteenth century when their Sinicization had already been well underway has been seen as a legacy of their ancestral pastoral way of life.[7] These studies have contributed to our understanding, albeit partially, of the nature of seasonal migrations continued by nomadic rulers who built and maintained their steppe empires.

Yet, little study has been done on the cases of nomadic states in ancient timse within the Mongolian Steppe, including the early Uighur state (744-840), mainly due to the dearth of relevant historical materials. The comments on this subject in introductory overviews of Uighur history have been sketchy and speculative, surmising that the Türks and the Uighurs, based in their political center of the Orkhon River valley, moved between deep mountains and fertile lands along the river in summer,[8] or pointing to the existence of their rulers' seasonal residential camp (*ordu*, or *louju* 樓居 in Chinese).[9] This study also aims to recover the pattern of seasonal migrations of the early Uighur rulers and provide new insights into the characteristics of their state formation.

More specifically, this study attempts to examine carefully the extant Türkic stone inscriptions and explore the unexplored subject of seasonal migration of nomadic rulers on the Mongolian Steppe.[10] To begin with, I will use the stone inscriptions, related to the formation and consolidation of the Uighur state during the reign of its second ruler Qarlïq qaghan (Gele kehan 葛勒可汗, r. 747-759), and illustrate the routes of seasonal migrations involved with his expeditions as well as the locations of his summer and

7 Kim Hodong 金浩東, "Monggol jeguk gunjudeul eui yangdo sunhaeng gwa yumok jeok seupsok" 帝國 君主 兩都巡幸 遊牧的 習俗 [Mongol emperors' tour of the two capitals, and nomadic customs], Jungang Asia yeon'gu 7 (2002), pp.1-23.

8 Yang Shengmin 楊聖敏, 回紇史 [History of the Uighurs], (吉林敎育出版社, 1991), p.100.

9 Ren Aijun 任愛君, "回鶻'居'與契丹'四樓'之關係研究" [Study on the relation between the Uighur '*louju*' and the Qïtaň '*silou*'], 西北民族研究 1997-2, pp.138-145.

10 In order to reconstruct an overview of the Uighurs' seasonal migrations, this study uses mainly the 'Tes' Inscriptionn and the 'Tariyat' inscription of Qarlïq qaghan, as well as his tombstone 'Shine Usu' inscription. For the Uighur stone inscriptions, see Jeong Jaehun 정재훈, *Wigureu yumok jeguk sa* 위구르 유목제국사 744-840 [History of the nomadic empire of the Uighurs] (Seoul: Munhak gwa jiseong sa, 2005), pp.405-452.

winter camps. Focusing on the sacred Ötüken Mountain (Yudujin, Wudejian, Yudujun 於都斤, 烏德鞬, 鬱督軍)—a hub for the seasonal migrations of the Uighur rulers—during the period, this paper combines field research with the analysis of stone inscription. By so doing, this approach will shed light on the ways the Uighur rulers' seasonal migrations were closely tied to their state-building and the nature of their statecraft on top of their efforts to construct the capital city as a political center.

## Seasonal Migrations during the Uighur State Formation

For some years, even before the foundation of the Uighur state, Bayan Chor (Qarlïq qaghan after enthronement) had actively helped his father Qutluq Boyla (Quli peiluo 骨力裴羅— an Uighur chieftain) in his attempt to establish the Uighur state by overthrowing the Türks (Tujue 突厥). Beginning in 741, at the age of 28, Bayan Chor assisted his father's extensive expeditions.[11] Afterwards, the Uighurs would expand their control by taking part in the rebellion against the Türks and taking advantage of a chaotic succession struggle following the death of Inel qaghan (Yiran kehan 伊然可汗: r. 731-41 as the fourth qaghan) in 741.[12] Qutluq Boyla, however, assisted a Basmïl chieftain (known to the Chinese as Ashina shi 阿史那施)—who led the rebellion, killed the Türk qaghan (Pam Kül Tegin?), occupied the Orkhon River valley, and assumed the title of 'Ilig bilge qaghan'—and called himself as 'yabghu' together with the Qarluq chieftain.[13]

The Uighurs attacked the defeated Türks by crossing the Gobi Desert.[14] Bayan Chor joined that campaign, set out from Udurghan in 744 to assist his father in crossing the Gobi, met him at Key tagh again, passed Qara Qum (Heisha 黑沙, south of the Yinshan 陰山 Mountain Range in Chinese), and fought a series of battle against the Türks at Kögür, Kömür tagh, and Yar ögüz (Huanghe 黃河 in Chinese).[15] The goal of those battles was to subdue the Türks south of the Gobi and to stop the Türkish effort to restore their state through installing the Ozmïš qaghan (Wusumishi kehan 烏蘇米施可汗) as the ruler.

Upon the returning of Bayan Chor, his father Qutluq Boyla attacked and defeated the Basmïl's Ilig bilge qaghan in collaboration with the Qarluq chieftain to take upon himself the title of 'Qutlugh Bilge Kül qaghan' (Guduolubiqieque kehan 骨咄祿毗伽闕可汗: r. 744-747). Immediately, the Qutlugh Bilge Kül qaghan delivered the head of the Türk's Ozmïš qaghan via the military governor Wang Zhongsi 王忠嗣 at Shuofang 朔方 to the court of the Tang Dynasty (618-907), which had feared a Türkish invasion southward. This action inspired the Tang to invest the Uighur qaghan as the "king who respected righteousness" (Fengyi wang 奉義王) and the "qaghan who cherished humaneness" (Huairen kehan 懷仁可汗).[16]

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[11] The Tariyat Inscription, (E-5).

[12] The internal conflicts of the second Türk empire in its last years that caused it to fall can be summarized as follows. Following the death of Inel *qaghan* in 741, his wife Qutlugh barïm *qatun* (Guduolu Parunkedun骨咄祿 婆閏可敦, who was Bilge qaghan's wife and a daughter of Bilge Tonyuquq) succeeded in putting his young son Tengri qaghan on the throne and tried to weaken the power of the royal house to strengthen the *qaghan's* power. In order to have the succession she wanted, she lured and killed the candidate with the most potential, Tarduš šad 左殺 (Youxianwang 右賢王 in Chinese transcription, who was invested as the ruler of the Western Frontier Region of the Türk empire). Her action, however, provoked a rebellion from Tölis šad (Zuoxianwang 左賢王, who was invested as the ruler of the Eastern Frontier Region of the Türk empire). Tölis šad (Pan Kül Tegin 判闕特勤 as his proper name, and Qutlugh yabghu 骨咄葉護 as his official name) attacked and killed not only the young Tengri *qaghan* but also the succeeding *qaghan*, and established a separate force of his own, contributing to the dissensions and weakness and ultimately downfall of the Türk empire. (*Xin Tang shu* 新唐書 [New Tang history], fascicle 215 *xia*, "Tujue 突厥 *xia*," p.6054; Jiu Tang shu 舊唐書 [Old Tang history], fascicle 194 shang, "Tujue 突厥 *shang*," p.5177) The Chinese dynastic histories cited in this paper are from the punctuated and edited editions of the Zhonghua shuju 中華書局.

[13] *Xin Tang shu*, fasc. 215 *xia*, "Tujue 突厥 *xia*," p.6055.

[14] The Uighur ruling class who submitted to the Tang included Tarduš šad's 西殺 wife and son, Bög čor's (the Kapaghan *gaghan*) grandson Bediz Tegin 勃德支特勤, the Bilge *qaghan's* daughter princess Talui 大洛, the Inel *qaghan's* wife Yüz begh 余塞匐, the Tengri *qaghan's* 登利可汗 daughter princess Yüz 余燭, and Abus elteber 阿布思 頡利發, and others. A total of large 10,000 Uighur refugees into the Tang territory indicates the strength of the Türk forces, though defeated.

[15] Along with the inscription sources above, the Tang military commissioner Wang Zhongsi 王忠嗣 at Shuofang 朔方 reported that "Once again the Nujie怒皆 and Tujue 突厥 tribes were vanquished. Since the borderlands were pacified, the barbarians dared not to enter into [China]." (*Jiu Tang shu*, fasc. 103, "Wang Zhongsi," p.3198) His statement indicates that the Uighur military operations also took place south of the Yinshan mountains.

[16] *Jiu Tang shu*, fasc. 117, "Huigu 回鶻 *shang*," p.6114.

The Uighurs continued to vanquish the remaining forces of the Türks by defeating Bolmïš qaghan (Baimei kehan 白眉可汗), a Tardush Shad's descendant who had put up fierce resistance, and sending his head to the Tang.[17] Thereafter, the strength of the Türks became severely weakened and the last important ruler of the Türks' in-law clan (known as Ashide 阿史德 in Chinese), Qutlugh Barïm Qatun, finally surrendered to the Tang in 745.[18] Therefore, the Uighurs could come to the fore as the new rulers of the Mongolian Steppe by expanding over the steppes to the north of the Gobi Desert and receiving investitures from the Tang court.

Still, the subsequent formation of the Uighur state did not fare as the Uighurs had hoped. The Uighur state was confronted with ongoing challenges from other Türkic tribes, notably from the Qarluqs, or a former ally and other nomadic tribes out of the Türk rules. To begin with, the Uighurs tried to incorporate the confederation of nine Türkic tribes, collectively known as the 'Toquz Oghuz' or 'Nine Surnames' (Jiuxing Huihe 九姓 回紇 in Chinese).[19] In 746, the Uighurs would drive out the Qarluqs to the west and extended their control over eastern nomadic tribes such as the Toquz Tatar (Jiuxing Dada 九姓 達靼 in Chinese)[20] who had tried to create their independent power bases.

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17 *Cefu yuangui* 冊府元龜 [Prime tortoise of the record office], fasc. 975, "Waichenbu Baoyi 2" 外臣部 褒異2
[Vassal Baoyi 2], 11457 *xia* (Photographic version of the Zhonghua shuju, 1982).

18 *Zizhi tongjian* 資治通鑑 [Comprehensive mirror to aid in government], fasc. 215, Tang Emperor Xuanzong the 3rd year of Tianbo reign era 唐玄宗 天寶 3 (745), p.6863 (Punctuated and edited version of the Zhonghua shuju, 1990).

19 Jeong Jaehun , "Wigureu chogi (744-755) 'guseong Hoeheul' eui bujok guseong: 'Toquz Oghuz' munje eui jaegeomto" 初期 (744-755) '九姓回紇' 部族 構成—' ' (Toquz Oghuz) 問題 再檢討 [Composition of the 'Nine Surnames' tribes in the early Uighur state, 744-755: Review of the 'Toquz Oghuz' issue], *Dongyang sahak yeongu* 東洋史學研究 68 (1999).

20 The Toquz Tatar transcribed in Chinese sources as Dada 達靼 or Shiwei 室韋 was a Mongolian tribe of forest people residing north of eastern Mongolia in Tang times. (Xin Tang shu, fasc. 219, "Beidi Shiwei 北狄 室韋," p.6176.) The very Toquz Tatar who challenged the Uighurs at the time were estimated to be those nomads of the Shiwei tribe close to them. (*Siweishi yanjiu* 室韋史研究 [Study of the history of the Shiwei tribe], (北方文物雜誌社, 1985), pp.87-90; Zhang Jiuhe 張久和, 原蒙古人的歷史—室韋·達靼研究 [History of original Mongolian peoples: Study of the Shiwei and Dada tribes], (高等教育出版社, 1998), pp.134-138, pp.140-145.)





However, although the Qarluq qaghan had been pushed to the west, he maintained some degree of power and kept diplomatic contact with the Tang. Moreover, the Qarluqs posed a strong challenge by taking advantage of a power vacuum created during the interregnum following the death of Qutlugh Bilge Kül qaghan until his son ascended the throne as Qarlïq qaghan. It is not surprising that the death of a ruler in a steppe state might entail its serious decline or even its collapse, because the fate of steppe states heavily relied on the personal power and authority of its ruler. Therefore, Qarlïq qaghan launched campaigns to bring neighboring peoples under subjugation and to firmly establish his state.

In 748, no sooner had Qarlïq qaghan ascended the throne at the qaghan's court in the winter camp base to the rear of the mountain peaks (As ögüz bash and Qan ïduq bash) of the Ötüken Mountain, than he launched an expedition to the north.[21] He vanquished the Seqiz Oghuz and the Toquz Tatar based in Bükügüg and named them as "close subjects" (qara igil bodun). He boasted that it was accomplished as a result of the virtue of Heaven (*tengri*) and Earth (*yir*).[22] That campaign succeeded in deterring the separation of the Seqiz Oghuz, one important component of the confederation under his early rule.[23]

Afterwards, the qaghan tried to secure their loyalty as his subjects, yet was not so successful to pursue them further and gained a victory at Burghu in the 4th month of 748.[24] In the summer of that year, he sent expeditionary forces to the north up to the Selenge River valley, passing the mountain peak Shïb bash on the right side of the Ilun köl Lake. The expedition aimed to attack the Uighur chieftain Tay bilge tutuq, who put up resistance from the lower reaches of the Selenge River, indicating that the qaghan pursued the resisting force that had moved to the lower reaches of

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21 The Tariyat Inscription, (S-5).

22 The Shine usu Inscription, (E-1)-(E-2).

23 The Seqiz Oghuz referred to the confederation of those Türkic nomadic tribe, who had maintained a close alliance with the Uighurs, and included the sub-groups, such as Bugu 僕固, Hun 渾, Bayïrqu 拔曳固 or 拔野古, Tongra 同羅, Ediz 思結, Qabïsh 契苾, Abus 阿布思, and (?) 骨崙屋骨恐.

24 The Shine usu Inscription, (E-3)-(E-4).

the river for their favorable summer camping. Furthermore, the qaghan's troop moved to the north, which can be proven by the record that his troops gained victories at Qasui of the Achïq Altïr köl Lake and along the Selenge River on the 8th month of the same year.[25]

With the arrival of winter, the qaghan returned to the Ötüken Mountain, clearly showing the seasonal pattern of nomadic movement to the south in winter from the north in summer. Upon returning to the Ötüken Mountain in winter from the summer victories along the Selenge River valley, the qaghan flattered himself that "we were freed from the enemies." Thereupon, he granted the titles of 'yabghu' and 'shad' to his two sons and affiliated the two categories of people—Tölis and Tardush—with them respectively[26] in his effort to establish the state administrative structure.

In the following year of 750, on the 14th day of the 2nd month (springtime), the qaghan again embarked on an expedition to the northwest to attack the village communities called 'Chik' in the Kem River region. Upon completing the expedition in summer, the qaghan spent the summertime at the site of what is now the Tes River valley, and erected an epigraphic stele to commemorate his victory.[27] The lower half of the monument was discovered in 1976, and has been known as the 'Tes' Inscriptionnn. In the autumn of the same year, the qaghan subjugated the Tatars again and returned to the Ötüken Mountain in the winter of early 751. Then, in the summer of the same year, he erected an epigraphic monument at the point between the peaks Ay bash and Toqush at the rear of the Ïduq bash peak of the Ötüken Mountain.[28] The monument has not yet been discovered but its existence can be ascertained by the 'Shine Usu' inscription erected later. If this monument is discovered, scholars will benefit from more evidence able to reveal the summer camp base and the movement of the Uighur rulers in the early stage of their state-building.

[25] The Shine usu Inscription, (E-6)-(E-7).

[26] The Shine usu Inscription, (E-7).

[27] The Shine usu Inscription, (E-7)-(E-8).

[28] The Shine usu Inscription, (E-8)-(E-9).





In the autumn of 752, the qaghan set out on an expedition to the west from his Ötüken summer camp base to attack the Chiks again. The camp base for this campaign had been established at the 'Etiz bash' peak to the west of the Ötüken Mountain.[29] The Chiks' challenge at the time can be seen as the result of the weak control of the Uighurs over the western Mongolian Steppes and also the growing threat from the Qïrghïz (Xiajiasi 黠戛斯 or Jiakun 堅昆 in Chinese). By that time, the Qïrghïz had came down south as far as south of the Kögmen yiš Mountain (today the Sayan Mountains)[30] to the northwest of the Mongolian Steppe to help the Chiks.

The confrontation with the Qïrghïz marked the start of a crucial struggle against a major rival of the newly-found Uighur state. The story of the initial conflict with the Qïrghïz between 750 and 752 remained unclear because stele inscriptions about it have been worn out. Yet, it can be speculated that it was not a victorious story to the Uighurs. The reason is that the 'Tariyat Inscription,' erected in 753, made no reference to the fact that the initial war against the Qïrghïz was a successful one especially as compared with the extensive account of their earlier victory against the Chiks.

The Uighurs continued to undertake expedition against the Chiks in the autumn of 751. Furthermore, even in the early winter season on the 11th month, they crossed the Altai Mountains and advanced to the Bolchu River (a branch of the Irtysh River) to attack the Üč Qarluqs (Sangxing Geluolu 三姓 葛邏祿 in Chinese).[31] This indicates that they undertook expansionary campaigns not only against the Qïrghïz, but also against the Qarluqs and the Basmils further to the west. Moreover, the qaghan restarted attacking the Chiks in the spring of 752 after spending the previous winter at the Ötüken Mountain and returned to the Siz bash peak to spend the summer. The qaghan proclaimed that "a governor (*tutuq* derived from Chi-

[29] The Tariyat Inscription, (W-1).

[30] The Kögmen yiš mountain may refer to today's Tannu Ula or Sayan mountains bordering the Yenisei River basin. Other ancient Türkic inscriptions also often note that the Kögmen yiš mountain was an important strategic point to secure for the wars with the Qïrghïz.

[31] The Shine usu Inscription, (S-1)-(S-2).

nese *dudu* 都督) was granted to the Chik *bodun* (people),"[32] meaning that the qaghan could send an overseer to control the Chiks or appoint the Chik chieftain as a governor.

After a summer victory against his rivals in 753, the qaqhan erected an epigraphic stele on the shore of the Terkhin Lake located at the upper reach of the Selenge River, known as the 'Tariyat Inscription,' in order to commemorate his achievement of defeating rival nomadic powers such as the Qïrghïz, allied with the Chiks, the Qarluqs and the Basmils, and establishing domination over the Mongolian Steppe. On the inscription, the qaghan described in great detail his successful early campaigns including secured territories, subject peoples, and enfeoffed lands. The final subjugation of the Basmils and the Qarluqs to the north in 754[33] enabled the Uighurs to incorporate them into a single subject community (*kebuluo* 客部落 in Chinese sources) under appointed governor, relegate them to the forward guard at every battle,[34] and stand as the new hegemon across the Mongolian Steppe.[35]

On the 'Tariyat' Inscription of 753, the qaghan listed eight branches of the Selenge River under his domination such as "Orqon, Toghla, Sebin, Teledü, Qaragha, and Buraghu,"[36] and made it clear that he "moved and camped [seasonally] within the boundaries of these territories."[37] Among the names of the branch streams listed there, only two are identical with

[32] The Shine usu Inscription, (S-2). The title *tutuq* was used to designate the Türkic chiefs under the "loose-reign" (*jimi* 羈縻) rule of the Tang, and was comparable to the indigenous titles of the first Türk empire 'elteber' or 'ilteber.'

[33] The Shine usu Inscription, (W-2).

[34] *Tang Huiyao* 唐會要 [Tang collection of notabilia], fasc. 98, "Huihe 回紇," p.1744 (Punctuated and edited version of the Zhonghua shuju, 1990).

[35] Kawasaki Hirotaka 川崎浩孝, "カルルク西遷年代考—シネウス·タリアト碑文の再檢討による" [A Study on the dating of Qarlïq *qaghan's* western expeditions through a reexamination of the Shine usu and Tariyat Inscriptions], 廻紇タリアト·シネ=ウス兩碑文 (八世紀中葉) のテキスト復原と年代記載から見た北·東·中央アジア (Katayama Akio, et al. 片山章雄 等, 1993年度東海大學文學部研究造成金成果報告書, 1994), p.109; Chen Liangwei 陳良偉, "拔悉密汗國及其相關的問題," 新疆大學學報 1992-3, p.59.

[36] The Tariyat Inscription, (W-1).

[37] The Tariyat Inscription, (W-4).





modern-day names—Orqon and Tol (Toghla)—, yet all the branch streams listed seem to be tributaries of the Selenge River. The Selenge River originates from the Khanghai Mountain range and the Khovsgol region, and passes through the Mongolian Steppe to flow into the Baikal Lake, being fed by a good number of tributaries and branch streams created by the rugged terrains of the steppe. These waterways flow into larger rivers which nourish pasture lands and nurture nomadic peoples. Therefore, it seems likely that more or less the whole range of the Selenge River valley might well constitute the domain of the early Uighur state.

As noted above, it can be seen that the boundaries of seasonal movement by the Uighurs under their early ruler Qarlïq qaghan consisted of the Ötüken Mountain and the tributaries and branch streams of the Selenge River. To specify their seasonal migration pattern, we need to identify the present-day location of the Ötüken Mountain—the center of the Uygur polity— to and from which the Uygur rulers and population moved. More importantly, what should not be discarded here is the fact that the campaign routes in the early expansionary stage of the Uighur state cannot be mechanically equated to the pattern of seasonal migrations in the later stage of the Uighur state marked then by stability and growth.

## Seasonal Migrations and the Ötüken Mountain

The Ötüken Mountain and their adjacent areas, known as the stronghold of the early ruler Qarlïq qaghan, were referred to as the 'Ötüken yiš' (mountain) or the 'Ötüken yir' (land) in all the records. Yet, the exact location of 'Ötüken' mentioned often in the Türkic and Uighur periods has remained uncertain. It is generally accepted that the site was the heartland of the Mongolian Steppe, and was best suited for the seat of the government of the historical nomadic states.[38] Among a range of discus-

[38] It has been understood that the *qaghan's* court south of the Gobi Desert in the Xiongnu era also had been located close to today's Kharkhorin, and identifiable to the Ötüken mountain in the Türk and Uighur eras. See Uchida Ginpū 內田吟風, 北アジア史研究—匈奴編 [A study of the history of northern Asia: On the Xiongnu], (東京: 同朋舍, 1975), pp.97-102.

sion about its location,[39] I subscribeto the thesis that the Ötüken is located in the "mountain forest steppe" along the Orkhon River valley flowing down the northern slope of the Khangai Mountain range, which still needs an elaboration.[40]

The northern slope of the Khangai Mountain, referred traditionally to as 'Ötüken,' was one of the most fertile mountain forest steppes within the Mongolian Steppe, as suggested by the name 'Khangai', which means "cool climate, soft soil, many streams and lakes, rich grasslands and forests in a mountainous region."[41] Blessed with the streams flowing down from the mountains and the rich grasslands and forests along the streams, 'Ötüken' was historically the heartland of the Mongolian Steppe. Geographically, this wide steppe was traversed by a set of tributaries of the Selenge River, including the Orkhon River, and enclosed by mountains less dry than the arid Gobi Desert to the south. The environment as above made this area not only available for herding and hunting, but also prepared for a higher concentration of livestock than other steppes.

Also in the period of the Türkic empire, the qaghans recognized the Orkhon River valley, running down the northern slope of the Khangai Mountain as the central sacred land in their possession, by which means they could justify their power derived from Heaven (*tengri*).[42] In the mid-sixth century, Muhan qaghan 木汗可汗 (r. 553-572) of the first Türkic empire conquered the Rourans 柔然, took possession of this land, and enthroned himself as the legitimate sovereign of the Mongolian Steppe.[43] Later, in the 'Kül Tegin' Inscription, the Bilge qaghan (r. 716-733) of the second Türkic empire cited this land as the 'ïduq (sacred) Ötüken' and remarked that "there is no better land than the Ötüken Mountain to exercise government!" or "setting yourself up in the Ötüken Mountain, you can forever govern the state as sovereign."[44] This eulogy expresses the qaghans' belief that the possession of this sacred land might well guarantee the divine right to rule the steppe permanently.

After overthrowing the Türkic empire, the Uighurs regarded the occupation of 'ïduq Ötüken' as a heartland in legitimizing their rule over the entire Mongolian Steppes. When the Qarlïq qaghan declared the eight tributaries of the Selenge River as his domain and launched expeditions to occupy them, he aimed to extend his power over the surrounding areas of the Ötüken Mountain. The name of the nomadic rulers' heartland in the Mongolian Steppe also proves that the site was regarded as a sacred land.[45] For example, the Qarlïq qaghan's summer and winter camp bases were located at 'ïduq bash' and 'qan ïduq bash' respectively, all meaning sacred peaks.

In order to know the present location of Ötüken where the qaghan's bases were placed, it is necessary to connect the requirements for a suitable base with its geographical conditions. In general, two essential elements that pastoral nomads considered for their settlement base were wind and water. They would choose the place where wind and water were easily available in summer while in winter the place where the severity of winter wind could be reduced by mountain barrier to the north and the access to grasses were secured for their animals. To meet such requirements, given the geographical setting of the mountain forest steppe, they would move down to lower lands in winter while moving upward a mountain or moving to a place in a mountain where wind was abundantly available after winter.[46] Therefore, the present location of the ïduq peaks of the qaghan's bas-

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[39] For the research findings so far, see Mori Masao 護雅夫, 古代トロコ民族史研究 I [Study on the ancient Türkic people I], (東京: 山川出版社, 1967), p.57.

[40] Yoshida Junichi 吉田順一, "ハンガイと陰山" [The Khangai and Yinshan mountains], 史觀 102 (1980), p.52.

[41] *Ibid.*, p.49.

[42] Mori Masao 護雅夫, 古代トロコ民族史研究 I [A study of the history of ancient Türkic people I], p.24.

[43] *Zhoushu* 周書 [History of the Zhou of the Northern Dynasties], fascicle 50, "Yiyu Tujue chuan" 異域 突厥傳 [Biography of the Türks in foreign lands], p.910.

[44] The Kül Tegin Inscription, (S-8). For Korean translation of the inscription, see Jeong Jaehun 정재훈, *Dolgweol yumok jeguksa* 돌궐유목제국사 [History of the Türk steppe empire] (Seoul: Sagyejeol, 2016), pp.620-627.

[45] Mori Masao 護雅夫, "ウチユケンと古代遊牧國家" [The Ötüken and ancient nomadic states], 內陸アジア研究 I [Study on Inner Asia I], (1964), pp.37-40; Yamada Nobuo山田信夫, "テユルクの聖地ウトユケン山" [The Ötüken mountain, the sacred land of the Türks], 北アジア遊牧民族史研究 [A study of the history of nomadic peoples in northern Asia], (東京: 東京大學出版會, 1989), p.67.

[46] Refer to the note 2.

es can be estimated by combining these natural requirements and the information considering seasonal migrations in the stone inscriptions.

As explained in the previous section, in order to consolidate his newly found state, immediately following the death of his father, Qarlïq qaghan launched expeditions starting from the Ötüken Mountain northwest towards the Terkhin Lake. At the time, the qaghan spent summers around the Tes River and the Terkhin Lake to the northwest of the Ötüken Mountain, as well as around the mainstream Selenge River. Except for the year 751 when his state enjoyed temporary stability and he spent the summer at the contact point of the Ay peak (meaning the moon-shaped peak) to the rear of the ïduq peak and Toqush, the qaghan stayed northwest of the Mongolian Steppe until the year 753. It seems to me that the course of migrations the qaghan took might well have met both the overall inclination of nomads to move to the north in summer and his particular need for military expeditions.

The contact point of the Ay peak to the rear of the ïduq peak and Toqush, where Qarlïq qaghan was recorded to have spent summer in his early rule, was a mountain forest steppe suitable for the qaghan's summer camp base. The site was to the north of the sacred ïduq peak, encompassing a lower peak and its surrounding steppe. It may be possible to find out its exact location in the mountain forest steppe along the present upper Orkhon River valley, which was referred to as the 'sacred Ötüken' by the qaghan.




Figure 1. Mongolian Steppes (satellite photo)




Figure 2. Mountain Steppe in the Northern Slope of the Khangai Mountain








Figure 3. Mountain Steppe Centered on the Chigeltei Peak (enlarged satellite photo)



Figure 4. Mountain Map Centered on the Chigeltei Peak

To this end, I have analyzed the geographical features of the Mongolian Steppe as represented in satellite photos (Figure 1 and Figure 2) as well as the geographical data collected through two field surveys conducted in 1996 and 2005. As a result, the best candidate for the present location of the Ötüken Mountain with the sacred peak and its surrounding steppe appears to be a triangular green mountain region (Figure 3) of the northern slope of the Khangai Mountain, shaped by the Orkhon River to the east, the Khunui River to the west, and the Tamir River to the south.

This extensive mountainous site in point is marked by the Chigeltei peak at 2,294 meters above sea level. From the high elevated Chigeltei peak, the slope stretches from the northwest to the southeast along with a number of the tributaries of the Orkhon River that flows down in the same direction (Figure 4). To the south of the peak, following the northern slope of the Khangai Mountain lies the vast mountain forest steppe alongside many streams and river, thus constituting the invaluable sources of water and grazing land for pastoral nomads and their livestock. And, the ïduq peak described in the inscriptions may refer to the Chigeltei peak. The contact point of the Ay peak to the rear of the ïduq peak and Toqush, where the Qarlïq qaghan's summer camp base was recorded to be placed, may be located at the Khunui River area to the north, or the steppe adjacent to its tributary Jaraitain, or even the Moghon Shine usu further north where the

tomb and the stone steles honoring Qarlïq qaghan have been discovered (See Figure 4 and Figure 5). All these sites are cool in the summer thanks to the blowing wind and had easy access to water.

These sites in point can be a possible locus for the winter camp base of the qaghan, in view of their high mountain barriers in the northwest blocking severe winter wind. Although the extant inscriptions depict mostly the summer camp bases, the location of the winter camp base, where the qaghan was recorded to spend the summer of 749 according to The Shine usu Inscription, can be roughly determined by the record from the Tariyat Inscription which states the location of the winter base at the 'As öngüsh bash' peak inside the Ötüken Mountain and at the rear of the 'Kan ïduq' peak. Given the descriptions from the two inscriptions,[47] the winter camp base of the qaghan can be the present basin area between the two lowly peaks to the southeast of the Chigeltei peak. This area occupies a mountain slope that is 1,700 meters above sea level, blocked by mountain barriers to the northwest sufficient to construct the qaghan's court (*kehanting* 可汗庭) and accommodate a large number of people.

Moreover, not only was the northern expedition possible from there, but the vast steppe and forest of the Tamir River valley was also readily available closely down below. Furthermore, this presumed location of the Ötüken possesses not only the geographical features, favorable to the qaghan's seasonal migrations and campaigns, but also a higher concentration of cultural and religious remains. As a matter of fact, through field surveys around this region, there is a higher concentration of ancient remains, compared to other regions, such as deer-shaped stone monuments, stone mound tombs, and human-shaped stone monuments, all of which indicate how the political and religious center of the Uighur state ran.[48]

In sum, according to the inscriptions, it appears to me that the qaghan's camp bases were located in the triangular area centered on the

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[47] The Shine usu Inscription, (E-7); The Tariyat Inscription, (S-6).

[48] Numerous maps of these historical remains were published in Mongolia Монголын Хүмүүнлигийн ухааны Академи, *Монгол Нутаг Дахь Түүх Соёлын Дурсгал* (Улаанбаатар, 1999), p.68, p.94.





Chigeltei peak, or the Ötüken Mountain area during the time. In summer, he would launch expeditions towards the north or the northwest or move to neighboring places from there while he would return to the bases on the southern slope of the mountains against cold weather. The presumed location of the Ötüken as above could afford three crucial advantages to the qaghan in his effort to strengthen the newly-found Uighur state. First, the site was favorably situated for the northwestern expeditions which the qaghan prioritized. Second, since it lied at the center of a dense network of tributaries of the Selenge River, the qaghan could effectively exercise control over it. Third, the possession of the Ötüken, acclaimed generally as "God's land" among the rulers of the Mongolian Steppe, could promote further an ideological legitimization of the qagan's power.[49]

## Seasonal Migrations in Relation to the Construction of the Capital

By 753, Qarlïq qaghan had waged a series of warfare with neighboring nomadic peoples and from then on took initiatives in consolidating the Uighur state. He tried to make the Ötüken Mountain, centered around the tributaries of the Selenge River, not only as the camps for seasonal migrations, but also as a political center from which he could exercise control over his realm. The qaghan was not just content with bringing various northern or northwestern nomadic peoples under subjugation. He also strove to forge close ties with communities of sedentary peoples in accordance with the general pattern of state expansion among nomadic rulers.[50]

The Uighur state in its early stage came to terms with the Tang when the founder Qutlugh Bilge Kül qaghan conquered the Türks and received the title of the 'king who respected righteousness' (Fengyi wang 奉義王)

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[49] Yamada Nobuo山田信夫, "テユルクの聖地ウトユケン山" [The Ötüken mountain, the sacred land of the Türks], p.71.

[50] Kim Hodong 金浩東, "Buk Asia youmok gukga eui gunjugweon" 北 遊牧國家 君主權 [Sovereign power of the nomadic states in northern Asia], *TongAsa sang eui wanggweon* 東亞史上 王權 [Monarchical power in East Asian history], (Seoul: Hanul academi, 1993), p.137.

from the Tang.[51] However, the event did not lead to a substantial relationship with the Tang. His successor Qarlïq qaghan busied himself with conquering nomadic peoples rather than making contact with the Tang. Establishing his power over the nomadic world was an absolute priority for the qaghan on the ground that military victories over the other contenders of power in the Mongolian Steppe would perpetually confirm the Uighur destiny and legacies from their ancestors.[52] Through his military prowess, the qaghan was able to consolidate his power over the Inner Asian steppe by 753, and in 754 he was able to drive out the Qarluqs and the Basmïls to the west. Still, the Uighurs' renewed effort to make a rapprochement with the Tang met with little success.

As it happened, the qaghan started recruiting the Sogdians, engaged in trade between the East and the West, to the Uighur government. The Sogdians of oasis origin had served important roles in the operation of the nomadic states and became prominent during the imperial period of the Türks[53] to the point of making their residential colonies in the Mongolian Steppe. The Uighurs also tried to forge a constructive tie with them by building residential facilities to accommodate them, as shown in an account recorded on The Shine usu Inscription following the victories against the Qarluqs and others around the Terkhin Lake in 753. Afterwards, the qaghan returned to the Ötüken and built the ordu in the vicinity of the Orkhon River and the balïq (permanent citadels).[54]

The qaghan chose to build his *ordu* close to the citadels on the vast rich pastures by the main stream of the Orkhon River flowing from the

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[51] *Jiu Tang shu*, fasc. 117, "Huigu 回鶻 *shang*," p.6114.

[52] The Shine usu Inscription, (N-12)-(E-2).

[53] Mori Masao護雅夫, "ソグド人の東方發展に關する考古學的一資料" [An archaeological material related to the Sogdians' eastern expansion], 古代トルコ民族史研究 II [A study of the history of ancient Türkic people II], (東京: 山川出版社, 1992), p.216-229; Iwasa Seiichirō 岩佐精一郎, "元代の和林" [Helin in the Yuan era], 岩佐精一郎遺稿 [Posthumous manuscripts of Iwasa Seiichirō], (東京, 1936), p.233; К. М. Байпаков, Среднебекобая городская культура южного казахстана и семиречья (Алма-Ата, 1986); Étienne De La Vaissière ; James Ward, tr., Sogdian traders : A History (Histoire des marchands Sogdiens) (Leiden ; Boston : Brill, 2005), p.225.

[54] The Shine usu Inscription, (S-10).





**Maps**




Figure 5. Location of the Ötüken Mountain Area in the Northern Slope of the Khangai Mountain—Political Centers of the Türks, Uighurs, and Mongols

Khangai Mountain to the north and its tributary Tamir River. This fertile steppe area of sedentary agriculture (even today) with the trade routes linking the East and the West was fairly compatible with commercial bases of itinerant caravans. As Bilge qaghan of the Türks once remarked; "If you take the seat [of the government] at Ötüken and send out the caravans, you need not worry about anything."[55] The area allowed for commercial transactions with adjacent regions whose citadels includes both Qara Balghasun—close to Khosho Chaydam—, the political center of the Türk empire, and Qaraqorum, the capital city of the Mongol Empire later.

Yet, the Uighurs could not develop a close relationship with the Tang. At that time, the Tang did not recognize the Uighurs as the master of the

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[55] The Kül Tegin Inscription, (S-8).

pastoral nomadic world but merely as one of the "loose-reign" (*jimi* 羈縻) peoples. The Uighurs were unable to force the Tang to send a princess for peace-making (*hefan gongzhu* 和蕃公主) or for opening border markets (*hushi* 互市). Rather, the Tang used its "loose-reign" peoples such as the old and new Türk subordinates, who had submitted in the mid-7th century (Tujue *zahu* 突厥 雜胡) and in the aftermath of the downfall of the second Türk empire (Tujue *jianghu* 突厥 降戶) respectively, to counter the aggressive Tibetans (Tufan) 吐蕃 and Qïtans 契丹, as well as the rising Uighurs.[56]

Until 756, the Uighurs had been unable to develop any concrete diplomatic relationship with the Tang according to their terms. However, by rendering invaluable military service against the An Lushan 安祿山 Rebellion that began in the eleventh month of 755, the Uighur state could acquire a valuable opportunity to establish a new favorable relationship with the Tang. Suzong 肅宗 (r. 756-762), at the face of the fall of his capital Chang'an 長安 and in counter to the growing power of his Türk subordinates (Tujue *jianghu* 突厥 降戶) and the Tibetans on the heels of the rebellion, decided to accept the assistance of the Uighurs. In the ninth month of 757, the eldest son (Tarduš ulugh bilge yabghu) of Qarlïq qaghan was ordered to assist the Tang armies in recapturing the two Tang capitals of Chang'an 長安 and Luoyang 洛陽, and, in return, the Uighurs were allowed to loot and pillage the two imperial capitals, and were rewarded with gifts. On his return to the steppes in the winter, the Uighur heir apparent promised another military expedition to help the Tang and in the next year Qarlïq qaghan began a diplomatic marriage by asking for an imperial bride of the Tang.

Breaking with precedents, Suzong granted a marriage alliance with Qarlïq qaghan and sent a daughter of his, known as the Ningguo Princess

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[56] Jeong Jaehun 丁載勳, "Dangjo eui Dolgweol hangho gimi wa An Roksan eui nan: Dolgweol jei jeguk (682-745) bunggoe ihu yumok segye eui jaepyeon gwa gwallyeon hayeo" 唐朝 突厥 洛戶 羈縻 安祿山 亂—突厥 第二帝國 (682-745) 崩壞 以後 遊牧世界 再編 關聯 [The Tang's loose-rein rule of the Türk subordinates, and the An Lushan rebellion in relation to the reordering of the steppe world in the aftermath of the collapse of the second Türk empire], Bunyeol gwa tonghap: Jungguk jungse eui jesang 分裂 統合—中國中世 諸相 [Division and Unification: Aspects of medieval China], (Seoul: Jisik saneop sa, 1998).





寧國公主, to marry him. The Tang court also accorded the title of "Bilge qaghan whose heroic martial power is far reaching" to him in the 7th month of 758. This marriage alliance, expressed as 'the Tang and the Uighurs are in lip and teeth relationship,'[57] marked an epochal event. The Uighurs started to gain recognition of their regional hegemony from the Tang and represent themselves as the leader of the whole northern nomadic world .

In the 7th month when the qaghan stayed at his summer camp base, the Ningguo Princess arrived probably at the northern side of the Ötüken. The location of her residency can be inferred from the statement on The Shine usu Inscription that the city of Bay balïq (rich city) was built on the northern bank of the Selenge River on behalf of the princess and the Sogdian merchants.[58] The meaning of 'balïq' or citadels, close to the qaghan's *ordu*, denotes a large complex of permanent structures rather than the movable housing common to the nomads. Bay balïq may be identified with the Khotag Undur som citadel remains on the northern bank of the Selenge River today. The remains consist of three distinguishable sites; the smallest by the Uighurs and the remainders by the Qïtans.[59] The northern bank of the Selenge River, where the Khunui River joins, lies at the center of the vast pasture land with cool summer weather and has the trade route along the river connecting the East and the West.

The location of the Uighur summer camp base to the north of the Ötüken was a regular migration site but their migration further north is related to the battles with the Qïrghïz. The northern bank of the Selenge River, where Bay balïq was located, had the strategic advantage of launching expeditions against northern enemies. In the early period of the Uighur state, the Uighurs largely prevailed over the Qïrghïz. For example, accord-

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[57] "Ce Huihe wei yingwu weiyuan kehan wen" 冊回紇爲英武威遠可汗文 [Writ for investing the Uighur as the qaghan whose heroic martial power is far reaching], Tang da zhaoling ji 唐大詔令集 [Collection of the Tang imperial edicts], 638 (上海: 學林出版社, 1992).

[58] The Shine usu Inscription, (W-5).

[59] Hayashi Toshio, Shiraishi Noriyuki, and Matsuda Koichi 俊雄·白石典之·松田孝一, "バイバリク遺蹟" [The Bay balïq remains], (中央ユーラシア學研究會, モンゴル國現存遺蹟·碑文調査研究報告 [Research report on existing historical remains and stone inscriptions of the Mongolian People's Republic], 1999), pp.196-198.




Figure 6. Location of the Bay balïq Citadel. The rectangle on the right bottom marks the citadel of the Uighur era.
(Source: Hayashi Toshio, Shiraishi Noriyuki, and Matsuda Koichi 俊雄·白石典之·林松田孝一, "バイバリク遺蹟" [The Bay balïq remains]. (中央ユーラシア學研究會, モンゴル國現存遺蹟·碑文調査研究報告[Research report on existing historical remains and stone inscriptions of the Mongolian People's Republic], 1999), p.198)

ing to the *Xin Tang shu*, "in the reign period of Emperor Suzong, [the Qïrghïz] were defeated by the Uighurs, and cut off from China ever since."[60] Also, in the 9th month of 758, an Uighur envoy (Dashouling Gaijiangjun 大首領 盖將軍 in Chinese), dispatched to the Tang court reported the Uighur destruction of a Qïrghïz army of 50,000.[61]

In order to deal with the severe winter season, the qaghan moved

[60] Xin Tang shu, fasc. 217 xia, "Huigu 回鶻 xia," p.6149.

[61] Jiu Tang shu, fasc. 195, "Huihe 迴紇," p.5201.





from the northern bank of the Selenge River to the southern slope of the Ötüken where the winter capital Kara Balghasun sat. Despite the lack of detailed accounts, it is highly likely that new dwellings were necessary for the princess to tide over the extreme winter weather, just as Bay balïq was selected as her summer dwelling. Therefore, the construction of Kara Balghasun received renewed vigor after the arrival of the Tang princess and the position of Kara Balghsun as the winter capital was further strengthened.

The construction of the capital Kara Balghasun continued even after the death of Qarlïq qaghan in the following year (the 4th month of 759). After the Ningguo Princess had returned home to finish mourning in the 6th month, a daughter of Pugu Huaien 僕固懷恩, called the younger Ningguo Princess, was married to the third ruler Bögü qaghan (r. 759-780, Mouyu kehan 牟羽可汗 in Chinese sources) and became the qatun, for whom more residential facilities were built. Pugu Huaien 僕固懷恩 was one of the foremost Tang generals of Türk descent who played an active role in quelling the An Shi Rebellion and forming a military alliance with the Uighurs by visiting them together with the Dunhuang king Cheng Cai in the 9th month of 757. Furthermore, the Dunhuang king received the Uighur princess Bilge as his wife and Pugu Huaien sent off another daughter of his to marry the qaghan's second son Bilge Tölis ulugh bilge shad.[62]

If hesitant somewhat in leading campaigns to assist the Tang, Bögü qaghan personally put down the rebellion of Shi Siming 史思明 (703-761), one of An Lushan's generals who proclaimed himself emperor, and vigorously strengthened the Uighur-Tang ties including the construction of a royal palace in Kara Balghasun for the Tang princess.[63] Meanwhile, he adopted Manicheism from his Sogdian supporters to further strengthen his rule.[64] This was meant to forge a strong and long-lasting connection with a

[62] Xin Tang shu, fasc. 217 shang, "Huigu 回鶻 shang," p.6115.

[63] Zizhi tongjian 資治通鑑 [Comprehensive mirror to aid in government], fasc. 226, Tang Emperor Dezong the 1st year of Jianzhong reign era 唐德宗 建中元年 (780), p.7282.

[64] Jeong Jaehun , "Wigureu eui Manigyo suyong gwa geu seonggyeok" 摩尼教 受容 性格 [The Uighurs' adoption of Manicheism and its characteristics], Yeoksa hakbo 歷史學報 168 (2000).

people possessing commercial and urban skills as well as religious devotion. The Sogdian traders, acting as a bridge between the Uighurs and the Tang, made crucial contributions to the trade of Uighur horses for Chinese silk, a major economic policy for the Tang.[65] Consequently, the sedentary urban centers like Kara Balghasun and Bay balïq expanded to accommodate the Sogdian merchants as well as the people from the Tang. Furthermore, the active construction of the capital for sedentary populations wielded a substantial influence on the pattern of seasonal migrations of the qaghan.

Additionally, there might be a certain spring camp where the qaghan would stay on his way to the summer camp at Bay balïq after spending the winter season at the Ötüken. A plausible site for that purpose could be the Moghon Shine usu (clear water of the snake) where Qarlïq qaghan's tomb was built after his death in the 4th month of 759 and his funeral was held in the 6th month with the arrival of the Tang condolence embassy. The stone inscriptions and mound stone monuments in the middle of an elevated basin, surrounded by the small 'Moghon Shine usu' Lake to the south, alongside a tributary of the Khanui River have still remained in place.[66]

Besides, among the nomadic peoples in the region, sacrificial offering or military training in the form of hunting was usually held at the site of the spring camp.[67] The Türks used to gather at the sacred Tarenshui 他人水 in the middle of the 5th month to offer sacrifice to tengri (heavenly god)[68] and the Gaoche 高車 with whom the Uighurs was once affiliated also performed a similar ritual during the spring season.[69] Later, the Qïtans performed a range of primitive religious rituals at the site of the spring

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[65] Zizhi tongjian, fascicle 226, Tang Emperor Dezong the 1st year of Jianzhong reign era (780), p.7282.

[66] Hayashi Toshio 林俊雄, "ウイグル可汗國初期の石碑遺跡" [The stone inscriptions of the early Uighur qaghan state], 廻紇タリアト・シネ=ウス兩碑文(八世紀中葉)のテキスト復原と年代記載から見た北·東·中央アジア (Katayama Akio, et al., 片山章雄 等, 1993年度東海大學文學部研究造成金成果報告書, 1994).

[67] Kim Hodong, "Monggol jeguk gunjudeul eui yangdo sunhaeng gwa yumok jeok seupsok," 5, p.12.

[68] Zhoushu 周書, fasc. 50, "Yiyu Tujue chuan" 異域 突厥傳, p.910.

[69] Weishu 魏書 [History of the Wei of the Northern Dynasties], fasc. 103, "Gaoche" 高車, p.2309.





camp.[70] Likewise, it is highly likely that the Uighurs also performed similar spring rituals somewhere around the Ötüken. If such rituals were performed in the spring season, as mentioned above, the most plausible venue may well be around the Shine usu. Moreover, the venue, bordering the forest to the northeast, was an ideal hunting ground fit for training a large number of soldiers, to be sent out whenever necessary, and a strategic location for a marshalling area, both of which suggest the function of the spring camp as a strategic platform to launch expeditions against other nomadic peoples.




Figure 7. Location of the Shine usu Inscription.
(Source: Hayashi Toshio 俊雄. "ウイグル可汗國初期の石碑遺跡" [The stone inscriptions of the early Uighur qaghan state], 8)

In summary, the qaghan's seasonal migration followed the path starting from the winter camp at Kara Balghasun situated in the southern slope of the Ötüken Mountain, heading northward to the spring camp in the steppe along the Khanui River and moving further north to spend the summer season. In particular, from the arrival of the Ningguo Princess in 758 onward, movements between Bay balïq and Kara Balghasun became central in the qaghan's seasonal migrations, naturally resulting in the further construction of comfortable living quarters for the Tang princess. What should not be dismissed is the fact that related structures like citadels and inner courts could serve as important

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[70] Yi Yongbeom 李龍範, "Yodae chunyu go" 遼代春遊考 [Study on the imperial spring tour of the Liao dynasty], Jungse Manju Monggo sa eui yeon'gu 中世滿州·蒙古史의 硏究 [Study on the histories of Manchu and Mongol], (Seoul: Donghwa chulpan gongsa, 1988), p.115.




Figure 8.The Spring Camp (Moghon Shine Usu) of the Uighurs between the Summer and Winter Camps

symbols and landmarks to demonstrate the qaghan's authority and power.[71] As Figure 9 shows, Kara Balghasun's development into a great city testifies to the enhanced position and power of the Uighur qaghans through the establishment of constructive relation with the Tang and the further westward expansion since the late 8th century. Consequently, the later qaghans, while continuing seasonal migrations centered on their existing summer and winter camps, tried to build additional urban centers in their realm to accommodate the Tang people and the Sogdians, nurture the economic growth, increase their cultural competence, and finally maintain the Uighur hegemony in the Mongolian Steppe.

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[71] The Ilkhanate of the Mongol empire era constructed and expanded permanent structures centered on the cities to demonstrate its rulers' prestige. See Honda Minobu 本田實信, "イルハンの冬營地.夏營地" [Winter and summer camp bases of the Ikhanate], モンゴル時代史研究 [Study on the Mongol history], (東京: 東京大學出版會, 1993), p.378.







Abb. 32: Karabalgasun: Stadtplan auf der Grundlage einer luftgestützten Vermessung 2007
Зураг 32: Хар Балгас: 2007 онд агаараас авсан хэмжилтэнд үндэслэсэн хотын дэвсгэр зураг

Figure 9. Map of Kara Balghasun (Courtesy of the Excavation Team from University of Bonn)

## Concluding Remarks

Written and archaeological sources have suggested that the early Uighur rulers followed the nomadic practice of seasonal migrations around the triangular-shaped mountain steppe area of the Ötüken—the modern Chigeltei peak—. Along this line, I explores more specifically the Uighur route that started from the winter camp in the Ötüken northward to the Khanui River steppe in the spring season north or northwest to Bay balïq for summer. And, in the course of the migration the second ruler Qarlïq qaghan conducted frequent expeditions to bring other neighboring nomadic peoples under his dominance and confirm the Uighur hegemony over the Mongolian Steppe. Until his newly-found state achieved a level of stability in 753, the qaghan kept performing military operations to the north or northwest in summer whiling returning to the Ötüken in winter. At the same time, the Uighur military aid in suppressing the An Lushan Rebellion in 756 gave

the qughan an invaluable chance to improve the Uighur-Tang relationship. Following his marriage to the Ningguo Princess in 758, the qaghan built permanent living quarters around his ordu on behalf of the Tang princess by constructing his royal residences in Bay balïq for summer and in Kara Balghasun for winter. Without forgoing the traditional nomadic practice of seasonal migrations, he built more permanent structures alongside the citadels in the summer and winter camps for the Tang princess and the Sogdian merchants; the construction project continued from the reign of the third ruler Bögü qaghan onward. Hence, I contend, the development of permanent urban centers was closely related to the increasing contact and exchange with the Tang through diplomatic marriages, the vigorous promotion of trade with the Sogdians, and eventually strengthen the qughan's power. To be certain, the Uighur ascendency in conjunction with the diplomatic and commercial changes made the Uighurs themselves reshape their own seasonal migration pattern and residential structures.





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# The Postal Relay System in Western Asia under the Mongol Rule and Ghazan Khan's Reform*

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## Introduction

In the early thirteenth century, to establish a broad transportation and communication network, the Mongols installed postal relay stations called *jam*, or *yām*, across their empire. This postal system was crucial in the efficient running of the empire. It is no wonder that a considerable number of studies have investigated the system. Especially, thanks to affluent primary sources, we have relatively in-depth researches on the conditions of the postal system in China, on the topics as diverse as postal relay routes, tablets called *paiza*, and postal households called *jamchi*.[1] On the other hand,

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1 Pioneering studies on the Mongol postal system, relay stations, and tablets include chapters in the work of Haneda Tōru, *Haneda Hakushi shigaku ronbunshū*, vol. 1, *Rekishihen* (Kyōto: Tōyōshi Kenkyūkai, 1957), pp.32-136. For studies on postal routes and *pāīza*, see Chen Dezhi, *Meng Yuanshi yanjiu* (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 2005), pp.3-18, pp.113-200; and Cai Meibiao, "Yuandai yuanpai liangzhong kaoshi," *Lishi Yanjiu* 4 (1980), 125-32. See also recent works by Dang Baohai's *Meng Yuan yizhan jiaotong yanjiu* (Beijing: Kunlun Chubanshe, 2006) and Mo Shumin's "Meng Yuan youyi yanjiu" (Ph.d. diss., Jinan University, 2004). There are few studies in the West, but we should mention Peter Olbricht's classical work, *Das Postwesen in China unter der Mongolenherrschaft im* 13 und 14 Jahrhundert (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1954).

studies on the postal system of the three western uluses have suffered as a result of the lack of such sources. There are very few studies on the relay stations in the Chaghadai Ulus[2] or Jochi Ulus, although those of the Jochi Ulus are mentioned in papers on the development of Imperial Russia's postal system.[3]

Compared to these two uluses, although the Hülegü Ulus has received a little bit more attention since a considerable number of Persian and Arabic sources have survived, we do not have yet sufficient and detailed researches on the Mongol postal system in Iran.[4] In this sense, Adam J. Silverstein's recent study[5] is noteworthy: he examines the postal systems in West Asia under the Mongol rule and then provides an analysis of the reforms of Ghazan Khan (r., 1295-1304) and their significance. Instead of levying special taxes to cover the huge expenses for the operation of the relay stations, Ghazan had the government pay them. Silverstein sees this bureaucratization of relay-station management as a sign of the postal system in West Asia returning back to the indigenous and traditional practices that had existed before the Mongol rule. He also regards the courier service (*paykān*) which was adopted during Ghazan Khan's rule and whose expenses were furnished by the Bureau of Treasury (*dīvān*) was also modeled after the Mamluk postal system called *barīd*.[6]

However, most scholars had considered the Mamluk postal system, especially *barīd*, was in fact modeled after the Mongol system,[7] not vice

[2] On the postal roads in Central Asia, now we have Shim Hosung's "The Postal Roads of the Great Khans in Central Asia under the Mongol-Yuan Empire," *Journal of Song-Yuan Studies*, 44 (2014), pp.405-469.

[3] Gustave Alef, "The Origin and Early Development of the Muscovite Postal Service," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 15, no. 1 (March 1967): pp.1-15; John W. Randolph, "The Singing Coachman or, The Road and Russia's Ethnographic Invention in Early Modern Times," *Journal of Early Modern History* 11, no. 1-2 (2007), pp.33-61.

[4] Jean Sauvaget, *La poste aux chevaux dans L'Empire des Mamelouks* (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1941); Didier Gazagnadou, *La poste à relais* (Paris: Éditions Kimé, 1994).

[5] Adam J. Silverstein, *Postal Systems in the Pre-Modern Islamic World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

[6] Silverstein, *Postal Systems in the Pre-Modern Islamic World*, pp.159-160.

[7] Sauvaget, *La poste aux chevaux dans L'Empire des Mamelouks*, pp.10-13; David Ayalon, "On





versa. One may wonder if Silverstein's conclusion was based on the analysis of this postal system primarily within the historical and spatial context of western Asia, rather than in relation to other systems within the Mongol Empire, specifically that of the Qa'an Ulus, the Great Yuan. So this paper aims to examine this subject in a broader imperial context and to ascertain if his conclusion can be justified. Fortunately, detailed records of the reforms of Ghazan Khan survive in the *Jāmiʿ al-tavārīkh* (hereafter *JT*), 'Compendium of Chronicles', compiled by Rashīd al-Dīn (1247-1318/9), a key person who advised Ghazan to introduce the reforms. This paper will focus on the questions such as what the issues and difficulties were in the postal relay stations before Ghazan Khan, why he and Rashīd al-Dīn were compelled to reform the system, and where they found a model for the reform.

## The Implementation of the Mongol Postal Relay System in Western Asia

*Yuanshi* ('History of Yuan Dynasty') confirms that the Mongol Empire introduced a postal system around 1229, the year Ögödei was proclaimed *Qa'an*: "When the princes and government officials were gathered and a great assembly was convened at Köde'e Aral near the Kerülen River on the day of *jiwei* (己未), in the eighth month of autumn," "a granary and relay station was first installed."[8] The paragraph 279 in the *Secret History of the Mongols* states, "Now We shall settle the matter once and for all by providing poststation masters and posthorse keepers from the various units of a thousand of different areas, by setting up a post station at every stage, by not allowing the messengers to move freely among the population unless on urgent business, but *instead* by having them ride in haste through the

One of the Works of Jean Sauvaget," *Israel Oriental Studies* 1 (1971), pp.298-302; Gazagnadou, *La poste à relais*, pp.77-80; Reuven Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks: The Mamluk-Ilkhanid War*, 1260-1281 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp.74-75.

[8] *Yuanshi* (Song Lian et. al. eds., Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1976), p.29.

post stations. (italics in original)"[9] These descriptions suggest that Ögödei and Chagadai both established relay stations that connected their territories. In addition, Chagadai installed stations leading to the territories governed by Batu, thereby creating a postal route running east to west across the Eurasian steppe.[10]

The Mongols extended their postal system to newly conquered lands. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, there were two postal routes connecting Qaraqorum and north China, *bāyān yām*[11] and *nārīn yām*. There were a total of thirty-seven relay stations, one every five *farsang*,[12] or every thirty kilometers, each under the protection of a different *chiliarchy*, an administrative or military unit of a thousand people or troops.[13] *Yuanshi* notes that there were "119 *tergen, morin*, and *narin* relay stations in the north."[14] *Zhanchi* records that the postal route for wagons (*tergen*) had fifty-seven relay stations, the route for horses (*morin*) had thirty-eight relay stations, and the secret route (*narin*) had twenty-four relay stations,[15] for a total of 119 stations, the exact number of stations recorded in *Yuanshi*.[16]

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9 Igor de Rachewiltz tr., *The Secret History of the Mongols: A Mongolian Epic Chronicle of the Thirteenth Century*, vol. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 2004), pp.214-215.

10 *Yuanshi*, pp.299-300.

11 Earlier I have read this word as *tāyān yām,* not *bāyān yām* (Rashīd al-Dīn, *Rasideu at Din eui jipsa*, vol. 3, *Kan eui huyedeul*, tr. Kim Hodong, Seoul: Sagyejeol, 2005, p.97; hereafter *JT*/Kim). However, *bāyān yām* seems to be a more accurate reading as found in the Tashkent manuscript (The al-Biruni Institute of Oriental Studies, ms. nr. 1620: 118v). In Mongolian, *bāyān* means wealth, while *tayan* does not make sense, so it is possible that the word was used because goods for the palace were transported along this route. Thackston also read this word as *tayan*. See Wheeler M. Thackson tr., *Jami'u't-tawarikh*. *Compendium of Chronicles* (3 vols., Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University, 1998-1999; hereafter *JT*/Thackston), pp.328-329.

12 *Farsang*, or *farsakh*, is a unit that has been used to measure distance in western Asian since antiquity. 1 *farsakh* equaled 5.94 kilometers in ancient Persia, or 5.985 kilometers in Islamic times. Today, 1 *farsakh* equals 6 kilometers in Iran. See W. Hinz, "farsakh," in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam* (new edition), vol. 2 (eds. by Bernard Lewis, Charles Pellat, and Joseph Schacht; Leiden: Brill, 1991), pp.812-813.

13 *JT*/Kim, vol. 3, pp.97-98. Cf. *JT*/Thackston, pp.328-329.

14 *Yuanshi*, p.1383.

15 *Zhanchi*, pp.158-159.

16 On the three postal routes between Qaraqorum and nothern China (Khitay), see Chen, *Meng*





The Mongols installed relay stations in western Asia first time around 1240, about a decade later than in northern China. According to *Tārīkh-i Jahān-gushāʾī* ('History of the World Conqueror'; hereafter *TJG*) by ʿAta Malik Juwaynī, the Uyghur bureaucrat Körgüz received an imperial order (*yarlīq*) and a tablet (*pāīza*) upon being appointed by Ögödei Qa'an as the governor of western Asia. After reaching Ṭūs in Khurāsān in northeastern Iran, he turned the city into a base from which to rebuild western Asia, which had been devasted by war.[17] He constructed a government office and a park in the city and soon dignitaries and nobles began to set up homes there. The marketplace was restored, and excavations began to build a culvert. He also began the installation of relay stations, perhaps because he considered the construction of a transportation network an integral part of rebuilding the city.

> He established *yams* in various places complete with horses and other necessities in order that the people might not be put to inconvenience by the ambassadors; and so strict was his rule that no emir, who had previously cut off heads with no one able to protest, could now decapitate a chicken; whilst the peasantry became so self-assured that if a great army of Mongols encamped in a field they might not even ask a peasant to hold a horse's head, let alone demand provisions (*ʿulūfa*) and offerings of food (*nuzl*), and the same applied to ambassadors, coming and going.[18]

The above passage from *TJG* hints that envoys or troops were accustomed to arbitrarily pilfering livestock and other supplies from locals while on the move. It also demonstrates that Körgüz put an end to such practices and installed relay stations that would provide envoys with 'horses

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*Yuanshi yanjiu congkao*, pp.4-15.

17 *Tārīkh-i Jahān-gushāī*, ed. Muḥammad Qazwīnī, vol. 2 (hereafter *TJG*/Qazwīnī; Leyden: E. J. Brill, 1912), pp.237-238; *Genghis Khan: The History of the World-Conqueror*, tr. by John A. Boyle (hereafter TJG/Boyle; Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), pp.500-501.

18 *TJG*/Qazwīnī, vol. 2, p.238; *TJG*/Boyle, pp.501-502.

(*chahār-pāī*) and other necessities (*maṣāliḥ*),' or postal mounts and food they needed for a swift, smooth journey.

Körgüz appears to have brought about these changes in late 1239 or early 1240. TJG notes that after visiting Qaraqorum and being granted jurisdiction over western Asia, or "the land beyond Amu Darya that general Chōrmāghūn's troops had conquered," Körgüz stopped by Khwarazm and Shahristāna before his arrival at Ṭūs in the month of Jumāda al-awwal 637 according to the Hijri calendar, or between November and December 1239.[19] Exactly where relay stations were installed around that time is, however, difficult to pinpoint. It is safe to assume that the stations extended from Ṭūs in Khurāsān toward areas already equipped with relay stations such as the uluses of Chagadai and Batu, i.e., Central Asia and the Qipchaq steppe. However, there are no sources indicating that relay stations operated in the west of Ṭūs, in what is now Iran and Iraq. When Chin Temür served as governor of western Asia (630-63 AH; 1232/33-1235/36 CE), the extent of his power was limited to northwestern Khurāsān and Mazāndarān along the southeastern coast of the Caspian Sea. Körgüz, on the other hand, ruled a larger domain that included areas conquered by Chōrmāghūn's troops, modern-day Azerbaijan and Diyarbakr.[20] It is therefore quite possible that relay stations were installed in newly conquered areas to facilitate the transport of tributes, the exchange of envoys, and the procurement of military supplies.

Ögödei's death in 1241 deprived Körgüz of protection and eventually resulted in his execution. Thereafter, Töregene Qatun, Ögödei's wife who acted as regent after his death, appointed Arghun Aqa to take charge of western Asia. In 1243-44 (641 AH), he stopped by Khurāsān on his way across northern Iran to Tabriz. There, he set up a base and ruled the area for a decade until Hülegü's troops advanced into western Asia in 1256.[21] No

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] John A. Boyle, "Dynastic and Political History of the Īl-Khāns," in *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. 5, *The Saljuq and Mongol Periods*, ed. J. A. Boyle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), pp.336-338.

[21] Boyle, "Dynastic and Political History of the Īl-Khāns," pp.338-341.





details are known about the operation of relay stations during that period, but accounts in *TJG* indicate that even after Körgüz installed relay stations, envoys occasionally requisitioned supplies with impunity. In 1251, Arghun Aqa attended Möngke's enthronement ceremony and used the occasion to appeal to the new qa'an on behalf of his people, who were suffering from conscripted labor and expropriation due to an unstable tax system. He proposed the discontinuation of all other taxes and expropriations in exchange for the adoption of a tax called *qubchur*. This was based on the model of taxation introduced by Maḥmūd Yalavāch in Central Asia, which took individual differences in wealth and capability into account. Möngke accepted this proposal and adopted a graduated tax scale from one to ten *dīnārs*. The tax revenue was to be used to cover the cost of requisitioned labor (*ḥashar*), the operation of relay stations (*yām*), and the travel expenses of envoys (*ikhrājāt*).[22] In the Islamic realm, land taxes like *ushr* and *kharāj* collected one tenth of the harvest, but *qubchur* was an entirely new tax that resembled a poll tax levied on every liable individual.[23]

The implementation of *qubchur* was not limited to western Asia but extended to northern China as well. According to "Treatise on Food and Money (*shihuozhi* 食貨志)" in *Yuanshi*, the tax paid in silver (*baoyin* 包銀) was first introduced in 1251 during Möngke's reign. Initially, it seems that the Han Chinese were required to pay six *liang* (兩) in silver as tax, but the amount was later reduced to four liang, which was collected in installments of two *liang* in silver and two liang in other goods such as silk or dye.[24] In 1251, however, the *baoyin* tax was reduced from six to four *liang*, and this

[22] *TJG*/Qazwīnī, vol. 2, p.254; *TJG*/Boyle, p.517.

[23] On the various uses of *qubchur*, see Gerhard Doerfer, *Türkische und Mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen*, vol. 2 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1965), pp.387-391. There has been considerable confusion among scholars surrounding the concept and meaning of *qubchur* as a tax. See Thomas T. Allsen, *Mongol Imperialism: The Policies of the Grand Qan Möngke in China, Russia, and the Islamic Lands, 1251-1259* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987), pp.163-171; Ann K. S. Lambton, *Continuity and Change in Medieval Persia* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1988), pp.199-204; Herbert F. Schurmann, "Mongol Tributary Practices of the Thirteenth Century," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 19, no. 3/4 (1956), pp.304-398; John Masson Smith, "Mongol and Nomadic Taxation," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 30 (1970), pp.46-85.

[24] *Yuanshi*, p.2361.

reduction make it reasonable to assume that the *baoyin* tax was introduced earlier in the beginning of Ögödei's reign.[25] Moreover, the household tax, called *kechai* (科差), consisted of the 'silver tax (*baoyin*)' and the 'silk tax (*siliao* 絲料)' introduced in 1236. The silk tax required one catty (*jin* 斤) of silk or other textiles to be paid to government officials by every two households and one catty of silk or other textiles to be paid by every five households to the original appanages (*ben touxia* 本投下).[26] After his visit to Mongolia between 1235 and 1236, the Southern Song envoy Xu Ting (徐霆) noted, "Regarding tax [*chaifa* 差發] in the Han territory, in addition to the silver levy in lieu of silk and cotton on each household and each person, the tax also includes the total funds required for regular and irregular public expenses such as the dispatch of envoys and war horses and the transport of food and tools."[27] This suggests that the implementation of the household tax, *qubchur* or *kecha*i, during Möngke's reign was intended to replace the practice of arbitrary collection of taxes to fund the operation of relay stations and instead to levy a lump sum so that people would no longer have to suffer because of envoys abusing the system.

To levy *qubchur* in western Asia, Arghun Aqa launched an extensive census (*shumarā*) of conquered areas, including Khurāsān, Mazāndarān, Iraq, Yazd, Tabriz, Derbend, Georgia, Arran, and Azerbaijan. He then set an annual levy of seventy *dinār-i ruknī* for every ten people.[28] *Dinār-i ruknī* means "*dinār* (gold coin) minted by Rukn al-Dīn," and according to Juwaynī, the exchange rate for this currency at the time was 75 *dinār-i ruknī* for 1 *bālish* or 500 *mithqāl*.[29] *Bālish* was a weight unit corresponding to the *ding* (錠) used in China at the time and was equivalent to two kilo-

[25] Otagi Matsuo, "Genchō zeisei kō: Zeiryō to kasa ni tsuite," in *Otagi Matsuo Tōyō shigaku ronshū*, vol. 4, Genchōshi (Tōkyō: San'ichi Shobo, 1988), pp.257-297.

[26] Otagi, "Genchō zeisei kō: Zeiryō to kasa ni tsuite," pp.270-271; Zhao Gong, *Meng-ta pei-lu und Hei-ta shih-lüeh*, tr. Elisabeth Pinks (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1980), pp.142-145.

[27] Peng Daya and Xu Ting, "Heida shilüe," in *Menggu shiliao sizhong*, ed. Wang Guowei (Taipei: Zhengzhong Shuju, 1962), p.490.

[28] *TJG*/Qazwīnī, vol. 2, pp.256-257; *TJG*/Boyle, pp.519-521.

[29] *TJG*/Qazwīnī, vol. 1, p.16; TJG/Boyle, 23. In Boyle's translation, 500 *mithqāl* is mistranslated as 50 and there is no mention of *dāng*.





grams. One *ding* equals to fifty *liang* (兩), also called *guan* (貫), and same as 500 *qian* (錢), which indicates that one *mithqāl* was equal to one *qian*.[30] One *balīsh* equaled 50 *dinārs*, so one *dinār* equaled 1.5 *dinār-i ruknī*. One *dinār* was generally equal to six *dāng*, which is probably why Juwaynī stated that one *dinār-i ruknī* equaled four *dāng*.[31] The seventy *dinār-i ruknī* for every ten people therefore amounted to approximately one *ding*, meaning each person paid about five *liang* in tax. This was similar to the six and later four *liang* levied to each household in northern China. The following passage in *TJG* describes how each person and household bore the cost of operating relay stations.

> Again, when the extent of their territories became broad and vast and important events fell out, it became essential to ascertain the activities of their enemies, and it was also necessary to transport goods from the West to the East and from the Far East to the West. Therefore throughout the length and breadth of the land the they established *yams*, and made arrangements for the upkeep and expenses of each *yam*, assigning thereto a fixed number of men and beasts as well as food, drink and other necessities. All this they shared out amongst the *tümen*, each two *tümen* having to supply one *yam*. Thus, in accordance with the census, they so distribute and exact the charge, that messengers need make no long detour in order to obtain fresh mounts while at the same time the peasantry and the army are not placed in constant inconvenience.[32]

The circumstances changed once Hülegü's conquest of western Asia began. After setting out from his base camp in Mongolia in the fall of 1254, he passed through Samarqand and Kish and finally crossed Amu Darya on January 1, 1256. He dispatched express messengers (*īlchīyān-i*

[30] For a more detailed discussion, see Matsui Dai, "Mongoru jidai no doryōkō," *Tōhōgaku* 107 (2004), pp.153-166.

[31] *Dāng* means grain in Persian. Judith Kolbas, *The Mongols in Iran: Chingiz Khan to Uljaytu, 1220-1309* (London: Routledge, 2006), p.221.

[32] *TJG*/Qazwīnī, vol. 2, pp.24-25; *TJG*/Boyle, 33.

*sarī‘ al-sair*) to deliver edicts to local leaders throughout the region, urging them to immediately provide support including troops (*lashkar*) and weapons (*ālat*).[33] Although estimates of the size of the forces Hülegü had under his command differ, it seems to have been 170,000 to 180,000 men, a force requiring the efficient use of existing relay stations to smoothly execute his campaign.[34]

Therefore, the *qubchur* of seventy *dinār-i ruknī*, which had been collected to cover the cost of labor, the operation of relay stations, and the travel expenses of envoys was nowhere near enough to meet the new demands. A sharp increase was inevitable, and Arghun Aqa implemented this after meeting with Hülegü in Arran in 1258: “since the expense (*ikhrājāt*) of levies of men (*ḥashar*),[35] post-houses (*yām*), relays (*ūlāgh*) and supplies for the army exceeded the estimates and could not be met by the *qubchur* as then fixed,”[36] the tax scale of one to ten *dīnārs* was changed to one to five hundred *dīnārs*. Although individual differences in wealth were still taken into consideration, the maximum contribution increased fifty-fold. Such an increase may have been justified during the war, but we do not have any specific source showing if it changed after the elimination of the Nizārīs and the subjugation of the Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad.

This section has examined how the Mongol postal relay system developed from the 1230s, when general Chōrmāghūn’s troops advanced into western Asia to stop Jalāl al-Dīn’s attempts to revive the Khwarazmian Empire, and the late 1250s, when Hülegü conquered nearly all of western Asia. Before relay stations were installed, envoys burdened the people of cities and towns along their route by arbitrarily requisitioning horses and supplies. However, once Körgüz became governor of Khurāsān and Mazāndarān in late 1239, he created relay stations along the major routes

[33] *JT*/Rawshan, p.979; *JT*/Alizade, 25; *JT*/Thackston, p.480.

[34] John Masson Smith, “Mongol Manpower and Persian Population,” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 18, no. 3 (1975), pp.271-299.

[35] John A. Boyle usually translates the term *ḥashar*, which frequently appears in *Tārīkh-i Jahāngushā ī*, as “levy” or “forced levy.” See TJG/Boyle, p.85, p.92, p.97.

[36] *TJG*/Qazwīnī, vol. 2, p.261; *TJG*/Boyle, p.524.





to provide envoys with livestock and other supplies. Arbitrary requisitions continued, however, because the existing tax system could not secure the funds necessary to cover the cost of maintaining relay stations. To rectify this problem, the *qubchur* was introduced. Corresponding to the *baoyin* tax adopted in northern China in 1251, the *qubchur* was a poll tax levied to cover the travel expenses of envoys, maintain relay stations, and procure war supplies. While each household contributed six, later four, *liang* in northern China, every ten people paid one to ten *dīnārs* in western Asia, the equivalent of approximately five *liang* (equal to 0.2 kilogram in silver) per person. However, Hülegü’s expedition in the late 1250s drastically increased the cost of procuring war supplies and operating relay stations in western Asia. As a result, the *qubchur* drastically increased to between one and five hundred *dīnārs*.

## Issues Related to the Operation of Relay Stations in Hülegü Ulus

According to an Armenian source, after conquering western Asia, Hülegü requisitioned one man from each small village and two men from each large village and sent them to help restore areas devasted by the war. Such men were called *iam*, and in exchange for receiving tax exemptions, they were instructed to provide only “bread and broth” to Tatar travelers.[37] *Iam* is undoubtedly a variation of the Mongol-Turco term *jam* or *yām*, used to refer to relay stations, but it appears to have been mistakenly used instead of *jamchi* or *yāmchī*, the term used for keepers of relay stations.[38] Bread and broth, typically served to envoys, was called *süsi* in Mongolian and transcribed into Chinese as *shousi* (首思). While the reasons why Hülegü

[37] Robert P. Blake and Richard N. Frye, “History of the Nation of the Archers (The Mongols) by Grigor of Akanc‘, Hitherto Ascribed to Matak‘ia The Monk: The Armenian Text Edited with an English Translation and Notes,” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 12, no. 3-4 (1949), pp.269-399.

[38] The same error was made by William Rubruck, who referred to relay station keepers as *iam* in his travelogue about his trip to Karakorum between 1253 and 1255. See Rubruck, *The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck: His Journey to the Court of the Great Khan Möngke, 1253-1255* (Peter Jackson tr., London: The Hakluyt Society, 1990), p.114.

dispatched relay station keepers to help with reconstruction are unknown, one of their responsibilities was providing food to envoys.

Further evidence of the duties of relay station keepers comes from an edict Abaqa (r. 1265-1281), the son and successor of Hülegü, issued to the envoys sent by Pope Nicholas III.[39] The edict ordered a general named Samaghar as well as "overseers [*darughas*], government officials [*noyad*], postal inspectors [*todqaghul*], road patrols [*qaraghul*], relay station keepers [*jamučin*], and boatmen [*ongghačačin*] of all cities" to provide "plenty of horses [*ulagh-a*], drinks [*umda*], and bread and broth [*sigüsü*]" to the envoy 'Baračirqun' and priests (*marqasiyas*) the pope sent to Qubilai and Abaqa. Samaghar was a Mongol general stationed in Rum who led several attacks on Syria before his death on October 30, 1281, during the Second Battle of Homs.[40] 'Baračirqun' seems to refer to the Franciscan Gerard of Prato, who was appointed by Pope Nicholas III to lead a mission to the Mongol rulers.[41]

According to Abaqa's edict, relay stations had an obligation to provide three things: horses, drinks, and bread and broth. The edict therefore confirms that even after Hülegü conquered western Asia and became the ruler of an independent ulus, relay stations were required to offer horses and food to envoys. In this sense, the postal system in the Hülegü Ulus appears to have been no different from that of other uluses within the Mongol Empire.

There was still the issue, however, of where to find the funds necessary to provide horses and food and how such provisions were to be supplied to envoys. Arghun Aqa had responded to this need by levying the *qubchur* tax to stop envoys and troops randomly requisitioning supplies at

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[39] Antoine Mostaert and Francis Woodman Cleaves, "Trois documents Mongols des Archives Secrètes Vaticanes," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 15, no. 3-4 (1952), pp.432-445.

[40] Mostaert and Cleaves, "Trois documents Mongols des Archives Secrètes Vaticanes," p.436.

[41] Amitai-Preiss, *Mongols and Mamluks, 1260-1281*, 101-102. The edict is thought to have been drafted in the Year of the Chicken. Although Mostaert and Cleaves have been unable to clarify whether the year was 1267 or 1279, Amitai-Preiss believes that the Vatican sent the envoys to deliver the news that Qubilai was converted to Christianity around 1276 or 1277.





relay stations. However, the question remains as to whether this tax was sufficient to cover these costs. The answer can be found among descriptions of Ghazan Khan's reforms in *JT*.[42] This provides useful descriptions of the disorder surrounding relay stations at the time.

Rashīd al-Dīn states that "Envoys were not content with their allowances for mounts and supplies: anyone they came across they would strip clean and press until they had taken large amounts of money", indicating that one role of relay stations was to provide horses and food.[43] He goes on to say that "If they passed by ten villages and *khaylkhanas* a day, they would take from them all many times the provisions allowed by custom and the law",[44] showing that there were specific rules and laws on the number of horses and the amount of food relay stations were obligated to supply. The following passage explains where the funds to secure such supplies originated from.

> Aside from this, in cities where huge sums of money were released for the post and envoys' expenses, provincial governors took other taxes on that pretext from the peasants, some of which they spent and some of which they embezzled. In all provinces the customs tax, which. is the one tax paid most in cash throughout the realm, had been earmarked for envoys' expenses, but it did not suffice even for their transport. Governors would charge provisions to the customs tax and then abscond.[45]

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[42] Honda Minobu, "Mongoru to Isuramu," in *Mongoru jidaishi kenkyū* (Tōkyō: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1991), p.223. For Ghazan Khan's reforms, see Ann K. S. *Lambton, Landlord and Peasant in Persia: A Study of Land Tenure and Land Revenue Administration* (London: Oxford University Press, 1953); Honda Minobu, "Gazan Han no zeisei kaikaku," in *Mongoru jidaishi kenkyū*, pp.261-341; Ilya Pavlovich Petrushevsky, "The Socio-Economic Condition of Iran Under the Īl-Khāns," in *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. 5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), pp.494-500.

[43] *JT*/Thackston, p.715; *JT*/Rawshan, p.1446-1447.

[44] *JT*/Thackston, p.715; *JT*/Rawshan, p.1446-1447.

[45] *JT*/Thackston, p.716; *JT*/Rawshan, p.1448.

In other words, each city's budget was supposed to cover the costs of operating relay stations and the horses and food they provided to envoys. This scheme operated in tandem with the tax collection system in the Hülegü Ulus and the entire Mongol Empire. The Mongols generally levied two kinds of taxes on their conquered subjects. One was taxes that had traditionally been levied and the other was a new tax as subjects of the Mongol Empire. The former was a grain tax called *shuiliang* (稅粮) in China or *qalān* (*māl*) in western Asia, while the latter was a household tax called *kechai* (科差) in China or *qubchūr* in western Asia.[46] Apart from these, there were additional taxes referred to as *zafan chaiyi* (雜泛差役) and *hegu hemai* (和雇和買) in Yuan China.[47] These taxes were also collected in Iran.[48] In the Hülegü Ulus, three different kinds of *qalān* were collected: a land tax called *kharāj* from farmers, a commercial tax called *tamghā* from merchants, and a livestock tax called *marāʾī* from shepherds. The 'huge sums of money' of each city's budget allotted for the upkeep of relay stations and the travel expenses of envoys was raised through the poll tax *qupchūr* and the commercial tax *tamghā*.

Despite these two major sources of tax revenue to draw from, the operation of the relay stations fell into disarray. Rashīd al-Dīn pointed to two reasons for this. The first was a surfeit of envoys. Envoys and couriers were, of course, necessary for the emperor in dealing with state affairs. However, a multitude of other people also employed envoys. These included the emperor's wives; princes; high officials (*amīr*) of each palatial camp (*ordo*); military commanders of myriarch (*tumen*), chiliarch (*mingghan*), and century (*jaghun*); local supervisory officials (*shaḥna*); falconers (*qushchi*); leopard hunters (*barschi*); horse grooms (*akhtachi*); quiver bearers (*qorchi*); and provisioners (*idechi*). Furthermore, envoys were also involved in lawsuits involving inheritance claims, competitions for the position of village chief (*raʾīs*), and the transport of treasures (*tangsuq*) to the court.[49] It reached a point where there were more envoys on the road than caravans or other travelers. Even if each relay station had possessed five thousand horses, they would not have been able to handle the demands of such a volume of envoys.[50]

Under such circumstances, envoys on important missions were often unable to properly utilize relay stations and were forced to make several trips instead of one to complete their mission. This inevitably led to competition for the finite supplies at each station, leading to envoys traveling with armed escorts. Even for minor tasks, they were accompanied by two to three hundred troops, a number that sometimes rose to as many as a thousand.

This sharp increase in the number of envoys led to an explosion in the number of bandits. Envoys often hired thieves and ruffians as members of their entourage. It also became difficult to verify the authenticity of envoys. Thieves (*duzdān*) robbed the decrees (*yarlīgh*) and tablets (*pāīza*) issued to envoys and used them to impersonate envoys and plunder relay stations. Some took the horses from relay stations and sold them as their own property. Such thieves sometimes formed close relationships with village leaders (*rūʾasāʾ*) or magistrates (*ketkhudāyān*), allowing them to extort further goods from the villagers.[51]

The second reason Rashīd al-Dīn identified for the poor running of relay stations was the corruption of local officials. Regional governors collected separate taxes in addition to a poll tax and commercial tax under the pretense of covering the increasing costs due to the many envoys who frequented relay stations. These costs included the upkeep and provisions of relay stations (*yām*), horses (*ūlāgh*), provisions and fodder (*ūlūfa va ʻalafa*), bread and broth (*shūsūn*), and lodgings (*nuzl*). However, only a small part of the revenue from these separate taxes went toward relay sta-

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[46] Smith, "Mongol and Nomadic Taxation," pp.46-85.

[47] For *zafan chaiyi* and *hegu hemai*, see Chen Gaohua, "Yuandai yifa jianlun," in *Yuanshiyanjiu lungao* (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1991), pp.21-46; Chen Gaohua, "Lun Yuandai de hegu hemai," in *Yuanshiyanjiu lungao*, pp.47-66.

[48] Honda, "Gazan Han no zeisei kaikaku," pp.282-301.

[49] *JT*/Thackston, pp.714-720; *JT*/Rawshan, pp.1444-1452.

[50] *JT*/Thackston, p.715; *JT*/Rawshan, p.1446.

[51] *JT*/Thackston, pp.718-720; *JT*/Rawshan, pp.1452-1453.

tion expenses. The rest lined the pockets of regional governors who forced commercial tax collectors to cover the travel expenses of envoys. When multiple entourages demanded supplies at the same time, regional governors encouraged competition among them, granting the supplies to the entourage that offered them the best compensation.[52] However, this corruption was not simply a product of personal greed; it was linked to a structural problem in the Hülegü Ulus' administration and tax system, one that Ghazan Khan sought to rectify.

## Ghazan Khan's Reform of the Postal Relay System

On the surface, the surging number of envoys and corruption by local officials were responsible for the problems with the postal relay system in the Hülegü Ulus. Ghazan Khan believed that the number of envoys had increased because princes, royal sons-in-law, princesses, and other high-ranking officials arbitrarily dispatched envoys to take care of their personal affairs. As such, he adopted strict rules about the envoys' use of relay stations. He ordered relay stations not to provide horses to envoys unless they carried royal letters (*khaṭṭ-i mubārak*) bearing the khan's signature (*nishān*) or stamped with a golden royal seal (*āltūn tamghā-yi khāṣṣa*).[53] In the Hülegü Ulus, the khan had several seals, each for a different purpose: (a) the big jade seal (*tamghā-yi yashm-i buzurg*) for documents related to important state affairs or the appointment of regional rulers, (b) the small jade seal (*yashm-i andakī kūchaktar*) for documents announcing the appointment of judges, imams, and sheikhs, (c) the big golden seal (*tamghā-yi buzurg az zar*) for documents related to moderately important state affairs, and (d) the special golden seal (*tamghāī-yi makhṣūṣ-i az zar*) engraved with a bow, club, and sword for the dispatch and stationing of troops.[54] Scribes (*bītīkchīyān*) had traditionally been entrusted with the key to the box in which such seals were kept, but Ghazan Khan had the seals locked in a royal box (*qābtūrqā-yi mubārak*) that no one could access without his permission.

One problem with the new rules was that they made it difficult for commanders at the frontier to send envoys to the central court in critical circumstances. To overcome this problem, Ghazan Khan issued permits called *maktūb* engraved with his seal and signature. *Maktūb* differed in terms of the number of horses an envoy could claim at relay stations, which ranged from one to four. In an emergency, regional commanders would hand their *maktūb* to their envoys. Local officials issued a different kind of *maktūb* engraved with their own black seal and an inscription specifying the bearer's points of departure and arrival "from point A to point B."[55] These reforms sought to stop nobles and high-ranking officials from using envoys indiscriminately.

Ghazan Khan also came up with measures to deal with the bandit problem. He made the villagers nearest to the location of a robbery primarily responsible for pursuing (*pay-bordan*) and arresting (*bādīd*) the robbers. If anyone was caught cooperating with the bandits, they received an automatic death sentence. Ghazan introduced measures to prevent inspectors (*tutghāūl*) and patrol officers (*rāh-dār*) from habitually extorting caravans. At the points where they were stationed they should erect "steles of stone and plaster and plaques on which should be inscribed the number of patrolmen for that locale and the pertinent stipulations of the law."[56] According to Rashīd al-Dīn, previously inspectors had set up posts at random locations and charged caravans an "inspection fee" (*tūtghāū'lī*), and within two years of the introduction of the "tablets of justice" (*lawḥ-i 'adl*), such practices had disappeared and safety had been restored to the roads.[57]

The solution to the corruption of local government officials was fundamentally different from that of the envoys. The root of such corruption

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[52] *JT*/Thackston, pp.714-718; *JT*/Rawshan, pp.1444-1452.

[53] *JT*/Thackston, p.717; *JT*/Rawshan, p.1449

[54] *JT*/Thackston, p.726; *JT*/Rawshan, p.1468; *JT*/ Alizade, p.500.

[55] *JT*/Thackston, p.717; *JT*/Rawshan, p.1449.

[56] *JT*/Thackston, p.720.

[57] *JT*/Thackston , pp.718-720; *JT*/Rawshan , pp.1452-1456; *JT*/Alizade, pp.486-490.

went deeper than personal recalcitrance, down to the tax collection system of the Hülegü Ulus. In other words, it was impossible to stop local government officials from exploiting relay stations without reforming the tax collection system.

The most important reason Ghazan Khan was compelled to carry out tax reform was because of tax farming.[58] This meant that the governor of a region pledged a certain amount of tax collected in his jurisdiction (*jam'ī-yi mu'ayyan*) in exchange for tax farming concessions in the region and a money draft called barāt (pl. *barāvāt*) issued by the central Bureau of Treasury (*dīvān*). Based on this contract, the governor collected taxes, used part of the revenue to cover ordinary expenditures (*ikhrājāt-i muqarrarī*), cashed the money drafts, and returned the balance to the state treasury. The salary of local officials (*marsūm*), the pension (*idrār*) of religious workers, and the cost of maintaining local government offices (*'imārat*), including the travel expenses of envoys (*ikhrājāt-i īlchiyān*) and the cost of maintaining relay stations, fell under ordinary expenditures.[59]

In addition to regular taxes such as land tax, commercial tax, and livestock tax, governors levied a poll tax called *qubchur*, which was infamous for the way it was collected.

> A governor would levy *qubchur* on the peasants ten times a year, though in some places *qubchur* was levied twenty or thirty times. It was the practice of governors to make a subtotal of the amount of *qubchur* that had been charged to him, and whenever envoys came to the province on business or to demand money or provisions, the governor would use them as a pretext to impose a *qubchur*. No matter how many envoys arrived — and their expenses and demands were without limit — the governor would rejoice at their arrival, for he would impose a levy once in the name of taxes, once in the name of provisions and expenses, and once in the name of contracts and demands. Some of it he would spend on supplies, and some he would take himself; some he would give to the *shahna* and *bitigchis* so that they would support him and corroborate his falsification.[60]

This description suggests that issuing money drafts to governors, thereby granting them tax farming concessions that allowed them to levy *qubchur* indiscriminately, was largely responsible for the disorder in the Hülegü Ulus' tax system prior to Ghazan Khan's rule. Governors took advantage of the system to line their own pockets, and officials higher up in the local and central government received goods from them in exchange for looking the other way.

To remedy the situation, Ghazan Khan had no choice but to reform tax farming via money drafts. He dispatched scribes to each province (*vilāyat*), county (*nāḥiyāt*), and village (*dih*) throughout the ulus to conduct a census and land survey for the creation of a tax registry (*qānūn*, pl. *qavānīn*) that would be kept in Ghazaniyya, a city newly built near Tabriz and named after the khan. At the central Bureau of Treasury, a scribe was assigned to each province to issue each village in the province a tax bill (*barāt-i mutavajjihāt*) stamped with a golden seal (*altūn tamghā*) based on the tax registry kept in Ghazaniyya.[61] To prevent locals working in tax administration from committing corruption, an itemized tax statement was engraved on a plate made of stone, limestone, copper, or steel and installed at the village entrance, mosque, or minaret.[62] Ghazan Khan's reform abolished the tax farming concessions given to local officials and determined and publicized in advance how much tax was to be collected on a specific date so as to prevent corruption and properly furnish the state coffers.

In carrying out his reforms, Ghazan Khan also had to consider the financial support offered to soldiers, a "tribal and financial matter" on which

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[58] Honda, "Gazan Han no zeisei kaikaku," pp.270-271; Petrushevsky, "The Socio-Economic Condition of Iran Under the Īl-Khāns," pp.529-537.

[59] Honda, "Gazan Han no zeisei kaikaku," pp.270-271.

[60] *JT*/Thackston, p.701; *JT*/Rawshan, p.1415.

[61] *JT*/Thackston, p.706; *JT*/ Rawshan, p.1425; *JT*/Alizade, pp.462-463.

[62] *JT*/Thackston, pp.710-711; *JT*/ Rawshan, p.1436; *JT*/Alizade, pp.471-472.

the fate of the Mongol administration depended.[63] When the battles of conquest ended in western Asia, the Mongol troops there were left with no more opportunities to gather the spoils of war. Frequent unrest drove them into economic deprivation, with some even selling their own children as slaves.[64] This prompted the government to issue vouchers to the military that could be exchanged for supplies from the residents of a particular area. The troops presented their vouchers to the local tax collector who then arranged for them to obtain the supplies they needed. However, tax collectors used these vouchers as an excuse to indiscriminately levy the *qubchur* tax, while Mongol troops also extorted supplies from peasants. To rectify the situation, Ghazan Khan introduced the *iqṭā'* system. This system allotted land to Mongol military commanders in royal estates (*īnjū*), state lands (*dālāy* or *dīvānī*), or grazing pastures that nomads migrated through as the seasons changed. The commanders were allowed to let farmers there cultivate the allotted land and to collect tax directly from them to meet the expenses of their units.[65] Ghazan Khan hoped that ownership of land would motivate the troops to take responsibility for their property and refrain from exploiting civilians. He thus sought to kill two birds with one stone: to satisfy the financial needs of the military and to eliminate the harmful effects of levying the *qubchur* tax.

Ghazan Khan's reform of the postal relay system was thus carried out in tandem with the implementation of the *iqṭā'* system. Previously, envoys expected their travel expenses to be covered by the cities and villages along their journey, which prompted local officials to use envoy visits as an excuse to levy the *qubchur* tax, commercial tax, or other special taxes. After the reform, envoys received a predetermined amount from the central government to cover their expenses or from a local government along their travel route, which was funded by the revenue raised from a specific tax. Envoys received their travel allowance in cash, and unless they were on an

63 Honda, "Gazan Han no zeisei kaikaku," p.261.

64 Honda, "Furagu urusu no ikuta sei," pp.234-235.

65 Honda, "Furagu urusu no ikuta sei," pp.250-251.





urgent mission, they were forbidden from using post horses. Ghazan Khan made this quite clear:

> He also ordered that if occasionally it was necessary to sell horses or donkeys for certain people to reach a province, they should pay the full price, and the animals would then be theirs. Under no circumstances was the word *ulagh* to be uttered.[66]

According to Rashīd al-Dīn, this was how Ghazan Khan freed cities, towns, and villages throughout the ulus from the cost of post horses and food for envoys.

Envoys were now required to purchase food with cash and were not allowed to use post horses. However, these horses still had an important use. We can find a statement in one of the sections in *JT* that Ghazan Khan had a relay station installed every three *farsang* (approximately eighteen kilometers) along main roads (*rāhhā-i mu'aẓẓam*), and fifteen well-fed horses were kept ready at each station. According to Rashīd al-Dīn, ministers called *amīr-i buzurg* were responsible for overseeing relay stations and their expenses. However, the relay stations were kept not for envoys on ordinary missions, but for those on urgent missions to the frontiers. Envoys were allowed to claim the same number of post horses at relay stations as the number inscribed on the *maktūb* they carried. Such stations were generally installed at locations far away from cities and villages.[67]

To facilitate 'urgent' correspondence, Ghazan Khan operated two different types of couriers. One was mounted couriers (*ūlāghchī*) who rode in relays (*ūlām bi-ūlām*) and could cover sixty *farsang* (approximately 360 kilometers) in twenty-four hours.[68] This meant that news from Khurāsān near the eastern frontier could reach the capital Tabriz within three to four days. Rashīd al-Dīn called such relay stations installed for the delivery of

66 *JT*/Thackston, p.718.

67 *JT*/Thackston, pp.716-717.

68 *Ūlām* is a translation of the Turkic word ulam, which means consecutive. Doerfer, *Türkische und Mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen*, pp.107-108.

urgent messages *bīnchīk yām*. In Turkish, the word *bīnchīk* means "express post horse."[69] The other type of courier traveled on foot. Each relay station had two runners (*payk*) who ran in relays and could cover thirty *farsang* (approximately 180 kilometers) in one day.

The geographical treatise *Nuzhat al-qulūb*, compiled in 1340 by Ḥamdallāh Mustawfī Qazwīnī, confirms Rashīd al-Dīn's claims.[70] According to a detailed description in the treatise about the six royal roads (*shāh-rāh*) that existed during the reign of Öljeitü,[71] the distance between Nishāpūr, a major city in Khurāsān, and the capital Sulṭāniyya was 188 farsang, and the distance between Sulṭāniyya and the former capital Tabriz was 46 *farsang*. Adding the two distances indicates that Nishāpūr and Tabriz were 234 *farsang* apart, a distance which could be covered by the rapid relay horses in three to four days.[72]

The reforms of Ghazan Khan also appear in the historical work *Tārīkh-i Vaṣṣāf*. This states that Ghazan Khan ordered a relay station installed every four *farsang* throughout his ulus, which extended from Amu Darya to Egypt. Each station was equipped with post horses (*asbān-i yām-i multajim va masrūj*), horse keepers (*ulāghchiyān*), and couriers (*munhiyān va fuyūj-i mushammar al-ḍayl*). Mounted couriers were expected to cover sixty *farsang* in twenty-four hours in relays, while foot couriers needed to cover forty *farsang*. While the *maktūb* such couriers carried were sealed

[69] Doerfer, *Türkische und Mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen*, p.327. Doerfer described *bīnchīk* as "schnelle kurierpherd," and claimed that the word *bīnchīk* derived from *bin- or min*, meaning "to ride a horse."

[70] Ḥamdallāh Mustawfī, *The Geographical Part of the Nuzhat-al-Qulūb*, ed. Guy Le Strange (Leyden: E. J. Brill, 1915). This work was translated into English, *The Geographical Part of the Nuzhat-al-Qulūb*, tr. Guy Le Strange (Leyden: E. J. Brill, 1916).

[71] Because Öljeitü moved the capital from Tabriz to Sulṭāniyya, the six royal roads spread out from the new capital to the south, east, north, west, southeast, and southwest. For further details, see Ḥamdallāh Mustawfī, *The Geographical Part of the Nuzhat-al-Qulūb*, ed. Le Strange, pp.163-189; Ḥamd-Allāh Mustawfī, *The Geographical Part of the Nuzhat-al-Qulūb*, tr. Le Strange, pp.160-179; Guy Le Strange, *The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate: Mesopotamia, Persia, and Central Asia, from the Moslem Conquest to the Time of Timur* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1905), pp.228-231.

[72] Mustawfī, *The Geographical Part of the Nuzhat-al-Qulūb*, tr. Le Strange, p.169, p.175.





(*muhr-i khatama-i mushk*), they had a green stamp displaying the shape of a rider or runner at the top along with a note stating that "a courier named so-and-so departed from this location at this date and time." The note allowed the horse keeper at the next relay station to determine whether the *maktūb* carrier had arrived on time. A vertical line enclosed in a circle (⏀) was added to the *maktūb* if its carrier arrived on time, and if the carrier arrived more than an hour late, a circle with one horizontal, instead of vertical, line (⊖) was drawn. This system enabled mounted couriers to cover distances of more than a thousand *farsang*(!) in a week.[73]

The *pāīzas* issued to envoys and high-ranking officials were another integral part of the reform of the postal relay system. *Pāīzas* were commonly used not in the Hülegü Ulus only, but all across the Mongol Empire as well.[74] The problem was that the khan's wives and court ministers independently issued a variety of *pāīzas*. To resolve the chaos, Ghazan Khan invalidated all such *pāīzas* and issued new ones that varied according to the owner's rank. Nobles and high-ranking officials such as sulṭāns, maliks, and supervisory officials (*shaḥna*) received a large, round wooden *pāīza* engraved with a lion's head and the bearer's name. The *pāīza* was valid until the owner's retirement, upon which it had to be returned. Mid-ranking supervisory officials and maliks received a slightly smaller *pāīza* also engraved with the owner's name and a unique mark (*naqshi-yi makhṣūṣ*). Envoys using relay stations for urgent messages (*bīnchīk yām*) received a long *pāīza* (*pāīza-i dirāz*) made of copper and engraved with the

[73] Waṣṣāf al-Ḥaḍrat (ʿAbd Allāh ibn Fazl Allāh), *Tajziyat al-amṣār va tazjiyat al-aʿṣār*, Majlis-e Milli 8321, Tehran, 868/1463-4, 201r-201v; *Kitāb-i Waṣṣāf al-Ḥaḍrāt: bi-ihtimām-i Muḥammad Mahdī Iṣfahānī*, Bombay lithographed edition, 1269/1853, pp.386-387; ʿAbd al-Muḥammad Āyatī, ed., *Taḥrīr-i tārīkh-i Waṣṣāf* (Tehran: Bunyād-i Farhang-i Īrān, 1967), pp.232-233.

[74] Sheila S. Blair has confirmed the presence of an envoy (*ilchi*) bearing a *pāīza* running ahead of Hülegü in one of the miniature paintings included in copies of the *Compendium of Chronicles* kept at the National Library of France and the Asiatic Society of Bengal. Sheila S. Blair, "A Mongol Envoy," in *The Iconography of Islamic Art: Studies in Honour of Robert Hillenbrand*, ed. Bernard O'Kane (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), pp.45-60. A poem written by a contemporary of Hülegü's son Abaqa features various Turkic and Mongolian words including *pāyze, sūsūn, yām,* and *yāmchi*. Vladimir Minorsky, "Pūr-i Bahā's 'Mongol' Ode (Mongolica, 2)," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 18, no. 2 (1956), pp.261-278.

shape of a moon at the top. High-ranking frontier commanders had five *pāīzas* at their disposal and mid-ranking commanders three in the event that they had to dispatch express messengers (*īlchiyān-i yārātū*) in an emergency.[75]

## Similarities to the Postal System of the Qa'an Ulus

What stood out most about Ghazan Khan's reforms was how the state began to directly finance the operation of relay stations. Silverstein claims that through the reforms, the postal system of the Hülegü Ulus "finally came to resemble a great imperial postal system in the Near Eastern tradition."[76] He acknowledges that the adoption of runners "smacks of Chinese origins", but the fact that the cost was covered by the central Bureau of Treasury, he argues, appears to indicate that the system was modeled after the Mamluk *Barīd*.[77]

To answer the question of the origins of the postal system, it is necessary to determine who bore the cost of operating relay stations in the Hülegü Ulus. According to *Tārīkh-i Jahān-gushāʾī*, as mentioned above, the Mongols conducted a census in an area they had conquered before installing relay stations. Two *tümens* then jointly bore the cost of supplying the station with horses, food, drinks, and other necessary supplies. Armenian sources also describe how after his military campaign, Hülegü requisitioned one or two men from each village to help with the restoration of areas in western Asian that had been devasted by the war. These men provided bread and broth to Tatar travelers, that is envoys, in exchange for tax exemptions. As such, both the men assigned to serve as *yāmchī* at relay stations and the local population, through their taxes, were responsible for the operation of relay stations.

How the relay stations were actually run can be inferred from the

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[75] *JT*/Thackston, pp.727-728; JT/Rawshan, pp.1471-1472; *JT*/ Alizade, pp.503-504.

[76] Silverstein, *Postal Systems in the Pre-Modern Islamic World*, p.159.

[77] Silverstein, *Postal Systems in the Pre-Modern Islamic World*, pp.159-160.





way relay stations were operated in northern China within the realm of the Qa'an Ulus. The stations Ögödei installed along routes between the imperial capital of Qaraqorum and other regions were initially the responsibility of nomadic groups of *mingghan*('thousand').[78] The principle of collecting funds from the general population to finance the operation of relay stations remained the same in the territories Ögödei conquered in northern China. According to Xu Ting's account of his visit to Mongolia between 1235 and 1236, "in addition to the silver levy in lieu of silk and cotton to each household and each person, the tax also includes the total funds required for regular and irregular public expenses such as the dispatch of envoys and war horses or the transport of food and tools."[79]

Postal households, however, appear to have had an additional burden compared to the general population. This fact is confirmed by the two statutes found in the treatise of *Zhanchi* in *Jingshi dadian*. The first one stipulates that, from 1229, "ten postal households must pay one *dan* (石) of rice every year, which is to be carted [to the relay station in need of it] by a person from a *janghun* (百戶)."[80] One *dan* of rice per annum does not seem to be such a heavy burden for ten households to bear.[81] The second statute is imperial decree in 1238 given to postal households in Yanjing, Xuande, and Xijing:

> One horse must be offered by every four households from the 217 households on the older census and by every eight households from the 434 households on the new census. Also, one ox must be offered by every two households from the 169 old households and by every four households from the 338 new households.[82]

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[78] Rachewiltz tr., *The Secret History*, p.215; *TJG*/Boyle, p.30.

[79] Peng and Xu, "Heida shilüe," p.490.

[80] *Zhanchi*, 2.

[81] Ota Yaichiro, "Gendai ni no okeru tanko no keitai." *Tōyōshi kenkyū* 36, no. 1 (1977), p.45.

[82] *Zhanchi*, 13.

In other words, old households had to provide one horse for every four households or one ox for every two households while the burden was reduced by half for new households. These payments were still about thirty times greater than those levied on ordinary households, which had to provide one horse for every 134 old households or one horse for every 268 new households. However, this burden may have been offset by the tax exemptions postal households received.[83]

These rules stayed more or less the same until 1264, the fifth year of Qubilai's reign.

> On the ninth day of the eighth month, the chancellor of the Central Secretariat proposed that since a gap between rich and poor exists among postal households, each household should be exempt from paying three *dan* of grain for up to four *qing* of land so that those grains may be used to cover expenses related to post horses and bread and broth, but they should pay tax on lands larger than that, and His Majesty approved.[84]

The proposal was meant to help postal households focus their resources on running relay stations by giving them tax exemptions on up to four *qing*, 1 *qing* being equal to 6.67 *hectare*, of farmland. Even so, postal households had insufficient resources to cover the ever-mounting operational costs of relay stations. From around 1281, the eighteenth year of the Zhiyuan era, the state began to provide funds for bread and broth, and this became standard practice in the later years of the Zhiyuan era.[85] Postal

[83] Dang, *Meng Yuan yizhan jiaotong yanjiu*, 35 (footnote 2).

[84] *Zhanchi*, 20.

[85] See Dang, *Meng Yuan yizhan jiaotong yanjiu*, pp.128-129; Mo Shumin, "Meng Yuan youyi yanjiu" (Ph.D. diss., Jinan University, 2004), pp.90-92; Ota, "Gendai ni no okeru tanko no keitai," pp.48-51. However, it is unlikely that postal households gained much economically from state funding for bread and broth. Instead of being held responsible for covering the cost for bread and broth, postal households had to pay a tax called *zafan chaiyi*. Moreover, local officials embezzled most of the funds the state paid for bread and broth and then forced postal households to make up the deficit.





households were now responsible for supplying post horses, while the state took responsibility for supplying the bread and broth served at relay stations. According to a statute from 1264, four postal households had to provide one regular horse, which implied that they also had to provide another additional horse attached to the regular one.[86] For its part, the central government calculated the funds each region required for bread and broth and dispensed them to local governments twice a year, once between spring and summer and again between fall and winter. These funds were then redistributed to relay stations. For example, the paper notes the state issued for bread and broth expenses at 38 circuits in Fuli (腹裏) and Liaoyang (遼陽) amounted to 10,950 *ding* (錠). In addition, envoys dispatched by central government departments sometimes received allowances for their trips from granary clerks.[87]

There is considerable evidence that the operation of relay stations in the Qa'an Ulus influenced the running of the stations in the Hülegü Ulus. According to Juwaynī, the station keepers and the general population jointly provided horses and food for relay stations in western Asia. The station keepers also received tax exemptions for providing bread and broth. This is basically the same as the way relay station expenses were covered in northern China prior to Qubilai's enthronement: ordinary and postal households both bore the costs of operating the stations, while postal households supplied more grain, horses, and oxen than ordinary households in exchange for being exempt from household taxes (*kechai*). This practice seems to have been maintained in the Hülegü Ulus as well. Necessary expenses and services for the relay stations were met by the station keepers who provided the lodgings and food to traveling envoys while receiving in return tax exemptions, plus the *qubchur* tax and the commercial tax that local officials collected from the general population. However, the surging number

[86] Chen Gaohua, "Lun Yuandai de zhanhu," in *Yuanshiyanjiu lungao* (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1991), p.164.

[87] Dang, *Meng Yuan yizhan jiaotong yanjiu*, p.255, pp.258-266. State funding of bread and broth had become commonplace by the mid to late years of the Zhiyuan era, but areas near the two Yuan capitals continued to cover the cost on their own.

of envoys and the corruption of local officials made the cost of operating relay stations unbearable. This prompted local officials to randomly collect extra taxes from the people who had no choice but to comply with their demands for food and supplies.

The practices in Qa'an Ulus during the Zhiyuan reign may also have influenced Ghazan Khan's decision to stop envoys taking whatever they needed from relay stations and to give them travel allowances from the central government's budget.

> Then he said, "We will give envoys who go to the provinces a provisions allowance from the treasury sufficient for their roundtrip so that they will not have to requisition supplies in any locale. When they arrive at their destination they will be fed from a special surtax." Thus any envoy who was assigned to a province was given cash from the treasury to cover his provisions on the way.[88]

Although the wording in the above passage is somewhat ambiguous, it still hints at the change in how the travel expenses of envoys were covered. Previously, envoys demanded the horses and food they required at points along their journey, and local officials collected all sorts of taxes from the locals to accommodate the envoys' demands. The number of horses and the amount of food envoys could request were, of course, stipulated by law, but this was mostly ignored. However, the existing tax system that granted tax farming concessions to local officials made it practically impossible to root out these practices. The tax reforms that Ghazan Khan undertook therefore made collecting taxes the preserve of the central government. They also specified the amount of tax that could be collected locally and made this information public so that envoys could only receive predetermined allowances from the central government or local officials. However, the cash allowance from the state treasury was for food and did not cover the provision of horses. Hence, the fact that the central government covered the travel expenses of envoys does not mean that Ghazan Khan's reforms were a departure from Mongol traditions or a return to west Asian traditions.

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[88] *JT*/Thackston, pp.717-718; *JT*/Rawshan, p.1451.





A closer look at the postal system in western Asia in the age of the caliphs reveals that it was quite different from that of the Mongols. It was a communication network that focused on gathering intelligence on public sentiment, rumors, and signs of insurrection, while the Mongol system was a transportation network that allowed people and goods to move over vast distances.[89] In the former, the state covered the expenses of relay station keepers who were then charged with the responsibility of passing on intelligence. However, the number of stations was nowhere near that of the Mongol Empire, which had to handle a far greater volume of traffic, nor were they equipped with horses, food, and lodgings. The reason the state decided to cover the operational costs of relay stations in the Qa'an and the Hülegü uluses was not because it was following a west Asian tradition, but because the financial burden of running the stations became too overwhelming for postal households on their own.

The changes Ghazan Khan made to how expenses were covered were not the only reforms that resembled practices in the postal system of the Qa'an Ulus. The khan issued *maktūbs* to commanders at the frontier, and envoys had to produce these permits in order to use post horses. Such *maktūbs* were engraved with the khan's signature or seal and specified the number of horses an envoy could requisition, which was between one and four.[90] This practice was identical to the messenger permits called *puma shengzi* ('postal edict,' 鋪馬聖旨) used in the Qa'an Ulus. Such permits were also known as *yubao shengzi* ('edict with royal seal,' 御寶聖旨) because they were stamped with the imperial seal, or as *puma zhazi* ('postal document,' 鋪馬札子) or *yiquan* ('postal ticket,' 驛券) because they granted

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[89] Francis Dvornik, *Origins of Intelligence Services: The Ancient Near East, Persia, Greece, Rome, Byzantium, the Arab Muslim Empires, the Mongol Empire, China, Muscovy* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1974), pp.188-261; Silverstein, *Postal Systems in the Pre-Modern Islamic World*, pp.53-140.

[90] *JT*/Thackston, p.717; *JT*/Rawshan, p.1450.

access to post horses. Multiple permits with different numbers of horses were issued to each local government depending on the demand in each area. For example, in 1282, permits for three, four, and five horses were issued to five circuits and permits for two horses to one circuit in each province. Permits for one or two horses were issued to five circuits in Sichuan Province in 1283 and permits for two or three horses were issued to five circuits in Huguang Province in 1284.[91]

The practice of stamping seals not only on *maktūbs* but on all imperial decrees was another practice that appears to have come from the Qa'an Ulus. The khan of the Hülegü Ulus had four different seals including the big and small jade seals and the big and special golden seals, which were kept in a box whose keys were entrusted to scribes. This led to widespread abuse of the use of the seals, prompting Ghazan Khan to lock them inside a royal chest that no one could access without his permission.[92] The storage and use of seals had also been an issue in the Qa'an Ulus. We do not know how the royal seals were stored, but we know the circumstances in the local government. It was *darughachis* who stamped the seals of local officials, but it was senior officials who kept those seals in their possession. In 1265, a few years after the revolt by Han Chinese, a royal order reversed these roles. It introduced a permanent policy of Mongols as overseers (*darughachi*) and keepers of the seals, Han Chinese as general administrators (*zongguan* 總管), and Muslims as associate administrators (*tongzhi*).[93] As a result, Han Chinese general administrators could no longer use seals without the permission of the Mongol overseers.

The Qa'an and the Hülegü uluses were also similar in terms of their courier systems. As previously mentioned, Ghazan Khan had two types of couriers that traveled in relays: mounted couriers who could cover 360 kilometers and foot couriers who could cover 180 kilometers a day. Writing in *Xinshi* (心史), the Southern Song dynasty loyalist Zheng Sixiao (鄭思肖)

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[91] See Dang, *Meng Yuan yizhan jiaotong yanjiu*, pp.211-218.

[92] *JT*/Thackston, p.726; *JT*/Rawshan, p.1467.

[93] See Kataoka Kazutada, *Chūgoku kan'in seido kenkyū* (Tōkyō: Tōhō Shoten, 2008), pp.197-201.





noted that "relay stations are ninety *li* [里] apart. A person sent on an urgent mission by a Tatar lord is called a *haiqing shichen* ['falcon envoy,' 海青使臣] who switches mounts at each station to ride past eight to nine stations in twenty-four hours."[94] This suggests that a mounted messenger could cover between 720 to 810 *li* in twenty-four hours, or 360 to 450 kilometers, assuming that one *li* amounted to five kilometers during the Yuan dynasty. On the other hand, the term *jidi pubing* ('express postal soldier,' 急遞鋪兵) often appears in Yuan Chinese sources and is the equivalent of foot couriers. According to *Yuanshi*, during the reign of Qubilai, "After taking the distances of terrain and the size of population into consideration, express stations [*jidi zhanpu* 急遞站鋪] were installed from Yanjing [燕京] to Kaipingfu [開平府], and then to Jingzhao [京兆]. One station was installed after every ten, fifteen, or twenty-five li, and express messengers were selected from registered as well as unregistered households in each *zhou* [州] and *xian* [縣]."[95] These express messengers also make an appearance in a description by Marco Polo, who noted that a relay station was installed every three miles within the Qa'an's realm and that the foot couriers assigned to such station ran ten days and nights in relays to cover distances that normally took a hundred days to travel.[96]

Adam Silverstein argues that the courier system established under Ghazan Khan was an imitation of the Mamluk Barīd. Originating from the Greek *beredos* or the Latin *veredus*, *barīd* means post horse.[97] However, a system of using post horses to deliver messages, with riders switching mounts at regular intervals to guarantee speed, would not have been a novel concept to Ghazan Khan or Mongol nomads who valued mobility from constantly moving between pastures with their livestock. It therefore seems unlikely that the Mamluk *Barīd* served as the inspiration for Ghazan

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[94] Zheng Sixiao, *Xinshi*, quoted in Dang, *Meng Yuan yizhan jiaotong yanjiu*, pp.239-240.

[95] Song, *Yuanshi*, p.2596.

[96] Marco Polo, *Mareuko Pollo eui dongbang gyeonmullok*, tr. Kim Hodong (Seoul: Sagyejeol, 2000), p.278.

[97] D. Sourdel, "barīd," *The Encyclopaedia of Islam* (New Edition), vol. 1 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986), pp.1045-1046.

Khan's courier system.

Although the Qa'an ulus first adopted foot couriers in 1261 and they came to be known as *jidi pubing*, their origin dates back to the reign of the Jin emperor Zhangzong.[98] According to *Jinshi* (金史), in 1206, the first express postal station (急遞鋪) was installed. Messengers wearing a belt strung with bells traveled in relays and covered three hundred *li* a day. However, they were permitted to ride horses only when their messages related to military mobilizations or flood prevention.[99]

It is difficult to pinpoint when foot couriers first appeared in western Asia. In *Siyāsat-nāma*, the author and Persian vizier Niẓām al-Mulk mentions a *paykān* who covered fifty *farsang* (about 300 kilometers) in twenty-four hours. While *paykān* usually refers to runners, Silverstein suspects that the term referred to mounted couriers since no runner could cover this distance on foot in twenty-four hours.[100] If this is true, the practice of using foot couriers must have been adopted in western Asia after it was conquered by the Mongols. In the section on the Mongol tribes in *JT*, the *Bekrīn* (*Mekrīn*) are described as rock climbers (*qayāchiI*) and mountaineers who originally lived in the steep mountains of Uyghuristan before some of them relocated to western Asia with Hülegü.[101] It is likely that Hülegü used them to target mountaintop fortresses, but it is also possible that he used them as couriers capable of swiftly carrying messages through mountainous areas. This is supported by miniature paintings of envoys, found in a few *JT* manuscripts, wearing a *pāīza* and running ahead of Hülegü, hinting at the possibility that they were in fact foot couriers.[102] It thus appears that the Mongol system of foot couriers was not necessarily derived from the Mamluk *Barīd*, regardless of whether Hülegü was the first Mongol ruler to use it.

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98 Mo, "Meng Yuan youyi yanjiu," pp.108-109.

99 *Jinshi*, (Tuotuo et. al. eds; Zhonghua Shuju, 1976), p.276

100 Silverstein, *Postal Systems in the Pre-Modern Islamic World*, pp.130-131.

101 *JT*/Thackston, pp.76-77.

102 Blair, "A Mongol Envoy," pp.45-60.





## Conclusion

The Mongols began to install relay stations in western Asia in late 1239 during Ögedei's reign, after Körgüz became governor of Khurāsān. This coincided with the Mongol decision to put an end to the military activities of Jalāl al-Dīn and be more directly involved in governing conquered areas. Körgüz's successor Arghun Aqa introduced a poll tax, *qubchur*, to prevent envoys from arbitrarily extorting supplies at relay stations. After Möngke's enthronement, he conducted a census throughout western Asia to provide the information necessary to levy the *qubchur* and to use the revenue to cover the cost of operating relay stations. However, Hülegü's subsequent military campaigns caused a sharp rise in the *qubchur*.

Once the Nizārīs were eliminated and the Abbasid caliphate subdued, Hülegü installed relay stations to effectively govern the conquered areas. Although details of their operation are difficult to verify, it seems clear that postal households called *yāmchī* were responsible for the management of relay stations and that they received tax exemptions in exchange for their service. Although such households had to make contributions in the form of horses and food, a substantial portion of the expenses of the relay stations seem to have been covered by revenue from the *qubchur* and a commercial tax called *tamghā*. Additional taxes were levied when the cost of running the relay stations surged due to Hülegü's campaigns.

By the time Ghazan Khan ascended the throne in 1295, the postal relay system was in chaos, if we can believe Rashīd al-Dīn's claim. The number of envoys dispatched by princes, royal sons-in-law, and ministers far exceeded the budgets local authorities had to run the relay stations. Moreover, bandits targeted both locals and envoys. To make matters worse, local officials illegally collected taxes from residents in their jurisdiction under the pretense of having to provide envoys with supplies. At the root of all these issues was the disarray of taxation system and the weakening of the royal authority.

Sensing the general crisis the Hülegü Ulus had fallen into, Ghazan Khan reformed the state's tax, land management, and postal relay systems;

overhauled procedures related to administrative documentation; and unified weights and measures. In his reform of the postal relay system, he sought to achieve two major goals: reduce the number of envoys and eradicate the corruption of local officials. To stop princes and nobles from arbitrarily dispatching envoys, only those with permits called *maktūb* bearing the khan's signature or seal were allowed to use post horses, and only *pāīza*, tablets issued by the central government, were accepted as a means of identification at relay stations. To deal with corruption in the taxation system, Ghazan prohibited local officials from collecting taxes from residents to cover the travel expenses of envoys. He also created a tax registry and had the central government use the revenue from locally collected taxes to purchase food for envoys. While taxes collected from the people continued to be used to cover the cost of operating relay stations, the collection of taxes and the redistribution of tax revenues came under the central government's strict supervision and control, thus putting an end to the practice of envoys demanding supplies from local officials or the general population.

In addition to these reforms, Ghazan Khan had relay stations installed every three *farsang* (approximately eighteen kilometers) along main roads throughout his ulus and ordered each station to have fifteen post horses available. To deliver messages swiftly, two types of couriers were operated: mounted couriers and foot couriers. Mounted couriers could cover 360 kilometers a day and reach the capital Tabriz from Khurāsān on the northeastern frontier in three to four days. At the same time, two runners (*paykān*) were stationed at each relay station.

In essence, Ghazan Khan's reform of the postal relay system was about centralizing the practice of dispatching envoys and the funding of relay stations. Many of the changes bear striking similarities to the postal relay system in the Qa'an Ulus under Qubilai's rule, including the central government's funding of food expenses at relay stations, the format of *pāīzas*, the use of signatures and seals, and the operation of express messengers. This suggests that the postal relay system of the Qa'an Ulus served as a model for Ghazan Khan's reforms.

The fact that the state became directly involved in financing the operational costs of relay stations does not mean that Ghazan Khan reverted to the traditional west Asian postal system prior to Mongol rule. Neither does it suggest that the courier system was an imitation of the Mamluk *Barīd*. His pride would have made it difficult for him to imitate a system from the Mamluks, whom he would have seen as Turkic slaves that had revolted against their master.[103] While he may have been trying to avoid political subordination to the qa'an after Qubilai's death and to strengthen his status as an independent ruler, Mongol traditions still mattered to Ghazan Khan.[104]

Recent studies have confirmed that frequent exchanges of envoys between the Hülegü and Qa'an Uluses led to them influencing each other in the realms of politics, economics, and culture.[105] Bolad Chingsang, who visited the Hülegü ulus as Qubilai's envoy and ended up staying there, had a knowledge and understanding of the Mongols that was second to none. The knowledge he gained from serving as chancellor in the Qa'an Ulus most likely helped Rashīd al-Dīn not only when he was writing *The Blessed History of Ghazan*, but also when he was devising plans for Ghazan Khan's reforms.[106] Moreover, the diverse contents of *JT* suggests that Rashīd al-Dīn had acquired an in-depth knowledge of the Qa'an Ulus from sources other than Bolad Chingsang. It is thus most probable that Ghazan Khan and Rashīd al-Dīn modeled their reforms on the system in the Qa'an Uulus. One of the best illustrations is their reform of the postal relay system in the Hülegü Ulus.

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[103] Charles J. Halperin, "The Kipchak Connection: The Ilkhans, the Mamluks and Ayn Jalut," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 63, no. 2 (2000), p.241.

[104] Reuven Amitai-Preiss, "Ghazan, Islam and Mongol Tradition: A View from the Mamlūk Sultanate," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 59, no. 1 (1996), pp.1-10.

[105] Thomas T. Allsen, *Culture and Conquest in Mongol Eurasia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

[106] Thomas T. Allsen, "Biography of a Cultural Broker: Bolad Ch'eng-Hsiang in China and Iran," *in The Court of the Il-Khans, 1290-1340*, eds. Julian Raby and Teresa Fitzherbert, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp.7-22.

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# Khaisan and the 1911 Independence of Mongolia

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## Introduction

Mongols proclaimed their independence from the Qing dynasty on December 1, 1911, and enthroned Jebtsundamba Khutugtu—the highest reincarnate lama in Khalkha Mongolia—as Bogd Khaan on December 28 of that same year in establishing a new independent state. The Bogd Khaan government did not confine the territory of the Mongolian state to Outer Mongolia but aimed for the unification of the entire Mongol people including those of Inner Mongolia. This had been the objective of the Mongols before the declaration of independence, and the movement for its realization had developed continually after the proclamation. This movement's symbolic figure was Khaisan from Inner Mongolia, who visited St. Petersburg to request Russian assistance just before Mongolian independence was declared.[1]

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1 Khaisan's name is variously written in Chinese characters: For example, Haishan (海山), Haishan (海珊), Haisen (海森), Haisan (海三), Haiyuan (海元), and so on. Among these, the most common Chinese rendering is Haishan (海山).

Khaisan played such a decisive role in achieving independence that it is even said that "If Khaisan had not come to Khüree (present-day Ulaanbaatar), Mongolian independence could not have been achieved."[2] Above all, the fact that Khaisan was included in the delegation to Russia, together with Tserenchimed and Khanddorj who were the most influential leaders of the independence movement, speaks volumes about his stature in the movement. On the one hand, Khaisan participated in the delegation to Russia to show that the aspiration for independence was the will of the entire Mongol people. On the other hand, Khaisan joined the deputation because he was one of the very persons leading the push for independence.

Khaisan's hometown was in a region into which Han Chinese people had migrated from early on. As the Han immigration was accompanied by pasture reclamation, acute ethnic conflicts between the Han Chinese and the Mongols arose in Khaisan's hometown. In this situation, Khaisan left his home due to the conflict with the Han Chinese, moved to Harbin, and from there went on to Khüree where he played a leading role in the Mongolian independence movement. Appointed as a high official in the Bogd Khaan government in Khüree, he strove to build a new independent state. However, his efforts for Mongolian independence and the unification of Inner and Outer Mongolia brought him into conflict with the leaders of Outer Mongolia, as well as with Russia. As a result, he suffered through political ordeals and then ultimately returned to China when Mongolian independence was revoked through the 1915 Kyakhta Trilateral Treaty.

A review of Khaisan's life gives a vivid look both at the rise and fall of Mongolian nationalism and at almost all aspects of Mongolia's international relations in the early 20th century, including the ethnic conflict in Inner Mongolia from the late 19th century, the 1911 declaration of independence and the ensuing national unification movement, the power struggle within the Bogd Khaan government, Mongolia's international status determined by diplomatic negotiations between the great powers, and the fate of

[2] Lü Yiran ed., *Beiyang zhengfu shiqi de Menggu diqu lishi ziliao* [Historical Materials on the Mongol Regions during the Beiyang Government Period] (Haerbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe, 1999), p.213.





the Inner Mongols who emigrated to Outer Mongolia with aspirations of Mongolian independence and unification. In this regard, the explication of Khaisan's life and achievements is essential to understand the history of Mongolia and the international circumstances surrounding it at the turn of the 20th century.

For this reason, beginning from the time when Khaisan was still active, there have been many different evaluations made of him, and his name has been mentioned in almost all research on 1911 Mongolian independence. Khaisan's role in the history of the Mongolian independence movement was highlighted for the first time by the Mongolian scholar Puntsagnorov.[3] His research, however, was not a full-fledged one since it just focused on the meaning of Khaisan's participation in the delegation to Russia. It was the Japanese historian Nakami Tatsuo who first gave full consideration to Khaisan's life trajectory, tracing the entire span of his life from his birth, to his involvement in the Mongolian independence and unification movements, to his eventual return to China.[4] After that, Jamsran—a Mongolian researcher—published a monograph discussing the entire life of Khaisan. Another Mongolian scholar—Boldbaatar—also undertook full-scale research on Khaisan.[5] In addition, Lan Meihua highlighted Khaisan and his activities in an article concerning the Inner Mongols who participated in the 1911 independence movement. Afterward, Fan Mingfang also published a comprehensive article on Khaisan.[6] Most recently, Li Guilian and Lee Pyung-rae published articles on Khaisan's scholarship on Mongo-

[3] Ts. Puntsagnorov, *Mongolyn avtonomit üeiin tüükh* [A History of Mongolia's Autonomous Period] (Ulaanbaatar: Ulsyn khevlel ba khevleliin üildverleliig erkhlekh gazar, 1955).

[4] Nakami Tatsuo, "Haisan to Otai: Bogudo · Han seiken niokeru nan Mongorujin" [Khaisan and Otai: Southern Mongols in the Bogd Khaan Government], *Toyo Gakuho* 57-1 · 2 (1976).

[5] L. Jamsran, *Mongolchuudyn sergen mandaltyn ekhen* [The Beginning of the Mongols' Renaissance] (Ulaanbaatar: Soyombo khevleliin gazar, 1992); J. Boldbaatar, *Chin zütgelt gün Khaisan* (Ulaanbaatar: Mongol ulsyn ikh surguul, 2002).

[6] Lan Meihua, "Neimenggu yu 1911 nian Menggu duli yundong" [Inner Mongolia and the Mongolian Independence Movement in 1911], *Hanxue yanjiu* 23-1 (2005); Fan Mingfang, "Haishan yu 1911 nian Waimenggu duli" [Khaisan and the Independence of Outer Mongolia in 1911], *Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu* 15-4 (2005).

lian-Chinese lexicography and Khaisan's relationship with a Mongolian newspaper known as *Mongγul-un sonin bičig*, respectively.[7]

With these studies, Khaisan's life and achievements have been elucidated in fair detail. There are still many ambiguous aspects of his life and activities, however. Thus, scholars have put forward distinctly different assessments of his life, particularly regarding his changing careers from an anti-Chinese activist, to a fighter for Mongolian independence, to a high official in the Bogd Khaan government, and his eventual return to China. Therefore, the present author will examine Khaisan's life, as well as his role in the history of Mongolian independence, by focusing on various ambiguous aspects that have remained unanswered in previous studies. By doing so, this study will provide an accurate depiction of the historically important figure and also contribute to a clearer understanding of the Mongolian independence and unification movements in 1911. In addition, this research helps comprehend the Inner Mongols' viewpoints, as well as why they came to have various positions, on Mongolian independence.

The first section of this article discusses Khaisan's early life in his hometown, his move to Harbin, and then his activities in that city. In the second part, this study examines his visit to Khüree, his participation in the Mongolian independence movement, his activities in the Bogd Khaan government, and the political ordeals that he suffered. The last section of this research looks into the reasons why Khaisan sought a return to China after the failure of the Mongolian independence and unification movements and then attempts to evaluate his life from the perspective of the rise and fall of Mongolian nationalism.

[7] Li Guilian, "Haishan ji qi 'Menghan hebi wufang yuanyin' yanjiu" 海山及其《蒙漢合壁五方元音》研究 [A Study on Khaisan and His Book Entitled *Mongolian-Chinese Original Sounds of the Five Regions*], *Zhangchun daxue xuebao* (2018); Lee Pyung-rae, "Haisan-gwa <Monggol Shinmun>" [Khaisan and the Mongolian Newspaper], *Monggolhak* 64 (2021).





## Khaisan's Awakening of National Consciousness and Emigration to Harbin

Khaisan was born in 1857, the youngest of three brothers, in Khadlan Ulaan Gangga Village (哈達蘭烏蘭岡村) of Kharchin Jasag Chinwang Banner (喀喇沁扎薩克親王旗), Josutu League, Inner Mongolia—present-day Gangyingzi Village (岡營子村) of Tianyi Township (天義鄉) in Ningcheng County (寧城縣), Chifeng (赤峰), Inner Mongolia.[8] His father, Bayantömör, was an influential local figure who owned a farm, along with temporary dwellings, even in the Tuquan (突泉) area in the northern part of the Greater Khinggan Range. Bayantömör brought in a private tutor to teach his son the Mongolian, Manchu, and Chinese languages, along with various knowledge of the Eastern and Western scholarships, for 14 years. Because of the regulation that "Mongols cannot take the imperial examination, and Han Chinese cannot be enfeoffed as Prince," Khaisan married a Han Chinese woman surnamed Ma (馬) to qualify for the imperial examination. With the abolition of the imperial examination system of the Qing dynasty, however, he was unable to fulfill his aim. Although the circumstances are not clear, Khaisan was selected as a low-level official at the local office of Pingquan Prefecture (平泉州)[9] in the Kharchin Banner and began his offi-

[8] Regarding his activities in his hometown, this article consulted the following materials: Kalaqin youyiqi beizi Haishan ed. & trans., *Menghan hebi wufang yuanyin* [Mongolian-Chinese Original Sounds of the Five Regions] (Beijing, 1917); Bai Yukun, "Haishan," in *Neimenggu wenshi ziliao* [Materials on Inner Mongolian Literature and History] vol. 14 (Huhehaote: Zhongguo renmin zhengxie Neimenggu zizhiqu weiyuanhui Neimenggu zizhiqu weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui, 1984); Wu Ziyun, "Haishan jianli" [A Brief History of Khaisan], in *Neimenggu wenshi ziliao* vol. 14; Deshan, *Mengguolejin Hailetuti shi shulüe* [A Brief Memoir of Hailetuti of the Mongoljin], trans. Bao Yongqing and Qingshan (Huhehaote: Neimenggu daxue chubanshe, 1997).

[9] The Josutu League of Inner Mongolia was an area into which Han Chinese moved from early on, and Mongols and Chinese lived together. The Qing government administered the Han people from the early Yongzheng period and established an office for the settlement of lawsuits between the Mongols and Chinese. For example, the Qing court installed Bagouting (八溝廳) in the Kharchin Banner in the 7th year of Yongzheng, which was renamed Pingquan Prefecture (平泉州) in the 41st year of Qianlong. Concerning this, see Wang Guojun, *Menggu jiwen* [A Record on Mongolia], ed. and anno. Ma Xi and Xu Shiming (Huhehaote: Neimenggu renmin chubanshe,

cial career. Before long, he was promoted to a position of responsibility and became acquainted with local magnates. Later, when he was around thirty years old (in 1887), Khaisan was appointed to the post of Lieutenant-General (*Ma. meiren i janggin*) at the Princely Establishment (王府) of the Kharchin Right Banner.

The local people of the time called Khaisan, Yu Zhichang (于芝昌)—the Zakhiragch Janggi (管旗章京), and Sodnom—the Director of Fiscal Bureau (度支局長)—the "three outstanding figures of the Kharchin Banner."[10] Another story has it that there were three persons called "San (三, meaning 'three' in Chinese)" in the Kharchin region, namely, Khaisan (Haisan 海三, another Chinese rendering of Haishan 海山), Baosan (鮑三, a maternal uncle of the Prince of the Kharchin Right Banner), and Zhangsan (張三, a sobriquet of Zhang Huatang 張華堂). These three were reportedly influential local figures in competition with one another, and due to the discord among them, Khaisan left the Kharchin Banner for Harbin.[11] It is not clear when and why Khaisan left his hometown. Chinese sources recorded that "Khaisan ran away abroad because he committed a crime"[12] or "he fled to Russia because he committed a crime."[13] A few scholars, however, have argued that Khaisan moved to Harbin after serving as a leader of the anti-Chinese movement.[14] The areas around the Kharchin Banner had long witnessed conflicts between the Han Chinese and Mongols over the use of pastures. These ethnic conflicts intensified to involve armed clashes in the late 19th century when the western powers encroached on the territory and economic interests of the Qing dynasty. It was at that time, the story goes,

2006), pp.23-24.

10 Wang Guojun, *Menggu jiwen*, pp.219-220.

11 Bai Yukun, "Haishan," p.158; Wu Ziyun, "Haishan jianli," p.162; Deshan, *Mengguolejin Hailetuti shi shulüe*, p.80.

12 Lü Yiran ed., *Beiyang zhengfu shiqi de Menggu diqu lishi ziliao*, p.28.

13 Wu Xiangxiang ed., *Zhongguo xiandai shiliao congshu* [A Collection of Historical Sources on Modern Chinese History] vol. 1 (Taipei: Jingshi wenbianshe, 1962), p.669.

14 Nakami Tatsuo, "Haisan to Otai," p.127; Jamsran, *Mongolchuudyn sergen mandaltyn ekhen*, p.145.





that Khaisan led the anti-Chinese movement.

Some other later scholars have written that Khaisan left home because of a conflict with Zhangsan. According to them, during the anti-Mongol Jindandao (金丹道) Rebellion in 1891,[15] Zhangsan put pressure on Khaisan by making use of the ethnic conflict between the Chinese and Mongols. In response, Khaisan counterattacked Zhangsan by taking active roles in the Qing suppression of the Jindandao Rebellion. In the face of a military crisis, Zhangsan allied with Baosan by becoming his sworn son. In doing so, Zhangsan attempted to attack Khaisan by securing military support, through Baosan, from the Prince of the Kharchin Right Banner. Meanwhile, a minor leader of the Jindandao Rebellion was arrested but managed to escape while being transferred to Pingquan Prefecture. On this occasion, Zhangsan brought charges against Khaisan for letting the rebel flee. Realizing the seriousness of this situation, Khaisan then left home with his brothers and family in 1902.[16] Another researcher argues that Baosan, in collusion with Zhangsan, met the Prince of the Kharchin Banner and accused Khaisan of punishing innocent civilians. The prince then accepted the claims by Baosan and Zhangsan and reprimanded Khaisan, discharging him from office. As a result, Khaisan grew furious and left his hometown.[17]

Materials about the Boxers (義和團), however, provide a little different story: Zhang Liansheng (張連升; that is, Zhangsan) was a leader of the insurgent army, a group of about 300 people, in the areas on the Liao River, while Haiyuan (海元; namely, Khaisan) served in the Qing army that

15 The Jindandao Rebellion is the revolt ignited by followers of the Jindandao—a secret religious society of Han Chinese—in 1891 in and around the Juu Uda and Josutu Leagues of eastern Inner Mongolia. This rebellion was also known as the Revolt of Red Turban Bandits (紅巾賊之變). During this rebellion, the main target of the attack was Mongols, and thus a huge number of Mongols were killed or injured. The number of Mongol casualties varies from tens of thousands up to over a hundred thousand. For details, see Borjigin Bürensain, *Kingendai niokeru Mongorujin nōkō sonraku shakai no keisei* [The Formation of Mongol Agricultural Village Society in the Modern Period] (Tokyo: Kazama shōbo, 2002).

16 Bai Yukun, "Haishan," p.158; Deshan, *Mengguolejin Hailetuti shi shulüe*, pp.80-81.

17 Wu Ziyun, "Haishan jianli," p.162.

suppressed the rebellion.[18] According to an annotation of this record, since Zhang Liansheng continued to resist the Qing troops, Khaisan arrested and escorted Zhang to the office of Pingquan Prefecture. On the way, Zhang committed suicide, and Zhang's family made a false accusation that Khaisan had killed him. Subsequently, the prefect of Pingquan ordered Khaisan's arrest, and Khaisan left home in the winter of 1902.[19]

As all of this shows, the explanations for Khaisan's leaving home vary depending on the sources. The Jindandao Rebellion was an anti-Mongol incident, during which Han Chinese pillaged and killed Mongols indiscriminately. Although the branch of the Boxer Rebellion, led by Zhang Liansheng, called for expelling the Western powers from Qing China with the slogan "Support the Qing and annihilate the West (扶清滅洋)," they also clamored "Eliminate the barbarians and sweep the northern region away (除胡掃北)," thereby including the Mongols among their targets of attack. These two rebellions developed in very similar ways: first, the Han Chinese rebels attacked the Mongols, and the Qing army then suppressed the Chinese revolt; second, Khaisan took an active role in the suppression of the rebellions as a member of the Qing army.[20] Thus, the argument by Nakami Tatsuo and Jamsran that Khaisan participated in the anti-Chinese movement reflects an aspect of the historical truth. The remaining question concerns the time when the incident involving Khaisan and Zhang Liansheng (or Zhangsan) took place. Some scholars take it to have been the time of the Jindandao Rebellion, and others consider it that of the Boxer Rebellion. As can be seen from the records on the Boxer Rebellion that "the remnants of the Red Turban bandits (紅巾教匪) raged in the name of the Boxers,"[21] the mistake may have arisen from the identification of the Boxers with the Red Turbans (i.e., the Jindandao believers). Given that Khaisan left home in 1902, therefore, it is reasonable to view that the incident

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[18] Wang Guojun, *Menggu jiwen*, pp.209-210.

[19] *Ibid*., p.220.

[20] *Ibid.*, pp.14-15, pp.209-210.

[21] *Ibid*., p.209.





involving Zhang Liansheng (or Zhangsan) occurred during the time of the Boxer Rebellion.

Another issue concerning Khaisan's early career prior to his move to Harbin is whether the statement Khaisan gave to the Finnish scholar Gustaf John Ramstedt that he had worked at the Princely Establishment of Prince of Na (那王府)[22] in Beijing and also as Li Hongzhang (李鴻章)'s secretary is true or not.[23] Concerning Khaisan's service for Prince of Na, Nakami Tatsuo considered Prince of Na as Namnansüren of the Khalkha Mongols, while Jamsran deemed the prince as Nayantu.[24] At any rate, since there are no relevant Mongolian sources, it is doubtful whether Khaisan really worked in Beijing. Moreover, given the situation of the time, it is even less probable that Khaisan served as a secretary for Li Hongzhang. During the Jindandao Rebellion, however, Li Hongzhang—then the Governor-General of Zhili (直隸)—sent Ye Zhichao (葉志超) to Pingquan to suppress the revolt. At that time, Khaisan reportedly participated in the suppression as a guide of the Qing army.[25] For this reason, Khaisan could be considered a subordinate of Li Hongzhang in a broad sense in that he helped Ye Zhichao. Thus, Khaisan's statement is not entirely unfounded.

In 1902, Khaisan reportedly hid in a temporary dwelling on his family farm in the Tuquan area with his three brothers and other family members; after a while, he moved to Harbin. Therefore, it is hard to know exactly when he left for Harbin. From the records that Khaisan lived in "a house of a certain foreigner" for four years before the declaration of independence,[26] and that he left for Khüree in 1907, it seems likely that Khaisan moved to Harbin in late 1902 or early 1903.[27] It is also not clear

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[22] Wu Xiangxiang ed., *Zhongguo xiandai shiliao congshu*, p.669.

[23] G. J. Ramstedt, *Ilgob charye dongbang yeohaeng* [Seven Journeys to the East], trans. Go Songmu (Seoul: Mineumsa, 1986), p.203.

[24] Nakami Tatsuo, "Haisan to Otai," p.127; Jamsran, *Mongolchuudyn sergen mandaltyn ekhen*, p.146.

[25] Wang Guojun, *Menggu jiwen*, p.32.

[26] Lü Yiran ed., *Beiyang zhengfu shiqi de Menggu diqu lishi ziliao*, p.213.

[27] The Russian scholar E. A. Belov did not specify his sources but wrote that Khaisan moved to

what made Khaisan move to Harbin. According to research, after moving to Harbin, Khaisan met a person surnamed "Fu (傅 or 付)"—a person from Heicheng (黑城) of Kharchin Middle Banner—who then served as a translator for the Russian consulate and introduced Khaisan to the Russian consul, G. M. Semyonov. From that time, Khaisan hid in the Russian consulate for four years, learned Russian, built a deep relationship with Semyonov, and then left for Khüree in 1907 on Semyonov's suggestion.[28]

Japanese sources provide a different story: Khaisan and his son dwelt in the house of the Russian A. D. Khitrovo in Harbin and then left for Khüree in 1907 on Khitrovo's suggestion.[29] Chinese sources also confirm this. Specifically, the Governor of Heilongjiang Province, Yu Sixing (于駟興), reported to his superior that in Harbin he discovered Khaisan hiding in the house of Khitrovo, but was not able to arrest him because of the tight security.[30] Furthermore, according to the testimony of Ramstedt, Khaisan was dispossessed of all his properties and subordinates by Chinese people and volunteered to become an agent for the secret police in exchange for money from Russia. There is thus a possibility that he somehow had connections with Russia already and then went to Harbin, where he built a relationship with Semyonov and advised Russian officials on their Mongolian policy.

After the opening of the Eastern Qing Railway (東清鐵道), Russia attempted to advance on Khölönbuir, the Jirim League, and other places, carrying out various operations with Khitrovo being a central figure. According to the report of Yu Sixing mentioned above, Khitrovo was then supposed to reside in Harbin at least on paper, but he actually traveled across Inner Mongolia, often sojourning in the Princely Establishment of Prince Udai of the Jasagtu Banner, Jirim League.[31] This report also stated that while hiding in Harbin after his involvement in an incident in 1905, Khaisan frequently visited the Jasagtu Banner of the Jirim League to conduct some activities.[32] These situations lead us to the possibility that Khitrovo and Khaisan had a close relationship. Therefore, the assumption that Khaisan served as a Russian spy in Harbin and Inner Mongolia is not entirely groundless. In connection with this, the evaluation of Khaisan in the Russian report on the Mongol delegation to Russia in August 1911—stating that "he made efforts to turn Mongolian affairs to Russian advantage for the past five years"—seems quite indicative of Khaisan's activities during his days in Harbin.[33]

Concerning Khaisan's stay in Harbin, one more thing to be verified is whether he worked as an editor of a Mongolian newspaper known as *Mongγul-un sonin bičig*, the first newspaper published in the Mongolian language. This newspaper was published from May 1909 to October 1919 by the Eastern Qing Railway Administration Bureau (東清鐵道管理局) with sponsorship from Russia.[34] For now, the only evidence of Khaisan's in-

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Harbin in 1900 or 1905. For details, see E. A. Belov, *Rossiya i Mongoliya v nachale XX veka (1911-1919)* [Russia and Mongolia at the beginning of the 20th Century *(1911-1919)*] (Moscow: IV RAN, 1999), p.195.

28 Bai Yukun, "Haishan," p.159; Deshan, *Mengguolejin Hailetuti shi shulüe*, p.81. A person surnamed Fu probably indicates Fuhai (阜海; also rendered as 福海 or 富海). Concerning Fuhai, see Baildagch, "Hukai to Shinmatsu~Minkoku shoki niokeru nai Mongoru tōbu no seikyoku henka" [Fuhai and Political Changes in Eastern Inner Mongolia from the Late Qing Period to the Early Days of the Republic of China], trans. Borjigin Bürensain, *Shiteki* 22 (2002).

29 "Gokuhi Kodama Toshimasa shi Mōko shisatsuki batsui" [Top Secret Excerpts of Mr. Kodama Toshimasa's Inspection Report on Mongolia], in *Nihon gaikō bunsho* [Japanese Diplomatic Documents] vol. 1. 1914, p.751.

30 Baildagch, "Hukai to Shinmatsu~Minkoku shoki niokeru nai Mongoru tōbu no seikyoku henka," p.44.

31 Khitrovo was a Russian military officer who was deeply involved in Russian policies on Mongolia in the early 20th century. Khitrovo was also involved in the publication of the Mongolian Newspaper (i.e., *Mongγul-un sonin bičig*), as well as the independence of Mongolia. To support the Mongolian independence movement, he traveled across both Inner and Outer Mongolia, encouraging Mongol princes to struggle against the Qing dynasty. Later, he participated in the Kyakhta Trilateral Conference as a Russian representative in the capacity of the Border Commissioner of Kyakhta. For details, see E. A. Belov, *Rossiya i Mongoliya v nachale XX veka (1911-1919)*, p.195; O. Batsaikhan, *Mongolyn tusgaar togtnol ba Khyatad, Oros, Mongol gurvan ulsyn 1915 ony Khiagtyn geree 1911-1915* (Ulaanbaatar: Mongol ulsyn shinjlekh ukhaany akademi, Tüükhiin khüreelen, Olon ulsyn sudlalyn khüreelen, 2002), p.248.

32 Baildagch, "Hukai to Shinmatsu~Minkoku shoki niokeru nai Mongoru tōbu no seikyoku henka," pp.40-44.

33 Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiskoi imperii [Archives of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire], F. Kitaiskii stol 143, Opis 491, d. 644, pp.162-163.

34 G. Deleg, *Mongol togtmol khevleliin tüükhen temdeglel* (Ulaanbaatar: Ulsyn khevleliin khereg

volvement in the newspaper is Khaisan's testimony to Ramstedt, saying that he "published the first newspaper in Mongolian." A long time ago, Shirendev—an influential historian in Mongolia—wrote without citing any reference that Khaisan had been the editor of the Mongolian newspaper, *Mongyul-un sonin bičig*. Ever since, many historians have accepted this as a historical fact without further consideration.[35] Recently, scholars began to raise questions about this conventional view. On this topic, Lee Pyung-rae has conducted up-to-date research. Having closely examined Russian materials, he came to the conclusion that Khaisan had highly likely served as the editor of the *Mongyul-un sonin bičig*.[36]

## Khaisan's Visit to Khüree and Devotion to Mongolian Independence

According to Chinese sources, Khaisan went to Khüree in the 33rd year of Guangxu (1907) on the suggestion of Semyonov.[37] Mongolian sources also provide similar information. For example, the memoirs of Navannamjil testify that Khaisan went to Khüree together with Almas-Ochir from the same hometown.[38] Another source records that Almas-Ochir, after consulting with Khitrovo and others, came to Khüree in 1907.[39] Considering that

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erkhlekh khoroo, 1965), pp.37-63.

35 B. Shirendev, *Mongol ardyn khuv'sgalyn tüükh* [A History of the Mongolian People's Revolution] (Ulaanbaatar: Ulsyn khevleliin gazar, 1969), p.30.

36 Lee Pyung-rae, "Haisan-gwa <Monggol Shinmun>," p.64.

37 Bai Yukun, "Haishan," p.159; Lü Yiran ed., *Beiyang zhengfu shiqi de Menggu diqu lishi ziliao*, p.279.

38 Shinjlekh ukhaany akademi Tüükhiin khüreelengiin gar bichmel san, F-3, D-1, Kh/N-1036 ("Güng Qayisan-u tuqai"), p.1 (undated). Although he didn't specify the year, N. Magsarjav wrote that the two men went together to Khüree. For details, see N. Magsarjav, *Mongol ulsyn shine tüükh* [A New History of Mongolia], Mongoloos kiril bichigt bulgasan O. Batsaikhan and Z. Lonjid (Ulaanbaatar: Mongol ulsyn shinjlekh ukhaany akademi, Tüükhiin khüreelen, Mongol ulsyn zasgiin gazryn arkhiv, 1994), p.6.

39 L. Dendev, *XX zuuny Mongolyn tüükhiin ekh survalj*, Uigarjin Mongol bichgees kirill üsegt buulgaj, khevleld beltgesen O. Batsaikhan (Ulaanbaatar: Mongol ulsyn shinjlekh ukhaany akademi, Olon ulsyn sudlalyn khüreelen, 2003), p.22 (henceforce, *Materials on 20th-Century Mongolian History*).





Khaisan kept close relationships with Russian officials in Harbin, it would be reasonable to assume that Khaisan and Almas-Ochir together came to Khüree in 1907 after consultation with the Russians in Harbin.

The purpose of their visit to Khüree is clear. They went to Khüree to pursue Mongolian independence from the Qing dynasty. Reportedly, Semyonov told Khaisan that "Outer Mongolia should become independent, but there is a shortage of capable people, so you should go there as soon as possible,"[40] and Khitrovo said Almas-Ochir that "Go to Ulaanbaatar, have an audience with the Bogd Khaan telling him to establish an autonomous government, and then come back!"[41] Mongolian sources make more specific references to this aspect: According to Navannamjil, after coming to Khüree clandestinely, the two men met with religious and secular leaders, presenting the view that if Outer Mongolia commenced the great enterprise of establishing an independent state for both Inner and Outer Mongolia, Inner Mongolia would then bring it to completion. Magsarjav also states that the two met with the ruling class of Khüree and discussed how to integrate and strengthen all the Mongol peoples.

It is hard to believe that Khaisan and Almas-Ochir would have visited Khüree and discussed the issue of Mongolian independence and unification without any prior negotiation with the Outer Mongolian side. In this respect, Magsarjav makes a couple of noteworthy points: first, before the declaration of independence in 1911, leaders of both Inner and Outer Mongolia sought ways of achieving independence from the Qing dynasty and national integration through exchanges of letters and other means, and second, some Inner Mongolian leaders sent detailed information on the pasture reclamations and atrocities by Han Chinese, urging the Outer Mongolian side to be cautious about them.[42] In particular, the news of the 1891

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40 Bai Yukun, "Haishan," p.159.

41 *Materials on 20th-Century Mongolian History*, p.22. This material was written after the 1921 revolution to report past events to the government. For this reason, Khüree is rendered Ulaanbaatar and the Bogd Khaan government an autonomous government in this material.

42 Magsarjav, *Mongol ulsyn shine tüükh*, p.6.

massacre of Mongols by Jindandao rebels was given special emphasis in a Mongol letter to the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Empire.[43] It thus seems likely that Khaisan's and Almas-Ochir's visit to Khüree may have taken place during this process of exchanges between Inner and Outer Mongolia. However, it is difficult to see that their visit to Khüree was caused only by the exchanges between the Mongols. Khaisan's and Almas-Ochir's visit to Khüree was probably prompted by Russian intervention.

First of all, it is noteworthy that Khitrovo, Udai (i.e., the prince of the Jasagtu Banner, Jirim League), and others consulted with I. Ia. Korostovets—the Russian ambassador in Beijing—to discuss the issue of independence of Barga, Outer Mongolia, and Inner Mongolia. According to relevant sources, Korostovets, commenting on Khitrovo's plan, stated that it would be better for them to concentrate on the independence of Outer Mongolia because of the difficulties in Inner Mongolia and Barga that resulted from the large population of Han Chinese in those regions, and called for exertions to improve their friendly relationships with Outer Mongolia.[44] From these facts, it seems fair to assume that Almas-Ochir and Khaisan visited Khüree following the advice of Korostovets. This possibility leads us to the conclusion that Almas-Ochir's and Khaisan's visit to Khüree was likely decided on in accordance with Russian policy on Mongolia. Thus, it is also possible to see that their visit to Khüree resulted from the joint enterprise of the Russian officials in Harbin, Khüree, and Beijing.

It is also noteworthy that Almas-Ochir and Khaisan visited Khüree in 1907 after the New Policies (新政) in Outer Mongolia had come into full-swing operation, and resistance against it had begun to intensify in 1906. Distinct from the cases in China Proper, the New Policies in the Mongolian region pursued "filling the frontiers by moving in Han Chinese."[45] This

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[43] A. Ochir and G. Pürvee eds., *Mongolyn ard tümnii 1911 ony ündesnii erkh chölöö tusgaar togtnolyn tölöö temchel, Barimt bichig emkhetgel 1900-1914* (Ulaanbaatar: Ulsyn khevleliin gazar, 1982), p.166 (henceforth *Materials on the Liberation Movement*).

[44] *Materials on 20th-Century Mongolian History*, p.22.

[45] Regarding the New Policies in Outer Mongolia, see Lee Pyung-rae, "20 segi chogi areu Monggol wanggong deul-ui shinjeong-e daehan insik" [Ar-Mongol Princes' Perceptions of the New Policies in the Early 20th Century], in *Kim Mungyeong gyosu jeongnyeon toeim ginyeom dong Asia sa nonchong* (1996); Lan Meihua, "China's New Administration in Mongolia," in *Mongolia in the Twentieth Century: Landlocked Cosmopolitan*, eds. Stephen Kotkin and Bruce A. Elleman (New York and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1999); Fan Mingfang, "Qingmo Waimeng xinzheng shuping" [A Review of Outer Mongolia's New Policies in the Late Qing Period], *Xiyu yanjiu* 2005-1 (2005).





had no other aim than to prepare for a possible Russian intrusion into Mongolia. Russia had been objecting to the Chinese frontier policies on the grounds of its own security. At this point, the interests of the Russian Empire and Mongol princes coincided, and they sent Khaisan and Almas-Ochir to Khüree to realize the Russian policy on Mongolia as represented by the advice of Korostovets.

According to Magsarjav's research, Khaisan and Almas-Ochir criticized the New Policies of the Qing dynasty and discussed how to unite the entire Mongol people and strengthen them economically and militarily. They did not arrive at a conclusion, however, and then traveled to Khölönbuir and Khailar to scrutinize the circumstances of the northern frontiers of Mongolia and the adjacent regions beyond Qing control. After that, Khaisan returned to Khüree, but Almas-Ochir did not.[46] It is not clear exactly when Khaisan returned. Since Ramstedt met him in Khüree between October and December of 1909, he must have returned to Khüree prior to that.

Ever since he first came to Khüree, Khaisan was under surveillance by the Qing frontier authorities. When Khaisan came to Khüree in 1907, the Court of Colonial Affairs (理藩部) ordered Yanzhi (延祉)—the Grand Minister Superintendent (辦事大臣) in Khüree—to arrest and send Khaisan to Beijing. Yanzhi kept an eye on Khisan but did not implement the order thoroughly, believing that Khaisan would not cause much trouble. After Yanzhi was replaced and left Khüree in the first year of Xuantong (1909), Khaisan began to reveal himself in public.[47] From this information, one thing is evident: Khaisan was under severe constraints on his activities during his first stay in Khüree. Presumably, for this reason, Khaisan disguised

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[46] Magsarjav, *Mongol ulsyn shine tüükh*, p.6; "Güng Qayisan-u tuqai," p.1.

[47] Lü Yiran ed., *Beiyang zhengfu shiqi de Menggu diqu lishi ziliao*, p.279.

himself as a pilgrim or a chef for Tserenchimed in Khüree.[48]

In Khüree, Khaisan was under the protection of the leaders of the Mongolian independence movement, including Khanddorj and Tserenchimed. It was Khanddorj who introduced him to Ramstedt, and in the house of Tserenchimed, he passed himself off as a chef. Some sources exaggerated the roles of Khaisan and Almas-Ochir by stating that they first proposed the independence movement when they came to Khüree. This claim, however, is not entirely unfounded because Khaisan was on friendly terms with Khanddorj and Tserenchimed in Khüree, and the 1911 Mongolian independence would not have been possible without Khaisan. From what Ramstedt said, there is a possibility that Khaisan indeed proposed Mongolian independence from the Qing and persuaded Mongol princes to that end. According to Ramstedt, Khaisan met with a total of 88 Mongol princes, among whom only 40 understood the current situations, while others were so ignorant of the state of affairs of the time and indulgent in drinking that Khaisan's visits often ended up as fruitless endeavors.[49]

Whether or not 88 persons were the exact number, it seems true that Khaisan met with numerous people, given that many sources emphasize that Khaisan discussed Mongolian independence with high-ranking Lamas and princes. In view of this, Khaisan probably played a leading role as a propagator of Mongolian independence over the course of the preparation for the 1911 declaration of independence. Russian materials also confirm this. The above-mentioned report on the Mongol delegation to Russia of August 1911 evaluated Khaisan as "an important encourager to Bogd Gegeen ⋯ who saw the present time as the most opportune moment (for independence) and appealed that they should rise up at this moment."[50] This makes understandable the words of the Russian consul V. F. Lyuba that "for many years, in Harbin, Kyakhta, Mongolia, and wherever he could go, Khaisan propagated the idea of Mongolian independence and called for the

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[48] Ramstedt, *Ilgob charye dongbang yeohaeng*, p.203; "Güng Qayisan-u tuqai," pp.2-3.

[49] Ramstedt, *Ilgob charye dongbang yeohaeng*, p.203.

[50] Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiskoi imperii [Archives of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire], F. Kitaiskii stol 143, Opis 491, d. 644, pp.162-163.





integration of the entire Mongol people."[51]

In this way, Khaisan proposed and propagated the necessity of Mongolian independence and integration. Although it was not necessarily the result of his efforts, Mongol princes held a secret conference at Bogd Mountain in July 1911, made the decision to pursue independence from the Qing dynasty, and sent Khanddorj, Tserenchimed, and Khaisan to St. Petersburg to request support from Russia. This Mongol delegation left Khüree on July 29, 1911, and arrived on August 15 in St. Petersburg, where they discussed the pending issues with their Russian counterparts. Apart from this, the delegation discussed the future of Mongolia with a Buryat monk, Agvan Dorzhiev, on August 25. On the same day, Khaisan also met with the Russian Minister of Commerce and Industry. This meeting is noteworthy in view of his later activities in the economic sector of the independent government of Mongolia.[52]

Tserenchimed and Khaisan left St. Petersburg on September 11, arrived in Moscow on the following day, and then departed for Irkutsk on around October 3. Tserenchimed subsequently left Irkutsk on October 17, heading for Khüree. Khaisan, however, stayed in Irkutsk until mid-November with the initial intention of returning to his hometown.[53] As the political situation in China Proper grew unstable with the outbreak of the Xinhai Revolution, he decided to go to Khüree via Kyakhta. Judging from the fact that he sent a letter to W. Kotwicz in Kyakhta on December 7, he must have arrived in Kyakhta before that.[54] Although it is uncertain exactly when Khaisan returned to Khüree, he must have arrived in Khüree before December 30, 1911, because Tserenchimed's letter to Kotwicz—dated De-

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[51] *Ibid*., d. 645, p.165.

[52] O. Batsaikhan, *Mongolyn süülchiin ejen khaan VIII Bogd Javjandamba* (Ulaanbaatar: Mongol ulsyn shinjlekh ukhaany akademi, Olon ulsyn sudlalyn khüreelen, 2008), p.32.

[53] Such itineraries can be confirmed by the letters that Tserenchimed and Khaisan sent to Kotwicz (1872-1944), a Mongolist from Poland serving as an official in the Russian Ministry of Finance. For details, see *V. Kotvichiin khuviin arkhivaas oldson Mongolyn tüükhend kholbogdokh zarim bichig*, Sudlan khevlüülsen akad. B. Shirendev, Erkhelsen akad. Sh. Natsagdorj (Ulaanbaatar: Shinjlekh ukhaany akademiin khevlel, 1972) (hereinafter *Kotwicz Collection*).

[54] *Ibid*., p.81.

cember 30, 1911—indicates that Khaisan had already been working in the Ministry of the Interior.[55]

The members of the delegation returned individually to evade surveillance by the Qing dynasty. The remaining question is why Khaisan did not come straight back to Khüree but stayed in Irkutsk and Kyakhta for about two months. During his stay in Irkutsk, Khaisan maintained contact with Khüree and St. Petersburg to keep track of the overall situation and to negotiate on arms aid and other matters with Russian officials. In a letter to Kotwicz, Khaisan stated that although he had tried several times to go to his hometown in Inner Mongolia, circumstances at that time had not allowed it. Peculiarly, in his letter to Kotwicz dated November 16, 1911, Khaisan asked Kotwicz, in writing letters to him from then on, to send them to Nikolai Nikolaevich Gombojav in Beijing, under the name of "Mongol Batu."[56] Thus, it seems that he intended to go to his hometown and conduct activities for Mongolian independence while maintaining contact with Beijing to keep track of circumstances there. With the outbreak of the Xinhai Revolution, however, he had to modify this original plan. According to his letter to Kotwicz dated February 2, 1912,[57] Khaisan returned to Khüree because of the strong request from Tserenchimed.

## Glory and Frustration in the Bogd Khaan Government

After the Mongol delegation to Russia returned to Khüree, princes of Outer Mongolia set up a provisional government on November 30, 1911, and declared on December 1 both internally and externally that Mongolia threw off Qing rule and became an independent state.[58] Then, on December 29, they enthroned Jebtsundamba Khutugtu as Bogd Khaan, announced the establishment of the cabinet of five ministries, and granted honors and rewards to those who had contributed to Mongolian independence. Among the delegation to Russia, Khanddorj was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs and Tserenchimed Minister of Internal Affairs, while Khaisan was mentioned in the third place of honor. Khaisan was granted the noble title of Bulwark Duke (輔國公) and appointed Deputy Minister (*des tüshmel*) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.[59] The reason why Khaisan, then appointed merely Deputy Minister, was named in the third place of honor may have been the important role he had played in the independence process.

Presumably, it was Tserenchimed's recommendation that made Khaisan appointed Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Navannamjil, who worked together with Khaisan and witnessed firsthand the situation of the time, recollected as follows: "Duke Khaisan was a man of outstanding political insight with proficiency in the Manchu, Chinese, and Mongolian languages, and knew very well the international situation as well as the state of internal affairs of the late Qing dynasty. Therefore, in pursuing Mongolian independence and seeking support from the Russian Emperor, he served as a core supporter of Da Lama Tserenchimed, contributed to the construction of the new state, and became Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs."[60] As mentioned above, Khaisan once hid in the house of Tserenchimed in disguise of his chef and later accompanied Tserenchimed when the Mongol delegation returned from Russia. As will be discussed below, it was also Tserenchimed who actively helped Khaisan when he got in trouble politically.

In this regard, Navannamjil testified, "because [Khaisan] was not on good terms with Prince Khanddorj and other ministers, he resorted to the protection of Da Lama [Tserenchimed], merely providing Da Lama with a variety of advice. Hence, he did not have any actual power to conduct [affairs] in his charge."[61] This testimony clarifies that Khaisan performed his

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55 *Ibid*., pp.127-129.

56 *Ibid*., pp.32-33.

57 *Ibid*., p.116.

58 *Materials on the Liberation Movement*, p.110.

59 *Materials on 20th-Century Mongolian History*, pp.124-125.

60 G. Navaannamjil, *Övgön bicheechiin ügüülel* [A Writing of an Old Scribe] (Ulaanbaatar: Ulsyn khevleliin gazar, 1956), pp.188-189.

61 *Ibid*., p.189.

official duties under Tserenchimed's protection. Khaisan showed excellent abilities not only as a high official but in various other areas as well. A Mongolian document gave an evaluation of him as follows: "He is a person like a pillar of our country, being loyal, fluent in many languages, shrewd, faithful to the grace of the lord, and devoted to official duties."[62] Navannamjil also appraised Khaisan, "whenever I talked to Duke Khaisan about public affairs and daily matters, he was reticent and mild-mannered. Given that he always put forward [his own] opinion on every issue to make things right, however, I thought him a genuine scholar."[63]

Numerous foreigners who met Khaisan in Khüree also thought highly of Khaisan's ability. T. A. Rustad—a resident employee in Beijing of British American Tobacco—who met Khaisan frequently on his business trip to Khüree said, "he is a genuine patriot and never concerned with himself ··· Duke Khaisan is the only one who does something in the new Mongolian government. Others in the government only drink and watch how things go, throwing every affair upon him."[64] Ramstedt also wrote in an unpublished letter that Khaisan "was truly at the heart of all matters and the most unyielding enemy of China."[65] Korostovets, who was usually critical of Khaisan, also evaluated him positively in terms of his capability and devotion.[66]

Khaisan was active in the economic sector, including trade, as well. As mentioned above, on August 25, 1911, he had a meeting with the Russian Minister of Commerce and Industry. This meeting was made possible at the request of the Mongolian side. In the spring of 1912, Khaisan—together with Tserenchimed, Khanddorj, Duke Tüshee, and a Russian named

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[62] Mongol ulsyn ündesnii arkhiv, FA-47, D-1, Kh/N-7, nug-1, kh-262.

[63] "Güng Qayisan-u tuqai," p.5.

[64] *The Correspondence of G. E. Morrison 2 (1912-1920)*, ed. Lo Hui-Min (Cambridge University Press, 1978), p.52.

[65] G. J. Pentti Aalto, "Ramstedt and the Mongolian Independence Movement," *Studia Mongolica* Tom. 1(9) Fasc. 1-17 (1973): p.128.

[66] Korostovets, *Mōko kinseishi* [A History of Modern Mongolia], trans. Takayama Yōkichi (Tokyo: Morikita shoten, 1943), p.364.





F. Moskvitin—established the Russo-Mongolian Consignment Warehouse Company to stimulate commercial transactions between Mongolia and Russia. Khaisan participated in this joint company as an investor along with three Ministers of the independent Mongolian government.[67] Although it was Moskvitin who first proposed the establishment of the company, Khaisan's participation in this joint project reveals his economic acumen.

Khaisan paid great attention to attracting foreign companies as well. According to Rustad, Khaisan asked Rustad to introduce a British mining company to him, with a promise of full support from the Mongolian government. Khaisan also suggested that the Mongolian government award the right to develop unknown gold mines to a British mining company, on condition that the company would receive support from the British government. Khaisan thought that drawing the British Empire to Mongolia would make it possible to maintain a balance against Russian influence. Thus, he tried to invite people of all countries to Mongolia and requested introductions of telegraph entrepreneurs, to whom the Russian side would react sensitively.[68] These activities indicate that Khaisan intended to attract a third power to Mongolia to develop natural resources and escape Russian influence, being part of his efforts to maintain Mongolian independence by making use of the power relations among the great powers.

Khaisan took part in the unification war of western Mongolia, conducted from the spring to August of 1912, and also in the unification war of Inner Mongolia that began in early 1913. Although no sources show why he—an official of the Interior Ministry—participated in these wars of national unification, the cause of Mongolian unification seems to have prompted him to engage in the wars. In the western Mongolian unification war, not only Outer Mongols but also various other groups of Mongol origin—including the Bargas, Chakhars, Uriyankhais, Dörböds, and Torguuds—participated, and Damdinsüren, Khaisan, and others from Inner

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[67] *Kotwicz Collection*, p.181.

[68] *The Correspondence of G. E. Morrison 2* (*1912-1920*), pp.51-52.

Mongolia served as commanders. In the Inner Mongolian unification war as well, many Inner Mongols—including Khaisan and Nasan-Arbijikh—served as commanders, while Damdinsüren from the Barga was the commander-in-chief.[69]

In this way, ever since the establishment of the Bogd Khaan government, Khaisan was involved in the entire field of activities. In return, the Bogd Khaan government sent 100 camels to Khaisan's home in the spring of 1912 and moved his family, brothers, and other relatives, around 50 altogether, to Outer Mongolia that summer, having them settle and live in Selenge Province of northern Mongolia in the autumn.[70] In 1913, however, a series of accusations and requests for the punishment of Khaisan ensued. As previous studies clarified in detail, Khaisan underwent ordeals—having his house searched, being tortured, and imprisoned—and was eventually removed from office. Whether or not those charges and accusations were based on facts, given the timing and main instigators, they seem unlikely to have been mere cases of personal corruption.

In connection with this, it is necessary to take a look at the power relations within the Bogd Khaan government. As the Bogd Khaan government did not have the Prime Minister's Office initially, the Ministry of Internal Affairs presided over the whole state affairs as the senior department. As a result, Tserenchimed and Khaisan—two leaders of the Ministry of Internal Affairs—took the initiative in the early Bod Khaan government, leading to considerable dissatisfaction among other officials in the government. In a letter to Kotwicz (dated February 21, 1912), Agvan Dorzhiev of the Buryat, who lived in Khüree at that time, conveyed this mood of the early cabinet, saying "Da Lama [Tserenchimed] became Minister of Internal Affairs, and Khaisan received the title of Duke. These two people, with great authority, determine state affairs, and whatever they propose to the

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[69] Lee Pyung-rae, "1912-1913 nyeon Bogd jeongbu-ui naemonggol tonghab sido-wa jwajeol" [The Bogd Khaan Government's Attempt to Integrate Inner Mongolia and Its Frustration in 1912-1913], *Jung'ang Asia yeongu* 14 (2009).

[70] Jamsran, *Mongolchuudyn sergen mandaltyn ekhen*, p. 150; Boldbaatar, *Chin zütgelt gün Khaisan*, pp.27-28.





Khaan will be done just as they propose. This offends so many aristocrats that no one knows what might happen [next]."[71] The Russian merchant Moskvitin stated similarly, "they can not accept that a Lama from a low status [i.e., Tserenchimed][72] takes charge of state affairs, while aristocrats themselves cannot play any role. They hate Khaisan, too. Outer Mongols consider it inappropriate that an immigrant [i.e., Khaisan] achieves a successful career in Outer Mongolia."[73]

Russians were also not satisfied with Tserenchimed and Khaisan. In a letter to Kotwicz (dated March 24, 1912), Moskvitin expressed his view that Tserenchimed was becoming increasingly troublesome and hostile to him, and since Tserenchimed still exerted great influence on Bogd Khaan, there was little hope of toppling Tserenchimed, and Russia's position in Mongolia would thus become more difficult than during the period of Qing rule.[74] The Russian ambassador in Beijing, V. N. Krupenskii, in a telegram to the Foreign Minister of the Russian Empire (dated May 7, 1912),[75] reported that there was serious strife between the ministers and princes in the Bogd Khaan government, and that Tserenchimed, along with some officials from the Kharchin, took political power and were unfriendly to Russia.

From the beginning, Russia tried to realize its own political and economic interests while recognizing China's suzerainty over Outer Mongolia. In contrast, Tserenchimed and Khaisan pursued Mongolia's complete independence, as well as the unification of Inner and Outer Mongolia. In fact, they had been in conflict with the Russian consul in Khüree over Mongolia's future even before the proclamation of independence,[76] and this conflict became more intense as Tserenchimed took power in the new govern-

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[71] *Kotwicz Collection*, p.164.

[72] Navaannamjil, *Övgön bicheechiin ügüülel*, p.187.

[73] *Kotwicz Collection*, p.150.

[74] *Ibid*., pp.174-176.

[75] Chen Chunhua trans., *Eguo waijiao wenshu xuanyi* [Selected Translations of Russian Diplomatic Documents] (Haerbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe, 1991), p.34.

[76] *Kotwicz Collection*, p.78.

ment after the Mongolian independence.[77] According to Moskvitin, Khaisan supported Tserenchimed's position, and thus whoever negotiated with them had to do so under tense conditions.[78] From Russia's perspective, therefore, the two needed to be ousted from power for Russia to realize its policy in Mongolia.

The Russian consul Lyuba fomented conflicts among the Mongol ruling class by telling princes and nobles "if one man is allowed to handle everything, no known knows what to happen later."[79] As can be seen from the report of Krupenskii, from early on, a feud was going on between the faction of Tserenchimed and that of other bureaucrats within the Bogd Khaan Government, and this conflict intensified as time went by.[80] Lyuba's advice was that Russia should intervene in the power struggle between the two groups. He also tried to undermine Tserenchimed's and Khaisan's influence by putting pressure on Bogd Khaan. The Russian Foreign Minister, S. D. Sazonov, who received the report from Krupenskii, sent a telegram to Lyuba, instructing him to request Bogd Khaan for the replacement of Tserenchimed with a prince whom Russia trusted. In response, Lyuba reminded Bogd Khaan that the Mongolian government was taking a series of measures contrary to Russian advice, and advanced his opinions as follows: if the Mongolian government admitted officials who were not from Outer Mongolia (for example, Khaisan and others from Inner Mongolia), that would have a bad influence on the government; and, he hoped that one of the Mongol princes would take the initiative in the Mongolian government. Bogd Khaan gave his consent to Lyuba's opinions, and Mongol princes met with Lyuba to let him know Bogd Khaan's consent. Finally, Lyuba reported it to the Russian government.[81]

Thus, in July 1912, the Prime Minister's Office was established in the Bogd Khaan government, and Namnansüren was appointed Prime Minister. From then on, Russian officials and Outer Mongol princes continued their maneuvers against Tserenchimed and Khaisan. Notably, at the time of the Russo-Mongolian Agreement of November 3, 1912, when Tserenchimed objected to the plan proposed by Russia, the Russian delegate Korostovets threatened Tserenchimed by throwing the draft agreement to the floor.[82] Furthermore, Korostovets met with Bogd Khaan and singled out Tserenchimed, Bintü Wang, Khaisan, and Puntsagtseren as anti-Russianists,[83] demanding ousting them from power. Whether by accident or not, among the four men, Bintü Wang died a suspicious death,[84] and Tserenchimed died of illness in the summer of 1914 on his way to his new post. Although there are no relevant sources, it is difficult to deny the possibility that Russian and Outer Mongolian leaders may have been involved in these two men's deaths.[85]

In this regard, it is possible to see that Russian and Outer Mongolian leaders were involved in the ordeals of Khaisan. In connection with this, an unpublished letter from Ramstedt to Rudnev suggests many things. Specifically, Ramstedt indicated that Khaisan was persecuted by Russia and Out-

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[77] In a letter to Kotwicz (dated February 4, 1912), Lyuba wrote that Tserenchimed was a "crooked fellow" (*ibid*., p. 121). Moskvitin stated, in another letter to Kotwicz (dated March 24, 1912), that the relationship between Lyuba and Da Lama broke down due to the issue of "Mongolor" (*ibid*., p. 174).

[78] *Ibid*., p.174.

[79] *Ibid*., p.164.

[80] *Ibid*., p.230.

[81] Chen Chunhua trans., *Eguo waijiao wenshu xuanyi*, pp.33-34.

[82] Korostovets, *Mōko kinseishi*, pp.274-275; *Kotwicz Collection*, p.247.

[83] Korostovets, *Mōko kinseishi*, p.423.

[84] Boyanmandu [Buyanmandakh], "Wo suo zhidao de Bintu wang Gunchuke sulong" [My Memories on Bintü Wang Günchügsüren], in *Neimenggu jinxiandai wanggong lu* [Records on Modern Inner Mongolian Princes] (Huhehaote: Zhongguo renmin zhengxie Neimenggu zizhiqu weiyuanhui Neimenggu zizhiqu weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui, 1988).

[85] J. Boldbaatar, *Da lam* (Ulaanbaatar: Shinjlekh ukhaany akademi Tüükhiin khüreelen, 1997), pp.46-52. A Mongolian source states that Tserenchimed was sent to western Mongolia due to discord with Namnansüren (Navaannamjil, *Övgön bicheechiin ügüülel*, p.202), while a Chinese source testifies that the Russian consul Miller was involved in Tserenchimed's death (The Second Historical Archives of China, 1045-260, 1914. 8.22.). Zhou Xuejun also deals with this issue comprehensively. For details, see Zhou Xuejun, "Zhebuzun danba zhengquan 'Neige zongli dachen' shezhi kao" [A Study on the Establishment of 'Prime Minister' of the Jebtsundamba Government], *Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu* 1999-3 (1999).

er Mongolian nobles, saying "Khanddorj and other Outer Mongolian princes criticized Khaisan as a demagogue … It is a tragedy that Khaisan, who was the most enthusiastic friend of Russia and the most intelligent, was sacrificed through the conspiracy of Lyuba and became a betrayer of Russia."[86]

First, in early 1913, Namsrai, the Minister of Justice, filed a lawsuit against Khaisan on the grounds that Khaisan called in Russians and Chinese and let them farm and cut hay in the pastureland granted to him by a decree of Bogd Khaan. Here, it is notable that the litigant was a representative pro-Russianist singled out by Korostovets.[87] Probably a little before this lawsuit, although the exact date cannot be confirmed, Khaisan was subjected to searches of his house on suspicion of atrocious acts (killings of innocent people and arson) and the theft of spoils during the western Mongolian unification war, as well as collusion with the Beijing government of China.[88]

Moreover, in October 1913, Raashminjüür from the Jirim League in Inner Mongolia—then the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Mongolian government—brought charges against Khaisan, alleging that Khaisan was communicating secretly with the Beijing government. Due to this accusation, Khaisan was subjected to a great deal of suffering, including imprisonment, torture, and the seizure of family property. Navannamjil, who witnessed this incident firsthand, remarked on this case that the accusations were all lies and slander caused by the resentment and vengeance of Khaisan's opponents, and that Khaisan did not confess anything and then was set free without punishment after the case was transferred to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.[89] Thus, Navannamjil evaluated this incident as a political conspiracy. Adding support to this interpretation is the fact that Kodama—a Japanese who visited Outer Mongolia around the time (September 4-26, 1913)—associated the arrest and detention of Khaisan with the Russian consul.[90]

The accusations against Khaisan, however, do not seem to have been entirely groundless. Various sources show that Khaisan indeed continued to maintain relations with the Prince of the Kharchin Banner—Khaisan's hometown—and with the Beijing government. According to his letters to the Beijing government, Khaisan sent several Inner Mongolian princes to Beijing.[91] Kodama, who met Khaisan in Khüree, also confirmed that Khaisan remained in correspondence with the Prince of the Kharchin Banner. The Russian consul, A. Ya. Miller, also reminded Kodama of the fact that Khaisan had continued corresponding with the Prince of Kharchin and maintained relationships with the Beijing government.[92] At any rate, Khaisan seems to have tried to make a breakthrough on the side of China after the Russo-Mongolian Agreement was concluded in late 1912. And, this appears to have provided the pretext for the attacks on Khaisan by Outer Mongolian leaders, Inner Mongols residing in Khüree, and particularly Russia, all of whom were in conflict with him.

## Concluding Remarks: The Frustration of Mongolian Unification and Return to China

After the imprisonment, Khaisan was soon released for reasons of health, yet he seems to have remained under a kind of house arrest. According to sources, although Khaisan was reinstated and set free from house arrest thanks to Tserenchimed's efforts, he spent his time in Outer Mongolia dispirited. As an example, Khaisan refused to participate in the work of drafting the Royal Regulations of the Mongolian State (欽定蒙古國則例). He finally went via Kyakhta to Beijing, where Yuan Shikai gave him an

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86 Pentti Aalto, "Ramstedt and the Mongolian Independence Movement," pp.127-128.

87 Korostovets, *Mōko kinseishi*, p.248.

88 According to compilers of the sources about Khaisan, Togtokh from Inner Mongolia accused Khaisan. Bai Yukun, "Haishan," pp.159-160; Deshan, *Mengguolejin Hailetuti shi shulüe*, pp.82-83.

89 "Güng Qayisan-u tuqai," pp.11-12.

90 "Gokuhi Kodama Toshimasa shi Mōko shisatsuki batsui," p.752.

91 The Second Historical Archives of China, 1045-1260, 1914. 2.

92 "Gokuhi Kodama Toshimasa shi Mōko shisatsuki batsui," p.751.

audience and ennobled him with the title of beise, providing him with a luxurious house as well. Khaisan kept himself indoors, devoting himself to the translation of the *Mongolian-Chinese Original Sounds of the Five Regions* (蒙漢合壁五方元音), which he published in Beijing in the spring of 1917. When he died of illness in the same year, the Beijing government sent his body and family to his hometown for a grand funeral.[93]

From a broader perspective, Khaisan's return to China came amid the massive return home of Inner Mongols, who had participated in the Bogd Khaan government, after the 1915 Kyakhta Trilateral Treaty. But, considering his position in the history of the Mongolian independence movement in the 1910s, the complex international relations surrounding Mongolia before and after the proclamation of independence, and the power struggle within the Bogd Khaan government, it is hard to see Khaisan's return to China just as a part of the collective return of Inner Mongols. This article will not discuss the process leading up to Khaisan's return because previous studies clarified this aspect of his life in detail. In this conclusion, the present author will discuss why Khaisan went back to China and when he sought his return, finally assessing his life from the perspective of the rise and fall of Mongolian nationalism in the 1910s.

Why did Khaisan eventually return to China despite his early awakening of national consciousness, his participation in anti-Chinese movements, and his leading role in the 1911 declaration of independence? Mongolian researchers explain that Khaisan returned to China due to the difficult situations he faced, such as his imprisonment and torture, as well as the frustration of full Mongolian independence and unification that resulted from the 1915 Kyakhta Trilateral Treaty. Fan Mingfang argues that Khaisan decided to go to Beijing for his own safety because the Beijing government's counterattack against the Mongol army that had advanced onto Inner Mongolia came into full swing in the autumn of 1913. Lan Meihua explains that Khaisan began his activities with China in his mind because of his personal "unpleasant experiences," such as his disappointment over the

[93] Bai Yukun, "Haishan," p.161; Deshan, *Mengguolejin Hailetuti shi shulüe*, p.84.





Russo-Mongolian Agreement (November 3, 1912), the unfruitful return of the Mongol delegation to Russia in pursuit of Russian aid, and the punishment on him for the Khovd incident. Lastly, Nakami Tatsuo explains Khaisan's return to China as an example of the self-contradiction faced by the Inner Mongols of the time, which resulted from the principle of power in international relations—a major component of 20th-century Mongolian history.

All of these explanations seem to reflect the reasons why Khaisan chose to go to China, but the most plausible one is the third. Although Lan Meihua does not specify the exact time when Khaisan sought to return, judging from the cited sources, she seems to consider that Khaisan tried to prepare for a breakthrough for his future between late 1912 and early 1913. The result of the Russo-Mongolian Agreement—in sum, autonomous Outer Mongolia under Chinese suzerainty—must have been frustrating to Khaisan who had insisted on Mongolia's full independence, as well as the unification of Inner and Outer Mongolia. That Tserenchimed left for Harbin in early 1913 to negotiate with Japan could be seen as a desperate effort to escape Russia's increasing influence. Here, it is noteworthy that Tserenchimed attempted to negotiate with Japan at the time that the Mongol delegation to Russia headed by Khanddorj repeated fruitless negotiations with Russia. As pointed out by Nakami Tatsuo, while Khanddorj's visit to Russia was made at the level of the Bogd Khaan government, Tserenchimed's attempt to negotiate with Japan is likely to have been made at the request of nationalists.[94] This suggests, on the one hand, a possibility that the attempt to negotiate with Japan arose from dissatisfaction with the policy of the Bogd Khaan government, while on the other hand implying something about the power relations within the government.

As mentioned above, from the early days of the Bogd Khaan government, there were conflicts within the cabinet. According to relevant sources, power struggles between the pro-Russian faction and nationalist group

[94] Nakami Tatsuo, "Bogudo=Han seiken no tainichi kōshō doryoku to teikokushugi rekkyō" [Independent Mongolia and the Imperialist Powers: 1911-1914], *Ajia·Afurika gengo bunka kenkyū* [Journal of Asian and African Studies] 17 (1979): pp.9-17.

arose in early 1913, and many Inner Mongols aimed to leave Khüree at this time.[95] Further, in April 1913, a general of Uliastai named Nayantu reported that Khaisan had already been inclined toward China,[96] and there is another record that Khaisan presented a copy of the Russo-Mongolian Agreement to Yuan Shikai at an unknown time.[97] In addition, in September 1913, Khaisan sent his son—Hai Yongfu (海永傅)—to Beijing to enunciate his support for republicanism.[98]

If these sources are accurate, it can be argued that Khaisan agonized over his course of action with the Beijing government in his mind between the signing of the Russo-Mongolian Agreement (November 3, 1912) and the spring of 1913, and finally decided to go to Beijing in around September 1913. The present author does not believe that Khaisan went to Beijing only for his own safety because evaluating Khaisan's decision that way would be an oversimplification of the choice made by a man who had devoted his entire life to Mongolian independence. The world that Khaisan had dreamt about involved the full independence and unification of Mongolia and Mongol peoples, but the Russo-Mongolian Agreement deprived him of this dream completely. Khaisan tried to prevent Russia's scheme—realizing Russia's interests in Mongolia while recognizing Chinese suzerainty over Mongolia—and yet his efforts gave rise to frictions with Russia and Outer Mongolian princes who were dependent on Russia. These conflicts eventually led to his political ordeal.

Khaisan's suffering began with the lawsuit by Namsrai that was raised when the negotiation with Japan led by Khaisan's faction ended in failure, and the conflict between the pro-Russian faction and nationalist group emerged. As discussed above, this lawsuit by Namsrai probably resulted from the conspiracy of Outer Mongolian princes and the Russian consul; and, in the process, Bintü Wang from Inner Mongolia, who had

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[95] The Second Historical Archives of China, 1002-1062(2), 1913. 3. 7.

[96] *Ibid*., 1002-1062(2), 1913. 4.17.

[97] *Ibid*., 1045-1290, 1913. 6.25.

[98] *Ibid*., 1045-1260, 1914. 8.22.





shared the same intentions with Khaisan, met a sudden death (June 1913).[99] Faced with his internal and external difficulties, Khaisan probably took the abnormal death of Bintü Wang as a direct threat to himself, and this would be the decisive reason for his choice to go to Beijing. The fact that Khaisan sent his son to Beijing in September 1913 indicates that he made his decision before that time.

Given these facts, Khaisan's choice was somehow inevitable. In a situation where Outer Mongolian princes' persecution of him, the jealousy of his fellow Inner Mongols in Khüree, and Russia's checks on him were all intensifying, there remained no choice for him but to go to Beijing. Moreover, under the circumstance in which Mongolian independence and unification had foundered completely, it would have made no difference for him whether China or Russia controlled the country. From his standpoint, in contrast to Russia's hostility to him, China welcomed his return. In addition, he had many acquaintances in China, and his hometown was under Chinese dominion. In this respect, Khaisan's return was fundamentally different from that of other Inner Mongols who went back to China after the 1915 Kyakhta Treaty. While Khaisan's choice was inevitable, others' returns were voluntary.

Khaisan's return to China had a couple of significant meanings in terms of the development of Mongolian nationalism that erupted at the turn of the 20th century, as well as the fates of Inner Mongolian leaders of the time. First, his return to China symbolized the frustration of the Mongolian independence and unification movement. Given the process Khaisan made his inevitable choice, the main factors that thwarted the Mongolian unification movement were the schism among the Mongol leaders that forced Khaisan to leave Khüree, as well as the Russian intervention that penetrated and manipulated the internal discord.

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[99] The preface to *Menghan hebi wufang yuanyin* [Mongolian-Chinese Original Sounds of the Five Regions] was written by Bintü Wang (see *Menghan hebi wufang yuanyin*, pp.9-11). According to the preface, Bintü Wang met Khaisan in the summer of 1912 (壬子) in Khüree, and Khaisan asked him to write a preface at that time. Given that the duke [i.e., Khaisan] was diligent and that [the book] would be useful for future students, Bintü Wang composed the preface happily. This passage shows that the relationship between Khaisan and Bintü Wang was good.

Second, the trajectory of Khaisan's life—from his hometown in Inner Mongolia, to Harbin, to Khüree, and eventually to Beijing—represents Inner Mongolia's position and fate under foreign domination. As Qing China had suffered both internal and external troubles since the mid-19th century, Inner Mongolia was also drawn into the vortex of rapid change: The massive immigration of Han Chinese aggravated the ethnic conflict between the Mongols and Chinese, the class conflict between the Mongol nobility and the ruled intensified, and, lastly, Russian, Japanese, and other foreign interventions began in Inner Mongolia. In this situation, Inner Mongolian leaders split into three groups. Some Inner Mongolian leaders toiled to maintain their traditional privileges with the slogan of "Mongol-Chinese Unity" (蒙漢團結), while others pursued their private interests by taking advantage of the conflicts between Qing China (Republican China, from 1912), Mongols, and foreign powers. The last group joined the struggle against the Han Chinese and strove for Mongolian independence,[100] and Khaisan belonged to this third group.

The ruling class in Inner Mongolia also stood at a crossroads of similar choices after the 1911 declaration of independence. When the Bogd Khaan government requested Inner Mongolian princes to join the new Mongolian state, some princes participated in the new state, others clearly refused, and the others waited and saw the situation, finally turning to the Beijing government.[101] Later, as Outer Mongolia fell into the status of an autonomous country under Chinese suzerainty with the 1915 Kyakhta Trilateral Treaty, there arose yet another matter of choice for the Inner Mongols in Khüree: Whether to remain in Khüree or return to their homeland. In the circumstance that Mongolian independence had been nullified, there was little justification to remain in Khüree. On top of that, the Chinese government proclaimed that the Inner Mongols in Khüree would be pardoned, and free travel and communication would be allowed between Inner and Outer Mongols.[102] At that time, many Inner Mongols left Khüree for their homeland, although not a small number of them remained.

It is not easy to give a definite answer to the question of why some Inner Mongols chose to stay in Khüree and others to return home. Considering the number of people who returned to their homeland, their decision does not seem to have resulted from their wish to live in their hometown. As can be seen from Khaisan's words that the Outer Mongols treated the Inner Mongols arrogantly,[103] the Inner Mongols in Khüree were held in check by the Outer Mongols.[104] A report by the Russian consul Miller also stated that the attitude of the Outer Mongols toward the Inner Mongols was haughty. Miller's report provides further information on the Inner Mongols' dissatisfaction: They wanted to leave Khüree because they were not able to cultivate lands due to the climate of Outer Mongolia, as well as the Bogd Khaan government was ineffective, imposing higher tax rates compared to China, and not giving lands or financial benefits to them.[105] In particular, after the 1915 Kyakhta Treaty, the Outer Mongols ostracized the Inner Mongols. Thus, those from Inner Mongolia were not able to secure stability in Outer Mongolia.[106]

For the Inner Mongols, who had a feeling of superiority over the Outer Mongols,[107] such a situation would not be bearable. It is thus hard to view the Inner Mongols' return to China purely due to personal safety concerns. The Inner Mongols in Khüree—traitors in the eyes of the Beijing government—must have had inevitable reasons to decide to return to China. Admittedly, some Inner Mongols—such as Damdinsüren from the Barga—remained in Khüree. Yet, it seems that they were still in uncomfort-

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[100] Borjigin Bürensain, "Harachin · Tomedo imin to Mongoru shakai" [Kharchin-Tümed Immigrants and Mongolian Society], in *Kingendai Mongoru tōbu no henyō* [The Transformation of Eastern Mongolia in the Modern Period] (Tokyo: Yuzankaku, 2007).

[101] Lee Pyung-rae, "1912-1913 nyeon Bogd jeongbu-ui naemonggol tonghab sido-wa jwajeol."

[102] O. Batsaikhan, *Khyatad, Oros, Mongol gurvan ulsyn 1915 ony Khiagtyn geree* (Ulaanbaatar: Mongol ulsyn ündesni arkhivyn gazar, Shinjlekh ukhaany akademi Tüükhiin khüreelen, 1999), p.548.

[103] Ramstedt, *Ilgob charye dongbang yeohaeng*, p.203.

[104] Nakami Tatsuo, "Haisan to Otai," p.133.

[105] Chen Chunhua trans., *Eguo waijiao wenshu xuanyi*, pp. 328-330, pp.339-340.

[106] Lü Yiran ed., *Beiyang zhengfu shiqi de Menggu diqu lishi ziliao*, p.194.

[107] Chen Chunhua trans., *Eguo waijiao wenshu xuanyi*, pp.227-228.

able relations with the Outer Mongols, given that they requested the Bogd Khaan government to establish an administrative district only for the Inner Mongols. The Bogd Khaan government refused this request. Presumably, for this reason, Inner Mongols fled Outer Mongolia to Inner Mongolia even in 1917.[108] In light of these situations, Khaisan's choice is understandable. Khaisan's decision to return to China resulted ultimately from the insurmountable schism between the Inner and Outer Mongols. Due to this schism, the Inner Mongolian leaders who refused to participate in the Bogd Khaan government had difficulties in abandoning their ties with China. By taking advantage of this schism, the foreign powers around Mongolia endeavored to realize their own interests, and under the pressure from the foreign powers, the burgeoning Mongolian nationalism failed to come to fruition.

[108] Tachibana Makoto, "Kyafuta kyōtei-go no kihuku Mongorujin no unmei" [The Fate of the Mongols Joined Bogd Khaan's Government after the Kiakhta Agreement], *Waseda daigaku Mongoru kenkyūjo kiyō* [Bulletin of Waseda Institute for Mongolian Studies] 5 (2009).





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# Article
# (Translated)

# Zongfan and Zhonghua as Interpretative Concepts for Seeing the Qing: Possibilities and Limitations of Yuanchong Wang's 'Joseon Model'

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# Zongfan and Zhonghua as Interpretative Concepts for Seeing the Qing: Possibilities and Limitations of Yuanchong Wang's 'Joseon Model' *

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## I. Introduction

In the field of Qing (清 1644-1912) history, there have been several topics of controversy between Chinese scholars and their non-Chinese counterparts, for which they have found little consensus. The prominent examples have been the issues surrounding the two theses of 'New Qing History' and 'Qing Imperialism.' The thesis of 'Qing Imperialism' made its appearance from the mid-twentieth century, focusing on the nature of the Qing's policy towards Joseon in the late nineteenth century and interpreting the Qing's Joseon (朝鮮 1392-1910)policy as fundamentally imperialistic.[1] On the oth-

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1 Kim Key-Hiuk, *The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order*: *Korea, Japan, and the Chinese Empire*, 1860-1882 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); Song Byeonggi 宋炳基, *Geundae Han Jung gwangyesa yeon'gu: 19 segi eui yeon Mi ron gwa Jo Cheong gyoseop* 近代韓中關係史研究: 19世紀의 聯美論과 朝淸交涉 [Study on the history of modern Korean-Chinese relations: Discourse of allying with America and talks between Joseon and the Qing] (Seoul: Danguk taehakgyo chulpanbu, 1985); Gweon Seokbong 權錫奉, Cheong mal dae Joseon jeongchaeksa yeon'gu 淸末對朝鮮政策史研究 [Study on the history of the late Qing's policy toward Joseon] (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1986); Kim Jeonggi 金正起, "1876-1894 nyeon Cheong

er hand, without denying the interventionist nature of the Qing policy, some Chinese scholars tend to see it as the strengthening of the Qing's traditional suzerain rights.[2] It may well be hard for contemporary Chinese scholars who have viewed recent Chinese history as a semi-colonial experience to accept the thesis that China exercised imperialist control and influence over its neighboring countries in its recent past. Hence, they have tried to refute the imperialist interpretation of the late Qing's relations with its neighboring states, especially with Joseon, and was in favor of the suzerain-vassal relationship which had been historically recognized as the legitimate norm of foreign relations within the Qing-centric world order.

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eui Joseon jeongchaek yeon'gu" 1876-1894年 清의 朝鮮政策硏究 [The Qing's policy toward Joseon, 1876-1894], Ph. D. dissertation, Seoul National University (1994); Motegi Tosio 茂木敏夫, "Chūka sekai no kindai teki saihen" 中華世界の'近代'的 再編 [Modern reconstruction of the Chinese world], Ph. D. dissertation, University of Tokyo (1994); Gu Seonheui 具仙姬, *Hanguk geundae dae Cheong jeongchaeksa yeon'gu* 韓國 近代 對淸政策史 硏究 [Study on Korea's policy toward the Qing in modern era] (Seoul: Hyean 1999); Kirk W. Larsen, *Tradition, Treaties, and Trade: Qing Imperialism and Chosŏn Korea, 1850-1910* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008).

[2] Lin Mingde 林明德, *Yuan Shikai yu Chaoxian* 袁世凱與朝鮮 [Yuan Shikai and Joseon] (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo, or Academia Sinica, 1970); Zhang Cunwu 張存武, "Qing ji Zhong Han guanxi zhi bian tong" 淸季中韓關係之變通 [Adaptations of the Sino-Korean relations in the late Qing], *Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo jikan* 中央硏究院近代史硏究所集刊 14 (1985); Song Huijuan 宋慧娟, *Qingdai Zhong Chao Zongfan guanxi shanbian yanjiu* 淸代中朝宗藩關係嬗變硏究 [Study on the evolution of the Sino-Korean Zongfan relations in the Qing era], Changchun: Jilin daxue chubanshe (2007), pp.151-260; Cao Wen 曹雯, "Wan Qing zhengfu duiwai zhengce de tiaozheng yu Chaoxian" 晩淸政府對外政策的調整與朝鮮 [Late Qing government's adjustment of foreign policy and Joseon], Qingshi yanjiu 淸史硏究 2008-2 (2008); Zhang Weiming 張衛明, "Zai Zongfan tizhi yu guoji gongfa zhi jian: wan Qing Zhong Chao zhixu de chongxin jiangou" 在宗藩體制與國際公法之間: 晩淸中朝秩序的重新建構 [In between Zongfan system and international law: Reconstruction of the Sino-Korean order in the late Qing], Xueshu yanjiu 學術硏究 2011-3 (2011); Sun Yanshu 孫豔姝, "Wan Qing Zhong Chao chaogong guanxi xiangkao" 晩淸中朝朝貢關係詳考 [Detailed study on the Sino-Korean tributary relations in late Qing], *Shixue yuekan* 史學月刊 2011-1 (2011). Recently, some of the Chinese works have been critical of the Qing's policy toward Joseon, but they do not view the Qing's strengthening of its suzerain rights as being unjustifiable; For example, Ma Yong 馬勇, "Jiawu qian Qing zhengfu "Chaoxian fanglue" zai jiantao" 甲午前淸政府"朝鮮方略"再檢討 [Rethinking of the Qing government's strategy for Joseon before 1894], Shehui kexue jikan 社會科學輯刊 2014-6 (2014); Hou Zhongjun 侯中軍, "Jiawu zhanqian Zhong Chao Zongfan guanxi de xuelixing fansi" 甲午戰前中朝宗藩關係的學理性反思 [Theoretical rethinking of the Sino-Korean *Zongfan relations prior to the Sino-Japanese War], Jinyang xuekan*晉陽學刊 2017-6 (2017).





In a similar vein, contemporary Chinese academic circles have put forth strong arguments against the findings of 'New Qing History' scholars in the United States.[3] Critical of the discourse of 'Sinicization' of the non-

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[3] The representative Chinese works critical of the 'new Qing history' are as follows; Zhong Han 鍾焓, "Bei Mei 'xin Qingshi' yanjiu de jishi hezai?—shi duoyuzhong shiliao kaobian huzheng de shizheng xueshu, huanshi yishi xingtai de yingshi zhi xue? (shang)" 北美"新淸史"硏究的基石何在?-是多語種史料考辨互證的實證學術, 還是意識形態化的應時之學? (上) [What is the research criterion of the 'New Qing History' of North America?—Is it an empirical study based on multiple-language sources, or a study ideologically-adapted to the time? (part 1)], *Zhongguo bianjiang minzu yanjiu* 中國邊疆民族硏究 7 (2014); Li Zhaoyong 李昭勇, "Qiangdiao 'Manchu zhi dao' de 'xin Qingshi' chuyi" 强調"滿洲之道"的"新淸史"芻議 [A humble opinion on the 'New Qing History' that emphasizes the 'Manchurian way'], *Manzu yanjiu* 滿族硏究 2014-2 (2014); Li Zhiting 李治亭, "'Xin Qingshi': 'xin diguo zhuyi' shixue biaoben" "新淸史": "新帝國主義"史學標本 ['New Qing history': An example of 'new imperialism'], *Zhongguo shehui kexue bao* 中國社會科學報 728 (April 20, 2015); Cheng Xijin程秀金, "'Xin Qingshi' Qingchao tongzhi moshi zhi shuping—yi Qingchao pingding he guanxia Xinjiang wei zhongxin" "新淸史"淸朝統治模式之述評-以淸朝平定和管轄新疆爲中心 [Critique on the Qing governance model of the 'New Qing History'—Focusing on the Qing pacification and jurisdiction of Xinjiang] Xueshu yuekan 學術月刊 2015-6 (2015); Yang Nianqun 楊念群, "Quanshi 'zhengtongxing' caishi lijie Qingchao lishi de guanjian" 詮釋"正統性"才是理解淸朝歷史的關鍵 [Clarification of 'orthodox legitimacy' must be the key to understanding Qing history], *Dushu* 讀書 2015-12 (2015); Liu Wenpeng 劉文鵬, "Neilu Yazhou shiye xia de 'xin Qingshi' yanjiu" 內陸亞洲視野下的"新淸史"硏究 [Study on the 'New Qing History' with Inner Asian perspectives], *Lishi yanjiu* 歷史硏究 2016-4 (2016); Zhang Zhiqiang 張志强, "Chaoyue minzu zhuyi: 'duoyuan yiti' de Qingdai Zhongguo—dui 'xin Qingshi' de huiying" 超越民族主義:"多元一體"的淸代中國-對"新淸史"的回應 [Transcending nationalism: 'Unity of multiple elements' by Qing China versus the 'New Qing History' school's response], *Wenhua zongheng* 文化縱橫 2016-2 (2016); Li Jing李靜, "'Zhongguo jueqi' de lishi xushi yu dangdai xiangxiang—yi 'xin Qingshi' de 'diguo zhuanxiang' wei zhongxin" "中國崛起"的歷史敍事與當代想象-以"新淸史"的"帝國轉向"爲中心 [Historical narrative based on 'rising China' and contemporary imagination—Focusing on the imperialist orientation of the 'New Qing History'], *Wenyi lilun yu piping* 文藝理論與批評 2017-5 (2017); Wang Rongzu 汪榮祖, "'Zhongguo' gainian heyi chengwei wenti—jiu 'xin Qingshi' ji xiangguan wenti yu Ou Lide jiaoshou shangque" "中國"概念何以成爲問題-就"新淸史"及相關問題與歐立德教授商榷 [How does the concept of 'Zhongguo' become a problem—Discussion on the 'New Qing History,' its related problems, and Professor Mark C. Elliot], *Tansuo yu zhengming* 探索與爭鳴 2018-6 (2018); Fang Weigui 方維規, "'Zhongguo' yishi heyi shengcheng—kance 'xin Qingshi' de xueshu diceng ji qi zhoubian gouzao" "中國"意識何以生成-勘測"新淸史"的學術地層及其周邊構造 [How has the idea of "Zhongguo" been generated—Exploration of the academic topography of the "New Qing History" and its surrounding structure], *Tansuo yu zhengming* 探索與爭鳴 2018-6 (2018); Zhong Han 鍾焓, *Qingchaoshi de jiben tezheng zai tanjiu: yi dui Bei Mei 'xin Qingshi' guandian de fansi wei zhongxin* 淸朝史的基本特征再探究: 以對北美"新淸史"觀點的反思爲中心 [Reconsideration of the basic characteristics of Qing history: Focusing on rethinking the perspectives of the "New Qing History"], (Beijing: Zhongyang minzu daxue chubanshe, 2018).

Chinese dynasties, the 'New Qing History' school brings to light the Inner Asian origins of the Qing dynasty, non-Chinese source materials, and global historical frameworks.[4] The paradigm of 'New Qing History' opens a new approach to a multiethnic and multicultural Qing, departing from the conventional Sino-centric narratives of Qing history. Yet, not a few Chinese scholars remain suspicious of the school's 'political' intention to identify the Qing as an Inner Asian empire and to separate the Qing from Chinese history,[5] hampering further academic debates. Since the different perspectives on the 'New Qing History' and 'Qing Imperialism' in the late nineteenth century are inseparably connected to the understanding of contemporary China,[6] the prospect for consensus between the two schools

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4 For the major perspectives of 'New Qing History,' see Ruth W. Dunnell and James A. Millward's "Introduction," in *New Qing Imperial History*: *The Making of Inner Asian Empire at Qing Chengde*, edited by James A. Millward et al. (New York: Routledge, 2004), pp.1-14; Joanna Waley-Cohen, "The New Qing History" Radical History Review 88 (2004), pp.193-206; Pamela K. Crossley 파멜라 크로슬리, "'Sin' Cheongsa e daehan josim seureoun jeopgeun" '신'청사에 대한 조심스러운 접근 [A reserved approach to 'new' Qing history], in *Oeguk hakgye eui jeongbok wangjo yeon'gu sigak gwa choegeun donghyang* 외국학계의 정복왕조 연구 시각과 최근 동향 [Foreign scholarly circles' research perspectives on the conquering dynasties and recent trends], (Seoul: Northeast Asian History Foundation, 2010); Kim Seonmin 김선민, "Manju jeguk inga Cheong jeguk inga—cheogeun Miguk eui Cheongdaesa yeon'gu donghyang eul jungsim euro" 만주제국인가 청 제국인가-최근 미국의 청대사 연구동향을 중심으로 [The Manchu empire, or the Qing?—A critical review on the 'New Qing History' in the U. S.], Sachong 사총 74 (2011); Dang Wei 黨爲, *Bei Mei xin Qingsa sanshi nian: jujue Han zhongxin de Zhongguo shiguan de xingqi yu fanzhan* 美國新清史三十年: 拒絶漢中心的中國史觀的興起與發展 [30 years of the 'New Qing History' in the U. S.: Rise and development of non-Han-centric perspective of Chinese history], Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2012); Yun Wuk 윤욱, "Sin Cheongsa wa apeuro eui gwaje" 新清史와 앞으로의 과제 ['New Qing History and its future tasks], *Yeoksa wa segye* 역사와 세계 47 (2015).

5 Chen Weirong, *Da Yuanshi yu xin Qingshi* 大元史與新清史 [Great Yuan history and New Qing History] (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2019), 203-211; Zhong Han, *Qingchaoshi de jiben tezheng zai tanjiu: yi dui Bei Mei 'xin Qingshi' guandian de fansi wei zhongxin*, pp.196-215.

6 The Qing dynasty left important legacies of historical continuity to present China in such areas as territory, Chinese identity as modern nation-state, issue of Chinese ethnicity, and unification ideology. See Lu Yong 陸勇, *Qingdai 'Zhongguo' guannian yanjiu* 清代"中國"觀念研究 [Study on the notion of *Zhongguo* in the Qing period] (Xi'an: Xiaxi renmin jiaoyu chubanshe, 2015); Huang Xingtao 黃興涛, *Chongsu Zhonghua: jindai Zhongguo 'Zhonghua minzu' guannian yanjiu* 重塑中華: 近代中國"中華民族"觀念研究 [Remolding Chineseness: Study on the concept of the "Chinese people" in modern China], (Beijing: Beijing shifan daxue chubanshe, 2017), pp.9-50.





through constructive academic debates seems unpromising for now.

Under this intellectual milieu, Wang Yuanchong 王元崇 of the History Department of the University of Delaware published a monograph about Sino-Korean relations during the Qing period, *Remaking the Chinese Empire: Manchu-Korean Relations, 1616-1911*.[7] As the title and the subtitle suggest, the author traced Qing efforts to establish itself as a 'Chinese empire' through its relations with Joseon. Even though the Qing subdued Joseon, which had remained the most important tributary state to Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), it did not incorporate Joseon into its territory but continued the Ming-style tributary or *Zhongfan* 宗藩 (feudalistic relationship) system with Joseon. As for Joseon, it entered into a dual relationship with the Chinese world and a non-Chinese polity at the same time. Wang highlights the Qing's use of its unique relations with Joseon to remake itself into *Zhonghua* 中華 (civilized center) of the known world and tackles the controversy based on the Chinese versus non-Chinese dichotomy.[8] This paper aims to examine Yuanchong Wang's important arguments in his book and to review the concept of 'civilized center' as a reference point in narrating the empire building of the Qing and the diplomatic relations of the Qing with Joseon.

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7 Wang Yuanchong, *Remaking the Chinese Empire: Manchu-Korean Relations, 1616-1911* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2018).

8 This approach, in a sense, resonates with a recent trend of Chinese academic circles moving away from the unproductive controversy based on the discourse of 'Sinicization' towards interpreting the Qing history as formation of Middle Kingdom through the interaction of 'Sinicization' (*Hanhua* 漢化) and 'Manchuism' (*Huhua* 胡化). Yang Nianqun楊念群, "Chaoyue 'Hanhua lun' yu 'Manchu texing lun': Qingshi yanjiu nengfou zouchu disan tiao daolu?" 超越"漢化論"與"滿洲特性論": 清史研究能否走出第三條道路? [Transcending the theories of "Sinicization" and "Manchuism": Is a third way possible for the study of Qing history?], *Zhongguo renmin daxue xuebao* 中國人民大學學報 2011-2 (2011); Xu Kai徐凱, *Manchu renting 'fadian' yu buzu shuangzhong goujian: 16 shiji yilai Manchu minzu de lishi shanbian* 滿洲認同"法典"與部族雙重構建: 16世紀以來滿洲民族的歷史嬗變 [Manchu identity double represented in the 'law code' and tribal ethnicity: Historical evolution of the Manchu ethnicity since the sixteenth century], Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2015), pp.296-345; Chen Baoliang 陳寶良, "Tiaochu 'Hanhua' yu 'Huhua' zhi zheng" 跳出"漢化"與"胡化"之爭 [Transcending the debate between 'Sinicization' and 'Manchuism'], *Beijing ribao* 北京日報 (June 3, 2019).

## New Approach to the Qing through Its Relations with Joseon

In the "Introduction," Yuanchong Wang outlines the four major projects of the book under the title phrases of "Revitalizing the Concept of *Zongfan* in the Narrative of Late Imperial China," "Reinterpreting the Rise of the Modern Chinese State through the Lens of Qing-Joseon Relations," "Revisiting the Chinese Empire under the Qing," and "Renegotiating Qing Imperialism," as a kind of manifesto to shine an innovative perspective to the interpretation of the Qing and its relations with Joseon. In depicting the foreign relations under the Chinese world order, Wang chooses to recycle the term *Zhongfan* instead of the more common terms like *chaogong* 朝貢 (tributary relations) or *hushi* 互市 (reciprocal trade relations). The *Zongfan* system is said to have started with the Western Zhou Dynasty (1046-771 BCE), in which *Zong* referred to the Chinese monarch who claimed to be the Son of Heaven (*tianzi* 天子) while fan referred to the royal clan members who received fiefs (*fanfeng* 藩封) from the Son of Heaven. The two sides together constituted the world of "all-under-Heaven" (*tianxia* 天下). This feudalistic model of ancient China evolved later into the monarch-subject relationship between the imperial court and the outlying subordinate countries, which continued to run with the reciprocal practices of paying tribute (*chaogong* 朝貢) and bestowing investiture (*cefeng* 冊封), as well as with the double policies of "serving the great" (*shida* 事大) and "cherishing the small" (*zixiao* 字小).

It is the legendary account of 箕子 Jizi (K., Gija), a loyal member of the Shang Dynasty (ca. 1600-1046 BCE) who was believed to have been enfeoffed to ancient Joseon, that symbolized the beginning of Sino-Korean kinship and cultural affinity. The Sino-Korean relationship was further strengthened at the event of the Ming's military cooperation with Joseon against Japan during the East Asian War, 1592-1598. Then, the *Zongfan* arrangement had represented the historicity of the Sino-Korean relations throughout the pre-modern period including the Qing dynasty. According to the Wang, based largely on its relations with Joseon, the Qing court categorized outer fan (*waifan* 外藩) as those states on the periphery of the Qing





that sent emissaries offering tribute (*jingong* 進貢) to the imperial court, and received investiture of kingship from the emperor. The Qing category of outer fan, however, could incorporate an array of political polities, such as *fanbu* 藩部 (vassal tribe) in Mongolia and Xinjiang, *shuguo* 屬國 (subordinate state) like Joseon, and *chaogongguo* 朝貢國 (tributary state) like Annam and Ryukyu, depending on varying historical contexts.[9] Still, it should be noted that in the Qing's definition and adoption of the outer fan, its relations with Joseon served prominently as the key reference.

Wang observes that the Qing actively made use of the Sino-Korean relations, established during the Ming period, to achieve its own agenda instead of simply renewing such relations. He regards Qing-Joseon relations as a key component in constructing the Qing-centric *Zongfan* system, which started from the Qing invasion of Joseon in 1637 and after the crossing of Shanhai Pass 山海關 in 1644 was consolidated by applying the 'Joseon model' to the outer *fan* under the jurisdiction of the Board of Rites (Libu 禮部). Even though the *fan* 藩 (subordinate polities) during the Qing period had various meanings according to specific context, the Qing court understood Joseon and other subordinate polities basically as members of the Qing-centric family.[10] He traces the long-term historical process of how the Qing established and consolidated itself as a Chinese empire, and eventually transformed itself into a modern Chinese state. Wang's account that the Qing defined itself as a Chinese empire even before the crossing of the Shanhai Pass does not mean that the non-Chinese ethnic Manchus began the assimilation process of 'Sinicization' (*Hanhua* 漢化). In this book, the term 'Sinicization' does not refer to that of cultural assimilation of non-Chinese dynasties as commonly defined by previous studies. Instead, it refers to the politico-cultural action of the Manchu regime to embrace Chinese civilization in such a way that helped them to achieve their political goal.[11]

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[9] Zhang Shuangzhi, 張雙智, "Qingchao waifan tizhi nei de zhaojin nianban yu chaogong zhidu" 清朝外藩體制內的朝覲年班與朝貢制度 [Institutions of emissaries and tributes under the outer fan system of the Qing], *Qingshi yanjiu* 清史研究 2010-3 (2010).

[10] Wang Yuanchong, *Remaking the Chinese Empire: Manchu-Korean Relations, 1616-1911*, p.6.

[11] For a similar approach, see Evelyn S. Rawski, *Early Modern China and Northeast Asia: Cross-*

The Chinese civilization (*Zhonghua* 中華), then, is understood as a civilization that could be shared universally rather than as one exclusively possessed by the ethnic Han Chinese. Zhongguo 中國 (Middle Kingdom) is understood as the civilized center of the world and the term 'Sinicization' does not mean assimilation to the Han Chinese civilization but assimilation to the civilization presented by Zhongguo.[12] When Hongtaiji defined the Qing as the Chinese empire at the time of his ascension to the imperial throne in 1637, he proclaimed the important political project of promoting the Qing's identity as a Chinese empire rather than as a Eurasian empire of the ethnic Manchus. Thus, Wang shifts away from an important thesis of the 'New Qing History' that puts stress on the Inner Asian nature of the Qing.

How can it be possible to encompass the non-Chinese regions and peoples under the management of Lifanyuan 理藩院 (rendered as "Mongolian Superintendency" in the book)? The theory of 'Sinicization' can tell only the degree to which these non-Chinese regions and peoples became assimilated to the Han-Chinese civilization. However, Wang defines the Qing as a Chinese empire. Many Chinese scholars are opposed to designating the Qing as an empire.[13] The term 'empire' as a European concept did

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*Border Perspectives* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Song Nianshen, *Making Borders in Modern East Asia: The Tumen River Demarcation, 1881-1919* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

12 The identification with Chineseness does not mean that the Qing identified themselves with that of Han Chinese, and also can be distinguishable from Ho Pingti's 何炳棣 notion of non-Chinese assimilation into Chinese culture or from Pei Huang's idea of non-Chinese adaptation of and participation in Chinese culture. Ho Pingti, "In Defense of Sinicization: A Rebuttal of Evelyn Rawski's Reenvisioning the Qing," *Journal of Asian Studies* 57: 1 (1998), pp.123-155; Pei Huang, *Reorienting the Manchus: A Study of Sinicization, 1583-1795* (Ithaca: Cornell University East Asia Program, 2011), 4-5. Wang Yuanchong stresses that the Manchus put themselves on the path towards integrating with the civilized dynasty of Zhongguo. See Wang Yuanchong, *Remaking the Chinese Empire: Manchu-Korean Relations, 1616-1911*, p.30.

13 Ding Yizhuang, 定宜莊, "'Guojia' yu 'diguo': 'Huanan yanjiu' yu 'xin Qingshi' duihua de jichu hezai" 「國家」與「帝國」:「華南研究」與「新清史」對話的基礎何在 ['Nation' and 'empire': Where lies common ground for conversation between the 'study of South China' and the 'new Qing history'], *Lishi renleixue xuekan* 歷史人類學學刊 15-2 (2017), p.229; Liu Wenming 劉文明, "'Diguo' gainian zai xifang he Zhongguo: lishi yuanyuan he dangdai zhengming" "帝國"概念在西方和中國: 歷史 淵源和當代爭鳴 [The concept of 'empire' as existed in the West and China: Its





not make its appearance in the Chinese political vocabulary until the late nineteenth century. Historically, the ruling dynasties in China called themselves as the "Heavenly Dynasty" (*tianzhao* 天朝) or the center of "all-under-Heaven" (*tianxia* 天下). The Western notion of 'empire' was first introduced to the narrative of Chinese history from Chinese contacts with the Western imperial powers in the nineteenth century. The Western empires, seen as violent polities eager for territorial and hegemonic expansion, carried negative connotations. In contrast, the Chinese order of all-under-Heaven based on li 禮 (proper rituals) was considered to be reciprocal in a non-violent relationship. Hence, some of the Chinese scholars, adhering to modern Chinese experiences of semi-colonialism, charged that the 'New Qing History' not only emphasizes the imperialist nature of the high Qing expansion as having been inspired by Western imperialism of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, but also branded it as a "new imperialist historiography" (*xin diguozhuyi shixue* 新帝國主義史學).[14] Wang regards the Qing as an empire, yet cautions that the high Qing expansionism prior to contacts with European powers should be distinguished from European imperialism or colonialism.

The Chinese empire under the Qing as defined by Wang was not of the European type and was comprised of two dimensions: the territorial Chinese empire and the politico-cultural Chinese empire. The territorial Chinese empire was equal to the Great Qing's territory under the emperor's rule while the politico-cultural Chinese empire encompassed both the Great Qing's territory and the outer fan where the authority of the emperor was recognized as the Son of Heaven who presided over the world of all-under-Heaven.

Within the *Zongfan* world, according to Wang, the *Zhong* represented by the Qing court and the *fan* represented by surrounding subordinate states shared the notion of the unequal hierarchical world order. Their shared world of "all-under-Heaven" was understood to operate under the

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historical origins and contemporary debates], *Quanqiushi pinglun* 全球史評論 2018-2 (2018).

14 Li Zhiting, "'Xin Qingshi': 'xin diguo zhuyi' shixue biaoben."

principle of *Zongfan* system determined not by the power politics of modern diplomacy but by the "bilateral arrangement" based on cosmopolitan Confucian ideology. Seen from this perspective, what was defeated in the wars with France in Vietnam in 1883 and with Japan in Joseon in 1894 was not the territorial Chinese empire but the politico-cultural one. With the decline of the politico-cultural empire after 1895, Wang argues that there emerged a modern Chinese state.[15]

The book is critical of the 'High Qing Imperialism' thesis and the 'New Qing History' thesis alike on the ground that the territorial expansion, carried out during the High Qing period of the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, should not be detached from the pre-Qing Chinese historical context. The book is also critical of the argument regarding the 'Late Qing Imperialism' thesis that views the Qing's growing control of Joseon in the late nineteenth century as bearing an astonishing resemblance to Western imperialism.[16] In interpreting the late Qing's foreign policy toward its neighboring countries, Wang chooses Korea to see the Sino-Korean relationship within the *Zongfan* framework formed between the Qing and Joseon. The 'Zongfanism' as defined by Wang refers to a Chinese system of political and diplomatic communication and exchange between what was identified as the civilized center of the world and the political polities, less civilized or even barbaric, on its periphery. Under this hierarchical system, the center (*Zong* 宗) possessed absolute patriarchal authority over the subordinate states (*fan* 藩) while the two sides retained mutually constitutive legitimacy informed by their shared politico-cultural norms.[17]

Wang's definition of the Qing as a Chinese empire is premised on its successful consolidation of the *Zongfan* system with its outlying vassal

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15 Wang Yuanchong, *Remaking the Chinese Empire: Manchu-Korean Relations, 1616-1911*, p.15.

16 Lee Yur-Bok, *Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Korea, 1866-1887* (New York: Humanities, 1970), pp.136-142; Martina Deuchler, *Confucian Gentlemen and Barbarian Envoys: The Opening of Korea, 1875-1885* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977), p.220; Kim Key-hiuk, *The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order: Korea, Japan, and the Chinese Empire, 1860-1882*, 348; Kirk W. Larsen, *Tradition, Treaties, and Trade: Qing Imperialism and Chosŏn Korea, 1850-1910*, pp.11-19.

17 Wang Yuanchong, Remaking *the Chinese Empire: Manchu-Korean Relations, 1616-1911*, pp.17-18.





states, in particular, Joseon which played the key role in consolidating this relationshipm. According to Wang, the Qing had already proclaimed itself as the Chinese empire even prior to the crossing of the Great Wall in 1644 by forging the *Zongfan* system with Joseon. By using Joseon's status as the Qing's prototypical outer fan—the 'Joseon model'—the Qing revitalized the well-established and highly programmed formalities of the Ming in its contacts with its outer *fan* and incorporated them into the Qing's geopolitical hegemony after 1644. Since Joseon had remained the key component of the Qing's Chinese empire by providing for its legitimacy and mechanism, the loss of Joseon meant the collapse of the Qing's politico-cultural power in East Asia. Therefore, Wang asserts, the Qing was willing to risk war with its competitors to protect Joseon from their encroachment in the late nineteenth century.

The major historical events covered by the book include subduing Joseon, 1616-43 (Chapter 1), barbarianizing Joseon, 1644-1761 (Chapter 2), justifying its civilized position through its relations with Joseon, 1762-1861 (Chapter 3), defining Joseon's status at the face of Western inroad after the Opium War, 1862-1876 (Chapter 4), supervising Joseon in its relations with Western powers and Japan, 1877-1884 (Chapter 5), and finally losing Joseon in the end, 1885-1911 (Chapter 6). In the course of the 1630s, the 1760s, and the 1860s, the Qing presented itself as the Chinese empire by utilizing its relations with Joseon. Under the crisis of Western encroachments into the East, the Qing reinforced the *Zongfan* framework of its foreign relations by reaffirming its conventional relations with Joseon. The Qing defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 ended the Qing-Joseon *Zongfan* system and resulted in the collapse of the politico-cultural Chinese empire. Yet, the legacies of the *Zongfan* system between the two countries persisted, as was shown in the Qing annual imperial calendar (*huangli* 皇曆) that denoted Joseon as an inner province (*neixing* 內省), or a lost vassal state.

Therefore, Wang argues that it was not until after World War II, especially after the Korean War (1950-1953) that China became a modern nation-state capable of recognizing the absolute independence and sovereignty of the Korean state. This argument goes so far as to imply that Republi-

can China still subscribed to the idea of the politico-cultural Chinese empire in which Korea was a key part. It was only after Korea became sovereign nations, though divided into two polities, and thus removed from the Chinese politico-cultural empire that China developed into a nation-state system. In other words, Korea in the Joseon and modern eras was of central importance in the construction of the Qing as the Chinese empire and also crucial to China's transformation into a modern nation-state.

## Foundations of the Qing's Relationship with Its Subordinate Countries (*waifan* 外藩)

### 1. Revival of the Conception of *Zongfan* 宗藩

As the conceptual framework of the Qing's foreign relations, Wang employs the *Zongfan* system instead of the tributary system centered on paying tributes (*chaogong* 朝貢) and giving investitures (*cefeng* 冊封). By the time of the Ming, Wang assumes, Joseon was fully committed to the Confucian statecraft ideology of the Ming. The Qing forged the *Zongfan* system with Joseon by force in order to secure the orthodox legitimacy (*zhengtong* 正統) as a Chinese empire and consolidated thereafter the *Zongfan* system in its relations with neighboring countries. Wang chose to employ the term '*Zongfan* system' instead of the more common term 'tributary system' used among Western scholarly circles because the latter has certain shortcomings, as pointed out by many scholars. The tributary system, employed by John K. Fairbank, is a synonym for the 'Chinese world order,' in contrast to the 'treaty system' that he coined to explain the Sino-Western diplomatic relations after the Opium War. As such, the term 'tributary system' has obscured the multiplicity of China's external relations, including the Qing-Joseon relations.

Still, the value of the *Zongfan* frame as a conceptual interpretative tool for explaining the Qing's foreign relations is debatable. The Chinese scholar Li Dalong's 李大龍 study shows that the usage of the term *Zongfan* could date back to the Western Zhou era but it was not until the Song era that the term appeared frequently on historical documents, referring to





members of the imperial family or feudal kings (*fanwang* 藩王), and lasted through the Qing era—that is to say, the term was rarely used to refer to neighboring states.[18] Though not included in Li's reference, the *Da Ming huidian* 大明會典 (Collected Statutes of the Great Ming) uses the term *Zongfan* in association with the regulations pertaining to feudal kings and not neighboring states like Joseon.

This is not to say, however, that there was no example of Joseon being treated as a *Zongfan*. As an important example of such a treatment, Wang points to the Qing investiture of King Yeongjo(r. 1724-1776)'s grandson Yi San 李祘 (later King Jeongjo r.1776-1800) as the crown successor to the throne. Since the Qing court had not experienced the same kind of situation, the Qianlong emperor ordered the search for appropriate precedents for the title of "crown grandson" (Ch., *shisun*; K., *seson* 世孫). The Board of Rites, after consulting Confucian classics and historical records, found at least two precedents in the Song and Ming periods respectively. The Ming precedent served as a crucial rationale for the investiture of King Yeongjo's grandson as crown grandson. In the fourth year of the Ming Hongzhi emperor(r. 1487-1505), the eldest son (Zhu Zhenyu 朱眞淤) of a princely king (Zhu Gongzong 朱貢錝) had been invested as the crown prince. However, due to his death, his second son (Zhu Biguang 朱碈枋) was invested as the crown grandson. The Board of Rites asserted that "the outer fan is fundamentally the same as *Zongfan*," and recommended the emperor to invest Yi San as the crown grandson. Wang interprets this event as an evidence that the Qing treated Joseon as "an extended royal family member of the Middle Kingdom."[19] He contends that the kinship tie of the *Zongfan* system, traced back to the Zhou feudal system, as well as the Confucian moral principle of benevolent rule was an important reason behind

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[18] Li Dalong, 李大龍, Cong *'tianxia' dao 'Zhongguo': duominzu guojia jiangyu lilun jiegou* 從"天下"到"中國": 多民族國家疆域理論解構 [From 'all-under-Heaven' to 'China': Deconstruction of the theory of multi ethnic nation], (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2015), pp.191-195. He uses the term *fanshu* 藩屬 (subordinate) instead of *Zongfan* 宗藩.

[19] Wang Yuanchong, *Remaking the Chinese Empire: Manchu-Korean Relations, 1616-1911*, pp.42-43. The issue of "crown grandson" took place in 1763 (the 28th year of Qianlong, or the 29th year of Yeongjo) instead of 1768 in page 42 of the book.

the Qing court's restraint from "provincializing Joseon."[20]

It is true that the Qing court paid special attention to the matter of investing Joseon's royal family members. Though not mentioned in the book, there was one incidence of the Qing court's rejection of Joseon's request for investment of a crown prince. In 1697, King Sukjong(r. 1674-1720) sent an emissary to Beijing asking for the investiture of Yi Yun 李昀, his concubine Lady Jang's son, as the crown prince. But, the Qing court rejected the king's request by way of citing a regulation in the *Da Ming huidian* that appointing the secondary son as crown prince was possible only after the king and queen reached the age of fifty without an heir. The Joseon court maintained that the regulation in point was for the inner fan and not for a foreign state like Joseon. The Qing court decided that Joseon should be regarded as the same as an inner fan,[21] thus treating it as a *Zongfan* member. Nevertheless, I think, it is debatable whether that rule did apply particularly to Joseon or could be extended broadly to other outer fan like Vietnam and Ryukyu. More research is needed to see if the remark that "the outer fan is fundamentally the same as *Zongfan*" is valid and whether similar cases can be found in the Qing's relations with other outer fan other than Joseon.

The *Zongfan* system as an analytical framework began to be used in earnest by Chinese scholars from the 1930s. Shao Xunzheng's 邵循正 M. A. thesis "Zhong Fa Yuenan guanxi shimo" 中法越南關係始末 (An outline of the relations between China, France, and Vietnam), presented to Qinghua University in 1933, defines the Qing-Vietnam relations in the context of the Sino-French War as a *Zongfan* system.[22] Jiang Tingfu's 蔣廷黻 *Jindai Zhongguo waijiaoshi ziliao jiyao* 近代中國外交史資料輯要 (Selection of diplomatic materials of modern China) sees the conceptual conflict between China's conventional *Zongfan* system and Western international relationship, based on modern international laws, as one crucial cause of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895.[23] Chinese scholars in the 1930s put forth the *Zongfan* system as a contradiction to the Western international order rather than as a comprehensive interstate system for explaining China's pre-modern foreign relations,[24] thus displaying their critical attitude toward the late Qing's outdated and incompetent treatment of foreign relations as well as the imperialist aggression of the West. In short, what should not go unnoticed is the fact that the term *Zongfan* was a projection of the nationalistic sentiments in the 1930s among Chinese intellectuals who were deeply concerned with the Qing failure to cope with Western imperialism in the late nineteenth century. Therefore, we need to use the term *Zongfan* with reservation in explaining China's foreign relations before the nineteenth century.

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[20] For a detailed account for the issue of provincializing Korea in the 1880s and the 1890s, see Wang Yuanchong, "Provincializing Korea: The Construction of the Chinese Empire in the Borderland and the Rise of the Modern Chinese State" *T'oung Pao* 105 (2019), pp.128-182.

[21] Son Sungwook, 손성욱, "Wangseja chaekbong euro bon Cheong Jo gwangye (Ganghui 35 nyeon-Geonryung 2 nyeon)" 王世子 冊封으로 본 淸·朝 관계 (康熙 35년~乾隆 2년) [Qing-Joseon relations (from the 35th year of Kangxi to the 2nd year of Qianlong) seen through the investment of crown grandson], *Dongyang sahak yeon'gu* 동양사학연구 146 (2019), pp.196-206.

[22] Shao Xunzheng 邵循正, Zhong Fa Yuenan guanxi shimo 中法越南關係始末 [An account of relations between China and France, and Vietnam], (Shijiazhuang: Hebei jiaoyu chubanshe, 2000).

[23] Jiang Tingfu 蔣廷黻, ed., *Jindai Zhongguo waijiaoshi ziliao jiyao*, zhongjuan, 近代中國外交史資料輯要, 中卷 [Collection of diplomatic materials of modern China], (Shanghai: Shangwu chubanshe, 1934), p.364.

[24] For a study on the conflicts and adaptations of the concept of suzerain rights between China and the West, focused on translation, see Okamoto Takashi 岡本隆司, "*Sōshuken to kokusaihō to honyaku: tōhō mondai kara Chōsen mondai e*" 宗主権と國際法と飜譯—'東方問題'から'朝鮮問題'へ [Suzerainty, international law, and translation: From the Eastern question to the Korean question], in *Sōshuken no sekaishi: Tōzai Ajia no kindai to honyaku gainen* 宗主権の世界史: 東アジアの近代と飜譯概念 [A world history of suzerainty: A modern history of East and West Asia and translated concepts], ed. Okamoto Takashi 岡本隆司 編, (Nagoya: Nagoya daigaku shuppankai, 2014), pp.90-118. Yu Bada 유바다, "1882 nyeon joyak jangjeong eui chegyeol gwa sokguk banjujiguk Joseon eui gukjebeop jeok jiwi" 1882년 조약장정의 체결과 屬國·半主之國 조선의 국제법적 지위 [Conclusion of the 1882 treaties and regulations, and international status of Joseon as a subordinate and semi-independent state], *Yeoksa wa hyeonsil* 역사와 현실 99 (2016); Yi Dongwuk 이동욱, "Cheong mal jongjugweon gwannyeom eui byeonhwa wa Joseon jeongchaek eui jeonhwan" 청말 종주권 관념의 변화와 조선 정책의 전환 [Change in the concept of suzerain rights in the late Qing, and shift of its policy towards Joseon], *Sachong* 사총 96 (2019).

## 2. The ‘Joseon Model’

Wang traces the Qing’s bid for a Chinese empire to the establishment of the Qing-Joseon *Zongfan* system in 1637 previous to the Qing entry into the Chinese inner land through the Shanhai Pass in 1644.[25] Even before its occupation of Beijing in 1644, the Manchu regime, through its frequent contacts with Joseon, converted Joseon into a typical “outer subordinate” (*waifan* 外藩), and after 1644, developed a mature political relationship model—referred to as the ‘Joseon model’ by Wang—of a Qing-centric *Zongfan* system for managing its relations with other outer subordinates newly incorporated into the system under the jurisdiction of the Board of Rites. The Qing secured its orthodox legitimacy by establishing its *Zongfan* system with Joseon (the ‘Joseon model’), and proceeded to extend its influence on other outer subordinates by applying the ‘Joseon model’ predicated upon sophisticated Confucian rituals. To the Qing, the significance of outer subordinates meant more than just its borderland fence and Joseon was its key component to be preserved for the continuation of such a system.[26]

However, many studies on the Qing-Joseon relations put stress on the uniqueness of Joseon’s position, distinguishable from other outer subordinates under the jurisdiction of the Board of Rites. In addition to the disagreement on seeing Joseon as the representative pattern/model of outer subordinates, some Korean scholars like Koo Bumjin, Kim Changsu, and Yi Jaegyeong have demonstrated the distinctive nature of Joseon’s position from that of other tributary states like Annam (Vietnam) and Ryukyu.[27]

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[25] Wang Yuanchong, *Remaking the Chinese Empire: Manchu-Korean Relations, 1616-1911*, p.7.

[26] *Ibid*., p.8, p.55.

[27] Koo Bumjin 구범진, “Cheong eui Joseon sahaeng inseon gwa ‘dae Cheong jeguk cheje’” 淸의 朝鮮使行 人選과 ‘大淸帝國體制’ [Selection of the Qing emissaries to Joseon, and the system of ‘great Qing empire’], Inmun nonchong 人文論叢 59 (2008); Kim Changsu 김창수, “Cheong eui joseo banpo sasin eul tonghae bon Joseon eui jiwi” 청의 詔書 반포 사신을 통해 본 조선의 지위 [Joseon’s status seen through the Qing’s imperial edicts and emissaries], *Yeoksa wa hyeonsi*l 역사와 현실 89 (2013); Yi Jaegyeong 이재경, “Dae Cheong jeguk cheje nae Joseon gukwang eui bopjeok wising—gukwang e daehan euicheo beoleun eul jungsim euiro” 大淸帝國體制 내





Wang, however, maintains that the Qing-Joseon *Zongfan* system should not be seen as a specific case of the *Zongfan* system. Instead, the relationship can be best understood as “a prototype that shaped the formation of the Qing’s *Zongfan* system and helped the Manchu regime transform its political identity” into the civilized center of the known world and secure its orthodox legitimacy in East Asian international relations.[28]

This argument, however, raises some questions. First, the subjugation of Joseon begs the question that the Qing aimed to declare itself as a legitimate Chinese empire. In the second Manchu invasion of Joseon in 1636, Hongtaiji enumerated the acts of Joseon that led to his campaign against it. These include Joseon’s obstinate loyalty to the Ming, its refusal to send congratulatory envoys on the occasion of his enthronement as emperor, its defiance against the Mandate of Heaven bestowed on the Qing, and the preparation for the war with the Qing.[29] Hongtaiji made it clear that the subjugation of Joseon was the first crucial step to reconstruct the Manchu regime as a Chinese empire by appropriating terminologies reserved for an empire, such as the ‘Son of Heaven,’ and the Chinese world of ‘all-under-Heaven.’ Still, what is questionable is how much important Joseon was to the Qing in the making of a legitimate empire.

Following the famous Dalinghe 大凌河 battle, on the eighteenth day of the sixth month of the seventh year of the Tiancong 天聰 reign (1633), Hongtaiji consulted with Gusaeojeon and other generals over the first target of attack among the Ming, Joseon, and the Chahar Mongols. A general agreement among the participants was that for Joseon, given the peace treaty already in force, it should not be a priority. Gusaeojeon, in particular, maintained that as soon as the Jin 金 would take hold of the “inner land”

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조선국왕의 법적 위상-국왕에 대한 議處·罰銀을 중심으로 [Legal status of Joseon kings in Qing imperial jurisdiction— with a focuse on the Qing court’s deliberations on penalties and the silver fines imposed on them], *Minjok munhwa yeon’gu* 民族文化硏究 83 (2019).

[28] Wang Yuanchong, *Remaking the Chinese Empire: Manchu-Korean Relations, 1616-1911,* pp.59-60.

[29] Zhang Cunwu and She Quanhong 張存武, 葉泉宏, ed., *Qing ruguan qian yu Chaoxian wanglai guoshu huibian, 1619-1643* 淸入關前與朝鮮往來國書彙編: 一六一九-一六四三 [Collection of state letters exchanged between the Qing and Joseon, 1619-1643], (Taipei: Guoshiguan, 2000), pp.193-198.

(neidi 內地: mainland China), Joseon would submit to it naturally.[30] His remark can be construed to mean that the Manchu regime could achieve its legitimacy by conquering the Ming rather than Joseon. It is unlikely that in less than four years, the subjugation of Joseon was considered indispensable by the Qing leaders in their quest for legitimacy as a Chinese empire. Rather, what was at stake was not so much the legitimacy as a Chinese empire as the imperial prestige of Hongtaiji who had already possessed emperorship. Hongtaiji's enthronement ceremony, which he desired to hold in unanimous acknowledgment of his "brotherly" state, was done imperfectly because of Joseon's decline to send a congratulatory mission, damaging his imperial authority. As Koo Bumjin, it seems that the second Manchu invasion was carried out for the purpose of securing the legitimacy of Hongtaiji's imperial pretension by completing his previously imperfect enthronement ceremony on the soil of Joseon, far from securing the legitimacy needed for claiming a Chinese empire.[31] The second Manchu invasion shifted the Qing-Joseon relationship from one between elder brother and younger brother to one between monarch and subject.

What is debatable is to what extent the Qing could institutionalize its relations with Joseon on the base of the ritual model during the period from 1637 to 1644 when it crossed the Great Wall. The Qing instituted the system of Six Boards as the mainstay of central administration and put the Board of Rites in charge of diplomatic ritual when exchanging envoys with neighboring states. Following the Ming protocol, the Joseon court was made to send tributary missions to the Qing emperor regularly, instead of sending communication missions for friendship with neighbors (named *chunsinsa* 春信使 and *chusinsa* 秋信使). In addition, the Joseon court was given a newly cast golden seal to be used for its communication with the Qing court, and the format of its state letter was determined to denote its

[30] Bak Minsu 박민수, "Cheong eui ipgwan gwa giin eui Bukgyeong iju yeon'gu" 淸의 入關과 旗人의 北京 移住 硏究 [Study on the Qing's crossing of the Great Wall, and migration of bannermen to Beijing], Ph. D. dissertation, Seoul National University (2017), pp.25-27.

[31] Koo Bumjin 구범진, Byeongja horan, Hongtaiji eui jeonjaeng 병자호란, 홍타이지의 전쟁 [Second Manchu invasion of 1636: Hongtaiji's war], (KKachi, 2019), pp.64-71.





subordinate position vis-à-vis the Qing.

Establishment of these ritual formalities notwithstanding, the matters of practical importance between the two states were handled not by the Board of Rites but by the Board of Revenue. It was Inggūldai and Mafuta, two top Manchu generals in charge of the contents of tribute items and state letters. In fact, the affairs related to the erection of the stele of Samjeondo 三田渡碑, such as its inscription and size, were put under the management of the Board of Revenue. Considering the wartime conditions, the full prolonged performance of tributary rituals might not be advisable. As a result, the ritual practices by Joseon emissaries were not performed with punctiliousness, with no advance sessions to rehearse the complicated ceremonies in front of the imperial audience, not a few of which were skipped.[32] Hence, the Qing's commitment to building a 'Joseon model' based on the ritual practices can be called into question. Rather, it seems to me that the Qing, at least in its inauguration period, was more interested in the leverage power that the ritual practices could produce with a view to enacting a strict hierarchical relationship with Joseon.

Significantly, the ritual relationship with Joseon under the management of the Board of Rites began in earnest with the first incorporation of a former Ming tributary system into the Qing-centric world order after the Qing occupation of Beijing in 1644. In the second month of 1653 (the tenth year of Shunzhi reign), the Ryukyu kingdom sent the envoy Ma Zongyi 馬宗毅 to return the imperial seal once bestowed by the Ming court. His mission arrived in Fujian in the fifth month, and in Beijing early next year. The envoy received an imperial seal with the inscription "Seal of the King of Ryukyu" in Manchu and Chinese. Previously, in the sixth month of 1653, the Joseon king was given an identical seal with the inscription both in Manchu and Chinese, replacing the one inscribed only in Manchu letters. These two simultaneous events indicate that Joseon was also a part of the Qing effort to reorganize former Ming tributary states into the jurisdic-

[32] Son Sungwook 손성욱, "Cheong jogongguk sasin euirye eui hyeongseong gwa byeonhwa" 淸朝貢國 使臣 儀禮의 形成과 變化 [Formation and change of the ritual procedures of the Qing's tributary states], *Dongyang sahak yeon'gu* 東洋史學硏究 143 (2018), pp.277-279.

tion of the Board of Rites.[33] Moreover, in the same year, the Qing fully implemented the edict of 1644 (the first year of Shunzhi's reign) that the Board of Rites be the single channel in contacts and exchanges with the Joseon court.[34]

The 'Joseon model' is Wang's rendering of the Chinese terms *Chaoxian shili* 朝鮮事例 or *Chasoxian zhi li* 朝鮮之例, which first appeared in the Later Jin (1616-1636) historical materials in 1629 (the second year of Tiancong's reign). In a policy memorial toward the Ming submitted to Hongtaiji, Gao Hongzhong 高鴻中, a Han Chinese scholar serving the Later Jin, suggested that "if the Ming would want a peace agreement, depending on their genuine intent, we (the Later Jin) will follow the 'Joseon model' to receive the [Ming] investiture of kingship and to use the [Ming] regnal title to count the date."[35] Conventionally, the status of Joseon as an outer *fan* of the Ming had been manifested in its reception of the Ming investiture of kingship and use of the Ming calendar.

Another example of the 'Joseon model,' Wang argues, came out in the 1660s when Zheng Jing' 鄭經 negotiated with the Qing to retain his occupation of Taiwan. The Qing was trying to persuade him to surrender to the Qing but Zheng insisted on "following the 'Joseon model' (*zhao Chaoxian shili* 照朝鮮事例)," by which he meant to enter into tributary relation with the Qing without adopting the Qing hair style and costume, thus securing for Taiwan an independent status like that of Joseon. However, the Kangxi emperor rejected his proposal on the grounds that Joseon was "always a foreign state" (*conglai suoyou zhi waiguo* 從來所有之外國),[36] thereby making a clear distinction between foreign state (*waiguo* 外國) and

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[33] *Ibid*., pp.282-283.

[34] Kim Changsu 김창수, "Joseon Cheong oegyo munseo eui gyoseop gyeongno wa Seonggyeong eui yeokhal" 조선 · 청 외교문서의 교섭경로와 성경의 역할 [Communication channels of the diplomatic documents between the Qing and Joseon, and the role of Shengjing], *Yeoksa wa hyeonsil* 역사와 현실 107 (2018), p.158.

[35] Wang Yuanchong, *Remaking the Chinese Empire: Manchu-Korean Relations, 1616-1911,* 28. The memorial was presented in 1629 (the 3rd year of Tiancong) instead of 1630 in the page 28 of the book.

[36] *Ibid*., p.52, p.56.





inner subordinate (*neifan* 內藩) to which Taiwan belonged.

However, it is insufficient to invariably equate the 'Joseon model' with a standard model applicable to all other outer *fan* of the Qing. The tributary relations had been ostensibly manifested through granting Chinese investitures (political legitimacy) and having tributary states accepting the Chinese calendar (cultural hegemony). This is best exemplified by frequent visits of Joseon emissaries to Beijing in the Ming era. Gao Hongzhong and Zheng Jing must have been very familiar with such Joseon tributary practices and hence cited them as a precedent that could be followed in their times as well. In order to strengthen the 'Joseon model' as the general norm for all other outer *fan* within the Qing Chinese empire, further research must gather more concrete examples regarding the hegemonic narratives of the Manchu regime.

The term *Chasoxian zhi li* 朝鮮之例 often appeared when the Qing "followed the model of Joseon" (*zhao Chaoxian zhi li* 照朝鮮之例) in its ritualized contacts with other outer *fan* such as Annam, Ryukyu, and Siam.[37] Since Joseon had been the first outer *fan* to the Qing and well known for the frequent visits of its emissaries to the Qing court, Joseon's ritualized contacts with the Qing had left many precedents (K., *jeollye* 前例) for the later outer *fan* to follow. It is debatable whether these precedents were taken by the Qing as standard models (K., *jeollye* 典例) from the beginning onwards.

Moreover, in my view, it is also debatable whether the term *Chasoxian zhi li* retained the same connotations even in later periods of the Qing, especially in the later Qianlong 乾隆 era when the term was used more frequently than earlier times with the extension of banquet ceremonies hosted by the emperor.[38] If Wang takes the term *Chasoxian zhi li* to be

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[37] *Ibid.*, p.72.

[38] Song Sungwook, "Cheong jogongguk sasin euirye eui hyeongseong gwa byeonhwa," pp.280-294; Koo Bumjin 구범진, "Cheong Geonryung yeon'gan oebeon yeonrye eui byeonhwa wa Geonryung eui 'seongse'" 淸 乾隆 연간 外藩宴禮의 변화와 乾隆의 '盛世' [Changes in the banquet ceremonies for emissaries from outer *fan*, and the prosperity of the Qianlong era], *Yeoksa munhwa yeon'gu* 역사문화연구 68 (2018), pp.170-182.

synonymous with the 'Joseon model,' there is a possibility that the 'Joseon model' from the early Qing could be different in nature from the same model in the later Qianlong era. As a matter of fact, Huang Zhilian's recent study informs that banquet ceremonies for emissaries during the Qianlong era represented a regression of the traditional (Ming) "rule by ritual (*lizhi* 禮治) of the Heavenly Dynasty" during the Ming dynasty.[39] Apart from his criticism against the Qianlong emperor's proclivity for ostentation, Huang's study reveals that there was a marked change in the way the emissaries were treated in the Qianlong era from that of the early Qing, which bore much similarity with the Ming practices. Along this line, it is certain that the thesis of a consistent 'Joseon model' from the early Qing should be reconsidered.

## Expansion and Maintenance of the Chinese Empire (*Zhonghua diguo* 中華帝國)

### 1. Conceptual Expansion of the Chinese Empire

A number of recent studies regarding the Qing, such as those of the 'New Qing History' with Manchu ethnic perspectives and the Qing historical studies in Japan with the focus on its Inner Asian nature are opposed to those studies approaching the Qing as a Chinese empire.[40] Featuring the multifaceted nature of the Qing, Pamela K. Crossley explains that the Qing rulers were supposed to perform manifold roles as the Son of Heaven of the Middle Kingdom, Great Khan of the Mongol world, and 'wheel-turning king' of the Tibetan Buddhist realm. In the process, the Qing was able

[39] Huang Zhilian 黃枝連, *Tianzhao lizhi tixi yanjiu, xia, Chaoxian de ruhua qingjing guozao: Chaoxian wangchao yu Man Qing wangchao de guanxi xingtai lun* 天朝禮治體系研究 下 (朝鮮的儒化情境構造朝鮮王朝與滿清 王朝的關係形態論) [Study on the rule of rituals by the Heavenly Dynasty, part 2—The context and structure of Joseon's Confucianization: Relationship between the Joseon dynasty and the Manchu Qing dynasty], Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 1994), pp.471-488.

[40] Kim Seonmin 김선민, "Cheong jeguk eui jibae inyeom gwa jibae cheje" 청 제국의 지배이념과 지배체제 [Ruling ideology and system of the Qing], *Sachong* 사총 88 (2016).





to define itself as a universal empire embracing a variety of ethnic groups and polities and moving beyond a Chinese dynasty.[41]

In contrast, Wang posits the idea of the Chinese empire as an overarching framework of the world order to dominate and embrace diverse ethnic polities on the grounds that it based its legitimacy on its position as the civilized center of the known world. Under this universalistic Chinese empire, the emperor as the Son of Heaven held the Mandate of Heaven and exercised a hegemonic control over the peripheral states who accepted their subordinate status vis-à-vis the emperor. Here, the Chinese empire does not refer to an empire of ethnic Han Chinese but a universalistic politico-cultural empire whose ideology and civilization could be shared by its surrounding states.

Futhermore, Wang draws our attention to the fact that Hongtaiji, even before crossing the Great Wall into Beijing in 1644, had already defined his Manchu regime as the Chinese empire on the occasion of his assuming the emperorship, and in so doing defines the hierarchical *Zongfan* system with Joseon as the best resource to support the Qing regime's legitimacy as the Chinese empire. He, thus, underlines the Manchu regime's initiation to transform itself into a Chinese empire "even if it had remained in Manchuria and had not crossed the Great Wall in 1644"[42] to intimate that the Chinese empire in politico-cultural terms could transcend ethnic boundaries.

While the 'New Qing History' school and Chinese scholars have engaged in a debate over the extent to which the Manchu ruling class, including the Qing rulers, identified themselves as having Sino-centric attributes, Wang's research interest lies in tracing the trajectory of the Qing as a Chinese empire through its relations with Joseon. The non-Chinese or Inner Asian elements within the Qing are not Wang's primary subject of research. Hence, it will be of little use to raise questions about the issues outside of the book's purview. The scope of Wang's research is restricted to

[41] Pamela Kyle Crossley, "The Rulerships of China," *American Historical Review* 97:5 (1992), pp.1468-1483; Pamela Kyle Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), pp.223-246.

[42] Wang Yuanchong, *Remaking the Chinese Empire: Manchu-Korean Relations, 1616-1911*, p.32.

the Qing's foreign relations with outlying subordinate states under the management of the Board of Rites, and the institutions and practices that the Qing had largely inherited from the Ming. It is beyond question that the very field of his research abounds in evidence of the Qing's adoption of elements of Chinese civilization.

All the same, some of the book's arguments require critical re-evaluation. The book clings to the Qing-centric *Zongfan* system. The 'Joseon model,' in spite of a forced practice under the *Zongfan* hierarchical system, did help both parties to secure their orthodox legitimacy within the Qing-centric world order. Generally speaking, Wang thinks, it is in the Qing's relations with its neighboring states that mutual consent rather than unilateral coercion was the order of the day. Following Joseon, the kingdom of Ryukyu, once a tributary state of the Ming, was incorporated into the Qing-centric system of foreign relations. In 1647, following the Qing armies' occupation of the Zhejiang and Fujian provinces, the Shunzhi emperor issued an imperial edict proclaiming pacification of the Central Plain (i.e., China proper) and demanded that the Ming's outer *fan* such as Ryukyu and Annam return their seals given by the Ming and receive investiture from him. However, Ryukyu, observing the shifts of the fortunes of the Ming dynasty in the south, did not return the Ming seal and investiture until 1653.[43]

To be certain, it is hard to deny that the incorporation of the Qing's major outer *fan* like Joseon, Ryukyu, and Annam into the Qing-centric world order was prompted not only via the politico-cultural rationales, but also by the formidable Qing military. Even though these states conceded to the Qing's claim in replacing the Ming in its asymmetrical foreign relations, conducted on the basis of the former established rituals, their seemingly willingness should be appreciated with a degree of reservation. The room for power politics in the interactions between the Qing and these

[43] Wu Yuanfeng 吳元豐, "Qingchu Liuqiuguo wangjiu Ma Zongyi shihua ji qi yiyi" 清初琉球國王舅馬宗毅使華及其意義 [A Ryukyu emissary Ma Zongyi in the early Qing, and its significance], *Qingshi yanjiu* 清史研究 2017-2 (2017). For another outer *fan*, Annam, which followed Ryukyu, see Sun Hongnian 孫宏年, *Qingdai Zhong Yue Zongfan guanxi yanjiu* 清代中越宗藩關系研究 [Study on the Sino-Vietnamese *Zongfan* relations in the Qing era], (Harbin: Heilongjiang jiaoyu chubanshe, 2006), pp.1-15.





states should be taken into account given that the assumed legitimacy of the Qing as the civilized center of the world was not immune to the internal challenges from divergent political and cultural forces of the Qing from within.

Wang also states that the military campaigns during the Qianlong period (1735-1796) extended the Qing's territory to its peak and he intensified the efforts to reinforce the Qing's identity of Chineseness and its status as the civilized center of the world while upholding the rhetoric of the "great one unity" (*da yitong* 大一統). Accordingly, Wang sees the period of 1762-1861 as a maturation of the Qing's claim to be the civilized center of the world and maintains that "the Qing eventually prevailed over Joseon" in a contested discourse about the politico-cultural legitimacy. In order to illustrate the changing perceptions toward the Qing among some of the Joseon intellectuals, Wang enumerates the three figures of the School of Northern Learning (Bukhak pa 北學派)—Hong Daeyong, Bak Jega, and Bak Jiweon. Bak Jiweon 朴趾源 (1737-1805), who, in his *Rehe Diary* (*Yeolha ilgi* 熱河日記), used the Qing regnal title to date his arrival in Beijing on August 30, 1780. Wang counts this event as a sign of Bak's embracing of the *Zongfan* ideology by acknowledging the Qing as the civilized center.

Still, Wang's argument that by the late eighteenth century Joseon basically accepted the Qing as the Chinese empire and that there occurred a reversal of the discourse on the civilized status between the Qing and Joseon needs some more critical revision. It is true that many Joseon emissaries in Beijing witnessed the firm conviction of the Qing rulers, in particular, the Yongzheng and Qianlong Emperors, that the Qing inherited the status of the civilized center from the previous Ming. It is also true that many Joseon intellectuals came to understand the concept of civilized status as cutting across ethnic and national boundaries,[44] whereby changing their

[44] For the issue of the role ethnicity and nationality played in Joseon Koreans' view on *Zhonghua* 中華 (civilized center), see Kye Seungbum 계승범, "Joseon hugi Joseon Junghwa jueui wa geu haeseok munje" 조선후기 조선 중화주의와 그 해석문제 [Late Joseon Koreans' view on Zhonghua, and the question of its interpretation], *Hanguksa yeon'gu* 한국사연구 159 (2012); U Gyeongseop

perception of the Qing as an uncivilized state.

But, to the eyes of the Joseon ruling elites in general, the Qing was still in short of civilizing influence (K., *gyohwa* 敎化), still wearing the Manchu hairstyle and robes. Furthermore, numerous scholars in Joseon still used the reign title of the last emperor of the Ming, Chongzhen 崇禎 to record dates. A state ceremony to commemorate the Ming Wanli emperor 萬曆帝, who was believed to have saved Joseon from the Japanese invasions of the 1590s, also continued to be performed in the Great Altar for Gratitude (*Daebodan* 大報壇). Despite Joseon's demonstration of its loyalty to the Qing court, I believe, these acts of defiance clearly show Joseons' deep rooted antipathy against the Qing of the Manchu origin and reluctance to fully acknowledge the claim of the Manchu regime to be the civilized center of the known world.

## 2. Unchanged *Zongfan* 宗藩 Conventions?

The three key issues—sovereignty, borders, and subjectivity—in the relationship between China and its outer *fan* came to the fore as the Western powers made their inroad into the Chinese world. Wang alleges that this relationship was not determined by China's "suzerainty" but by the each side's acknowledgment of "mutually constitutive legitimacy" buttressed by Confucian political ideology.[45] Within the *Zongfan* system, the issues of sovereignty, borders, and subjectivity were not complex but became the source of conflicts with the Western powers who tried to apply the international law and norms to the Qing's foreign relations with its neighboring states. The book shows that the Qing's incorporation of the outer *fan* in politico-cultural terms remained unchanged until the end of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, and that it was only through the decline of this po-

우경섭, "Joseon Junghwa jueui e daehan hakseol jeok geomto" 조선중화주의에 대한 학설사적 검토 [Theoretical review of Joseon Koreans' view of *Zhonghua*], *Hanguksa yeon'gu* 한국사연구 159 (2012); Kim Yeongmin 김영민, "Joseon Junghwa jueui eui jaegeomto" 조선중화주의의 재검토 [Review of Joseon Koreans' view of *Zhonghua*], *Hanguksa yeon'gu* 한국사연구 162 (2013).

[45] Wang Yuanchong, *Remaking the Chinese Empire: Manchu-Korean Relations, 1616-1911*, p.12.





litico-cultural empire that a modern Chinese state emerged after 1895. According to Wang, as the most cardinal component of the politico-cultural empire of the Qing, Joseon was the top priority in the Qing's protection of its outer *fan*.

Following the end of the Second Opium War of 1856-1860, the Qing's relations with Western countries changed. The West entered into a series of modern treaties with the Qing, established permanent diplomatic representatives in Beijing, and began to take interest in approaching the Qing tributary state of Joseon. As a result, Joseon was about to make its appearance on the new international order insisted on by the West.[46] France and the United States executed military expeditions against Joseon in 1866 and 1871 respectively. These ended without the intended results due to the strong resistance from Joseon.

In the course of these armed conflicts and negotiations, the issue of Joseon's relationship with the Qing and its international status came to the fore and the two Western states pushed the Qing to clarify the definition of its relationship with and responsibility for Joseon. The Qing, Wang avers, made it clear that Joseon as a subordinate state possessed the right of self-

[46] F. C. Jones, "Foreign Diplomacy in Korea, 1866-1894," Ph. D. Dissertation, Harvard University (1935); Gweon Hyeoksu 權赫秀, "Byeong'in yang'yo was Jungguk Cheong jeongbu eui daeung yeon'gu" 병인양요와 중국 청정부의 대응 연구 [French invasion of 1866, and the response of the Qing government], *Baeksan hakbo* 백산학보 63 (2003); Kim Weonmo 金源模, *Geundae Han Mi gyoseopsa* 近代韓美交涉史 [History of contacts between Korea and the U. S. in the modern era], (Hongseongsa, 1979); Bak Ilgeun 朴日根, *Miguk eui gaeguk jeongchaek gwa Han Mi oegyo gwangye* 美國의 開國政策과 韓美外交關係 [Policy of the U. S. for opening Korea, and Korea-U. S. diplomatic relations], (Ilchogak, 1981); Gweon Hyeoksu 權赫秀, "1871 nyeon eui sinmi yangyo wa Jungguk Cheong jeongbu eui daeung yeon'gu" 1871年의 辛未洋擾와 中國 淸政府의 應對 硏究 [Study on the American invasion of 1871, and the Qing government's response], in *Geundae Han Jung gwangyesa eui jaejomyeong* 近代 韓中關係史의 再照明 [Rethinking of Sino-Korean relations in the modern era], (Hyean, 2007), pp.51-77; Kirk W. Larsen, *Tradition, Treaties, and Trade: Qing Imperialism and Chosŏn Korea, 1850-1910*, pp.43-61; Jiang Bo 姜博, "Yangrao zhong de tianchao: xifang qinrao Chaoxian yu Qing zhengfu de yingdui" 洋擾中的天朝: 西方侵擾朝鮮與清政府的應對 [Heavenly dynasty during the Western invasions: Joseon under attack from the West, and the Qing government's response], M. A. thesis, Shandong University (2016); Son Sungwook 손성욱, "'Oegyo' eui gyunyeol gwa mosaek: 1860-1870 nyeondae Cheong Jo gwangye" '外交'의 균열과 모색: 1860~70년대 淸·朝관계 [Diplomatic rupture and undertaking: the Qing-Joseon relations in the 1860s and 1870s], *Yeoksa hakbo* 역사학보 240 (2018).

rule (Ch., *zizhu*; K., *jaju* 自主). Wang attributes "a range of conceptual, textual, ideological, and epistemological conflicts between China and its Western counterparts" during the expeditions to the discrepancies in understanding the different norms of international relations between Chinese officials and their Western counterparts. Western countries no longer regarded Joseon as a tributary of the Qing but considered it as a state with independent sovereignty for which China did not take responsibility.[47] As for the Qing, however, Joseon remained a central part of its politico-cultural empire, in addition to its strategic value for state security on its eastern border.

As Wang points out, there was a discrepancy in the understanding of the Chinese term *shuguo* 屬國 or *shubang* 屬邦 (subordinate state) between the Qing officials and Western diplomats. The Western diplomats found that the relationship, as had been conventionally conducted between the Qing and Joseon, was of a puzzling nature in terms of Western international norms applied to sovereign states. They turned to the relationship of suzerain and vassal as the closest framework of international relations so as to accommodate East Asian interstate relations to a Western interpretive setting. The Qing officials, however, asserted that Joseon was a *shuguo* of the Qing while Joseon managed its own affairs with its right of *zizhu* 自主 (self-rule) without any interference from the Qing. Western diplomats in East Asia generally interpreted this declaration as a formalistic one, with the Qing exercising little power over Joseon, to allow the Western states to apply their international system to East Asia.[48]

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[47] Wang Yuanchong, *Remaking the Chinese Empire: Manchu-Korean Relations, 1616-1911*, p.125, p.131.

[48] For conflicts and adaptations of the conventional concept of subordinate state in the context of international law, see Yu Bada, 유바다, "19 segi jugweon gukga jilseo ha banju sokguk Joseon eui jiwi" 19세기 주권국가 질서 하 半主·屬國 조선의 지위 [Status of semi-independent, subordinate Joseon under the international order of sovereign states in the nineteenth century], *Gukje beophakhoe nonchong* 국제법학회논총 62-2 (2017); Kim Bongjin 김봉진, "'Joseon=sokguk, sokbang' eui gaenyeom sa" '조선 = 속국(屬國), 속방(屬邦)'의 개념사 [Conceptual history of Joseon as subordinate tate], *Hanguk dongyang jeongchi sasang sa yeon'gu* 한국동양정치사상사연구 18-1 (2019); Yi Dongwuk 이동욱, "Cheong mal gukjebop beonyeok gwa 'beonsok' gwallyeon gaenyeom eui hwakjang" 청말 국제법 번역과 '藩屬' 관련 개념의 의미 확장 [Translation of international law in the late Qing, and conceptual expansion of the term *beonsok* '藩屬' (subordinate)], *Jungguk geunhyeondae sa yeon'gu* 중국근현대사연구 80 (2018).





Both the Qing and the Western powers were willing to use military forces to move Joseon into their desired foreign relationship: the *Zongfan* or 'tributary' relationship for the Qing and the international relationship based on international law for the Western powers respectively. Yet, during the Korean crises of 1866 and 1871 when the French and the Americans invaded Joseon, there was a bare possibility of any Qing military intervention because the Second Opium War and the suppression of the Taiping Rebellion with the military aid from Britain and France held the Qing on the defensive in potential military conflicts with Western powers until the 1880s. The Qing's defensive position was testified at the time of the impending French invasion of Joseon in 1866. The minister of the Board of Rites Wan Qingli 萬青藜 warned the Joseon envoy in Beijing, Yu Hujo 柳厚祚, that "even if [your state] would be unable to make peace with [the French], it is completely inadvisable to ask for military aid [from the Qing]. The distance is too far to give any timely help and [the Qing] cannot afford to raise an army. An unfulfilled promise would only make things worse. [your state] may well ask the Middle Kingdom to assume a role of mediator with its reasonable measures."[49]

In the 1880s, the Qing carried out interventionist policies in handling the affairs of Joseon. Wang does not see this transformation of the Qing policy toward Joseon in light of an imperialist approach, but interprets it in the context of fulfilling its commitment to keep the *Zongfan* system of which Joseon constituted the key component. As an instance of the Chinese role in the *Zongfan* system, Wang locates the justification given by Li Shuchang 黎庶昌, the Qing minister in Tokyo, that by dispatching Qing soldiers to Joseon in the 1882 mutiny, the Qing was following the principle of cherishing the small (*zixiao* 字小) where China was the "patriarch of a family" (*jiazhang* 家長) and had the obligation to investigate the "houses of his

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[49] "Sang busa jae Bukgyeong si pildam" 上副使在北京時筆談 [Brush talks by vice envoy while in Beijing], in *Eoyang surok* 禦洋隨錄 [Writings on defending the sea], edited by Han Ungpil 韓應弼, (Seoul: Kyujanggak Library), 50.

sons or brothers" (*zidi jia* 子弟家) when a problem occurred. Thus, according to Wang, the Qing military intervention was a manifestation of the Qing patriarchal authority over Joseon, acknowledged ever since 1637, not as an act of imperialism in modern times.

Similarly, Wang indicates that the Qing's detainment of Daeweon'gun 大院君 (1820-1898) from Joseon to Baoding, close to Beijing, was an example for a legitimate exercise of Qing's power to "punish any official of the *fan* and even to depose the king, if necessary," as shown by the exile of the Goryeo (918-1392) King Chunghye 忠惠王 (r. 1330-1332/1339-1344) by Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368), and the dethronement of the last king of the Lê Dynasty of Annam by the Qing in 1789. Li Hongzhang 李鴻章 cited the historical precedent of the banishment of two Goryeo Kings, King Chungseon 忠宣王 (r. 1308-1313) and King Chunghye, by the Yuan to the border provinces in order to obtain the approval of Emperor Guangxu 光緒帝 (1875-1908). Yet, in an official instruction to Joseon issued jointly by Ma Jianzhong 馬建忠, Wu Changqing 吳長慶, Ding Ruchang 丁汝昌, and Wei Lunxian 魏綸先, the Qing officials explained that the summon of Daeweon'gun was for investigation, different in nature from the cases of King Chungseon and King Chunghye, and that the Joseon should not be suspicious of the emperor's intent and should remain settled.[50] Thus, what should not be dismissed is the fact that apart from Li Hongzhang's statement for punishing unruly *fan* officials the Qing officials on the scene were worried about possible Joseon resentment if Daeweon'gun's case resulted in punishments similar to those received by the two Goryeo kings. It seems to me that the episode shows that even though the Qing and Joseon took the *Zongfan* hierarchical order for granted, the two parties did not necessarily agree with its *modus operandi*.

In the midst of growing pressure on Joseon from the Western powers since the late 1870s, the Qing initiated the first Sino-Korean treaty of a semi-modern nature as both states adapted to such pressure and attempted

[50] Gojong sillok 高宗實錄 [Veritable records of King Gojong], gweon 19, the 13th day of the 7th month of the 19th year of Gojong.





to strengthen their mutual ties. Wang interprets this treaty as representing the dual policy toward Joseon adopted by the Qing in endeavors to cope with the conflict with the West in justification of its *Zongfan* conventions. A majority of scholars outside of the Chinese academic circles have tended to interpret the Qing policy toward Joseon after the "Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade between Qing and Joseon" (K., Jo Cheong sangmin suryuk muyeok jangjeong 朝淸商民水陸貿易章程) in 1882 as an imperialist approach to strengthen its suzerain control over Joseon and to pursue its own commercial benefits. In contrast, Wang formulates the "inner dual network" of Sino-Korean contacts on the occasion of the 1882 Sino-Korean Regulations, with the two states keeping the conventional "court-to-court system" while adjusting to the newly created "state-to-state system."

Wang also argues that the Qing court in the 1880s still adhered to the conventional *Zongfan* rules and precedents in its policies toward Joseon. For example, he cites a lenient and paternal discourse of Emperor Guangxu on the issue of how to treat the illicit crossings of Korean peasants in the borderland between the Qing and Joseon. It is worthy of note that the emperor's evoking of the *Zongfan* system with the outer *fan* like Joseon was done in contradiction of the serious concerns of local officials with the problems of border trespassing against the imperial principle of the "ancestral [Manchurian] territory." Nonetheless, it is hardly deniable that when the Qing was set in a competitive position for controlling Korea with other powers in the late nineteenth century, it strove to strengthen its suzerain authority over Joseon.

Wang also sees the "Regulations for Trade at the Border between Jilin and Joseon Whenever Necessary" (K., Gillm Joseon sangmin susi muyeok jangjeong 吉林朝鮮商民隨時貿易章程) in 1883 as another example of the regulations, not a treaty, between the Qing and Joseon based on the "format of bilateral official correspondence in accordance with the *Zongfan* hierarchy." Wang maintains that the norms expressed in the three trade regulations between the Qing and Joseon by the end of 1883 "continued to serve as a way of institutionalizing the hierarchical relationship," and "articulating the parties' identities in the Chinese world," just as the *Zongfan* discourse had served the same purposes in the 1630s, 1760s, and

1860s.[51] International law was of no concern to the Qing policymakers when it comes to the Sino-Korean relations. According to Wang, the two issues concerning the sovereignty of Joseon—the Qing settlements and the extraterritoriality in the settlements—were negotiated and handled by the two states so that the Qing could practice no imperialism.

It should be noted, however, that the contacts between the Qing and Joseon, conducted in the traditional *Zongfan* framework with little reference to 'international law,' do not preclude a possibility of change in the nature of the Sino-Korean relations. The international circumstances of the time were unprecedented and sudden to the extent that the hitherto hegemonic Qing order was put in a relativistic position vis-à-vis the treaty system instituted by a series of modern treaties between the Qing and the Western powers. Such radically altered international circumstances made a tremendous impact on the relationship between the Qing and Joseon. Joseon opened its doors to the Western nations and began to perform state diplomacy with them.

At this juncture, as Joseon had been introduced into an international stage dominated by the Western nations, Wang insists, the Qing government devised a dual system of relationship with Joseon—the overlapping operation of the *Zongfan* framework in the court-to-court contacts and at the same time the treaty system in the two countries' state-to-state diplomatic relations. Wang tries to verify the continuity of the *Zongfan* system between the two states in which the Qing sent condolence delegations on the occasion of the death of Queen Dowager Jo (Jo daebi 趙大妃) in 1890. Although the Joseon court was reluctant to receive an official condolence on the ground of expense burdens, Yuan Shikai 袁世凱 did his best for the Qing court to dispatch it. Sending an imperial mission to mourn the death of a royal member of Joseon was a routine ritual practice in the traditional tributary relations between the Qing and Joseon.

Hence, Wang explains that this case displays the constant operation

[51] Wang Yuanchong, *Remaking the Chinese Empire: Manchu-Korean Relations, 1616-1911*, p.6, p.167.





of the *Zongfan* system and that Yuan's request for that was not an act of presumption. As mentioned out in the book, Yuan could not attend the grand ceremony performed by the imperial mission because of his status. Nor did he meet with the imperial envoys. Yet, what was worth noting was that he exerted pressure on the Joseon court to follow his demands for the conventional ritual regulations, such as the king's welcoming of the Qing envoys at outside of the court. In so doing, Yuan desired to show the peculiarity of the *Zongfan* system to the Western diplomats. Furthermore, the fact that Yuan made sure of publishing in English the imperial mission's performance of the condolence rituals for the sake of Queen Dowager Jo[52] testified to the existence of his ulterior motive going beyond simply conforming to the traditional *Zongfan* system.[53]

But, what is unclear is whether Yuan Shikai in Hanseong—Seoul—had the authority to interfere with the matter of sending an imperial mission to Joseon. Wang spotlights the dual diplomacy of court-to-court and state-to-state contacts in the Qing-Joseon relations after 1882, with Yuan Shikai falling on the latter. Yuan, for his part, blurred the line between the court-to-court sphere and the state-to-state sphere by initiating an issue that was supposed to be handled by the Board of Rites. In retrospect, since 1653, the relations of the Qing with Joseon had been placed under the jurisdiction of the Board of Rites, indicative of a return to the established diplomatic norms during the bygone Ming tributary relations, so as to bolster the legitimacy of the Qing as the central civilized empire.

Under these circumstances, Yuan Shikai's initiative can be seen as an interference with the long established arrangement of the Qing government in handling tributary affairs with Joseon. The Qing response to Yuan's interference with tacit understanding signified a growing laxity of the tributary rituals as performed between the two states. In fact, from the early

[52] Private Secretary to the Imperial Commissioners, *Notes on the Imperial Chinese Mission to Corea*, 1890 (Shanghai, 1892).

[53] Joshua Van Lieu, "The Politics of Condolence: Contested Representations of Tribute in Late Nineteenth-Century Chosŏn-Qing Relations" *Journal of Korean Studies,* vol. 14 no.1 (2009), pp.83-115.

nineteenth century on, the ritual regulations that Joseon envoys kept in Beijing had become increasingly lax.[54] Ever since 1882, the weight of the Qing-Joseon relations shifted to modern state diplomacy and away from the conventional rituals.

Wang interprets the Qing's policy on Joseon in terms of 'Zongfanism' as opposed to the colonialism of the West. He argues that the Qing court's refusal to give official consideration to the proposal from some Qing officials to provincialize Joseon was predicated on the tenets of 'Zongfanism,' as manifested in the early Qing-Joseon relations. Many high-ranking Qing officials and intellectuals, such as Huang Zunxian 黃遵憲 and He Ruzhang 何如璋 in 1880, Zhang Shusheng 張樹聲 and Zhang Peilun 張佩綸 in 1882, Shengyu 盛昱 in 1884, and Kang Youwei 康有爲 in 1890, forwarded proposals to either supervise and protect Joseon by dispatching Qing imperial officials or to provincialize it but their proposals had little impact on the Qing court's established policy on Joseon. While the Yuan and the Ming had officially discussed plans for the provincialization of Korea, the Qing court did not bring any issue to official debate.

Even though the Qing court believed that it had the theoretical authority to incorporate Joseon into its territorial empire, it remained committed to *Zongfan* principles in its interactions with Joseon. Both Empress Dowager Cixi 慈禧太后 (1835-1908) and Emperor Guangxu did not listen to proposals to incorporate Joseon into mainland China. The Qing court's perception of Joseon cannot be the same as when it decided to provincialize Xinjiang in 1884 and may explain the difference between the territorial empire and the politico-cultural empire. Then, the perceptions of the Qing court as represented by Empress Dowager Cixi and Emperor Guangxu about contemporary Joseon and international relations may not be as unambiguous as Wang believes. Moreover, now that multiple treaties between Joseon and Western powers were in place and Russia and Japan had keen interests in extending their power into the Korean Peninsula, it is

[54] Son Sungwook, "Oegyo eui gyunyeol gwa mosaek: 1860-70 nyeondae Cheong Jo gwangye," pp.294-306.





highly unlikely that the Qing could provincialize Joseon.

Since the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, many Qing officials and elites had predicted a disastrous fate of their country. When both the Qing and Japan issued a declaration of war, Wang notes, the former justified the Qing's action under the principle of "cherishing the small (i.e., Joseon)" to protect its outer *fan* within the *Zongfan* system. On the contrary, Japan used European terminologies of international relations such as its treaties with the Qing and Joseon under the international law. The *Zongfan* discourse on defending the politico-cultural frontier of the Qing as a regional hegemon provided the Qing with the rationale for protecting all of its inner *fan* and outer *fan*.

As for the Qing, Wang insists, the Sino-Japanese War was a great cause not only to keep its territorial integrity, but to uphold its ideological legitimacy for its politico-cultural frontier. But, we should not dismiss the fact that the defeat of the Qing by Japan captured the grave failure of the Qing discourse to justify its politico-cultural frontier including Manchuria, Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet, and Taiwan. What is more, Wang's argument for the ongoing operation of the *Zongfan* system by the Qing in international relations from the late nineteen century to the early twentieth century should be equipped with more academically meticulous clarification able to contextualize a strikingly contingent process of interaction between the Qing and its neighbors and a remarkably open-ended intersection of engagement and counterengagement in East Asia.

## Concluding Remarks

Wang reevaluates the international relations of the Qing in such a way that the Manchu regime began to create a Chinese empire even before crossing the Great Wall in 1644 by subjugating Joseon in 1637 and applying the hierarchical *Zongfan* system to it. This argument is predicated upon three theses of an ethnic and political transcendence of the Qing boundaries; 1) a standardization of the 'Joseon model' as a prototype for the Qing-centric world, 2) a continuity of the *Zongfan* system between the Qing and Joseon for two and half centuries especially from the seventeenth century to the

nineteenth century, and 3) a combination of territorial hegemony and politico-cultural hegemony. The sincere and proactive attitudes of the Manchu ruling elites in appropriating Han Chinese elements in their early stage of empire building may well be seen as a distinguishable feature of the Qing from the traditional Chinese empires. So, it is meaningful for Wang to employ the conceptual framework that illustrates the Qing-centered world order, in particular, its foreign relations with Joseon—the field hitherto less heeded by the Western academia.

Some Korean scholars have also displayed a similar approach to the distinction between territorial empire and politico-cultural empire. Jeon Ingap categorizes the Qing into the ideological empire, in pursuit for the Chinese worldview of civilized center versus barbarian periphery, and the real-world empire in *realpolitik*. According to Jeon, the ideological empire secured its legitimacy by transforming "the Qing-centric world order into a cosmopolitan ideology of international order" while the real-world empire successfully exercised indirect rule over those areas outside of the Qing jurisdiction—what he calls "non-Chinese areas of the Qing"—in alliance with local power-holders.[55] Jeon's argument that the Qing's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 signified the collapse of the Qing ideological empire is in line with Wang's argument that it was the politico-cultural empire, less than the territorial empire, that was vanquished in the war.

Yet, Jeon does not regard the Qing as a Chinese empire because "defining two heterodox worlds as a Chinese empire is too Han Chinese vantage point."[56] Thus, unlike Wang, Jeon does perceive Zhongguo and Chineseness to be of Han Chinese in essence. His view of the Qing may well explain why the Qing did not make persistent efforts to impose Chinese culture on the "non-Chinese areas of the Qing." Jeon's view is close to that of Pamela Crossley who regards the Qing as a multifaceted empire far from a Chinese empire. Hence, we must take into account both the Chinese historical point of view and the Inner Asian point of view in observing the

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[55] Jeon Ingap, *Ibid*., (2012b), p.254.

[56] Jeon Ingap, *Ibid*., (2012a), p.165.





traits of the Qing hegemony.

Meanwhile, in understanding the Qing as one of the Chinese empires, Wang places legitimacy before ethnicity and focuses on the discourse and actions of the Manchu ruling elites and their Han Chinese supporters. Yet, it should be noted that the polities and groups in Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang under the management of the Lifan yuan 理藩院 (Mongolian Superintendency) were crucial parts of their identities. Moreover, even though the Joseon court officially acknowledged the Qing's position as the civilized center of the world after its military subjugation in 1637, the majority of Joseon intellectuals believed that the civilization of Joseon was more advanced than that of that of the Qing. They believed that the orthodox legitimacy of the Confucian civilization rested with their state, deemed as a "Another Center of Civilization" (*so Junghwa* 小中華), whereas mainland China was occupied by the barbarian Manchus after the collapse of the Ming. What is more, it is an overstatement to say that the nature of that relationship had been uniform throughout the entire period of their interaction. In early Qing, diplomatic issues with Joseon were managed simultaneously by the Lifan yuan and the Board of Rites but after the fall of the Ming in 1644 they were transferred completely to the Board of Rites. And, the Qing interventionist policies in the late 1870s and the early and mid-1880s can be also seen as a reversal to the earlier diplomatic practice of the Qing in the seventeenth century.

That is why more systematic comparative studies need to be required in illuminating the historical, by no means historically retrospective, characteristics of the regional hegemony of the Qing, or what Wang calls the *Zongfan* system. Then, there is a multidimensional explanation in respect of whether any overrepresented concept of the Qing-Joseon relationship may played a role in creating the *Zongfan* system. Alongside this, what is also to be done is further diachronic and structural analyses regarding the historical attributes of the *Zongfan* system for clarifying the Qing's relations with the other outer *fan*, other than Joseon, within East Asia.

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# Review Article

# Of Parts and Wholes: Reading Sangpil Jin's *Surviving Imperial Intrigues: Korea's Struggles for Neutrality Amid Empires, 1882-1907*

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# Of Parts and Wholes: Reading Sangpil Jin's *Surviving Imperial Intrigues: Korea's Struggles for Neutrality Amid Empires, 1882-1907* *

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Sangpil Jin has done a service to the field in writing the first monograph in English on the attempts to establish Chosŏn 朝鮮, and later the Han Empire 大韓帝國, as a neutral state after the models of Switzerland, Belgium, and Bulgaria. While accounts of these various proposals are available in existing publications in English, Korean, and Japanese, as is apparent from Jin's bibliography, Jin's work places all of them together in a single work to form a narrative history of the question of Korean neutrality over the twenty-five years from 1882 until the Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907. In so doing, Jin invites readers to consider the history of Korean foreign relations from a distinctly extra-regional, international perspective uncommon in diplomatic histories of the period. It is this reframing that is perhaps the most interesting and intriguing contribution Jin presents to a subject that already boasts decades of scholarship in multiple languages.

In the Introduction, Jin explains the aims of the work, provides a rather brisk literature review, enumerates his research questions, and dis-

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* Korean words and phrases are romanized in McCune-Resichauer, Chinese in pinyin, and Japanese in Hepburn.

cusses the broad array of primary source materials upon which he has created his narrative, including diplomatic documents, newspapers, diaries, and the like from Korea, Japan, China, Russia, Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, the United States, Italy, and the Netherlands. Jin seeks to determine who made what neutralization proposals, when, where, and how. He also aims to identify the factors that led to the ultimate failure of these proposals and to make comparison with European cases to further delineate the conditions that engender successful neutralization strategies. The answers to these empirical questions, Jin maintains, will enable him to challenge two positions in the existing literature: 1) Korean neutralization was ultimately impossible because there was insufficient international interest, and 2) The governments of Chosŏn and the Han Empire were passive actors in international diplomacy.

Jin proceeds with six chapters detailing the dozens of neutrality discussions and proposals. Each of these chapters is conceived in terms of rivalries between powers that sought to dominate Chosŏn and the Han Empire, starting with the Sino-Japanese rivalry of 1882-1885, the Anglo-Russian rivalry of 1885-1887, the Sino-Japanese rivalry of 1887-1897, the Russo Japanese rivalry of 1897-1903, and finally, the Russo-Japanese rivalry of 1903-1907. He ends the work with a concluding chapter that summarizes the previous chapters and makes reference to more modern neutrality proposals for a future unified Korea and other smaller states that may consider the story of Korean neutrality as a tutorial in policy pitfalls.
This typology is curious in that it tends to undermine Jin's assertion that the Chosŏn state was active itself in creating neutralization proposals; the book is wholly structured around the agendas of Qing, Japan, Britain, and Russia, rather than any particular plan the Chosŏn state may have had in mind. The chapter titles alone provide some insight into the international character of the neutrality question, as well as Jin's approach. Chosŏn neutrality in the 1880s was primarily a concern of foreign governments and intelligentsia. Chapter 2 well illuminates the international quality of the calls for Chosŏn neutrality in this period with accounts of the many proposals from Inoue Kowashi 井上毅, Gustave Boissonade, Inoue Kaoru 井上馨, Enomoto Takeaki 榎本武揚, Paul Georg von Möllendorff, Herman Budler,





the British and French governments, and even some Japanese newspapers. What is clear from this chapter is that a full understanding of the Chosŏn foreign policy environment requires not only an understanding of the regional security issues of the day but also of the global geopolitics of late nineteenth-century imperialism. Here Jin does well in showing that indeed the level of international interest in Chosŏn neutrality was quite high, even if the Chosŏn government itself did not show much interest in such policy options at the time. This is among the more successful chapters of the Jin's work as it is empirically robust, well-paced, and informative in that it is just not that common that diplomatic histories pay much attention to potential Chosŏn neutralization.

Chapter 5, especially from page 127, and Chapter 6 are the strongest of the entirety of the book. It is clear that Jin understands the overall narrative of the multiple neutralization attempts from 1900 onward in considerable depth. He succeeds amply in supporting this narrative with a strong selection of primary source materials concerning the various failed attempts to neutralize the Great Han Empire in the context of the growing tensions preceding the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Chapter 6 is something of a gripping read as the Korean imperial court makes one attempt after another to illicit international support for neutralization that all ultimately fail in the face of Russian and Japanese incursions into the territory of the Han Empire in 1903 and 1904. Among the most fascinating of these overtures is that of Yi Hanŭng 李漢應, chargé d'afaires of the Korean legation in London (pp. 175-182). Yi made a detailed proposal to the British Foreign Office in 1904 in which he directly linked stability in East Asia with stability in Europe. Noting the friendly relationships between Russia and France and between Britain and Japan, Yi suggested that war between Russia and Japan could potentially sour Anglo-French relations in Europe. He proposed that an Anglo-French alliance and British guarantees of Korean territorial integrity could counteract Russo-Japanese hostilities over Korea and maintain global geopolitical stability. The conceptual diagrams Yi provided to the British to illustrate these dynamics, while not entirely easy to understand, are well-worth a careful read for anyone interested in the geopolitical thinking of the Korean imperial government in the early twen-

tieth century.

Despite the very many strengths of Jin's work in the chapters summarized above, Chapters 3 and 4, in which Jin explores the neutrality proposals of the period from 1885 to 1897, are problematic. While Jin is able to show convincingly that other states were interested in Chosŏn neutrality, he has some trouble demonstrating just how interested the Chosŏn state itself was in pursuing neutrality in the 1880s. In Chapter 3, the 1880s Korean neutrality proposals Jin considers are from Kim Yunsik 金允植, Yu Kilchun 俞吉濬, Kim Okkyun 金玉均, and Owen Denny, in his capacity as an advisor to the Chosŏn government. Jin competently summarizes Yu's famous proposal but Yu held no post in the Chosŏn government at the time and the political environment was such that he was in no position to have his views heard. Kim Okkyun was in a far worse position as he was in exile in Japan, had recently avoided an assassination ordered by King Kojong, and was facing the prospect of deportation. Under these circumstances, he briefly proposed Chosŏn neutrality in an open letter to Li Hongzhang, published in the *Tokyo nichi nichi shimbun* 東京日日新聞, that appears to have been as much a policy proposal as it was a bald attempt to court Li in a bid to save his very recently threatened life.[1] Like Yu, Kim was in no position to have his policy proposals heard. Jin tells us that while Owen Denny was in the employ of the Chosŏn state in the late 1880s, he explored neutrality, but once Jin provides the details on the Denny proposals, they only suggested that various groupings of foreign states guarantee Chosŏn territorial integrity. Jin refers to these collectively as "Denny's neutralization plan" even though, in Jin's own telling, they make no reference to neutrality (pp. 77-79).

The most noteworthy figure in Jin's spread of 1880s Chosŏn neutrality proposals is Kim Yunsik, whom Jin dubs the "pioneer" of Chosŏn neutralization (p. 61). Kim is well-known for his staunchly pro-Qing 清 sympathies so the assertion that he was a pioneer of Chosŏn neutrality, and, by

[1] Yi Kwangnin, "Haeje," in *Kim Okkyun, Kim Okkyun chŏnjip* (Sŏul: Asea Munhwasa, 1980), xi-xii. For the text of Kim Okkyun's letter, see Kim Okkyun, Kim Okkyun chŏnjip (Sŏul: Asea Munhwasa, 1980), pp.151-152.





extension, that he must have advocated severing the Chosŏn relationship with Qing, is nothing less than arresting, if not wholly stunning, to any student of the diplomatic history of the period. Jin acknowledges Kim as "a well-known member of the pro-China faction" but also suggests that Kim had his doubts about Chosŏn diplomatic isolation because he considered establishing diplomatic relations with the United States (p. 61). Jin cites a page from Kim's essay "Origin of the Tianjin envoy appointment" (*Ch'ŏnjin pongsa yŏn'gi* 天津奉使緣起) in support of this assertion. However, Kim wrote this text in 1892, at least seven years after the time period Jin is considering and ten years after Chosŏn actually concluded a treaty with the United States. He was not so much exploring possibilities in this text as he was summarizing Qing proposals from the late 1870s.[2] Rather than chafing against Qing influence, Kim was repeating Qing policy points. Jin also suggests that Kim "insisted that Korea not be a vassal of China" and cites two pages from Kim's *Ŭmch'ŏngsa* 陰晴史 (p. 61). This passage does not appear to contain such an insistence. It is a transcript of a conversation between Kim Yunsik and Liu Xianglin 劉鄉林, director of the Tianjin Arsenal. Liu asks Kim general questions about Korean history, the compilation of official histories, whether or not common people or the king in Chosŏn have copies of Chinese histories. There is also a highly critical discussion of the Meiji reforms and cultural changes in Japan. It is a wide-ranging and fascinating discussion but it lacks material on Yun's opinions about the Chosŏn-Qing relationship.[3] This may be the result of a typo in the citation but the result is that the reader is unable to understand the context in which Kim may have made this statement. It is upon this unstable foundation that Jin asks the reader to accept that Kim Yunsik's "…newfound doubts about the effectiveness of the tributary system in protecting Korea against foreign invasion led him to embrace neutrality" (p. 62). And yet, there is no discussion of what these doubts might have been or how they may have led Kim to drop his devotion to Qing and take up the cause

[2] Jin cites Kim Yunsik, *Kim Yunsik chŏnjip 2* (Sŏul: Asea Munhwasa, 1980), 515 but the material concerning the United States to which he is most likely referring is on pp.513-514.

[3] Kim Yunsik, *Ŭmch'ŏngsa* (Sŏul: Kuksa P'yŏnch'an Wiwŏnhoe, 1971), pp.94-95.

of Chosŏn neutrality.

Kim Yunsik's supposedly pioneering adoption of neutrality comes to the fore during the Kŏmun-do 巨文島 Incident in which Britain occupied Kŏmun Island, a part of Chosŏn territory, in 1885-1887. Jin writes that German consul general Otto Zembsch reported that Kim expressed interest in neutralization during their discussions of the British occupation. Unfortunately, there do not seem to be any statements from Kim himself, only Zembsch's characterization of the position of the Korean government and that of Möllendorff (pp. 62-63). In fact, Zembsch points out that the Chosŏn government did not make an explicit neutrality proposal, despite Kim's references to Belgium as a potential model, and that it was his own assessment that Chosŏn would like to neutralize but would not do so for fear of damaging its relationship with Qing. Even the Belgium reference appears to center on the guarantees of territorial integrity rather than neutrality *per se*.[4] While this is certainly interesting, it is not enough to establish that Zembsch's perception was correct. Western diplomats were not especially skilled in understanding the positions and decisions of the Chosŏn government in this period so one must exercise great caution in accepting their observations at face value, especially without the benefit of confirmation through Chosŏn sources.[5]

After his discussion of Zembsch's assessment that Chosŏn wished to neutralize, Jin presents a Chosŏn document from June 1885 in which, he asserts, "Finally, Korea officially expresses its intentions to neutralize…" (p. 63) but this interpretation is worthy of further consideration. Jin's translation of the document reads, in part, "In the event of conflicts amongst other countries, Chosŏn has to remain neutral, by neither lending its territory to any country nor permitting a temporary occupation of its territory…" (p. 63) The choice of the word "neutrality" for the term *kugoe chi pun* 局外之分 is questionable.[6] It does not appear that Kim meant to convey that Chosŏn was declaring itself a neutral state in the manner of Switzerland or Belgium but rather a disinterested party, an outsider in a particular dispute, namely the Anglo-Russian tensions over the British occupation of Kŏmun Island. Jin did not mention that this passage was the concluding portion of a longer document that reviews the particulars of the Kŏmun Island occupation, the Chosŏn contention that the occupation is illegal, and the Chosŏn refusal to approve it. The conflicts to which the Chosŏn government is referring are those which might arise between Britain and other states in opposition to the occupation, specifically Russia. Chosŏn wanted no part in this fight and so made a public statement to explain that it did not support the occupation. The point of this document is not to declare that Chosŏn had become a neutral state but rather to inform the treaty powers that it was not in collusion with the British. We may note that the United States government also adopted a policy of neutrality in regard to the Kŏmun Island occupation, a posture that did not indicate that the United States had declared itself a neutral power.[7]

In a confusing turn, Jin then concedes that in reality, the document "…contained no specific wording about neutralization" (p. 64) even though his analysis and translation make that very assertion. And in the next paragraph he maintains that Kim "…could not explicitly call for Korean neutralization" because of the Chosŏn tributary relationship with Qing (p. 64), even though Jin characterized the June 1885 document above as an official expression of the intent to neutralize, sent formally to all the treaty powers. If, as Jin states, Kim could only speak about neutralization privately with Zembsch for fear of Qing ire (p. 64), why was he able to make this public announcement to the entire diplomatic community of Seoul? Moreover, when Kim sent this June 1885 announcement to all the treaty powers,

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4 Kim Uhyŏn, "P. G. Möllendorff ŭi Chosŏn chungniphwa kusang," *P'yŏnghwa yŏn'gu 8* (1983), pp.76-77.

5 Joshua Van Lieu, "The Politics of Condolence: Contested Representations of Tribute in Late Nineteenth-Century Chosŏn-Qing Relations," *The Journal of Korean Studies* 14 (2009), pp.83-115.

6 The text can be found in a variety of locations, including a copy Kim Yunsik sent to Qing representative Chen Shutang 陳樹堂. See, Asea Munje Yŏn'guso, *Ku Han'guk oegyo munsŏ: Ch'ŏngan* 1 (Sŏul: Koryŏ Taehakkyo Ch'ulp'anbu, 1970), pp.261-262.

7 Yur-bok Lee, *West Goes East: Paul Georg von Möllendorff and Great Power Imperialism in Late Yi Korea*, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1988), p.123.

the Qing government itself was among the recipients. And the Qing government, moreover, did not object.[8] It did not object because it was not objectionable; it was not a declaration of Chosŏn neutrality.

To get a sense of Kim Yunsik's understanding of the Chosŏn relationship with Qing, we might engage in a closer reading of his "Origin of the Tianjin envoy appointment" that Jin sighted earlier as evidence of Kim's supposed explorations of diplomatic alternatives to Qing. Kim Yunsik wrote this piece while in exile in Myŏnch'ŏn 沔川 as the introduction to his 1892 text *Tianjin transcripts* (*Ch'ŏnjin ch'odam* 天津草談), a collection of transcripts of the conversations he had had with Qing officials while he was an envoy in Tianjin in 1881-1882. The essay recounts the geopolitical developments of East Asia in the 1860s and 1870s that led the Chosŏn court to appoint him as an envoy, nominally to oversee the dispatch of several dozen Chosŏn students to Tianjin to learn weapons manufacturing techniques and foreign languages. The primary theme of the essay is that Chosŏn and Qing had entered into a new cooperative diplomatic relationship so as to face new geopolitical challenges that were rapidly moving beyond the capabilities of the old security arrangements. This introduction shows that even into the early 1890s, Kim maintained that a close relationship with Qing, not neutrality, was the key to Chosŏn security.[9]

Chosŏn, Kim explained, had really only had formal relations with two states; it "served" (*sa* 事) Qing to the north as a tributary state and to the east it had amicable relations (*t'ong* 通) with Japan. As western powers imposed themselves upon Qing and Japan, both "respected their international law" (遵其公法) as the only way to defend themselves in an increasingly hostile security environment. After Japan established relations with western states, in Kim's telling, the emperor abolished the Tokugawa Shogunate, assumed personal rule, and adopted western methods in gover-

[8] Asea Munje Yŏn'guso, *Ku Han'guk oegyo munsŏ: Ch'ŏngan* 1 (Sŏul: Koryŏ Taehakkyo Ch'ulp'anbu, 1970), pp.261-263. A recent Korean translation of these documents can be found here: Yi Yŏnse, Nam Tonggŏl, and An Chŏnghŏn, ed. and trans., *Yŏkchu ku Han'guk oegyo munsŏ*: *Ch'ŏngan* 3 (Inch'ŏn: Inch'ŏn Taehakkyo Inch'ŏnhak Yŏn'guwŏn, 2019), pp.130-136.

[9] Kim Yunsik, *chŏnjip* 2, pp.512-515.





nance, manufacturing, and all other interests of the state. Japan thereby absorbed the Liuqiu 流求 Kingdom and expanded into Hokkaido 北海道, becoming known as an "East Asian power" (*Tongyang kangguk* 東洋强國). After Chosŏn rejected the Japanese announcement of the imperial restoration, Kim explained, Japan sent warships to Kanghwa 江華 Island whereupon the Chosŏn court had no choice but to allow a treaty opening Chosŏn ports to Japan. Russia as well was on the move, establishing a port and a military presence at Vladivostok. Chosŏn thus faced threats all around.[10]

At around the same time, Kim continued, Annam 安南, Burma (Myŏnjŏn 緬甸), and Liuqiu all fell to hostile powers while Chosŏn seemed wholly unaware. All three states, he maintained, had only had relations with a single foreign state: Annam concluded treaties with France, Burma concluded treaties with Britain, and Liuqiu was a tributary state to Japan (服事日本). As France, Britain, and Japan became increasingly threatening and openly hostile, Annam, Burma, and Liuqiu had no treaties with other countries and so were unable to call upon another state for aid. These developments, Kim recounts, caused no small alarm at the Qing court since all three had been Qing tributary states.[11] This portion of Kim's argument is central to Jin's claim that Kim had decided that Qing could no longer be relied upon to guarantee Chosŏn security. Indeed, the collapse of three other tributary states, one after the other, does seem to be an indication that paying tribute to the Qing court in the nineteenth century was no guarantee that Qing forces would appear to defend against foreign invasion. While Kim does not deny that there were no Qing interventions to save these states, he does not suggest that Qing weakness was the real problem:

> In each of these three cases, a Qing tributary state cast off the old and took pleasure in the new, bringing disaster and defeat upon itself. Qing wanted to help and defend them but in reality only sighed that the whip was not long enough. Also, it would have

[10] Kim Yunsik, *chŏnjip* 2, pp.512-513.

[11] Kim Yunsik, *chŏnjip* 2, p.513.

been difficult to intervene in remote regions or overseas in the absence of treaty obligations. Moreover, there was no real harm [in the fall of these states] to the greater calculus of Qing [security] so [the Qing court] could not vigorously contest [these developments].

蓋此三國皆清國通貢之國棄舊悅新自取禍敗清國雖欲救護實有鞭長不及之歎且在約外不便過問海外荒服又無損於清國之大計故不能力爭[12]

Kim begins by blaming Annam, Burma, and Liuqiu for having cast off the old, for having forsaken their old relationships with the Qing court in favor of the charms of newer relationships with the states that would eventually destroy them. A closer, more loyal relationship with Qing, in this formulation, served as the foundation of national security. Qing could not directly intervene without the justification of treaty obligations and, moreover, these countries were just not that important to Qing security so their continued existence as independent states was ultimately of no concern to the Qing court. The Qing court did, however, wish to help but in reality only lamented that "the whip was not long enough." This turn of phrase is a direct allusion to the *Zuo Tradition* (*Zuo chuan* 左傳). In 594 BCE, the state of Chu 楚 laid siege to Song 宋. Song asked the state of Jin 晉 to intervene on its behalf. The Marquis of Jin wanted to help but a minister of the Jin court, Bo Zong 伯宗, dissuaded him, arguing that "despite its length, the whip does not reach the horse's belly" (雖鞭之長不及馬腹).[13] Bo Zong here maintains that even though the Jin state was powerful, its power was not sufficient to challenge Chu over the siege of Song and so advises the Marquis of Jin to wait for a more opportune moment. The Jin

[12] Kim Yunsik, *chŏnjip* 2, p.513.

[13] Feng Lihua and Liu Hao, eds, *Jingjiao zuoxiu* (Shanghai: Huiwentang, 1911), 11:11a-11b; Kwŏn Sangno and Chang Tobin, eds. *Kosa sŏngŏ sajŏn* (Sŏul: Hagwŏnsa, 1961), p.537; Stephen Durant, Wai-yee Li, and David Schaburg, trans. and eds., *Zuo Tradition: Zuozhuan 1* (Seattle: University of Washington, 2016), pp.676-677.





whip was long but not long enough to reach the belly of Chu. Qing, like the state of Jin, wanted to intervene, but France, Britain, and Japan, the modern equivalents of the ascendant state of Chu, were too powerful to be confronted directly. As the Marquis of Jin finally decided to leave Song to its fate, Qing decided that Annam, Burma, and Liuqiu were not important enough to justify major military confrontations.

Had Kim Yunsik concluded here, it would not be hard to agree with Sangpil Jin that Kim had decided that Qing could no longer be relied upon for Chosŏn security. While Kim tried to excuse the Qing court for allowing Annam, Burma, and Liuqiu to fall, his allusion to the ancient state of Jin shows that he did not think that Qing had the military strength or the political will to intervene in these cases. Kim did not, however, end his narrative here. Unlike Annam, Burma, and Liuqiu, Chosŏn shared land and maritime boundaries with the three Qing provinces of Jilin 吉林, Liaoning 遼寧, and Heilongjiang 黑龍江. So important were these provinces to Qing security, Kim writes, that the Qing court considered Chosŏn territory to be just as important as its own. The Qing Commissioner for Northern Ports Li Hongzhang sought to avoid Chosŏn suffering the same fate as Annam, Burma, and Liuqiu and so sent letters to Yi Yuwŏn 李裕元, a high Chosŏn court official, and Yi Ch'oeŭng 李最應, King Kojong's 高宗 uncle and high Chosŏn official, in an effort to encourage the Chosŏn court to pursue a two-part foreign policy: be close to Qing (*ch'in-Ch'ŏng* 親清) and ally with the United States (*yŏn-Mi* 聯美).[14] These are well-known policy proposals that also appeared in the 1881 *Chosŏn ch'aengnyak* 朝鮮策略, composed by Huang Zunxian 黃遵憲 but a product of Li Hongzhang and his staff.[15] Kim summarizes the Qing argument on the benefits of Chosŏn remaining close to Qing as follows:

Our country serves Qing [as a tributary state] and [both states] have maintained these protocols for hundreds of years. Now that

[14] Kim Yunsik, *chŏnjip 2*, p.514.

[15] Hwang Chunhŏn, "Chosŏn ch'aengnyak" in *Susinsa kirok*, ed. Kuksa P'yŏnch'an Wiwŏnhoe (Sŏul Kuksa P'yŏnch'an Wiwŏnhoe, 1958), pp.160-161.

the ban on maritime travel has been lifted and our country is an independent state among the myriad states of the world, Qing does not lightly interfere in our domestic governance or foreign relations. And yet our country is often dim concerning international relations; were it not for Qing help and encouragement, we would surely fall into blunder. Therefore, if both states, [Qing in] the center and [our country in] the east, resolve to become even closer and to take every opportunity to discreetly help one another, like members of the same family without difference, then [together we] can stop the contempt of foreigners. This is the benefit of being close to Qing.

我國服事清國自有數百年相守之典禮然海禁旣開我國亦以自主立於萬國之中則內治外交清國不便干涉而我國素昧交際若無清國勸助則必隨事失誤故中東兩國須加意親密隨機暗幫如一室無間則亦可以禦外人之侮此親清國之利也[16]

These are hardly the words of a Chosŏn diplomat wishing to severe ties with Qing and declare neutrality. To be clear, Kim is summarizing the Qing case for Chosŏn and Qing maintaining a close relationship but in the context of the earlier portions of the document in which he adheres closely to the Qing analysis of Chosŏn geopolitical challenges, it seems clear that Kim himself has adopted this position. We might also do well to keep in mind that this is a text written in exile. King Kojong sent him into exile for his steadfast opposition to Chosŏn overtures to Russia at the expense of the relationship with Qing.[17] Rather than a pioneer of Chosŏn neutrality, Kim was a man who firmly believed that tributary states who abandoned their obligations to the Qing court met with disaster and that a tight relationship with Qing was the key to a robust Chosŏn-Qing joint defense against foreign incursion.

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[16] Kim Yunsik, *chŏnjip 2*, p.513.

[17] Yurbok Lee, *West Goes East*, p.119, p.136.





This somewhat extended consideration of Kim Yunsik's position on the Chosŏn-Qing relationship demonstrates the dangers of neglecting contexts, both within and without individual documents. A focus on Kim's discussion of the benefits of allying with the United States in this text, with neither a careful reading of the text in its entirety nor reference to the time and place of its composition, seems to have led Jin to conclude that Kim's adherence to the Qing line was weakening. Similarly, any reading of the Zembsch communications, which contain no statements from Kim Yunsik himself, must be undertaken with the understanding of who is actually speaking. Or when considering the message Kim Yunsik sent to the treaty powers in June 1885, it is critical to consider not just the portion of the text that could be construed as a declaration neutrality but rather the document as a whole and in context, including whatever reactions it may have elicited from its recipients.

We might also apply these concerns to Kim Okkyun's open letter to Li Hongzhang. How are we to understand the brief neutralization proposal in the context of a much longer letter, written in exile by a man nearly assassinated and facing deportation? And what of Kim's other open letter published in the same newspaper, written to King Kojong on the same themes of assassination, international relations, and Chosŏn security?[18] How were these letters received? Were they solitary a scream in the political wilderness or were there readers? In short, did they matter? Jin discusses three more Chosŏn neutrality proposals, albeit briefly, in Chapter 4. The reader encounters Kim Kajin's 金嘉鎭 proposal of 1890, dispatched in two sentences (p. 99). King Kojong himself makes a proposal in 1891, described in one sentence (pp. 99-100). Yu Kilchun makes a second proposal in 1894, presented in two sentences (p. 101). To be sure, these proposals, especially those from Kim Kajin and King Kojong, are important and more than worthy of our consideration but it is not easy to know what Jin would have the reader make of them when they appear and vanish with such velocity. The problem may be that the primary sources are scant or mute but

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[18] Kim Okkyun, *chŏnjip*, pp.141-148.

it would be of great interest to know more details about the proposals and the circumstances of their presentation and reception. Whatever the case may be, these brief encounters with proposals and sources, with parts but not wholes, with texts but not contexts, are a recurrent problem in Chapters 3 and 4 that undercut Jin's argumentation.

There is a technical critique I wish to make but I do so with some hesitation as I know from my own experience over the years in editing *The Journal of Korean Studies* and *Acta Koreana* that romanization is no easy matter, especially in a book-length work. The task is monumental in scale and yet requires a finely tuned attention to minute detail. Romanization in this book is meant to be in the Pinyin, Hepburn, and McCune-Reischauer systems for Chinese, Japanese, and Korean respectively but the text is riddled with romanization errors. Some of the more frequently appearing examples include Pak Yŏngho instead of Pak Yŏnghyo 朴泳孝, Eŏ Yunchung instead of Ŏ Yunjung 魚允中, and toggling between Joseon and Chosŏn 朝鮮. There are inconsistencies in the use of tone markers in pinyin as well as absent macrons in Hepburn. There are cases in the bibliography where romanization varies within a single entry, such as Daehan/Taehan 大韓. Pages 302-304 display many of these problems but there is not a page in the bibliography free romanization errors. While these errors and idiosyncrasies were not enough to prevent me from locating cited materials, they were tiresome and at times vexing. They are an unfortunate irritant to an otherwise very rich bibliography. It is my hope that in the felicitous event of a revised edition, these issues may be rectified.

Let us then return to the assumptions Jin wished to challenge with this work. There is no doubt that he is wholly successful in demonstrating that there was considerable international interest in Chosŏn and Han Empire neutralization across the whole of the twenty-five-year period under consideration. Indeed, this is one of the salient strengths of Jin's work and is valuable in demonstrating how important both regional and global rivalries were in framing the fate of Chosŏn at the end of the nineteenth century and the Han Empire at the turn of the twentieth. As for the question of Chosŏn interest in neutralization, however, this remains murky. Yu Kilchun was a clear and well-known proponent. Kim Okkyun was an unexpected





advocate but only under peculiar and deeply trying circumstances. Neither were members of the Chosŏn government at the time of their proposals. Kim Yunsik was interested in attaining guarantors of Chosŏn territorial integrity but his devotion to Qing makes it singularly unlikely that he would have called for a fully neutral Chosŏn state. Jin tantalizes with proposals from Kim Kajin, Kojong, and Yu Kilchun in the early 1890s, but there seems to be so little information on these initiatives that it is difficult to know how seriously the Chosŏn government took the idea. For the ten years from 1897 to 1907, however, Jin makes a convincing case for the active engagement of the imperial government in the final years before abdication of the Kwangmu 光武 Emperor. Jin has surely attained far greater richness in these chapter because the primary resources are more plentiful and revealing than the scanty materials upon which he had to depend for his account of the 1880s and early 1890s.

We may thus judge Jin as mostly successful. He has amply demonstrated the international aspects of the problem of Chosŏn neutrality and, while Chapters 3 and 4 were problematic, Chapters 5 and 6 were highly effective in making the case for an active Korean state. The literature review was brief, uncritical, and omitted the majority of the secondary sources in the bibliography so it is little difficult to claim that he has provided a significantly new perspective that may develop or overturn existing understandings. And yet, the very fact that Jin has collected and summarized such quantity of neutrality proposals in a single volume is remarkable in and of itself. In his conclusion, he includes a table listing all the proposals and their salient characteristics that stretches across ten pages (pp. 211-220). In this way, Jin has provided a valuable resource and something of a road map for future scholarship in late nineteenth and early twentieth-century Korean diplomatic history. Jin's work is thus worthy of consideration by students and scholars of Korean diplomatic history.

# Notes for Contributors

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