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A New Interpretive Approach to the Japanese Pirates in Medieval East Asia: The Dispatch of Goryeo Envoys to Japan in 1366

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A New Interpretive Approach to the Japanese Pirates in Medieval East Asia: The Dispatch of Goryeo Envoys to Japan in 1366¹

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Introduction

Japanese pirates, known as *waegu* in Korea, had a great impact on the international relations of East Asia between the 13th and 16th centuries. Most studies on Japan's negotiations with its neighbors over the issue of the Japanese pirates have tended to stress the relationship between Ming China (1368-1646) and Muromachi *bakufu* (1336-1573), such as the investiture of the shogun Ashikaga Yoshimitsu (1358-1408) as the emperor of Japan by the Ming. Still, few research has been done with reference to the relationship between Goryeo (918-1392) and the Muromachi bakufu, specifically the two delegations to Japan, dispatched by King Gongmin (r. 1351-1374) of Goryeo in 1366, in fathoming more delicate explanations concerning the issue of the Japanese pirates during the Northern and Southern Courts Period (1185-1392).² For instance, Nakamura Hidetaka touched on the importance of the diplomatic activity between Goryeo and

¹ This translated article is a revised version of Yi Young, "14세기 동아시아 국제 정세와 왜구-공민왕 15년(1366)의 禁倭使節의 파견을 중심으로," *한일관계사연구* 26 (April 2007): 95-146.

² Murai Shosuke, *Ajia no naka no chūsei nihon* [Medieval Japan in Asia] (Tōkyō: Azekura Shobō, 1988). The Nanbokuchō Period was a time of civil war between the Northern Court (Hokuchō 北朝) based in Kyoto and the Southern Court (Nanchō 南朝) based in Nara.

the Muromachi bakufu in establishing the amicable trade relations.³ While acknowledging the visit of the Goryeo envoys as one major factor in Japan's international relations surrounding the issue of Japanese pirates, Murai Shosuke devoted the rest of his discussion to the relationship between the Ming and the Muromachi bakufu.⁴ Kawazoe Shoji associated the visit of the Goryeo envoys in 1366 with the political agenda of the Muromachi bakufu that exerted itself using diplomacy as a weapon in gaining control over its Northern Court (北朝, Hokuchō) and actively promoted the conquest of Kyushu, or the center of the Japanese piracy in the grip of the Southern Court (南朝, Nancho).⁵ However, he did not delve into how the visits of 1366 were more closely connected not only with the issue of the Japanese pirates but also the competition between the Northern Court and the Southern Court over Kyushu. With the focus on the complex circumstances of East Asia in the late 14th century, this paper charts the way King Gongmin sent two delegations to Japan in 1366 and sought for some practical measures against the Japanese pirates. In so doing, I will reread Goryeo diplomacy against the Japanese piracy after 1350 as a vivid lens through which to view domestic problems of Korea, China and Japan, as well as contemporary international relations among the three countries, more clearly in the context of medieval East Asia. This re-interpretation, I believe, will help rediscover a vigorous confluence of internal politics and external relations as the major impetus for historical change in East Asia.

Historical Backgrounds

Japanese pirate activities intensified from 1350 but the Goryeo court sent

envoys to the Japanese court in 1366.⁶ This delay stands in stark contrast to how Goryeo responded in the 13th century when any Japanese pirate raid was immediately followed by its dispatch of envoys to Japan. The question is that it took more than a decade for Goryeo to dispatch envoys to Japan to handle the piracy. The first recorded pirate raid in the 13th century took place in May 1223. According to Japanese records, it took four years for Goryeo to send a Cho, the governor (*anchalsa* 按察使) of Jeolla Province, and deliver a letter to Japan in May 1227.⁷ When the other raid occurred in the same month, Goryeo sent Bak In (?-?) to Japan in December of the same year.⁸ Although another small raid was attempted, Goryeo was sensitive enough to dispatch envoys to Japan in July 1259.⁹ In addition, two months after an attack, it seems, Hong Jeo and Gwak Wang-bu went to Japan in April 1263 to protest against the intrusion.¹⁰

The major difference between the Japanese piracy in the 13th and 14th centuries lies in size; the former usually moved in dozens against whom Goryeo troops could counter on their own. The Goryeo court did not perceive them as a major threat to national security even if sending the delegations to Japan. These small raids in the 13th century contrasts markedly with the scale and frequency of the Japanese piracy in March 1350 when the pirates resumed their activities after an 85-year hiatus.¹¹

It is clear that there were significant differences between the raids in 1350 and those in the 13th century. For example, as compared with the cases in the previous century, the pirates used up to 100 ships in 1350 when the largest suppression saw 300 pirates beheaded. This change shows that

³ Nakamura Hidetaka, *Nissen kankeishi no kenkyū* 1 [Studies on the History of Japanese-Korean Relations 1] (Tōkyō: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1965), 203.

⁴ Murai Shosuke, "Kenmu-Muromachi seiken to higashi Ajia" [Kenmu-Muromachi Regimes and East Asia], *Koza Nihon rekishi* [Japanese History] 4 (Tōkyō: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1985).

⁵ Kawazoe Shoji, *Taigai kankei no shiteki tenkai* [Historical Development of External Relations] (Tōkyō: Bunken Shuppan, 1996).

⁶ In February 1350, the Japanese pirates came back out of an eighty-year hiatus and resumed their attacks on Goryeo. From then on, pirate raids continued to occur almost every year until the early years of Joseon (1392-1910). Many Korean records commonly use expressions like "the Japanese pirates of 1350" or "post-1350 Japanese pirates" to mark the resumption of these attacks.

⁷ *Azuma Kagami* [The Mirror of the East], entry for Jōji 1/05/14.

⁸ *Goryeosa jeoryo* [The Abridged Chronicle of Goryeo] 15, entry for December, 1227 (丁亥).

⁹ *Goryeosa jeoryo* 15, entry for July, 1259 (己未).

¹⁰ *Goryeosa jeoryo* 15, entry for April, 1263 (癸亥).

¹¹ Yi Young, *Wako to Nichi-Rei kankeishi* [A History of the Japanese Pirates and the Japan-Goryeo Relations] (Tōkyō: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1999), 140.

Table 1. Japanese Pirate Raids in 1350

Month	Area Raided	No. of Pirate Ships	Note
February	Goseong, Jungnim, Geoje	unknown	300 Japanese pirates beheaded.
April	Suncheon-bu	100	Namwon, Gurye, Yeonggwang, and Jangheung raided.
May	Suncheon-bu	66	Goryeo troops seized one pirate ship and killed thirteen pirates.
June	Happo, Goseong, Hoewon, Jangheung-bu	20	
November	Dongnaehyang	unknown	

the nature of the piracy in and after 1350 had dramatically changed. What is more remarkable is that in August 1351 a fleet of 130 pirate ships attacked the islands of Jayeon Island and Sannok Island near Ganghwa Island, located at the mouth of the Han River, where cargo vessels from all over the country gathered.¹²

Even, on March 15, 1352, the Japanese pirates attacked the capital Gaeseong and caused widespread panic among the populace. In 1365, the pirates desecrated the tomb of Changneung, where Wang Ryung (?-897), or the father of the founder Wang Geon (r. 918-943) of Goryeo was buried, and stole his portrait, an irrevocably blasphemous act that struck at the very heart of the Goryeo royal family and court. A more damaging incident occurred in July 1358 when the pirates tried to obstruct Goryeo’s coastlines. Goryeo relied greatly on marine transportation in order to collect taxes, transport supplies from central and southern regions, and respond efficiently to some crucial security issues along the northern border. The greater the political, military, and diplomatic threats from the north were, the more important the stability of supply chain supported from the south. Hence, the disruption in marine transportation as above could result in a serious security crisis to Goryeo.

However, the Goryeo court did not immediately dispatch envoys to

the Japanese court. To unearth the reason why Goryeo did not protest to the Japanese court in and after 1350, we need to look at the historical context of the Sino-Korean relationship at that time. As for the Goryeo court, then, the issue of the Japanese pirates was inseparable not only from its complex relationship with Yuan China (1271-1368)—the epitome of *Pax Mongolica* in East Asia—relationship but also the entangled tension between Goryeo and Japan after the Mongol Invasions which constituted the two attacks under the allied forces of Goryeo and the Yuan in 1274 and 1281. Sensing the decline of the Yuan since the mid-14th century, still, the reign of King Gongmin saw national security unstable by dint of the Red Turban Invasions (1359-1362), the armed conflicts with the Mongolian warlords in Manchuria, and the border tensions with the Jurchens in the northeastern border, all of which were tied to the decline of the Yuan hegemony at that time.

Under these distressed circumstances, however, the Goryeo court hid the fact that it was suffering from frequent Japanese pirate attacks. When the pirates raided Gyodong Island and Ganghwa Island, both of them were fairly close to the capital, Goryeo did not inform the Yuan of the attacks. Rather, it falsely reported to the Censorate (御史臺) of the Yuan court that it had defeated each and every attack by Japanese pirates.¹³ What made Goryeo cautious about its foreign policy towards Japan was a possibility that the Yuan, even if gradually collapsing, might use this security issue as an excuse to increase political and military pressure on Goryeo and to re-strengthen its regional power.

In the meantime, Goryeo would also be reluctant to expose its political or military weaknesses to Japan simultaneously by sending its envoys to Japan and receiving Japanese envoys. If the Japanese envoys had been allowed to visit the capital Gaeseong, it would have been impossible for Goryeo to conceal its precarious security. In fact, the Japan court and Tsushima Island did send their envoys to Goryeo four times in 1368 after the visit of Goryeo envoys in 1366 and 1368. It is uncertain whether the Japa-

¹² *Goryeosa* [The History of Goryeo Dynasty] 37, entry for 08/10/1351 (辛卯).

¹³ *Goryeosa* 40, entry for 04/15/1363 (癸巳). Apart from this *baekgwangjino*, there seems to be no other record of Goryeo mentioning post-1350 Japanese pirate attacks to the Yuan.

nese envoys traveled all the way to Gaeseong or only to a designated place in Gimhae, South Gyeongsang Province. But, they would probably have been able to collect substantial information about Goryeo via diverse routes during their sojourn. Goryeo's greatest fear at the time was a gloomy scenario where it might not be sustainable in the two-tiered attack by the Red Turbans, the Mongolian warlords in Manchuria, the Jurchens, or even the Yuan armies from the north on one hand and the Japanese pirates from the south on the other hand. That is why waiting for more than a decade to assure the relative pacification of the northern border, King Gongmin dispatched envoys to Japan and requested the suppression of Japanese pirates.

Goryeo's Delegation to Japan in 1366

In August 1366, the 15th year of King Gongmin's reign or the 5th year of the Northern Court's Joji Era (1362-1368), Kim Yong (?-1363) was appointed as an envoy and arrived in Japan with his aides in the following month.¹⁴ Goryeo sent the other delegation in November.¹⁵ This delegation arrived in Japan on February 27, 1367¹⁶ and reached Kyoto in early April.¹⁷ However, the most official record of *Goryeosa* (the History of Goryeo Dynasty) accounts for only the second mission led by Kim II (?-?) without

¹⁴ “これによって高麗国の王より、元朝皇帝の勅宣を受けて、牒使十七人わが国に来朝す。この使ひ異国の至正二十三年八月十三日に高麗を立て、日本国貞治五年九月二十三日出雲に着岸す。” *Taiheiki* [The Chronicle of Great Peace] 39: Koraijin rai chokoto [Goryeo Envoys Granted an Imperial Audience]. The 26 year of the Zhizheng era (1366) appears to have been miswritten as the 23 year of the Zhizheng era (1363). In other words, Kim Yong and his aides departed Goryeo in August 13, 1366, and arrived at Izumo in September 23.

¹⁵ *Goryeosa* 41, entry for 11/14/1366 (丙午). Considering diplomatic customs and transportation between Goryeo and Japan at the time, it would have been difficult for a diplomatic delegation to return within three to four months. When the Japanese court received official letter or document from Goryeo, it would first examine precedents and then through multiple discussions determine whether to reply, who would reply, and what the reply would convey.

¹⁶ *Zuikai Shūhō, Zenrin kokuhōki: Shintei zoku Zenrin kokuhōki* [Documents Concerning the Friendly Relations with Neighboring Countries] (Tokyo: Shūeisha, 1995), 97.

¹⁷ *Moromoriki* [Record of Moromori], entry for Jōji 6/4/06.

quoting the first mission of Kim Yong. A description of *Goryeosa* regarding the mission to Japan in 1377 does mention that a diplomatic letter, which An Gil-sang (?-1380) brought to Japan, included a remark about Kim Yong's mission in 1366.¹⁸

Kim Yong, according to Nakamura Hidetaka, was charged with delivering a letter that conveyed the Yuan emperor's wishes to the Japanese court. Along this line, Nakamura surmises that the purpose of the first delegation was to deliver a letter and gifts from the Branch Secretariat for the Eastern Campaigns (征東行省)—a military organization established in Goryeo by Kublai Khan (r. 1260-1294)—whereas the purpose of the second delegation was to deliver a letter from the Goryeo court itself. And, considering Goryeo's relations with the Yuan at the time, Nakamura argues, it was difficult for Goryeo to use a letter from the Yuan to request Japan to suppress the Japanese pirates. For this argument, he points to the fact that in 1365 Goryeo received a letter from the Yuan regarding the need to suppress Japanese pirates. Still, the twelve cases of diplomatic activities between Goryeo and the Yuan in 1365 do not contain any description that the Yuan sent a letter to Goryeo on the subject of the Japanese pirates.¹⁹ Similarly, envoys were already exchanged five times in the first half of 1366 before Kim Yong left for Japan in August but there is no record that explains the purpose of the delegation in combination with the Japanese pirates during the period.²⁰

A case of Yuan involvement in the Goryeo-Japan relationship, to say nothing of the suppression of Japanese pirates, would have been a major issue for Goryeo that fought together with the Yuan against Japan in 1274 and 1281. Approximately a century earlier, the Goryeo court had struggled over how to handle an imperial letter from Kublai Khan who asked Goryeo to escort a Yuan envoy to Japan regarding its subjugation.²¹ A Yuan request

¹⁸ *Goryeosa* 133: Biography 46, entry for June 1377 (丁巳).

¹⁹ *Goryeosa* 41, entry for 1/9/1365; 2/24/1365; 2/27/1365; 3/4/1365; 3/30/1365; 4/3/1365; 4/13/1365; 9/10/1365; 10/9/1365; (intercalary month) 10/9/1365; 11/10/1365 (乙巳).

²⁰ *Goryeosa* 41, entry for 3/18/1366; 4/9/1366; 4/20/1366; 8/18/1366; 8/23/1366 (丙午).

²¹ Yi, *Wako to Nichi-Rei kankeishi*, 92-98.

on the eve of its own collapse in the late 14th century was far less a menace than that of the majestic Kublia era. But, the presence of a Yuan letter itself could carry freight on the Goryeo court. It is therefore difficult to imagine that contemporary sources would omit mention of such a letter. And, as previously stated, Goryeo's predicament with the Japanese pirates could have served as a rationale for the Yuan to take an aggressive action against the Goryeo court. In fact, the new Ming court after the fall of the Yuan also applied pressure on Goryeo several times for its inability to deal with the Japanese pirates.²² Such diplomatic strain made Goryeo fear that the Ming, as in the case of the previous Yuan, might use the issue of the Japanese pirates as a pretext to wield strong influence on its security matters.²³

All the same, it is questionable whether as of 1365 the Yuan actually had the capacity to force Goryeo to send an envoy to Japan. The History of the Yuan (*Yuanshi* 元史) makes no mention of whether the Yuan court was aware of Japanese pirate raids around 1365 or the extent of the damage they had caused. In a relative sense, the matter of the Japanese pirates was to be set aside due to the domestic turmoil from which the Yuan had helplessly and hopelessly suffered. It seems that the unredeemable fate of the Yuan required little initiative in which to send its own envoy to Japan or order Goryeo to send an envoy regarding a solution to the (Japanese) piracy.

If then, we can think about the dispatch of envoys in 1366 as a measure the Goryeo court took without an actual involvement of the Yuan court. The following excerpt is from the letter Kim Yong delivered to the Japanese court.

As per the emperor's orders, the Branch Secretariat for the Eastern Campaigns surveyed and confirmed that the border of Goryeo maintained by our branch secretariat and Japan meets with the waterway.... Since 1350, the 10th year of the Zhizheng era (1341-1368), many pirate ships have attacked. Such ships came from your territory to areas like

Happo, where our branch secretariat is located, and set government offices on fire, tormented people, and in extreme cases, didn't hesitate to take lives. For ten years, [our] ships have been unable to set to sea and [our] people have been unable to live in peace, all because the people of your islands do not fear the law of their land and head to sea to threaten and pillage [our land] out of sheer greed. Yet, upon careful consideration, we believe that given the vastness of its territory, Japan may not be aware of the detailed circumstances of its neighbors. If we were to mobilize our troops to arrest the pirates, it would ruin the friendly relations between neighbors. We have therefore decided to send a written inquiry to Japan. As such, we hope that Japan will be able to better control the islands in its territory and strictly forbid them from pillaging so that their people can no longer violate borders and exert violence. Our Branch Secretariat will now send its officials to travel through various points to finally have an audience with the sovereign of Japan, inform him of the aforementioned facts, and secure an answer before returning to our homeland. We hope that his majesty will be able to arrive at a decision and make sure to respond. Please consider the aforementioned cause behind this situation and offer a reply. The mission is carried out by Border Commander of Ten Thousand (萬戶 *manho*) Kim Eul-gwi and Border Commander of Thousand (千戶 *cheonho*) Kim Yong.²⁴

Interestingly, while officially pronouncing that it was drafted by the Branch Secretariat of the Eastern Campaigns under the Yuan emperor's orders, the letter gave little prominence to any severe damage that the Yuan had received. Actually, what the letter brought out as an example of the massive Japanese pillages was only one incident at the seaport of South Gyeong-sang Province, or Happo (today's Masan) in Goryeo.

Important is that the Branch Secretariat for the Eastern Campaigns was closed by King Gongmin in April 1356 according to his anti-Yuan pol-

²² Three such instances can be confirmed through records for 1443, 1444, and 1445 during the reign of King Sejong (r. 1418-1450) of Joseon.

²³ *Goryeosa* 113: Bibliography 26, entry for Jeong Ji.

²⁴ *Taiheiki* 39: Koraijin rai chokoto.

icies.²⁵ In this regard, Murai argued that the letter, written a decade after the abolishment of the Branch Secretariat for the Eastern Campaigns, must have been sent by Goryeo whose king used to be the actual head of the Branch Secretariat and the very person responsible for its discontinuation.²⁶ Then, it can be said that Goryeo took symbolic advantage of the authority of the Yuan, invading two times before, and authored the letter on their terms against the Japanese piracy.

This Goryeo initiative, I think, provides more space for us to answer the two questions. First, it facilitates the interpretation of the omission of Kim Yong's mission in 1366 from *Goryeosa* whose official history was not supposed to offer any clue or evidence that Goryeo borrowed the name of the Yuan without any recognition of or collaboration with the Yuan itself. The second point is that the dispatch of Kim Il in less than four months after Kim Yong's delegation departed can be construed as a careful plan of the Goryeo court with the aim of convincing the Japanese court that the first letter, delivered earlier by Kim Yong, was genuinely from the Yuan. In other words, Goryeo wanted Japan to believe that Kim Yong was acting as an envoy from the Yuan while Kim Il was delivering a separate letter from Goryeo.

Taken altogether, Goryeo began responding actively to the problem of the Japanese pirates through the diplomatic channel after witnessing the Yuan fall into a state of irretractable decadence in the late 1360s. Remarkably, the Goryeo court added weight to the anti-piracy message of its diplomacy by taking advantage of the Yuan's authority as a key mediator to solve the interstate tensions between Goryeo and Japan regarding the Japanese pirates. It means that Goryeo sought to avail itself of the unstable Yuan security during the Yuan-Ming transition period when the Yuan was preoccupied with its own borders. This approach will help explore further the way Goryeo, Japan, and the Yuan turned diplomatic and military interaction among themselves into the interest of their own national security,

²⁵ *Goryeosa* 39, entry for 5/18/1356 (丙申).

²⁶ Murai Shosuke, *Ajia no naka no chūsei nihon*, 315.

i.e., an intense dialogue between internal politics and external relations during the period.

Japan's Response to the Goryeo Envoys in 1366

How did Japan, specifically the Northern Court supported by the Muromachi bakufu, respond to the two official letters from Goryeo? Konoe Michitsugu (1332-1387) noted in March 20, 1367 that "an envoy from a foreign country, some say Goryeo, visited" (異國或人云高麗云：使者來朝).²⁷ Four days later, Sanjō Kintada (1324-1383) found that the envoys from the Mongols (Yuan) and Goryeo brought letters (蒙古并高麗使持牒狀).²⁸ The second statement hints at the Japanese high-ranking officials' reception of Kim Yong as an envoy of the Mongols and Kim Il as an envoy of Goryeo. *The Chronicle of Great Peace (Taiheiki 太平記)*, a detailed military chronicle of the Northern and Southern Courts Period, also states that "the King of Goryeo received an imperial order from the Yuan dynasty that sent seventeen envoys to Japan."

Even ten years later, the Japanese still believed that envoys came both from the Yuan and Goryeo. Konoe Michitsugu recorded in May 1376 that the letter, delivered by the Goryeo envoy Na Heung-yu (?-?) in 1375, asks for the pirates to be stopped, generally similar to the content of the letter sent during the Joji Era (1362-1368), but this latest letter is from Goryeo alone.²⁹ His description, if unwittingly, informed the fact that the Goryeo court was successful in making the Japanese believe that the letter Kim Yong delivered in 1366 was from the Yuan.

To have a better understanding of the effectiveness of the Yuan authority in Goryeo diplomacy, we cannot but recall the Mongol invasions of Japan in 1274 and 1281. According to Kaizu Ichiro, the Mongol invasions

²⁷ Konoe Michitsugu, *Gukanki* [The Journal of Konoe Michitsugu] 2 (Kyōto: Rinsen Shoten, 1967), 137.

²⁸ Sanjō Kintada, *Gogumaiki* [The Journal of Sanjo Kintada] 1 (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 1980), 109.

²⁹ Konoe Michitsugu, *Gukanki* 4 (Kyōto: Rinsen Shoten, 1967), 33.

thoroughly terrorized Japanese society and the vigorous anti-Mongolian resistance triggered full-scale reform across Japan in all aspects of the society, including politics, economy and culture, from the late Kamakura period (1192-1333).³⁰ The shock the allied Mongol-Goryeo forces provoked can be glimpsed in *Taiheiki*. “Taigen yori Nihongo komuru koto” (太元より日本を攻むる事), or the chapter that follows “Koraijin rai chokoto” in Volume 39 not only depicts how the Japanese fled *en masse* in the face of the allied Mongol-Goryeo forces and their new weapon, called as *tetsuhau* (bomb), but also illustrates the fear that the Japanese society of the day had over the foreign attack. Well aware of the meaning of ‘the Eastern Campaigns’ in the title of the Branch Secretariat for the Eastern Campaigns as a conquest of Japan in the east, the ruling class of Japan might have considered the letter Kim Yong delivered in 1366 to be a signal in which the Yuan looks for another chance to gather its troops and arrest the Japanese pirates even in Japan, namely, an implicit threat against the Japanese court. In this manner, Goryeo rekindled the Japanese memories of the Mongolian Invasions by bringing up the Yuan military organization’s name.

What was the reaction of the Muromachi bakufu to the Goryeo envoys? Kawazoe Shoji intimated that the 1366 envoys prompted the bakufu to think about vanquishing Kyushu.³¹ The dispatch of envoys in 1366, according to Kawazoe, was directly related to the replacement of Shibukawa Yoshiyuki (1348-1375) with Imagawa Ryoshun (1326-?) as Kyushu Commissioner (Kyushu *tandai*). In response to the two invasions by the allied Mongol-Goryeo forces in the 13th century, the previous Kamakura bakufu devised a plan to suppress anti-bakufu forces, including the pirates, within their own territory.³² The Muromachi bakufu also realized that the issue of the Japanese pirates would give foreign powers, such as the Yuan, a fine excuse to attack its own country.

³⁰ Kaizu Ichirō, “Genko, wako, nihonkokuo” [Yuan Invaders, Japanese Pirates, and Japanese King], *Nihonshi kōza* [Japanese History Lecture] 4 (Tōkyō: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 2004): 6.

³¹ Kawazoe Shoji, *Taigai kankei no shiteki tenkai* [Historical Development of External Relations] (Tōkyō: Bunken Shuppan, 1996).

³² Yi, *Wako to Nichi-Rei kankeishi*, 134-40.

The appointment of Imagawa Ryoshun as Kyushu Commissioner in 1370 appears to be one of the practical steps that the bakufu took. As a key member of the bakufu, Imagawa Ryoshun, whose family was also related to the distinguished Ashikaga clan in the Muromachi shogunate, served as the Secretary (*chokan* 長官) of the *Samuraidokoro* (侍所).³³ Around the time Imagawa became Kyushu Commissioner, the Southern Court maintained strong control over Kyushu. When the former Kyushu Commissioner Isshiki Noriuji (?-1369) left for Kyoto in October 1355, his son Isshiki Naouji (?-?) took over the position but also ended up heading to the capital three years later. In March 1360, the bakufu appointed Shiba Ujitsune (?-?) as the new Kyushu Commissioner; his troops attempted to conquer Dazaifu, Fukuoka in September 1362 but they were repelled by the Southern Court’s force (*Seiseifu* 征西府) in Chojahara. After careful consideration, the bakufu appointed Shibukawa Yoshiyuki as the Kyushu Commissioner in August 1365. Spending his entire appointment in the Chugoku region, however, Shibukawa never set foot in Kyushu.

Throughout the nine years between the Southern Court’s forces’ occupation of Dazaifu in 1362 and the appointment of Imagawa Ryoshun as the Kyushu Commissioner in June 1370, the Muromachi bakufu did not devote much energy to recovering Kyushu. Although Isshiki Noriuji, Isshiki Naouji, Shiba Ujitsune, and Shibukawa Yoshiyuki were all related to the Ashikaga clan, they received little support from the bakufu. For instance, Isshiki Noriuji, the Muromachi bakufu’s first Kyushu Commissioner from 1336 to 1355, complained about the difficulties of governing Kyushu. He wrote several letters claiming that he would remain in Kyushu only if certain conditions, necessary to carry out his duties, were met. In fact, the commissioner had no office of his own and was forced to stay at the Shokufuji Temple (聖福寺) in Hakata, 12-13 kilometers north of Dazaifu. Similarly, he had only twenty subordinates under his control while lacking military and financial resources required to gain control over Kyushu.³⁴

³³ *Samuraidokoro* was an office that performed military affairs and police duties under the Muromachi bakufu.

³⁴ Kawazoe Shoji, *Imagawa Ryoshun* [Critical Biography of Imagawa Ryoshun] (Tōkyō: Yoshikawa

Imagawa Ryoshun, on the other hand, departed for Kyushu with many warriors under his direct control while embarking on the journey to his new position with his family upon receiving orders to subdue the western regions.³⁵ Before arriving at his new post, he already formed close ties with a number of powerful families in the Chugoku region so as to support the rear area security while governing Kyushu. He even arranged his brother's marriage to a member of the Ouchi clan (大内氏), one of the most eminent warrior families in Western Japan of the day, in the region.³⁶ He also propelled many warriors in Kyushu into joining him in achieving governance tasks.³⁷ In other words, the bakufu let him mobilize powerful local leaders in Chugoku, create a system to support the Kyushu Commissioner, and conquer Kyushu. Kawazoe points out these moves as the major reason why Imagawa was able to avoid repeating the failures of his predecessors and successfully govern Kyushu.³⁸

As it stands, in February 1369, according to Murai Shosuke, a Ming delegation visited Prince Kaneyoshi (1329-1383) of the Southern Court to request the suppression of the Japanese pirates in Kyushu. The prince accepted the Ming proposal without holding fast to his hardline stance against the foreign powers, specifically the Ming.³⁹ In other words, Imagawa's advance into Kyushu under the bakufu's full support since the late 1360s had been such a threat to the Southern Court that Prince Kaneyoshi had to agree on the Ming's request as opposed to the Japanese pirates and acknowledge Ming's suzerainty over his domain of Kyushu. As the bakufu chose Imagawa Ryoshun as the Kyushu Commissioner and actively inter-

Kobunkan, 1964).

³⁵ Imagawa Ryoshun, *Nan Taiheiki* [Critique on the Chronicle of Great Peace] 19.

³⁶ Kawazoe, *Imagawa Ryoshun*.

³⁷ From Imagawa Ryoshun's voyage to Moji to his attack on Dazaifu, several powerful families in Chugoku supported his army as it took part in several battles. Among these were Ouchi Hiroyo (1325-1380) and his son Ouchi Yoshihiro (1356-1400), Sufu Shishin (?-?), Yamauchi Michitada (?-?), Mori Motoharu (1323-?), Kikkawa Tsunemi (?-1435), and Nagai Sadahiro (1271-1323). See Kawazoe, *Imagawa Ryoshun*, 96.

³⁸ Kawazoe, *Imagawa Ryoshun*.

³⁹ Murai Shosuke, *Ajia no naka no chusei nihon*.

vened in the political affairs of Kyushu, the Southern Court came to re-shape its external relations in a more flexible and open-ended way.

Then, the Goryeo delegations, dispatched three years before the visit of the Ming envoy to Japan, played a crucial role in expediting the changes in the Muromachi bakufu's policy for Kyushu. As for the bakufu, neglecting the Southern Court in Kyushu, the major base of the Japanese pirates, would not only hinder the unification of Japan under its hegemony, but also potentially lead to foreign invasion far from favorable to their power. It is at this juncture that Goryeo's delegation to Japan in 1366 proved a vital incentive to catalyze a series of changes that simultaneously affected the issue of the Japanese pirates in East Asia and reinvigorated the intraregional confrontation between the Northern Court, dominated by the bakufu, and the Southern Court, led by Prince Kaneyoshi, in Medieval Japan.

Concluding Remarks

Through a 17-year long passage of patient diplomacy, Goryeo, in endeavor to conceal from the Yuan court the extent of the damage the Japanese pirate attacks generated and to prevent Japan from discovering its internal and external crises, withstood harsh Japanese piracy. Kim Yong was the first envoy who left for Kyoto in August 1366 and delivered a letter from the Branch Secretariat for the Eastern Campaigns regarding the suppression of the Japanese pirate and Kim Il was the second one who departed for Kyoto in November 1366 and delivered a letter from Goryeo regarding the same agenda. To send these envoys in less than four months was designed to persuade the Muromachi bakufu in the Northern Court to take immediate action against the pirates based mostly in Kyushu. Particularly, the first delegation with the letter from the Branch Secretariat for the Eastern Campaigns made a symbolic and psychological impact on the bakufu recalling some grave memories of the Mongol Invasion in 1274 and 1281, launched by the allied forces of the Yuan and Goryeo, and realizing that the issue of the Japanese pirates could arouse Japan to foreign, Goryeo and the Yuan in specific, intervention under the veil of an anti-piracy operation. This situation might not guarantee their hegemony over the whole of Japan including

the western part, or Kyushu under the grip of the Southern Court. In this fashion, the Goryeo court took advantage of the Yuan to maximize its diplomatic goal of suppressing the Japanese pirates for national security. The arrival of the Goryeo envoys motivated the bakufu to pursue more actively the conquest of Kyushu by way of removing the Japanese pirates and overthrowing the Southern Court, in search of a constructive relationship with the new Ming after the contact of the Goryeo envoys with the Northern Court under the Muromachi bakufu at Kyoto in 1366, and to forestall any pretext for foreign intervention in Japan after the Mongol invasions in late 13th century. Hence, the diplomatic activities of Goryeo in 1366 against the Japanese pirates captures how interstate power relations among Goryeo, Japan and the Yuan marched in step with intrastate power relations of each country, viz. a dynamic confluence between internal politics and external relations in medieval East Asia.

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The Transformation of Korea-China Relations in the 19th Century: Between Autonomy and Sovereignty

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The Transformation of Korea-China Relations in the 19th Century: Between Autonomy and Sovereignty*

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Introduction

This article, along with other joint research projects, will attempt a comprehensive outline of Korea-China relations in the 19th century. This period is mainly characterized by the gradual collapse of the existing Sinocentric order (i.e., the tribute system) and the combative emergence of the new, modern order (i.e., the treaty system) following the West's advance into East Asia. Therefore, unlike the first half of the Joseon dynasty, which was not much different from the early Qing period, the changes in the East Asian order, such as the relationship between China and Japan over Joseon in the latter half, especially after the 1870s, are the focus of attention. The transition to the order based on international law was a process of accepting the new Europe-based international order of equal negotiation powers between sovereign states, each of which had inalienable independence. Still, the attitude and timing of its acceptance were quite different, and the issue of resetting the East Asian countries' bilateral relations at the same time emerged as an essential conflict.

However, as there are already so many studies on the history of Korea-China relations in the 19th century, I wish to summarize, while referring to previous studies as much as possible, Joseon's trend toward indepen-

dence from the Chinese world order and Qing's move to regard the traditional "superior-tributary state" (上國-屬邦) relations as a modern "suzerain-vassal state" (宗主國-屬國) relationship. On that note, I deliberately avoid the term "suzerainty-vassalage" (宗藩 or 宗屬) herein, which has been used elsewhere. The traditional relationship between Joseon and Qing cannot be expressed as a "suzerain-vassal state relationship" (宗藩關係), which was only used to define the hierarchical relationship between an emperor and feudal lords (藩王) in China. Many scholars have pointed out that there are no historical examples of the use of this term "suzerain-vassal state relationship" in regards to foreign relations and is, therefore, never appropriate as a concept explaining Qing's foreign relations.¹ Of course, in the 1880s, Qing defined Joseon as a vassal state (屬國/屬邦) and sought for this relationship to be internationally recognized, but this concept of "subjugation" fit within the "tributary state" (進貢國) in *The Elements of International Law* (萬國公法) and did not directly refer to a "vassal state" (封臣國). The term suzerainty or suzerain state is also a modern concept, and not a concept or term used in the traditional Sinocentric order.² Since any attempts

of such alternation were neither successful nor approved by Western countries, it is difficult to explain the relationship between Joseon and Qing in terms of a "suzerain-vassal state relationship," even though one may talk about it as the 'orientation' of Qing. Therefore, it is necessary to pay particular attention to the use of terminology when describing the Joseon-Qing relationship in the 19th century.³

Joseon-Qing Relationship in the Middle and Late 19th Century

After Joseon was subjugated by the Manchu Invasion in January 1637, Qing built a Sinocentric relationship called the Sadae system (事大秩序) with Joseon which enforced the tribute (朝貢)-investiture (冊封) relationship and tributary trade (互市) system at the border. The principles that defined this order were 'worshiping the stronger with politeness (事大以禮)' and 'comforting the weaker with kindness (字小以德),' which were, of course, the notions and duties based on the Confucian virtues—"li" (禮) and "de" (德). Such superior-tributary relations with Qing gradually became norms replacing those with Ming and remained stable until the 1870s.⁴ It is more appropriate to regard the Joseon-Qing relationship as

* This translated article is a revised version of Kim Hyungjong, "19세기 근대 한중관계의 변용: 자주와 독립 사이," *동양사학연구* 140 (September 2017): 223-70.

¹ Liu Zhiyang and Li Dalong, "'Fanshu' yu 'zongfan' bianxi - zhongguo gudai jiangyu xingcheng lilun yanjiu zhi si" [A Precise Analysis of "Vassalage" and "Suzerainty"-The 4th Study of the Theory on Territory Formation in Ancient China], *Zhongguo bianjiangshidi yanjiu* 2006-3 (2006); Chen Shangsheng, "Zhongguo chuantong duiwai guanxi yanjiu chuyi" [A Study on Traditional Chinese Foreign Relations], *Anhuishixue* 2008-1 (2008).

² For the issue of incorporating Joseon in the "Biography of Vassal States" instead of the "Biography of Foreign States," as was done previously, in *The Draft History of Qing* (清史稿) written in the beginning of the 20th century due to the influence of the situation at the end of the 19th century, see Koh Byong-ik, "Jungukjeongsa-ui oegukyeoljeon: Joseonjeon-ul jungsim-uro" [Foreign Nations in the Official Chinese History: With a Focus on Joseon], in *Dongamunhwasa-ui yeongu* [A Study on the History of East Asian Diplomacy], Koh Byong-ik (Seoul: Seoul National University Publishing Council, 1970a); Kim Hyungjong, "Junghwainmingonghwaguk-eseoui Cheongsapyeonsu-'Sincheongsu' Pyeon-chantonron-e natanan Junggukhakgye-ui baneungbunseok" [An Analysis of the Chinese Academics' Responses Revealed in People's Republic of China's Project of New Qing History], in *Jungguk-ui Cheongsagongjeong yeongu* [China's Qing History Project], Northeast Asian History Foundation, ed., (Seoul: Northeast Asian History Foundation, 2008); and Koo Bumjin, "Dongasia gukje-jilseo-ui byeondong-gwa Joseon-Qing gwangye" [The Transformation of the East Asian World Order and Joseon-Qing Relations],

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³ For the controversy regarding the Joseon-Qing Relationship, see Kang Dongkook, "Zokuho no seiji shiso-shi: 19 seiki kohan ni okeru Chosen chii mondai o meguru gensetsu no keifu" [A Politico-Philosophical History of Subang: The Genealogy of Discourse on 'the Status of Korea' in the Late 19th Century], PhD diss., University of Tokyo (2004); and Koo Sunhee, "Cheongiljeonjaeng-ui uimi: Jo-Cheong 'sokbang' gwangye-rul jungsim-uro" [The Implication of the First Sino-Japanese War: With a focus on the Qing-Joseon 'Superior-Tribute State' Relationship], *Hanguk geunhyeondaesa yeongu* 37 (2006).

⁴ For further details regarding this issue, see Chun Hae-Jong, *Han-Jung gwangyesa yeongu* [A Study on the History of Sino-Korean Relations] (Seoul: Ilchokak, 1970); Zhang Cunwu, *Qing-Han zongfanmaoyi* [The History of Qing-Joseon's Tributary Trade] (Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute of Modern History, 1978). Kim Taekjung et al., trans (Paju: Gyomoonsa, 2001); Choi So-Ja, *Myeong-Cheong sidae Jung-Han gwangyesa yeongu* [A Study on the Sino-Korean Relations in the Ming and Qing Period] (Seoul: Ewha Woman's University Press, 1997) and

“exceptional” rather than as an “exemplary” case, which is almost unique in the Sinocentric order.⁵ The assessment of the Qing emperor in the early 19th century illustrates such a point well. In 1820, Emperor Jiaqing (嘉慶帝) remarked, “Joseon has long been a tributary state and has been the most respectful.”⁶ It was not different from the previous assessment by Emperor Kangxi (康熙帝), who said, “the country [Joseon] is extremely respectful and reserved about everything, and everyone in the country is thrilled to serve.”⁷ The following emperors of Qing were equally pleased with the Sinocentric tributary relationship with Joseon.

In the middle of the 19th century, this relationship remained unchanged even in the face of the West’s expansion and growing demand for trade and diplomatic relations, which was symbolized by the advance of Western ships into East Asia. Nevertheless, Qing’s prestige had declined with its defeat in the Opium War followed by Emperor Xianfeng’s fleeing to Chengde amid the Second Opium War (a.k.a., the Arrow War). At the same time, Qing was brought to the brink of collapse due to internal crises such as the Taiping Rebellion (太平天國), the Nien Rebellion (捻軍), and the revolt of minorities, including Muslims from various peripheries of the country, all of which caused considerable turbulence in the existing regional order and Joseon’s stance on the Sadae system and its perception. Japan

also signed the Treaty of Japan and the United States in 1854 under pressure from U.S. Navy Admiral Mathew C. Perry, and signed the Treaty of Commerce between the United States and Japan in 1858. Japan, which subsequently signed a series of unequal treaties with Western countries, was also incorporated into the treaty system.

After the Second Opium War, Qing set up a separate office, known as the Zongli Yamen (總理各國事務衙門) or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in addition to the existing offices for foreign affairs such as the Ministry of Ceremony (Lipu: 禮部) and the Court of Colonial Affairs (Lifan Yuan: 理藩院). The Zongli Yamen was exclusively in charge of diplomatic relations and trade with Western countries. Furthermore, Qing permitted diplomatic envoys to be stationed in Beijing, which it had vehemently opposed previously. These facts indicated fundamental changes in the international order of East Asia. In particular, Qing’s acceptance of foreign envoys in its capital symbolized the collapse of the Sinocentric order, as the reluctance and stubborn refusal to permit a foreign envoy to be stationed in the capital, even after the signing of treaties, was also the main cause of friction and resistance in Japan and Joseon. The clash of different civilizations and world views and a paradigm shift in relations among countries characterize the international circumstances in East Asia in this period.⁸

Cheong-gwa Joseon: Geunse dongasia-ui sanghoinsik [Qing and Joseon: Mutual Perceptions of Modern East Asian Nations] (Seoul: Hyeon, 2005); Kim Key-Hiuk, *The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order: Korea, Japan, and the Chinese Empire, 1860-1882* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); _____, “19-segi jungyeop-ui dongasia gukjejeongse, geundae Han-Jung-II gwangyesa” [The Mid-19th Century East Asian State of Affairs], in *Geundae Han-Jung-II gwangyesa* [The History of Diplomatic Relations of Modern Korea, China, and Japan] (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2007a); and Zhang Liheng, *Zai chuantong yu xiandai xing zhi jian: 1626-1894 Nianjian de zhong chao guanxi* [Between Tradition and Modernity: Sino-Korean Relations from 1626 to 1894] (Beijing: Shehukexuewenxian chubanshe, 2012). Also, this paper owes much to Kim Han-Gyu, *Han-Jung gwangyesa II* [A History of Sino-Korean Relations II] (Seoul: Arche, 1999, 2002).

⁵ Lim Jongtae, “Tributary Relations between the Choson and Ch’ing Courts to 1800,” in *The Cambridge History of China*. Willard J. Peterson, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), vol. 9.

⁶ *Renjong Shilu* 仁宗實錄 (Jianqing reign, 25th year, 9th month).

⁷ *Kangxi Shilu* 康熙實錄 (Kangxi reign, 45th year, 10th month).

⁸ Kim Yong-Koo, *Segyegwanchungdol-gwa hanmal oegyosa 1866-1882* [The Clash of Worldviews and the Late Joseon’s Diplomacy 1866-1882] (Seoul: Moonji Publishing, 2001); _____, *Segye oegyosa* [The Diplomatic History of the World] (Seoul: Seoul National University Publishing Council, 2006); _____, *Geomundo-wa Vla-divostok: 19-segi Hanbando-ui pahaengjeok segyehwa gwajeong* [Geomun Island and Vladivostok: The Process of Deviant Internationalization of the Korean Peninsula] (Seoul: Sogang University Press, 2008); _____, *Yaktaljegukjuui-wa Hanbando: Segyeooegyosa heurumsok-ui Byeongin-Shinmiyangyo* [Plundering Imperialism and the Korean Peninsula: the Foreign Disturbance of 1866 and the Foreign Disturbance of 1871 in the Diplomatic History of the World] (Seoul: One, 2013); Kim Key-Hiuk, “19-segi jungyeop-ui dongasia gukje-jeongse, geundae Han-Jung-II gwangyesa” (2007a); Kang Sang-Gyu, *19-segi Dongasia-ui paradigm byeonhwan-gwa Jeguk Ilbon* [The 19th Century East Asia’s Paradigm Shift and Imperial Japan] (Seoul: Nonhyung, 2007); _____, *19-segi Dongasia-ui paradigm byeonhwan-gwa Habando* [The 19th Century East Asia’s Paradigm Shift and the Korean Peninsula] (Seoul: Nonhyung, 2008); and _____, *Joseon jeongchisa-ui balgyeon: Joseon-ui jungchijihyung-gwa munmyeongjeonhwan-ui wigi* [Discovering the Political history of Joseon: The Political Terrain of Joseon and the Crisis of Civilization Shift] (Paju: Changbi Publishers, 2013).

At the same time, the relaxation of the Sadae system due to the decline of Qing was becoming more pronounced. This being the case, the incidents in 1874 and 1881 in which Joseon's tributary delegation was plundered by a set of bandits, which was deemed unheard of and enough to lose face, illustrates these changes well.⁹ Despite contact with the West and a change in perception of it,¹⁰ Joseon, which was then dominated by powerful royal in-law families, refused to engage in commerce or sign treaties with Western countries and banned Christian missionary work, other than humanitarian measures for the ships from the West that had been adrift.¹¹ Joseon responded passively, yet persistently, in the form of an emphasis on "self-defense," fearing the possibility of opium or Christianity spreading.¹² The regime under the royal in-law families during the reign of Cheoljong had *The Annals of King Cheoljong* fabricate its fourteen years of crisis as 'a peaceful time when nothing happened,' deceiving itself that "the storm that has already entered the field of view to be a distant mountain shower."¹³

In the meantime, the government of Joseon took the position that

⁹ *Muzong Shilu* (Tongzhi reign, 15th year, 10th month); *Dejong Shilu* (Guangxu reign, 1st year, 8th month; 7th year, 7th month).

¹⁰ Won Se-Yeon, *Seosedongjeom-gwa Joseonwangjo-ui daeung: dongseoyang-ui sanghoihaewa munhogaebang* [The West's Advance into the East and Joseon's Reactions: Understanding between the West and East and Open-door policy] (Seoul: Handl, 2003); Cho Kwang, *Joseon-hugi sahoe-ui ihae* [Understanding the Late Joseon Society] (Paju: Kyungin Publishing, 2010); and Noh Dae-Hwan, "Gaebang-ui segyesajeok heureum-gwa Joseon-ui seontack: soeguk-gwa gaehang" [The Trend of Opening in the World History and Joseon's Choice: Closed-door Policy and Opening Ports], in *Joseon sidaesa* [Joseon History], Hong Soon-Min et al., ed. (Seoul: Purunyoksa, 2016), vol. 1.

¹¹ Woo Chul-Koo, "Gumi yeolang-ui tongsangyogu" [Western Powers' Demands for Trade Relations], in *Hanguksa* [The History of Korea], National Institute of Korean History, ed. (Seoul: Tamgudang, 2003a), vol. 37: 73-86.

¹² Min Tu-Ki, "19-segi huban joseonwangjo-ui daeowiguisik: Je il-cha, i-cha jungyeongjeonjaeng-gwa iyangseon chulmol-eui daeung" [The Late 19th-century Joseon's Perception of Foreign Countries: Joseon's Reactions to the First and Second Opium Wars and the Intrusions of Western Ships in Its Waters], *Dong-banghakchi* 52 (1986).

¹³ Ha Jung-Shik, *Taepyeongcheonguk-gwa Joseon* [Taiping Rebellion and Joseon] (Seoul: Jisiksanup Publications, 2008), 330.

"Our country has long been under Chinese rule, but the governance and ordinances are all taken care of by ourselves; and although it is a well-known fact that [Joseon] is affiliated with China, it is also known by everyone that [Joseon] is an autonomous country" (hereafter, 'The View of the Autonomy of the Tributary State: 屬邦自主論').¹⁴ At the same time, using the traditional logic of 'No entitlement to diplomatic relations by subjects (人臣無外交)' as an excuse, Joseon passed the matter of approaching the West to Qing. However, Qing was no longer able to move forward from its position,¹⁵ and the fact that it made no active intervention in the French campaign against Korea (*Byeonginyangyo*: 丙寅洋擾) or the United States expedition to Korea (*Sinmiyangyo*: 辛未洋擾) in 1866 and 1871 herein explains the situation well.

Even so, this practice had gradually been challenged. Even within the Qing government, the influence of the Han Chinese officials, particularly provincial superintendents and foreign affairs bureaucrats, and the landed gentry class expanded significantly as the Self-Strengthening Movement (洋務運動) began to take place after the 1860s, and their advance and actual control of the leadership even in the diplomatic arena were also prominent. Until the 1870s, however, the existing regional order was not swayed much because the treaty system of plundering imperialism did not immediately topple the Sinocentric order. In fact, it was more likely that the treaty was treated as the expansion or reorganization of the "tributary trade" (互市), which was part of the tributary system.¹⁶ Nonetheless, in the late 1860s, the Zongli Yamen (總理衙門) was trying to persuade and advise Joseon to recognize the treaty system (and Christian missionary work), and

¹⁴ *Tongmungwarnji*, vol. 11, *Ginyeonsokpyeon* (present king 15th year, wuintiao 戊寅條).

¹⁵ Shin Ki-Suk, *Hanmaloeogyosayeongu: Cheonghanjongsokgwangye-lul jungsimuro* [A Study on the Diplomatic History of the Late Joseon: With a focus on the Suzerain-vassal Relations between Qing and Joseon] (Seoul: Ilchokak, 1967), 44-51.

¹⁶ Iwai Shigeki, "Asa eki to goshi, Iwanami Kaigan Higashiajia kin gendai tsushi I higashiajia sekai no kindai" [Tribute and Mutual City, Iwanami Lecture East Asian Modern History 1 Modern East Asian World] (Iwanami Shoten, 2010); Takashi Okamoto, "Client State / Protection and Independence-Ryukyu Vietnam · Vietnam · Korea, Iwanami Lecture East Asian Modern History 1 Modern East Asian World" (Iwanami Shoten, 2010).

such attempts were met by the stubborn refusal of Joseon, which had maintained a cold relationship with Qing, though being loyal, and kept its distance to protect its autonomy.¹⁷ Despite that, Joseon, which refused to sign a treaty or commerce with the West, holding the view of the *Hua-Yi Distinction* (華夷觀) or the distinction of the civilized / Chinese versus barbarians, and also insisted on its stern position to defeat the West by force should it intrude, was not at all free from inevitable changes. It was because Western military provocations, such as the French campaign against Korea (*Byeongin yangyo*) in 1866 and the United States expedition to Korea (*Sinmi yangyo*) in 1871, continued to pressure Joseon to open. Nonetheless, the Joseon Dynasty continued to resist such provocations and refused to open its doors instead by erecting *Cheokhwabi* (斥和碑), the monument to the exclusion of Western barbarians from the country.¹⁸

Changes in East Asia in the 1870s: Challenge from Japan

The reason behind Qing's inability to escape from its opportunistic wait-and-see attitude regarding Joseon's external relations was twofold.¹⁹ On the one hand, it could not guarantee Joseon's security. On the other hand, it was a problematic issue that required a "choice" between the Sinocentric Chinese order and the international order. The Zongli Yamen, which was in charge of diplomacy with the West and Japan after its establishment, began efforts to accept the treaty system by publishing a Chinese translation of *The Elements of International Law* (萬國公法), translated by William A. P. Martin (1865), and setting up the Tongwenguan (同文館), an institute in

Beijing that taught Western languages and scientific subjects. However, since the new principle was based on the premise of order among equal sovereign states within Christian civilization, it meant the rejection and dissolution of the Sinocentric order founded upon the concept of Hua-Yi distinction. Thus, it was virtually impossible to fully accept the treaty system at that time, and Qing used it instead as a tool to check the demands of the Great Powers.²⁰

It was Japan, which was forced to "open its ports" after contact with the West, that strongly challenged the existing East Asian order in the 1870s. Japan, which was incorporated into the treaty system by the U.S., actively accepted international law after the Meiji Restoration (明治維新). Japan changed its position on signing a treaty with Qing first when its attempt to reshape Joseon's relationship out of the Sadae system (事大交鄰) was thwarted. The Zongli Yamen at first refused to sign an equal treaty with Japan, which had long been outside the Sinocentric order, but eventually agreed to sign the Tianjin Treaty (清·日修好條規) in September 1871, following suggestions by Zeng Guofan (曾國藩) and Li Hongzhang (李鴻章) that this could serve Qing's interests if used well. Qing tried to prevent Japan from keeping China in check in collusion with the West, and also to control its ambitions for Joseon.²¹ A smooth transition of the two countries,

¹⁷ Mary C. Wright, "The Adaptability of Ch'ing Diplomacy," *Journal of Asian Studies* 173 (1958).

¹⁸ Woo Chul-Koo, *19-segi yeolgang-gwa Hanbando* [The 19th Century Great Powers and the Korean Peninsula] (Paju: Bopmunsa, 1999); Kim Yong-Koo, *Segyegwanchungdol-gwa hanmal oegyosa 1866-1882* (2001); _____, *Yaktaljegukjuui-wa Hanbando: Segyeoogyosa heurumsok-ui Byeongin-Shinmiyangyo* (2013); Kim Won-Mo 金源模, "Daewongun-ui daeoejeongchaek" [The Dawongun's foreign policy], in *Hanguksa* (2003a), vol. 37.

¹⁹ Zhang Liheng (2012), 127-45.

²⁰ Kang Sang-Gyu (2007); Kim Yong-Koo (2008); Kawashima Shin, "Jungguk-eseo mangukgongbeop-ui suyong-gwa geu iyong: jugwon-gaenyeom-e jumokhayeo" [China's Adoption and Use of International Law: On the Concept of Sovereignty], *Concepts and Communication* 18 (2016).

²¹ Wang Ermin, *Lihongzhang yu zhong ri ding yue (1871)* [Li Hongzhang and the Sino-Japanese Contract (1871)] (Taipei: Zhongyang yan jiu yuan jindai shi yan jiu suo, 1981); Gwon Hyeoksoo, *19-segimal Han-Jung gwangyesa yeongu: Li Hongzhang-ui Joseon insik-gwa jeongchaek-ul jungsim-uro* [A History of Korea-China Relations in the Late 19th Century: With a Focus on Li Hongzhang's Perception and Policy toward Joseon] (Seoul: Baeksan Jaryeowon, 2000); Cho Byong-Han, "Haebang cheje-wa 1870-nyeondae Li Hongzhang's Yang-muwundong" [The System of Maritime Defense and Li Hongzhang's Modernization Movement in the 1870s], *Dongyang-sahakyongu* 88 (2004); Kim Key-Hiuk, "Guendaechogi-e isseoseo Han-Cheong-II gwangye-ui jeongae: Gapsin jeongbyeon-e michin yeonghyang-ul jungsim-uro" [The Transformation of the Korea-China-Japan Relations in the Early Modern Era: With a Focus on the Impact on Gapsin Coup], in *Geundae Han-Jung-II gwangyesa* [The History of Diplomatic Relations of Modern Korea, China, and Japan] (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2007c); Li Xizhu, "Li Hongzhang-ui daeil insik-gwa oegyochaekryak: 1870-nyeondae-lul jungsim-uro" [Li Hongzhang's Perception of Japan and His Diplomatic Strategies in the 1870s], *Dongbuga Yeoksa*

especially one of which was the center of the Sinocentric order and the other the periphery of it, into the new relationship of equality and reciprocity set by the order of the international law, was possible because Japan had been the longstanding outsider of China's tributary circle.

What is noteworthy is that Article 1 of the Tianjin Treaty stipulates that, "The two countries' territories (所屬邦土), while respecting *li* (禮) bilaterally, could be permanently secured by not intruding borders." The intention of Qing [Li Hongzhang] was to keep Japan in check by interpreting the term "邦土" to denote "vassal state" (邦) and "inland" (土) to keep its suzerainty over Joseon and other subjugated states as nonaggression targets. In contrast, Japan, which desired to break Joseon away from China's subjugation, did not agree.²² As a result, Japan provoked Joseon in 1875 by way of the Ganghwa Island Incident or Unyoho Incident (雲揚號事件). The incident was recognized as an illegal and planned provocation as the Okubo Toshimichi (大久保利通) regime had planned to free itself of the predicament of domestic politics. Materials released to the public in 2002 confirmed again that the official report was fabricated right after the incident.²³ The following January, when Mori Arinori (森有禮) was dispatched to Beijing as an ambassador, he again raised the issue by saying "Joseon is a vassal state (屬國) of China only in name." In response, the Zongli Yamen replied, "[Qing] has never engaged in the internal affairs [of Joseon], and negotiations with foreign countries are made autonomously in that country

Nonchong 32 (2011).

²² Shin Ki-Suk (1967), 46-48.

²³ Yi Taejin, "Unyangho sageon-ui jinsang: sageon gyeongwi-wa ilbongukgi geyangseol-ui jin" [The Truth of the Un'yo Incident: The Circumstances and Truth of the Japanese Flag], *Joseon-ui jeongchi-wa sahoe* [The Politics and Society of Joseon] (Seoul: Jipmoondang, 2002); _____, "1876-nyeon Ganghwadojoyak-ui myeongam" [The Light and Shade of the 1876 Ganghwa Treaty], *Hanguksasimingangjwa* 36 (2005); Suzuki Akira, "Un'yo' kanchō Inoue Yoshika no Meiji 8-nen 9 tsuki 29 hidzuke no Kokato jiken hokoku-sho" [Unyo' Captain Inoue Yoshika's Ganghwa Island Incident Report on September 29, 1888], *Shigaku zasshi*: 111-12 (2002); Kim Heung-Soo, *Han-Il gywangye-ui guendaejeok gaepyeongwajeong* [The Modernization of Korea-Japan Relations] (Seoul: Seoul National University Publishing Council, 2009); Kim Jong-Hak, "Joilsuhogogyu-nun poham-oegyo-ui sanmulioessneunga" [Was the Treaty of Gangwha a Result of Ggunboat Diplomacy?], *Yeoksabi-pyeong* 114 (2016).

and hence cannot be forced upon each other."²⁴ Li Hongzhang also revealed the same attitude, saying, "Who does not know that Goryeo has been a vassal state of China for thousands of years?"²⁵ Confirming Qing's intention to not intervene in such a matter, Japan was more active in establishing diplomatic relations with Joseon, and the two countries resumed their negotiations when King Gojong, who began direct rule (親政) in December 1873, agreed to improve relations with Japan, which was proposed by Park Gyu-su (朴珪壽) and others.²⁶ Qing spoke of its determination to inform Joseon in advance of Japan's intentions or about related matters to take precautions against and offered no opposition to "friendly relations (修好)" between Joseon and Japan, but did not intervene further.²⁷ Subsequently, it was slightly different from the previous "no-intervention" position when Li Hongzhang advised Joseon to agree to the demands of Japan because he was in a dispute with Britain and France.²⁸

In January 1876, under the pretext of resolving the case of the Gang-

²⁴ *Qing Guangxu Chao-Zhong-Ri jiaoshe shiliao* [Historical Document on Negotiations among Korea, China and Japan during Emperor Guangxu of the Qing Dynasty] (Guangxu 1st year, 12th month, 21st day; 2nd year, 1st month, 30th day); *Geundae Hanguk oegyomunseo* [Diplomatic Documents of Modern Korea], vol. 3. (2009): 286-87 & 319-20.

²⁵ *Qing Guangxu Chao-Zhong-Ri jiaoshe shiliao* (Guangxu 2nd year, 1st month, 30th day); *Geundae Hanguk oegyomunseo* (2009), 294-97 & 303-12; *Li Hongzhang Quanjī* [The Collected Works of Li Hongzhang], vol. 31, letter 3, 339-42.

²⁶ Tahohashi Kiyoshi, *Kindai Nissen kankei no kenkyū* [A Study of Modern Japan-Korea Relations], 2 vols (Keijo: Chosen Sotokufu Chosen Shi Henshukai [Government-General of Korea's Joseon History Research Committee], 1940), Kim Jong-Hak trans. (Seoul: Ilchokak, 2013, 2016); Choi Deok-Soo, "Ganghwado joyak-gwa gaehang" [Ganghwado Treaty and Opening Ports], in *Hanguksa*, vol. 37 (2003): _____, *Gaehang-gwa Jo-Il gwangye: Sanghoinsik-gwa jeongchaek* [Port Opening and Joseon-Japan Relations: Perceptions and Policies toward Each Other] (Seoul: Korea University Press, 2004); Song Byung-Ki, *Hanguk, Miguk-gwaui cheatman-nam: daemigaeguksaron* [Korea's First Encounter with the United States: The History of Its Opening ports to the United States] (Seoul: Godswinbook, 2005); and Yiyuan Zezhou, *Jin dai Chaoxian de kai gang: yi Zhong Mei Ri san guo guan xi wei zhong xin* [Modern Korean Opening to Foreign Merchants: Centering on the Relationship among China, America and Japan] (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2008).

²⁷ Quan Hexiu, *Tangshaoyi zai jindai chaoxian shiliu nian huodong kao shu, dongya shijie de liebian yu jindai hua* (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2013), 38-53.

²⁸ It also meant a breach of the wait-and-see policy that Qing had maintained on Joseon by that time. Please, refer to Kim Yong-Koo (2001), 182-92; _____, (2006), 430-32; Zhang Liheng (2012), 143.

hwa Island Incident, Japan appointed Kuroda Kiyotaka (黒田清隆) as ambassador and Inoue Kaoru (井上馨) as deputy ambassador to Joseon to demand a treaty and open trade with all kinds of threats and menaces. In Joseon, where the focus was on the handling of the Ganghwa case (the issue of liability and reparations was not dealt with at all even in the actual treaty), opposition arose against the sudden opening of the country and trade request, but finally it approved the signing of the treaty only three days after reading the draft. The Japan-Korea Treaty of 1876 was, in fact, a copy of the unequal treaty the West had imposed on Japan. Japan inserted the phrase “Joseon holds equal rights with Japan as a sovereign state” in Article 1. As Joseon regarded itself as having sovereignty over domestic affairs and diplomacy, it did not view this provision as “independence” from China, and thus thought that it did not affect the Sinocentric order. While Joseon weighed the restoration of a friendly relationship while avoiding opposition from conservatives, Japan regarded it as an acceptance of the international order, which was more or less a one-sided interpretation. If this were true, then Joseon would have immediately started signing treaties with other Western countries, but this did not happen.²⁹ The fact that negotiations over the selection of ports to open and the collection of tariffs ran into difficulties shows that both parties did not make sufficient preparations before the signing of the treaty. Among other things, Japan needed the notable achievement of having Joseon sign the treaty under duress, and a considerable number of the provisions were hastily improvised on Ganghwa Island.³⁰

In the late 1870s, when the Tianjin Treaty and the Treaty of Shimonoseki (日·清 修好條規) were concluded, Qing also had to actively respond to the Japanese moves, as Japan annexed Ryukyu Island (琉球) in 1879, which had previously been a tribute state of Qing. Japan’s expansion abroad was a sensitive issue that directly touched on the territorial and border issues of Qing. As the most important tributary state of China, Joseon

²⁹ Choi Deok-Soo (2003).

³⁰ Kim Jong-Hak (2016).

could become the next example, and if that happened, Manchuria (滿洲) and even Beijing could be in danger.³¹

Moreover, around this time, Qing was at odds with Russia over the Russian occupation of Yili (伊犁) (1871). Russia took advantage of the chaos in the Xinjiang (新疆) area and Yaqub Beg’s revolt so Qing could not take a hardline policy on the Ryukyu issue. Qing dispatched Zuo Zongtang (左宗棠) to quell the rebellion of Xinjiang and Chonghou (崇厚) in order to solve the problem of Yili, but since the Livadia Treaty (1879) was of great advantage to the Russian side, Qing refused to ratify the treaty and again sent Zeng Jize (曾紀澤) to demand a revision of the treaty. The Yili conflict was settled by the signing of the St. Petersburg Treaty in 1881, but by going through this ordeal, Qing gradually realized the necessity of utilizing the concepts of borders and sovereignty in order to defend its soil and prevent Russian threats.³² Consequently, Qing strengthened its border regions in Xinjiang and Manchuria in preparation for a Russian confrontation and attempted significant policy changes in the selection and dispatch of competent senior-rank Han-Chinese local officials. Traditionally, the Qing Dynasty had ruled out the appointment of Han Chinese officials in the regions of Xinjiang and Manchuria. This policy shift, from one that made an explicit distinction between inland and outer regions to one which expanded the internal governance system by installing administrative districts in the border regions, achieved significant results as demonstrated by the performance of Wu Dacheng (吳大澂) in Manchuria.³³ As a result, Sinicization

³¹ Choi Hee-Jae, “Gwangseocho (1875-1885) chejejeongbi-ui yeongu” [A Study of the System Reformation in the Early Guangxu Era], PhD diss. (Seoul National University, 1997), 232-56; Kim Yong-Koo, *Segye oegyosa* [The Diplomatic History of the World] (Seoul: Seoul National University Publishing Council, 2006), 306-07; Kang Sang-Gyu, *19-segi Dongasia-ui paradigm byeonhwan-gwa Habando* [The 19th Century East Asia’s Paradigm Shift and the Korean Peninsula] (Seoul: Nonhyung, 2008), 211-47; Okamoto Takashi, “Ilbon-ui ryukyu byeonghap-gwa dongasiajilseo-ui jeonhwan: Cheongilsuhogogyu-lul jongsim-uro” [Japan’s Annexation of Ryukyu and the Transformation of the East Asian Order, with Special Reference to the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Amity], *Dongbuga Yeoksa Nonchong* 32 (2011).

³² Kim Yong-Koo (2006), 308-11.

³³ Kim Hyungjong, “Wudaecheng-gwa 1880-nyeondae Cheong-Reo dongbugukgyeonggamgye” [Wu Daecheng and the 1880s Sino-Russia Border Demarcation], *Korean Studies of Modern*

(漢化) or localization (內地化) began to a significant extent in the border regions and in the Manchuria area.

Around the same time, Qing made changes in its strategy and began to intervene more actively to retain Joseon and to induce Joseon to enter into a treaty system with other countries and start trade relations. Still, it was a diversionary tactic to rely on the international order to utilize Western countries and also to maintain the traditional Sinocentric order.³⁴ That reflected the early days of Emperor Guangxu when the regime's readjustment achieved some success and the spread of the restoration of the tradition, and the strengthening of the activities by the Han Chinese officials (清流派) who advocated a hardline foreign policy, which led to the emergence of nationalist diplomacy.³⁵

Relationship between Joseon and Qing in the 1880s: Toward Sovereignty in Joseon and Conflict with Qing's Vassalage System

1. Policy Transformation of Qing and Joseon: Opening the Gate and Intervention Policy

As the sense of crisis in Qing deepened with the view that “all our outer fences are being cut off,” opinions began to arise that Qing should be more actively involved with the situation in Joseon.³⁶ In particular, it was the

Chinese History 60 (2013).

³⁴ Wang Mingxing, *Hanguo jindai wajiao yu zhongguo (1861-1910)* [Korea's Modern Diplomacy and China (1861-1910)] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 1998).

³⁵ Choi Hee-Jae (1997).

³⁶ Many studies have dealt with Qing's transition of Joseon policy. For instance, see Song Byung-Ki, *Geundae Han-Jung gwangyesa yeongu: 19 segimal-ui yeonmiron-gwa Jo-Cheong gyoseop* [A Study on Modern Sino-Korean Relations: Arguments for Forming Ties with the US and Joseon-Qing Relations] (Seoul: Dankook University Press, 1985); _____, “Gaehang chogi-ui jocheonggwangye” [The Sino-Korea Relations in the Early open-port period] and “Jo-Mi joyak-ui chaegyool” [The Conclusion of the Joseon-US Treaty], in *Hanguksa* (2003a, 2003b), vol. 37; _____, *Hanguk, Miguk-gwau cheotmannam: daemigaeguksaron* (2005); Kwon Sok-Bong, *Cheongmal daeJoseon jeongchaeksa yeongu* [A Study on the History of the Late Qing's Policies

memorial from Ding Richang (丁日昌) to the emperor in 1879 that led to this transition. He argued that Qing should retain Joseon by letting it sign treaties with other countries while providing fully secured secret military aid.³⁷ When several similar opinions were voiced, the Zongli Yamen (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), through Li Hongzhang, decided to urge Joseon to sign treaties with the West. Accordingly, Li sent a letter which recommended the promotion of the treaty system and commerce with the Western Powers, to Yi Yuwon (李裕元), with whom Li had previously been in contact.³⁸ Li suggested that it would be better to use measures “attacking poison with poison and controlling an enemy with an enemy” to keep Japan in check through treaties with the Western countries.³⁹ At the same time, the Zongli Yamen also showed its intention to mediate Joseon's negotiations [從中排解] with other countries. Such a policy shift of “help [the vassal state] with measures in place [借箸代籌]” revealed that the Qing

toward Joseon] (Seoul: Ilchokak, 1986); Koo Sunhee, *Hanguk gundae daeCheong jeongchaeksa yeongu* [A Study on the History of Modern Korean Policies toward Qing] (Seoul: Hyeon, 1999) and “19-segi huban Joseonsahoe-wa jeongtongjeok jogonggwangye-ui seonggyeok” [The 19th Century Joseon Society and the Traditional Tributary Relationship], *Sahakyeongu* 80 (2005); Quan Hexiu, *19-segimal Han-Jung gwangyesa yeongu: Li Hongzhang-ui Joseon insik-gwa jeongchaek-ul jungsim-uro* [A History of Korea-China Relations in the Late 19th Century: With a focus on Li Hongzhang's Perception and Policy toward Joseon] (Seoul: Baeksan Jaryeowon, 2000); Kim Yong-Koo (2001, 2006); Okamoto Takashi, *Zokkoku to jishu no aida-kindai seikan kankei to Higashi-ajia no meiu* [Between Client State and Independence-Modern Seikan Relations and the Fate of East Asia] (Nagoya: Nagoyadaigaku shuppankai, 2004); _____, *Sekai no naka no Nisshin kankeishi: kōrin to zokkoku, jishu to dokuritsu* [The History of Sino-Korean Relations: Neighbour and Vassal, Autonomy and Independence], trans. Kang Jina 강진아 (Seoul: Sowadang, 2009); and Kirk W. Larsen, *Tradition, Treaties, and Trade: Qing Imperialism and Chosŏn Korea, 1850-1910* (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2008).

³⁷ Ding Richang, “Ci hui ban Nanyang haifang shufu qingdan” (Guangxu 5th year, 4th month, 25th day), *Ding Richang Ji*, vol. 1, book 12: 208-13.

³⁸ “Beiyang Minister Li Hongzhang's Letter issued by the General Office,” (Guangxu 5th year, 7th month, 13th day), *Qingji Zhong-Ri-Han guanxi shiliao*, vol. 2: 363-69 (Korean trans. vol. 3: 21-43). The letters between Li Hongzhang and Yi Yuwon are all documented in *Geundae hanguk oegyomunseo* (2009), vol. 3 & 4, and for more details about their correspondences, refer to Song Byung-Ki (1985), 12-50; and Quan Hexiu (2000), 38-51.

³⁹ “Beiyang Minister Li Hongzhang's letter issued by the General Office” (Guangxu 5th year, 7th month, 13th day), *Qingji Zhong-Ri-Han guanxi shiliao*, vol. 2: 363-69, (Korean trans. vol. 3: 28-30; 37-41); *Geundae Hanguk oegyomunseo* (2009), vol. 4: 279-80.

stance on Joseon had changed from the view of “laissez-faire theory” to a full display of Chinese suzerainty, and that the superior state had taken the initiative to change its existing policy in relation to its vassal state.⁴⁰

Of course, this cautious approach was not the only option explored in and out of the Qing government. He Ruzhang (何如璋), who was well aware of the situation in East Asia as the first ambassador to Japan, wrote a letter to the Zongli Yamen in April 1880. The letter proposed three options. First, merging and localizing Joseon directly into China would be the best plan. Second, sending Chinese political leaders to manage the internal affairs and diplomatic relations on behalf of Joseon would be the next best plan. Finally, advising Joseon to sign treaties with Western countries would be the least effective plan.⁴¹ When the situation in Joseon had changed significantly, He Ruzhang submitted “A Discussion on Joseon Foreign Policy (主持朝鮮外交議)” to the Zongli Yamen, excluding the merger plan, and instead proposing a plan to send Qing officials to learn about the internal and external affairs of Joseon. Contrary to what he claimed in the previous proposal, he suggested that the immediate dispatch of officials might be problematic, and so the government should adopt a measure to keep the power balance between the East and West by letting Joseon sign treaties with the West.⁴²

Importantly, He Ruzhang was concerned that “if Joseon were allowed to make a treaty with other countries, all others would regard it as a sovereign state and it would no longer be regarded as a vassal state of China.” His nationalist diplomacy standpoint deserves credit for its apparent intention to reshape the traditional order into modern international relations and at the same time, to position Joseon as a vassal state of China as de-

finied in *The Elements of International Law*.⁴³ Attempts to effectively replace the previous relationship of *Hua-Yi* distinction with that of a suzerain-vassal state under international law set the tone for Joseon policy from the 1880s, particularly since Han-Chinese officials were leading the diplomatic effort. His proposal said, “We can have it say ‘Joseon wishes to make a treaty by order of the Great Qing,’ in the treaty with Western countries,” and then the so-called “Vassal State Clause” was introduced.

However, Li Hongzhang believed in “maintaining and protecting [it] secretly” [密爲維持保護] for fear of backlash from Joseon and other countries. Li suggested to the Zongli Yamen that he would take his time and advise Joseon appropriately while looking at opportunities.⁴⁴ Although the Zongli Yamen agreed to this cautious approach, this policy discussion gave Li full authority over Joseon policy at the same time. In early 1881, based on a proposal from Li, the Zongli Yamen announced that it approved the proposal that the Superintendent of Trade for the North (Beiyang) [i.e., Li Hongzhang] and an envoy of the Chinese Legation in Japan directly exchange documents with Joseon on urgent matters, but that Beijing be frequently informed of these matters. It meant that Li was solely in charge of Joseon policy, and not the Libu (禮部) which had previously been in charge of the tributary relationship.⁴⁵

Before that, He Ruzhang took on the crucial role of promoting Joseon’s treaty with the U.S. In August 1880, He donated *A Strategic Policy for Joseon* (私擬朝鮮策略), which was a book written by Councilor Huang Junxian (黃遵憲), to Kim Hongjip, who was on his second visit to Japan. In short, *A Strategic Policy for Joseon* spoke directly. “There is nothing more

⁴⁰ “Beiyang Minister Li Hongzhang’s Letter Issued by the General Office” (Guangxu 5th year, 7th month, 13th day), *Qingji Zhong-Ri-Han guanxi shiliao*, vol. 2: 363 (Korean trans. vol. 3: 31-32).

⁴¹ Wu Daoxuan, “He zhang shi jia chuan” [The Records of the He (何) Family], from Wu Zhenqing and Deng Zhengli, *He Ruzhang ji* [Works of He Ruzhang] (Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Publishing House, 2010): 378-79.

⁴² He Ruzhang, “Zhuchi chaoxian waijiao yi” [A Discussion on Joseon Foreign Policy], from Wu Zhenqing and Deng Zhengli (2010), 93 and *Geundae Hanguk oegyomunseo* (2009), vol. 4: 287-88.

⁴³ Suzuki Tomoo, “Chu kuni ni okeru kuni 權 Shugi-teki gaiko-ron no seiritsu” [Establishment of Nationalist Diplomatic Theory in China], *Rekishikenkyu* 404 (1974); Song Byung-Ki (1985: 51-90); Wang Mingxing (1998).

⁴⁴ Li Hongzhang, “Fu zong shu lun weichi chaoxian” [General Office’s Discussion on Joseon], (Guangxu 6th year, 11th month, 21st day), *Li Hongzhang quanji*, vol. 32, letter 4: 639.

⁴⁵ “Zongli geguo shiwu yamen zou chaoxian yi lianluo waijiao biantong jiuuzhi zhe” [Zhongli Yamen in Charge of Changing Diplomatic Relations with Joseon] (Guangxu 7th year, 1st month, 25th day), *Qing Guangxu Chao-Zhong-Ri jiaoshe shiliao*, vol. 2, 31a-32a; Song Byung-Ki (1985), 103-118; Quan Hexiu (2000), 59-61.

urgent than stopping Russia today. What would be the strategy to stop Russia? Be close to China, cultivate national strength by signing a treaty with Japan, and establish relations with the United States.”⁴⁶ It held the view that even after being incorporated into the system of international law, Joseon should retain its status as a vassal state of China and rely more on Qing for military, economic, and diplomatic purposes.

Around the same time, there were similar signs of change in Joseon. In late 1875, Yi Yuwon began exchanging secret correspondence with Li Hongzhang. Such correspondence, which would have been taboo under the principle of ‘no diplomatic relations by subject’ (人臣無外交), began at the end of 1875 and reached a total of seventeen exchanges. Through this communication, Li attempted to maintain the traditional tribute system while curbing Russian and Japanese encroachments by incorporating Joseon into the treaty system. Joseon also sought to suppress public opposition and secure support to obtain knowledge and information for negotiations with Japan.⁴⁷ However, despite the recommendations in the 10th letter of 1879, Joseon refused them all, including signing a treaty, opening its doors, and trading with the West.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, change was apparent, Joseon later entered negotiations with the U.S. to strengthen its military power [武備密修策]. It was not until 1880 that military reforms began in earnest, but these reforms ended when the Imo Military Revolt broke out in 1882. *Yeongseongsa* (領選使) Kim Yunshik, the envoy that King Gojong sent with students to Tianjin to learn new culture (especially, weapon manufacture and use), returned to Joseon with the Qing army on September 14, 1882. Most of the students also left China early to return home.⁴⁹ The fact that the Joseon government installed the Office of State Affairs [Tong-

⁴⁶ Huang Zunxian, *Chaioxian Celue* [Joseon Strategy], annotated Cho Il-Mun, trans. (Seoul: Konkuk University Press, 1977), 1-52.

⁴⁷ Song Byung-Ki (1985), 12-23; Quan Hexiu (2000), 13-51.

⁴⁸ “The Letter of Joseon’s Former Ambassador Yi Yuan,” (Guanxu, 5th year, 11th month, 12th day), *Qing-ji Zhong-Ri-Han guanxi shiliao*, vol. 2: 399-401 (Korean trans. vol. 3: 59-63); *Geundae Hanguk oegyomunseo* (2009), vol. 4: 283-84.

⁴⁹ Kwon Sok-Bong (1986), 147-88; Koo Sunhee (1999), 25-64; Quan Hexiu (2000), 52-65; Kim Yong-Koo (2001), 310-21.

nigimuamun 統理機務衙門] in January 1881 and placed twelve ministries under it, including tributary relationship, diplomatic relations, and military matters, in order to implement the policy of strengthening its military power demonstrates that policy changes between Qing and Joseon took place at around the same time.⁵⁰

At any rate, Li Hongzhang, grasping the policy shift of Joseon, contacted the U.S. side again to discuss the signing of the treaty by Admiral Robert W. Shufeldt, who visited Tianjin again. At that time, Li tried to specify Joseon’s subjugation to Qing in the treaty by inserting the Vassal State Clause (屬邦條項), which said “Joseon has traditionally been a vassal state of China but with autonomy for domestic policies and diplomacy.” However, the Qing attempt encountered difficulties because Shufeldt refused to accept it during the five rounds of talks from March to mid-April 1882. In the end, a compromise was reached where this condition could be removed from the treaty as long as this condition was reported to the U.S. State Department. Finally, a draft of the fifteen articles was prepared, and on May 22, 1882, Joseon signed The Joseon-American Treaty of Amity and Commerce (朝美修好通商條約) [also known as the US-Korea Treaty of 1882] at Jemulpo Port. Joseon delivered the Vassal State specification separately to Shufeldt to be sent to the U.S. State Department.⁵¹ After the conclusion of the treaty between Joseon and the U.S., Joseon signed treaties with the United Kingdom (June 6, 1882), Germany (June 30, 1882), Russia

⁵⁰ For further details of Zongli Yamen and policy changes afterward, refer to Chun Hae-Jong, “Tongrigimuamun seolchi-ui gyeongwi-e tachayeo” [On the Establishment of the Zonglijiwu Yamen], *Yoksa Hakbo* 歷史學報, 17•18 (1962); Lee Kwang-Rin, “Tongrigianmun-uj jojik-gwa gineung” [The Organization and Functions of the Zongli Yamen], *Daehanmingukhaksulwon Nonmunjip*, 26 (1987); Chun Miran, “Tongrigyoseoptongsangamun-e gwanhan yeongu” [A Study on the Zongli jiashe tongshang shiwu yamen], *Idaesawon*, 24•25 (1989); Han Cheolho, *Hanguk geundae gaehwapa-wa tongchigigu yeongu* [The Reformists and Government Institutions in the Late Joseon Period] (Seoul: Sunin, 2009); and Sakai Hiromi, *Kaiko-ki no Chosen 戰略-Teki gaiko 1882-1884* [Korea’s Strategic Diplomacy during the Opening-Port Period, 1882-1884] (Osaka: Osakadaigaku shup-pankai, 2016).

⁵¹ For further details of the US-Korea Treaty of 1882, refer to Song Byung-Ki (1985), 219-22; Song Byung-ki (2003b), 283-302; Quan Hexiu (2000), 66-91; Kim Yong-Koo (2001), 306-21 & 336-69; Kim Yong-Koo (2006), 458-67; Ihara Takushu (2008), 157-226. The treaty document can be found in *Geundae Hanguk oegyomunseo* (2009), vol. 4: 480-83.

(July 7, 1884), and France (June 1886).⁵²

The introduction of a so-called treaty system to Joseon, as in the case of China, would be assessed as a transition from Japan's "monopolistic imperialism" to "multilateral imperialism."⁵³ In reality, it was a new attempt by Qing to pursue its suzerain policy and find common ground between the tribute system and the treaty system in Joseon.⁵⁴ This move contributed to the escalation of numerous conflict points with Joseon, which had been attempting to establish sovereignty in the international order. The Vassal State Clause, which Li Hongzhang worked hard to secure, was difficult to accept even in an international legal sense. Consequently, the U.S. and other countries who later signed treaties with Joseon found little meaning in it. Nonetheless, this clause continued to be effective until the signing of the Joseon-Austria Treaty of 1892.⁵⁵

2. Joseon-Qing Relationship in the 1880s: Between Autonomy and Sovereignty

1) Announcement of the China-Korea Treaty of 1882

After signing treaties with Japan and the U.S., Joseon felt the need to make a new treaty with Qing and also wanted to address the issue of hierarchy with Qing. In the fall of 1881 and April of the following year, Eo Yunjung and the Joseon delegates visited Tianjin to discuss these issue with Li Hongzhang and Zhou Fu (周馥). They raised questions concerning the dispatch of a diplomatic mission and residency of an ambassador and proposed that the Joseon legation be stationed in Beijing. If that occurred, then this would end the practice of sending delegates for tributes and memorials to the emperor, and the travel expenses and cost of food supplies for envoys

⁵² Kim Yong-Koo (2001), 370-433; Kim Yong-Koo (2006), 474-89; Woo Chul-Koo (2003b), 303-17; Koo Sun-hee (2005), 160.

⁵³ Karl W. Larsen (2008).

⁵⁴ Quan Hexiu (2000), 89-90.

⁵⁵ Shin Ki-Suk (1967), 58-66; Woo Chul-Koo (2003b), 303-17; Koo Sunhee (2005), 160.

would be abolished.⁵⁶ This bold request for a change in the system caused an adverse reaction from Qing, which considered it to be a presumptuous request from a vassal state. As a result, an imperial edict was issued, stating, "From now on, the Zongli Yamen is in charge of reviewing and handling trade issues with Joseon. Adjust to the old system and have Libu deal with Joseon's tributes and memorials with the pre-existing regularity. The issue of the Joseon ambassador residing in Beijing, as requested by Joseon, has many obstacles, so this will not be allowed."⁵⁷ In short, Qing permitted trade, but flatly rejected the conversion of diplomatic envoys to modern relations, as symbolized by the legation in Beijing. Taking Joseon's request as a slight, Qing intended to completely deny any changes in the superior-subordinate relations between the two countries.

At any rate, it was not until October after the upheaval due to the Imo Military Revolt had been settled, and Eo Yunjung, Zhou Fu, and Ma Jianzhong prepared The Joseon-Qing Communication and Commerce Rules (中國, 朝鮮商民水陸貿易章程) [also known as the China-Korea Treaty of 1882]. As Zhou Fu and Ma Jianzhong explained, "A treaty with another country is bound to be made only after waiting for the counterpart country's ratification, but the current treaty is specially allowed by the government," indicating that the treaty was made under the unilateral leadership of Qing.⁵⁸ Thus, unlike a treaty, these Rules became effective with the approval of the Qing emperor after Li Hongzhang sent a memorial to the emperor, and Joseon was forced to "comply with respect and treat it accordingly" (欽遵辦理).⁵⁹ In this process, Qing had effectively demonstrated the

⁵⁶ "Chaioxian guowang zi qing zai yi kai kou'an jiaoyi bing pai shi zhu jing wen" [The King of Joseon Asks for trade at the Port and for a Dispatch of an Envoy to the Capital] (Guanxu 8th year, 4th month, 29th day), *Qingji Zhong-Ri-Han guanxi shiliao*, vol. 3: 16b; *Geundae Hanguk oegyomunseo* (2013), vol. 6: 556.

⁵⁷ "Junji chu ji li bu deng shang yu" [The Military Aircraft Department Sends a Letter to the Ministry of Gifts] (Guanxu 8th year, 4th month, 29th day), *Qingji Zhong-Ri-Han guanxi shiliao*, vol. 3: 18b; *Geundae Hanguk oegyomunseo* (2013), vol. 6: 558.

⁵⁸ "Zhao lu jin haiguan zhou dao houbo dao madao fu yu yun zhong jielue," *Qingji Zhong-Ri-Han guanxi shiliao*, vol. 3: 984; *Geundae Hanguk oegyomunseo* (2013), vol. 6: 588.

⁵⁹ Originally "中國, 朝鮮商民水陸貿易章程" [The Joseon-Qing Communication and Commerce

reorganization of the traditional superior-tributary state relationship into a modern, documented “unequal” relationship, using the form of a modern treaty. The same can be seen in the deceptive phrasing of how Qing secured its privileges in written form by declaring that, “[the treaty] is meant to do a favor for its vassal state” in its preface to exclude other countries receiving most-favored-nation privileges.

The China-Korea Treaty illustrated the transitional nature of maintaining the traditional tribute system and allowing modern trade relations. The treaty was made based on an asymmetrical relation, as shown in Article 1, which states: “Qing permits the Superintendent of Beiyang to dispatch a commissioner of commercial affairs to Joseon’s open ports and overlook Chinese merchants, and the King of Joseon will dispatch his minister to stay in Tianjin, not Beijing.”⁶⁰ Thus, Joseon’s original attempt to actively address the system of international law became a yoke to restrict its sovereignty.⁶¹ Although the treaty was markedly unequal in that it emphasized the one-sided and exceptional interests of Qing—there was no provision for the scrapping or ratification of the Treaty — Joseon found it hard to avoid Qing coercion. Qing regarded the treaty as regulations between the superior and the subordinate. The reactions of Western countries were never favorable either.⁶²

Later, in October 1883, Li dispatched Chen Shutang (陳樹棠) as com-

Rules] was only in Chinese, but later translated to Korean and English by the Chinese Customs House. Refer to Quan Hexiu, “Jogonggwangyecheje sok-ui geundaejeok tongsanggwangye: Jungguk-Joseon sang-minsuryukmuyeokjangjeong yeongu” [Modern Trade Relations under the Tributary System: A Study on the Marital and Land Trade Charters of Chinese and Korean Merchants], *Dongbuga Yeoksa Nonchong* 28 (2010).

⁶⁰ Zhang Cunwu, *Qingdai Zhong-Han guanxi lunwenji* [Collected Works on Qing-Joseon Relations] (Taipei: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1987), 170.

⁶¹ Kim Jong-Won, *Geunse dongasia gwangyesa yeongu: Jo-Cheong gyoseop-gwa dongasamgukyoyeok-ul jungsim-uro* [A Study on the Diplomatic History of Modern East Asia: With a Focus on Joseon-Qing Relations and Trades among the Three East Asian Nations] (Seoul: Hyeon, 1999), 335-49; Kim Yong-Koo (2001), 101-12; Koo Sunhee “Joseon Junguksanmin suryukmuyeokjangjeong-gwa jo-cheong gwangye-ui byeonji” [Joseon and Chinese Merchants’ Trade Charters and Transformation of Joseon-Qing Relations], in *Hanguksa* (2003), vol. 38: 317-30; Koo Sunhee (2005), 161-66; Quan Hexiu (2000), 92-141.

⁶² Shin Ki-Suk (1967), 87-95.

missioner of general commercial affairs in Joseon (總辦朝鮮各口交涉商務委員) to begin expanding the base for economic advancement, including steamer traffic and securing tax concessions. In the next two years, Chen Shutang significantly promoted the situation of Chinese merchants and the Chinese residents’ community. This paved the way for Qing to gradually secure the upper hand in its competition with Japan in Joseon.⁶³ At the request of Joseon in late 1882, Li also recommended P.G. von Möllendorff (穆麟德) as his advisor for foreign affairs.⁶⁴

In addition to serving as a foreign affairs advisor, Möllendorff established the Joseon Customs Service and took over the position of general tax official. In the early 1880s, the trend of Qing activism in Joseon policy continued to strengthen until the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, which led Qing to acknowledge that Joseon was an “independent state.” The changes in the political situation within Joseon, such as the Imo Military Revolt (壬午軍亂) in 1882 and the Gapsin Coup (甲申政變) in 1884, served to magnify the trend further.

2) Imo Military Incident and Gapsin Coup

On July 23, 1882, the Imo Military Revolt began as an uprising due to the unpaid wages owed to the soldiers from the traditional military forces, the Muwiyeong (武衛營) and the Jangeoyeong (壯禦營). It led to rule by the Daewongun (King Gojong’s father) and further expanded into a movement to isolate both the Min clan and the Japanese forces.⁶⁵ Li Shuchang of the Qing legation in Japan informed Zhang Shuesheng (張樹聲), the Acting Superintendent of Beiyang, of the revolt and asked for the dispatch of a warship. Zhang submitted a memorial expressing the need for a strong re-

⁶³ Quan Hexiu (2007).

⁶⁴ Koh Byong-ik, “Mokindeok-ui gobing-gwa geu baegyeyong” [The Employment of Möllendorff and Its Background], *Donga gyoseopsa-ui yeongu* [The History of East Asian Relations] (Seoul: Seoul National University Publishing Council, 1970b); Lee Yur-bok, *West Goes East: Paul Georg von Möllendorff and Great Power Imperialism in late Yi Korea* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1988).

⁶⁵ Kim Yong-Koo (2001); Cho Seong-Yun, “Imogunran” [The Imo Military Revolt], in *Hanguksa* (2003), vol. 38.

sponse, fearing that “damage to the Chinese vassal state will result in Japan’s manipulative plot to deceive more people.”⁶⁶ The Zongli Yamen was in agreement with this view, and on August 9, Ding Ruchang (丁汝昌) and Ma Jianzhong (馬建忠) went to Incheon with three warships, followed by the Huai Army (淮軍) of Wu Changqing (吳長慶) with 63,000 troops. Xue Fucheng (薛福成), the officer of Jiangsu Province, firmly requested that the government should quickly deploy troops to subdue the Daewongun and adopt a hardline policy of directly intervening in Joseon’s internal affairs, including kidnapping him and taking him to China or dethroning the king.⁶⁷

Although the Qing intervention and kidnapping of the Daewongun were arbitrary decisions made without prior consultation with Joseon (King Gojong), Qing succeeded in strengthening the Sadae system by helping King Gojong regain power through the swift dispatch of troops, the suppression of the military uprising, and overpowering Japan. The entry of Qing’s military forces into Joseon was unprecedented after the 17th century, and Wu Changqing’s army continued to be stationed in Seoul, where the Joseon Royal Army collapsed. In October 1883, Li Hongzhang called for the withdrawal of the troops in his memorial, but the Qing government ordered him formulate long-term measures, saying, “We should not take this issue lightly.”⁶⁸ In Joseon, the division within the reformist faction and its conflict with the conservatives deepened as Qing overturned the tradition of not interfering in Joseon’s domestic affairs at once. In China, some argued for adhering to the traditional Joseon policy, saying that

⁶⁶ “Zongli geguo shiwu yamen zou chaoxian luan dang weigong riben shiguan bing jie wangong qing paibing yuanhu zhe” [The Prime Minister’s Office for National Affairs Reported that the Joseon’s Rebellious Party Besieged the Japanese Embassy, Robbed the Palace, and Requested Troops] (Guanxu 8th year, 6th month, 24th day), *Qingji Zhong-Ri-Han guanxi shiliao*, vol. 3: 31a; *Geundae Hanguk oegyomunseo* (2013), vol. 6: 96-97.

⁶⁷ Xue Fucheng, “Shang zhangshangshu lun yuanhu chaoxian jiyi shu” [Zhang Sushu’s Discussion on the Reason for Supporting and Protecting Joseon] (Guanxu 8th year, 6th month 29th day), from *Xue Fucheng xuanji* [Selected Writings of Xue Fucheng], Ding Fenglin ed. (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1987): 176-80; “Wang Xinzong, Zhong ri jiawu zhanzheng zhi waijiao beijing” [The Diplomatic Background of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895] (Beijing: Guoli qinghua daxue yan jiu yuan, 1937), 43.

⁶⁸ *Guanxu Shilu* (Guanxu reign, 9th year, 9th month, xinchoutiao 辛丑條).

the Chinese government would be “disgraced and ridiculed by the vassal state and other nations” for its unprecedented swift and violent approach, but the general trend was already established.⁶⁹

The political situation of the Joseon Dynasty, which caused turmoil due to the conflict between the conservative and the reformist factions, played an essential role in the realignment of relations with Qing. Even during the Gapsin Coup and the Donghak Peasants Uprising, there were situations in which the Qing army intervened or dispatched troops. In other words, there was a strong sense of a movement toward autonomy and independence, but Joseon’s “dependence” on Qing also co-existed to a considerable degree. Therefore, the change in the relationship between the two countries in the 1880s cannot be defined by the unilateral intervention of Qing. This is well-illustrated by Joseon requesting aid from Li Hongzhang for domestic affairs and diplomacy after the Imo Military Revolt, as it reflected the traditional Hua-Yi relationship of mutual consideration and dependence.⁷⁰ To this extent, the hardline voices urging direct intervention, such as those of the Qingliu faction (清流派), were greatly strengthened in Qing. Even then, Li refused to directly intervene, citing concerns that Qing would be held responsible for incidents and that sudden policy changes would cause a backlash from Joseon. In the end, he reluctantly moved his policy in this direction. The fall of Prince Gong, who had presided over a policy of careful diplomacy as Royal Chancellor of the Zongli Yamen in March of the 10th year of the reign of Kangxi (1884) to avoid friction with the western powers, may have affected the change in Li’s direction.⁷¹

⁶⁹ Sheng Yu, “Hanlin yuan shi jiang sheng yu zou chaoxian zhi an jiang chen banli shiyi bing chen chuzhi zhi ce zhe” [The Imperial Court Attendant Sheng Yu played the Case of Joseon] (Guanxu reign, 8th year, 8th month, 22nd day), from *Qingdai Zhong-Chao quanxidangan shiliao* [Compilation of Historical Materials of Qing-Joseon Relations] (Beijing: Guojijiwenhua chubangongsi, 1996): 74-75. Sheng-Yu was one of the members of the Aisin Gioro clan, the Manchurian imperial family.

⁷⁰ For more information on Joseon’s and Qing’s policy changes after the Imo Military Revolt, see Koo Sunhee (1999), 65-83.

⁷¹ *Geundae Hanguk oegyomunseo*, vol. 6: 529-37; Tahohashi Kiyoshi (1940), vol. 2: 470-83; Lin Ming-Te, *Yu-an-shikai yu chaoxian* [Yuan Shikai and Joseon] (Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute of Modern History, 1970), 84-104; Choi Hee-Jae (1997), 274-79; Kim Yong-Koo, *Imogunran-gwa*

It seems quite reasonable to see such a turnaround as a departure from, or a fundamental deterioration of, the traditional “suzerainty” rather than a strengthening.⁷² The reformists (Gaehwa Party or Independence Party) in Joseon challenged this change. In particular, those who sought to secure independence rushed to achieve their goal by promoting a coup to fundamentally reform the Yangban aristocratic society, even by drawing in foreign powers.⁷³ Kim Okgyun and Pak Yung-hio conspired in early October to change their political situation amid the return of half of Wu Changqing’s troops in the wake of the Sino-French War, which began in August 1884. On December 4, the reformists caused a stir when Hong Yeong-sik, the chief-postmaster of the Joseon Post Office, held the inauguration ceremony for the Post Office. Koko Takezoe (竹添進一郎) of the Japanese Legation, who had returned to Seoul on October 30, changed his stance to a positive attitude and showed approval, so the Gaehwa faction received Japan’s help.⁷⁴

The Gapsin Coup was a challenge to China’s revised policy as illustrated in the first principle of the platform of the new political party, stating that “[We] will bring about the Daewongun’s return to Joseon immediately and the ritual of tributes will be abolished after discussing it.”⁷⁵ On the afternoon of December 6, when the reform platform was announced, the

Gapsinjeongbyeon: sadaejilseo-ui byeonhyeong-gwa Hangukoegyosa [Imo Military Revolt and Gapsin Coup: The Transformation of the Sadae Order and History of Korean Diplomacy] (Seoul: One, 2004), 85-100.

⁷² Kim Key-Hiuk, *Geundae Han-Jung-II gwangyesa* [A History of Modern Korea-China-Japan Relations] (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2007), 154 & 173.

⁷³ Kim Jong-Hak, *Gaehwadang-ui giwon-gwa bimiloegyoo* [The Origin of the Enlightenment Party and Secret Diplomacy] (Seoul: Ilchokak, 2017).

⁷⁴ For the details on how Gapsin Coup was unfold, refer to Kim Yong-Koo (2001), Yoon Byung-Hee, “Gapsinjeongbyeon-ui baegyeong” [The Background of the Gapsin Coup] and “Gapsinjeongbyeon-ui judoser-yeok” [The Leading Force of the Gapsin Coup] in *Hanguksa* (2003), vol. 38; Shin Yong-Ha, “Gapsinjeong-byeon-ui jeongae” [The Development of Gapsin Coup] and “Gapsinjeongbyeon-ui yeonghyang-gwa uiui” [The Impact and Implications of Gapsin Coup], in *Hanguksa* (2003), vol. 38; Park Eun-Sook, *Gapsinjeongbyeon yeongu* [A Study on Gapsin Coup] (Goyang: Yeoksabipyeongsa, 2005); and Kim Jong-Hak (2017).

⁷⁵ Shin Yong-Ha (2003), 405-09; Kim Yong-Koo (2006), 515.

Qing army led by Yuan Shikai attacked Changdeok Palace, defeating the Joseon and Japanese armies and forcing King Gojong to move to the Qing camp. The reign of the Gaehwa Party ended on the 3rd day. This occurred because Yuan Shikai took bold action due to a letter from Shim Soon-taek, the vice premier of the Joseon government, and without Li Hongzhang’s prior instructions.⁷⁶ On the other hand, Japan won the diplomatic victory of the Hanseong Treaty (漢城條約, [Japan-Korea Treaty of 1885], which was signed in January 1885, which stipulated compensation for Japan for the damage to its legation, despite its involvement in the Coup. In February 1885, Japan sent Ito Hirobumi (伊藤博文) to Tianjin to negotiate with Li Hongzhang, which successfully led to the withdrawal of Qing’s Imperial Army in Seoul. The Tianjin Treaty (天津條約), concluded on April 18, 1885, stated that when one of the countries needs to send troops to Korea, they should first notify the other party and then withdraw immediately after the resolution of the incident. The treaty, which had not been approved by the Joseon government, authorized Japan’s right to dispatch its military and threatened Qing’s identity and status as a suzerain nation. With this privilege, Japan justified its war with Qing during the First Sino-Japanese War. However, after the Gapsin Coup and the Imo Military Revolt, Japan returned to its old position,⁷⁷ so it retreated to a policy of non-intervention for about ten years until the war with Qing. Although hardline opinions increased in Joseon thanks to the concealment of the truth behind the Gapsin Coup, the power of the reformists who had sided with Japan was weakened thereafter. As a result, Japan focused on acquiring and maintaining rights and expanding its military capabilities and urged the Qing government to step up its intervention in Joseon’s affairs in order to combat Russia.

3) New Arrival of Yuan Shikai: Demand for ‘Vassalage System’

Meanwhile, in order to avoid increased pressure from Qing after the Gapsin Coup, the Korean government turned to Russia for help. In the first se-

⁷⁶ Lin Ming-Te (1970), 36-83.

⁷⁷ Kim Yong-Koo (2006), 523.

cret treaty of March 1885, King Gojong sent a secret envoy to Vladivostok and contacted Alexey de Speyer of the Russian Legation in Japan via diplomatic advisor Möllendorff to ask for a guarantee of neutrality, the territorial integrity of Joseon, and a military instructor.⁷⁸ Although Möllendorff played a leading role here, Russia avoided answering the request to protect Joseon, and subsequent negotiations failed. The previous explanation that Britain took over Geomun Island (April 1885), due to the confidential Korea-Russia agreement, has already been refuted. However, it was clear that Britain, which was at odds with Russia in various parts of the world, had taken over the island to keep Russia in check in East Asia.⁷⁹ Through the handling of the Geomun Island incident (the Li-Ladygensky Joint Agreement [October 1886]),⁸⁰ Li achieved diplomatic achievements in winning British support for Qing's Joseon policy.

However, Qing, which lost Vietnam due to its defeat in the Sino-French War, desperately needed to guard Joseon, which was its only remaining tributary state. In July 1885, Enomoto Takeaki (榎本武陽) of the Japanese Legation in China submitted “*A Proposal for Joseon Foreign Affairs Policy*” by Inoue Kaoru, Minister of Foreign Affairs, which proposed Qing's intervention in the human resources and administration of Joseon. Li accepted it and began to strengthen his control over Joseon in earnest.⁸¹ Before that, Li recommended American diplomatic adviser Owen N. Denny and tax accountant H. F. Merrill instead of Möllendorff to reinforce practical control of Joseon's foreign affairs and finances. Merrill, who

⁷⁸ For more reference to the secret treaty between Joseon and Russia, see Kim Jong-Heon, “Shpeyer-wa Russia-gongsa Weber-ui Joseon nae oegyohwaldong: 1884-1894” [Shpeyer's and Russian Consul Weber's Diplomatic Activities in Korea: 1884-1894], in *Geundae Han-Reo gwangye yeongu: Sugyo-wa gyoseop-ui sigi Han-Reo gwangye* [Modern Russo-Korean Relations: the Early Stage and the Negotiation Period], ed. Hong Woong-Ho et al. (Seoul: Sunin, 2008); Boris Dmitrievich Park, *Россия и Корея* [Russia and Korea], Min Kyoung-Hyoun trans. (Seoul: Northeast Asian History Foundation, 2010), 273-330.

⁷⁹ Kim Hyun-Soo, *Harry S. Parks: Daeyoungjeguk-ui Dongasia oegyoyeok* [Harry S. Parks: Great Britain's Diplomacy in East Asia] (Seoul: Dankook University Press, 2011), 265-323.

⁸⁰ According to Boris Dmitrievich Park (2010, 320-24), there was no such “oral agreement.”

⁸¹ Lin Ming-Te (1970), 84-113; Choi Hee-jae (1997), 281-83.

assumed the post in October 1885, was given the task of subjugating the Joseon Customs Service to Qing on the recommendation of Robert Hart, the Inspector-General of China's Imperial Maritime Customs Service. As a result, the Joseon Customs merged into the Chinese Customs.

In addition, a telegraph line (Uiju-Incheon) was constructed with loans from Qing to Joseon immediately after the Gapsin Coup. It was opened in August 1885 and it integrated Joseon into China's network, from Lushun to Fenghuangcheng (鳳凰城-旅順), which enabled the rapid deployment of the Imperial Chinese Navy and the army from Manchuria in an emergency. (Afterwards, the Seoul-Incheon line and Seoul-Busan and Wonsan lines were established, completed, and operated by Qing.) When a telegram was exchanged through this network, communication between the two countries became much faster than traditional messages, which took several months to be delivered. Furthermore, the presence of Qing's suzerainty in Seoul had grown incomparably larger than before, as its government officials, such as Chen Shuzheng (and later Yuan Shikai), were able to push Qing's positions onto the Joseon government even more strongly. Thus, although Qing withdrew its troops after the Tianjin Treaty and later gave up its support for the reinforcement and modernization of the Joseon army, Qing was able to change its “imperialist” policy over Joseon into a very efficient one. Securing various privileges for the operation of the Beiyang Fleet and steamships also changed the Yellow Sea into a Chinese domestic route. In response to Joseon's request to delay the withdrawal of General Wu Changqing's troops, Li Hongzhang replied confidentially that, “Even if the army is to be withdrawn for a while, [Qing] is able to suppress and keep solidarity by alternating vessels to Incheon.” Also, “if there are any other incidents in the future, the army can be dispatched back to Joseon within a day, starting in the morning through steamers for its arrival in the evening, without a moment's delay,” he could secure Joseon in this manner due to the increased efficiency of communication, transportation, and decision-making.⁸²

⁸² Li Hongzhang, “Fu chaoxian guowang” [To King of Joseon] (Guanxu reign, 11th year, 6th month,

In September 1885, Qing also sent the Daewongun, who had been in custody for three years in Baoding Prefecture (保定府), back to Korea and appointed Yuan Shikai (袁世凱), who had escorted him, as Imperial Head Official (駐紮朝鮮總理通商交涉事宜). Li's control-line policy was a major change at that very point. It was intended to significantly strengthen direct intervention in Joseon, and countering Joseon's move to "lead Russia to refuse Qing" (引俄拒清) while restraining the full power of the Min clan regime.⁸³ For this reason, Yuan Shikai, who was assigned the post on November 17, 1885, was tantamount to "supervisory nation" (監國) for active intervening in Joseon's domestic affairs as well as in trade and foreign affairs. Li's stance on Yuan Shikai was well-captured in his statement that, "Yuan is full of wisdom and stratagem, who can be contacted regularly for meetings with Joseon statesmen of the Foreign Ministry and can help restore or correct a situation when he sees a need."⁸⁴ Moreover, his letter to King Gojong on Yuan's inauguration stated, "[I] hope [Joseon] consults with him as often as possible, and it will be of great help to the Joseon Dynasty in the present conditions."⁸⁵ As a result, despite several tenacious appeals from the Joseon Court and requests for Yuan's recall to Qing due to his arrogant and insolent behavior, Li refused to replace him and further extended his term twice.

Unnerved by his power, the King Gojong and Min clan governments tried "leading Russia to refuse Qing," as stated earlier. Unfortunately, Yuan detected the move and took the lead in harsh counter-measures such as mentioning dethronement. "If there were 500 troops, I would for sure bring the king down and capture a group of petty people and send them to Tianjin for questioning."⁸⁶ After Yuan blocked the "movement" of the second

5th day), *Li Hongzhang quanji*, vol. 33, letter 5, 509.

⁸³ Tahohashi Kiyoshi (1940), vol. 2: 43-71.

⁸⁴ Li Hongzhang, "Mi bao yuanshikai pian" [Secret memo to Yuan Shikai] (Guanxu reign, 11th year, 9th month, 21st day), *Li Hongzhang quanji*, vol. 11, memorial 11: 203-04.

⁸⁵ Li Hongzhang, "Fu chaoxian guowang" [To King of Joseon] (Guanxu reign, 11th year, 9th month, 2nd day), *Li Hongzhang quanji*, vol. 33, letter 5, 569.

⁸⁶ Yuan Shikai, "Fu beiyang dachen lihongzhang mi dian" [Secret Telegraph to Minister of Beiyang

secret treaty with Russia on August 11, 1886, he presented the statement on "Joseon's overall situation (朝鮮大局論)" on October 7, 1886. It coerced Joseon into admitting that, "The world knows that Joseon is a meager country with little competence and strength, so much so that it is unworthy of its sovereignty and cannot survive alone without the protection of a powerful nation."⁸⁷ Yuan defined Joseon as a country that could only survive by relying absolutely on Qing and persistently claimed that Joseon was a "subjugated state" of Qing. He used "vassalage" (附庸) based on the definition in the *Elements of International Law* (i.e., a vassal state (封臣國), not a tributary state (進貢國)), while securing the best interests of Qing in Joseon.

His active pursuit of Qing's interests since the 1880s had left a mark in vast areas, such as the reform of Joseon finances and currency, the introduction of loans for modern economic development, the establishment of banks, trade and transportation, intervention in the casting of money, and acquisition of fishing and mining concessions. These measures gave Qing a competitive edge in trade volume with Joseon almost to the point of overtaking Japan.⁸⁸ The Customs of Joseon, integrated into that of Qing, also provided a means to control the finances of Joseon. Even Merrill and other customs officers received salaries from China's Maritime Customs, and Joseon Customs' trade reports and statistics were incorporated into

Li Hongzhang] (Guanxu reign, 12th year, 7th month, 6th day); "Zhi beiyang dachen lihongzhang dian" [Telegraph to Minister of Beiyang Li Hongzhang] (Guanxu reign, 12th year, 7th month, 21st day), *Yuan Shikai quanji* [The Collected Works of Yuan Shikai], Luo Baoshan, ed. (Keifeng: Henan University Press, 2013), vol. 1: 204 & 214.

⁸⁷ Yuan Shikai, "Chaoxian daju lun" [Joseon's Overall Situation] (Guanxu reign, 12th year, 9th month, 10th day), *Yuan Shikai quanji*, vol. 1: 238-41; Kim Won-Mo (2003), 399-404.

⁸⁸ For more details on this, see Lin Ming-Te (1970); Kim Jeong-Ki, "Joseonjeongbu-ui Cheongchangwan doip" (1882-1894) [The Korean Government's Loans from China (1882-1894)], *Hanguksaron* 3 (1976); Lew Young-Ick, "Yuan Shih-k'ai's Residency and the Korean Enlightenment Movement (1885-1894)," *Journal of Korean Studies* 5 (1984); Robert R. Swartout, *Mandarins, gunboats, and power politics: Owen Nickerson Denny and the international rivalries in Korea* (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1980), Shin Bok-Ryong and Kang Seok-Chan trans. (Seoul: Pyeongminsa, 1988); Koo Sunhee (1999); Lee, Yang-Ja, *Joseon-eseoui Yuan Shikai* [Yuan Shikai in Joseon] (Busan: Shinjiscowon, 2002); Kirk W. Larsen (2008).

those of China, confirming its “vassal” status abroad. Robert Hart had been very cooperative with Qing’s “vassalization” policy of Joseon.⁸⁹

In addition, Yuan Shikai focused on Joseon’s international status and continuously reaffirmed that it was a “vassal state.” As Qing’s pressure grew stronger, King Gojong attempted to dispatch a diplomatic mission following the treaties of amity with other countries. In May 1887, Gojong dispatched Min Younghui as chief minister and Kim Gajin as a councilor to the Joseon Legation in Japan. Since this action did not provoke opposition from Qing, he appointed Park Jeongyang as ambassador to the U.S. on June 29. Concerned about the impact of the dispatch of a diplomatic mission to Western countries, Qing finally put forward the so-called “Vassal State Duty System” (屬邦分內體制) to prevent Joseon from achieving equal standing with Qing internationally. In October 1887, an imperial edict was issued stating, “All diplomatic envoys [of Joseon] sent to foreign countries must follow the vassalage system (屬邦體制) in correspondence with Chinese envoys.”⁹⁰ When Joseon tried to send Park Jeongyang to the U.S. despite Qing’s obstruction with the “Vassal State Duty System,”⁹¹ Li offered the “Agreement on Three Steps (另約三端)” as a condition of acquiescence. The agreement stated the three steps. First, when the Joseon envoy arrives in each country, he shall inform the minister of the Qing Legation immediately and visit the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the respec-

⁸⁹ Koh Byong-ik (1970b, c); Lin Ming-Te (1970); Lew Young-Ick (1984); Kim Jeong-Ki, “Cheong-ui Joseon-e daehan gunsajeongchack-gwa jongjugwon (1878-1894)” [Qing’s Military Policy on Joseon and Suzerainty (1878-1894)], in *Byeon Taeseop-baksa hoegapginyeomsahaknonchong* [The Collection of History Articles Commemorating the 60th Birthday of Dr. Byeon Taeseop] (Seoul: Samyoungsa, 1985); Lee Yang-Ja (2002); Koo Sunhee (1999, 2006); Kirk W. Larsen (2008).

⁹⁰ *Dezong Shilu* (Guangxu reign, 13th year, 9th month, Dingsitia 丁巳條); Kim Soo-am, “Hanguk-ui geundae oegyojedo yeongu: oegyogwanso-wa sangjusajeol-ul jungsim-uro” [A Study on Korea’s Modern Diplomatic Institution: Analysis on Joseon’s Diplomatic Framework and Permanent Envoy Mission in the 19th Century], PhD diss. (Seoul National University, 2000), 49-55.

⁹¹ Li Hongzhang, Fu chaoxian guowang ziwen [A Supplement: Official Document of King of Joseon] (Guanxu reign, 13th year, 10th month, 20th day), *Li Hongzhang quanji*, vol. 12, memorial 12, 257.

tive country together with Qing minister. Second, when in public, the Joseon envoy must walk behind the Qing minister. Third, any important diplomatic matters would be first discussed with the Qing minister and then the Joseon envoy would follow Qing instructions.

However, despite the constant monitoring and interruptions of Yuan Shikai, Park, who departed for the U.S., ignored the “Three Steps” after his arrival there.⁹² This clash led to persistent psychological warfare between Joseon and Qing over Qing’s reprimand and demand for Park’s return to Joseon. However, the attitude of resistance to the “vassalage system” was clearly revealed when Park, who was finally summoned, was reinstated without being reprimanded in the next few years. In the end, Li and Yuan failed to force Joseon to submit over this issue. Although Joseon’s persistent demand for the revision of the “vicious Three Steps” was not achieved, Qing also failed to implement the “vassalage system” in Joseon.⁹³ Thus, Qing might have temporarily succeeded in attaining the superficial submission of Joseon, but it could not overcome Joseon’s resistance against the plan without force.

As such, the document “Six Measures on Joseon Affairs” (朝鮮事宜六條辦法), written by the Zongli Yamen and Li Hongzhang in 1890, clearly shows Qing’s attempt to bind Joseon in vassalage since late 1880. This was not solely the decision of Yuan Shikai but the official policy of Qing. Prior to that, the Zongli Yamen’s report on the current situation of Joseon to the Emperor said, “The king of Joseon has a dark and weak character, is being cajoled by a group of petty people without knowing how to repay the kindness of Qing, and tries instead to rely on foreign aid.” It added, “Recently he has not even sent one letter to Qing, being hesitant, and as the symptoms of deep-rooted disease are getting worse, [he] is incapable of taking either tough measures or moderate methods.”⁹⁴ Thus, the Six Measures put

⁹² Horace N. Allen, *Alren-ui ilgi: Guhanmal gyeoktonggi bisa* [Allenal gyery: A Hidden History of Late Joseon], Kim Won-Mo, trans. & ed. (Seoul: Tanguk University Press, 1991), 150-51.

⁹³ Shin Ki-suk (1967), 231-64; Wang Mingxing (1998), 143-51; Koo Sunhee (1999), 157-73; Kim Won-Mo (2003), 614-51; Zhang Liheng (2012), 227-74.

⁹⁴ “Yi kuang deng zhe zun yi chaoxian shiyi liu tiao” [Yi Kuang and Others Discussed Six Articles

forward by the Zongli Yamen reflected these circumstances. Among them, the first two dealt with the expansion of the armed forces in the northeastern region and the construction of the railroad. The third measure addressed Qing's direct involvement in assigning and dispatching the tax officers of Joseon to comply with Qing's existing system. The fourth measure was to keep Joseon under the vassalage system and prevent its diplomatic mission from overstepping Qing authority. The fifth measure was to protect Joseon from foreign debts in order to maintain its profits, and the last measure was for Qing to frequently enlighten Joseon so as to keep it in position despite its growing political instability.⁹⁵

It is hard to say that Qing's policy was an attempt to "colonize," but in fact, it is evident that Qing wanted to turn Joseon into a vassal state (or protectorate) under Qing control. Although there were some harsh acts of coercion by Yuan Shikai, these were not approved by Li Hongzhang or the Qing government and the official policy of Qing did not reflect this direction.⁹⁶ Qing policy toward Joseon,⁹⁷ which was implemented after the late 1880s, not only destroyed the existing *Sadae* system of friendly relations based on the special consideration and concessions between the two countries, but also resulted in an unfavorable position for Joseon under international law. In this regard, one view of Yuan, who was responsible for Qing imperialism in Joseon, is that "his act of provocation damaged the pride of the Joseon people and severely damaged Sino-Joseon relations by giving [Joseon] a

 for Joseon Matters in Compliance with Imperial Orders] (Guanxu reign, 16th year, 2nd month, 10th day), *Qingdai Zhong-Chao quanxidangan shiliao*: 337-41.

⁹⁵ In the meantime, Empress Dowager Xi said that the first two were appropriate but the most earnest measures must be found in light of the current Joseon's situations in order to avoid delays. As for the next four measures, she thought that they were "almost an empty word" and ordered to find more appropriate methods (*Guanxu Shilo*, Guanxu 16th year, 2nd month, *Shinhae-jo*). This reveals that Qing's policy on Joseon was in name only with no substances except for the control by Yuan Shikai.

⁹⁶ Li Xizhu (2011).

⁹⁷ Kim Key-Hiuk and Kirk Larsen distinguished Qing's imperialism toward Joseon from the colonial imperialism of the West. Kim (1996) defined it as *Secondary Imperialism* while Larsen (2008) called it *Qing Imperialism*.

reason to separate from and maintain distance from Qing."⁹⁸ Consequently, Joseon's attempt to enter into the international order, regardless of the asymmetrical relationship between the "heavenly created superior state" and the "vassal state," and its attempt at enacting a self-strengthening policy suffered greatly. Furthermore, the rise of multinational imperialism, which was introduced by Qing, added to this predicament. While Yuan blocked the advance of foreign countries by unilaterally pursuing Qing interests during the decade before the Sino-Japanese War, the failure of Qing's Joseon policy with its defeat of the Sino-Japanese War jeopardized not only the Joseon Dynasty but also Qing itself.

Transformation of the Joseon-Qing Relationship after the First Sino-Japanese War

1. The First Sino-Japanese War and Joseon-Qing Relationship

After the Gapsin Coup, there was no significant clash between Qing and Japan over the next ten years until the Donghak Peasant Uprising in 1894 triggered a new military confrontation between the two.⁹⁹ The Donghak rebels under the leadership of Jeon Bongjun revolted in Gobu, Jeolla-do in February 1894, and soon seized Jeonju, the capital city of Jeolla Province. On June 3, the Joseon government controlled by Min Youngjun, the head of the Min clan, requested that Qing send troops.¹⁰⁰ On June 4, Yuan Shikai informed Li Hongzhang of this request, after communicating with the act-

⁹⁸ Cai Jian, *Wan qing yu dahan diguo de waijiao guanxi* [The Diplomatic Relations between Late Qing and the Korean Empire (1897-1910)] (Shanghai: Shanghai cishu chubanshe, 2008), 40.

⁹⁹ For more on the series of events that led to the First Sino-Japanese War, see Tahohashi Kiyoshi (1940), vol 2: 202-547; Shin Ki-Suk (1967), 295-376; Choi Deok-Soo, "Cheongiljeonjaeng-gwa Han-II gwangye" [The First Sino-Japanese War and the Korean-Japanese Relations], in *Gangjwa Han-II gwangyesa* [Lectures on the Diplomatic History of Korea and Japan], Cho Hang-Rae et al., ed., (Seoul: Hyeonumsa, 1994); Park Young-Jae, "Cheongiljeonjaeng" [The First Sino-Japanese War], in *Hanguksa* (2003), vol. 40: 15-46.

¹⁰⁰ Yi Taejin, *Gojongsidae-ui jaejomyeong* [Reexamining the King Gojong Era] (Paju: Thaeaksa, 2000).

ing Japanese minister to Korea, Fukashi Sugimura, and believed that Japan was only concerned about protecting its businessmen.¹⁰¹ Some might say that Qing was virtually entrapped in the Japanese foreign policy scheme¹⁰² but nonetheless, Li Hongzhang immediately ordered Shanx-Taiyuan General Nie Shicheng (聶士成) and Zhili Admiral Ye Zhichao (葉志超) to lead 2,000 infantrymen (plus an additional 500 later) and two battleships of the Beiyang Fleet (北洋艦隊), the modernized Qing fleet, to Asan and Incheon in Korea. Then Li notified Japan of the troop dispatch, complying with the Tianjin Treaty, and described Qing's military action as following its old tradition of protecting its tributary states.

Japan used the Donghak Uprising as a golden opportunity to send its military forces to Joseon. The intention is shown in the famous assertion by Mutsu Munemitsu (陸奥宗光), the Japanese Foreign Minister who oversaw the First Sino-Japanese War. At the start of his memoirs *Kenkenroku*, Mutsu said, "Anybody who is writing a history of Sino-China relations of that era must put the Donghak Uprising at the very beginning of its first chapter."¹⁰³ Although Japan had acted passively in East Asian diplomacy during the previous ten years, behind the scenes it had been fiercely strengthening its overseas expansionism¹⁰⁴ and deployed a much larger group of troops to Joseon using the excuse of the Uprising. On June 1, the Japanese government received Sugimura's telegram reporting on Joseon's request to Qing for military forces. On the very next day, Japan dismissed the Lower House and decided on the deployment of troops to Joseon, just

¹⁰¹ Chen Weifang, *Chaoxian wenti yu Jiawuzhanzheng* [The First Sino-Japanese War and the Problem of Joseon], Quan Hexiu, trans. (Seoul: Baeksan Jaryowon, 1999), 162-76.

¹⁰² Kim Won-Mo, "Allen-ui Yuan Shikai-ron" [Allen's Theory on Yuan Shikai], in Gachwagi Han-Mi *gyoseop gwangyesa* [The US-Korean Relations in the Enlightenment Period of Korea] (Seoul: Dankook University Press, 2003c), 513.

¹⁰³ Mutsu Munemitsu, *Kenkenroku* [Records of Loyalty], Kim Seung-il, trans. (Seoul: Bumwoosa, 1993), 32.

¹⁰⁴ Choi Suk-Wan, "Ilbonjeongbu-ui dongasijilseo jaepyeonjeongchaek-gwa cheongi-ljeonjaeng" [The Japanese Government's Revamping Policy of the East Asian Regional Order and the First Sino-Japanese War], *Dong-yangisahakyongu* 65 (1999); Choi Deok-Soo, *Gaehang-gwa Jo-Il gwangye: Sanghoinsik-gwa jeongchaek* [Port Opening and Joseon-Japan Relations: Perceptions and Policies toward Each Other] (Seoul: Korea University Press, 2004).

one day before Joseon officially asked Qing to send troops.¹⁰⁵ Later, on June 5, Japan organized the Imperial General Headquarters and prepared for war with Qing. The mixed brigade of the 5th Division received their orders on June 5 and completed deployment of its 8,000 troops to Incheon and Seoul by June 28. Nearly half of the battleships were also dispatched to the coast of Joseon.¹⁰⁶

When the troops and fleets of the two countries arrived in Joseon, however, they were no longer needed for their original purpose since the peasant rebels had already withdrawn from Jeonju after the conclusion of the Jeonju Peace Treaty on June 11. However, the domestic political situation did not allow the Japanese government to recall its troops back home. Hence, Japan provoked Qing instead under the pretext that the old Qing tradition of protecting its tributary state violated the Ganghwa Joseon-Japan Treaty of Amity, which stipulated that Joseon was an independent state. Japan also proposed an aggressive plan that Qing and Japan jointly reform the Joseon government. Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi, who had suppressed the aggressive overtures of Foreign Minister Mutsu and the military (including General Kawakami Soroku [川上操六], Deputy Chief of Staff in the Japanese military headquarters), decided on a showdown with Qing, spurred by domestic political trouble (the Japanese Lower House voted for the impeachment of his cabinet on May 31), public opinion, and upcoming elections.¹⁰⁷

Qing refused Japan's proposal to jointly reform the Joseon government on June 21. Japan issued an ultimatum, refused to withdraw its troops, and declared the severance of diplomatic ties with Qing (i.e., the First Letter of Severance) on June 23. Japan demanded that the Joseon government pursue political reforms in consultation with Japan, which was obviously an attempt to interfere in Joseon's domestic affairs and infringe upon its sovereignty. The aggressive Japanese approach to Joseon was a

¹⁰⁵ Park Young-Jae (2003), 44.

¹⁰⁶ Park Jong-Geun, *Nisshinsenso-ka no Chosen* [Korea under the First Sino-Japanese War], Park Young-Jae, trans. (Seoul: Ilchokak, 1989), 13-17.

¹⁰⁷ Takahashi Hidenao, *Ni-Tsu 清 Senso e no michi* [The Path to the First Sino-Japanese War] (Tokyo Sogensha, 1995).

complete surprise to Li Hongzhang, but he was forced to maintain a passive military stance because the western powers, including Britain and Russia, were intervening to prevent a war. Thus, Qing was unprepared for war while a thoroughly prepared Japan launched a preemptive attack on Qing troops.¹⁰⁸ Various external factors such as the Siberian railway that Russia began to build in 1891 and its subsequent advance to East Asia and Britain's approval of the amendment of the Anglo-Japan Treaty of Commerce and Navigation on July 16 also helped Japan's cause by greatly mitigating the burden of other countries' interference.¹⁰⁹ Therefore, Qing's request of arbitration to Russia and Britain and other third party interventions all failed to persuade Japan to withdraw its troops from Joseon.¹¹⁰

Japan sent the 2nd Letter of Severance to Qing on July 14 while preparing for war. Yuan Shikai left Seoul on July 19 after learning that there would be no withdrawal of forces from Joseon and his duties were taken up by Tang Shaoyi (唐紹儀), who would remain in Korea. When the Joseon government refused its reform proposal, Japan demanded the withdrawal of the Qing forces and the annulment of the trade treaty with Qing on July 20. As soon as the deadline had passed, two battalions of Japanese troops marched in on July 23, and took over Gyeongbokgung Palace. Thus, the First Sino-Japanese War began with Japan's attack on Joseon and instigating a war between Japan and Joseon. As both this war and the Russo-Japanese War were fought on the Korean peninsula with the goal of occupying Joseon, some people argue that those wars should be named "the First Joseon War" and "the Second Joseon War" and in fact, the First Sino-

¹⁰⁸ Dai Dongyang, "Gabo Jungiljeongjaeng gigan Cheong jeongbu-ui dae-II jeongchaek" [Qing's Policy on Japan during the First Sino-Japanese War], in *Cheongiljeonjaenggi Han-Jung-Il sanguk-ui sanghojeonryak* [The Strategies of Korea, China, and Japan during the First Sino-Japanese War], Northeast Asian History Foundation, ed. (Seoul: Northeast Asian History Foundation, 2009).

¹⁰⁹ Moriyama Shigenori, "Cheongiljeonjaeng-jung Ilbongunbu-ui dae-Han jeongryak" [Japanese Military Strategies on Korea during the First Sino-Japanese War], in *Cheongiljeonjaeng-ui jaejomyeong* [Reexamining the First Sino-Japanese War], Hallym University Institute of Asian Culture Studies, ed. (Chuncheon: Hallym University Press, 1996); Ian H. Nish, "Cheongiljeongjaeng-gwa yeongguk" [The First Sino-Chinese War and Britain], *ibid.*

¹¹⁰ Tahohashi Kiyoshi (1940), vol. 2: 402-68; Park Young-Jae (2003), 64-68.

Japanese War was the Sino-Korean-Japanese War. Japan also considered their war with Qing to actually be a war with Joseon.¹¹¹ In reality, Japan needed to take control of the Joseon government on the pretext of reforming the domestic politics in order to have successful military logistics, transportation, and communications during its war with Qing.¹¹²

In the meantime, Japan instigated the war. On July 25, it attacked the Qing's North Sea Fleet on Pung Island (豊島) near Asan Bay and sank the ship Gaosheng (高陞號), which Qing had borrowed from Britain to transport troops, drowning nearly a thousand Qing soldiers.¹¹³ Without comprehensive strategies nor a desire for war, Qing had been passively avoiding a military confrontation with Japan and was totally unprepared and thus its counter-measures were ineffective. Consequently, the momentum of the war belonged to Japan from the beginning. The Qing forces led by Ye Zhichao and Ye Zhicheng were crushed in the battle of Seonghwan (成歡) on July 29 and in the battle of Pyeongyang on September 15. On September 17, Qing relinquished its control of Joseon's seas to Japan after its defeat in the naval battle of the Yellow Sea, which began with the Japanese attack on the Beiyang Fleet at the mouth of the Amnok River. The war was even extended to Chinese territory, as the Japanese forces seized the entire Liaodong peninsula and marched further, threatening Beijing and Tianjin.

¹¹¹ The works that investigate the First Sino-Japanese War as a Japanese invasion of Joseon include Hara Akira, *Cheong-Il Reo-Il jeonjaeng eottetge bolgeotinga: dongasia 50-nyeon jeonjaeng 1894-1945 dasi bogi* [How to Look at the First Sino-Japanese War and Russo-Japanese War: Reexamining the 50 years (1894-1945) of Wars in East Asia], Kim Yeonok trans. (Paju: Sallim, 2015); Kang Hyo-Suk, "Cheongiljeonjaenggi Ilbongun-ui Jose-onminjung tanap: Ilbongun-ui bihapbeopseong-ul jongsim-uro" [The Japanese Military Oppression of the Joseon People during the First Sino-Japanese War: With a Focus on the Illegality of the Japanese Military], in *Cheongiljeonjaenggi Han-Jung-Il sanguk-ui sanghojeonryak* [The Strategies of Korea, China, and Japan during the First Sino-Japanese War] (Seoul: Northeast Asian History Foundation, 2009).

¹¹² Choi Deok-Soo (1994); Moriyama Shigenori (1996); Wang Hyeon-Jong, "Joseon Gabogaehyeokjeongggwan-ui dae-II jeongryak-gwa jongsok-ui simhwa" [The Gabo Reformist Government's Policy on Japan and Increasing Subjugation], in *Cheongiljeonjaenggi Han-Jung-Il sanguk-ui sanghojeonryak* (Seoul: Northeast Asian History Foundation, 2009).

¹¹³ Qi Qizhang provides the most comprehensive analysis on the First Sino-Japanese War in *Jiawuzhanzhengshi* [The History of the Gabo War] (Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2014).

Pushed in a tight corner, Qing was forced to begin peace negotiations with Japan. Accepting the suggestions of the Western arbitrators, Japan signed the Shimonoseki Treaty and ended the war against Qing. However, Russia, which had an eye on Manchuria and Joseon, intervened and pressed Japan along with France and Germany to return the Liaodong peninsula to China. Japan acceded to their demand and returned the Liaodong peninsula to Qing, thus receiving an additional 30 million ryang (approx. 1,125,000 kg) of gold instead, but this foreshadowed a new war in ten years (the Russo-Japanese War) over control of East Asia.

Accepting defeat, Li Hongzhang announced that China acknowledged Joseon's complete independence and promised to abolish all the conventions, such as tributes and ceremonies, which had infringed upon Joseon's independence. This announcement opened a new phase in the Qing-Joseon relationship. Now Qing was forced to view itself from the perspective of international law, as one of several sovereign states in the world equal to Joseon. As all the Qing government officials and staff had fled just before the war and all existing charters had been destroyed, the diplomatic ties between Qing and Joseon became severed, and thus the Sadae system between Qing and Joseon and the traditional Sinocentric order completely collapsed.

2. The Inauguration of the Korean Empire and Signing of the Korea-Qing Commerce Treaty

Although Japan expanded its control over the domestic governance of Joseon through the installation of a pro-Japanese cabinet, its authority was challenged by the three Western nations (i.e., Russia, Britain, and France). Taking advantage of this situation, Queen Min (or Queen Myeongseong) dismissed the pro-Japanese coalition cabinet led by Kim Hongjip and Pak Yung-hio and employed pro-Russian politicians, including Yi Beomjin and Yi Wanyong, providing Russia with an opportunity to expand its influence in Joseon again. Japan responded to the queen's defiance by having Consul Miura Goro, a former soldier, orchestrate her murder on October 8, 1895. The assassination of Queen Min (in the so-called Ulmi Incident) inflamed

anti-Japanese sentiment among Koreans and sparked militant uprisings in many parts of Korea. As a result, Japan ended up losing a great deal of its dominance in Korea. In light of the strong anti-Japanese uprisings and fearful for his own life, King Gojong fled his palace and situated himself in the Russian Legation for one year, which signaled the beginning of a pro-Russian period. In April 1897, Gojong returned to Deoksu Palace and changed the name of the country from Joseon to the Great Korean Empire (Daehan Jeguk) and adopted the era name of Gwangmu (光武). At the coronation ceremony, he crowned himself Emperor of Korea in an attempt to show the world that Korea was an independent nation ruled by an emperor equal to the emperor of Japan. In its first clause, the State Charter of the Great Korean Empire declared that Daehan Korea was a free, independent empire recognized by all the nations of the world.

Despite the initiation of the Gwangmu Reform, which was formed based on the principle of 'combining old virtues with new ideas (舊本新參),' even after the establishment of the Great Korean Empire, the relationship with Qing did not recover. It was difficult to normalize diplomatic ties when Qing was reluctant to form equal relations with one of its former "vassal" states.¹¹⁴ However, since an increasing number of Chinese merchants returned to Joseon after the war, Qing appointed Tang Shaoyi as Chief Commercial officer to Joseon in October 1895 to take charge of the protection and commerce of Qing merchants. Since Joseon and Qing did not agree on any official treaty, Qing could not send a diplomat to Joseon.¹¹⁵ When Tang arrived in Joseon in May 1896, the Joseon government was willing to sign a treaty with Qing, but he adamantly refused on account of King Gojong's residing in the Russian Legation. The Zongli Yamen also declared a policy toward Joseon on June 17, 1896 by which Qing

¹¹⁴ Kwon Sok-Bong (1987); Cai Jian (2008), 52-104; Lee Eun-Ja, "Han-Jung geundaeogyo-ui silheom (1895-1905)" [The Korean and Chinese Experiment of Modern Diplomacy], in *Hangjunggwangye-ui yeoksa-wa hyeonsil: geundaeogyo, sanghoinsik* [The History and Reality of Sino-Korean Relations: Modern Diplomacy and Mutual Perceptions], Yoo Yong-Tae, ed. (Seoul: Hanul, 2013).

¹¹⁵ Quan Hexiu (2013).

would allow commerce and install a consulate but would not sign a treaty, send an envoy, or submit diplomatic credentials and by which it would post a consul general in Korea to maintain the vassal system.¹¹⁶

Even after the Sadae system had collapsed and China itself had acknowledged the independence of Joseon,¹¹⁷ the Qing government still could not shed its suzerain mentality. This mindset was revealed when Chinese authorities such as Prince Gong and Zhang Zhidong refused to acknowledge the independence of Joseon, despite the Shimonosheki Treaty, which prevented Qing from signing any treaty with Joseon as an equal partner or establishing an equal system. However, despite Qing's aversion to the diplomacy of forced expediency, Qing was forced by Russia and Japan into signing a treaty with Korea, but even then Qing refused to deliver diplomatic credentials or station an envoy in Joseon. Finally, on June 18, 1898, Emperor Guangxu found a way to re-establish diplomatic ties by agreeing to send diplomatic credentials and envoys to Korea.¹¹⁸ One week later, Emperor Guangxu proclaimed the Definite National Policy [Míngdìng Guó Shì] and began the Musul Reform.

While there was still disagreement on issues such as the number of envoys and the content in the credentials, Qing's new ambassador to Korea, Xu Shoupeng (徐壽朋), was appointed on August 13, 1898, and he submitted his credentials directly to Emperor Gojong on February 1, 1899. After about six months of negotiation, the two countries signed the Korean-Qing Commerce Treaty on September 11, 1899, which normalized dip-

lomatic relations after having been severed for nearly five years.¹¹⁹ Although a new type of diplomatic relationship as equal partners was formed, it did not last long. At the beginning of the 20th century, many global upheavals including the Boxer Rebellion, the Russo-Japanese War, and the acceleration of Japan's invasion of Korea soon led the two countries to sever their diplomatic ties again. The failure of China's policy toward Joseon, as manifested by its defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War, led to the near-simultaneous collapse of the two countries.

Conclusion

China and Joseon visibly experienced numerous ups and downs, conflicts, and frictions as their relations were transformed into a modern mutual relationship in the late 19th century. Therefore, concepts such as Yu Giljun's 'dual system (兩截體制)'¹²⁰ or Quan He-Xiu's 'one diplomacy, two systems (一個外交 兩種體制)'¹²¹ are critical to understanding the intricate diplomatic relations between Qing and Joseon. The two countries could not help but experience conflict and friction over various issues since their goals and directions had changed from the 18th to the mid-19th centuries.

¹¹⁶ “Zongli geguo shiwu yamen zhu yu chou chaoxian tongshang banfa yi cun tizhi zhe” [The Prime Minister's Office of National Affairs Formulated Preliminary Plans to Handle Sino-Korean Trade Relations and to Preserve the Imperial System] (Guangxu reign, 22nd year, 6th month, 17th day), *Qing Guangxu Chao-Zhong-Ri jiaoshe shiliao* [Historical Document on Negotiations among Korea, China and Japan during Emperor Guang-xu of the Qing Dynasty], vol. 49: 30a-31a.

¹¹⁷ Karl W. Larsen (2008), 2248-49.

¹¹⁸ Mao Haijian, “Wuxu bianfa qijian guangxu di duiwai guannian de tiaoshi” [Emperor Guangxu's Adapted Ideas about International Relations during the Hundred Days' Reform of 1898], *Wuxu bianfa shi shi kao* [A Research on the History of the Hundred Days' Reform of 1898] (Hong Kong: Sanlian shudian, 2005).

¹¹⁹ Wang Mingxing (1998); Cai Jian (2008); Lee Eun-Ja (2013); Lee Young-Ok, “Cheongjo-wa Joseon (Daehan-jeguk)-ui oegyogwangye (1895-1910)” [Diplomatic Relations between Qing and Joseon (the Great Korean Empire), 1895-1910], *Chungkukhakpo* 50 (2004); _____, “Jogongjilseo-ui bonggoe-wa cheong-jo (daehanjeguk) gwangye-ui byeonhwa, 1895-1910” [The Collapse of the Tributary Order and Transformation of the Qing-Joseon (the Great Korean Empire) Relationship], in *Hanjung oegyogwangye-wa Jogongchaekbong* [The Korean Chinese Diplomatic Relationship and Tributary Royal Ordaining System], Koguryo Research Foundation, ed. (Seoul: Koguryo Research Foundation, 2005); Eun Jeong-Tae, “1899-nyeon Han-Cheong tongsangjyok-chegyeol-gwa Daehanjeguk” [The Conclusion of the Sino-Korean Trade Treaty in 1899 and the Great Korean Empire], *Yoksa Hakbo* 186 (2005); _____, “Cheongiljeonjaeng jeonhu Joseon-ui daecheongjeongchaek-gwa jocheonggwangye-ui byeonhwa” [Joseon's Policy on Qing and the Transformation of Joseon-Qing Relationship during the First Sino-Japanese War], in *Cheongiljeonjaengi Han-Jung-Il sanguk-ui sanghojeonryak* (Seoul: Northeast Asian History Foundation, 2009).

¹²⁰ Jung Yong-Hwa, *Munmyeong-ui jeongchisasang: Yu Giljun-gwa geundae Hanguk* [The Political Philosophy of Civilization: Yu Giljun and Modern Korea] (Seoul: Moonji Publishing, 2004).

¹²¹ Quan Hexiu (2013).

This situation exemplifies their drastically changed relationship from the previous period. In particular, Qing began to be aggressively involved in Joseon affairs immediately after Joseon transitioned to an open foreign policy and experienced the Imo Soldiers' Mutiny and Gapsin Coup, Joseon, which used to greatly rely on Qing's cooperation, attempted to assert its independence and sovereignty with help from Japan and Russia or sought to exercise independent diplomacy by sending envoys to western countries. It is apparent that Qing consistently suppressed Joseon's moves toward independence and enforced a 'vassalization' or 'imperialist' policy on Joseon with the 'vassalage system' or the 'Agreement on Three Steps.'

At any rate, the first Sino-Japanese War determined the winner of the competition over Joseon, and as a result, Joseon was able to achieve "independence" from Qing. Furthermore, Joseon changed its name to the Great Korean Empire and tried to create a diplomatic relationship with Qing as an equal sovereign state. However, because of Qing's attachment to the previous Sinocentric order and refusal to establish equal diplomatic relations with Joseon, the normalization of their diplomatic relations was delayed until 1899, when the Korea-Qing Commerce Treaty was finalized. The treaty signed at the end of the 19th century signaled a new era between the two nations, but they had little time to build a new equal relationship as modern states.

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The Japanese Military and Regular Police’s Placement and Suppression of the March First Independence Movement

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The Japanese Military and Regular Police's Placement and Suppression of the March First Independence Movement*

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Introduction

The March First Movement in 1919 was the largest event in the history of Korean independence activities. According to Bak Eun-sik (1859-1925), a total of 2,023,098 people took part in 1,542 rallies at 211 lower administrative districts, called *bu* or *gun*, between March and May 1919. Japan consistently used force to suppress the movement through which many Koreans suffered severely. The number of Korean deaths amounted to 7,509 while 15,961 were injured and 46,948 were incarcerated.¹ The police system in colonial Korea, occupied mainly by the Japanese military police (J. *Kenpeitai*), played a major role in suppressing the March First Movement.² By the time the movement occurred, the Japanese military police had al-

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¹ Bak Eun-sik, *Hanguk Dongnip Undong Jihyeolsa* [A Bloody History of the Korean Independence Movement]. Kim Do-hyung, trans. (Seoul: Somyeong chulpan, 2008).

² The term “military police” here refers to Japanese military policemen who performed regular police duties during the period of Japanese colonialization.

ready experienced a war with righteous armies in late Joseon (1392-1910) and served as the foundation of Japan's military rule over colonial Korea. Moreover, it had the civilian police under its command. Apart from the police system, Japanese occupation forces in colonial Korea also contributed to the suppression of the independence movement³ and other Japanese self-defense units took action against the independence movement.⁴

Japanese suppression of the March First Movement has been a major target of criticism ever since its beginning and many studies have so far managed to reveal the extent of the suppression and the degree of brutality at the time. As a result, the overall circumstances of Japanese suppression, including the size and structure of the oppressive agencies, the extent of damage Koreans suffered, and details related to the mobilization and the involvement of the Japanese occupation forces in Korea, have been generally known.⁵

However, when it comes to the studies on the Japanese police system of the time, some ambiguities have still remain. Few studies have been devoted to determining exactly how Japanese police forces were involved in suppressing the March First Movement. It is easier to locate studies on the damage Japanese authorities and government offices sustained from at-

³ Yi Yang-hi, "Ilbongun ui 3.1 undong tanap gwa Joseon tongchi bangan" [The Japanese Army's Suppression against the 1919 Independence Movement and Colonial Administration Plans], *Journal of Korean Modern and Contemporary History* 65 (2013): 104-36; Kim Sang-gyu, "1915-1921 nyeon Joseon judun Ilbongun ui sangjuhwa wa 3.1 undong tanap" [The Stationing of Japanese Occupation Forces in Joseon between 1915 and 1921 and the Suppression of the March First Movement], in *Junsasa yeongu chongseo* [Military History Research Series] 6 (Seoul: Institute for Military History, 2017).

⁴ Yi Yang-hi, "Jaechan ilbonin jawidan ui 3.1 undong tanap" [Suppression of the March First Independence Movement by the Self-Defense Force of Japanese Residents in Korea], *Journal of Korean Modern and Contemporary History* 76 (2016): 121-50; Yi Yang-hi, "3.1 undonggi ilje ui hangugin jawi danche jojik gwa unyong" [Organization and Management of Korean Self-Defense Corps by the Japanese Empire in the March First Independence Movement], *Journal of Korean Modern and Contemporary History* 83 (2017): 173-204.

⁵ The oldest, most extensive collection of papers was published by Dong-a Ilbo to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the March First Movement. The collection holds a total of eighty-one papers, memoirs, lists, and daily logs. Han Wu-geun et al., *Samil undong 50 junyeon ginyeom nonjip* [Collection to Commemorate the March First Movement's 50th Anniversary] (Seoul: Dong-a Ilbosa, 1969).

tacks by Koreans during the movement.⁶ Their analyses are geared to demonstrating how fiercely Koreans resisted Japanese suppression at the time. Some studies tend to convey vague descriptions about the Japanese authorities involved in suppressing Koreans. For instance, instead of offering specific names such as military police, regular police, Japanese army, or Japanese self-defense forces, ambiguous terms such as "the military and police" or "police officials" have often been used. This issue, it seems, has bearing on the inexplicit descriptions about Japanese authorities in historical sources or shows neglect of how each oppressive agency operated its network within colonial Korea.

Another matter for further examination concerns the Japanese military and regular police. During the 1910s, a military police system was being operated in colonial Korea so that when it came to public order, the Japanese military police wielded powerful influence. Yet, the Japanese regular police were involved in maintaining public order as well. Though not as extensive as the military police, the regular police also had a widespread network and numerous human resources. The military police undoubtedly played a leading role in handling matters of public order, but it is still necessary to consider how the regular police, managed by civil servants, strove to treat such matters.

This paper therefore seeks to examine how the Japanese military and the regular police forces were organized during the Japanese suppression of the March First Movement. Previous studies have managed to suggest the size and the status of the military police and the regular police, but they have failed to perform a more in-depth analysis on their structure during the March First Movement. The National Institute of Korean History has been digitalizing the extensive collection it has thus far amassed, which now includes historical sources such as Documents Related to the Korean Commotion (*Chōsen sōjō jiken kankei shorui* 朝鮮騷擾事件關係書類), Pro-

⁶ Kim Jin-bong, "Samil undong gwa minjung" [The March First Movement and the People], in *Samil undong 50 junyeon ginyeom nonjip* (Seoul: Dong-a Ilbosa, 1969), 358-60; Matsuda Toshihiko, *Nihon no Chōsen shokuminchi shihai to keisatsu* [Japan's Colonial Rule of Korea and the Police] (Tokyo: Azekura shobō, 2009), 233-40.

vincial Governor Report on the Korean Commotion (*Taishō hachinen sōjōjiken ni kansuru dōchoukan hōkokutsuzuri* 大正八年 騷擾事件ニ關スル道長官報告綴), Miscellaneous Cases Involving Insubordinate Groups (*Futeidan kankei jakken* 不逞團關係雜件), Gyeongseong District Court's Prosecution Bureau Documents (*Keijō chihōhōin kenjikyoku bunsho* 京城地方法院 檢事局 文書), court rulings, and reports from missionaries in Korea. Such historical sources have been used in combination with geographic information and information on administrative districts as well as military and regular police units in order to establish the “March First Movement Database” suitable for more diverse and constructive research methods.

This paper attempts to utilize information gathered from the March First Movement Database to explore how the colonial police authorities in Korea suppressed the March First Movement in 1919. First, beyond mere numerical observations, the structure and the geographic placement of military and regular police units around the time will be analyzed from various angles in which to trace the density of their network in different areas, determine the circumstances of individual units, and highlight the way the colonial apparatuses reacted to the Movement. And, the paper charts multiple aspects of the Japanese military and the regular police's suppression of Koreans. Those aspects include actual acts of suppression by the military police and the regular police, the frequency of each agency's involvement in protest suppression, and cases of simultaneous dispatch by the two public police organizations. By so doing, we can have a better understanding of the pattern in which the two organizations tried to subdue the nationwide anti-Japanese resistance and these two oppressive agencies make a difference to each other.

The Organization and Placement of Japanese Police Forces in Korea

1. The Organization of Japanese Police Forces in Korea

In the 1910s, the Japanese military police and regular police were jointly in

charge of maintaining public order on the Korean peninsula. Leadership roles, however, were held by the military police. Ahead of its forced occupation of Korea, Japan consolidated the military police and the regular police⁷ and appointed the military police commander as the police commissioner while the provost marshal additionally oversaw police affairs at the provincial level.⁸ This consolidation placed the military police on ordinary police duties so that while 26.6 percent, or 2,019 out of 7,582 military policemen handled ordinary police affairs as of 1910, that percentage surged to 98.9 percent, or 7,978 out of 8,066 military policemen by 1918.⁹ In other words, just one year before the March First Movement in 1919, the majority of the military police stationed on the Korean peninsula performed ordinary police duties. Although the military police and the regular police constantly restructured specific departments or individual units throughout the 1910s, the military police continued to play a central role in maintaining public order in Korea. By the time the March First Movement occurred, the military police and the regular police had formed dense networks across the Korean peninsula. The organization of the military police and the regular police reconstructed through the March First Movement Data-

⁷ Lee Sung-hee, “Hanguk byeonghap joyak jeonhugi ui juhan ilbongun heonbyeongdae yeongu: Hyeongyeong tongil munje reul jungsimuro” [A Study of the Japanese Military Police in Korea during the Japanese Annexation of Korea], *Journal of Japanese History* 26 (2007): 165-92.

⁸ Ryu Yeong-ik, “Joseon chongdokbu chogi ui gujo wa gineung” [The Structure and Operation of the Japanese Government-General of Korea in Its Early Stages], in *Samil undong 50 junyeon ginyeom nonjip* (Seoul: Dong-a Ilbosa, 1969), 102; Yi Hyeon-hi, “Samil undong ijeon heonbyeong gyeongchalje ui seonggyeok” [The Nature of the Military Police System Prior to the March First Movement], in *Samil undong 50 junyeon ginyeom nonjip* (Seoul: Dong-a Ilbosa, 1969), 114-15.

⁹ Matsuda Toshihiko, “Kaisetsu Chōsen kenpeitai shōshi” [Commentary on a Brief History of the Japanese Military Police in Korea], in *Chōsen kenpeitai rekishi 1* (Tokyo: Fuji shuppan, 2000), 8.

〈The Number of Japanese Military Police Performing Regular Police Duties〉

Year	1910	1911	1912	1913	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918
Number Performing Regular Police Duties	2,019	7,749	7,769	7,958	7,971	7,929	8,041	8,123	7,978
Total Number of Military Police	7,582	7,482	7,754	8,002	8,074	8,031	8,167	8,164	8,066

Table 1. The Organization of Police Forces (March 1919)

Military Police	Command	Headquarters	Squad	Outstation	Substation	Station	Total No. of Units
	1	13	78	98	879	6	
Regular Police	Government-General Police Bureau	Police Administrative Bureau	Station	Substation		Box	Total No. of Units
	1	13	99	528		108	
				636			
Total	2	26	177	1,619			1,824

base has been summarized in the table 1.

The organizational formation in the table displays minor discrepancies compared to what has so far been quoted in previous studies on police forces from the 1910s. The number of units at the squad/station level or above match previous records, but those below that level do not. The military police appear to have had twenty-five stations less than previously known while the regular police had two stations less.¹¹ Such discrepancies suggest that a gap existed between record and reality and while it remains unclear as to why such a gap emerged, the constant restructuring of police forces throughout the 1910s could have been a contributing factor.

After forcibly occupying Korea, Japan restructured police forces in

¹⁰ According to the March First Movement Database, the total number of regular police units was 757. This number included eight units (one station and seven substations) installed beyond the March First Movement on April 1, 1919, which is why those eight units have been excluded from the total in Table 1.

¹¹ The following table juxtaposes previous and updated data on the basic units of the Japanese military police and regular police.
 <Data Comparison on the Number of Basic Units>

Previous numbers	Military Police Outstation	Military Police Dispatch Station	Military Police Annex	Total	Police Substation	Police Station	Total
		98	877	43	1,018	532	106
Corrected numbers	Military Police Outstation	Military Police Substation	Military Police Station	Total	Police Substation	Police Station	Total
		98	879	6	983	528	108

* The previous data was collected through the Korean Statistical Information Service's web portal (<http://kosis.kr/index/index.do>).

Korea several times. The Government-General Ordinance No. 125 issued on August 27, 1914 assigned precincts for the Japanese military police to be stationed in Korea. This was followed by the Government-General Ordinance No. 126, which announced the military police squads that would be handling police affairs as well as the names and locations of outstations. A separate announcement was made for dispatch stations and smaller units. The names and locations of police bureaus, police stations, substations, and boxes were announced on the same day through the Government-General Ordinances no. 127 and 338.¹² Restructurings beyond this point were all carried out in the form of revising the aforementioned Ordinances No. 125, 126, 127, and 338.

Until the March First Movement, the Japanese Government-General of Korea (hereinafter the Government-General) often revised ordinances and announcements and more frequently reorganized the precincts of police stations and substations. Even at the height of the movement, a reshuffle was carried out on April 1, 1919, which included the establishment of the Gyeongju Police Station.¹³ The precincts of the military police and the regular police had changed whenever necessary. For instance, the military police and the regular police each covered six of the twelve administrative districts defined as a *myeon* in Goyang-gun, Gyeonggi Province until the ordinance revision on September 6, 1916 placed all twelve of the *myeons* of Goyang-gun under the control of the military police.¹⁴ The Government-General thus frequently reorganized the assignment of precincts throughout the 1910s and this is perhaps the reason why a mismatch occurred between the number of units in official statistics and the number of units that were actually operating at the time.

According to Table 1, police forces operated a total of 1,824 units

¹² *Joseon chongdokbu gwanbo* [Official Gazette of the Japanese Government-General of Korea], August 17, 1914, Extra Edition.

¹³ *Joseon chongdokbu gwanbo* 1991, August 17, 1914. This reshuffle closed three substations and newly installed one police station and seven substations.

¹⁴ Ordinance, no. 75 and Ordinance, no. 76 of the Japanese Government-General of Korea were issued on September 6, 1916 (*Joseon chongdokbu gwanbo* 1229, September 6, 1916).

when the March First Movement took place. Military police squads, outstations, substations, and stations equally contributed to the maintenance of public order in each region alongside regular police stations, substations, and boxes.¹⁵ Police forces at the time consisted of 7,978 military policemen and 5,402 regular policemen,¹⁶ meaning that there were 1,576 more military policemen (59.63%) than regular policemen (40.37%).

In terms of the number of units, the military police operated 326 more units than the regular police. While the regular police had 21 more mid-sized units than the military police, the military police ran far greater numbers of smaller-sized units than the regular police. The military police operated 983 units smaller than outstations, which was approximately 347 more than the 636 substations and boxes operated by the regular police. This suggests that the military police interacted more broadly with the lower stratum of colonial Korean society than the regular police.

In 1919, Korea was administratively divided into thirteen provinces, 232 *bus* (府) and *guns* (郡), 2,150 *myeons* (面), and 28,294 *lis*, *dongs*, and *jeongs*.¹⁷ A military police squad and a provincial police agency were installed in each province. A total of 177 military police squads or police stations covered areas at the *bu* or *gun* level, which meant that an average of two police stations covered around three *bus* or *guns* or each *bu* or *gun* was covered by 0.76 stations. Units smaller than outstations or substations totaled 1,619 so that seven of such units were installed at each *bu* or *gun*. The number of units smaller than a regular police station totaled 1,796,

which placed 7.7 of such units in each *bu* or *gun*. This meant that at the *myeon* level, 1,796 units smaller than a regular police station covered 2,510 *myeons*, so that each such station covered 1.4 *myeons*. As for administrative districts at the *li*, *dong*, and *jeong* level, which amounted to 28,294, each unit covered 15.8 *dongs*. Not all administrative districts larger than a *myeon* each had a unit, but it would be safe to say that most areas were under the direct influence of police forces.

As of 1919, 16,783,510 people formed a total of 3,152,228 households on the Korean peninsula.¹⁸ In terms of units smaller than a police station, each unit had to cover 9,345 people from 1,755 households. Since there were 13,380 military and regular policemen at the time, each policeman likely had to oversee 1,254 Koreans. The personnel size is likely to have differed to the status and the location of each unit. Dividing the number of policemen with the number of units, the military police and the regular police each had a similar personnel size per unit, which averaged 7.3. For the military police, 7,421 people served at each unit by dividing 7,978 policemen among 1,075 units while 7,212 people served at each regular police unit by dividing 5,402 policemen among 749 units. Considering the fact that 117 people worked at the Government-General Police Bureau in 1919, more personnel is likely to have been assigned to the 205 units equivalent to a police station or larger.

As for units smaller than substations, they are likely to have been staffed with no more than five people regardless of whether a unit belonged to the military or to the regular police. Through an organizational reform on July 1, 1910 shortly before Japan's forced occupation of Korea, the military police had a headquarters, 13 corps, 77 squads, 525 outstations, and three dispatch stations. Each substation was assigned with one

¹⁵ The Korean Statistical Information Service's web portal lists outstations (*bungyeonso*), dispatch stations (*pagyeonso*), and annexes (*chuljangso*) as basic units of the military police whereas such units are listed as outstations (*bungyeonso*), substations (*jujaeso*), and stations (*pachulso*) in the March First Movement Database. Regarding the names of the military police's basic units, the Government-General issued Ordinance No. 24 on March 30, 1918 so that from April 1 of the same year, dispatch stations were to be called substations (*Joseon chongdokbu gwanbo* 1692, March 30, 1918). Accordingly, annexes within the Yongsan Military Police Squad's jurisdiction were renamed as police stations while other dispatch stations and annexes were renamed as substations (*Joseon chongdokbu gwanbo* 1698, April 8, 1918).

¹⁶ Korean Statistical Information Service's web portal (<http://kosis.kr/index/index.do>).

¹⁷ Refer to the Administrative District Section of the March First Movement Database by the National Institute of Korean History.

¹⁸ For more information, please refer to the Korean Statistical Information Service's web portal (<http://kosis.kr/index/index.do>). The census results provided by the web portal is based on the Statistical Yearbook of the Japanese Government-General of Korea.

<Number of Korean Households and Population as of 1919>

Households	Population	Males	Females
3,152,228	16,783,510	8,632,605	8,150,905

staff sergeant, three corporals, and six military police assistants.¹⁹ The number of basic military police units nearly doubled from 528 in 1910 to 938 by early 1919. However, the number of military policemen merely increased by 484 over the same period. While the number of military police units almost doubled, the size of the military police force barely changed. Considering that each basic military police unit previously operated with about ten policemen soon after the Japanese annexation of Korea, the per-unit number must have dropped to one-half by the time the March First Movement occurred. As for the regular police, one or two Japanese officers and two to four assistants to the officers were assigned to each substation.²⁰ The number of basic regular police units rose from 354 in 1910 to 636 at the time of the March First Movement.²¹ The number of regular policemen, however, decreased from 5,694 to 5,402 over the same period.²² These circumstances indicate that basic units of both the military police and the regular police most likely operated in teams of about five people on average.

The general characteristics of police forces in Korea in the 1910s can be summarized as follows. The Japanese military police was a larger organization than the regular police in terms of the number of personnel and units. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that 60.7 percent of the 1,619 basic police units belonged to the Japanese military police. This can be interpreted as the clear evidence that the military police interacted more broadly with the lower stratum of colonial Korean society than the regular police. The personnel size of substations or smaller units, regardless of whether they belonged to the military police or to the regular police, is estimated to

¹⁹ Lee, "Hanguk byeonghap joyak jeonhugi ui juhan ilbongun heonbyeongdae yeongu," *Journal of Japanese History* 26 (2007): 176.

²⁰ Lee Yun-jeong, *Hanguk gyeongchalsa: Geungyeonhae pyeon* [A History of the Korean Police: From the Modern to Contemporary Period] (Seoul: Somyeong chulpan, 2015), 121.

²¹ Shortly before Japan's forced occupation of Korea, the regular police consisted of 111 police stations, one substation, and 375 basic units. The reshuffle on August 5, 1910 restructured the organization into ninety-seven police stations, four substations, and 354 basic units. *Hanguk gyeongchalsa pyeonchan wiwonhoe, Hanguk gyeongchalsa* [Korean Police History] 1 (Seoul: Ministry of Home Affairs (Security Bureau), 1972), 724-27.

²² Matsuda Toshihiko, *Nihon no Chōsen shokuminchi shihai to keisatsu*, 24-25.

have been as many as five per unit. Units that interacted directly with the lower social stratum were units equivalent to or smaller than military police squads and police stations. Around two regular police stations would cover approximately three *bus* or *guns*. By including all units smaller than police stations, 7.7 units would have been installed in each *bu* or *gun* and each unit would have covered 1.4 *myeons*. These estimations suggest that a dense Japanese police presence was formed at each *bu*, *gun*, and *myeon* in Korea by 1919, although each unit or policeman had to handle an extensive number of Koreans.

2. The Placement of Japanese Police Forces in Korea

Even while consolidating the military police and the regular police in June 1910, Japan sought to separate their respective precincts to prevent the police presence from overlapping anywhere. The regular police was mostly assigned to major cities, open port areas, and areas along railways whereas the military police was assigned to areas strategically important or vital to the suppression of Korean righteous armies.²³ During the 1910s, the military police and the regular police were each overseen by the Military Police Command and the Government-General Police Bureau both located in Gyeongseong-bu. A provost marshal's office and provincial police agency were installed at each Korean province to oversee smaller police units such as military police squads and police stations maintaining public order at the *bu* and *gun* levels.

Major cities and townships designated as a *bu* or a *jijeongmyeon* certainly seem to have been under the regular police's jurisdiction. All twelve *bus* were controlled by the regular police around the time the March First Movement occurred.²⁴ Military police squads were stationed at cities such

²³ Ryu Yeong-ik, "Joseon chongdokbu chogi ui gujo wa gineung" in *Samil undong 50 junyeon ginyeom nonjip* (Seoul: Dong-a Ilbosa, 1969), 102; Lee, "Hanguk Byeonghap Joyak Jeonhugi ui Juhan Ilbongun Heonbyeongdae Yeongu," *Journal of Japanese History* 26 (2007): 172.

²⁴ Through the Government-General Ordinance No. 100 issued on April 1, 1914, twelve *bus* and fourteen *myeons* were designated as urban districts (*Joseon chongdokbu gwanbo* 499, April 1,

as Daegu and Pyeongyang where provincial government buildings were located, but the regular police was in charge of maintaining public order in those areas as well. Gyeongseong-bu appears to be an exception because the Imperial Japanese Army's 20th Division was stationed. Out of the twenty-three townships designated as a *jijeongmyeon*,²⁵ sixteen of them were under the jurisdiction of the regular police. Eight of the *jijeongmyeons* accommodated a provincial government building including Cheongju-myeon (North Chungcheong Province), Gongju-myeon (South Chungcheong Province), Jeonju-myeon (North Jeolla Province), Gwangju-myeon (South Jeolla Province), Jinju-myeon (South Gyeongsang Province), Haeju-myeon (Hwanghae Province), Uiju-myeon (North Pyeongan Province), and Hamheung-myeon (South Hamheung Province). Except for Uiju-myeon, the other seven townships were under the regular police's jurisdiction. The military police had control over seven *jijeongmyeons*, which were Jochiwon-myeon, Iksan-myeon, Gimcheon-myeon, Pohang-myeon, Uiju-myeon, Hoeryeong-myeon, and Nanam-myeon.²⁶

1914). The twelve *bus* were Gyeongseong-bu, Incheon-bu, Gunsan-bu, Mokpo-bu, Daegu-bu, Busan-bu, Masan-bu, Pyeongyang-bu, Jinnampo-bu, Sinuiju-bu, Wonsan-bu, and Cheongjin-bu. The fourteen *myeons* were Suwon-myeon, Songdo-myeon, Cheongju-myeon, Gongju-myeon, Daejeon-myeon, Ganggyeong-myeon, Jeonju-myeon, Naju-myeon, Gwangju-myeon, Gimcheon-myeon, Jinju-myeon, Haeju-myeon, Uiju-myeon, and Hamheung-myeon. These designations remained valid when the March First Movement occurred.

²⁵ Through the Government-General Ordinance No. 67 on September 19, 1917, the following townships were designated as a *jijeongmyeon*: Suwon-myeon, Songdo-myeon, and Yeongdeungpo-myeon in Gyeonggi Province; Cheongju-myeon in North Chungcheong Province; Gongju-myeon, Daejeon-myeon, Ganggyeong-myeon, and Jochiwon-myeon in South Chungcheong Province; Jeonju-myeon and Iksan-myeon in North Jeolla Province; Gwangju-myeon in South Jeolla Province; Gimcheon-myeon and Pohang-myeon in North Gyeongsang Province; Jinju-myeon, Jinhae-myeon, and Tongyeong-myeon in South Gyeongsang Province; Haeju-myeon in Hwanghae Province; Uiju-myeon in North Pyeongan Province; Chuncheon-myeon in Gangwon Province; Hamheung-myeon in South Hamgyeong Province; Hoeryeong-myeon, Nanam-myeon, and Seongjin-myeon in North Hamgyeong Province (*Joseon chongdokbu gwanbo* 1539, September 19, 1917).

²⁶ Nanam-myeon used to be a secluded rural area that belonged to Ochon-myeon of Gyeongseong-gun until the Japanese army settled there, causing the area to develop rapidly and become sectioned off as a separate myeon. In September 1917, Nanam-myeon was designated as a *jijeongmyeon* (*Maeil Sinbo*, October 3, 1917). North Hamgyeong Province's government building was originally located in Ochon-myeon, Gyeongseong-gun, but the decision was made to relocate

The military police and the regular police seem to have been involved in policing areas along railways running through the Korean peninsula. By 1919, all sections of the Gyeongbu Line, Gyeongin Line, Gyeongui Line, Gyeongwon Line, Honam Line, Gunsan Line, and Gyeomipo Line were in service. The railways connecting Iksan and Jeonju, Samnangjin and Masan, Daegu and Pohang, Cheongjin and Hoeryeong, Sinanju and Gaecheon, and Pyeongyang and Jinnampo were already under operation as well. While the Gyeongin Line, Gyeongbu Line, and Gyeongui Line were completed under the reign of the Korean empire, the Gyeongwon Line, Honam Line, Daegu Line, and Hambuk Line had all opened in the 1910s.

The regular police were not necessarily predominant in terms of its coverage of areas along railways in the 1910s. Among the twenty-one *bus* and *guns* where Gyeongbu Line passed through, eight were controlled by the military police, nine by the regular police, and four jointly by the military police and the regular police alike. The situation was similar for the Gyeongui (Seoul-Uiju) Line so that among the twenty-two *bus* and *guns* it passed through, nine were covered by the military police, eleven by the regular police, and two were jointly covered. As for the Gyeongwon (Seoul-Wonsan) Line and the Hambuk (Hoeryong-Najin) Line that ran through mountainous regions, the military police covered a broader area than the regular police. Among the fourteen *bus* and *guns* the Gyeongwon Line passed, nine were covered by the military police, three by the regular police, and two were jointly covered. Such a mixture of military and regular police presence applied to other railways as well, such as for the Honam (Daejeon-Mokpo) Line that passed through eleven *bus* and *guns*, five of which were covered by the military police, five by the regular police, and one jointly by both the military police and the regular police.

A review of the distribution of police stations or smaller units reveals

the building as well as the provincial police bureau, free clinic, and police station to Nanam-myeon according to an announcement made on June 30, 1917 (*Maeil Sinbo*, July 5, 1917). The relocation was supposed to be finished by December 1919, but it took far longer until May 29, 1921 (*Maeil Sinbo*, June 1, 1921).

another pattern. The distribution of police units differed among the north-eastern, central, and southern regions on the Korean peninsula. Far more military police units were assigned to the northeastern regions such as Pyeongan, Hamgyeong, Hwanghae, and Gangwon Provinces. The mid to southern regions, on the other hand, such as Gyeonggi, Chungcheong, Jeolla, and Gyeongsang Provinces, had as many or more regular police units than the military police. In the northeastern regions, there were at least thirty-eight more or as many as eighty-six more military police units. This concentration of military police units in the northeastern regions while maintaining at least as many units as the regular police in the mid to southern regions explains why the military police operated a total of 1.4 times more units than the regular police on the Korean peninsula.

Table 2. Provincial Distribution of Police Units in Korea (March 1919)

Province	No. of Bu, Gun	Military Police	Regular Police	Military + Regular	Military - Regular
Nationwide	232	1,061	735	1,796	326
Gyeonggi	22	107	113	220	-6
North Chungcheong	10	42	42	84	0
South Chungcheong	14	52	55	107	-3
North Jeolla	15	56	57	113	-1
South Jeolla	23	61	73	134	-12
North Gyeongsang	24	87	88	175	-1
South Gyeongsang	21	50	70	120	-20
Hwanghae	17	99	45	144	54
South Pyeongan	16	87	49	136	38
North Pyeongan	20	103	47	150	56
Gangwon	21	110	34	144	76
South Hamgyeong	17	115	29	144	86
North Hamgyeong	12	92	33	125	59

The southwestern coastal regions and nearby islands, on the other hand, were mostly covered by the regular police. Except for Hampyeong-gun in South Jeolla Province, the entire southwestern coast between Gimpo and Ganghwa in Gyeonggi Province down to Gangjin and Wando in South Jeolla Province fell under the regular police's jurisdiction. The regular police also controlled the islands off the coast with some exceptions.²⁷ Meanwhile, the military police controlled all the regions around the Amnok River and the Duman River that bordered Manchuria. The east and the south coasts of Korea displayed a mixture of districts under either the military police or the regular police. The inlands of the Korean peninsula's north-central areas were largely under the jurisdiction of the military police. The regular police mainly covered coastal and urban areas in the north-central region in addition to a few inland areas in North Pyeongan Province such as Taecheon, Bakcheon, Unsan, and Yeongbyeon. Compared to the north-central region, there was a heavy mixture of military and regular police presence at inlands belonging to the southern provinces.

Although the military police and the regular police each took charge of different districts, they jointly covered the following *bus* and *guns*: Gyeongseong-bu, Gaeseong, Suwon, Cheongju, Yeongdong, Daejeon, Jeonju, Daegu, Sacheon, Changwon, Tongyeong, Busan, Pyeongyang, Pyeongwon, Uiju, Chuncheon, Hamheung, and Gyeongseong.²⁸ And, in the case of Gaeseong, Daejeon, Changwon, and Tongyeong, they were basically under the military police's jurisdiction, but they each had two regular po-

²⁷ The islands with military police presence were Geogeum-do and Naro-do of Goheung-gun in South Jeolla Province; Geoje-do of Tongyeong-gun and Gadeok-do of Changwon-gun in South Gyeongsang Province. A military police substation was installed at Geogeum-do, Naro-do, and Gadeok-do while three substations were installed at Geoje-do.

²⁸ Only the *bus* and *guns* jointly covered by basic units of the military police and the regular police are listed here. Daegu, Busan, and Pyeongyang have therefore been excluded for being regular police districts where a military police unit was installed. Among the places where a provincial government building was located, a military police squad and a regular police station were both installed in seven *bus* or *guns* of Gyeongseong-bu, Cheongju, Daegu, Pyeongyang, Chuncheon, Hamheung, and Gyeongseong. The six *guns* with only a regular police station were Gongju, Jeonju, Gwangju, Jinju, Haeju, and Uiju.

Table 3. Military Police Stations and Regular Police Stations in Gyeonggi Province and Their Respective Districts

Type	Supervising Unit	Unit (Precinct)
Military Police	Gyeongseong Military Police	Gyeongseong Military Police Squad (Goyang, Yangju, Gapyeong), Yongsan Military Police Squad (Yongsan of Gyeongseong-bu), Yongin Military Police Squad (Suwon, Yongin, Gwangju), Yeosu Military Police Squad (Yeosu, Icheon, Yangpyeong), Yangju Military Police Squad (Yangju, Pocheon, Yeoncheon), Gaeseong Military Police Squad (Gaeseong, Jangdan, Paju)
Regular Police	Direct Control of the Government-General Police Bureau	Changdeok Palace Police Station, Gyeongseongbon-jeong Police Station, Gyeongseong Jongno Police Station (all within Gyeongseong-bu)
	Gyeonggi Province Police Bureau	Incheon Police Station (Incheon, Bucheon), Yeongdeungpo Police Station (Siheung), Suwon Police Station (Suwon), Jinwi Police Station (Jinwi), Anseong Police Station (Anseong), Gimpo Police Station (Gimpo), Ganghwa Police Station (Ganghwa), Gaeseong Police Station (Gaeseong)

lice units as well.²⁹ On the other hand, there was a military police substation in Suwon-gun even though the district was covered by the regular police.

Gyeongseong-bu, Cheongju, Yeongdong, Jeonju, Sacheon, Pyeongwon, Uiju, Chuncheon, Hamheung, and Gyeongseong were covered by both the military police and the regular police. Military police squads and regular police stations as well as smaller units of each force were separately installed in those ten areas.³⁰ Provincial government buildings were also

²⁹ The Gaeseong Police Station and the Nambon-jeong Police Box were in Gaeseong; the Daejeon Police Station and the Daejeon Market Police Substation were in Daejeon; the Jinhae Police Station and Gyeonghwa Police Substation were in Changwon; and the Tongyeong Police Station and Yokjido Police Substation were in Tongyeong.

³⁰ The number of basic military and regular police units simultaneously installed in each *bu* or *gun* are listed in the following table.

Basic Units	Gyeong-seong-bu	Cheong-ju	Yeong-dong	Jeon-ju	Sa-cheon	Pyeong-won	Uiju	Chun-cheon	Ham-heung	Gyeong-seong
Military Police	6	5	3	4	3	4	7	5	7	13
Regular Police	50	6	4	8	3	4	5	3	5	4

located in some of those areas including Gyeongseong-bu, Cheongju, Jeonju, Uiju, Chuncheon, Hamheung, and Gyeongseong. It seems to me that the military police stayed in certain areas because they served as major bases for the Japanese occupation forces such as Gyeongseong-bu (Imperial Japanese Army's 20th division in Yongsan), Gyeongseong in North Hamgyeong (Imperial Japanese Army's 19th division in Nanam), and Hamheung in South Hamgyeong Province (74th infantry). Other areas such as Yeongdong, Sacheon, or Pyeongwon did not exhibit any distinct characteristics.

Meanwhile, there was a difference between military police squads and regular police stations in the range of districts they covered, as is the case with Gyeonggi Province. Before the movement in 1919, there were twenty-two *bus* and *guns* in Gyeonggi Province. Fifteen of them were covered by the military police while the regular police covered ten of them. The three areas where the military police and the regular police presence overlapped were Gyeongseong-bu, Suwon-gun, and Gaeseong-gun. While there were nearly twice as many regular police stations (eleven) compared to military police squads (six), each force maintained an identical number of basic units within Gyeonggi Province. Each police station was charged with covering a single *gun*, and each military police squad was expected to cover three *guns* except for the squad in Yongsan. Military police squads therefore tended to cover broader districts than regular police stations.

Hence, in terms of the areas the military police and the regular police each covered throughout the Korean peninsula, the regular police seem to have been mainly assigned to major cities or areas along railways. This trend remained unchanged in major cities, but the coverage of some areas along railways seems to have been transferred to the military police by 1919. Such a change is likely to be related to the fact that far more railroad construction was done than before Japan's forced occupation of Korea. The military police established a dense network in the northeastern regions of the Korean peninsula whereas it showed a presence equal to the regular police in regions south of Gyeonggi Province. While the northern regions bordering Manchuria all fell under the military police's jurisdiction, the southwestern coastal areas and islands were mostly covered by the regular

police. In some areas, the military police and the regular police were both present, but they basically covered separate districts although the districts military police squads covered tended to be larger than those assigned to regular police stations.

3. The Military Police and the Regular Police's Suppression of the March First Movement

1) An Overview of Protest Suppression

A movement for independence launched in major Korean cities on March 1, 1919 and soon spread nationwide. By late April, 212 out of 232 *bus* and *guns* on the Korean peninsula joined the movement so that approximately 1.1 million people participated in 1,214 protests.³¹ To suppress the movement, Japan not only mobilized the military police and the regular police but the army as well. And even during the movement, self-defense units were organized to subdue protests.³² Because the Japanese military police and regular police had each established a dense network across Korea by 1919, basic police units in direct contact with the lower social stratum came to stand at the forefront of suppressing protests when the independence movement occurred.

Although a total of 1,214 protests are known to have occurred during the March First Movement, a far greater number of incidents seem to have occurred at the time.³³ According to the data from the National Institute of Korean History, 2,297 out of the 2,464 incidents occurred domestically in 1919. The following table shows the different types of incidents that occurred around the time of the March First Movement.

³¹ Kim, "Samil undong gwa minjung," 362.

³² The National Institute of Korean History's March First Movement Database offers various details about specific incidents such as where they occurred, the forces involved in suppressing protests (regular police, military police, army), and sources including maps. The profile of each incident includes information about the type of weapons (firearms, swords, arson etc.) that were employed for suppression.

³³ Incidents registered in the March First Movement Database are basically classified into protest, business suspension, strike, class suspension, conspiracy, and other activities.

Table 4. Types of Incidents during the 1919 March First Movement

	Protest	Business Suspension	Strike	Class Suspension	Conspiracy	Other Activities	Total
Total	1,692	25	3	61	350	333	2,464
Domestic	1,593	25	2	58	320	299	2,297

Among the types of incidents, protests occupied the highest proportion at 68.7 percent, proving that protesting was indeed the most common form of resistance during the March First Movement. Conspiring was the second most frequent case type that amounted to 350 or 14.2 percent. This demonstrates that many attempts to launch a protest failed from being detected in advance. 333 incidents fell under the category of other activities which involved delivering letters or distributing the declaration of independence as well as other manifestos. Through sixty-one incidents, classes were boycotted or schools were closed, indicating how actively students took part in protests at the time. Merchants and laborers also participated in the movement in their own way by suspending their business or going on strike. 2,339 incidents, or 94.9 percent of all incidents at the time occurred over the two months, or March and April. To add further dimension to this study and compare it with previous studies, the 1,692 protests have been sorted by province in the following table.

The highest number of protests occurred in Gyeonggi Province (397), followed by Hwanghae Province (177), North Pyeongan Province (148), and South Gyeongsang Province (140). These numbers are somewhat dif-

Table 5. The Number of Protests in Each Province

Province	Gyeonggi	North Chung-cheong	South Chung-cheong	North Jeolla	South Jeolla	North Gyeong-sang	South Gyeong-sang
No. of Protests	397	84	117	44	36	118	140
Province	Gangwon	North Hamgyeong	South HamGyeong	Hwanghae	North Pyeongan	South Pyeongan	Overseas
No. of Protests	79	58	83	177	148	112	99

ferent from previous findings. According to the data Kim Jin-bong amassed on the extent of the movement, a total of 1,214 protests occurred over March and April in 1919. The highest number of protests occurred in Gyeonggi Province (288), Hwanghae Province (137), South Gyeongsang Province (121), North Pyeongan Province (114), and South Pyeongan Province (85).³⁴ While the hierarchy remains identical for the provinces of Gyeonggi and Hwanghae, there are slight discrepancies for the provinces of North Pyeongan, South Pyeongan, and South Gyeongsang. In the case of North Gyeongsang Province, however, 118 protests listed in the table above is nearly twice as many as the number from previous studies, which was 62.

Generally speaking, the independence movement in 1919 was carried out peacefully for the most part, which can be gathered from the types of action protesters took at the time.³⁵ Among the 1,593 domestic protests, 1,146 have been classified as “Long Live Korean Independence (*manse*) protests” that involved chanting the word “*manse*,” an abbreviation of ‘Long Live Korean Independence.’ This means that 71.9 percent of protests in Korea involved chanting. Adding the number of mass outcries to the number of *manse* protests brings the total of non-violent protests up to 1,287, or 80.8 percent of all domestic protests. On the contrary, the number of violent protests, related to vandalism, assault, murder or arson, amounted to 252, or 15.8 percent of all protests.³⁶

Meanwhile, the military police and the regular police’s suppression of the March First Movement can be examined through the methods of suppression they employed.³⁷ Among the 1,593 protests that occurred in Korea, 269, or 16.9 percent of them seem to have suffered suppression.³⁸

³⁴ Kim, “Samil undong gwa minjung,” 362.

³⁵ The six types of action listed in incident profiles were *manse* protest, mass outcry, vandalism, assault, murder, and arson.

³⁶ The type of action was not listed in fifty-four incidents (3.4%).

³⁷ Incident profiles listed five types of weapons that were employed for protest suppression including firearms, swords, arson, vandalism, and other weapons.

³⁸ A total of 271 incidents involved suppression, and only two took place outside Korea.

Table 6. Methods of Suppression by the Japanese Police and Army

	R	R+S	R+S+V+A	R+V+A	R+S+O	R+O	S	S+O	V	V+A	O	Total
Military Police	141	7	0	0	0	2	6	0	0	0	1	157
Regular Police	74	10	1	1	1	1	12	1	1	0	3	105
Army	5	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	6
Total	220	17	1	1	1	3	19	1	1	1*	4	269

- R (Rifle), S (Sword), V (Vandalism), A (Arson), O (Other Weapons)

- Sources with the term “policeman” have been classified as pertinent to the regular police.

* The suppressor in the case of vandalism and arson remains unclear.

Japanese suppression appears to have been initiated regardless of the type of action Koreans took to protest. 127 out of the 1,287 non-violent protests that involved chanting or mass outcries experienced suppression. As for the 252 incidents in hostile modes of protest, 137 of them met with suppression. In 54 cases of suppression, it remains unclear as to what kind of action Koreans took to protest. These numbers illustrate that Japan mobilized force to suppress Korean protesters regardless of whether the protesters’ actions were peaceful or not. The table below features the methods of suppression each force employed against 269 protests in Korea.

Among the 269 incidents of suppression, 220, or 81.8 percent of them purely involved direct firing of rifles and by including the twenty-three incidents that accompanied sword stabbing, vandalism, and arson, 90.3 percent involved firing of rifles in varied ways. So, it is safe to say that almost all incidents of armed suppression involved rifles. Swords were used to a far lesser degree than rifles. Only 19 incidents involved the sole use of swords and the number of incidents in which swords were used in combination with other weapons was 39. Swords appear to have been employed in incidents where the military police and the regular police were entangled with a throng of protesters. Only six incidents of suppression involved weapons other than rifles or swords. These proportions suggest that the military police and the regular police mostly maintained a distance from protesters when suppressing them and fired their rifles whenever necessary. 157 incidents, or 59.9 percent was carried out by the military po-

lice; 105 incidents, or 40.1 percent was carried out by the regular police. The proportion of units and personnel involved was 59.6 for the military police and 40.4 percent for the regular police, showing that both forces contributed similarly to the suppression of Korean protesters.³⁹

The most notable aspect of the above analysis pertains to the use of firearms for suppression. 243 out of the 269 incidents of suppression involved the firing of rifles. This mainly seems to have been caused by the greater amount of force rifles and the small size of units assigned to each region for the purpose of maintaining public order. As previously mentioned, any unit, assigned to a particular area, typically had five members, which far outnumbered the hundreds and thousands of people that gathered to protest. Small units of policemen therefore must have had to resort to the use of firearms available against large numbers of protesters.

On the other hand, there appears to be far fewer records on the use of swords or other weapons. Nevertheless, quite a few instances of suppression did in fact involve the use of swords or clubs. One example would be the case of Gu Nak-seo who was stabbed to death by the police in Anguk-dong, Seoul. There have also been reports about having been stabbed or clubbed in Seoncheon, North Pyeongan Province. While working as a missionary in Pyeongyang, Sadie N. Welbon described, in a letter, how the Japanese military police and regular police used rifles and swords to subdue Koreans.⁴⁰ There are plenty of other historical sources to prove that the Japanese military police and regular police simultaneously used firearms, swords, and other weapons such as clubs together in order to suppress Koreans during the movement. Reports about the movement's suppression at

³⁹ Below is a comparison of the number of suppressed manse protests as well as the number of military and regular police units and personnel involved.

	No. of Suppressed Protests	No. of Units Involved	No. of Personnel Involved
Military Police	157 (59.9%)	1,110 (59.6%)	7,978 (59.6%)
Regular Police	105 (40.1%)	751 (40.4%)	5,402 (40.4%)
Total	262	1,861	13,380

⁴⁰ Lee Jeong-eun, *Ilbon jegukjuui neun 3.1 undong eul eotteoke tanap haenna?* [How Did Japanese Imperialism Suppress the March First Movement?] (Cheonan: Hanguk dongnip undongsa yeonguso, 2018), 84-96.

the time therefore seem to have been focused on the use of firearms and neglected to mention incidents in which swords or other weapons were employed. Other circumstances also suggest that various details were frequently omitted from certain reports about the March First Movement's suppression. The reports indicate that a total of 159 protests during the movement directly caused deaths, but the circumstances of suppression remain ambiguous in 23 cases. Although reports do state the total number of deaths, they lack details on how Japan responded to protests, triggering the suspicion that many cases of suppression may have been omitted from such reports.

The predominant use of firearms to suppress protests is likely to have brought devastating consequences for Koreans. In fact, 136 of the 269 incidents of suppression resulted in deaths. Except for the three incidents in which swords caused deaths and one incident in which a weapon other than a rifle or sword caused deaths, firearms were employed through 132 incidents of suppression and caused deaths.

Table 6 shows that there were relatively fewer incidents where the Japanese army solely engaged in the armed suppression of independence protests. According to the table, the Japanese army was only involved in five incidents of firearm discharge and one incident of sword use. These numbers, however, do not mean that the Japanese Army played a passive role in suppressing the independence movement. Instead of conducting independent operations, the army often collaborated with the military police and the regular police to suppress protests. Whenever the military or regular police found it difficult to suppress protests on their own, they would turn to the army for reinforcements. The Japanese army was hence involved in 108 of the 269 incidents of protest suppression. The following table offers a summary of how the Japanese army joined forces with the Japanese military police and regular police to suppress the protests.

While the military police showed a high percentage of solely engaging in protest suppression, the regular police cooperated with the Japanese army in many cases, which amounted to 102 incidents, or 38 percent of the 269 incidents of protest suppression. This suggests that the Japanese army primarily offered reinforcements upon the military or the regular police's

Table 7. Cooperation between Japanese Army, Military Police, and Regular Police

	Military police	Military police+ Army	Military police+ Regular police	Regular police	Regular police+ Army	Regularpolice+ Military police + Army	Army	Total
No. of incidents	117	40	1	42	58	4	6	269

request, most likely because it basically served a purpose different from the police that was mainly responsible for maintaining public order. The military police, on the other hand, was most active in responding to protests based on the fact that it conducted far more independent operations instead of seeking reinforcements from the Japanese army.

The frequency of deaths during suppression also hints at how heavily the military police was committed to suppressing protests. Among 117 incidents in which the military police solely engaged in protest suppression, 61 incidents directly led to deaths. This contrasts with the 10 out of 42 incidents that resulted in deaths when the regular police were solely engaged in protest suppression. Even considering the fact that military police had twice as many personnel than the regular police, still, the proportional difference between them in causing deaths implies that the military police were relatively more aggressive in suppressing protesters.

Another noteworthy aspect is that the military police and the regular police joined forces on only five occasions of protest suppression. Those five incidents mainly occurred when the regular police failed at suppression or were absent during the outburst of a protest, which prompted military policemen or Japanese soldiers nearby to intervene. It seems extraordinary that there were such few cases of cooperation between the military police and the regular police at a time when 1,824 military and regular police units were available across the Korean peninsula to deal with 1,593 protests during the March First Movement. The reason why cooperation was rare might be due to the fact that their districts were completely separated, which made it challenging for any of them to entirely abandon their own districts to deal with protests that were taking place simultaneously in different areas.

Hence, in terms of inter-organizational cooperation, the military po-

lice and the regular police each cooperated with the Japanese army on individual occasions to suppress independence protests, far more frequently than the number of instances in which the military police and the regular police cooperated with each other. Apart from the fact that districts were strictly divided between the two organizations, the military police had a considerably larger number of units and personnel at its disposal, by which means it was capable of suppressing more protests on its own than the regular police.

2) Specific Cases of Protest Suppression

The protest at Songdo-myeon, Gaeseong-gun, Gyeonggi Province on March 3, 1919 can be considered a rare case of cooperation between the Japanese military police and the regular police for the purpose of protest suppression. The students from Holston Girl's High School, a mission school in Songdo-myeon, Gaeseong-gun, took to the streets around 2 p.m. on March 3, singing hymns and songs yearning for Korea's independence. As commoners as well as students from Songdo Higher Common School joined the protest, the number of protesters amounted to 1,000. Meanwhile, another crowd of 1,500 launched a separate protest led by Yi Hyeong-sun, a resident of Namsan-jeong in Songdo-myeon. The protesters continued to wave the Korean flag and chant the slogan of 'Long Live Korean Independence' after sunset and went as far as to burn the Japanese flag and attack a regular police box. This protest carried on until nearly midnight.⁴¹

At the time, Gaeseong-gun was mostly under the military police's jurisdiction. Eight substations belonging to the Gaeseong Military Police Squad were installed throughout the Gaeseong-gun.⁴² Songdo-myeon, however, was under the Gaeseong Police Station's jurisdiction. Songdo-myeon, where the district office of Gaeseong-gun was located, was further

⁴¹ Lee Jeong-eun and Kim Jeong-in, *Gungnae 3.1 undong* [The March First Movement in Korea] 1 - Central to Northern Regions (Cheonan: Hanguk dongnip undongsa yeonguso, 2009), 20.

⁴² "Revision of Military Police Command Notice No. 1 (Notice No. 2, August 1, 1917)," *Joseon chongdokbu gwanbo* 1512, August 17, 1917. The Gaeseong Military Police Squad covered Gaeseong-gun, Jangdan-gun, and Paju-gun.

divided into thirteen *jeongs*, nine of which were directly covered by the Gaeseong Police Station while four were covered by the police box at Nambon-jeong.⁴³ The protest on March 3 took place at Gaeseong-cup, a district controlled by the regular police. This is why the regular police initially responded when the protest occurred. The regular police took the female students over to a police station to try to interrogate them, and when other protesters rushed to the police station, policemen did their best to stop them. Thanks to the efforts of the police station chief and county governor, the protest led by the female students finally began to die down.⁴⁴

The other protest developed until after sunset a hostile streak as protesters threw stones and broke the windows of the Nambon-jeong Police Box.⁴⁵ With a personnel of about five at the police box and no more than sixty at a nearby police station, their combined forces would not have been enough to handle a crowd of more than two thousand protesters.⁴⁶ To disperse them, the regular police requested military aid from the railroad guards that dispatched a platoon of twenty-seven soldiers.⁴⁷ It ultimately

⁴³ "Government-General Notice No. 197 (August 26, 1918)," *Joseon chongdokbu gwanbo*, Extra edition, August 27, 1918.

⁴⁴ "Important No. 5725 On the Independence Movement 5 (March 4, 1919), from the Higher Police Division of the Government-General Police Bureau to the Governor-General Hasegawa Yoshimichi (長谷川好道), etc.," *1919-1921 Documents Related to Riots in Joseon 7-7*.

⁴⁵ Regarding the police unit that attacked at the time, some rulings indicate that both a military police squad and the police station were attacked (*Ruling on Shin Dong-yun*, Gyeongseong District Court, April 11, 1919). However, other rulings (*Ruling on Seventeen Defendants including Han Jong-seok*, Gyeongseong District Court, May 6, 1919) as well as multiple documents in the collection *Documents Related to Riots in Joseon* note that a regular police box was attacked.

⁴⁶ According to the Korean Statistical Information Service's web portal, 117 people worked for the Government-General Police Bureau as of 1919. Each province had a police bureau that oversaw police stations within the province. As of 1925, 61 people worked for the Gaeseong Police Station. For more information, refer to Misa Daizo, *Taishō 14-nen Chōsen keisatsu shokuinroku* [1925 Joseon Police Staff Directory] (Chōsen keisatsu shinbunsha, 1925), 37-38. There were 2,726 regular police units as of 1925, which was 865 more than at the time of the March First Movement when there were 1,861 units. The total number of regular police personnel was 18,458 in 1925, which was 5,078 more than 13,380 at the time of the March First Movement. The proportional increase in police personnel was slightly less than that in police units.

⁴⁷ Confidential No. 102 Article 18/Morning Special No. 12/No. 66, "Telegram: Protests and Dispatch Status in Suan, Uiju, Gaeseong, Anju, and Hamheung (March 4, 1919) from

took the combined forces of regular policemen and railroad guards to terminate the protest without any serious clashes with the protesters.

What seems rather unusual is the fact that the military police did not take part in subduing the protests. To be sure, Songdo-myeon did not fall under its district; even, when the regular police found themselves compelled urgently to request military aid, the military police squad at Daehwa-jeong, where the Gaeseong Regular Police Station was also located, took no action at all. Moreover, the regular police reached out to the railroad guards instead of the military police, which proved to be effective in dispersing the protesters.

The case of Songdo-myeon reveals a certain divide between the military police and the regular police, but that did not necessarily apply to all areas on the Korean peninsula. An example of cooperation between the military police, regular police, and army can be found in the joint suppression of a protest that took place on March 19 at Yeonghae-myeon in Yeongdeok-gun, North Gyeongsang Province.⁴⁸ The protest in Yeonghae-myeon actually began a day earlier on March 18 at a marketplace where approximately three thousand people gathered to chant the slogan 'Long Live Korean Independence.' After marching around the market, the protesters headed to a police substation to urge the policemen there to join the protest. And by the time the protesters marched again around the market and returned to the substation, they were ordered to be disbanded by the substation's Japanese chief. The protesters refused to follow the substation chief's orders and when he tried to confiscate the Korean flags in their hands, the agitated protesters forced their way into the substation. The

Utsunomiya Tarō (宇都宮太郎), Commander of the Japanese Army Stationed in Korea, to Tanaka Giichi (田中義一), Japanese Minister of the Army," *1919-1921 Documents Related to Riots in Joseon 7-1*.

⁴⁸ For further details on the *manse* protest in Yeonghae-myeon and its suppression, refer to Kim Hee-gon et al., *Yeongdeok ui dongnipsa* [A History of Independence Movements in Yeongdeok] (Yeongdeok: Yeongdeok-gun, 2003), 21-25. While previous studies have been based on rulings and some public records, no sources directly supporting descriptions on the development and suppression of *manse* protests have so far been presented. This paper seeks to reconstruct and examine *manse* protests and their suppression based on administrative sources.

chief of the Yeongdeok Police Station arrived at the scene with four of his subordinates to help suppress the protest but ended up being disarmed and confined. As the protest showed no sign of mitigation, the officer of the Eightieth Infantry Regiment came to aid with seventeen men under his command and cooperated with the military police to suppress the protesters. In the process of suppression, eight protesters were killed, sixteen were injured, and 170 were brought before the court.⁴⁹

Yeongdeok-gun was under the regular police's jurisdiction with seven substations overseen by the Yeongdeok Police Station. Yeongdeok-gun was divided into nine *myeons* at that time thus there was a police unit at nearly every *myeon*. The Yeonghae Police Substation was charged with the task of maintaining public order in Yeonghae-myeon.⁵⁰ The substation, however, appears to have lost its function during the protest on March 18. The five or so policemen on duty at the substation are likely to have been incapable of subduing a crowd of more than one thousand protesters.⁵¹ The substation's failure prompted the Yeongdeok Police Station to step in. The police station's chief took four policemen and headed to Yeonghae-

⁴⁹ Kim et al., *Yeongdeok ui dongnipsa*, 21-25; Kim Jin-ho, Park Yi-jun, and Park Cheol-gyu, *Gungnae 3.1 undong* [The March First Movement in Korea] 2 - *Southern Regions* (Cheonan: Hanguk dongnip undongsa yeonguso, 2009), 318-19; Kim Hee-gon, *Gyeongbuk dongnip undongsa* [A History of Independence Movements in North Gyeongsang Province] 3 - *March First Movement* (Gyeongsang Bukdo, 2013), 405-16.

⁵⁰ The Yeonghae Police Substation seems to have covered Yeonghae-myeon and Chuksan-myeon. Chuksan-myeon and Obo-myeon were the only *myeons* in Yeongdeok-gun without a regular police substation. Adjacent to Yeonghae-myeon, Chuksan-myeon used to be part of Yeonghae-gun before administrative districts became reshuffled while Obo-myeon was previously under Yeongdeok-gun's jurisdiction.

⁵¹ At the time, there was one Japanese police chief, one Japanese police officer, and three Korean police assistants at the Yeonghae Police Substation, which coincides with the previous section's analysis indicating that each basic police unit operated with an average of five people. The Japanese authorities estimated that the number of protesters amounted to around one thousand. Confidential No. 102 Article 83/Morning Special No. 43/No. 122, "Telegram: Protests and Dispatch Status in Yeonghae and Andong (March 19, 1919) from Utsunomiya Tarō, Commander of the Japanese Army Stationed in Korea, to Tanaka Giichi, Japanese Minister of the Army," *1919-1921 Documents Related to Riots in Joseon 7-1*. Meanwhile, trial materials noted that the number of protesters was two thousand. *Ruling on Ninety-six Defendants including Kim Se-yeong* (Sentences No. 786-823 of 1919), Daegu District Court, June 5, 1919.

myeon,⁵² but they also became disarmed and confined.⁵³ In other words, the regular police completely failed at suppressing the protest for Korean independence on its own.

The Japanese army and military police thereafter became involved in the protest's suppression. Instead of requesting for a smaller unit's support, the military police turned to the Pohang Military Police Squad. Upon receiving the urgent call for aid, the squad's commander took seven military policemen⁵⁴ and left for Yeonghae. Uljin and Yangyang to the north of Yeongdeok and Yeongil to its south were the military police's jurisdiction while Cheongsong to the west of Yeongdeok was controlled by the regular police. The Pohang Military Police Squad was based in Yeongil. Yeongyang and Cheongsong were mountainous areas thus the military police there would not have been able to respond quickly. Although Uljin was relatively closer to Yeonghae-myeon, the Pyeonghae Military Police Outstation was unable to assist because it had already dispatched its forces to suppress a different independence protest that occurred on March 18 at

⁵² A protest took place in Yeongdeok-myeon on March 18. Hundreds participated, but violence was not involved unlike the protest in Yeonghae-myeon. The protest in Yeongdeok-myeon was immediately suppressed by the Japanese regular police, which is probably why policemen in the area were able to offer support in suppressing the protest at Yeonghae-myeon.

⁵³ "Telegram (March 18, 1919) from Suzuki Takashi (鈴木隆), Governor of North Gyeongsang Province, to Yamagata Isaburō (山根伊三郎), Inspector General of Political Affairs at the Government-General," in the *1919 Secretary of State Report on the Riots 7*; Confidential No. 102 Article. 86/ No. 39, "Telegram: Protests and Dispatch Status in Korea between March 17 and 18 (March 19, 1919) from Kojima Michihirō (兒島惣次郎), Commander of the Japanese Army Stationed in Korea, to Tanaka Giichi, Japanese Minister of the Army," *1919-1921 Documents Related to Riots in Joseon 7-1*; Confidential No. 102 Article. 94/ No. 8, "Telegram: Protests and Dispatch Status in the Provinces of Gyeongsang and North Hamgyeong between March 18 and 19 (March 20, 1919)" from Kojima Michihirō, Commander of the Japanese Army Stationed in Korea, to Tanaka Giichi, "Japanese Minister of the Army," *1919-1921 Documents Related to Riots in Joseon 7-1*; Confidential No. 102 article. 98, "Telegram: Protests and Dispatch Status in the Provinces of Gyeongsang and North Hamgyeong between March 18 and 19 (March 20, 1919)" from Yamanashi Hanzō (山梨半造), Japanese Vice Minister of the Army, to the Senior Aide-de-Camp to the Japanese Emperor," *1919-1921 Documents Related to Riots in Joseon 7-1*.

⁵⁴ Confidential No. 102 article. 86/ No. 39, "Telegram: Protests and Dispatch Status in Korea between March 17 and 18 (March 19, 1919) from Kojima Michihirō, Commander of the Japanese Army Stationed in Korea, to Tanaka Giichi, Japanese Minister of the Army," *1919-1921 Documents Related to Riots in Joseon 7-1*.

Byeonggok-myeon of Yeongdeok-gun.⁵⁵

Another noteworthy aspect of this case was that the military police dispatched policemen that belonged to a squad instead of a smaller unit. In Yeongil-gun, an independence protest occurred at Pohang-myeon for three days between March 10 and 12 and another protest occurred at Cheongha-myeon on March 22.⁵⁶ Since no protests occurred in Yeongil-gun in between March 18 and March 22, the military police there could have spared personnel for protest suppression in other areas. Still, military policemen from a squad were dispatched instead of those from a substation closer to Yeongdeok.

Apart from requesting for the dispatch of military police, the provincial governor also requested the dispatch of forces from the Eightieth Infantry Regiment stationed in Daegu. The infantry regiment subsequently sent twenty-one troops via automobile to Pohang where they transferred to a steamboat to reach Yeongdeok.⁵⁷ The troops from the 80th Infantry Regiment arrived at Yeonghae around 4 p.m. on March 19. They joined forces with the military police already there, firing blanks to threaten the protesters. When the protest showed no signs of dying down, the troops switched to live ammunition; then, the protesters dispersed and the Japanese were released.⁵⁸ The protest's suppression left one death and fourteen injured.⁵⁹

⁵⁵ Kim et al., *Yeongdeok ui dongnipsa*, 215-17.

⁵⁶ Kim, *Gyeongbuk dongnip undongsa* 3, 447-53.

⁵⁷ Confidential Morning Briefing No. 302, "Latest Report on the Riots (March 19, 1919), The Headquarters of the Japanese Army Stationed in Korea," *1919-1921 Documents Related to Riots in Joseon* 7-7.

⁵⁸ "Telegram (March 19, 1919) from Suzuki Takashi, Governor of North Gyeongsang Province, to Yamagata Isaburo, Inspector General of Political Affairs at the Government-General," the 1919 Secretary of State Report on the Riots 7; Confidential No. 102, Article 89, and Morning Special No. 47/145, "Telegram: Protests and Dispatch Status in Korea on March 19 (March 20, 1919) from Utsunomiya Tarō, Commander of the Japanese Army Stationed in Korea, to Tanaka Giichi, Japanese Minister of the Army," *1919-1921 Documents Related to Riots in Joseon* 7-1.

⁵⁹ Confidential Morning Briefing No. 311, "Latest Report (No. 37) on the Riots (March 20, 1919), The Headquarters of the Japanese Army Stationed in Korea," *1919-1921 Documents Related to Riots in Joseon* 7-7. In actuality, more lives seem to have been lost through the suppression of the manse protest in Yeonghae-myeon, leaving eight dead and sixteen injured. Kim, *Gyeongbuk dongnip undongsa* 3, 414.

A few inferences can be drawn from the case involving Yeonghae-myeon. First, basic police units with minimum personnel were incapable of handling large crowds of active Korean protesters. It would have been virtually impossible for the five policemen at the Yeonghae Police Substation to suppress thousands of protesters. Second, the size of reinforcements offered by units within the same area was insufficient. The substations nearby most likely operated with a similar personnel size, which would have made it difficult for them to provide reinforcements. Even the Yeongdeok Police Station only managed to spare a team of five to help subdue the protest in Yeonghae-myeon. Third, while the military police dispatched seven policemen as reinforcements, the Japanese army provided a much larger reinforcements of twenty-one troops from the Eightieth Infantry Regiment. The protesters are likely to have found the troops' arrival as threatening as their use of live ammunition. Fourth, the mode of transportation reinforcements indicates that traveling by boat was the quickest way to access Yeonghae-myeon. The 80th Infantry Regiment traveled via automobile between Daegu and Pohang but took a steamboat from Pohang to Yeongdeok. It is therefore highly likely that the policemen from the Pohang Military Police Squad also took a steamboat to reach Yeongdeok. The fact that the reinforcements chose to travel by sea demonstrates that it must have been faster than taking the coastal road available to the north of Pohang-myeon at the time.

These cases abovementioned reveal each police organization's capacity to deal with suppression and their relationship with one another. The regular police requested military support to suppress the protest at Songdo-myeon on March 3, but the military police stationed nearby did not take part in the suppression. This suggests that the jurisdiction was rather strictly divided between the military police and the regular police. On the other hand, when the regular police failed to suppress the protest at Yeonghae-myeon on March 19, the military police and Japanese troops joined forces to provide reinforcements. Hence, depending on temporal circumstances and actual developments in individual protests, the Japanese army, military police, and regular police sometimes would move beyond their own jurisdictional divisions and cooperate to suppress the anti-Japanese Korean pro-

tests in 1919. The case involving Yeonghae-myeon shows that the Japanese army was capable of providing more substantial reinforcements than the Japanese military and regular police.

Conclusion

Utilizing some primary sources of the March First Movement Database, available through the National Institute of Korean History, this paper explores the pattern in which the military police and the regular police reacted to the nationwide anti-Japanese protest for Korean independence, or the March First Movement in 1919. The military police and the regular police were operating a dense network across the Korean peninsula with 177 units allocated across 232 *bus* and *guns*. This meant that two police stations were installed for almost every three *guns*. The number of military or regular police units per *bu* or *gun* was 7.7 on average, which meant that such units were installed at nearly every district down to the *myeon*-level. Although the network itself was dense, however, the basic units were left with a minimal number of personnel of around five people. It is the Japanese military police, superior to the regular police in every respect, that took the lead in the maintenance of public order and this control system until the movement.

The Japanese military police and regular police displayed further differences in terms of placement. The regular police controlled most of the twelve major cities classified as a *bu* according to the administrative system at that time. The regular police also controlled most regions except for the southwestern coastal regions and some islands. Generally speaking, in the regions south of Gyeonggi Province, the military police and the regular police each had a similar presence in number even though there were more regular police districts in some areas of South Jeolla Province and South Gyeongsang Province. As for the areas along railways, the military police and the regular police occupied similar proportions in terms of the distribution of their forces. Nonetheless, the military police did control vast regions that included the whole areas bordering Manchuria and most parts of Korea's central and northern inlands. Besides, there were more military po-

lice districts in Hwanghae Province and the northern half of Gangwon Province. The jurisdiction of military and regular police was strictly divided so that they only coexisted in ten out of the 232 *bus* and *guns* nationwide.

During the March First Movement, a total of 2,464 incidents occurred and 1,692 of them were protests. Within a span of two months between March and April 1919, 2,339 protests occurred; this figure accounted for 94.9 percent of all incidents during the period. The statistic indicates that protesting was the predominant mode of resistance. Among the 1,593 protests that took place solely on the Korean peninsula, the greatest number of protests occurred in Gyeonggi Province, Hwanghae Province, North Pyeongan Province, and South Gyeongsang Province. Under these circumstances, most armed suppression involved firearms on the grounds that 243 out of 269 incidents involved the use of firearms. There were only 19 instances of suppression using swords, not firearms, in the the combined operation of the military police and the regular police. This disparity in choice of weapon indicates that the military police and the regular police often fired their rifles from a distance in order to repress the protests with the overwhelmingly large number of the anti-Japanese protesters.

In terms of the method of suppression as above, this paper sheds light on a pattern in which the military police and the regular police, whose jurisdictions had been strictly separated from each other, did cooperate with each other against the March First Movement. The initial response to the protest in Songdo-myeon, Gyeonggi Province demonstrated the regular police's relationship with the military police. To suppress the protest in the very beginning stage of the movement, the regular police, taking charge of the local security of Songdo-myeon, reached out to the railroad guards for military aid. And although the Gaeseong Military Police Squad was stationed at Songdo-myeon at the time, it did not assist in suppressing the protest. This instance reveals how hesitant the military police and the regular police were to cross over into each other's district.

But, the military police and the regular police, as confronted with the upsurge of the movement throughout the Korean Peninsula, would join forces with each other. And, when the cooperation was not available, they would

join forces even with the Japanese army to suppress the protests. The protest at Yeonghae-myeon, in North Gyeongsang Province on March 19 exemplified this development. At Yeonghae-myeon, the regular police reached out to the military police for support; the provincial governor simultaneously requested reinforcements from the Japanese army. The protest was ultimately suppressed as the military police and the dispatched troops joined forces. That is to say, depending on how a protest unfolded, the colonial police apparatuses would jointly engage in protest suppression beyond jurisdiction.

With the focus on the structure and the geographic placement of military and regular police units, this paper examines the density of their network in different areas, as well as the circumstances of individual units, and reveals the way the colonial apparatuses reacted to the Movement. This approach will enable us to take a closer look at the actual modes of suppression by the military police and the regular police, the frequency of each agency's involvement in suppression, and the cases of simultaneous dispatch by the two public police organizations. By so doing, we can have a better understanding of the pattern in which the two organizations tried to subdue the nationwide anti-Japanese resistance and these two oppressive agencies made a difference to each other while collaborating with each other.

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Review Article

On Korean Peninsular Historical Linguistics: A Review of Recent Studies on the Languages of Early Korea

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Abstract

This paper is a review of four recent monographs published on the historical linguistics of the early Korean Peninsula. I provide an overview of merits, shortcomings, and suggestions for improvement in this vastly important—and in some ways, nascent—field of Northeast Asian linguistics. Although some of my comments may seem critical, they are intended to be constructive, with the goal of improving our understanding of the languages of early Korea. I also wish to emphasize from the beginning that, despite their shortcomings, these publications are to be commended, as few studies have been published in this area of research, and as the prerequisite philological work and relevant methodologies have not yet been firmly established in this area of Korean studies. My comments in this review should not be taken as criticism of any individual scholars, but rather, as criticism of certain approaches and trends in analyzing and interpreting the earliest linguistic data of the Korean Peninsula.

On Korean Peninsular Historical Linguistics: A Review of Recent Studies on the Languages of Early Korea

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General Remarks

Despite the fascinating and rich ethnolinguistic history of the early Korean Peninsula, the methodological shortcomings of the currently dominant research paradigms have hampered progress in analyzing the earliest data on the languages of the Korean Peninsula. Many issues need to be addressed, especially the current trends toward homogenizing the languages and cultures of the early Korean Peninsula, denying the existence of the conservative frontier dialect or dialects of Chinese spoken on the Korean Peninsula in the pre-Unified Silla period, and the fact that standard philological techniques and mainstream approaches to historical-comparative linguistic reconstruction have not yet been firmly established in this area of study.¹

1. Homogenizing the Languages of the Early Korean Peninsula

In the field of Korean studies, there is a widespread misconception that all languages spoken on the Korean Peninsula in the past are related to the of-

¹ For additional discussion of these and other problems, see Beckwith (2006, 2007, 2005, 2010a, 2010b), Shimunek (2017, 2021), and others.

ficial language of modern Korea. It has been convincingly demonstrated that this view is incorrect, as the ancient Korean Peninsula was characterized by multilingual and multicultural diversity.²

A tradition of homogenization has pervaded most work on pre-Koryŏ early Korean Peninsular historical linguistics and ethnolinguistic history. This is not necessarily due to a conscious *decision*, but because of not challenging or testing tradition-based approaches, adhering to methodological approaches which diverge significantly from mainstream historical-comparative linguistic methods, and because of a tendency to omit or not directly consult pre-translated original works by foreign scholars on early Korean Peninsular languages. Early Korean Peninsular historical linguistics is an open frontier for fruitful research, although the field itself requires fundamental revision before we can move forward.

It has been known since 河野六郎 Kōno Rokurō (1987) that the early Korean Peninsula was characterized by at least two very different languages, i.e., 扶餘 Puyŏ languages³ and 韓 Han languages.⁴ Beckwith (2004/2007) conclusively demonstrates that the Koguryŏ language is a Puyŏ language, divergently related to Japanese to the exclusion of other languages. Some scholars, confronted with Beckwith's revolutionary findings, have attempted to suppress this discovery in pursuit of modern revivals of the tradition-based theories.

The Puyo-Koguryoic languages and the Koreanic languages were spoken in the area that later became the modern states of Korea, so they are both certainly connected with the ethnolinguistic *heritage* of the Korean Peninsula—no one should ever dispute this—but that does not mean that the languages themselves are divergently related to Korean, i.e., that they are daughter languages of a common proto-language. In fact, the extant data suggests quite the contrary: Based on the *linguistic data* alone, it is more appropriate to speak of the Puyo-Koguryoic *branch* of the Japanese-

² On the linguistic diversity of early Korea, see Kōno (1987), Beckwith (2005, 2007, etc.), Kiyose & Beckwith (2006, 2008), Shimunek (2021), and others.

³ Hereafter: 'Puyo-Koguryoic.'

⁴ Hereafter: 'Koreanic.'

Koguryoic language family as spoken in Manchuria and on the early Korean Peninsula.⁵ The Koreanic language family is an entirely separate and unique language family, so far unrelated to any other identifiable languages on Earth,⁶ apart from the extinct Koreanic languages of Antiquity, and certain conservative and progressive modern daughter languages such as Cheju, Yukchin, and divergent Hamgyŏng dialects, perhaps treating Tashkent Korean and other Koryŏmal 高麗말 varieties⁷ as languages, too.⁸

2. Korean Peninsular Early Middle Chinese

As demonstrated by Beckwith (*KLJ*), the Middle Chinese dialect or dialects of the Korean Peninsula before the middle of the Unified Silla period were highly conservative, retaining phonological characteristics of Late Old Chinese.⁹ I term this 'Korean Peninsular Early Middle Chinese.'¹⁰ It is apparent that none of the authors of the four books under review read Beckwith's groundbreaking work on this topic.

3. Philology: A Science Not Yet Firmly Established in Northeast Asian Linguistics

Many studies on early languages of Northeast Asia are marred by philological shortcomings: Few scholars check the original sources, identify copyist errors, attempt text-critical notes, identify all known early text variants, attempt archetypes, identify errors in text transmission, or analyze the textual data itself before proceeding to linguistic analyses. This is true not only of studies in Korean Peninsular historical linguistics, but of many studies on other early languages of Northeast Asia in general. In the case of

⁵ Beckwith (2005, 2007).

⁶ The Altaic language family theories have been thoroughly disproven (*q.v. infra*).

⁷ in Russian: Корёман *Koryoman*.

⁸ For a groundbreaking fieldwork-based study of Tashkent Korean, see Ross King (1987).

⁹ For details on the phonology of this dialect of Chinese, see *KLJ* (93-105 et passim).

¹⁰ *q.v. LASM* (xxiv, 81-82, 84-88, 145) and Shimunek (2021).

Korean Peninsular philology, original source materials are now freely available online to the public—for example, on the indispensable website <db.history.go.kr>. As anyone who has worked with the 三國史記 *Samguk Sagi* and the 三國遺事 *Samguk Yusa* will know, even the earliest extant editions of these vastly important texts—i.e., the 1512 Kyujanggak editions (SS1512 and SY1512)—are rife with scribal errors that must be corrected before undertaking linguistic analyses.

Reviews of the Books

Yi Wŏnhŭi [李元熙]. 2018. *Ilbon yŏldo-ŭi Paekcheŏ* 日本列島の百濟語 [The Paekche Language of the Japanese Archipelago]. Sŏul: Churyusŏng ch’ulp’ansa. 616 pp. ISBN 978-89-6246-354-5.

This book attempts to address an exciting topic, the basic thesis of which I agree with—i.e., that early Korea had a fundamental ethnolinguistic impact on early Japan. Yi begins his book as follows:

“우리는 고대 한국어에 대하여 알지 못하고 있다. 백제어나 고구려어는 물론 통일신라 시대의 언어에 대하여도 캄캄한 실정이다. 고려시대의 말조차도 거의 모르고 있다. 우리들은 한국어를 자유자재로 사용하여 의사소통을 하고 있지만, 이 한국어를 삼국시대 이전으로 계속하여 거슬러 올라가면 어떻게 될까? 즉 한국어의 기원은 무엇인가에 대하여는 더더욱 캄캄하기만 하다.” (IYP 7)

[We do not know about Old Korean. The reality is murky, not only for Paekche and Koguryŏ, but also for the language of Unified Silla. Even the language of the Koryŏ period is almost unknown. We communicate freely in Korean, but what happens if we trace this Korean language back to before the Three Kingdoms period? As for the origin of the Korean language itself, we are mostly in the dark.]

Yi is using the word 古代 韓國語 ‘Old Korean’ in the traditionalist sense referring to all languages and dialects of the early Korean Peninsula. It is more accurate to use this term to refer only to the 韓 Han (Koreanic) lan-

guages and dialects of that time.¹¹ *Pace* Yi, we have significant data on the languages of Silla, Paekche, Koguryŏ, and even Kara (Kaya); much of this data has just not been adequately studied yet, aside from Koguryŏ (q.v. *KLJ*).

“왜 일본의 방언에는 수많은 고대 한국어가 숨어 있을까? 백제 멸망 이후 백제와 고구려의 유민들이 대거 도왜 하였기 때문일까? 그것도 하나의 이유이지만, 4세기 후반부터 5세기에 걸쳐 많은 가야인들이 집단으로 도왜 하여 왜지를 정복하였던 점에도 큰 원인이 있다고 생각한다.” (IYP 8)

[Why are there so many Old Korean words hiding in Japanese dialects? Is it because Paekche and Koguryŏ people who were displaced after the fall of Paekche emigrated to Japan? That is one reason, but I think the biggest reason is that from the late 4th century to the early 5th century, many Kaya people collectively emigrated to Japan and conquered Japanese territory.]

Early Korean Peninsular cultural, linguistic, and technological influence on Yamato Japan is certain, but Yi provides no historical documentation of this here, nor of any of his above-mentioned claims.¹² The majority of lexical comparisons (IYP 12-599) deviate from established historical linguistic methods. One comparison is in fact a Chinese loanword into both Korean and Japanese, as I will demonstrate below. Some proposals also include onomatopoeic words, nursery words, and other words known to be non-distinctive for comparative linguistics.¹³ Chapter 17 “삼국사기 지명과 일본의 방언” [The *Samguk Sagi* Toponyms and Japanese Dialects] (IYP 547-60) reveals that Yi did not consult *KLJ*, the most methodologically sound linguistic study of the Koguryŏ toponyms.

The book’s title and Yi’s comments above suggest that in his usage, 百濟語 *Paekcheŏ* ‘Paekche language’ ambiguously and inclusively denotes

¹¹ q.v. Shimunek (2021: 81 n.54).

¹² For example, Gisaburo N. Kiyose’s identification of early Korean Peninsular elements in Japanese toponyms (2004).

¹³ On non-distinctive words in lexical comparisons, see Campbell (1999) and *KLJ* (234-35).

the languages of Koguryō, Paekche, and Kara (Kaya). This is in stark contrast to nearly all previous studies on the languages of these states and does not accurately reflect the known ethnolinguistic diversity of the early Korean Peninsula.

A few of the words are indeed likely to be early Koreanic loanwords into Japanese.¹⁴ For example, Yi compares modern South Chōlla (Jeolla) dial. *sasal* in the phrase *sasalae* ‘long tobacco pipe (진 담뱃대)’ and its LMK etymon with MSJ *sasa* ‘Northern bamboo’ and Jpn Shimane dial. *sasara* ‘bamboo’ (*IYP* 173-74). This etymology is likely to be correct, but more details are needed. Specifically, LMK *sāsár ‘branch of bamboo’ is first attested in 1481 in the 杜詩諺解 *Tusi Ōnhae*, one of the earliest Hangul texts.¹⁵ On the Japanese side, MSJ ささら *sasara* ‘bamboo whisk’ should also be mentioned. This is likely to be a Koreanic loanword into Japanese, although the historical development of the Japanese forms, relevant archaeological finds (if any), and a plausible historical context need to be clarified before fully accepting this etymology.

Another probable etymology is given by Yi in his comparison of MSK 떡 and North P’yōngan (Pyeongan) dial. 시더구 ‘rice cake,’ their LMK etymon, and putative Old Japanese “*sitoki*,”¹⁶ the latter glossed by him as “神에게 바치는 떡” [rice cakes offered to deities],¹⁷ as well as Kagoshima and Kumamoto dial. “*sitoki*,” glossed as a specific kind of rice cake, and Yamaguchi and Shimane dial. “*o-sitoki*” ‘id.’; Yi correctly explains *o-* 御 as an honorific prefix (*IYP* 214, 562). This lexical comparison requires additional discussion. Specifically, the attested LMK form is *sták ‘rice cake.’¹⁸ 小倉進平 Ogura Shinpei attests early 20th-century North

Hamgyōng (Hamgyeong) dial. 시덕 [sidək] and Kangwōn (Gangwon) dial. 시더기 [sidəgi] ‘rice cake.’¹⁹ The attested MSJ form is *sitogi* しとぎ (菜). If the OJpn form can be verified, and if a plausible historical or archaeological background can be clarified in detail, this may indeed be a Koreanic-Japanese loanword.

Many of Yi’s other lexical comparisons are improbable and require careful reconsideration from the point of view of diachronic semantics, diachronic phonology, loanword relationships, philology, history, and archaeology. Moreover, comparisons of non-distinctive words must be excluded.²⁰ Due to time and space limitations, I will discuss only a few here.

For example, Yi proposes that MSK 쥘레 *k’yōlle* ‘pair of shoes or socks’ and its dialectal variant 쥘리 *k’ōri* are related by convergence to Jpn dial. *keri* ‘shoes, dress shoes, straw shoes’ (*IYP* 240). However, as demonstrated by Lee Dongseok, 쥘레 *k’yōlle* is a modern semantic and phonetic innovation from earlier 쥘리 *kyōri* ‘plow pulled by two oxen.’ The semantic extension to denote ‘pair’ (usually pairs of shoes or socks) is a very recent modern change.²¹ The Korean word is thus unlikely to be related to the Japanese dialect word.

One of Yi’s proposed Koreanic-Japanese loanwords is in fact a Chinese loanword. For example, Yi compares LMK 돌~돌 ‘pig’ and Jpn Kyōto dial. *don-*, the latter attested in *donko* ‘young wild boar’ and *dondoro* ‘trap for catching wild boars.’ Despite noting the obvious connection with Chinese 豚 (MSC *tún*, MSK *ton*, MSJ *ton*), Yi claims that ‘wild boar’ and ‘domesticated pig’ are fundamentally different, speculating that the Japanese word is a borrowing from Korean (*IYP* 131).

In fact, the bound morphemes MSK 豚 *ton* ‘pig,’ MSJ 豚 *ton* ‘pig,’ and Jpn Kyōto dial. *don* ‘wild boar’ are all reflexes of a Middle Chinese loanword in Korean and Japanese, from Middle Chinese 豚 (cf. tradition-

¹⁴ I have not been able to check any separate sources for the Japanese dialect forms cited by Yi, as I did not have many Japanese sources available to me at the time of writing, so in this paper, I take Yi’s Japanese dialect forms at face value, assuming they are correct—which remains to be independently verified with other sources.

¹⁵ Nam (2021: 797b-798a).

¹⁶ Yi’s “*si-to-ki*” (*sic*). I have been unable to consult *JDB* to check the OJpn form myself.

¹⁷ A similar proposal is offered by Toh, who compares “*stak*” (i.e., LMK *sták) with Jpn “*sitaki*” (2004: 465).

¹⁸ My phonetic reconstruction of the LMK Hangul form given by Nam (2021: 969b).

¹⁹ Cited here from Yi Sanggyu and Yi Sunhyōng’s redaction of Ogura Shinpei (2009 [1944]: 227 #90322).

²⁰ On non-distinctive words in historical-comparative linguistics, see Campbell (1999) and *KLJ* (234-35).

²¹ Lee Dongseok (2015).

based MChi ☆dwən, Pul. 313).²² The Kyōto dialect form is probably a later semantic innovation within Japanese and is certainly not a borrowing from Korean.

MSK 돼지 *twaɛji* ‘pig’ and LMK 돌~돋 ‘pig’ are reflexes of a borrowing from an earlier, Late Old Chinese form of the same Chinese word, as I demonstrate below:

MSK 돼지 *twaɛji* [twɛdʒi] ‘pig’ <도야지 (1908)²³ <되야지 (1891)²⁴ <되야지 (18th c.)²⁵ <도다지 (late 16th to early 17th c.)²⁶ <돋 (1461)²⁷ ~돋 (1447),²⁸ i.e., LMK *tòt ~ *tòth ‘pig’ + *-atsi ‘diminutive suffix denoting the young of certain domesticated animals.’

LMK 돌 *tòt ~ 돌 *tòth ‘pig’²⁹ <unattested Old Korean³⁰ ← 豚 LOC northern dial. *dont(ã) ~ central dial. *don(ã) > MChi (cf. Pul. 313: ☆dwən) → unattested mid- or late Unified Silla Sino-Korean >> 豚 돈 MSK *ton* ‘pig.’

²² Sino-Korean *ton* also occurs in recent borrowings from Japanese, such as 돈가스~돈까스 *tonkkasū* ‘pork cutlet’ ← MSJ 豚カツ *tonkatsu*, from 豚 *ton* ‘pork’ + カツ *katsu*, abbrev. カツレツ *katsuretsu* ‘cutlet’ ← English *cutlet*.

²³ Attested in 兒學 (Nam 2021: 415b). For this and other sigla of early Hangul texts, see Nam (2021: 14-18 and 附錄 [appendix]: 12-41).

²⁴ Attested in 雅言 (Nam 2021: 431a).

²⁵ Attested in 物譜 (Nam 2021: 431a).

²⁶ Attested in 馬解 and 癸丑 (Nam 2021: 409b).

²⁷ Attested in 楞解 (Nam 2021: 420b-421a).

²⁸ Attested in 龍歌 (Nam 2021: 429b-430a).

²⁹ The LMK word 돌 ‘pig’ was retained as late as the early 20th c. as the 돌 element in Kwangju (Gwangju) dial. 맬돈 [met-tot] ‘boar, wild pig’ (Ogura [1944] 2009: 375 #17565), i.e., 맬 <맬 <맷 ‘wild’ (< 岬 ‘mountain’ + 入 ‘genitive-attributive’) + 돌 ‘pig.’

³⁰ Although no pre-Chosŏn Koreanic words for ‘pig, boar’ are phonetically transcribed in extant texts, the earliest historical records from the Korean Peninsula and archaeological evidence suggest a long tradition of pig husbandry. On this tradition among the early Puyo-Koguryoic peoples, see *KLJ* 29. Note also 豬加, i.e., Pig *Ka [加], one of the four zoonym-based titles of the top officials of 夫餘 Puyŏ (later written 扶餘) below the sovereign according to the 三國志 *San Guo Zhi* (q.v. *KLJ* 42). Although 豬 ‘pig’ is semantically rendered, it is clear from this passage that the Puyŏ engaged in pig husbandry and had a word for ‘pig,’ cf. attested OKog *o ‘pig,’ cognate to OJpn *wi ‘pig, boar’ (*KLJ* 78, 140, 141), unrelated to Koreanic. On the Puyo-Koguryoic title *ka ‘official, minister’ see *KLJ* (122).

Thus, MSK 돼지 *twaɛji* ‘pig’ is a progressive reflex of the diminutive form of LMK 돌 *tòt ~ 돌 *tòth ‘pig,’ which is a Middle Korean reflex of an unattested Old Korean word borrowed from a partially oralized dialect of northern Late Old Chinese.³¹ Modern Sino-Korean and Sino-Japanese *ton* are borrowed from the Middle Chinese reflex of the same word, i.e., 豚 ‘young pig.’

Other early Koreanic loanwords in Japanese could be included. For example, MSK 가마 *kama* ‘cooking pot’ (as in 가마솥 *kamasot* ‘iron cooking pot’) and MSJ 釜 (*kama*) ‘iron pot’ (also in *kamado* 竈 ‘traditional Japanese stove’) certainly indicate a Koreanic loanword in Japanese, supported by linguistic and archaeological evidence.

For a book on a topic of potentially profound implications, the prose is terse, and very little historical discussion is given, the main body of the work consisting primarily of lexical comparisons of modern Japanese dialects to Modern Standard Korean or to Korean dialects, sometimes including Late Middle Korean and putative Old Japanese forms.³² This is perhaps due to the fact that, in the author’s words, this book is a “자매편” [companion volume] to 일본 천왕과 귀족의 백제어 *Ilbon ch’ŏnwang-gwa kwijok-ūi Paekcheŏ* (*IYP* 602), which I unfortunately have been unable to consult, but even as a companion volume, the paucity of philological, historical, and linguistic discussion often leaves the reader feeling perplexed.

In short, Yi’s book contains some intriguing comparisons, although the reader must carefully distinguish the genuine data from the abundant non-data, and each proposal must be meticulously reevaluated and revised in accordance with mainstream historical-comparative linguistic and philological methods. Yi’s lexical comparisons offer a preliminary step toward future work.

³¹ On partially oralized nasal codas in northern Late Old Chinese, see Beckwith & Kiyose (2018), *LASM* (389), Beckwith (2010b: 12-14), and others.

³² I will not discuss the concomitant issues of Yi’s lack of restricting comparisons to the earliest attested data. I encourage readers to read Campbell (1999) for a useful introduction to basic methods, techniques, and problematic data to be avoided in any comparative linguistic study.

Lee SeungJae = Yi Sŭngjae 이승재 [李丞宰]. 2017. *Mokkan-e kiroktoen kodaie hangugŏ* 木簡에 기록된 古代韓國語 [The Old Korean Language as Documented on Wooden Tablets]. Sŏul: Iljogak. 615 pp. ISBN 978-89-337-0736-4.

This is the strongest of Lee SeungJae's recent books on the early languages of the Korean Peninsula, and one of the most detailed books published in recent years on Silla and Paekche linguistic data. The merit of this book is that it addresses the wooden tablet text fragments from Silla and Paekche, an essentially untapped source of early Korean Peninsular linguistic data. The important textual data collected in this book, if reexamined, can be used for reconstructing Paekche and Silla lexemes and grammatical morphemes. Lee's book is a useful collection of early linguistic data from Silla and Paekche which have survived the test of time in archaeological sites, mostly in repositories in Buddhist monasteries, such as the Mirŭk Monastery collection and the Ham'an wooden tablet fragments. Lee identifies Paekche and Silla words, grammatical morphemes, phrases, and texts among the wooden tablet corpora, although his phonetic and semantic reconstructions are frequently exceedingly speculative and often deviate from mainstream historical-comparative linguistic methods.

Future analyses of this important source of linguistic data will enrich our knowledge of the ethnolinguistic history of early Korea and Northeast Asia. The photos of original text fragments reproduced by Lee are especially useful tools in this endeavor.³³

I offer comments on specific parts of the book below:

1) Lee gives an overview of 木簡 *mokkan* 'wooden tablets' and a history of their study (*MKT* 22-69), including a table of excavated *mokkan* organized

³³ Lee's table of contents (pp. 13-15) does not list the page numbers of these plates, so I will list them here: pp. 59-61, 65, 67, 71, 73, 77, 79, 82, 85-86, 120, 123-124, 129, 131-138, 141, 143, 145, 148, 150-151, 155, 164, 166, 169, 171, 173, 197, 198, 200, 203, 205, 210, 213-216, 223, 226, 228, 230, 319, 335, 337, 344, 346-347, 349, 352-354, 356, 390, 392.

by archaeological site and approximate dates (*MKT*, 29-30) and photos of the wooden tablet text fragments themselves. Most striking are the 咸安 Ham'an wooden tablets, which Lee dates to ca. 561 A.D. (*MKT* 30).

2) Lee devotes a full chapter to what he considers to be evidence of “數詞” [numerals] attested among the wooden tablet text fragments (*MKT* 70-114). I agree that these are indeed early words transcribed in Chinese characters, some of which may include Korean Peninsular orthographic innovations, but *pace* Lee, these words are of unknown semantic value and his phonetic reconstructions likewise require reconsideration.

3) “單位名詞와 普通名詞” [Unit Nouns and Common Nouns] (*MKT* 115-61). Lee identifies some useful semantic data in this chapter. Although the majority of the phonyms discussed herein are not phonetically decipherable, they provide clear evidence of early Koreanic pseudopartitive (i.e., phonym) phrasal order, i.e., ([NOUN] [NUMERAL] [CLASSIFIER]), as in modern Korean.³⁴

4) In “文書” [Official Records] (*MKT* 162-207), Lee attempts to decipher official texts written on the following four wooden tablets: 咸安 城山山城 221호 목간 Ham'an Sŏngsan Sansŏng Wooden Tablet No. 221 (*MKT* 162-91); 경주 月城垓子 2호 목간과 20호 목간 Kyŏngju Wŏlsŏng Haeja Wooden Tablets No. 2 and No. 20 (*MKT* 191-99); and 경주 (傳)仁容寺址 1호 목간 Kyŏngju (Sŏn) Inyong Monastery Site Wooden Tablet No. 1 (*MKT* 199-207).

5) “詩歌” [Poetry] (*MKT* 208-50) presents Lee's attempt to decipher poetry on Silla wooden tablets.

6) “表記法” [Transcription Methods] (*MKT* 251-304) presents Lee's inter-

³⁴ On the grammatical category phonym (classifiers, measures, and related terms) and the pseudopartitive constructions (“classifier phrases”) in which phonyms occur, see Beckwith (2007b).

pretation of the transcription methods employed in the wooden tablet texts. As examples of transcriptions identified in this chapter, note the following: 文尸 ‘writing,’ 蒜尸 ‘garlic,’ and 糸利 ‘thread’ (*MKT* 40, 264, 265), which Lee reconstructs as “*kær, *manær, *siri” (*MKT* 108).³⁵ Lee connects these with medieval and modern Koreanic words, but with only 尸 *r and 利 *ri as phonetic clues, I prefer to cautiously read these words as 文尸 *...r ‘writing,’ 蒜尸 *...r ‘garlic,’ and 糸利 *...ri ‘thread.’ For the word 蒜尸 ‘garlic,’ we cannot rule out a possible connection with OKog *meyr ‘garlic.’³⁶ Moreover, the word for ‘writing’ is attested in Old Koguryō and is likely to be a loanword from Puyo-Koguryoic into Koreanic.³⁷ The word for ‘silk thread’ is an Old Chinese loanword in early Koreanic.³⁸

For the character 尸, Lee follows the Middle Chinese value “si^L” (e.g., *HPP* 318, *HPK* 732) but correctly notes that in early Korean Peninsular transcriptions 尸 denotes a coda *r. *Pace* Lee’s claim that “이 대응관계는 한자음으로는 해결할 수 없다” [This correspondence cannot be resolved using Chinese character readings] (*MKT* 324), Beckwith offers a straightforward solution with explanatory power—i.e., that 尸 should be read in KPEMC as *iir, capable of transcribing foreign *r codas in languages of the early Korean Peninsula.³⁹ Beckwith’s reconstruction is further supported by other transcriptional characters indicating KPEMC *l corresponding to Tang Middle Chinese *s, and by the attested sound change of *l > *s in certain Chinese dialects.⁴⁰

Lee also identifies the following forms for ‘bamboo’ in the Ham’an tablets: 竹尸, 竹伊, and 竹利, which Lee reconstructs as “*다리” (i.e., *tari), and identifies the Modern Korean reflex 대 ‘bamboo’ (*MKT* 272-73). In fact, the only phonetic clues in these orthographic forms are the final pho-

³⁵ In an earlier paper, Lee treats these as “/*kil/,” “/*manΛ/,” and “/*siri/” (Lee 2014: 177).

³⁶ On Old Koguryō *meyr ‘garlic,’ see *KLJ*, 82, 100, 116, 131, 174, 252.

³⁷ *KLJ* 174. On other Koguryō loanwords in Koreanic, cf. *KLJ* (133, 175), Shimunek (2021), and Lee Ki-Moon (1964).

³⁸ Beckwith (2010b: 7-11 et passim).

³⁹ *KLJ* (60, 61 n.38, 84, 91n.94, 99-101 et passim).

⁴⁰ q.v. *KLJ* (99-101 et passim).

netic elements; I reconstruct these as 竹尸 *...r, 竹伊 *...i, and 竹利 *...ri, all ‘bamboo.’

The Ham’an tablets attest the numeral 四卍 ‘four’ in the context 酒四卍 瓮 ‘four jugs of wine’ (*MKT* 285, 407). This is a clear example of a classifier construction. Lee reconstructs “*neri” (*MKT* 453); I reconstruct *...ri and, speculatively, *nəri ‘four.’

Lee discusses Silla phonetic characters in the Silla *hyangga* (*MKT* 262), mostly repeating the traditional views. Lee’s phonetic reconstructions require reexamination, but to adequately address them would require many separate articles. As one example, Lee treats the Silla word 星利 ‘star’ in the 彗星歌 *Hyesōngga* ‘Song of the Comet’ as “벼리” (no asterisks given by Lee, *MKT* 262). Although the value “리” (i.e., *ri) is correct,⁴¹ it is more likely that the word in full should be read *iri, considering the glossed Han-Kara⁴² word *iri [一利] ‘star (星)’ among the Silla toponyms⁴³ (*SS*1512 34: 12a, line 3; see image on right), cognate to *iri-* in the South Ch’ungch’ōng (Chungcheong) dialect word *iri-ne* ‘Milky Way,’⁴⁴ composed of *iri* + ㅂ *ne* ‘river.’ The South Ch’ungch’ōng dialect word is analyzable as an inherited calque of Literary Chinese 星河 ‘Milky Way’ (lit. ‘star river’).



7) “韓國字” [Korean National Characters] (*MKT* 305-42) aims to identify certain graphemes as uniquely Korean innovative orthographic elements in the wooden tablet text fragments. Lee is likely correct that some of the non-standard characters among the Silla and Paekche wooden tablets may indeed be genuine Korean Peninsular innovations.

8) “韓國字의 日本 傳播” [The Transmission of Korean National Characters

⁴¹ For examples of 利 rendering Old Koguryō *ri, see *KLJ* (89, 139 et passim).

⁴² I use the term ‘Han-Kara’ to refer to the Koreanic language spoken in Kara territory.

⁴³ Geographically identified by Toh Soo-Hee (1987: 327) as a Kara toponym.

⁴⁴ q.v. Lee & Ramsey (2011: 52).

to Japan] (*MKT* 343-61). Many would agree that Chinese writing reached Japan via the Korean Peninsula, undoubtedly through intensive Paekche influence on Yamato Japan, and Lee attempts to demonstrate this with paleography.

Lee proposes that the characters 畚 ‘rice paddy,’⁴⁵ 畝 ‘dry field,’ and others, are Korean Peninsular innovations (*MKT* 330, 344-45 et passim). His most eye-catching claim is that the character 畝 is first attested in Korea, whence it was transmitted to Japan (*MKT* 344-45). According to Lee, 畝 is attested among the 羅州 Naju tablets, apparently datable to 610 (*MKT* 30, 344). However, the single putative attestation of 畝 (*MKT* 151 image 31) is difficult to verify from the blurry image. A high-quality image must be examined before accepting this exciting proposal.

Some of the characters in this chapter have corresponding variants in Chinese, e.g., 叻, which Lee treats as “𠂔” (*MKT* 330), is a known orthographic variant in Chinese for 旨 ‘delicious.’⁴⁶ One would like to see more discussion of the highly diverse contemporaneous regional variants used in China on the advent of Chinese characters in Korea.⁴⁷ Comparisons with the Chinese character variants employed in early medieval states of North China could be enlightening. For example, the easily available 異體字字典 *Yitizi Zidian* compiled by the National Academy for Educational Research (<dict.variants.moe.edu.tw>) could be consulted. The proposed phonetic values for the characters in this chapter also require reassessment.

9) Chapter Ten: “音韻論” [Phonology] (*MKT* 362-403). Lee’s reconstruc-

⁴⁵ As shown by Lee, 畚 is attested among the 宮南 Kungnam tablets, apparently datable to the 7th c. (*MKT* 30, 344).

⁴⁶ Attested at least as early as the 篇海 *Pian Hai*, a lexicographical work dating to the Jurchen Empire, cited in the 康熙字典 *Kangxi Zidian* (cited here from 異體字字典 *Yitizi Zidian* [Dictionary of Chinese Character Variants], <dict.variants.moe.edu.tw/>, accessed September 11, 2021). If this variant appears in Chinese first in the Jurchen Empire, it could be the result of Korean orthographic influence on Jurchen-period Chinese writing.

⁴⁷ A similar sentiment is expressed by Kim Byung-Joon, who has convincingly demonstrated that the Literary Chinese inscriptions of Koguryō, such as the Kwanggaet’o Stele of 414 A.D., are written in completely normal Literary Chinese, and do not exhibit Koreanic linguistic elements (2010: 25-29).

tions here diverge from mainstream international approaches to historical-comparative linguistic reconstruction.

10) Chapter Eleven: “系統論” [Relationship Theories] (*MKT* 404-15). In this chapter, Lee, primarily based on his comparison of numerals (*MKT* 410-15), acknowledges that the “남방 韓系語” [Southern Han languages] and the “북방 扶餘系語” [Northern Puyō languages] are distinct from each other. He then proceeds to link the Han 韓 (i.e., Koreanic) languages with the Puyō languages as deriving from a common source node, i.e., his “扶餘·韓祖語” [Proto-Puyō-Han language] (*MKT* 414), but this family tree proposal contradicts his own numeral comparisons, which undeniably link the Puyō languages to Japanese.⁴⁸

11) Chapter Twelve: “결론” [Conclusion] (*MKT* 416-54). Lee’s comments here on early numerals (*MKT* 452-54) require reconsideration and revision. First, as mentioned above, it is not certain that Lee’s putative Paekche ‘numerals’ in Table 31 on page 453 are indeed numerals. Certainly, they are words from one of the two main languages of Paekche, phonetically transcribed in KPEMC, but the semantic values are unknown, as they are attested in a list with no other details, and the phonetic values are only partially reconstructible.

Lee’s reconstructions of the Silla numerals also require reexamination. Although I agree with his *semantic* analyses of the *Samguk Yusa* Silla numerals 一等 as ‘one’ and 二尸 as ‘two,’ the phonetic values of these words are only partially reconstructible. Lee’s “*hədən” and “*tubər” (*MKT* 453) are not fully supported by the data. Cautiously, following KPEMC readings, we can partially reconstruct 一等 ‘one’ as *...tə(ŋ), or more likely *...tə(N), and 二尸 ‘two’ as *...r.


In fact, there is a phonetically more complete transcription of the Han-Silla numeral ‘two’ in the 處容歌 *Ch’ōyongga* in 三國遺事 *Samguk*

⁴⁸ q.v. *KLJ* (14, 61, 73, 79, 110, 115, 132-33, 142-43, 159, 180-181, 252, 254).

not discernible from the text itself as it is not accompanied by any gloss. Lee Ki-Moon's proposed reconstruction *nadan 'seven' (cited by Lee SeungJae) is primarily an attempt to match Tungusic *nadan* 'seven,' and contradicts the *Samguk Sagi* toponym gloss, which unambiguously indicates OKog *nan [難] 'seven (七),' cognate to Japanese *nana* 'seven.'⁵⁵ More likely, the toponym Nadan-*sōng* 那旦城 in the Kwanggaet'o Stele renders early Old Koguryō *na *tan, the first element of which is OKog *na 'bamboo,' *na 'land,' or, less likely, *na 'in, inside,' and the second element of which is OKog *tan 'valley,' all of which are well attested in the *Samguk Sagi* glossed transcriptions of Old Koguryō toponyms.⁵⁶ This early Old Koguryō toponym thus denotes 'Bamboo Valley,' 'Land Valley,' 'Earth Valley,' or, less likely, 'Inner Valley.'

Moreover, *pace* Lee (*MKT* 453), Koguryō 德頓 is not simply 'ten.' This sequence occurs in the *Samguk Sagi* in a Koguryō toponym phonetically transcribed 德頓忽, semantically glossed as Sipkok-*hyōn* 十谷縣 'Ten Valley County' (*SS*1512 37: 4b, line 2; see image on the right), composed of OKog *tək [德], glossed as 'ten (十),' OKog *tan [頓] 'valley (谷),' and OKog *χuər [忽] ~ *kuər [骨], here corresponding to 'county (縣),' the latter also attested in the basic meaning 'fort, fortress, walled city (城).' These Koguryō words have unique cognates in OJpn *tə ~ *təwo 'ten,' OJpn *tani 'valley,' and probably OJpn *kura 'storehouse, treasury.'⁵⁷

Lee also discusses 小川環樹 Tamaki Ogawa's proposal



⁵⁵ *KLJ* 61, 110, 133, 143, 180-81, 252.

⁵⁶ Cf. OKog *na 'bamboo' (*KLJ* 85-86, 132, 252), OKog *na 'land' (*KLJ* 53-55, 67, 75, 88, 132-33, 167, 176, 252), and OKog *na 'inside, in' (*KLJ* 53-55, 90-91, 110, 116, 132, 135, 252).

⁵⁷ On OKog *tək 'ten,' OKog *tan 'valley,' OKog *kuər [骨] ~ *χuər [忽] 'city (城), county (縣)' (from AKog *kuru [溝婁] 'city'), and their Old Japanese cognates, see *KLJ* (4-5, 41, 41n, 52, 53n, 56-58, 61, 64-65, 68, 70, 72-73, 77, 80-83, 85-87, 89-92, 95, 102, 109-10, 114-16, 126-28, 128n, 136, 138, 153-54, 170-71, 238-39, 250, 252-54). On OKog *kuər ~ *χuər, Beckwith notes that "Here it glosses the Chinese political term 縣 'county,' so the gloss gives a Koguryō equivalent of it, suggesting that the 'cities' were the county seats of their counties, and had the same name, as in Chinese practice" (p.c., Christopher I. Beckwith, September 2021).

that 別 in certain Northern Wei Chinese texts is a loanword from Taghbach,⁵⁸ and that this word is to be connected with Written Mongol *būri* 'each, every' (*MKT* 454); Lee further argues that this is the same word as Koguryō 別, which he claims is connected with Silla and Late Middle Korean. Although I agree with Lee's *motivation* to look for Serbi-Mongolic elements in Puyō languages,⁵⁹ Old Koguryō *piar [別] 'times, -fold; layer'⁶⁰ is phonetically and semantically very different from Mongol *būri* 'each, every,' and no comparable words are attested among the extant Taghbach lexical corpora.⁶¹

OKog *piar [別] 'times, -fold; layer (重),' on the other hand, is cognate to OJpn *pe 'fold, times; layer,' from reconstructible Common Japanese-Koguryoic *pira 'layer; times, -fold.'⁶² Beyond Japanese-Koguryoic and Koreanic, OKog *piar, CJK *pira, and LMK *paŋ 'id.' are probably *convergently* related (i.e., in a loanword relationship) to Chinese 倍 *bèi* (from OChi *pere ~ *pele) and, more distantly—also by convergence—to Indo-European *pel- 'fold; to fold.'⁶³

12) The “參考文獻” [Sources Consulted] (*MKT* 455-67) includes works written in Korean, Japanese, Chinese, and English.

⁵⁸ On Taghbach ~ Tabghatch ~ Tabghach (拓跋 Tuoba ~ T'o-pa), an early medieval Serbi-Mongolic language, see *LASM* (121-68 et passim).

⁵⁹ Serbi-Mongolic elements in Japanese-Koguryoic languages (including, if not especially, the Puyo-Koguryoic branch) are likely given the historical fact that early Japanese-Koguryoic peoples are documented in the *Hou Han Shu* as being subject peoples of the Serbi (鮮卑 Xianbei), q.v. *LASM* (413 et passim), *KLJ* (34-35, 39, 41), and Kiyose (2001: 136-37). On identifiable early Serbi-Mongolic loanwords in Japanese-Koguryoic, cf. *LASM* (327n.132, 391-94, 403-04, 458). For a LOC → early Japanese-Koguryoic → Serbi-Mongolic loanword, see *LASM* (400-02). For an early Japanese-Koguryoic and Serbi-Mongolic loanword correspondence of unknown directionality, see *LASM* (410). For a study of Puyo-Koguryoic loanwords in Jurchen-Manchu, a language neighboring Serbi-Mongolic, see Shimunek (2021).

⁶⁰ *KLJ* 59, 61, 109, 117, 134-35, 180, 182, 253.

⁶¹ For a near complete listing of Chinese transcriptions of Taghbach words, see *LASM* 165-68.

⁶² *KLJ* 134-35.

⁶³ *KLJ* 180.

13) “英文抄錄” [English Abstract] (MKT 469-519), translated by Marjorie Grace Burge.

14) The book also provides a detailed “日文抄錄” [Japanese Abstract], translated by 伊藤貴祥 Itō Takayoshi (MKT 521-61).

Lee’s decision to have native speakers translate his abstract will certainly help spread the book’s findings to scholars outside Korea, and both the English and Japanese abstracts are very detailed. I only have one comment on Burge’s English translation of the Korean philological term 末音添記 *marŭm ch’ōmgi* as “final sound affixation” (MKT 474). From the point of view of modern morphological theory, this translation is imprecise, as these are not ‘affixes’ in the true morphological sense of the word, but rather are ‘annotations,’ as 記 *ki* denotes. I prefer to translate 末音添記 as ‘[word-]final phonetic annotations,’ as many of these phonetic annotations are the final part of a single morpheme.

Lee SeungJae = Yi Sŭngjae 이승재 [李丞宰] 2016. *Hanjaŭm-ŭro pon Koguryŏ ūmunch’egye* 漢字音으로 본고구려어 음운체계 [The Phonological System of the Koguryŏ Language as Seen from Chinese Character Transcriptions]. Sŏul: Iljogak. 754 pp. ISBN 978-89-337-0725-8.

This is the most recent—and the heaviest—book published on the Koguryŏ language, comprising a large collection of lexical and onomastic data. The amassed data itself is the main contribution of this work. Lee SeungJae describes his approach as follows:

“고구려어를 연구할 때에는 고구려의 人名, 地名, 官名 등이 중요한 연구 대상이다. 이들은 어휘단위이기 때문에 고구려어의 문법을 연구하는 것은 불가하다. 고구려어 연구에서 그래도 접근 가능한 연구 분야가 있다면 그것은 語彙論과 音韻論 분야이다. 어휘론에서는 고구려어의 어휘를 찾아내어 모든 다음에 이것을 후대의 중세 한국어나 알타이 제어와 비교하게 된다. 이것이 너무나 힘들고 버거운 일이므로 우리는 어휘론을 논외의 대상에서 제외한다. 그 대신에 음운론 분야에 집중한다... 고구려어 표음자를 분석할 때에는 한어 중고음이 가장 좋은 기준이 된다.” (HPK 15-16)

[When studying the Koguryŏ language, the main data consist of personal names, toponyms, and official titles. Since these are lexical units, it is impossible to study Koguryŏ grammar. There are, however, accessible fields of research in Koguryŏ linguistics, namely, the lexicon and phonology. As for the lexicon, one must find and collect Koguryŏ words and then compare these with Middle Korean or the Altaic languages. Since this is such a difficult and daunting task, I have excluded the lexicon from my study. Instead, I focus on the field of phonology... When analyzing the Koguryŏ transcriptional characters, Middle Chinese readings are the best standard.]

Lee is correct that the data is lexical—specifically consisting, in the most tangible corpus of data—the 三國史記 *Samguk Sagi*—of individual words and morphemes in the form of semantically glossed and phonetically tran-

scribed toponyms. However, *pace* Lee's statement that “고구려어의 문법을 연구하는 것은 불가능하다” [it is impossible to study Koguryŏ grammar], the *Samguk Sagi* provides solid data on phrase-internal morphosyntax, including inflectional and derivational suffixes, as well as clear evidence of object-verb syntactic order.⁶⁴ Furthermore, *pace* Lee, the Altaic language family theory has been thoroughly disproven.⁶⁵

Despite acknowledging the fact that individual lexical items comprise the only source of data on the Koguryŏ language, Lee proceeds to present a reconstruction of Koguryŏ phonology without first undertaking detailed philological, phonetic, or semantic analyses of individual words and morphemes. The appendix (*HPK* 709-40), which provides Lee's interpretations of Koguryŏ syllables, does not analyze complete words and morphemes, and the phonetic reconstructions there and throughout the book require major revision.

Although Lee categorizes the data by source, little attempt is made to undertake the necessary philological work on this data. As shown by Beckwith (*KLJ*), the majority of Koguryŏ toponyms are phonetically transcribed and semantically glossed, but some of the Koguryŏ toponyms are semantic glosses with no corresponding phonetic transcription, some are reduplications and imitations (including phonetic imitations, semantic imitations, or a mixture of the two),⁶⁶ and there are many textual errors. Each of these toponyms must be meticulously analyzed one by one—as Beckwith (*KLJ*) has done—before moving ahead with reconstruction. Lee gives a verbose chapter on Koguryŏ phonology, but his lexical data—i.e., the basis of the data used in the chapter—was not analyzed first at the philological, morphological, or lexical levels. Some of the data he takes as “고구려어 表音字” [Koguryŏ phonetic transcriptional characters] is in fact not transcriptional at all: Although the majority are indeed attested in phonetic tran-

⁶⁴ q.v. *KLJ* 1, 7, 60-61, 67, 71-72, 81, 117-20, 160.

⁶⁵ *LASM* 1, *KLJ* (164-94 et passim), Beckwith (2006), Georg (2004), Clauson (1956), Abel-Rémusat (1820: 138) and others.

⁶⁶ See Shimunek (2021: 67-68) for an example of an inexact phonetic imitation and partial semantic imitation.

scriptions of Koguryŏ words, some are characters used as semantic glosses,⁶⁷ some are graphic errors,⁶⁸ graphic or phonetic imitations in semantic glosses,⁶⁹ and other non-transcriptions. These have been systematically addressed in *KLJ*.

Lee does not offer a chronological periodization of the Koguryŏ lexical data, even though the transcriptions span around five centuries, comprising three identifiable phonologically distinct periods of the Koguryŏ language, periodized by Beckwith (*KLJ*) as follows:

Archaic Koguryŏ (ca. 3rd c. A.D.), attested in Late Old Chinese transcriptions in the 三國志 *San Guo Zhi*, the 後漢書 *Hou Han Shu*, and other sources.⁷⁰

Early Old Koguryŏ (ca. 5th c. A.D.), attested in onomastic data in the 414 Kwanggaet'o Stele and other contemporaneous inscriptions.⁷¹

Old Koguryŏ (written down in 755 A.D.),⁷² transcribed in Korean Peninsular Early Middle Chinese⁷³ in the 三國史記 *Samguk Sagi*.

Lee's reconstructions—for example, his discussion of Koguryŏ 溝婁 and 骨 (*HPK* 283), his reconstructions in the appendix (*HPK* 709-40), and else-

⁶⁷ E.g., 國 (*HPK* 715: “kuk”) is, *pace* Lee, not a phonetic transcription, but a semantic gloss of OKog *piy ‘country, nation (國),’ which is also the OKog form of the ethnonym Puyŏ (q.v. *KLJ* 53, 135).

⁶⁸ E.g., 升 (*HPK* 732: “sinH”) is, *pace* Lee, not a phonetic transcription, but a graphic error for 斗 (q.v. *KLJ* 52).

⁶⁹ E.g., 守 (*HPK* 732: “siuH”) is, *pace* Lee, not a phonetic transcription, but a phonetic or graphic imitation of the character 遊 (of unknown meaning), used as a semantic gloss of OKog *kara (q.v. *KLJ* 86).

⁷⁰ Cf. *KLJ* 29-30, 32, 37, 39, 41-42, 46, 118-19, 120-27, 129-31, 139-40, 142-43, 250, et passim.

⁷¹ Cf. *KLJ* 29n-30n, 103, 130-31, 140.

⁷² On the periodization of Old Koguryŏ, see *KLJ* 2-3 et passim.

⁷³ My usage of this term is equivalent to ‘Archaic Northeastern Middle Chinese’ (q.v. *KLJ* 2-3, 93-105).

where—could have greatly benefitted from consulting Beckwith’s notes on Koguryō periodization and diachronic phonology.⁷⁴

If we apply Beckwith’s important findings to the mostly raw data amassed in Chapter 2 of Lee’s book, we will certainly expand and refine our diachronic understanding of the different periods of Koguryō lexical and morphological data.

I discuss specific chapters of Lee’s book below:

In Chapter 2 “고구려어 표음자” [Koguryō Transcriptional Characters] (HPK 41-118), Lee provides a useful list of lexical data from the Kwanggaet’o Stele (HPK 47-52). The early Old Koguryō toponym data here requires a separate lexical study.

The next major source of data in this chapter is a list of the *Samguk Sagi* toponyms (HPK 72-80). Consulting *KLJ* could have avoided repeating certain mistakes here. For example, Lee gives “買谷縣, 善谷縣” (HPK 76 #080). Beckwith has emended “買谷” in the *Samguk Sagi* original to *買吞,⁷⁵ rendering the well-attested words OKog *mey [買] ‘good (善),’ cognate to OJpn *mi ‘exalted, honored,’ and OKog *tan [吞] ‘valley (谷),’ cognate to OJpn *tani ‘valley’; OKog *tan ‘valley’ is also transcribed [旦] and [頓] in other toponym correspondences.⁷⁶



One important Koguryō toponym in the *Samguk Sagi* is not listed by Lee. This is 刀臘縣 ‘Torap County,’ semantically glossed as 雉巖城 ‘Pheasant Crag city,’ rendering OKog *tawr ~ *tawl ‘pheasant,’ cognate to OJpn *tewri ‘bird’ > MSJ *tori* ‘bird’ and OKog *ap, ~ *aip ~ *fiaip ‘high mountain, crag,’ from AKog *yapma, cognate to AJpn and OJpn *yama ‘mountain’ > MSJ *yama* ‘mountain.’⁷⁷ This toponym correspondence is attested in the 1512 Kyujanggak edition of the *Samguk Sagi* (SS1512 37: 4b, line 3; see image on the left).

⁷⁴ e.g., *KLJ* 5, 41, 41n, 57, 82, 93-143, 171, 238-50, 252 et passim.

⁷⁵ *KLJ* 77.

⁷⁶ q.v. *KLJ* 130-31, 136, et passim.

⁷⁷ *KLJ* 72, 121, 138.

Lee’s lists of Koguryō onomastica in Japanese sources (HPK 86-88),⁷⁸ early Koguryō titles (HPK 91),⁷⁹ and all other Koguryō data listed by Lee requires reconsideration. If the prerequisite philological work is undertaken on this data, it has the potential to increase our understanding of the Koguryō lexicon and Koguryō phonology.

Due to the idiosyncratic methods employed by Lee, his analyses in Chapter 3 “음절별 음운 분석” [Phonological Analysis by Syllables] (HPK 119-222), Chapter 4 “聲調” [Tone] (HPK 223-67), Chapter 5 “子音” [Consonants] (HPK 268-408), and Chapter 6 “母音” [Vowels] (HPK 409-653) are difficult to follow and deviate from mainstream historical-comparative reconstructions.

Lee reads Chinese characters in a now-superseded Karlgren-based theoretical reconstruction of central Middle Chinese, but *pace* Lee, the Koguryō data is transcribed in two different dialects: The Archaic Koguryō data (dating to the 3rd c.) is transcribed in northeastern Late Old Chinese and the Old Koguryō data (written down in 755) is transcribed in Korean Peninsular Early Middle Chinese.⁸⁰ It would have been better to consult *attested* Tang Middle Chinese for the most accurate Tang Middle Chinese forms,⁸¹ but these readings, too, are not accurate for most of the extant Koguryō data, as *Tang* Middle Chinese did not form the basis of Sino-Korean until sometime *after* the Tang-Silla alliance unified the Korean Peninsula. Before that time, the dominant Chinese dialect of the peninsula was Korean Peninsular Early Middle Chinese (KPEMC). The shift from Korean Peninsular Early Middle Chinese to Tang Middle Chinese as the standard way of reading Chinese characters on the Korean Peninsula was probably not immediate, and most of the toponyms phonetically transcribed in the *Samguk Sagi*, although written down in 755, clearly represent local conservative frontier dialects of Chinese retaining features of Late Old

⁷⁸ To Lee’s list we should add the OJpn transcription マカリ *makari* (q.v. *KLJ* 47).

⁷⁹ q.v. *KLJ* 43, 47 et passim.

⁸⁰ See discussion above.

⁸¹ q.v., Csongor (1952, 1954, 1960, 1962), Takata (1988, 1993), Takeuchi (2008), and many other studies.

Chinese phonology.⁸²

In Chapter 4, Lee proposes that Koguryō had “聲調” [tone], rendered as “pitch accent” in the English abstract (*HPK* 690). Lee claims that “聲調에서만 차이가 나는 표음자가 의외로 많다” [there are surprisingly many transcriptional characters that differ only in tone] and further claims to identify “最小對立 쌍” [minimal pairs] which he believes indicate contrastive pitch-tonal distinctions in Koguryō (*HPK* 223). However, Lee’s analyses are based on data which has not undergone the prerequisite philological work (*q.v. supra*).

It is also important to remember that although Tang Middle Chinese is widely believed to have been tonal, we have no idea what kind of pitch or tonal system (if any) existed in Korean Peninsular Early Middle Chinese, which was a conservative frontier dialect retaining many phonological characteristics from Late Old Chinese, a decidedly *non*-tonal language.⁸³

Beckwith’s work on Old Koguryō phonology does not support Lee’s view that Koguryō was a pitch-accent or tonal language: As Beckwith notes, “there is no information available on pitch accents in Koguryō” (*KLJ* 160). The periodization is also important here, as some of the data included in Lee’s tone chapter date to the 3rd c. and thus are Archaic Koguryō words transcribed in Late Old Chinese (see comments above on the periodization of the Koguryō language).

Although Lee’s “참고문헌” [Sources Consulted] (*HPK* 677-83) lists Beckwith (*KLJ*)—the first book written specifically on the Koguryō language—Lee’s single reference to *KLJ* is a single word on page 401, cited not directly from *KLJ*, but through 鄭光 Chōng Kwang’s misinterpretation.⁸⁴ It should also be noted that Lee does not consult 崔南熙 Ch’oe

Namhŭi (2005), the first Korean book on the Koguryō language, published after the 2004 first edition of *KLJ*.

In the English abstract (*HPK* 685-708), Lee follows the traditional date of the founding of the Koguryō kingdom as 37 B.C. (*HPK* 685). However, *pace* Lee, “the earliest historically solid references to Koguryō appear to be... events in 12 A.D. ... and a ‘tribute’ mission sent by the Koguryō king to the Chinese court in 32 A.D.” (*KLJ* 45). The earliest *linguistic data* on the Koguryō language is datable to the 3rd century A.D., i.e., the Archaic Koguryō period (*q.v. supra*).

As for the appendix “고구려어 表音字의 音價와 出典” [The Phonetic Values and Attestations of Koguryō Transcriptional Characters] (*HPK* 709-40), readers are advised to consult *KLJ* for the most accurate reconstructions of the Koguryō language.

⁸² For details on the phonology of this dialect, see *KLJ* (1-2, 93-105 et passim).

⁸³ It has been demonstrated, however, that Late Old Chinese was characterized by distinctive lexical stress, *q.v.* Beckwith & Kiyose (2018).

⁸⁴ In fact, *pace* Lee’s comments on research claiming that “고구려어에 유성자음이 있다고” [the Koguryō language has voiced consonants] (*HPK* 401), Beckwith has demonstrated that “Old Koguryō shows no phonemic distinction between voiced and unvoiced stops” (*KLJ* 57). Beckwith

reconstructs the word in question as *puk (*KLJ* 135), not “/*buk/” as Lee claims. Readers who wish to delve deeper into Koguryō philology and linguistics are encouraged to consult Beckwith’s original work in English (specifically the 2007 revised second edition), *not* Chōng Kwang’s Korean translation nor his review, which both misinterpret the important findings of Beckwith’s book.

Lee SeungJae = Yi Sŭngjae 이승재 [李丞宰]. 2013. *Hanjaŭmŭro pon Paekcheŏ chaŭmch'egye* 漢字音으로 본 백제어 자음체계. 서울: 태학사 [The Consonantal System of the Paekche Language as Seen from Chinese Character Transcriptions]. Sŏul: T'achaksa. 392 pp. ISBN 978-89-5966-627-0.

This book follows much the same methodology as *HPK*. As such, many of my comments above on *HPK* can be applied here. Due to space and time limitations, I will only address a few points.

First, it is clear that “백제어” [百濟語, the Paekche language] for Lee is a *single* language. Lee’s bibliography does not list 河野六郎 Kōno Rokurō’s (1987) seminal work on Paekche bilingualism—an absolute *sine qua non* for any study of the languages (in the plural) of Paekche—nor does Lee address Paekche multilingualism in his book. As a result, Lee inaccurately treats the two distinct languages of Paekche—i.e., Han-Paekche (a Koreanic language) and Puyō-Paekche (a Puyo-Koguryoic language distantly related to Japanese)—as a single language.

The chapter “백제어 표음 자료” [Sources Phonetically Transcribing the Paekche Language] (*HPP* 33-127) presents the main data of the book. However, as in his Koguryō book, no significant attempt is made to do the prerequisite philological work on this data, which is essentially taken at face value with few, if any, significant revisions. (See my comments above on textual problems in the *Samguk Sagi* toponym corpora).

Lee’s “백제어 수사” [Paekche numerals] (*HPP* 36) are later discussed in *MKT*. See my comments above on these Paekche words, which are, *pace* Lee, of unknown semantic value.

Lee lists and briefly discusses some of the Paekche non-onomastic lexical data in the 日本書紀 *Nihon Shoki* (*HPP* 65).⁸⁵


⁸⁵ Several Old Japanese transcription variants should be added to the list, e.g., [茂梨] ‘mountain’ (Kōno 1987: 76).

Although Lee briefly addresses the Late Middle Korean cognate of Han-Paekche (for Lee, undifferentiated Paekche) 厶レ ‘mountain’ (*HPP* 65), one should add the *Samguk Sagi* transcription of the clearly related Han-Paekche word *mora [毛良] (KPEMC *mawlia⁸⁶ ~ *molia⁸⁶) ‘high (高)’ (*SS1512* 36: 9b, line 1; image on preceding page) to his comparative lexical discussion.⁸⁷

In his treatment of the Paekche toponyms in the *Samguk Sagi* (*HPP* 94-99), Lee lists the majority of Paekche toponyms attested in the *Samguk Sagi*, although one stray Paekche toponym is missing, i.e., “奈靈郡本百濟奈已郡” (*SS1512* 35: 8a, line 2; image on right).⁸⁸ This correspondence correlates with the unglossed Paekche toponym “奈已郡” (*SS1512* 37: 10a, line 4; image on right), suggesting that either 已 or 巳 (probably both are copyist’s errors for 己 *ki) transcribe a Han-Paekche or Puyō-Paekche word for ‘spirit (靈).’ This remains to be studied in detail.⁸⁹

The first appendix, “百濟語 表音字의 音價와 出典” [The Phonetic Values and Attestations of Paekche Transcriptional Characters] (*HPP* 297-331), presents Lee’s phonetic interpretations of the Chinese characters used in transcriptions of Paekche linguistic data. My comments above on *HPK* are relevant here, as Lee follows the same approach here as in *HPK*.

The second appendix, “7世紀 末葉의 韓國語 資料” [Sources on Late



⁸⁶ Korean Peninsular Early Middle Chinese appears to have lost the velar nasal ŋ in syllable codas. I indicate this with a superscript ʰ (Shimunek 2021: 67 n. 8). In some instances, ŋ was oralized to *k (q.v. *KLJ* 102-05).

⁸⁷ For a parallel in the Puyo-Koguryoic languages, note OKog *tar, denoting both ‘high, tall’ and ‘mountain’ (*KLJ*).

⁸⁸ Lee discusses this toponym correspondence in his Koguryō book, treating the ‘Paekche’ designation as an error (*HPK* 76 n.35). Whether Koguryō or Paekche, it should be discussed in this chapter of Lee’s Paekche book as well.

⁸⁹ If the phonetic transcription is revised to *ki [己], corresponding to the gloss ‘spirit (靈),’ it could be a loanword from Middle Chinese 氣 ‘breath, air, vapor; life force; spirit,’ cf. attested Tang Middle Chinese in Old Tibetan orthography *khe* ~ *ki* (Tak. #0388).

Seventh Century Korean] (*HPP* 333-92), includes discussion of the 無量壽經連義述文贊 *Muryangshugyōng Yōnūsulmunch'an*, a commentary composed by the Paekche or Unified Silla Buddhist monk Kyōnghūng⁹⁰ on the 無量壽經 *Wuliangshoujing* [*Sukhāvāṭīvyūha Sūtra* 'Infinite Life Sutra']. Kyōnghūng seems to have been active in the 7th century (*HPP* 336) or during the Unified Silla period (*EKC*), but the extant variant of this text is a 1699 woodblock reprint.⁹¹ If Kyōnghūng's text was indeed transmitted from Paekche, one may imagine it has the potential to reveal important information about early Korean Peninsular Chinese phonology; however, as noted by Lee, Kyōnghūng explicitly cites 陸法言 *Lu Fayan's* 切韻 *Qie Yun* and other Chinese texts in his work (e.g., *HPP* 353). Lee correctly states that it is necessary to determine if Kyōnghūng's 反切 *fanqie* spellings are copies from Chinese texts such as the *Qie Yun* (601 A.D.) or 玄應 *Xuanying's* 一切經音義 *Yiqiejing Yinyi* (640 A.D.), or if these are Kyōnghūng's own *fanqie* (*HPP* 352-53). Considering the high probability that Tang Middle Chinese readings were adopted and promulgated in Unified Silla by Silla Buddhist monks, many of whom are known to have been educated in Tang China,⁹² it seems likely that the *fanqie* in Kyōnghūng's text do not represent local Korean Peninsular Early Middle Chinese pronunciations, but rather, are copies, imitations, or Kyōnghūng's own spellings of the prestigious Tang Middle Chinese pronunciations which eventually formed the basis of Sino-Korean sometime in the mid- to late-Unified Silla period. Future work comparing the *fanqie* of this important text with 王仁昫 *Wang Renxu's* redaction (706 A.D.) of the 切韻 *Qie Yun* and with Beckwith's reconstruction of Korean Peninsular Early Middle Chinese may help determine the value of Kyōnghūng's data.

⁹⁰ The name is written by Lee as “瑯興” (*HPP* 336 et passim) but by Kwon Inhan (2021) and *EKC* as “濛興.” I have not been able to check the original text to determine which is correct.

⁹¹ q.v. Kwon Inhan (2021).

⁹² On Silla Buddhist monks educated in Tang China, see: <http://dh.aks.ac.kr/Korea100/wiki/index.php/Tang_and_Silla:_Originality_of_Silla_Culture_and_the_Influence_of_Tang_China> (Accessed September 2021).

Concluding Remarks on the Four Books

The future of Korean Peninsular historical linguistics will depend on our willingness to revise the tradition, to acknowledge the fact that ancient Korea was a multilingual, multicultural, and multiethnic place, and to dispel the myth of a homogeneous Korea. It will require a complete revision, and steps must be taken to firmly establish rigorous philological techniques and mainstream historical-comparative linguistic methods in this area of research. Only then can we truly understand the ethnolinguistic history of the early Korean Peninsula. The authors of the books reviewed herein have made contributions which will provide other scholars with some of the raw data to proceed in this meticulous endeavor.

Abbreviations and Sigla

abbrev.	abbreviation
AJpn	Archaic Japanese (3rd c., Beckwith, 2007a, Kiyose, 2001)
AKog	Archaic Koguryō (3rd c., Beckwith, 2007a)
c.	century
ca.	circa
cf.	confer, compare, see also
CJK	Common Japanese-Koguryoic (Beckwith, 2007a)
CKor	Common Koreanic
CSM	Common Serbi-Mongolic (Shimunek, 2017)
CVB	converb
dial.	dialect, dialectal
EKC	<i>Encyclopedia of Korean Culture</i> 한국민족문화대백과사전 (Academy of Korean Studies)
EMK	Early Middle Korean
et passim	and throughout
GEN	genitive
HK	Han-Kara
HP	Han-Paekche
HPK	Lee SeungJae (2016)
HPP	Lee SeungJae (2013)
HS	Han-Silla
id.	<i>idem</i> , the same
i.e.	<i>id est</i> , that is
infra	below
IYP	Yi Wōnhūi (2018)
JK	Japanese-Koguryoic
Jpn	Japanese
KLJ	Beckwith (2007a)
KPEMC	Korean Peninsular Early Middle Chinese (KLJ; LASM; Shimunek, 2021)
KYS	<i>Jilin Leishi</i> 雞林類事 (Kyerim Yusa)
LASM	Shimunek (2017a)
lit.	literally
LMK	Late Middle Korean
LOC	Late Old Chinese
MChi	Middle Chinese

MJpn	Middle Japanese
MKT	Lee SeungJae (2017)
MSC	Modern Standard Chinese
MSJ	Modern Standard Japanese
MSK	Modern Standard Korean
n.	footnote
NCR	<i>Nichū-reki</i> 二中曆 (images from the National Diet Library Digital Collections database)
OJpn	Old Japanese
OKog	Old Koguryō (cited from Beckwith 2007a)
Pul.	Pulleyblank (1991)
q.v.	<i>quod vide</i> , which see
supra	above
SS1512	<i>Samguk Sagi</i> (1512 Kyujanggak edition, <db.history.go.kr>)
SY1512	<i>Samguk Yusa</i> (1512 Kyujanggak edition, <db.history.go.kr>)
Tak.	Takata (1988)
TOP	topic marker

Symbols

*	scientific reconstruction based on mainstream historical-comparative linguistic methods
☆	reconstruction based on traditional readings, 反切 <i>fanqie</i> , or rhyme tables
...	undecipherable sequence (in phonological reconstructions)
//	phonemic representation
[]	phonetic transcription (in IPA or other writing systems)
-	morpheme boundary
~	linguistic variation between two or more forms (free or conditioned)
←	loanword across languages
<	language-internal change
á	stressed vowel (in reconstructions of Old Chinese)
á	high pitch (in transcriptions of early and modern Korean)
à	low pitch (in transcriptions of early and modern Korean)
ǎ	rising pitch (in transcriptions of early Korean)
ã	reduced vowel
V	unspecified vowel

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