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# Articles (Translated)



# Clashes between Liaodong Koreans and the Goryeo Royal House in the 13th to 14th Centuries

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# Clashes between Liaodong Koreans and the Goryeo Royal House in the 13th to 14th Centuries\*

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## 1. Introduction

During the war between Goryeo and the Mongols in the mid 13th century, a sizeable number of Goryeo people (henceforth, Koreans) broke away in groups from the domain of Goryeo. Some surrendered voluntarily, leading some groups of their followers, to the Mongol Empire that welcomed them and bestowed official posts such as local directorate-general (總管) and chiliarch (千戶) for its newly acquired Korean subjects. Their duty was, mainly, to supervise people and households for military and labor mobilization, whereby they expanded their sphere of influence and elevated their positions within the system of the Mongol Empire.

Having established their power in Liaodong, this Korean diaspora often clashed with the Goryeo royal house while collaborating with the Mon-

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\* This article is translated from the Korean manuscript originally published in the *Journal of Korean History* (한국사연구) issue 181, June 2018: 71-102.

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gols to compete against their homeland for postwar gains. These powerful Korean groups in the region dispersed throughout the north of the Korean Peninsula and Liaodong. But, as the Dongnyeong Commandery (東寧府), installed in the north of the peninsula, was returned to Goryeo and the conflict between Goryeo and Ssangsyong Commandery (雙城總管府) had escalated in the late 13th century, Liaodong Koreans became the main force behind the conflict with the Goryeo royal house especially from the early 14th century.

The Liaodong Korean groups even frequently competed with each other, so they rarely banded together under any united force. In addition, their conflict with Goryeo did not manifest in a uniform fashion but varied in terms of time and context wherein each group was situated. For instance, the warlord Hong clan, the enfeoffed King of Shen (瀋王) faction, and the imperial relative Gi clan in the region confronted the Goryeo royal house all in different manners according to their capabilities and circumstances.<sup>1</sup> The rivalry between Liaodong Korean groups and the Goryeo royal house came to an end in the late 14th century when Goryeo solely survived as a polity. The Korean groups in Liaodong lost their political statuses and became absorbed into Goryeo or Ming China (1368-1644).

This paper investigates the tug of power between the aforementioned three Liaodong Korean groups and the Goryeo royal house in late Goryeo. For this purpose, it first examines how the conflict emerged and developed until its end during the Yuan-Ming transition period. What is further explored is the distinctive status of Goryeo kings under the Mongolian Empire, its impact on their power struggle with their rivals, and the final outcomes.<sup>2</sup> By doing so, this paper will help offer historical insight as to how Goryeo in the 13th to 14th centuries preserved its polity under the Mongolian world order.

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<sup>1</sup> More discussions on Liaodong Korean power groups in the 13th to 14th centuries can be found in the following studies: Chu Chae-hyok (1974), Kim Gu-jin (1986), Chang Dong-ik (1999), Kim Hye-won (1999), Lee Jung-shin (2001), and Oh Ki-seung (2017b).

<sup>2</sup> On the complex status of Goryeo and Goryeo kings in the 13th to 14th centuries, refer to the following studies: Kim Ho-dong (2007), Choi Yoon-jung (2013), and Lee Myung-mi (2016).

## 2. The Emergence of Conflict

The first Liaodong Korean who secured his position in the Mongol empire was the local overlord Hong Bokwon (洪福源). His family had lived in Inju (麟州)<sup>3</sup> for generations, which was the main military post of northern Goryeo. His father Hong Daesun (洪大純) was the local commander of Inju<sup>4</sup> who controlled its prefectural army. Hong Bokwon inherited this post from his father and commanded Inju's cavalry regiments but he surrendered immediately after the Mongols' first invasion to the prefecture in 1231. This deed earned him the Mongols' recognition for the "shuaixian guifu (率先歸)" or *act of surrender ahead of all others* as well as trust such that they continued to keep him in important positions.<sup>5</sup> Protected by Saritari's Mongol troops since his surrender, Hong extended his influence to the northwest region of Goryeo. The central Goryeo government implicitly condoned Hong's action by appointing him assistant commander (郎將) of Seogyeong (i.e., West Capital, modern-day Pyeongyang), signaling its intention of conciliating him. By that time, Hong Bokwon still allowed Goryeo officials' visits in his territory and did not entirely sever ties with the Goryeo government.<sup>6</sup>

Their relations changed abruptly, however, as Saritari, who invaded Goryeo again in 1232, was killed in the battle of Cheoinseong and the

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<sup>3</sup> Present-day Sinuiju in the Northern Pyeongan Province.

<sup>4</sup> *Goryeosa*, Book 130, *Biographies* 43, "Hong Bokwon." For more discussions on the development and status of the Bukgyeong region of Goryeo, refer to the following studies: Lee Kibaik (1968), Kim Gap-dong (1996), and Park Oak-kol (1999).

<sup>5</sup> Oh Ki-seung, "Yodong goryeoin hongssi seryeok ui hyeongseong gwa Hong Gunsang ui haengjeok e daehan gochal" [A study on formation of Liaodong Goryeo people group Hong clan and achievements of Hong Gun-sang], *Chiyeok gwa Yeoksa* 40 (2017a), 59; Choi Yoon-jung (2016), "13-segi ryeowon gwangyewa Hong Dagu" [The 13-century Goryeo-Mongol relations and Hong Dagu], *Jungguksa yeongu* 105 (2016): 100.

<sup>6</sup> During the years of 1231-32, Hong Bokwon appeared to maintain his relations with both the Mongols and Goryeo so as to maximize his interests in the northwest region of Goryeo. See Oh, "13-14-segi yeomong cheopgyeong jiyek goryeoin seryeok yeongu" [A study of Goryeo people group in the Goryeo-Mongol border area in the 13-14th century] (PhD diss., Chung-ang University, 2017b): 30-33.

Mongol troops had to retreat. At that time, the Mongols temporarily deferred attacks on Goryeo and concentrated their forces on the final showdown against the Jurchen Jin (1115-1234) and Dongzhen regime (1215-33). Without missing this opportunity, Goryeo took some measures to recover its control over Bukgye (北界), the northwest province of Goryeo. Without the protection of the Mongol troops, Hong Bokwon faced great pressure from the Goryeo government.<sup>7</sup> To conciliate Hong, Goryeo sent a pacification commissioner (宣諭使) but Hong killed him to demonstrate his will to support the Mongols. In response, Goryeo condemned his act as ‘mutiny’ and deployed 3,000 private soldiers of Choe U (崔瑀) with Bukgye’s military commander Min Hui (閔職) to attack Hong’s base.<sup>8</sup>

Goryeo succeeded in seizing Seogyong and captured Hong’s father and his brother Hong Baeksu (洪白壽) with his children,<sup>9</sup> but Hong Bokwon escaped and submitted himself to the Mongols with his retinue of 1,500 households in early 1233.<sup>10</sup> In the following year, the Mongols appointed him and Kim Bu (金符) Directorate-General of Surrendered Goryeo Military and Civilian Populations (管領歸附高麗軍民長官), thereby securing him the position of powerful Korean overlord in Liaodong.<sup>11</sup>

Due to the military clashes with Goryeo in the course of establishing their power in Liaodong, the Hong clan’s relationship with Goryeo fell apart and they were inevitably hostile to Goryeo. After settling in Liaodong, Hong Bokwon vilified Goryeo and took part in the Mongols’ military expeditions. Choi U, the de facto ruler of Goryeo at that time, tried to appease him by bestowing his father Hong Daesun and his brother Hong Baeksu, both of whom remained in Goryeo, with government posts and sending him bribes. *Goryeosa* [History of Goryeo] records that Hong Bok-

<sup>7</sup> Yun Yong-hyok, “Goryeo daemong hangjaengsa yeongu” [Goryeo Anti-municipity History Research] (Seoul: Iljisa, 1999): 62-63.

<sup>8</sup> *Goryeosa*, Book 23, *Annals* 23, Gojong 20th year, 12th month.

<sup>9</sup> *Goryeosa*, Book 23, *Annals* 23, Gojong 19th year, 12th month.

<sup>10</sup> *Yuan Gaoli Jishi*, Taizhong 6th year, 1st day of the 5th month.

<sup>11</sup> *Yuanshi*, Book 154, *Biographies* 41, “Hong Bokwon.”

won curtailed his slanders on Goryeo as a result of Choi's appeasement,<sup>12</sup> indicating that the relations between the Hong and the Goryeo court possibly ameliorated a little.

Nevertheless, it is likely that their relationship remained more or less hostile because Hong Bokwon did not stop his service as a fugleman of the Mongol troops and collaborated in the invasion of Goryeo.<sup>13</sup> In 1258, Hong Bokwon was terminated by Duke Yeongnyeong (永寧公) Wang Jun (王紘), a new emerging power in Liaodong.<sup>14</sup> The Hong clan aggravated their antagonism toward the Goryeo royal house.

The new rival group emerged as the Goryeo royal house overthrew the military regime and established a peace agreement with the Mongols. Once the hostile relations were resolved due to the peace agreement, the Goryeo royal house and Liaodong Korean groups, including the Hong clan, all equally became the eastern part of the Mongol Empire and found themselves being competitors against one another. Geographically adjacent to the Korean Peninsula, Liaodong lay in the shortest path to the center of the empire from Goryeo, making it an attractive settlement for refugees from Goryeo since the onset of the Goryeo-Mongol War. To Liaodong Korean groups, not only the territory of Goryeo proper but also the people from Goryeo were valuable resources to expand their power base. To Goryeo, they were the resources to be protected or recovered.

Power groups existing in such parallel and adjacent locations were prone to overlapping interests. The surge and expansion of one power could lead to the wilting and waning of the other, naturally leading to competitions among Korean political entities in the region over territory and population. For instance, during the Goryeo-Mongol war, not a few Go-

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<sup>12</sup> *Goryeosa*, Book 130, *Biographies* 43, "Hong Bokwon."

<sup>13</sup> *Goryeosa*, Book 130, *Biographies* 42, "Hong Bokwon."

<sup>14</sup> Wang Jun was in conflict with Hong Bokwon as he emerged as a new power in Liaodong by obtaining a fief in the region in order to contain the expansion of Hong's influence. Refer to the following paper for more details on their conflict and the purge of Hong Bokwon. See Oh (2016), "Mongjeguk ui dongbang gyeongyeong gwa yodong goryeoin seryeok" [A ruling tactics of Mongol empire in their eastern territory and Goryeo people group in Liaodong-especially in Liaoyang and Shenyang area], *Jungang saron* 43 (2016): 19-21.

ryeo people left their country and settled in Liaodong under the direction of Hong Bokwon. The Goryeo government demanded the return of runaways and attempted to repatriate them.<sup>15</sup> This case illustrates the degree to which the two powers wangled over the control of the Korean inflows in Liaodong. Goryeo and Liaodong Korean power groups continued to compete against each other in order to expand their spheres of interest and seize the superior position within the Mongolian empire.

Under this power structure encompassing Goryeo, Liaodong Korean power groups and the Mongol empire altogether, the political target of the Liaodong Koreans became less Goryeo's military regime than the kingship after Goryeo's incorporation to the Mongolian world order. This trend continued with all other Liaodong Korean groups that rose to power after the Hong clan and the Goryeo royal house had to stand at the forefront of political clashes in order to secure and maintain its exclusive rule over Goryeo.

### 3. Development and Characteristics of the Rivalry between Liaodong Koreans and the Goryeo Royal House

#### 1) Timeline of the Emergence of Major Liaodong Koreans and Transformation of Clashes

Since the completion of the Goryeo-Mongol War, the Hong Bokwon family, the King of Shen (瀋王) faction, and the Gi family headed by Gi Cheol (奇轍) attained prominence among Liaodong Korean groups through obtaining official positions within the empire's organization, establishing close ties with certain families of great khans, and provoking confrontations against the Goryeo royal house at different times.

Here, it should be noted that the word 'Koreans,' which is used to refer to the Liaodong Koreans, does not simply mean the people who be-

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<sup>15</sup> Lee Kang-hahn, "Goryeo hugi won dunjeong ui unyeong gwa byeonhwa" [Yuan-implemented Garrison farms in the 1270s, and the changes it went through], *Yoksa Hakbo* 196 (2007): 17.

longed to the country, Goryeo. Hong Bokwon, who led the first Liaodong Korean power group, voluntarily relinquished his ties to his homeland Goryeo. In addition, his son and successor, Hong Dagu (洪茶丘) could hardly be identified as a subject of Goryeo. As indicated from Kublai Khan's installation of a myriarchy commanding Koreans, Jurchen, and Chinese Han (高麗女直漢軍萬戶府) in 1292, the Mongol empire had already included Koreans as one of their ethnic stocks within itself. That is, it can be said that the Koreans within its imperial territory, including Liaodong, were considered one of its multi-ethnic constituents of the Mongolian empire.<sup>16</sup>

The Liaodong Korean group led by Hong Dagu was the first to launch strong attacks against the Goryeo royal house right after the Goryeo-Mongol war. Hong Dagu obtained Kublai Khan's favors through his military achievements, which enabled him to restore his father's once divested position of Directorate-General of Surrendered Goryeo Military and Civilian Populations (管領歸附高麗軍民總管) and inherit it through his personal connections.<sup>17</sup> Having redeemed his predecessor's lost domain, Hong Dagu maligned Goryeo's Prince Wang Jun, directly involved in Hong Bokwon's death, and confiscated his troops and horses.<sup>18</sup> Wang Jun's attempt to seek clemency for his relatives, including his elder brother Marquis Seunghwa Wang On (承化侯 王溫) and his nephew Wang Hwan (王桓), went unheeded. Hong Dagu even executed those Goryeo royalties while squelching the Sambyeolcho Rebellion.<sup>19</sup>

Apart from this case, Hong also clashed with Goryeo King Chungryeol 忠烈王 (r. 1274-98) over the preparation and process of helping Kublai's expedition to Japan, an attempt to permeate his influence into Goryeo. On the pretext of Yuan's expedition to Japan, Hong Dagu distressed

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<sup>16</sup> Oh (2017b), 80-81.

<sup>17</sup> *Yuanshi*, Book 154, *Biographies* 41, "Hong Bokwon's son Hong Dagu."

<sup>18</sup> *Goryeosa*, Book 18, Wonjong 4th year, 3rd month.

<sup>19</sup> *Goryeosa*, Book 90, *Biographies* 3, "Wonjong 1." Duke Yeongnyeong Wang Jun and Marquis Seunghwa Wang On were brothers, both being sons of Duke Pyeongyang Wang Gyeong, who was a son of King Hyeonjong. Therefore, Wang Jun asked his sons (Wang Ong and Wang Hui), who joined in the forces to quash Sambyeolcho, to save Wang On, but Hong Dagu maneuvered to kill him to avenge his father.

Goryeo while working as the director of garrison farm installation on the peninsula. He utilized this position as his foothold to procure manpower and probably to expand his sphere of control into the northern and southern parts of Goryeo.<sup>20</sup>

Heavily pressured, King Chungryeol went as far as to implore Kublai to replace Hong Dagu's forces with Mongol or Han troops instead on the grounds that Hong's domineering interferences in all domestic affairs, not just in military affairs, made it hard for the king to rule his kingdom.<sup>21</sup> However, King Chungryeol could not contain Hong's tyranny until he attained the position of Grand Councilor of the Branch Secretariat for Eastern Expeditions (征東行省), a higher-ranking office within the imperial government than Hong Dagu's.<sup>22</sup>

By the early 14th century, the Hong clan's influence in Liaodong had reached its peak. Hong Junghui (洪重喜), who had been dominating Liaodong as the successor of Hong Dagu, successfully entreated the Mongolian emperor to have Goryeo procure necessary supplies for the empress dowager's Buddhist service for immortality after King Chungseon 忠宣王 (r. 1298/1308-13)'s reinstatement.<sup>23</sup> In order to defeat King Chungseon, who was also holding the kingship of Shenyang as well as the kingship of Goryeo, Hong sued the king for his acts of being lawless, insolent, and violent<sup>24</sup> while attempting to install a direct Mongol-ruled branch secretariat in Goryeo for the first time.

This incident can be also interpreted as a preventive measure by the Hong clan to avert the expansion of Goryeo's royal power in Liaodong, as

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<sup>20</sup> Lee Kang-hahn (2007), 18.

<sup>21</sup> *Goryeosa*, Book 28, *Annals* 28, King Chungryeol, 4th year, 7th month.

<sup>22</sup> There are different arguments regarding the main reason for Kublai's inability to restrain Hong Dagu, although King Chungryeol was his son-in-law. Choi Yoon-jung (2013, 49) finds the reason in King Chongryeol's clear limitation due to his lack of contributions to the empire, such as the Hong family's act of surrender ahead of all others. In a similar vein, Lee Myung-mi (2016, 124) argues that there was no undeniable definite hierarchy between the two to prevent Hong Dagu from challenging King Chungryeol.

<sup>23</sup> *Goryeosa*, 1st year of King Chungryeol's 2nd reign, the day of dragon in the 3rd month.

<sup>24</sup> *Goryeosa*, Book 122, *Biographies* 35.

had been the case with Wang Jun in the past. However, his attempt was thwarted by the eunuch Bang Sinwu (renamed Mang Gutai (忙古台) after transferring to the Yuan royal court) who reported to Empress Dowager Shouyuan (壽元皇太后) that Hong had lied to upset Goryeo. Consequently, Hong was flogged and exiled to Chaozhou (潮州).<sup>25</sup> Later, Hong was pardoned and called up again but he died in the following year. Since then, the Hong clan could never regain their former eminence over Liaodong.<sup>26</sup>

With the demise of the Hong family, a new power group emerging from Liaodong in the late 1310s to contend against Goryeo's royal house was that of Wang Go (王嵩), the King of Shen who inherited King Chungseon's Shen kingship. As Wang Go tried to revive the kingship from its waning status, he came to be in conflict with the Goryeo royal family including King Chungsuk 忠肅王 (r. 1313-30 / 1332-39). The commandership that King Chungseon took over the troops and civilians in Liaodong as the King of Shen is likely to have all been transferred to branch secretariats by the time when Wang Go inherited the title. Chungseon's major assets, such as remaining properties in Liaodong—Haejeongojeompo (廡典庫店鋪), Yeongseongsori (營城掃里), Seonseongsori (宣城掃里) in Yizhou (懿州)—and land in the Jiangnan (江南) region, had been mostly inherited to King Chungsuk. That is why Wang Go received nothing more than a mansion with land in the grand capital of the Mongolian empire in addition to the titular title of King of Shen.<sup>27</sup> As a result, what had been left over to Wang Go was little power or assets although the one-syllable title offered to Wang presented a high-ranking peerage in the Mongolian empire.<sup>28</sup>

Dissatisfied, Wang Go ignited friction with the Goryeo king.<sup>29</sup> He

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<sup>25</sup> *Goryeosa*, Book 122, *Biographies* 35. *Yuanshi* records that he was exiled to Zhangzhou in the 2nd year of Kaishan Khan's reign, which slightly differs from the records in *Goryeosa*.

<sup>26</sup> They could not recover their power and declined further, and their defeat in the Yangdo Civil War in 1328 played a part in their demise. See Oh (2017b, PhD diss.), 87-88.

<sup>27</sup> *Goryeosa*, Book 35, *Annals* 35, the 15th reign of King Chungsuk, the day of snake in the 7th month.

<sup>28</sup> A one-syllable title such as Shen was ranked higher in Yuan than a two-syllable title such as Shenyang.

<sup>29</sup> Kim Hye-won (1999), 53.

launched political attacks on the Goryeo royal house, aiming to overthrow the king and usurp the throne for himself. In fact, his campaign worked to such an extent that King Chung Suk was detained in the Yuan for several years and his royal seal was confiscated. Although his scheme against Chung Suk eventually failed, his endeavors to usurp the Goryeo throne continued till his latter years. Wang and his followers were summoned as the group associated directly with the succession of the Goryeo throne even after the reign of King Chung Suk. While continuing their fight for the throne, the Wang group sought to ease the royal succession procedure, install direct Yuan-ruled branch secretariats, and undermine the authority of the Goryeo king.

After Wang Go's death in 1345, the campaign to enthrone the King of Shen as the Goryeo king withered away but the ascension of King Gongmin 恭愍王 (r. 1351-74) began with the emergence of a new rival group, the Gi clan. The group relied on the power of Empress Gi, a consort of the Mongol Emperor Shun (順帝), and her brother Gi Cheol (奇轍) was the central figure. Gi Cheol was appointed Temporary Acting Supervisor of the Branch Secretariat of Eastern Expedition (權征東省事) in Gaeseong, the capital of Goryeo, and took control of the secretariat.<sup>30</sup> After the death of King Chungmuk 忠穆王 (r. 1344-48), he expanded his power within Goryeo to act as a de facto ruler of the capital province of Goryeo by coercing the position of chancellor and the title of royal father-in-law<sup>31</sup> on the one hand and by securing his influence in Liaodong through the position of Manager of Governmental Affairs (平章政事) on the other hand. Thus, the Gi clan competed with the Goryeo royal house at the far-reaching level; they fought with the Goryeo king over political supremacy within Goryeo while engaging in military clashes over the territory encompassing northern Goryeo and Liaodong.

King Gongmin eliminated successfully the Gi clan and their influence within Goryeo in 1356. But, Liaodong was a different story. Since it was

<sup>30</sup> Koh Myung-soo, "Jeongdong haengseong gineung ui byeoncheon" [Changes in the Functions of Cheng-Tung Hsing-Sheng – With Period Division], *Hanguksahakbo* 66 (2017): 106.

<sup>31</sup> *Goryeosa*, Book 131, *Biographies* 44, "Gi Cheol."

not within Goryeo's sphere of authority either territorially or administratively, King Gongmin could not exert his influence directly on the remnant elements of the Gi clan in Liaodong. Thus, the king could do nothing to the remaining Gi family in Liaodong and later the conflict, caused by his purge of Gi Cheol, was about to explode into a full-blown military clash between the two powers. There were two military showdowns. The first one occurred when Empress Gi tried to seat Prince Deokheung (德興君) on the throne of Goryeo in 1364. The Mongols retrieved ten thousand troops from Liaodong and invaded Goryeo to replace King Gongmin with Deokheung on the throne. But, they were completely vanquished and the Mongols ended up losing their control over Goryeo's throne and domestic affairs.

When the Mongol empire lost and retreated from Mainland China, the Liaodong region was flooded with pro-Yuan cliques and temporarily fell into a state of fragmentation among numerous rivaling overlords before the advance of the Ming into the region. These overlords, including Nahachu, justified their authorities in their respective territories on the basis of their official positions warranted mostly by Yuan's Liaoyang Secretariat (遼陽行省) system so they all could be categorized as subjects of the Yuan. However, the Yuan could not provide any hierarchical order with a clearly designated central leadership; consequently, those overlords cohabited in a semi-autonomous manner.<sup>32</sup>

In light of this, Gi Cheol's son Gi Sain Temur (奇賽因帖木兒) organized a coalition of overlords in various areas on and around Liaoyang Prefecture under the name of the Dongnyeong Commandery and attacked Goryeo. In response, King Gongmin opted for a strong military retaliation

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<sup>32</sup> According to Jung Dong-hun, although these overlords self-claimed official positions in Liaoyang branch secretariats under the secretariat system of the Yuan Empire, they did not use the official letter forms postulated by the imperial secretariat system in their communications with the Goryeo government but personal letter forms. Jung argues that this freedom indicates that Goryeo and Liaoyang overlords communicated without much concern of Northern Yuan, which had already lost much of its control in the region including Liaodong and the Korean Peninsula. This argument evinces that these Liaodong groups at that time were not actually under the direct hierarchical control of Northern Yuan but semi-autonomous fiefs, although they used the titles of Yuan's secretariat system. See Jung's PhD dissertation, "Goryeo sidae oegyū munseo yeongu" [A study on diplomatic documents in the Goryeo Dynasty] (Seoul National University, 2016): 456.

to the commandery and launched two military expeditions to Liaodong in 1370 to demolish the coalition.<sup>33</sup> It is since King Gongmin's elimination of Gi Sain Temur in the late 14th century that the only Korean-based polity throughout Liaodong and the Korean Peninsula was Goryeo.

## 2) Securing Superior Positions under the System of the Mongol Empire

After the peace settlement between the Mongols and Goryeo, the Goryeo royal house and Liaodong Korean powers shared some characteristics of fiefdoms that could exercise autonomous rule within the boundary of Qa'an Ulus of the Mongol empire.<sup>34</sup> Under these circumstances several power groups sought their own way of expanding their spheres of influence in the region composed of Liaodong and the Korean Peninsula. The power struggle induced frequent rivalries among these groups. In this vein, the primary objective of both Goryeo and other Korean power groups was identical—securing the superior position over the others within the system of Qa'an Ulus.

As previously mentioned, the Korean power groups in Liaodong could easily fall into conflict while competing to procure power-enhancing resources including people. They had a similar manpower base drawn mostly from Goryeo and their domains were territorially close to Goryeo. What is more, such rivalry among themselves was intensified by the Mongols for its advantage at times when its relationship with Goryeo was unstable. It was also spurred by the emergence of a political entity such as the

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<sup>33</sup> For more details on the preparation and background of the expedition, refer to the following article: Oh K-S, "Gongminwang dae dongnyeongbu jeongyeok gochal" [A study on the Dongnyongbu campaign in the reign of King Kongmin], *Gunsa yeongu* 134 (2012).

<sup>34</sup> As will be discussed in later sections with more details, the territories and military and civilian populations that Liaodong Korean powers ruled were fundamentally enfeoffed demesnes in nature. Goryeo also shared some characteristics of a family fiefdom bestowed to the imperial son-in-law Goryeo king, while being a foreign state under the sovereignty of the Goryeo king. For more details, refer to: Kim Ho-dong (2007) and Morihira Masahiko 森平雅彦 (2013), "Mongoru hakenka no Kōrai" モンゴル覇権下の高麗, Nagoya daigaku shuppankai 名古屋大学出版会.

Gi family that could exert its influence in Goryeo without relying on the authority of the Goryeo royal house to weaken the royal family's power base. At other times, however, the clashes between the two Korean powers aggravated the relationship between Goryeo and the Mongols, as in the case of the Hong clan's attempt at installing direct Mongol-ruled secretariats in Goryeo during the reign of King Chungsuk. Also, conflict arose even when Goryeo-Mongol relations were stable as in the case of Hong Jung-hui's attempt to install direct Mongol-ruled secretariats against the Goryeo king during the second reign of King Chungseon.

Although the three Liaodong Korean power groups, discussed in the previous paragraphs, differed slightly in their main methods for containing and attacking the Goryeo royal house, they all tried to form close ties with some central figures of the Mongolian empire, attain the status of 'a person with a good root,' and obtain superior ranks within the imperial system. The same means were also employed by the Goryeo royal house in offsetting its rivals' political attacks.

In the early phase of conflict between the Liaodong Koreans and the Goryeo royal house, Hong Dagu was able to gain support from the Mongolian imperial house by joining the Mongols' military campaigns and obtaining Kublai's personal favor<sup>35</sup> as well as high-ranking jobs. In 1274, he was named Superintendent of the Shipbuilding Government-Military-Civilian Commandery (監督造船官軍民總管) and Deputy Marshal of the Eastern Expedition Force (東征副元帥) and deployed to Goryeo to represent the interests of the Mongol empire and enforce the procurement of supplies and shipbuilding assigned to Goryeo. In 1277, while preparing for the second expedition to Japan, Hong Dagu was promoted to Marshal of the Eastern Expedition Force (東征都元帥) and acted as a delegate of the empire. At that time, Hong Dagu was not simply a commander or myriarch (萬戶府) of Liaodong but a key agent able to materialize the empire's authority in proxy upon Goryeo. Under the Mongol system of branch secretariats, he held a higher status than the Goryeo government.

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<sup>35</sup> *Yianshi*, Book 154, *Biographies* 41, "Hong Bokwon's son Hong Dagu."

At the same time, however, King Chungryeol became the first Goryeo king who received a dual royal status: Goryeo king and the emperor's son-in-law. By marrying Kublai Khan's daughter, King Chungryeol became a member of the Mongol imperial family, which was an important factor that gave him the edge over other Korean powerholders. Through King Chungryeol's marriage into the imperial family and his military contributions, Goryeo exalted its status and strengthened its ties with the central government of the empire.<sup>36</sup> He was also appointed Grand Councilor of the Branch Secretariat for Eastern Expeditions, which allowed him to wield his power over the imperial organization.

King Chungseon, the son of King Chungryeol, was not only married into the imperial house but also formed a close affinity with Emperor Wuzong (r. 1307-11) and Emperor Renzong (r. 1311-20), thereby expanding his influence further in the empire. Consequently, he enjoyed privilege from the dual kingship of Goryeo and Shenyang and appears to have successfully suppressed the Hong clan in Liaodong by exiling Hong Junghui. Similarly, after Chungseon's death, Wang Go, the King of Shen, could temporarily achieve desired results by calumniating King Chungsuk thanks to his connections to the imperial family. Wang was the husband of Princess Nullyun who was a niece of King Chungseon's consort, Princess Gyegukdaejang (or Princess Budashiri) so he was able to win Emperor Yingzong's favor. Prior to this, Wang Jun, married also to the imperial family, gained imperial support for the power struggle with Hong clan.<sup>37</sup>

To be certain, kinship or an affinity to a particular bloodline and the degree of personal closeness to a powerful person from that particular bloodline were crucial factors in obtaining a political advantage. These personal connections played an important role in determining the superior side

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<sup>36</sup> King Chungryeol's active display of willingness regarding the expeditions to Japan and the suppression of Qadan's revolt was construed as military 'contributions' to the Yuan Empire and facilitated close ties with Yuan. But his actions were not up to his official display, but passive, incurring criticisms from Mongol envoys. Choi (2013) discusses the links between improved relations between Goryeo and Yuan through contributions to the empire and the enhanced status of Goryeo kings.

<sup>37</sup> *Goryeosa*, Book 130, *Biographies* 43, Rebels 4, "Hong Bokwon."

between rival power groups. As the Gi family ascended to power, related directly to the imperial house, the Goryeo royal house came to lose its superior affinity to the imperial house to the rival Korean group.<sup>38</sup> Empress Gi, as indicated by her title, was married to the Mongol emperor and her status was far higher than that of a mere son-in-law.<sup>39</sup>

Therefore, the rising power of Empress Gi and her family was an unprecedented threat to the Goryeo royal house. The Goryeo kings since King Chungryeol maintained more intimate relations with the Mongol imperial family than other Korean power groups, thereby securing a superior position in power struggle, but it all changed with the Gi family whose tyranny became severe in Liaodong as well as in Goryeo.<sup>40</sup> It was difficult for the Goryeo royal house to overcome its inferior position to the Gi clan within the system of the Mongolian empire, which led King Gongmin to adopt a drastic way of purging the Gi clan.

#### 4. Factors for the Outcome of the Conflict in the Transition Period of the Yuan and the Ming

The conflict between the Goryeo royal house and Liaodong Korean powers came to an end in the late 14th century when the Ming emerged as a new power in Mainland China. The conflict that had lasted throughout the 13th century finally reached its conclusion wherein all competing Korean groups except Goryeo lost their status of polity and some of their fragments were absorbed into Goryeo. The fundamental reason for this consequence varied

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<sup>38</sup> Lee Myung-mi (2016), 283.

<sup>39</sup> Empress Gi held enough political might to demand the abdication of the imperial throne in favor of the crown prince, although she failed. *Yuanshi* records that although the dethroning of King Gongmin for Prince Deokheung in 1363 was ordered in the name of the Mongolian emperor, all machinations from the dethronement to the invasion of Goryeo were conducted by Empress Gi, which suggests her strong political influence in the imperial court. *Yuanshi*, Book 46, *Basic Annals*.

<sup>40</sup> Lee Myung-mi, "Gongminwang dae choban gunjugwon jaeguchuk sidowa gissilga" [Trials to reconstruct the authority of Koryeo kingship early in King Gongmin's reign and the Ki family around the reforms in 1356], *Hanguk muhwa* 53 (2011).

in their political identities and external perceptions toward them.

A Goryeo king held a multi-layered political status under the Mongolian world order. This form of status was completed in the era of King Chungryeol, the successor of King Wonjong 元宗 (r. 1259-74), who finalized the peace treaty between Goryeo and the Mongols. King Chungryeol received 'the seal of the royal son-in-law and Goryeo king (駙馬高麗國王印)' from the Mongolian empire in 1281, which signified a Goryeo king as a lord of a fiefdom deemed to an imperial son-in-law within the empire and as a king of a foreign vassal state under the Mongolian hegemony. In addition, a Goryeo king headed a branch secretariat for military campaigns through the inheritable position of Left Grand Councilor of the Branch Secretariat for Eastern Expeditions (征東行中書省左丞相).

In other words, a Goryeo king's right to rule Goryeo's territory and people was guaranteed in the tri-layered authority. The first concerned a personal relationship as a member of the imperial family within the system of Qa'an Ulus. The second came from an autonomous authority as a king of a foreign state under the Mongolian hegemony. The third rested on an institutional status as a grand councilor within the system of branch secretariats under the organizational structure of the Mongolian empire. All Goryeo kings since King Chungryeol retained this tri-layered status until its relations with the Mongols were cut off in late Goryeo.

Once, the Mongols appointed Korguz (闊里吉思) Manager of the Secretariat for Eastern Expeditions and deployed him to Goryeo to get directly involved in the management of the secretariat with the intention of strengthening its grip over the organization. And, during the era of the Gi clan the control over this secretariat deviated from the Goryeo king once more. Gi Cheol ruled it as an independent bureau for twelve years and six months from November 1343 when he was appointed Temporary Acting Supervisor of the Branch Secretariat for Eastern Expeditions. Then, King Gongmin purged Gi Cheol and abolished all subordinate offices under the secretariat other than the Offices of the Left and Right in 1356.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid., 111-12.

Except for the two occasions as above, this branch secretariat was controlled by Goryeo kings whose grand councilor position was automatically and unchangeably inherited. The Mongols, then, could not intervene in the affairs of Goryeo's Eastern Expedition branch secretariat as much as it did with other expedition branch secretariats. This reveals that the Branch Secretariat for Eastern Expeditions was fundamentally under the direct authority of Goryeo kings.

The leaders of the Korean power groups in Liaodong, different from a Goryeo king who had a complex authority and status, were simply either a ruler of a fiefdom or an official within the empire's branch secretariat system.<sup>42</sup> The Hong clan or the Wang family generally received or inherited the positions of directorate-general of military and civilians (軍民總管) and myriarch while holding the position of surveillance commissioner (按撫使) within the imperial administrative system. During their golden era, they also obtained high-ranking official positions such as right chancellor (右丞) or manager of governmental affairs (平章政事). Gi Cheol and Gi Sain Temur were also the managers of governmental affairs in Liaodong. Wang Go did inherit the kingship of Shen, thus having the status of a fief king (諸王), a distinguished status above other Liaodong leaders, albeit little practical power. Still, the kingship of Shen was an enfeoffed title within the territory directly governed by the empire whereas the Goryeo kingship, as a royal house of a foreign state, possessed itself of its own autonomous territory with its own borders. Hence, the two kingships were fundamentally different from each other in nature.

Once the system of branch secretariats was settled in Liaodong, the powerful in the region were appointed or self-appointed to high-ranking positions to justify their authority over their respective domain. Gi Cheol and his son Gi Sain Temur also followed this route: the father enjoyed his

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<sup>42</sup> Some of these powerholders held official positions in branch secretariats as well as were lords of fiefs, but their statuses were not equal to a Goryeo king, who was also a sovereign king of a foreign state. Their fief authorities were limited to a domestic scale under the central Yuan government, and it was virtually impossible for them to evolve to achieve a status as independent as the Goryeo kingship.

power as the manager of governmental affairs in the Liaodong branch secretariat while the son built his power on the pretext of the self-made organization, the Commandery of Dongnyeong. Although both of them were originally from Goryeo, their political identities belonged to the order of the Mongolian empire like other Liaodong Korean powerholders.

In comparison, as previously mentioned, a Goryeo king was ratified to rule the territory and people of Goryeo as the head of the kingdom through the two titles of Right Grand Councilor of the Branch Secretariat for Eastern Expeditions and Sovereign King of the Imperial Son-in-Law State Goryeo. These two titles constituted three orders: 1) the international order centered on the Mongol Empire, 2) the Ulus order centered on the imperial house, and 3) the order of the Mongolian branch secretariat system. With an essentially different political identity from that of the other Korean power groups, Goryeo kings were in a position to select and utilize the tri-layered authority to their interest.<sup>43</sup>

This tri-layeredness of the Goryeo authority, however, did not always work to their advantage but sometimes undermined the regal ability to overpower the Liaodong Korean groups. Why? A Goryeo king was a king of a foreign state despite his higher status in terms of bloodline and administrative position. A Goryeo king, as a ruler of a foreign state, could not conduct or demand immediate control over Liaodong governed completely and directly under the sovereignty of the Mongol empire.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> This type of political maneuver was often seen in Goryeo when a Goryeo king tried to foster private guards (親衛勢力) in the process of seizing political control of the government. As a lord of a fiefdom, he was allowed to have kheshig, royal bodyguards (King Chungryeol and King Gongmin), and directly contain Goryeo bureaucrats through his authority to recommend people for the positions in secretariat offices and the hierarchy of the secretariat system (King Chungryeol). In addition, as a king of a foreign vassal state situated outside the empire, he could use the bureaucrats of Goryeo to contain interventions from Yuan through the secretariat system.

<sup>44</sup> Goryeo kings conducted their authority within the jurisdiction of the Liaoyang secretariat, although it was very limited. For instance, King Chungryeol installed irigan (伊里干), a village of refugees, and King Chungseon was invested as the King of Shenyang. However, it is hard to claim that they could fully exercise their authority over the Liaoyang population because the irigan was small in its scale and its residents were mainly drawn from mainland Goryeo. Also, the kingship of Shenyang was an enfeoffed position, and thus Goryeo kings' influence in Liaodong through this position was limited to King Chungryeol, the only Goryeo king who gained the title.

Even in the peace agreement between Goryeo and the Mongols, what was stipulated is that the official sovereignty of a Goryeo king extended only to Goryeo. The tri-tiered authority of the Goryeo king was inalienably and inherently vested to the Goryeo kingship. That is, although a Goryeo king was ranked higher than any political leaders of Liaodong Korean power groups, it was impossible for him to extend his control in order to enfeoff or usurp their estate. In this sense, his position as a foreign king whose sovereignty was confined to the territory of Goryeo could structurally minimize an influence on the Liaodong region.

Conversely, although their estate sizes and official ranks were inferior to Goryeo kings, the Liaodong Korean groups were able to protect their power thanks to the borderland demarcating the empire from that foreign state—Goryeo—. They could contain Goryeo by creating slanders and promoting direct Mongolian branch secretariats in Goryeo through connections to central figures inside the imperial court since their fiefs were more tightly affiliated to the Mongolian empire than Goryeo. These anti-Goryeo measures were in high demand on occasions when the Goryeo-Mongol relations went unstable or the Mongols tried to strengthen their control over Goryeo.

Likewise, the way Goryeo and the Liaodong Korea groups responded to their political adventure and challenge were different from each other. The former took advantage of the dualistic nature of a fiefdom under the Mongolian empire and a foreign state. What the latter resorted to for their political achievement as well as protection was their subordinate status under the government of the Mongolian empire. This stark disparity between Goryeo kings and Liaodong Korean leaders as opposed to their political legitimacy was largely maintained without much disturbance until the late 14th century when the Ming took over Mainland China and advanced into Liaodong. Their divergent *modus vivendi* turned out to be a crucial factor in determining the fates of Goryeo and the Liaodong Korean polities.

In its early days, the Ming issued two types of diplomatic documents:

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As illustrated by these cases, the Goryeo kingship itself could not guarantee authority over the Liaoyang secretariat.

an edict that assumed a suzerain-vassal relationship and an epistle which did not. The former was sent to foreign states such as Vietnam, Japan, and Champa to form new diplomatic relations while the latter was sent to its rival groups in China, including remnant Mongolian powers such as Koko Temur and Nahachu. At first, Goryeo received an epistle like the latter groups<sup>45</sup> and replied in a diplomatic statement that demanded a diplomatic relationship as a foreign state while voluntarily pronouncing itself as a vassal state. The Ming accepted this attitude and officially granted King Gongmin the investiture of the kingship of Goryeo.<sup>46</sup> This diplomatic procedure defined the two countries to be in a tributary relationship, far from the complex one between the Ming and the remnant forces of the Mongolian regime. Goryeo's new form of diplomatic relations with the Ming indicates that the Ming accepted Goryeo's rationale of self-justification for a foreign state. What was also pronounced is that a Goryeo king was to be acknowledged for his status as a king of a foreign state and was to be treated differently from any other fief kings in the previous Mongolian empire.<sup>47</sup>

The establishment of diplomatic ties and the recognition of Goryeo's sovereignty had already been in place<sup>48</sup> before the Ming began its advancement to Liaodong encouraged by Liu Yi's (劉益) surrender. Even after the Ming annexed Liaodong and came to border with Goryeo, their tributary relationship remained unchanged. Later, during the reign of King Wu 禡王 (r. 1374-88) of Goryeo, the Ming succeeded in occupying Liaodong and

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<sup>45</sup> Jung Dong-hun (2016, 468-69) suggests that the reason for Ming sending an epistle to Goryeo stems from its knowledge of Goryeo's over a century-long close ties with Yuan.

<sup>46</sup> *Goryeosa*, Book 42, *Annals* 42, the 19th year of King Gongmin's reign, the day of tiger on the 5th month.

<sup>47</sup> This recognition of Goryeo as an independent foreign state could be interpreted as an extension of the pre-existing perception already formed in the Yuan period or as the restoration of the traditional view of Goryeo since Tang and Song. Either case would provide a rationale for Goryeo to proclaim, and for Ming to accept, that a Goryeo king was a king of a foreign state during Goryeo-Mongol relations.

<sup>48</sup> King Gongmin received the issue of his investiture in 1370, and Liu Yi surrendered to Ming in the following year.

began to pressure Goryeo which also attempted to take over Liaodong as a response to the Ming's aggressive *ostropolitik*. The two countries came to the brink of a military showdown over border disputes but their diplomatic relations, settled by King Gongmin, remained fundamentally unchanged.

Contrarily, as the Mongolian control over Mainland China was collapsing in the late 14th century, the Liaodong Korean polities could not secure their individual boundaries either territorially or conceptually. Thus, only left with identities as part of the Mongolian empire, they could only go down with the old empire.<sup>49</sup> This collateral demise was the fate of not just Liaodong Korean polities but of all other major overlords in Liaodong, such as Nahachu, Liu Yi, and Gao Jinan (高家奴) during that period. These overlords had to claim their positions of grand councilor of a branch secretariat or manager of government affairs in order to justify their control over the lands against the Ming that regarded the heritage of the Mongols rightfully as theirs.<sup>50</sup> When the Ming imperiously marched into Liaodong, all the overlords, affiliated directly and indirectly with the Mongolian empire, were considered as the anti-Ming elements. As a result, all the polities including Liaodong Korean groups ended up falling apart.

Goryeo, however, could maintain its identity as a foreign state even if the king lost the statuses of the empire's son-in-law and grand councilor of the branch secretariat. Diplomatic negotiations by King Gongmin and his successors also facilitated the ultimate acceptance of Goryeo as an autonomous foreign state by the Ming. Consequently, Goryeo could escape the fate of being absorbed into the Ming as was the case of the powerful Korean groups in Liaodong. Instead, on the grounds that it could choose its own diplomatic relations, Goryeo successfully justified its political identity as an autonomous state and formed diplomatic relations with the Ming under the tributary system.

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<sup>49</sup> Oh (2017b), 173-74.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 101-2.

## 5. Conclusion

With the conclusion of the Goryeo-Mongol War, Goryeo became subordinated to the hegemony of the Mongol Empire. After that, the relationship between Liaodong Korean power groups and the Goryeo royal house ran unpredictable. Their similarities, based on comparable ethnic manpower and adjacent territories, incurred frequent confrontations between the two sides and both of them fought for leverage over the other by having the empire on their side. On occasions when the Goryeo-Mongol relations turned unstable, the empire even meddled in these disputes and aggravated the rivalry.

The major Liaodong Korean power groups that led the confrontation against the Goryeo royal house were the Hong clan, the King of Shen faction, and the Gi clan. The Hongs rose to power through military contributions on battle fields enough to threaten the Goryeo royal family but lost their might when King Chungryeol strengthened his position by marrying the Mongol imperial family and obtaining a superior rank (grand councilor of a branch secretariat). The King of Shen, who also vied for Goryeo's throne, attempted to install direct Mongol-ruled secretariats in Goryeo and undermine the multi-layered authorities of the Goryeo kingship. His aspiration failed, however, as King Chungsuk was released from exile. The Gi clan established an even closer affinity than Goryeo kings via marriage (to a Mongolian emperor) while securing their power in both Liaodong and Goryeo, viz. the most dangerous threat to the Goryeo royal house. However, this power group also collapsed as King Gongmin eradicated the Gi faction in Goryeo by a surprise attack and then severed diplomatic relations with the Mongol empire. The Gi group tried in vain to replace King Gongmin by Prince Deokheung and to conduct military operations under Gi Sain Temur's Dongnyeong Commandery. King Gongmin successfully protected the sovereignty of the Goryeo royal house and the territory of Goryeo.

During the course of all confrontations between the Goryeo royal house and Liaodong Korean power groups, familial affinity to the imperial court at Peking played a great part due to the empire's favoritism to its

family connections. Goryeo kings, unlike Liaodong Korean leaders, were able to maintain their multi-layered political identity that allowed them, as a king of a foreign state, to secure independent boundaries from the Mongol Empire even while marrying the imperial family and holding the position of grand councilor of a branch secretariat under the imperial system. This particular status of the Goryeo royal house was a key factor integral to the survival of Goryeo, and, even later, to the establishment of new diplomatic relations with the Ming as an autonomous foreign state despite their long and close ties with the Mongols.

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# Communications between Joseon Korea and Ming China through the Liaodong Region in the Early Fifteenth Century

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# Communications between Joseon Korea and Ming China through the Liaodong Region in the Early Fifteenth Century\*

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## 1. Introduction

The Liaodong Peninsular was a diplomatically and militarily volatile region during the dynastic transition from Goryeo to Joseon. The Goryeo King Gongmin 恭愍王 (r. 1351-74) and King Taejo 太祖 (Yi Seonggye 李成桂, r. 1392-98), the founder of the Joseon dynasty, tried hard to extend their states' power and influence into the region. Ming China (1368-1644) also tried hard to seize control of the region by expelling the remnant forces of Yuan China (1271-1368) to the north and by meddling in the Korean states. Hence, the Liaodong region vividly witnessed information collecting activities of Goryeo and Joseon as well as the Ming, and received much more attention in the two countries' relations than any other regions.

The tense relations between Joseon and the Ming in the early fif-

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teenth century, even including possible military conflict of large scale, put the limitations on information collecting through official missions and individual translators as well as personal network. Consequently, both countries employed a variety of tactics to catch each other's moves regarding the Liaodong region. In the midst of reticence of official exchange of information, information collecting activities were continued because in Liaodong both countries had retained keen interests in expanding their power and influence therein.

Yi Bangweon 李芳遠 (later King Taejong 太宗, r. 1400-18) tried to bring stability to the relations with the Ming after purging of the hardliners against the Ming, such as Jeong Dojeon 鄭道傳 and Nam Eun 南閔. The Jianwen emperor 建文帝 (r. 1398-1402) of the Ming, beset with domestic troubles, also tried to stabilize the relations of the two countries. The official diplomatic exchanges and communications with the Ming increased during the reign of King Taejong especially over the issues of repatriation of prisoners of war and drifters as well as trade. As the time passed into King Sejong's reign, the Liaodong Military Command (Liaodongdusi 遼東都司, hereafter LMC) emerged as an important contact point with respect to those administrative affairs between the two states. When it comes to urgent interstate matters, both dispatched diplomatic messengers first to the LMC, from which they were transmitted to the respective court.

The importance of the Liaodong Military Command as a communication channel in the early Joseon-Ming relations has not gained much scholarly interest. Given the frequent frictions in their early years of relations, many studies have tended to focus on the conflicting nature of the Joseon-Ming relationship surrounding the Liaodong area.<sup>1</sup> In the same vein, a number of studies have explored the means of collecting and dealing with information on the potential adversaries under the fluctuating in-

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<sup>1</sup> For the conflicts between Joseon and the Ming surrounding Liaodong, see Bak Weon-hyo, *Myeongcho Joseon gwangyesa yeongu* 明初朝鮮關係史研究 [Study of the relations between the early Ming and Joseon] (Seoul: Iljogak, 2002); Kim Han-gyu, *Yodongsa* [Study of the Liaodong history] (Seoul: Munhak gwa Jiseongsa, 2004); Nam Eui-hyeon, *Myeongdae Yodong Jibaejeongchaek yeongu* [Study on the control policy over Liaodong during the Ming era] (Chuncheon: Gangweon daehakgyo chulpanbu, 2008).

terstate circumstances, in particular, Joseon's information-gathering activities against the Ming.<sup>2</sup>

The tensions and disputes between Joseon and the Ming did not preclude their official and/or informal communication and exchange because both needed information about each other. Information collecting in pre-modern times relied heavily on human resources. Then, human contact and exchange, if official or secretive, was essential. Thus, Joseon and the Ming managed to maintain human contact and exchange to obtain necessary intelligence about each other even during the tumultuous times of their relations. With this in mind, the article explores changing methods of communication and exchange through Liaodong between Joseon and the Ming in the context of shifting relationships between the two countries after the founding of Joseon in 1392. By so doing, I believe, this approach will enable us to chart the simultaneity of confrontation and communication in international relations of Northeast Asia at that time.

## 2. Joseon's Information Collecting and Communication with the Ming in Its Early Years

At its beginning years, Joseon had been embroiled in a series of diplomatic conflicts with the Ming while subscribing to a policy of *sadae* 事大 (serving of the great). In order to detect the circumstances and moves of the Ming, the Joseon court had made continuous effort to collect related intelligence. Ever suspicious of Joseon, the Ming too had paid close attention to Joseon's moves in the Liaodong and Jurchen regions. Conventionally,

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<sup>2</sup> For the information-gathering activities in early Joseon, see Lee, Kyu-chul, "Joseon chogi daeoe jeongbo sujip hwaldong eui silsang gwa byeonhwa" [Realities and changes of the foreign information-gathering activities in early Joseon], *Yeoksa wa hyeonsil* 65 (2007); Lee, Kyu-chul, "Joseon chogi daeoe jeongbo eui sujip hwaldong gwa bogo gyengno" [Foreign information-gathering activities and its reporting channels], *Gunsa* 65 (2007); Kim Gyeongnok, "Joseon sidae daejungguk oegyo munseo wa oegyo jeongbo eui sujip-bojon chegye" [Diplomatic documents sent to China in the Joseon era, and the system for collecting and preserving foreign information], *Dongbuka yeoksa nonchong* 25 (2009); Gu Doyeong "16 segi Joseon dae Myeong sahaengdan eui jeongbo sujip gwa jeongboryeok" [Information-collecting capabilities of the Joseon envoys to the Ming in the sixteenth century], *Daedong munhwa yeongu* 95 (2016).

communications between the two states, except the official diplomatic missions, had been restricted but they had used a variety of intelligence-gathering resources to know each other.

The Liaodong region had become a venue of serious information-gathering activities by both the Ming court and the Joseon court, the second of which had inherited the late Goryeo's strategy towards the region. Since a great number of Goryeo people still resided in the region even after its demise, the Joseon court tried to expand its influence on them. On the other hand, ever since its inauguration the Ming had made an aggressive inroad into the region on the grounds that the Yuan forces still remained a real military threat on its northern frontier including Liaodong. Simultaneously, the Ming had much concern for the Joseon's interest in the region and worried about a possible military expedition by Joseon. As a matter of fact, the Joseon court considered sending an army into Liaodong to protect its interests there in good part because it viewed Liaodong as the most immediately accessible borderland to monitor the Ming's activities.

In the fourth year of the Hongwu reign (1371), when Liu Yi 劉益, a local warlord in Liaoyang Province yielded to the Ming authorities. The Ming court established the Office of Commissioner of Liaodong Guard (Liaodongwei zhihuishi si 遼東衛指揮使司), appointing him to its commissioner in charge<sup>3</sup> and making clear its strategy for extending power into the region.<sup>4</sup> In the meantime, in the fifth month of the same year a band of local generals like Hong Baobao, Ma Yanhui, and Badan rose in rebellion, and killed Liu Yi.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, Naghachu 納哈出 (d. 1388), a powerful Mongol warlord, also began a military move.<sup>6</sup> Then, the Hongwu emperor

<sup>3</sup> *Ming Taizu shilu* [Veritable records of Ming Taizu] 61: 04/02/28 (壬午). All references henceforth from the *shilu* 實錄 (*sillok* in Korean) specify the book (*juan* 卷; *gweon* in Korean), followed by the date of the entry in reign year, month, day sequence. For example, "Ming Taizu shilu 61: 04/02/28" refers to *Ming Taizu shilu* book sixty one, year four of Ming Taizu's reign, twenty eighth day of the second lunar month.

<sup>4</sup> Yang Yang, *Mingdai Liaodong dushi* [The Liaodong Military Command in the Ming era] (Zhengzhou: Zhongzhou guji chubanshe, 1988), 8.

<sup>5</sup> *Ming Taizu shilu* 65: 04/05/15 (丙寅).

<sup>6</sup> *Ming Taizu shilu* 66: 04/06/29 (庚戌).

洪武帝 (r. 1368-98) ordered that the Office of Commissioner-in-Charge of Stabilizing Liaodong Guard (Ding Liao duwei zhihuishi si 定遼都衛指揮使司) be established to command a network of local guards (*wei* 衛) across the Liaodong region.<sup>7</sup> Afterwards, in the tenth month of 1375, the office was renamed as the Office of Commissioner-in-Chief of Liaodong (Liaodong du zhihuishi si 遼東都指揮使司),<sup>8</sup> commonly called by its shortened name, the Liaodong Military Command (Liaodong dushi 遼東都司).

The Liaodong Military Command was bound to enter into military confrontation with the neighboring forces like the Mongols as well as Goryeo people. King Gongmin of Goryeo had already attempted several military excursions and his successor King Wu 禡王 (r. 1374-88) was ready to launch an expedition against Liaodong. In particular, much of the Liaodong region still reverberated the strong influence of the Mongols so the role of LMC was crucial in securing the Ming control over the region.

As it happened, the LMC could not increase its influence over the area by solely resorting to military means against its neighbors. Though the LMC was willing to get engaged in the military conflicts with Goryeo and Joseon, it also carried out non-military affairs like trade and administrative measures with them. For example, the Hongwu Emperor put the LMC in charge of conducting the affairs related to the trade of cows with Joseon.<sup>9</sup> The Ming's large-scale trade initiatives were conducted through the LMC.<sup>10</sup> Those early incidents anticipated the subsequent central role to be played by the LMC in conducting communications and exchange between Goryeo / Joseon and the Ming.

Goryeo had come into a number of diplomatic conflicts with the Ming to the point of having a military clash. Nonetheless, the relationship between the two states, though unstable, had been maintained through this communication channel in Liaodong. The conflict between Goryeo and the

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<sup>7</sup> *Ming Taizu shilu* 67: 04/07/01 (辛亥).

<sup>8</sup> *Ming Taizu shilu* 101: 08/10/27 (癸丑).

<sup>9</sup> *Ming Taizu shilu* 185: 20/09/20 (丁酉).

<sup>10</sup> *Ming Taizong shilu* [Veritable records of Ming Taizong] 32: 02/06/22 (t辛卯); *Ming Xuanzong shilu* [Veritable records of Ming Xuanzong] 28: 02/05/09 (丙申).

Ming had been intensified in that both states had wanted to extend power and influence over Liaodong, yet they had managed to keep a diplomatic relationship by exchanging official envoys and correspondences.<sup>11</sup> This pattern of the relations between Goryeo and the Ming had been carried into Joseon.

Joseon's first recorded communication with the LMC was to offer tribute horses. In the eighth month of 1392, the Joseon court ordered Director of the Office of Treating Guests Jeong Jawi 丁子偉 to send 1,000 tribute horses to Liaodong.<sup>12</sup> Again, in the eleventh month of the same year, the Joseon court ordered Director of the Provision Office Yi Eulsu 李乙修 to deliver 1,000 horses to Liaodong.<sup>13</sup> These events of horse trade show that the LMC was in a position to serve as a trade post when Liaodong had become the center for horse trade between Joseon and the Ming. As in the case of Goryeo, Joseon also utilized the horse-trade routes that had been opened between Goryeo and the Ming.<sup>14</sup>

When sending its envoys to the Ming, the Joseon court stressed that it had been owing to King Taejo's decision that the previous Goryeo armies had been averted from entering into Liaodong.<sup>15</sup> Through such a gesture, the Joseon court wanted to show that, different from Goryeo, it had neither

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<sup>11</sup> Jeong Dong-hun, "Goryeo sidae oegyo munseo yeon'gu" [Study on the diplomatic documents in the Goryeo era], Ph. D. dissertation, Seoul National University (2016), 537.

<sup>12</sup> *Taejo sillok* [Veritable records of King Taejo] 01: 01/08/27 (丙子). For the horse trade between the Ming and Goryeo and Joseon, see Kim Sunja, "Yeomal Seoncho Myeong gwaui ma muyeok" [Horse trade between the Ming and late Goryeo and early Joseon], In *Hanguk jungse Han Jung gwangyesa* [History of Korea-China relations in medieval Korea] (Seoul: Hyeon, 2007).

<sup>13</sup> *Taejo sillok* 03: 01/11/09 (丙戌).

<sup>14</sup> During King Gongmin's period, the Ming had attempted to attain horses from Jeju Island; in the next King U 禔王 (r. 1374-88)'s time, the Ming continued to demand tribute horses from Goryeo. King U and King Gongyang 恭讓王 (r. 1389-92) had tribute horses of 8,000 and 10,000 respectively delivered to Liaodong. When delivering a large herd of 10,000 horses, even divided into smaller groups of 1,000 horses, Goryeo must have faced a host of problems, such as travel routes and horse feed, which in turn necessitated further contacts with the Ming officials for the safe delivery of horses.

<sup>15</sup> *Taejo sillok* 01: 01/08/29 (戊寅): "遣前密直使 趙琳 赴京進表曰 權知高麗國事臣某言 伏惟小邦 自恭愍王無嗣 薨逝之後 辛毗子禍 冒姓竊位者 十有五年矣 迨至戊辰春 妄興師旅 將犯遼東 以臣爲都統使 率兵至鴨綠江 臣竊自念 小邦不可以犯上國之境 論諸將以大義 卽與還師 禍乃自知其罪 遜位子昌."

intention to confront the Ming nor military interest in Liaodong. Still, the founding leaders of Joseon did emphasize the revocation of the attack on Liaodong as an important rationale for King Taejo's accession to the throne.<sup>16</sup> They tried to make use of an attack on Liaodong as a leverage in handing the complex relationship with the Ming.

Another issue that brought Joseon and the Ming into contact in Liaodong was that of repatriation of war captives. In 1393, a Chinese person whom Jo On 趙溫, a Joseon field commander in the northwest region captured during his attack on Japanese pirates (*wakō* 倭寇) was repatriated to Liaodong.<sup>17</sup> From its beginning, Joseon made it a rule to repatriate Chinese prisoners of war, drifters, and transgressors back to the Ming via the LMC. However, despite its apparent stress on the official principle of noninvolvement in Liaodong, the Joseon court had an active interest in the region which was the indispensable passing route to its diplomatic missions to the Ming. For that reason, meeting local figures in the region was inevitable. Such contacts, done under the tense relations between the two countries, might trigger any diplomatic dispute by reason of the suspicious eyes of the Ming court.

In 1393, the Ming court questioned the Joseon's activities in Liaodong by dispatching the two envoys Huang Yǒngqī 黃永奇 and Cui Yuan 崔淵. The imperial edict pointed out the Joseon's activities in Liaodong as follows.

[The Joseon court] sent men to Liaodong and offered silk and gold and silver, pretending to conduct etiquette. Yet, the intent lied in luring our border generals. This was the second case of committing an act of offense.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> *Taejo sillok* 01: 01/07/17 (丙申); *Taejo sillok* 01: 01/07/18 (丁酉).

<sup>17</sup> *Taejo sillok* 03: 02/03/29 (甲戌): “西北面都巡問使趙溫擊倭寇于隨州獲寧海州人李唐信以獻命衣糧遣前判典儀寺事金乙祥管送遼東.”

<sup>18</sup> *Taejo sillok* 03: 02/05/23 (丁卯): “欽差內史黃永奇崔淵等奉帝手詔來上率百官迎于宣義門外前導至壽昌宮聽詔行禮詔曰... 一遣人至遼將布帛金銀之類假以行禮爲由意在誘我邊將此生譽二也.”

The edict expressed the suspicion with which the Ming court saw the Joseon court's offering of silk, gold, and silver to the Liaodong generals in the name of conducting etiquette. It is highly likely that the Ming court suspected the Joseon court of distributing a form of bribes to the generals, who might supply needed information in return. The Joseon court sent a memorial (*pyomun* 表文) to contend that offering gifts was an honest act of expressing courtesy and there was no ulterior purpose of winning over the generals.

In addition, the memorial promised to track down the fugitives from Liaodong to Joseon and to repatriate them back to Liaodong.<sup>19</sup> While admitting that the residents of Liaodong fled to Joseon, the Joseon court also vindicated that a great number of them had been the erstwhile Goryeo immigrants to Liaodong who had longed to return to their native land to rejoin their families. But, the Ming court believed that Joseon took interest in resettling Liaodong residents into its territory and approached the local officials at the LMC. Judging by the Ming responses to the incident, it seems to me that information gathering and spying on Liaodong by way of making a close tie with the Ming authorities in that region could be an important role of the Joseon diplomats during their mission.

Nonetheless, the tense relations between Joseon and the Ming did not necessarily exclude official communications that the two states wanted to maintain. In the sixth month of 1393, the LMC sent a battalion commander (*qianhu* 千戶) Gaokuokuochu 高闊闕出 to deliver to the Joseon court an official message (*ziwen* 咨文) of the Board of Rites (Libu 禮部) about payment for the price of horses Joseon had sent.<sup>20</sup> As it happened, official messages between the Ming court and the Joseon court were not always directly sent to each other but instead to the LMC first so that it could deliver

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<sup>19</sup> *Taejo sillok* 03: 02/06/01 (乙亥).

<sup>20</sup> *Taejo sillok* 03: 02/06/06 (庚辰): “遼東都指揮使司差千戶高闊闕出齎禮部咨來其咨曰洪武二十年二月二十八日禮部署部事儀部主事蓋霖等官將遼東都司實收過高麗節次解到馬數於奉天門奉聖旨爾禮部照依馬數將紵絲絛布差官運去給還他價欵此除欵遵外今將該給馬價段匹絛布差揮同知王鼎等管運前去計實收過馬九千八百八十四匹給紵絲絛布各一匹共運去各色紵絲絛布萬九千七百六十四匹紵絲九千八百八十四匹絛布九千八百八十四匹.”

them to each side. As such, the LMC mediated the two courts in times of their tense relations as in the case of King Taejo's era.

This pattern of intermediary communication via the LMC could be a substitute channel between the two governments when a rupture of direct communication between them happened. For example, because of the Hongwu Emperor's decree banning Joseon envoys from entering into the Ming territory, the congratulatory and gratitude missions sent by the Joseon court were stopped at Liaodong in 1393.<sup>21</sup> In order to submit the memorials to the Ming court, Joseon had no choice but to rely on the help of the LMC.<sup>22</sup> Still, the Joseon court did not remain helpless. A royal secretary Jo Eon 曹彦 was ordered to lead and return back those fugitives from Liaodong.<sup>23</sup> At that time, the Joseon court managed to send a message clarifying its position. Remarkably, like the messages from the Ming court to the Joseon court, the message from the Joseon court to the Ming Board of Rites was sent via the LMC. Again, the LMC served as a substitute channel of communication between the two countries.

Nevertheless, the role of the LMC as an agency for information exchange and gathering was limited according to the unsettling nature that the initial relations between Joseon and the Ming had displayed. Without officially established routes for obtaining information, the two countries sought for alternative means like espionage to know more about each other's moves especially in times of the heightened diplomatic conflicts. In the first month of 1394, the Ming court sent an official message of the Office of Left Military Governor (Zuojun dudufu 左軍都督府) carried by the imperial envoys Lu Tanai 盧他乃, Piao Delong 朴德龍, and Zheng Cheng 鄭澄. The official message included an interrogation report of Choe Dok'I 崔禿伊, whom the Ming authorities suspected as a spy dispatched by Joseon. In the report, Choe and others were quoted as confessing that they had engaged in collecting intelligence around the Ninghai Guard 寧海衛 in

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<sup>21</sup> *Taejo sillok* 04: 02/07/28 (辛未); *Taejo sillok* 04: 02/08/02 (乙亥).

<sup>22</sup> *Taejo sillok* 04: 02/08/02 (乙亥).

<sup>23</sup> *Taejo sillok* 04: 02/08/29 (壬寅).

Shandong and that they had spread a rumor of Joseon's impending attack against Liaodong.<sup>24</sup>

Regarding the question raised by the Ming, the Joseon court did not put forward any serious response, unlike other diplomatic issues with the Ming. It appears that the Joseon court actually dispatched the Choe squad for espionage activities, as officially claimed by the Ming envoys, and hence had little counterevidence to refute the Ming claim. Afterwards, the Ming further charged the Joseon court with the espionage activities by Jang Galmae 張葛買<sup>25</sup> and Ho Deok 胡德.<sup>26</sup> Though Choe, Jang, and Ho acted under different circumstances, according to the Ming authorities, all were considered part of Joseon's spying activity on the Ming.<sup>27</sup> In the end, the Joseon court dispatched Yi Bangweon (later King Taejong) in response to the Ming demand for sending a prince and presented a memorial clarifying the diplomatic questions raised by the Ming.<sup>28</sup> Subsequently, the Ming relented and began to accept Joseon envoys coming through Liaodong.<sup>29</sup> Joseon sent again tribute horses to Liaodong<sup>30</sup> and repatriated Chinese residents and soldiers who fled from Liaodong.<sup>31</sup> Thus, the communications and exchanges through the LMC were restored.

At the same time, Joseon also saw the moves of the Ming in Liaodong with suspicion. The Joseon court decided to execute the Buddhist monk Juewu 覺悟 from Liaodong on the basis of his confession that he had been dispatched by the Ming authorities to spy on circumstances of Jo-

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<sup>24</sup> *Taejo sillok* 05: 03/01/12 (壬子).

<sup>25</sup> *Taejo sillok* 05: 03/02/19 (己丑).

<sup>26</sup> *Taejo sillok* 05: 03/04/04 (癸酉).

<sup>27</sup> For an analysis on those three incidents, see Lee, Kyu-chul, "Joseon chogi daeoe jeongbo sujip hwaldong eui silsang gwa byeonhwa" [Realities and changes of the foreign information-gathering activities in early Joseon], *Yeoksa wa hyeonsil* 65 (2007), 296-98.

<sup>28</sup> *Taejo sillok* 06: 03/06/07 (乙亥).

<sup>29</sup> *Taejo sillok* 06: 03/08/08 (乙亥).

<sup>30</sup> *Taejo sillok* 06: 03/08/21 (戊子); *Taejo sillok* 06: 03/09/05 (壬寅).

<sup>31</sup> *Taejo sillok* 07: 04/01/19 (甲寅); *Taejo sillok* 07: 04/02/22 (丙戌).

seon.<sup>32</sup> In the sixth month of 1398, a certain Ming prisoner of war Jin Song 金松, presumably a Joseon escapee from the Ming, fled to Joseon and revealed the invaluable information regarding Prince of Yan's (Yanwang 燕王: later Yongle Emperor) defeat of the Mongol armies in Liaodong. The Joseon court decided not to send Kim back to the Ming authorities and made him resettle in Korea.<sup>33</sup> The Joseon court was fairly selective in repatriating defectors from Liaodong because many of them could supply fresh information invaluable within the context of its precarious relationship with the Ming.

### 3. Improvement of the Relations and Communications between Joseon and the Ming

During the reign of King Jeongjong 定宗 (r. 1398-1400) and the early years of King Taejong 太宗 (r. 1400-18), the diplomatic communication between Joseon and the Ming had been hardly improved. At the time, the best source of information for Joseon was the soldiers from Liaodong who defected to Joseon in fear of military service during the rebellion led by Prince of Yan. In the third month of 1399, one soldier of Goryeo descent, affiliated with the Ming Dongning Guard 東寧衛, fled to Joseon and reported important information about Prince of Yan. According to him, the prince visited Nanjing to attend a memorial service of the late Hongwu emperor, declined the order of the Jianwen emperor to enter the city by himself, and returned to his principedom at Beijing to rally armies against the emperor.<sup>34</sup> One concern raised by the uprising by Prince of Yan was a possibility of the Ming Dingliao Guard's surrender to Joseon. Discussing this matter with Jeon Backyeong 全伯英, a director of the Office of Loyal Lectures (Gyeongyeon 經筵), Jeongjong worried about Joseon being embroiled with the Ming internal conflict in such case. Another director Gweon Geun 權近

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<sup>32</sup> *Taejo sillok* 07: 04/05/18 (庚戌).

<sup>33</sup> *Taejo sillok* 14: 07/06/10 (甲寅).

<sup>34</sup> *Jeongjong sillok* [Veritable records of King Jeongjong] 01: 01/03/01 (壬申).

(1352-1409) also agreed with him.<sup>35</sup> Such being the case, the Joseon court accepted the defectors from the Dingliao Guard and kept collecting information about the civil strife between the Jianwen emperor and Prince of Yan.<sup>36</sup>

The civil strife in the Ming brought about a turning point in expanding its communication with Joseon. Due to the complex domestic turmoil, the Jianwen emperor did not afford to make confrontation with foreign countries like Joseon; rather, he sought for aid from Joseon. Hence, he granted the imperial mandate (*gaoming* 誥命) and official seal (*vinxin* 印信) declined by the Hongwu emperor to normalize the relations between the two countries.<sup>37</sup> A Ming request for 10,000 horses in the summer of 1401 was accepted by Joseon,<sup>38</sup> making it possible to conduct large-scale trade in the Liaodong region between them. Joseon's horses and Ming's payment for them were all transacted in Liaodong.

At the time, the Ming envoys, dispatched to Joseon to handle the horse trade affairs such as transportation and payment, were Zhu Mengxian 祝孟獻, Vice Minister of the Court of Imperial Stud (Taipusi 太僕侍), and Lu Yong 陸顥, a secretary from the Board of Rites (Libu 禮部).<sup>39</sup> Following the envoys' arrival, the Ming court sent the two figures, Song Hao 宋鏞 and Xiang An 相安 from the Directorate of Education (Guozijian 國子監) to talk about the price for horses. The price for horses was paid in 90,000 bolts of silk and cotton cloth, including medicinal materials, all of which were shipped in 150 wagons drawn by 300 horses and oxen.<sup>40</sup> Even if trade with the Ming had been conducted sporadically through Liaodong since

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<sup>35</sup> *Jeongjong sillok* 04: 02/05/17 (辛巳).

<sup>36</sup> *Jeongjong sillok* 05: 02/09/19 (庚辰).

<sup>37</sup> *Taejong sillok* [Veritable records of King Taejong] 01: 01/03/06 (乙丑).

<sup>38</sup> *Taejong sillok* 02: 01/09/01 (丁亥).

<sup>39</sup> *Taejong sillok* 02: 01/09/01 (丁亥).

<sup>40</sup> *Taejong sillok* 02: 01/09/15 (辛丑). When Zhu Mengxian came to know that the Joseon court wanted more of the horse price, he promised to report the matter to the Ming court as soon as he would arrive at the LMC (*Taejong sillok* 02: 01/12/14 (戊辰)). Thus, in the early years of King Taejong, the Ming set a precedent to make official use of the LMC as an intermediate point of communication between the two countries after a period of rupture in their relations.

the declining years of Goryeo, such a large-scale horse trade, done in response to the Ming request after its internal warfare, opened a path to a better relationship between Joseon and the Ming. Thus, after a period of tension the Liaodong region became important in terms of international trade and diplomatic communication between the two states.

Another central issue between Joseon and the Ming was the problem of runaway soldiers and refugees who fled from Liaodong to Joseon. From the start of Taejong's rule, an increasing number of Liaodong soldiers and residents of Goryeo descent flowed into Joseon to avoid starvation, military service, and the turbulent condition caused by the military struggle between the Jianwen Emperor and Prince of Yan.<sup>41</sup>

As for the ethnic Goryeo refugees from Liaodong, Joseon took a conciliatory measure by resettling them in the southern provinces. In 1402, Jeong Hon 鄭渾, a commissioner for the northwest region, proposed that Goryeo people who had fled to Liaoyang and returned be relocated to the southern three provinces (*hasamdo* 下三道) for military service because, when allowed to stay around the Amnok (Ch. Yalu) River, they were likely to return to Liaoyang. Taejong accepted his proposal and ordered them to resettle in those provinces.<sup>42</sup> In fact, since 1399 the refugees from Liaodong had been given food and resettled in the southern provinces.<sup>43</sup>

Joseon was eager to accommodate the refugees from Liaoyang and resettle them within its territories not only because they had been originally its subjects, but also because they were an important source of information related to the ongoing internal conflicts between the Jianwen Emperor and the Prince of Yan. In 1402, a Liaodong soldier Zhu Jing 朱景 and others fled to Euiju 義州 and reported that the Jianwen Emperor's armies entered

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<sup>41</sup> For the problems of refugees from Liaodong (*mansangun* 漫散軍) in the early years of Joseon, see Bak Weonho, *Myeongcho Joseon gwangyesa yeon'gu* [Study on the relations between the early Ming and Joseon] (Seoul: Ilchogak, 2002), 145-50.

<sup>42</sup> *Taejong sillok* 03: 02/02/04 (丁巳).

<sup>43</sup> *Taejong sillok* 03: 02/03/14 (丁酉): “分置遼東逃來人等於江原道及東北面初遼東人男女九十名逃來義州又民一百五十戶乘桴越江到泥城云燕軍大興衛領軍楊大人棄城降于燕故畏而逃來上令議政府分置之給糧又移西北面各州安置己卯年以後向國逃來人於下三道各州給糧。”

the area while attacking the armies of Prince of Yan. Thereupon, Taejong dispatched Yu Gwisan 庾龜山, Director of the Office of Royal Provisions (Naejasi 內資寺), to Euiju to explore the state of affairs surrounding the Ming.<sup>44</sup> Shortly thereafter, some groups of Goryeo refugees from Liaodong fled to Euiju and Yiseong and reported that the armies of Prince Yan were overwhelmingly victorious.<sup>45</sup>

The intensified conflicts within the Ming made it hard for Joseon to send official envoys or to exchange letters with the LMC. The most needed information about the latest developments within the Ming could not be obtained through the official channels of communication. As a result, the recent information supplied by the soldiers and residents from Liaoyang was highly valued by the Joseon court. Now that the border city of Euiju was closest to the Ming in obtaining any valuable information about it, the news from the mouth of those fleeing from Liaodong could be substantially updated to grasp recent developments.

Before long, a Ming general from Liaodong leading 5,000 soldiers arrived at the border of Joseon and requested for permission to cross the river to capture the runaway soldiers. Upon receiving the report, Taejong initially suspected that the militarized refugees, whom he had already accepted, originally came from Goryeo. Yet, as the Ming general enumerated such names as Yi Hwasang, Kim Jadamni, Impalsilni,<sup>46</sup> Yi Jeoni and others, the Joseon court informed the Ming general that no man in the list had been found in Joseon and promised their return whenever capturing them.<sup>47</sup>

Just two days after the Joseon court's reply to the Ming general, Ham Yeongeon 咸英彦, a Joseon battalion commander at Euiju had an audience with Taejong, reporting that a battalion command of the Dongning Guard (Dongningwei 東寧衛) Impallsilli 林八刺失里 with 3,000 households re-

<sup>44</sup> *Taejong sillok* 03: 02/03/13 (丙申).

<sup>45</sup> *Taejong sillok* 03: 02/03/14 (丁酉).

<sup>46</sup> Impalsilni 林八失你, a Jurchen chief, may well be identical with Impallsilli 林八刺失里 in the *Veritable Records of the Joseon Dynasty* (*Joseon wangjo sillok* 朝鮮王朝實錄). By and large, it was common that names of many Jurchens were written differently in Chinese characters.

<sup>47</sup> *Taejong sillok* 03: 02/04/03 (乙卯).

volted against the Ming and pronounced his intention to submit to Joseon.<sup>48</sup> It is possible that the Taejong feigned his ignorance about Impallalsilli's rebellion against the Ming when he replied to the Ming general because he might already have had the report of the rebellion even before meeting with Ham Yeongon. Being aware of it or not, Taejong did not let the Ming general know about the presence of Impallalsilli. Afterwards, Taejong accepted Impallalsilli's submission to the Joseon court.

While allowing for the protection of the refugee armies (*mansangun* 漫散軍) led by Impallalsilli, Taejong chose to provide the Ming with the information about another refugee armies. He did inform the Ming envoy Zhu Mengxian that the refugee armies had raided against the border area of Joseon. The king, however, instructed the Joseon translator Choe Un 崔雲, sent to the Ming authorities, to report the information about the refugee armies as follows.

When you make it to the Dingliao Guard (Dingliaowei 定遼衛), just say that the refugee armies encamped themselves around the Poju area but their next movement is unknown. If the people of Liaodong (i.e., the Ming authorities) would want to raise armies and attack them, tell them that the mountains and rivers in the Poju area sits perilous without allowing the large armies to access it.<sup>49</sup>

Although informing the Ming authorities of current whereabouts of the refugee armies, the king ordered Choe to assure the Ming authorities in Liaodong that they are mobile beyond the grasp of the Ming armies due to rugged landscape. Reading between the lines, it seems that Taejong had no mind to provide accurate information about the refugee armies.

What is more, knowing that Impallalsilli had revolted against the

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<sup>48</sup> *Taejong sillok* 03: 02/04/05 (丁巳): “義州千戶咸英彥入見李彬使英彥詣闕且啓英彥自遼東還言路見本國人劉仁伯言東寧衛千戶林八刺失里率三千餘戶而叛河指揮姚千戶等率一千五百餘兵追逐盡爲八刺失里所殺衆首路岐又多殺瀋陽開原兩衛軍馬渡鋪州江口欲附朝鮮若不計入願爲農事於此地以居.”

<sup>49</sup> *Taejong sillok* 03: 02/04/16 (戊辰): “汝去定遼衛但言漫散軍來屯鋪州等處不知其指向遼東人若欲領兵討之汝言鋪州等處山水深險大軍不可往也.”

Ming authorities and the Ming armies had chased him, the king decided to accept his group. The king would provide Impallalsilli and his refugee armies with protection as opposed to the Ming armies. The Joseon court was being thrown into a debate with respect to whether to return Impallalsilli and his refugee armies to the Ming authorities or not.<sup>50</sup> Eventually, the claim to accept them as the country's own subjects prevailed and they were regrouped and resettled in the southern provinces.<sup>51</sup> The decision seems to be influenced in good part by the unstable internal conditions of the Ming. The way Impallalsilli was treated by the Joseon court points to the state of tension between Joseon and the Ming in the military matters surrounding Liaodong.

However, when the hitherto uncertain conditions were settled with the victory of Prince of Yan (later the Yongle Emperor), the attitude of Joseon changed drastically. In the ninth month of 1402, the translator Gang Bang'u 康邦祐 reported that on the thirteenth day of the sixth month Prince of Yan had triumphed, followed by the suicide of the Jianwen emperor, and ascended the imperial throne on the seventeenth day of the same month. Gang also reported that Yu Shiji 俞士吉, a censor of the Censorate (Duchayuan 都察院) and Wang Tai 汪泰, a vice minister of the Court of State Ceremonial (Honglusi 鴻臚寺) had left for Joseon with an ascension decree of the Yongle Emperor.<sup>52</sup> Joseon most likely obtained this news through the LMC which renewed its bridging role between the Joseon and the Ming court in their communication.

In the twelfth month of the same year, the Joseon court sent out an order across the country that runaway soldiers from Liaodong be tracked down in order to be deported. That was a preemptive measure prior to the new Ming court under the Yongle Emperor.<sup>53</sup> Shortly thereafter, the Joseon court ordered the minister of the Ministry of Punishment (Hyeongjo 刑曹)

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<sup>50</sup> *Taejong sillok* 03: 02/05/08 (庚寅).

<sup>51</sup> *Taejong sillok* 04: 02/09/17 (丁酉).

<sup>52</sup> *Taejong sillok* 04: 02/09/28 (戊申).

<sup>53</sup> *Taejong sillok* 04: 02/12/13 (壬戌).

Jin Euigwi 陳義貴 to arrest Impallalsilli and send him back to Liaodong.<sup>54</sup> In the third month of the next year, the court ordered the assistant minister of the State Council (Uijeongbu 議政府) Hwang Geojeong 黃居正 to compose a memorial (*jubon* 奏本) to let the Ming court know about the deportation of the refugee soldiers.<sup>55</sup> After the ascension of the Yongle emperor, the Joseon court did not disturb the Ming request for sending back runaway soldiers to Liaodong any longer and became transparent in reporting accurate information about them to the Ming. Sending back Impallalsilli and other refugees, the Joseon court set a defining precedent for handling the future cases of Liaodong soldiers and residents who would flee to Joseon. Obviously, after the Yongle Emperor came to power Joseon did not take any more strategic interest in Liaodong as a land for its advancement.

As seen above, the issue of defectors prompted communications between the LMC and the Joseon court. In particular, because of the increasing number of runaway soldiers and residents from Liaodong to Joseon in the aftermath of the internal conflicts within the Ming, the LMC made frequent contacts with the Joseon court in view of their repatriation. Joseon became convinced that the Yongle Emperor had a determined will to bring them back to the Ming and began to comply to the Ming's demand. The list of returnees included not only Liaodong soldiers and residents but also ethnic Chinese who had fled to Joseon or who had been captured by the Japanese pirates; all of them were to be shipped back to Liaodong.

By the sixth and seventh years of Taejong (1406 and 1407), the relations between Joseon and the Ming were stabilized with increased contacts and exchanges. To begin with, the administrative matters, centering on tribute trade and repatriation of prisoners of war, triggered more communications between Joseon and the LMC. In particular, the audience of the Joseon prince with the Ming emperor contributed much to the improvement of relations.<sup>56</sup> Since Liaodong was the inevitable passage of the Joseon

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<sup>54</sup> *Taejong sillok* 04: 02/12/23 (壬申).

<sup>55</sup> *Taejong sillok* 05: 03/03/22 (己亥).

<sup>56</sup> *Taejong sillok* 13: 07/06/21 (癸卯); *Taejong sillok* 14: 07/09/07 (丁巳).

prince on his way to the Ming court, the two courts used the LMC as the communication channel in implementing varied necessary diplomatic and administrative measures.

As a matter of fact, to the Joseon court the LMC was the biggest source of information about recent changes and developments surrounding the interstate relations including those between the Ming and the Mongols. In 1409 the translator Jeon Eui 全義 returning from Liaodong reported that the Ming court had dispatched Haishou 海壽 to Joseon to crosscheck the intelligence that Joseon would raise armies to help the Tartars 韃靼.<sup>57</sup> In the next year, the translator Yi Jayeong 李子瑛 from Liaodong also reported that the Tartar armies had defeated Ming armies at the Kaiyuan and Jinshan areas but retreated after a failed raid against a northern gate of the LMC.<sup>58</sup> The translator Yi Yong 李龍 also reported that a Liaodong army of 10,000 strong, while moving to Beijing, had suffered a decimating defeat at a battle with the Tartars.<sup>59</sup> The translator Bak Mu 朴茂 also reported that the Tartar attacks had subsided and Liaodong people went back to their normal defense and life.<sup>60</sup>

Significantly, all these Korean translators collected important information about the Ming defenses and the military interactions with its neighbors in the Liaodong region by making use of both official and informal sources of information from the LMC. Thus, the LMC emerged as Joseon's most important site for information collecting activities.<sup>61</sup> Along this line, the Joseon court accelerated its personnel's information collecting activities in the LMC in order to know more about the Yongle Emperor's recent moves including his northern expedition, the military confrontations,

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<sup>57</sup> *Taejong sillok* 18: 09/11/18 (丙戌).

<sup>58</sup> *Taejong sillok* 19: 10/01/14 (辛巳).

<sup>59</sup> *Taejong sillok* 19: 10/01/16 (癸未).

<sup>60</sup> *Taejong sillok* 19: 10/02/06 (癸卯).

<sup>61</sup> Besides their official tasks, Joseon officials dispatched to the LMC were required to collect information about recent moves and developments concerning the Ming and other forces. For example, in 1410 (the tenth year of Taejong), the Joseon court ordered Jo Sadeok 曹士德, who escorted a Chinese captive from Japan to Liaodong, to gather information related to the Ming (*Taejong sillok* 19: 10/01/17 (甲申)).

and the Ming internal administration.<sup>62</sup> Besides, the court came to know via the Liaodong sources that the Japanese pirates had looted the Lushun area.<sup>63</sup>

Following Taejong, King Sejong 世宗 (r. 1418-50) also continued the information collecting activities through the LMC and understood such crucial developments as the movements of the Tartars against the Ming,<sup>64</sup> the response of the emperor to them,<sup>65</sup> and the results of military confrontations.<sup>66</sup> Remarkably, the Sejong era witnessed Joseon supplying military information on the Japanese pirates to the Ming via the LMC. In 1419, upon the ascension of Sejong, Joseon sent a punitive expedition against Tsushima Island, a stronghold of the Japanese pirates. Prior to the expedition, the Joseon court had provided the Ming with the recent movements of the Japanese. The original source of the information came from a certain Kim Deukgwan 金得觀, once a Chinese prisoner of war in Japan, who had fled to Joseon with the information about the Japanese impending raid to the Ming coast.<sup>67</sup> The Joseon court had debated over the methods of how to convey Kim's information to the Ming and decided to send him in person for reporting.<sup>68</sup>

In addition, the Joseon court repatriated 130 Chinese prisoners of war to Liaodong, who had been saved during the course of the expedition campaign as above.<sup>69</sup> Even though an official report of the expedition to the Ming has not been found, it is highly likely that during the repatriation procedure, some details of the expedition could have been reported to the LMC to explain how the 130 Chinese captives had been rescued by the Joseon armies, another example of the way important military information

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<sup>62</sup> *Taejong sillok* 28: 14/09/19 (己丑).

<sup>63</sup> *Taejong sillok* 30: 15/07/23 (戊午).

<sup>64</sup> *Sejong sillok* [Veritable records of King Sejong] 14: 03/12/12 (辛丑).

<sup>65</sup> *Sejong sillok* 16: 04/04/17 (癸卯).

<sup>66</sup> *Sejong sillok* 18: 04/11/07 (庚申).

<sup>67</sup> *Sejong sillok* 03: 01/01/13 (戊午).

<sup>68</sup> *Sejong sillok* 03: 01/01/15 (庚申).

<sup>69</sup> *Sejong sillok* 04: 01/07/21 (甲子).

was exchanged through the LMC between Joseon and the Ming.

Following the previous precedent of sending the crown prince Yangnyeong 讓寧大君 (1394-1462) during the era of Taejong, Sejong also planned to send his crown prince to Beijing to have audience with the emperor. Yet, the Xuande Emperor 宣德帝 (r. 1425-35) dispatched the imperial envoy Ruan Chi 阮赤 to the LMC to stop the visit of the Joseon crown prince to Beijing.<sup>70</sup> The magistrate of border town Euiju (Euiju moksa 義州牧使) Namgung Gye 南宮啓 reported the words of Ruan Chi.

Yun Bong 尹鳳 had returned to Beijing and reported that the crown prince of Joseon had departed for the Ming court on the twenty fifth day of the ninth month for audience. The emperor ordered that the audience be suspended and that Ruan Chi be dispatched to Liaodong with the imperial decree to be delivered to a Joseon translator there. The imperial decree arrived there but there was no Joseon translator waiting there. Then, Zhi Hui 指揮 and Fan Rong 范榮 (i.e., Ming envoys) were ordered to depart for the Joseon court with the imperial decree.<sup>71</sup>

The episode reveals that communicating the matter of urgent care was conducted through the LMC. The Ming court sent the urgent message of the emperor to stop the visit of the Joseon crown prince who had been reported to have already departed, assuming that the Joseon translator could receive the imperial message to be delivered to the Joseon court. It should be noted that the Ming court sent the urgent message to the LMC by taking it for granted that Joseon translator messengers were available there because by that time it had become customary for Joseon translators to conduct official businesses almost routinely at the LMC.

The eras of Taejong and Sejong witnessed that the LMC established itself as the locus of diplomatic communication and exchange between Jo-

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<sup>70</sup> *Sejong sillok* 38: 09/10/18 (壬申).

<sup>71</sup> *Sejong sillok* 38: 09/11/08 (壬辰): “尹鳳回到北京奏朝鮮世子爲朝見今九月二十五日發程帝勅世子停朝見令赤捧勅到遼東傳授朝鮮通事入來者火迫傳送有聖旨到此無朝鮮通事來到者傳授指揮范榮等出送。”

seon and the Ming. Both Joseon and the Ming sent urgent messages first to the LMC, from which they traveled through the inland channels of the respective country. Even though the translators and other officials from Joseon did not have their permanent offices at the LMC, Joseon officials were dispatched to the LMC with a variety of tasks, such as giving notice of parental funeral (chinsang 親喪) of Ming eunuch of Korean descent (hwaja 火者), explanatory missions (jiljeongwan 質正官), and trade. Besides, it was at the LMC that the Ming imperial decrees and messages were copied to be sent to the Joseon court<sup>72</sup> and information about impending or current missions were exchanged.<sup>73</sup> Important military information about invasions of neighboring forces and their defenses was also collected at the LMC and reported to the respective court. Accordingly, the detailed information about diplomatic missions of each country, such as date of departure from the capital, travel itinerary, size of mission, purpose of mission and summary of official decree and letter, was sent first to the LMC. That is how Joseon and the Ming continued diplomatic communication and exchange via the LMC throughout the fifteenth century.

#### 4. Conclusion

In its beginning years, Joseon came into frequent conflicts with the Ming surrounding the Liaodong and Jurchen regions. Joseon made strenuous efforts to collect information about the Ming's internal conditions and movements. On the other hand, the Ming held doubts and suspicions about Joseon and kept an eye on any development in those areas. Even though the official exchange of diplomatic missions was restrained, both countries made use of human resources and networks to collect information about each other. Even under their tense relations Joseon and the Ming continued to communicate to handle such matters as repatriation of war captives and shipwrecked people, and trade. In their communication and exchange, the

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<sup>72</sup> *Sejong sillok* 22: 05/11/05 (壬午); *Sejong sillok* 42: 10/11/04 (壬子).

<sup>73</sup> *Sejong sillok* 25: 06/09/23 (乙未).

LMC (Liaodong Military Command) emerged as the mediating center of the two countries. The diplomatic correspondences like official letters were sent first to the LMC before they traveled onwards through the domestic route of the respective country.

King Taejong devoted himself to the task of putting his court on good terms with the Ming court. In the meantime, the Jianwen Emperor refrained from antagonizing Joseon due to the troubled internal conditions. In fact, he sought for aids from Joseon in exchange of imperial mandate and official seal which had been denied to Joseon by the Hongwu Emperor. The issue of runaway soldiers and residents from Liaodong to Joseon contributed to the increase of communications between the two countries. Due to the civil war between the Jianwen Emperor and Prince of Yan, many people in the Liaodong region fled to Joseon. The LMC often made contact with the Joseon court to demand their return. The Joseon court, however, wanted to resettle them within its territory and tried to evade such demand by citing the difficulty of knowing their whereabouts. When the victorious Prince of Yan ascended the throne as the Yongle Emperor, the Joseon court was assured of the Ming's determined will and began to track down and repatriate the refugee soldiers and residents from Liaodong. Under these circumstances, the Chinese prisoners of war, captured by the Japanese pirates and salvaged by the Joseon authorities, were also to be returned back to the LMC.

From the era of Taejong onwards, the Joseon court and the LMC increased their communications to handle many issues of administrative nature, such as repatriation of fugitives and conducting tribute trade. The LMC played a crucial role in mediating the two courts in their communication. The urgent messages were sent first to the LMC so that they could be conveyed to the respective court through domestic routes. Even though Joseon's translators and officials did not reside at the LMC on a permanent basis, Joseon officials with varied tasks were dispatched in succession. It was at the LMC that the Ming imperial decrees and messages were copied to be sent to the Joseon court and information about impending or current missions was exchanged there. It became customary that the detailed information about diplomatic missions of each country, such as date of departure

from the capital, travel itinerary, size of mission, purpose of mission and summary of official decree and letter, was all sent first to the LMC. Moreover, important military information about invasions of neighboring forces and their defenses was collected at the LMC and reported to the respective court. Therefore, it can be said that the relationship between Joseon and the Ming was vitally improved in the fifteenth century when both countries had strong need to envision a new and constructive pattern of communication through the LMC.

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# Japanese Survey of Labor Resources and Koreans Taken by Force from South Chungcheong

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# Japanese Survey of Labor Resources and Koreans Taken by Force from South Chungcheong

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## 1. Introduction

Since the liberation of Korea in 1945, Japan has denied that it forcibly took<sup>1</sup> Koreans, especially by making some women serve as Japanese military “comfort women.” Rather than feeling contrition, Japan has grown increasingly outspoken in justifying its wars of aggression. However, it is a historical fact that Koreans were forcibly taken under Japanese occupation, one which is supported by countless records and testimonies.

After going to war with China through the Mukden Incident, Japan established the National Mobilization Law on April 1, 1938, and adopted a national mobilization system in colonial Korea the following month on May 5.

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<sup>2</sup> This article is translated from the Korean manuscript originally published in the *Journal of Korean Modern and Contemporary History* (한일근대사연구) issue 78, September 2016: 191-230.

<sup>1</sup> The phrase “taken by force” began to be used when Bak Gyeong-sik published *Records of Forcibly Taken Koreans* (조선인강제연행의기록) in 1965. The phrase was originally used to highlight the use of force at a time when the forced mobilization of human resources was not yet recognized as a historical fact. It thereafter spawned variations including “wartime manpower mobilization” by Kim Min-young, “forced mobilization” by Kang Man-gil and Kang Chang-il, “wartime labor mobilization” by Yamada Shōji (山田昭次), Furushō Tadashi (古庄正), Higuchi Yūichi (樋口雄一), and “taken by force/forced labor” by Jeon Ki-ho and Jung Hye-kyung. This paper primarily uses “taken by force” in the sense that Japan committed a crime against humanity by using Koreans as an instrument of war.

Japan continued to expand the war front by attacking Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, to begin the Pacific War. To engage in wars of aggression, Japan sought to make up for its shortage of manpower through colonial Koreans instead of its own people. Thus began the forced mobilization of Koreans, which was an anti-human exploitation of labor resources and the ultimate means to carry out Japan's colonial policy of annihilating Koreans.

To prepare for and support Japan in forcibly taking Koreans, the Japanese Government-General of Korea investigated the distribution and amount of labor resources in colonial Korea by launching a nationwide survey. Previous studies have so far only introduced snippets of this survey. Huh Soo-youl dealt with the survey of labor resources in relation to the Japanese policy of rural restructuring in colonial Korea.<sup>2</sup> Unno Fukuzu explained that the survey was part of Japan's plan to redistribute its labor resources.<sup>3</sup> The survey has also been mentioned by the National Archives of Korea over the process of creating annotations for labor-related Japanese documents.<sup>4</sup>

Recently, the forcible taking of Koreans is being more actively researched as a part of studying the regional histories of Korea. Relevant case studies have been carried out in Daejeon,<sup>5</sup> Yeosu,<sup>6</sup> Ganghwa,<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Huh Soo-youl, "Joseonin nodongnyeok eui gangje dongwon eui siltae: Joseon naeseo eui gangje dongwon jeongchaek eui jeongae rul jungsimuro" [The Reality of the Forced Mobilization of Korean Labor: Focusing on Forced Mobilization Policies in Korea], in *Ilje eui Hanguk sikmin tongchi* [Japan's Colonial Rule of Korea], Cha Ki-pyok, ed. (Seoul: Jeongumsa, 1985).

<sup>3</sup> Unno Fukuzu 海野福壽, "Chōsen no rōmu dōin" [Labor Mobilization in Korea], in *Iwanami kōza: Kindai Nihon to shokuminchi* [Iwanami Lecture: Modern Japan and Its Colonies], vol. 5 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1993).

<sup>4</sup> *Ilje munseo haeje: Ijae, sagye, sanggong, gyeonggeumsok, yeollo, nomu pyeon* [Annotated Japanese Documents: Finance, Fiscal Budget, Commerce, Light Metals, Fuel, and Labor-Related Documents] (Jeongbu girok bojonso, 2002).

<sup>5</sup> Roh Young-jong, "Daejeon jiyook eui gangje yeonhaeng hyeonhwang: Gukga girokwon sojang girokmul eul jungsimuro" [Laborers Forcibly Taken from Daejeon: Focusing on Documents at the National Archives of Korea], *Daejeon munhwa* 14 (December 2005): 195-233.

<sup>6</sup> Kim In-duck, "Ilje sidae Yeosu jiyook gangje yeonhaeng e daehan gochal" [A Study on the Compulsive Haul in Yeosu], *Yeoksawa gyeonggye* 67 (2008): 9-29.

<sup>7</sup> Kim Jin-young, "Ilje mal ganghwagun e daehan illyeok dongwon eui siltae wa chueui (1938-45): Gukgagirokwon sojang 'ilje gangje yeonhaengja myeongbu' reul jungsimuro" [The Actual

Uiseong,<sup>8</sup> Wando,<sup>9</sup> Jeju,<sup>10</sup> and North Gyeongsang Province.<sup>11</sup> Such studies sought to gain an understanding of people forcibly taken from a specific region by utilizing registers of victims as well as reports issued by the Truth Commission on Forced Mobilization under Japanese Imperialism. There have also been case studies on people forcibly taken in North Jeolla Province,<sup>12</sup> the mobilization of soldiers in Gangwon Province,<sup>13</sup> and the mobilization of students in Incheon,<sup>14</sup> Daegu,<sup>15</sup> and South Gyeongsang

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Condition and Change of Human Manpower Mobilization in Ganghwa-Gun at the End of Japanese Imperialism: Referring to ‘Compulsory Hauled People List’ in the Custody of National Archives & Records Service] (Master’s Thesis, Kyung Hee University, 2008).

- <sup>8</sup> Kim Nan-young, “Ilje malgi Gyeongbuk Euseong-gun eui nomu dongwon hyeonhwang gwa siltae” [The Actual Status and Conditions of Forced Labor Mobilization in Uiseong-gun at the End of Japanese Colonization] (Master’s Thesis, Chungnam National University, 2011).
- <sup>9</sup> Moon Hye-ji, “Ilje malgi Wando jiyek nomu dongwon yeongu” [Research on Labor Mobilization in Wando at the End of the Japanese Colonization Period] (Master’s Thesis, Mokpo National University, 2014).
- <sup>10</sup> Huh Soo-youll, “Jejudo e isseoseo Joseonin gangje dongwon” [Forced Mobilization of Koreans on Jeju Island], in *Ilje malgi Jejudo eui ilbongun yeongu* [Studies on the Japanese Military on Jeju Island Near the End of Japan’s Colonial Rule of Korea], Cho Sung-young, ed. (Seoul: Bogosa, 2008); Ji Young-im, “Gusul eul tonghae bon iljeha Jejudo nae gangje dongwon eui siltae wa teukjing,” [Forced Mobilization from Jeju Island Under Japanese Colonial Rule] in *Ilje malgi Jejudo eui ilbongun yeongu* [Studies on the Japanese Military on Jeju Island Near the End of Japan’s Colonial Rule of Korea], Cho Sung-young, ed. (Seoul: Bogosa, 2008).
- <sup>11</sup> Lee Soo-hwan and Yi Gwang-woo, “1939-1945 Gyeongbuk giyeok eui nodongnyeok gangje dongwon” [Compulsory Labor Mobilization in Gyeongbuk Area from 1939 till 1945], *Minjok munhwa nonchong* 58 (December 2014): 35-58.
- <sup>12</sup> Kim Min-young, “Ilje gangeomgi gunnae nomu dongwon e daehan yeongu: Jeonbuk jiyek eui sarye” [A Case Study on the Domestic Forced Mobilization of Koreans at Jeonbuk Region in the Japanese Colonial Period], *Hanil minjok munje yeongu* 16 (2009): 51-80.
- <sup>13</sup> Kim Young-mee, “Ilje malgi (1938-45) Gangwon jiyek gunin dongwon e daehan yeongu” [Military Conscription in Gangwon Province Near the End of the Japanese Colonial Rule (1938-1945)] (Master’s Thesis, Kangwon National University, 2006).
- <sup>14</sup> Kim Mi-hyun, “Jeonsi chejegi Incheon jiyek haksaeung nodongnyeok dongwon” [Mobilization of Incheon Students’ Labor under National Total Motivation System of Japan’s Colonial Rule of Korea], *Incheonhak yeongu* 12 (2010): 139-82.
- <sup>15</sup> Kwon Young-bae, “Iljemaal jeonsichejeha jungdeung hakgyo eui dongwon gwa jeohang: Daegu jiyek eul jungsimeuro” [Wartime Mobilization and Resistance of Secondary School Students in the Late Japanese Imperial Rule in Korea], *Yeoksa gyoyuk nonjip* 40 (February 2008): 355-89.

Province.<sup>16</sup>

Kang Man-gil was the first to study Korean resistance against being forcibly taken.<sup>17</sup> He analyzed the circumstances of resistance revealed through issues of Teukgo wolbo, the Monthly Bulletin of the Special Higher Police, published between April 1940 and December 1941. Other scholars joined in researching cases of such resistance, featuring studies about Koreans forced to work in Hokkaido<sup>18</sup> or various attempts to resist or avoid being taken, including the “Bamboo Spear Revolt at Mount Daewang.” Byun Eun-jin focused on the movements of secret societies and the cases of escape to shed light on resistance against forced labor that occurred in Japan.<sup>19</sup> Jung Hye-kyung looked into the forcible taking of Koreans in North Gyeongsang Province, organized resistance by groups such as the Study Group to Recover Korea’s Independence (Daehan dongnip hoebokdan) and the Mount Daewang Death Squad (Daewangsang gyeolsadae), and Koreans who violated the National Conscription Ordinance.<sup>20</sup> There have also been case studies conducted on various forms of resistance in-

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<sup>16</sup> Jeon Sung-hyun, “Ilje malgi Gyeongnam jiyek geullo bogukdae wa gungnae nomu dongwon: Haksaeong nodongnyeok dongwon eul jungsimuro” [Labor Patriotism Corps and the Domestic Labor Mobilization in South Gyeongsang at the End of Japanese Imperialism], *Yeoksawa gyeonggye* 95 (June 2015): 169-206.

<sup>17</sup> Kang Man-gil, “Chimnyak jeonjaenggi Ilbon e gangje dongwon dweun Joseon nodongja eui jeohang” [The Resistance of Korean Forced Labors Drafted by Japanese Imperialism during World War II], *Hanguksa hakbo* 2 (1997): 239-63.

<sup>18</sup> Roh Young-jong, “Ilje malgi Joseonin eui Bukhaedo(Hokkaido) jiyek gangje yeonhaeng gwa geobu tujaeng” [Koreans Forcibly Taken to Hokkaido and Their Resistance Near the End of Japan’s Colonial Rule], *Hanguk geundaesa yeongu* 17 (June 2001): 153-88.

<sup>19</sup> Byun Eun-jin, “Ilje chimnyak jeonjaenggi Joseonin ‘gangje dongwon’ nodongja eui jeohang gwa seonggyeok: Ilbon nae ‘doju’ wa ‘bimil gyeolsa eundong’ eul jungsimuro” [A Study on the Resistance of Korean ‘Forced Labour’ Drafted by Japanese Imperialism, 1937-45: Focusing on ‘Escape’ and ‘Secret Organizations’], *Asea yeongu* 45 (2002): 33-65.

<sup>20</sup> Jung Hye-kyung, “Ilje malgi Gyeongbuk jiyek chulsin gangje dongwon nomujadeul eui jeohang” [A Study of Korean Protests Against Obligatory Labor Mobilization of Japanese Authorities: A Case Study of Keyonsang-Bukdo Province, 1943-44], *Hanil minjok munje yeongu* 25 (2013): 79-137.

volving student soldiers<sup>21</sup> or civilian personnel in the military.<sup>22</sup>

South Chungcheong Province is a granary where Koreans became mobilized early on. The area showed the highest ratio of potential laborers and employment seekers according to the 1940 survey of labor resources. Approximately 110,000 people from the province are listed on the register of forced laborers now held at the National Archives of Korea. This number amounts to 7.24 percent of South Chungcheong Province's entire population (1,536,587) in 1940, meaning one out of thirteen people in the province was forcibly mobilized.

Hence, this paper attempts to determine how the Japanese Government-General of Korea (hereinafter the Government-General) conducted its labor resources survey, specifically through the recruitment or mobilization methods used in South Chungcheong Province and the forms of resistance people from the area engaged in. Based on the progress made through previous studies, various collections of sources and testimonies have been studied including reports such as the Monthly Bulletin of the Special Higher Police (特高月報) and documents issued by the Government-General, such as "On the Labor Resources Survey."<sup>23</sup>

## 2. Japanese Survey of Korean Labor Resources

### 1) Survey Procedure

To secure enough manpower to engage in wars of aggression, Japan "col-

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<sup>21</sup> Kim Do-hyung, "Ilje malgi Daegu 24 budae hakbyeong talchul euigeo" [A Study on the Korean Soldiers' Escape from the 24th Japanese Military Unit in Daegu], *Gunsa* 65 (2007): 203-32.

<sup>22</sup> Yu Byung-sun, "Ilje malgi Indonesia Hanin gunsok eui hangil tujaeng" [Anti-Japanese Struggle of Korean Civilian Workers Attached to the Japanese Military in Indonesia in the Late Stages of Japanese Imperialism], *Hanguk dongnip undongsa yeongu* 44 (2013): 207-45; Rostineu, "Hangukin gunsok eui Indonesia esocoui dongnip undong" [Korean Military Labor's Independent Movement in Indonesia on the Japanese Imperialism] (Master's Thesis, Inha University, 2009).

<sup>23</sup> Labor-related Japanese documents held at the National Archives of Korea, originally titled Rōmu shigen chōsa kankei shorui (勞務資源調査關係書類), include records about the Government-General's labor resources survey from 1939 to 1940.

lected” resources as contributions from its colony Korea. In preparation for Japan’s plan to forcibly take Koreans, the Government-General conducted a nationwide survey of labor resources in colonial Korea. This motive in conducting the survey was made apparent in documents issued by the Government-General, which stated that “since it has become impossible to satisfy the demand without the authorities’ facilitation, the location and amount of surplus rural manpower must be constantly surveyed to contribute to the adequate allocation of labor and thereby increase war supplies and productivity.”<sup>24</sup>

The Government-General surveyed the labor resources of colonial Korea and reviewed its findings in July 1939.<sup>25</sup> After two further rounds of reviews, the head of the Government-General’s Home Affairs Bureau then sent to the governor of each Korean province instructions on the labor resources survey under the title *Rōmu shigen chōsa yōkō* (勞務資源調査要綱) on March 12, 1940.<sup>26</sup> The governors were instructed to “each take their individual local circumstances into consideration to establish a minimum farmland size according to data as of the end of March 1939, to draft a ‘labor resources survey chart,’ and to submit it to the Government-General by the end of April.” The survey aimed at ascertaining the number of potential laborers and employment seekers willing to relocate or change jobs,<sup>27</sup> was to be conducted only at the township (*myeon*) level, an administrative unit smaller than a county (*gun*) or a town (*eup*).

The labor resources survey chart was composed of twelve entries that

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<sup>24</sup> “Rōmu shigen chōsa yōkō” [Guidelines for the Labor Resources Survey], *Rōmu shigen chōsa ni kansuru ken* [Matters Regarding the Labor Resources Survey] (March 12, 1940).

<sup>25</sup> The papers dated July 24, 1939 and February 7, 1940 in *Rōmu shigen chōsa ni kansuru ken* indicate that guidelines based on survey results were reviewed on the two days but failed to gain final approval at the time.

<sup>26</sup> A newspaper reported at the time that “the Government-General will conduct a labor resources survey of rural areas because of the pressing need to adjust the demand and supply of labor resources and provide Japan with Korean workers.” “Rural Laborers and Capitalists to be Surveyed,” *Dong-A Ilbo* (March 15, 1940).

<sup>27</sup> Hereafter “potential laborers” refer to potential laborers capable of relocating or changing jobs and “employment seekers” refer to employment seekers willing to relocate or change jobs for employment.

required details such as the domicile, current address, and occupation<sup>28</sup> of the head of each household, the name, age, and health condition<sup>29</sup> of each household member, their relation to the household's head, availability or willingness to relocate or change jobs for employment,<sup>30</sup> farmland size (rice paddies and fields), and financial circumstances (annual income and expenditure). What is notable is that the information the chart required was not aimed at calculating surplus manpower. The Government-General initially intended to investigate the amount of surplus manpower by excluding the manpower necessary for farming and housekeeping from the total amount of available manpower. However, the Government-General changed the survey guidelines to tallying the number of people among the farming population who could relocate or change jobs for employment. As such, an arbitrarily determined minimum farmland size was used as a standard to classify any farming household with farmland smaller than the minimum size as a household with surplus manpower, thereby aiming to determine the maximum number of farmers that could be mobilized from rural Korea.<sup>31</sup>

Conducting a nationwide survey of labor resources required a considerable amount of funds. According to "Matters Regarding the Allocation of Expenses to Conduct the Labor Resources Survey" the head of the Government-General's Home Affairs Bureau sent to the governor of each Korean province on March 13, 1940, the Government-General planned to spend a total of 30,310 Korean Won on the survey. This budget included wages paid to surveyors amounting to 26,452 Korean Won and 20,600 Korean Won to cover the cost of surveying supplies. However, the Govern-

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<sup>28</sup> Occupation was categorized as either independent farmer, independent and tenant farmer, tenant farmer, or agricultural worker.

<sup>29</sup> Health condition was categorized as strong, average, or weak.

<sup>30</sup> Men between the ages of twenty to forty-four and women between the ages of twelve and nineteen in average or above health were considered potential laborers.

<sup>31</sup> Huh, "Joseonin nodongnyeok eui gangje dongwon eui siltae: Joseon naeseo eui gangje dongwon jeongchaek eui jeongae rul jungsimeuro": 309.

ment-General only allotted a total of 22,710 Korean Won to all provinces.<sup>32</sup>

With funding from the Government-General, each province was to appoint “persons intimately familiar with their township’s circumstances” as surveyors. With five surveyors covering each township, a total of 11,355 surveyors were hired to investigate the 2,271 townships across the Korean peninsula.<sup>33</sup> Each surveyor was paid two Korean Won as wages.

The surveyors were those who actually conducted the survey at each township and filled out the survey chart. Townships compiled the complet-

<sup>32</sup> The allotted amount of 22,710 Won was only 74.9 percent of the 30,310 Won budget for the labor resources survey, or 48.2 percent of the budget the Government-General had actually secured for the project, which was 47,142 Won. The table below shows a breakdown of how much the Government-General allotted to each province.

Province	Subsidy for Surveyor’s Allowance (Korean Won)	Subsidy for Expenses on Surveying Supplies (Korean Won)	Total
Gyeonggi	2,320	760	3,080
North Chungcheong	1,040	360	1,400
South Chungcheong	1,670	560	2,230
North Jeolla	1,720	576	2,296
South Jeolla	2,440	808	3,248
North Gyeongsang	2,430	808	3,238
South Gyeongsang	2,300	760	3,060
Hwanghae	2,030	672	2,702
South Pyongan	1,380	464	1,844
North Pyongan	1,730	584	2,314
Gangwon	1,680	568	2,248
South Hamgyong	1,250	424	1,674
North Hamgyong	720	256	976
<b>Total</b>	22,710	7,600	30,310

<sup>33</sup> The table below shows how many townships and surveyors there were in each county.

Province	No. of Townships	No. of Surveyors	Province	No. of Townships	No. of Surveyors
Gyeonggi	332	1,160	Hwanghae	203	1,015
North Chungcheong	104	520	South Pyongan	138	690
South Chungcheong	167	835	North Pyongan	173	865
North Jeolla	172	860	Gangwon	168	840
South Jeolla	244	1,220	South Hamgyong	126	625
North Gyeongsang	243	1,215	North Hamgyong	72	360
South Gyeongsang	230	1,150	<b>Total</b>	2,271	11,355

ed charts and submitted them to the county office, which would then be transferred to the provincial office.<sup>34</sup>

Table 1. Korean Households with below Minimum Farmland and Surplus Manpower (1939)

Province	Total Farmland Size as of 1936 (Unit: <i>ban</i> )	Minimum Farmland Size (Unit: <i>ban</i> )	Current No. of Households	No. of Households with Below Minimum Farmland	No. of Households with Surplus Manpower
Gyeonggi	3,932,444	21	244,605	187,259	57,346
North Chungcheong	1,611,586	18	142,162	89,533	52,629
South Chungcheong	2,492,580	14	223,372	178,041	45,331
North Jeolla	2,434,055	18	237,546	152,128	85,418
South Jeolla	4,309,902	17	401,161	239,439	161,722
North Gyeongsang	3,840,138	16	358,415	225,890	132,525
South Gyeongsang	2,776,239	30	297,742	173,514	124,228
Hwanghae	5,796,841	33	246,543	193,228	53,315
South Pyongan	4,673,995	34	179,043	141,636	37,407
North Pyongan	5,358,127	40	211,747	157,592	54,155
Gangwon	4,211,890	44	247,593	105,297	142,296
South Hamgyong	5,562,294	37	189,893	126,416	63,477
North Hamgyong	2,415,753	24	78,933	65,291	13,642
<b>Total</b>	49,415,844		3,058,755	2,035,264	1,023,491

<sup>34</sup> According to the survey schedule, the Government-General had to create the labor resources survey chart and distribute it to each province by March 15. Townships had to submit the completed charts to their respective province by April 10 and each province had to submit the collected charts to the Government-General by the end of April.

Each province was to analyze the labor resources survey charts collected from each county under its jurisdiction and draft various reports on the results for the Government-General such as “Report on the Labor Resources Survey,” “Report on Households with Below Minimum Farmland and Surplus Manpower,” and “Report on Employment Seekers Willing to Relocate or Change Jobs.”

According to Table 1 below, the number of households with surplus manpower was 1,023,491 as of 1939, corresponding to 33.5 percent or more than one third of the total number of households in Korea, which were 3,058,755 at that time. This clearly indicates that the Government-General’s intent was to maximize the number of Koreans available for its ultimate purpose of forcibly taking them.

What stands out from the breakdown of such households by province in Table 1 is the difference between provinces in terms of the minimum farmland size, ranging from as small as 14 *ban* for South Chungcheong Province to as large as 44 *ban* for South Hamgyong Province.<sup>35</sup> The difference is likely to have been caused by varying degrees of soil fertility between each area. Nevertheless, the minimum farmland size was a highly significant indicator because the number of households with below minimum farmland and surplus manpower depended on how minimum farmland sizes were defined. However, a clear explanation has not yet been discovered regarding how those sizes were determined. Yet, the ratio of arable land to the entire area of each province offers a clue to understanding the difference in minimum farmland sizes among Korean provinces. Provinces with a higher ratio of arable land and rice paddies tended to define smaller minimum farmland sizes.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> The numbers in the original source were 20 *ban* for Gyeonggi, 20 *ban* for North Chungcheong, 16 *ban* for South Chungcheong, 28 *ban* for Hwanghae, 30 *ban* for South Pyongan, 30 *ban* for North Pyongan, 30 *ban* for Gangwon, 35 *ban* for South Hamgyong, and 35 *ban* for North Hamgyong. However, the numbers have been corrected under the assumption that they appear to be miscalculations (total farmland size = minimum farmland size × number of households with below minimum farmland).

<sup>36</sup> The Proportion of Farmland to Land in Korea (as of late 1939).

The provinces with the largest number of households with surplus manpower were South Jeolla Province with 161,722 (15.8 percent of all households in the province), Gangwon Province with 142,296 (13.9 percent), North Gyeongsang Province with 132,525 (12.9 percent), South Gyeongsang Province with 124,228 (12.1 percent), and North Jeolla Province with 85,418 (8.3 percent). The majority (75.1 percent) of such households were concentrated in the provinces of Jeolla, Gyeongsang, and Gangwon. However, surplus manpower was gauged only by the size of fields and paddies and the income they generated for each household, which tended to classify a greater number of households as having surplus manpower. This classification did not take income from side jobs and cash income into consideration, leading to a higher number of households with surplus manpower despite a lower number of households with below-minimum farmland, which was an aspect of the survey the Government-General was aware of at the time.

The data directly linked to the Government-General's purpose for surveying Korean labor resources would probably have been the number of potential laborers and employment seekers. Each county was expected to calculate the minimum farmland size to be applied within its jurisdiction

Province	Proportion of Farmland to Land			Province	Proportion of Farmland to Land		
	Total	Rice Paddies	Fields		Total	Rice Paddies	Fields
Gyeonggi	30.5	16.6 (54.4%)	13.9	Hwanghae	33.4	9.0 (26.9%)	24.4
North Chungcheong	21.3	9.8 (46.0%)	11.5	South Pyongan	26.7	6.09 (22.5%)	20.7
South Chungcheong	31.0	20.8 (67.1%)	10.2	North Pyongan	14.3	3.4 (23.8%)	10.9
North Jeolla	28.5	20.4 (71.6%)	8.1	Gangwon	13.5	3.6 (26.7%)	9.9
South Jeolla	30.9	15.5 (50.2%)	15.4	South Hamgyong	13.0	2.0 (15.4%)	11.0
North Gyeongsang	20.2	10.7 (53.0%)	9.5	North Hamgyong	11.0	1.0 (9.1%)	10.0
South Gyeongsang	22.4	14.8 (66.1%)	7.6	<b>Total</b>	20.3	7.9 (38.9%)	12.4

\* The percentages in parentheses are the proportion of rice paddies to arable land.

and then to confirm the number of potential laborers and employment seekers at households with farmland smaller than the minimum size. The survey chart was used to investigate one hundred households per township and determine the number of available laborers and employment seekers per household. Based on each township’s findings, each county would then calculate an average number of potential laborers and employment seekers per township and multiply that average by the number of households with below-minimum farmland in order to produce an estimation of the total number of potential laborers and employment seekers in the county.

**Table 2.** Potential Laborers and Employment Seekers Willing to Relocate or Change Jobs

Province	No. of Potential Laborers					No. of Employment Seekers				
	Women	Men				Women	Men			
	12-19	20-30	31-40	41-50	Total	12-19	20-30	31-40	41-50	Total
Gyeonggi	6,017	14,744	8,661	2,829	26,234	513	2,158	829	298	3,285
North Chungcheong	39,967	89,503	44,861	14,759	149,123	3,938	23,635	7,143	1,683	32,461
South Chungcheong	17,785	66,017	19,408	4,751	90,176	2,717	31,004	8,649	1,954	41,607
North Jeolla	11,408	36,332	20,423	8,330	65,085	1,790	17,597	7,995	2,948	28,540
South Jeolla	17,631	37,763	26,092	15,258	79,113	1,544	13,376	8,060	3,501	24,937
North Gyeongsang	19,304	64,969	30,035	12,108	107,112	2,815	24,254	8,831	2,826	35,911
South Gyeongsang	44,671	71,384	40,502	21,719	133,605	3,691	23,306	9,373	3,790	36,469
Hwanghae	11,030	16,218	10,930	6,271	33,419	1,000	2,073	1,275	815	4,163
South Pyongan	33,179	50,396	32,201	14,547	97,114	721	5,001	2,505	1,069	8,575
North Pyongan	12,667	34,076	17,480	8,084	59,640	1,127	10,671	4,138	1,941	16,750
Gangwon	4,760	14,104	7,869	3,312	25,285	325	999	476	121	1,596
South Hamgyong	10,744	32,692	13,310	5,292	51,294	557	4,111	1,813	708	6,632
North Hamgyong	3,478	5,870	3,115	1,321	10,306	29	734	415	239	1,388
<b>Total</b>	232,641	534,068	274,887	118,581	927,536	20,767	158,919	61,502	21,893	242,316

As shown in Table 2, there were a total of 1,160,177 potential laborers (927,536 men and 232,641 women) and 263,083 employment seekers (242,316 men and 20,767 women) in Korea. Employment seekers amounted to 22.7 percent of the potential laborers. In terms of the gender ratio among employment seekers, 26.1 percent of the potential laborers were males seeking employment compared to only 8.9 percent of potential female laborers who were employment seekers. In other words, 77.3 percent, or 897,084 potential laborers did not wish to relocate or change jobs for employment, indicating that a considerable number of Koreans were destined to be taken against their will.

When limiting the scope to males, the South Chungcheong Province recorded the highest percentage of male employment seekers (41,607) among potential male laborers (90,176) at 46.1 percent. This, however, suggests that the remaining 53.9 percent of potential male laborers in the province who were not seeking employment were at the risk of being forcibly mobilized. The province to record the second highest percentage of male employment seekers (28,540) among potential male laborers (65,085) was North Jeolla at 43.9 percent. Behind the two provinces came North Gyeongsang Province at 33.5 percent (35,911 out of 107,112), South Jeolla Province at 31.5 percent (24,937 out of 79,113), North Pyeongan Province at 28.1 percent (16,750 out of 59,640), South Gyeongsang Province at 27.3 percent (36,469 out of 133,605), and North Chungcheong Province at 21.8 percent (32,461 out of 149,123).

Meanwhile, Table 2 shows that the number of potential laborers and employment seekers were concentrated in the southern provinces of Gyeongsang, Jeolla, and Chungcheong. One in four of the potential laborers in those provinces, or 242,316 out of 927,536, were willing to relocate or change jobs for employment. This coincides with findings indicating that the forcible taking of Koreans through recruitment were limited to those same southern provinces in addition to the Gyeonggi Province.

The search for potential laborers and employment seekers was categorized by age and gender. Men between the ages of twenty to fifty were divided into three groups of twenty-one to thirty-year-olds, thirty-one to forty-year-olds, and forty-one to fifty-year-olds. These age ranges would

have been applied to secure men capable of physical labor at coal mines, factories, and certain facilities. As for females, the survey only targeted those between the ages of twelve and nineteen, possibly to secure single women who could be taken away to serve as “comfort women” for the Japanese military. The number of potential female laborers aged between twelve and nineteen totaled up to 232,641, but only 20,767, or 8.9 percent of them sought employment. This suggests that women were more at risk than men of being taken by force. Near the end of Japan’s colonial rule of Korea, news about young women taken away as comfort women mainly spread between mothers with daughters. The Government-General sought to control such news by denouncing the reports as fabricated rumors, and anyone caught spreading them was sentenced to three to six months of confinement for violating the Army and the Navy’s criminal law.<sup>37</sup>

Considering the number of Koreans forcibly taken according to Japan’s mobilization plan between 1940 and 1942, the Japanese demand for labor would not have been satisfied even if all potential laborers had been mobilized. The 1940 goal was to forcibly take 425,400 (355,900 men, 69,500 women), 419,600 (447,300 men, 82,300 women) in 1941, and 442,743 (403,040 men, 39,703 women) in 1942, amounting to a total of 1,287,430 (1,206,240 men, 191,503 women) for those three years.<sup>38</sup> This

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<sup>37</sup> Rumors spread among Koreans that “the authorities have recently been planning to recruit seventeen or eighteen-year-old single women to send to Manchuria to cook for and comfort Japanese soldiers” or that “they will requisition twelve, sixteen, or seventeen-year-old maidens to donate blood to injured soldiers.” Roh Young-jong, “‘Gunwianbu’ gwallyeon girongmul daesi bogi” [Reviewing Records Related to the ‘Japanese Military Comfort Women’], *Girogin* 4 (2006): 89.

<sup>38</sup> Annual Goals for No. of Koreans to Take Based on the National Mobilization Plan

Year	Men	Women	Total
1940	425,400	69,500	355,900
1941	337,300	82,300	419,600
1942	403,040	39,708	442,743
<b>Total</b>	1,165,740	191,508	1,218,243

Anzako Yuka, “Joseon Chongdokbu Eui ‘chongdongwon Cheje’ (1937-45) Hyeongseong Jeongchaek” [Study of ‘Total Mobilization System’ (1937-45) Policy by Administration General of Chosen] (Doctoral dissertation, Korea University, 2006): 184-85.

total was 127,253 greater than the aggregate number of potential laborers at the time, which was 1,160,177. The mobilization target required 130 percent of the potential male laborers and 82.3 percent of the potential female laborers in Korea. Moreover, the target required 489.3 percent of the actual employment seekers, or 497.8 percent of male employment seekers and 120.5 percent of female employment seekers.

The above numbers demonstrate that Japan's labor mobilization plan could have never been fully executed without resorting to coercive methods. The Government-General's mobilization demands continued to rise between 1940 and 1942, exceeding the maximum number of potential laborers since 1942 to be nearly five times more than the number of employment seekers at the time.

## 2) Survey of South Chungcheong Province

South Chungcheong Province had 107,961 potential laborers (90,176 men, 17,785 women) and 31,257 employment seekers (41,607 men, 2,717 women), more than any other area in Korea. The ratio of employment seekers among potential laborers was 41.4 percent, or 46.1 percent when limiting the scope to males. The province surveyed labor resources in the 167 townships under its jurisdiction and reported the results to the Government-General's Home Affairs Bureau on May 17, 1940.<sup>39</sup> A total of 835 surveyors were employed to investigate 16,700 households, which accounted for 7.8 percent of all the households in the province.

According to Table 3, there were 85,929 households with below-minimum farmland and 128,759 households with surplus manpower in the South Chungcheong Province as of March 31, 1940. Compared to survey results from 1939, the province had 8,684 (3.9 percent) fewer farming households, 92,112 (51.7 percent) fewer households with below-minimum farmland, but 83,428 (184 percent) more households with surplus manpower in 1940. Among all farming households in the province, 60 percent

<sup>39</sup> "Rōmu shigen chōsa kankei shorui," *Rōmu shigen chōsa ni kansuru ken*, September 24, 1940.

**Table 3.** Households with below Minimum Farmland and Surplus Manpower in South Chungcheong (1940)

County	No. of Farming Households	No. of Surveyed Households	No. of Households with Below Minimum Farmland	No. of Households with Surplus Manpower
Daedeok	13,026	1,100 (8.4%)	5,979	7,047 (54.1%)
Gongju	18,152	1,100 (6.1%)	5,199	12,993 (71.6%)
Nonsan	16,693	1,300 (7.8%)	5,680	11,012 (66.0%)
Dangjin	15,000	1,000 (6.7%)	5,528	9,472 (63.1%)
Boryeon	11,136	1,000 (9.0%)	4,465	7,715 (69.3%)
Buyeo	19,045	1,600 (8.4%)	6,968	12,077 (63.4%)
Seosan	26,179	2,000 (7.6%)	16,344	9,835 (37.6%)
Seocheon	12,180	1,200 (9.9%)	5,750	9,053 (74.3%)
Asan	14,153	1,200 (8.5%)	5,098	9,055 (64.0%)
Yeongi	8,826	600 (6.8%)	1,963	6,863 (77.8%)
Yesan	16,606	1,200 (7.2%)	8,724	7,882 (47.4%)
Cheonan	14,151	1,300 (9.2%)	5,179	8,971 (63.4%)
Cheongyang	14,739	1,000 (6.8%)	2,010	9,126 (61.9%)
Hongseong	14,739	1,100 (7.5%)	7,042	7,697 (52.2%)
<b>Total</b>	214,688	16,700 (7.8%)	85,929	128,759 (60.0%)

of them turned out to be households with surplus manpower. These results seem to reflect how well the province conformed to the Government-General's survey guidelines. They also hint that coercive methods including recruitment would eventually be used to procure labor resources from the province.

The county with the highest number of households with surplus manpower in the province was Yeongi County with 6,863 households, which amounted to 77.8 percent of all households in the county. Other counties with a high percentage of households with surplus manpower included Seocheon County with 9,053 (74.3 percent), Gongju County with 12,993 (71.6 percent), Boryeong County with 7,715 (69.3 percent), and Hongseong County with 7,697 (52.2 percent). The counties with the lowest percentage of households with surplus manpower were Seosan County with

**Table 4.** Potential Laborers and Employment Seekers Willing to Relocate or Change Jobs in South Chungcheong

County	Population in 1940 <sup>40</sup>	No. of Employment Seekers	No. of Potential Laborers					
			Total	Women	Men			
					12-19	Subtotal	20-30	31-40
Daedeok	76,039	1,021	4,044 (5.3%)	1,078	2,966	2,382	465	119
Gongju	124,536	8,238	16,799 (13.5%)	2,046	14,753	11,515	2,720	518
Geumsan	73,740	1,951	5,221 (7.1%)	736	4,485	2,688	1,164	633
Nonsan	134,716	2,983	5,429 (4.0%)	1,574	3,855	3,095	694	66
Dangjin	94,365	3,190	8,135 (8.6%)	1,477	6,658	4,745	1,582	331
Boryeong	86,470	1,109	4,281 (4.9%)	940	3,341	2,608	571	162
Buyeo	122,390	6,786	12,402 (10.1%)	1,521	10,881	6,775	3,140	966
Seosan	160,022	1,847	9,362 (5.9%)	747	8,615	5,331	2,616	668
Seocheon	102,509	3,294	8,627 (8.4%)	2,190	6,437	5,061	1,123	253
Asan	93,221	3,666	6,066 (6.5%)	1,294	4,772	3,740	851	181
Yeongi	65,944	2,257	6,271 (9.5%)	1,084	5,187	4,200	775	212
Yesan	114,679	2,065	6,919 (6.0%)	867	6,052	4,209	1,371	472
Cheonan	112,646	3,193	8,325 (7.4%)	2,009	6,316	4,773	1,364	179
Cheongyang	77,648	2,199	4,728 (6.1%)	666	4,062	3,003	812	247
Hongseong	97,692	2,477	6,973 (7.1%)	692	6,281	4,580	1,324	377
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,536,587</b>	<b>46,276</b>	<b>113,182 (7.4%)</b>	<b>18,521</b>	<b>94,661</b>	<b>68,705 (72.6%)</b>	<b>20,572 (21.7%)</b>	<b>5,384 (5.7%)</b>

9,835 (37.6 percent) and Yesan County with 7,882 (47.4 percent).

On August 28, 1940, the number of potential laborers and employment seekers in South Chungcheong Province was reported to the Government-General. Table 4 offers a breakdown of those numbers by age, county, and gender.

As can be seen in Table 4, there were 113,182 potential laborers (94,661 men and 18,521 women) and 46,276 employment seekers (43,456 men and 2,820 women) across fifteen counties in South Chungcheong Province. The number of potential laborers accounted for 7.37 percent of the province's population, which were 1,536,587 as of 1940.<sup>41</sup> That percentage would rise to approximately 14.7 percent by considering only half of the province's entire population, which was 768,294, in order to exclude the aged, children, and women older than twenty. With the province seeking to report the largest possible number of potential laborers to the Government-General, the results suggested that one out of seven male adults or single women could be mobilized by force in the future.

Among the total of 94,661 potential male laborers in the South Chungcheong Province, the largest pool of them was 14,753 in Gongju County (16.4 percent) while Daedeok County had the smallest pool with 2,966 potential male laborers. The number of potential male laborers varied by age group, 68,705 or 72.6 percent were between twenty to thirty years old, 20,572 or 21.7 percent were between thirty-one to forty years old, and 5,384 or 5.7 percent were forty-one years old or older. This gives reason to speculate that Japan primarily targeted males in their twenties to forcibly take away.

The total of 46,276 employment seekers accounted for about 40.9 percent of the potential laborers in the province. Among potential male la-

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<sup>40</sup> Chōsen Sōtokufu, *Chōsen Sōtokufu Tōkei Nenpō* [Statistical Yearbook of the Japanese Government-General of Korea] (1939-42).

<sup>41</sup> A total of 111,316 people from South Chungcheong province are listed on the register of forcibly taken Koreans kept at the National Archives of Korea. This number accounts for 7.24 percent of the province's population of 1,536,586 in 1940, meaning that one out of thirteen people were forcibly taken to Japan.

borers, 45.9 percent were employment seekers, while the equivalent ratio for females was 15.2 percent. Moreover, the total number of employment seekers amounted to a mere 2.8 percent of the province's entire population in 1940. These numbers and percentages therefore demonstrate that recruitment in the province would never have been successful for Japan without resorting to coercive and deceptive methods.

### 3. Cases of Recruitment in South Chungcheong

Rural communities in Korea were forced to serve two purposes under Japanese colonial rule. One was to produce food and the other was to provide labor resources for Japan's wars of aggression, which thereby led to forced mobilization. Koreans were forcibly taken in various ways including recruitment, placement through government channels, conscription, or the organization of patriotic labor corps called *Geullo bogukdae* (勤勞報國隊), but all of them involved coercion. In the case of recruitment, recruiters from Japanese companies were dispatched to areas designated by the Government-General to directly procure laborers. Two years were given to recruit from the seven designated provinces of North and South Chungcheong, North and South Gyeongsang, North and South Jeolla, and Gyeonggi.

*The Essentials to Recruiting Korean Workers* reveals Japan's coercive recruitment process.<sup>42</sup> Japanese companies seeking to recruit Koreans were required to submit five copies of an "Application to Employ Korean Workers" to local government offices in Japan through an employment agency. The government offices would review the application, attach an "application approved" label if deemed reasonable, and transfer the application to the Japanese Ministry of Health and Welfare. Through consultation with the Japanese Home Ministry, the Japanese Ministry of Health and Welfare would make a labor mobilization plan and communicate it to the

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<sup>42</sup> Hayashi Eidai and Katō Hiroshi, eds., *Senji gaikokujin kyōsei renkō kankei shiryōshū 3: Chōsenjin 2* [Collection of Historical Documents Related to Forcibly Taken Foreigners 3: Koreans 2], vol. 2 (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 1991): 1074-78.

Government-General in Korea. At the same time, the Ministry of Health and Welfare issued an “Import Permission Order” to each prefectural government office in Japan responsible for notifying individual companies on whether their application had been approved or not.

Japanese companies that gained approval from the Ministry of Health and Welfare would then be allowed to submit an “Application for Approval of Labor Recruitment” to the Government-General in Korea. The Government-General would review and compare the applications to the details in the “Import Permission Order” transmitted from the Japanese Ministry of Health and Welfare before finally assigning a recruitment area (province) and issuing a license to each company’s recruiter. Once a company was assigned with a recruitment area, it could formally submit an “Application for Permission to Recruit” to the corresponding Korean province. The provincial government would attach to the company’s application its conclusion on whether permission should be granted and how many workers the company would be permitted to recruit and present the documents for the Government-General’s final approval. After obtaining final approval, the province would officially grant permission for the company to recruit and assign a specific county for recruitment based on the requested number of workers. Before initiating recruitment, a recruiter was required to hand in to the local chief constable a notification<sup>43</sup> attached with a copy of the company’s “Application to Recruit and Employ Korean Workers” and a recruitment notice.

The recruitment of Korean workers was fraught with coercion and deception. The Japanese government, the Japanese Government-General of Korea, colonial officials, the police, and Japanese companies cooperated closely with each other to coax, trick, and threaten Koreans into being taken away to Japan. From eight o’clock in the morning of May 23, 1940, the

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<sup>43</sup> The notification included details such as 1) the recruiter’s name and address, 2) recruitment office location, 3) recruitment period, 4) recruitment volume, 5) time, place, and date of assembly for employment seekers (Shokugyō shōkai-sho shikōkisoku) [Employment Agency Enforcement Regulation], Japanese Government-General of Korea’s Order no. 7, Article no. 47 (January 20, 1940).

Government-General held meetings for the next three days with the director of each Korean province's social affairs department. The main topic of those meetings was about securing the supply of labor. Discussions took place on subjects related to recruitment permits, worker selection, basic training, and registers of farming households and potential laborers.<sup>44</sup> This demonstrates that the Government-General and provincial government officials were deeply involved in mobilizing Koreans from the recruitment stage. The Government-General allotted a recruitment quota for each province, county, and township so that the respective government offices as well as police stations and substations could employ all sorts of methods to fill their quota. Meanwhile, corporate recruiters bribed and entertained officials at the Government-General and relevant counties or townships as well as policemen so as to elicit their support in recruiting Korean workers.

The recruited Korean workers were transported on foot, by truck, train, or ship, which usually took from three to fifteen days. They were told to assemble at their township office where a staff member would lead them to a county office and hand them over to a corporate recruiter. Each county would then move groups of workers to train stations in Daejeon, Hongseong, Cheonan, Nonsan, or Iri (modern day Iksan) from which they were transported by train to Busan or Yeosu and then to Shimonoseki, Japan or the South Sea Islands by cross-channel liners. Won Cheon-sang was practically kidnapped in 1942 to a mine in Oita near Fukuoka Prefecture with no clue as to where he was being sent or what sort of work he was expected to do. The excerpt below from his testimony reveals the circumstances under which he was forcibly taken.

That's when. Just as I was wondering whether something had happened in our neighborhood, someone came and told me he needed to ask me something. So, I went. When I got there, he didn't ask me anything and just left me there. When evening came, he brought a couple of other people and told us we had to go, and we went straight to Dangjin County...

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<sup>44</sup> "Possible Solutions for Securing Manpower, Mass Recruitment to be Discussed at Today's Director of Social Affairs Meeting," *Dong-A Ilbo* (May 24, 1940).

We spent the night there, had breakfast the next morning, and around lunch time, we were told to come out. We were put on a truck that just started driving toward somewhere.<sup>45</sup>

The description above features a case in which a Korean man was tricked and forcibly taken by someone, most likely a recruiter. Without any explanation, the man was put on a truck and driven to a coal mine. In 1940, a policeman from the Goseong Police Station arrested a man walking along a road in Sacheon County of South Gyeongsang Province and took the man away on a truck.<sup>46</sup> Some people were taken away in the middle of the night or early in the morning. Some were working in a field when they were taken away on a truck and shipped to Japanese coal mines in Hokkaido or Kyushu.<sup>47</sup> The case below of Kim Su-eui, who was taken away in 1943 to the Itazuke Air Base in Fukuoka Prefecture, shows that the word recruitment was synonymous to being taken by force. Recruiting methods resembled those of a “man hunt” from the beginning.

I had come back from work and was eating supper at home when “recruiters” came in and said, “Let’s go to the township office!” “Oh, recruitment!” was what instantly crossed my mind, so I answered, “I’m in the middle of a meal.” They pulled my arm saying, “You can eat at the township office.” Mother wailed and pleaded that I was an only child, but the recruiters angrily told her “not to bother them” and dragged me away.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Won Cheon-sang (1919 nyeon chungnam dangjingung chulsaeng) eui jeungeon [Testimony by Han Yeon-wu (Born in 1919 in Seosan County, South Chungcheong)] from Truth Commission on Forced Mobilization under the Japanese Imperialism, *Ttokttakseon Tago Odaga Bada Gwisin Dweol Ppeon Haenne* [I Almost Became a Sea Ghost on a Steamboat] (Seoul: Prime Minister’s Secretariat, 2006): 171-72.

<sup>46</sup> Kim Woon-tai, *Ilbon jegukjueui eui Hanguk tongchi* [Japanese Imperialism’s Rule of Korea] (Seoul: Pakyoungsa, 1986): 534-35.

<sup>47</sup> Park Gyeong-sik, *Nihon teikokushugi no Chōsen shihai* [Japanese Imperialism’s Rule of Korea], vol. 2 (Aoki Shoten, 1973): 70.

<sup>48</sup> Kim Chan-jeong, *Shogen Chōsenjin kyōsei renkō* [Testimonies of Forcibly Taken Koreans] (Tokyo: Shin jinbutsu oraisha, 1975): 20.

The Sumitomo Konomai Gold Mine and the Hokkaido Coal Mine Steamship Company are Japanese companies that can be clearly confirmed through records for forcibly taking Koreans from South Chungcheong Province. Between October 7, 1939 and September 22, 1942, twelve transports of 1,688 Koreans were made from South Chungcheong to the Sumitomo Konomai Gold Mine,<sup>49</sup> while six transports of at least 1,811 Koreans were made to the Hokkaido Coal Mine Steamship Company between July 1941 and March 1942.

The Hokkaido Coal Mine Steamship Company had been struggling from a lack of manpower in 1939, which is why it quickly proceeded to apply for recruitment in Korea in July that year. However, through a work-force manager meeting the Coal Mining Association hosted in Sapporo, an agreement was reached on September 1, 1939 under which the Hokkaido Prefectural Government would gather all applications in the prefecture and deliver them to the Government-General in Korea by mid-September. The Hokkaido Coal Mine Steamship Company was thus able to obtain official permission from the Government-General on September 19, 1939 and contracted out its recruitment of Koreans. The first transport began on October 3 and shipped 400 Koreans on the freighter Tokachi-maru from October 5 to 9. Until November 7, approximately 2,500 Koreans were taken by force to the company's multiple mines. The company later switched to the direct recruitment of Koreans and took around 2,100 Koreans from the two Jeolla provinces as well as South Gyeongsang Province.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> The register of forcibly taken Koreans kept at the National Archives of Korea contains 2,096 laborers from South Chungcheong Province who were taken to the Konomai Gold Mine. Roh Young-jong, "Chungnam jiyek sahoe, gyeongje sutalsang" [Social, Economic Pillaging in South Chungcheong], in *Chungcheong namdoji* [Records of South Chungcheong Province], vol. 9 (South Chungcheong Province, 2008).

<sup>50</sup> Hokkaido Mining Co., Ltd. sent personnel staff to Seoul to confer with government offices and hired two Korean employees to handle recruitment affairs, but later chose to contract out its recruitment operations due to the following reasons: 1) short recruitment period compared to large recruitment volume, 2) shortage of corporate recruiters, 3) pressure of transporting large groups of workers to meet their shipment deadline by October 1939, 4) unstable circumstances in Korea due to a disaster, and 5) unpredictable timing of brokerage through government agencies. Eidai and Katō, *Senji gaikokujin kyōsei renkō kankei shiryōshū 3: Chōsenjin 2* (1084).

Based in Hokkaido, the Hokkaido Coal Mine Steamship Company was a representative firm in coal mine development with a capital of ten billion Japanese Yen. The firm was originally established on November 18, 1889 as the Hokkaido Coal Mine Railway Company. The company re-named itself in October 1906 after acquiring mines such as Horonai, Sorachi, and Yubari and developing several others including the Shinhoronai Mine.<sup>51</sup> The Hokkaido Coal Mine Steamship Company recruited all across Korea between August 2, 1939 and June 5, 1942 and took over the course of twenty-five transports 83.4 percent, or 10,425 out of its quota of 12,500 laborers. Among the Koreans the company took, approximately 14.5 percent, or more than 1,811 were from the South Chungcheong Province. Table 5 provides details on six rounds of recruitment the company carried out in South Chungcheong Province.

Between July 1941 and March 1942, the Government-General assigned a quota six times to the Hokkaido Coal Mine Steamship Company for recruitment in South Chungcheong Province and the company later obtained formal permission to recruit from the province's governor as well. The company's quota was 2,150 in total and at least 1,811 Koreans were taken away from South Chungcheong, which was a slightly higher percentage compared to the average of 83.4 percent for all of Korea. The table shows that 453 Koreans were taken from Seosan County through three rounds of recruitment, more than any other county in the province and 100.7 percent of the quota the company was assigned for the county. The next highest number of Koreans taken through two rounds of recruitment were Buyeo (237, 118.5 percent), Yesan (221, 88.4 percent), and Hongseong (197, 93.8 percent). Only thirty-eight Koreans were taken from Secheon County, less than any other county in the province and equivalent to a mere 38 percent of the company's quota in the county.

There were two instances in which more Koreans were taken than the assigned quota for a single round of recruitment in a county. The Hokkaido

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<sup>51</sup> Sapporo Trade and Industry Bureau's Coal Department, *Hokkaidō no sekitan sangyō* [Hokkaido Coal Industry] (1954).

Table 5. Forced Mobilization through Recruitment in South Chungcheong (Hokkaido Coal Mine Steamship Company)<sup>52</sup>

	Application Date	Approval Date	Date of Assignment to Province by the Government-General	Date of Provincial Governor's Permission	Start Date of Recruitment	Date of Arrival	Quota	No. of Koreans Taken	No. of Korean Workers by County
<b>Total</b>	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,150	1,811+ α (84.2%)	
Round 1	1941.3.15.	1941.5.22.	1941.7.6.	1941.7.28.	1941.7.28.	1941.8.27.	200	197 (98.5%)	Seosan 197 (200)
Round 2	1941.6.17.	1941.8.9.	1941.9.27.	1941.10.20.	1941.11.10.	1941.12.12.	100	100 (100%)	Geumsan 100 (100)
Round 3	1941.6.17.	1941.8.9.	1941.11.4.	1941.12.12.	1942.1.20.	1941.2.28.	700 <sup>53</sup>	693 (99%)	Seosan 150 (150) Buyeo 137 (100) Hongseong 137 (150) Yesan 122 (150) Nonsan 147 (150)
Round 4			1941.11.19.	1941.12.12.	-	-	300	α	
Round 5			1941.1.20.	1942.1.21.	1942.1.24.	1942.3.24.	300	224 (74.7%)	Yeongi 95 (100) Seochon 38 (100) Buyeo 100 (100)
Round 6	1941.7.15.	1941.9.29.	1941.3.5.	1942.3.6.	1942.4.15.	1942.6.5.	550	597 (119.4%)	Cheonan 100 (100) Asan 98 (100) Dangjin 134 (150) Yesan 99 (100) Seosan 106 (100) Hongseong 60 (68)

Coal Mine Steamship Company was assigned a quota of 100 for its third recruitment in Buyeo County but took 137 people and took 106 people from Seosan County, more than the assigned quota of 100 for the company's sixth recruitment in the county. However, in Seocheon County, the company ended up taking only 38 people instead of its assigned quota of 100. The company nearly filled its quota in most counties of South Chungcheong Province, but the way it exceeded its quota in several counties indicates how coercive and deceptive its recruitment must have been under the Japanese government and Government-General's support. Since July 1939, the Hokkaido Coal Mine Steamship Company eagerly took part in the application process to acquire Korean workers. Owning ships and trains to transport such workers is likely to have served as an advantage to the company in gaining permission.<sup>54</sup>

Meanwhile, the Konomai Gold Mine located in Monbetsu, Hokkaido was acquired by Sumitomo Mining Co., Ltd.<sup>55</sup> in 1917 and operated until

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<sup>52</sup> Moriya Yoshihiko, "Dai niiji sekai taisen ni okeru Chōsenjin kyōsei renkō no tōkei-teki kenkyū" [Statistical Researches on Korean Forced Transfer during World War II], *Dōto daigaku kiyō* 13 (December 1994): 76–77.

<sup>53</sup> The original table marked this number as 400, but it has been corrected to 700 in this paper based on the sum of quotas assigned to the counties where the third round of recruitment took place.

<sup>54</sup> After initiating its application process in July 1939, the Hokkaido Coal Mine Steamship Company dispatched all its labor management staff members to Seoul to confer with government officials in Korea. The company actively recruited Korean workers through the two Koreans it hired to handle recruitment tasks and succeeded in taking 84.2 percent of its quota by taking advantage of the ships and trains it owned through Yubari Railway Company and Kyoritsu Steamship Company. Eidai and Katō, *Senji gaikokujin kyōsei renkō kankei shiryōshū* 3: *Chōsenjin* 2, 1078–85; Chōsenjin kyōsei renkō shinsō chōsadan, *Chōsenjin kyōsei renkō kyōsei rōdō no kiroku: Hokkaidō, Chishima, Karafuto Hen* [Records of Forced Labor: Volume on Hokkaidō, Chishima, Karafuto] (Tokyo: Gendaishi Shuppankai, 1974): 136–37.

<sup>55</sup> Established in 1919, Sumitomo was headquartered in Osaka and operated mines in Hokkaido including Konomai Gold Mine, Akabira (赤平) Coal Mine, Ueutashinai (上歌志内) Coal Mine, Utashinai (歌志内) Coal Mine, Shinutashinai (新歌志内) Coal Mine, Kokufu (國富) Mine, Naie (奈井江) Coal Mine, Inaushi (伊奈牛) Mine, Karamatsu (唐松) Coal Mine, Ponbetsu (奔別) Coal Mine, and Yasoshi (八士) Mine. Truth Commission on Forced Mobilization under Japanese Imperialism, *Gangje Dongwon Myeongbu Haejejip* [Annotated Register of Forced Laborers], vol. 1 (Seoul: Prime Minister's Secretariat, 2009): 123–24.

the mine's closure in 1973.<sup>56</sup>

Between October 1939 and September 1942, the gold mine took a total of 1,744 Koreans from South Chungcheong Province through twelve rounds of recruitment. Table 6 below features details on the twelve rounds of recruitment the gold mine carried out in South Chungcheong Province.

Table 6. Forced Mobilization through Recruitment in South Chungcheong (Sumitomo Konomai Gold Mine)<sup>57</sup>

County	Round no.	Arrival Date	Quota	Number of People Taken	No. of People Taken by Towns and Townships
<b>Total</b>		-	1,668	1,668	
Cheonan	Sub total	-	201	202	Cheonan 23, Pungse 12, Hwanseong 25, Gwangdeok 5, Mokcheon 29, Seongnam 23, Sushin 4, Galjeon 14, Seonghwan 19, Buk 21, Uembong 1, Seonggeo 9, Ipjang 9, Jiksan 7, Goesan 1
	1	1939. 10.7.	102	102	Cheonan 7, Pungse 12, Hwanseong 23, Gwangdeok 5, Mokcheon 8, Seongnam 4, Sushin 4, Galjeon 14, Seonghwan 19, Buk 6
	22	1942. 8.29.	99	100	Cheonan 16, Hwanseong 2, Mokcheon 21, Seongnam 19, North 15, Uembong 1, Seonggeo 9, Ipjang 9, Jiksan 7, Goesan 1
Asan	Sub total	-	200	200	Onyang 27, Songak 6, Tangjeong 15, Yeomchi 22, Uembong 19, Yeongin 10, Inju 14, Seonjang 27, Dogo 20, Sinchang 24, Dobang 2, Dunpo 14
	1	1939. 10.7.	100	100	Onyang 16, Songak 3, Tangjeong 7, Yeomchi 14, Uembong 5, Yeongin 5, Inju 3, Seonjang 16, Dogo 11, Sinchang 13, Dobang 2, Dunpo 5
	20	1942. 8.15.	100	100	Onyang 11, Songak 3, Tangjeong 8, Yeomchi 8, Uembong 14, Yeongin 5, Inju 11, Seonjang 11, Dogo 9, Sinchang 11, Dunpo 9

<sup>56</sup> Eidai Hayashi and Moriya Yoshihiko, eds., *Senji gaikokujin kyōsei renkō kankei shiryōshū 3: Chōsenjin 2* [Collection of Historical Documents Related to Forcibly Taken Foreigners 3: Koreans 2], vol. 3 (Tokyo: Akashi shoten, 1991): 1261-62.

<sup>57</sup> Moriya Yoshihiko, “Kinzoku kōzan to Chōsen-Kankokujin kyōsei renkō” [Forced Transfer and Labor from Korean Peninsula in the Metal Mines during World War II: In the Case of Konomai Gold Mine of Sumitomo Company], *Dōto daigaku kiyō* 9 (December 1990): 19-20.

Dangjin	Sub total	-	197	197	Dangjin 31, Sunseong 24, Godae 10, Seokmun 9, Myeoncheon 20, Hapdeok 37, Bongcheon 18, Sinpyeong 13, Songak 22, Songsan 22, Songdeok 1
	1	1939.10.7.	100	100	Dangjin 16, Sunseong 15, Godae 3, Seokmun 4, Myeoncheon 10, Hapdeok 24, Bongcheon 9, Sinpyeong 6, Songak 8, Songsan 4, Songdeok 1
	21	1942.8.23.	97	97	Dangjin 15, Sunseong 9, Godae 7, Seokmun 5, Myeoncheon 10, Hapdeok 13, Bongcheon 9, Sinpyeong 7, Songak 14, Songsan 8
Yeongi	Sub total	-	236	236	Dong 55, Jochiwon 23, Seo 38, Jeoneui 52, Jeondong 26, Nam 36, Geumnam 50
	2	1940.1.6.	50	50	Dong 23, Jochiwon 4, Seo 9, Jeoneui 7
	6	1940.12.8.	97	97	Dong 21, Jochiwon 6, Seo 11, Jeoneui 17, Jeondong 3, Nam 10, Geumnam 29
	7	1941.1.16.	15	15	Dong 3, Jochiwon 1, Jeoneui 4, Jeondong 7
	10	1941.12.21.	74	74	Dong 2, Jochiwon 3, Seo 12, Jeoneui 16, Jeondong 8, Nam 12, Geumnam 21
Gongju	Sub total	-	226	226	Tancheon 33, Gyeryeong 23, Banpo 20, Janggi 28, Euidang 15, Jeongan 13, Useong 21, Sagok 12, Sinha 14, Sinsang 5, Gongju 16, Mokdong 26
	3	1940.3.27.	125	125	Tancheon 12, Gyeryeong 17, Banpo 14, Janggi 13, Euidang 14, Jeongan 7, Useong 11, Sagok 9, Sinha 3, Sinsang 5, Gongju 10, Mokdong 10
	6	1940.12.8.	26	26	Tancheon 20, Gongju 6
	7	1941.1.16.	75	75	Tancheon (1), Gyeryeong 6, Banpo 6, Janggi 15, Euidang 1, Jeongan 6, Useong 10, Sagok 3, Sinha 11, Mokdong 6
Buyeo	9	1941.9.8.	148	148	Buyeo 7, Gyuam 4, Eunsan 7, Woesan 29, Chochoon 15, Seokseong 12, Guryong 3, Oksan 4, Nam 17, Chungbuk 5, Yangam 10, Yanghwa 7, Imcheon 10, Sedo 8, Hongsan 10
Daedeok	Sub total	-	120	120	Jinjam 22, Giseong 37, Yuseong 10, Sannaek 6, Jeonbong 2, Dong 12, Tandong 7, Buk 8, Gujeuk 13, Yucheon 3
	2	1940.1.6.	50	50	Jinjam 20, Giseong 30

	10	1941. 12.21.	70	70	Jinjam 2, Giseong 7, Yuseong 10, Sannaeg 6, Jeonbong 2, Dong 12, Tandong 7, Buk 8, Gujeuk 13, Yucheon 3
Nonsan	9	1941. 9.8.	114	114	Nonsan 8, Yangchon 10, Noseong 12, Gujagok 5, Beolgok 8, Sangwol 13, Bujeok 5, Seongdong 13, Ganggyeong 6, Yeonsan 12, Gasegok 9, Duma 13
Yesan	10	1941. 12.21.	97	97	Yesan 4, Daesul 9, Sinyang 8, Gwangsi 6, Daheung 3, Eungbong 5, Sapgyo 11, Godeok 13, Sinam 9, Oga 16, Deoksan 11, Beomsan 2
Seocheon	Sub total	-	128	128	Jongcheon 8, Seo 13, Biin 20, Hansan 23, Masan 6, Maseo 9, Seocheon 5, Gisan 1, Sicho 8, Munsan 17, Janghang 7, Hwayang 8, Dong 3
	9	1941. 9.8.	33	33	Jongcheon 6, Seo 3, Biin 9, Hansan 5, Masan 2, Maseo 1, Seocheon 1, Hwayang 6
	19	1942. 8.7.	50	50	Hansan 15, Masan 3, Maseo 8, Gisan 1, Sicho 8, Munsan 15
	23	1942. 9.22.	45	45	Jongcheon 2, Seo 10, Biin 11, Hansan 3, Masan 1, Seocheon 4, Munsan 2, Janghang 7, Hwayang 2, Dong 3

As indicated in Table 6, the Sumitomo Konomai Gold Mine's first round of recruitment occurred in the counties of Cheonan, Asan, and Dangjin. The second round took place in the counties of Yeongi and Daedeok, the third round in Gongju, the sixth and seventh round in Yeongi and Gongju, the ninth round in Buyeo, Nonsan, and Seocheon, the tenth round in Yeongi, Daedeok, and Yesan, the nineteenth round in Seocheon, the twentieth round in Asan, the twenty-first round in Dangjin, the twenty-second round in Cheonan, and the twenty-third round in Seocheon. The table shows that the gold mine took 1,668 Koreans from South Chungcheong Province between October 7, 1939 and September 22, 1942. Four rounds of recruitment occurred in Yeongi County to take 236 people, which was the greatest number of Koreans the gold mine took from a single county in South Chungcheong Province. Yesan County was where the gold mine took the least number of people, which was 97 people through a single round of recruitment.

In the case of the tenth round of recruitment, the gold mine's recruiter

Takano Jūgorō (高野重五郎)<sup>58</sup> submitted to South Chungcheong Province an “Application for Permission to Recruit Koreans.” On November 7, 1941, the province’s governor granted the gold mine permission through Provincial Ordinance no. 257. During a span of two months, the gold mine was permitted to recruit 100 Koreans each from Daedeok County and Yeongi County as well as 150 Koreans from Yesan County, meaning a quota of 350 persons in total through the gold mine’s tenth round of recruitment. According to the application for this tenth round, Koreans were to be divided into twelve groups. One supervisor would be assigned to every fifty Koreans on a ship or to every thirty Koreans on a train. The plan was to transport the Korean workers by train to Busan and hire a ship to transport them from Busan to Hakodate or Otaru in Japan. They would then take a train to Monbetsu Station where a van would pick them up to be delivered to a mine.<sup>59</sup>

The gold mine’s recruiter spent 6,023.31 Korean Won to forcibly take 98 Koreans from Yesan County of South Chungcheong Province from November to December in 1941. 1,228.76 Won and 380.8 Won were respectively spent on bribing or entertaining county and township officials. Officials such as the county governor, the head of each township, the county’s director of home affairs, the social affairs staff of the county and its townships, the chief constable, and the head of each police patrol unit were presented with bribes such as teaware, canned food, shirts, or snacks. They were entertained a total of 46 times through dinners or parties. Apart from bribery and entertainment, 886.47 Won was spent on recruiting expenses, 1,078 Won on payment to the Association for Korean Labor Affairs (*Joseon nomu hyeophoe*), and 2,450 Won on travel and transportation expenses. As a result, it cost the gold mine 61.46 Won for every worker pro-

<sup>58</sup> Takano Jūgorō set up a temporary office to recruit Koreans at Hanaya Hotel located at 52, 1-jeongmok, Bon-jeong in Daejeon. Once a farmer after graduating from Simsang Elementary School, he became employed by Konomai Gold Mine in 1932 and began working as the mine’s foreman in 1937.

<sup>59</sup> “Documents Related to Labor Mobilization on the Korean Peninsula,” in Eidai and Moriya, *Senji gaikokujin kyōsei renkō kankei shiryōshū 3: Chōsenjin 2*: 1289-1305.

cured from Korea.<sup>60</sup> Hence, from the Japanese Government-General of Korea to low-ranking administrative officials in rural Korea, the Sumitomo Konomai Gold Mine made full use of its connections and persistently used coercive and deceptive methods to take full advantage of its quota and procure 1,668 Koreans from South Chungcheong Province through twelve rounds of recruitment.

#### 4. Resistance by Workers from South Chungcheong

##### 1) Evasion

Japan's forced mobilization was met with resistance by Koreans in South Chungcheong Province. Although it was rare to collectively resist recruitment, many Koreans did try to resist individually through various means of evasion. They attempted evasion during recruitment or in the process of

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<sup>60</sup> The details of expenditures for the Konomai Gold Mine's recruitment are as below. Moriya Yoshihiko, "Chōsenjin kyōsei renkō ni okeru boshū-kanassen chōyōhōshiki no ikkansei" [A Study on the Consistency of the Systems for Recruiting, Official Mediation, and Conscription of the Koreans during the World War II], *Dōto daigaku kiyō* 14 (December 1995): 13-102.

Date	Detail	Amount (Won)	Date	Detail	Amount (Won)
11.1	Clothes & hat storage at Nonsan Station (21 days)	15.75	12.10	Abstract family register, expedition fee	19.90
11.6	Waxed paper for worker register	8.40	12.10	Abstract family register, expedition fee, daily wage	250.00
11.9	150 copies of the recruitment notice	37.00	12.11	Worker accommodation, meals	319.03
11.12	Tools to post notice	3.16	12.11	3 recruiter train tickets (Yesan-Cheonan)	3.90
11.23	Travel expenses & daily wage (7 days)	20.00	12.11	Train tickets (Cheonan-Daejeon)	3.90
12.8	Background check form (Yesan Police Station)	15.00	12.11	Daily wage & expenses for returning home	45.00
12.9	Automobile lease (20 days)	18.90	12.12	Medical expenses for injured workers	4.90
12.10	Photos of recruited workers	65.00	12.12	Other	27.23
12.10	Physical examination & vaccination	30.00	<b>Total</b>		886.47

being transported, and even after arriving at their final destination they continued to seek opportunities to escape.

Residents of South Chungcheong Province foremost kept the whereabouts of their family members or relatives ambiguous to one another to lower the possibility of being taken away. People who particularly sought to evade recruitment went into hiding in nearby mountains such as Mount Chilgap, Mount Daedun, or Mount Gyeryong or on a remote island if they lived in coastal areas. Meanwhile, people often attempted to escape while being transported, whether it be from their lodgings, a train station, restroom, or even from a truck or a train in motion. Attempts to escape continued even after reaching their final destination. However, workers caught attempting to escape were beaten, sometimes to the point of death, or placed under heavy labor and surveillance.

Koreans caught trying to escape from Hokkaido were sent to labor camps called *takobeya* where they suffered under harsh working and living conditions. Below is an excerpt from a testimony by Yun Seung-yeol, who was taken on February 27, 1942 from Hongseong County of South Chungcheong Province to the Hokkaido Coal Mine Railway Company's Sorachi Mine where he witnessed a fellow Korean worker, an unidentified person whose last name was Yun, become subjected to heavy labor at a *takobeya* for trying to escape.

Once rock dust gets into the bodies of workers there, it's stuck and can't be flushed out. That's why people who stay there often get sick. You know those places called "*takobeya*." Runaways are sent there to do that stuff, that hard work. There's no hours or anything like that there. You have to carry a huge load through thick rock dust all day so you can't recognize anyone when they get out. Rock dust. That's what they made Koreans do... Runaways were sent there. To a *takobeya*. There was someone taken to Hanyang with me, his name was Yun. It would've been better if he stayed put where he was, but he got caught running away. So, he was sent away there to do that shit. All those white rocks. My god, it's no place to be. We got three shifts but it's a double shift there. Double shift. It means you go to work in the evening and again in

the morning. Double shift. So, you work more.<sup>61</sup>

Life at a *takobeya* indeed meant a significantly heavier workload. Most sites usually operated under a three-shift system, but workers sent to a *takobeya* had to bear a double shift. In other words, the price for trying to run away was to be confined at a *takobeya* and forced to work day and night. Despite such harsh circumstances, Koreans still sought ways to escape. Also, a severe beating awaited those caught trying to escape. While working at a coal mine in Nagasaki Prefecture, Han Yeon-woo from Seosan County of South Chungcheong Province testified about the beating of a fellow Korean who attempted to run away.

Lots of people died. From a mine collapse or a beating... Yes. Even after all those threats to kill anyone who runs away... People still ran away? Yes, they still did. That's why they would get dragged away and beaten. He was one of them. I saw it. Beaten to show what would happen to anyone who tries to run away. We were told not to run away or else we'd get killed.<sup>62</sup>

Japanese supervisors or foremen sought to prevent Korean workers from escaping by making an example out of anyone caught trying to run away. Testimonies such as the one below indicate that Koreans were threatened by witnessing the capture and beating of their compatriots that ended in death in many cases.

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<sup>61</sup> Yoon Byeong-ryeol (1925 nyeon Chungnam Hongseonggun chulsaeng) eui jeungeon [Testimony by Yoon Byeong-ryeol (Born in 1925 in Hongseong County, South Chungcheong)] in Truth Commission on Forced Mobilization under the Japanese Imperialism, *Ahobmeori neomeo bukhaedoro* [Beyond Ahobmeori To Hokkaido] (Seoul: Prime Minister's Secretariat, 2009): 85-86.

<sup>62</sup> Han Yeon-wu (1919 nyeon Chungnam Seosangun chulsaeng) eui jeungeon [Testimony by Han Yeon-wu (Born in 1919 in Seosan County, South Chungcheong)] in Truth Commission on Forced Mobilization under the Japanese Imperialism, *Ttokttakseon tago odaga bada gwisin dweol ppeon haenne* [I Almost Became a Sea Ghost on a Steamboat]: 80-84.

Seven or eight foremen surrounded him, cursed at him, and struck his ribs and shins with clubs. He rubbed his hands together, begging for mercy. The foremen said, “Runaways deserve to die.” They eagerly stripped him of his clothes, placed a club between his shins, and made him sit. They sat on his shoulders to press him down. ... One foreman used another club to strike a heavy blow on his shoulders that knocked him down, leaving him like a limp, trembling frog. Another foreman joined in by kicking him, while yet another pounced on him. He was soaked with blood by the time he completely lost consciousness. It was routine for the foremen to prepare a bucket of water to splash on beaten runaways, throw a sack over them, and chat over a smoke. When the sound of his breathing grew faint, he was carried away on a stretcher to the dispensary, but he never came back.<sup>63</sup>

The above describes the death of a Korean from Chungcheong Province in June 1942 after being beaten by Japanese foremen for trying to escape forced labor at a railroad construction site in Biratori, Hokkaido. Although many met the same fate of being bludgeoned to death for attempting to flee, the beatings failed to stop Korean workers from continuing to take the risk.

Japan began to investigate what was causing Koreans to escape as the number of runaways kept rising to reach 429 by November 1939.<sup>64</sup> At the same time, it had officials such as chief constables give speeches about the “valor of industrial warriors” in order to brainwash Koreans into believing that “Japan and Korea are one” on their way to and even after they arrived in Japan.

- 1) Those who use recruitment as a means to sail over to Japan
- 2) Those who receive instructions to escape from acquaintances or oth-

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<sup>63</sup> Kwon Byong-tak, *Kerama yeoldo: Ilje mal jingyonggi* [Kerama Islands: Accounts of Conscripted Labor Around the End of Japanese Colonial Rule] (Yeungnam University Press, 1982): 50-51.

<sup>64</sup> Police Agency Security Office under the Japanese Home Ministry, “November, December Bulletin of the Special Higher Police,” *Teukgo wolbo* 23 (1939): 166.

ers in Japan

- 3) Those who are kidnapped on their way to a place of employment by someone offering to broker a job less dangerous than working at a mine or a coal mine
- 4) Those who fear working at a mine or a coal mine
- 5) Those averse to being overworked at a mine or a coal mine
- 6) Those who believe the actual terms of labor are different from those advertised during recruitment

Japan identified the above six cases as potential reasons that were causing recruited Koreans to run away. However, such identification was no more than conjecture on the part of Japan. Koreans were forced to support Japan's wars of aggression, but they were aware that Japan and Korea being one was a fabricated idea. The voluntary participation of Koreans had been impossible from the outset. In 1940, the number of mobilized Korean workers dropped 56.7 percent from 54,944 to 31,177, among which 20,430 had run away. The continuously rising number of runaways thus served as one of the main reasons Japanese companies switched to a more coercive, organized method of procuring labor through government offices that took on the role of brokers.<sup>65</sup>

## 2) Collective Action

Apart from running away, Koreans taken from South Chungcheong Province also constantly attempted to resist working in Japan by going on strikes, slowing down, or taking direct, collective action. They acted together to demand the improvement of poor wages, meals, contract lengths, and working conditions. Against punishments that Japanese supervisors or foremen privately inflicted, Korean workers resorted to the direct use of force from time to time.

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<sup>65</sup> Kang, "Chimnyak jeonjaenggi Ilbon e gangje dongwon dweun Joseon nodongja eui jeohang": 244.

The difference between Korea and Japan's funeral practices gave reason to engage in collective action as well. On March 15, 1940, a strike occurred to demand the repatriation of a Korean worker who died by accident at Nippon Mining's Toyoha Mine.<sup>66</sup> On November 17, 1940, Koreans protested against the funeral arrangements for a worker who died from a cave-in at the Mitsubishi Mining Company's Teine Mine. The denial of requests to repatriate the body, postpone the funeral until family members arrived, provide interment, and suspend all mining operations until after the funeral were met with a unified, rebellious response involving abusive language by all 292 Korean workers on site.<sup>67</sup> When the Hokkaido Coal Mine Steamship Company decided to cut back on meal portions, Korean workers at the company's Yubari Mine declared on April 3, 1941 that they were unable to work on empty stomachs. They went on a strike by refusing to enter the pit until the company accepted their demand for the provision of meal replacements.<sup>68</sup> On June 25, 1941, around eight hundred Koreans working at the Oyubari Mine assaulted police officers and threw stones at them in protest.<sup>69</sup>

One hundred thirteen Korean workers were ostracizing their pit boss over meal issues. When the matter became public on June 15, a police officer came to persuade the Koreans to change their mind. However, nearly 200 Koreans surrounded the officer, yelling as they stripped him of his hat and clothes to beat him. That prompted the Yubari Police Station to issue an emergency dispatch to the scene where thirty-four Korean workers were arrested to pacify the situation. At the sight of their colleagues being taken away, the remaining Koreans chased the

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<sup>66</sup> Police Agency Security Office under the Japanese Home Ministry, "April Bulletin of the Special Higher Police," *Teukgo wolbo* 24 (1940): 180.

<sup>67</sup> Police Agency Security Office under the Japanese Home Ministry, "November, December Bulletin of the Special Higher Police," *Teukgo wolbo* 23 (1939): 188.

<sup>68</sup> Police Agency Security Office under the Japanese Home Ministry, "April Bulletin of the Special Higher Police," *Teukgo wolbo* 27 (1941): 86.

<sup>69</sup> Police Agency Security Office under the Japanese Home Ministry, "June Bulletin of the Special Higher Police," *Teukgo wolbo* 27 (1941): 75-76.

police up to the bus station, creating further commotion as they assaulted and threw stones at officers. The Koreans also threatened to “attack the police station if their arrested colleagues failed to be released by the 27th.” By that time, Koreans from other pits joined in so that approximately 800 of them seemed rebellious enough to attempt an attack on the police station.

This incident was settled with the repatriation of ten among the arrested thirty-four Koreans for obstructing justice. Meanwhile, on October 15, 1940, fifty Koreans went on strike at Mitsubishi’s Obira Mine in Oita Prefecture because of wages that differed from what was advertised during recruitment. When Koreans witnessed their representative being beaten by Japanese pit bosses at the office, they swarmed to the office and threw stones to break its windows in protest.<sup>70</sup> This incident, however, was not the first in which Koreans from South Chungcheong collectively protested against the beating of compatriots by Japanese supervisors or foremen, which sometimes escalated to the Koreans using force. On October 27, 1939, a Korean worker discovered a Japanese supervisor beating a Korean colleague inside a pit at the Konomai Gold Mine and rushed to the office to complain.<sup>71</sup> Similar incidents occurred at the Toi Gold Mine in Shizuoka Prefecture as well as the Higashimizome Mining Co., Ltd. in Yamaguchi Prefecture.

On October 11, 1941, around one hundred Koreans from South Chungcheong who witnessed their compatriot being beaten by a Japanese pit boss barged into the office in protest to injure three oppressive Japanese pit bosses and shatter fifty sheets of window glass.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> Police Agency Security Office under the Japanese Home Ministry, “November Bulletin of the Special Higher Police,” *Teukgo wolbo* 26 (1940): 86.

<sup>71</sup> Police Agency Security Office under the Japanese Home Ministry, “November, December Bulletin of the Special Higher Police,” *Teukgo wolbo* 23 (1939): 188.

<sup>72</sup> Police Agency Security Office under the Japanese Home Ministry, “October Bulletin of the Special Higher Police,” *Teukgo wolbo* 28 (1941): 111.

Among the 176 Koreans involved in the above incident at the Toi Gold Mine, eleven were arrested for leading the riot and eight of them were repatriated for being convicted of assault. The excerpt below describes how Koreans from South Chungcheong acted in unison at the Higashimizome Mine upon witnessing the beating of several compatriots.

On April 14, 1942, fifty-four Koreans from South Chungcheong including Yun Hui-mok witnessed a Japanese pit boss beating their colleague Kang Bong-jun and three other Korean workers for feigning illness to avoid work. The witnesses rushed over to the office to warn the manager that they will never forgive the pit boss's assault upon a fellow migrant.<sup>73</sup>

The testimony below by Ji Ok-dong from Cheonan County of South Chungcheong Province describes yet another instance of collective resistance that occurred at the Asajino Airfield in Hokkaido, Japan.

As he was eating, a colleague of ours said “Darn, the work is hard and this is what we get for meals. There’s practically nothing except for these four pieces.” That’s when the “sewayaku,” the supervisor got up as he said, “What? You damn bastard!” and started kicking him in the middle of a meal. The kicking made his lunch box fly away and blood started to stream. The others there shouted, “This bastard is killing a man. Let’s beat him to death!” They began to stomp on the supervisor until he was half dead. But word got out so that the military police came over, fully armed with guns and helmets and all that. There must have been about fifty of them. They came in a truck and stood on guard as they investigated. Instead of being put to work, we were sent to the barracks that day. But because the military police came, the four workers who took the lead (in beating the supervisor) got killed. They were shot

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<sup>73</sup> Police Agency Security Office under the Japanese Home Ministry, “April Bulletin of the Special Higher Police,” *Teukgo wolbo* 30 (1942): 157.

to death.<sup>74</sup>

As shown through the testimonies above, Japanese supervisors privately abused Korean workers without any particular reason. And some of those Koreans collectively reacted to such abuse with violence toward Japanese supervisors. Yet, most people from South Chungcheong chose to run away. Those caught trying were beaten, sometimes to the point of death. Such consequences still did not stop Koreans from continuing their attempts to escape. Aware that the Japanese idea of Japan and Korea being one was pure fiction, they also acted in unison to carry out strikes and slowdowns, and voiced their demands regarding meals, wages, contract lengths, or working hours.

## 5. Conclusion

As Japan aggressively broadened its influence over China and recalibrated its colonial operations to facilitate war in the late 1930s, it started to mobilize Koreans as a means to launch wars of aggression. Japan's labor mobilization plan involved several different methods, one of which was recruitment. Mobilizing labor required beforehand a nationwide survey of Korean labor resources. For the survey, minimum farmland sizes were defined to detect the number of households with surplus manpower and also determine the number of potential laborers and employment seekers willing to relocate or change jobs.

The survey results revealed that there were 1,160,177 potential laborers and 263,083 employment seekers in Korea. The ratio of employment seekers among potential laborers was 22.7 percent, a number maximized to demonstrate that a high percentage of Koreans were compliant toward the Japanese government's colonial policies and justified such policies. At the same time, the ratio hinted at how coercive and deceptive Japan's mobili-

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<sup>74</sup> Ji Ok-dong (1926 nyeon Chungnam Cheonwongun chulsaeng) eui jeungeon [Testimony by Ji Ok-dong (Born in 1926 in Cheonwon County, South Chungcheong)] in Truth Commission on Forced Mobilization under the Japanese Imperialism, *Ahobmeori neomeo bukhaedoro*: 368.

zation of Koreans would become. As of March 31, 1940, South Chungcheong Province had 113,182 potential laborers and 46,276 employment seekers. The number of potential laborers amounted to 7.37 percent of the province's entire population at the time, which were 1,536,587. These numbers meant that one out of every thirteen people in the province could be mobilized.

The coercion and deception in Japan's recruitment methods indicate that many Koreans were taken away by force. Recruitment quotas were determined through a strictly hierarchical administrative system in both Japan and colonial Korea and involved bribery and entertainment provided by Japanese corporate recruiters to ensure administrative cooperation from authorities of all ranks. The Hokkaido Coal Mine Steamship Company and the Sumitomo Konomai Gold Mine are notable among the Japanese companies that can be identified through records for carrying out recruitment in South Chungcheong. Between the two companies alone, more than 3,555 Koreans were taken from the province to Japan through eighteen rounds of recruitment between 1939 and 1942.

People from South Chungcheong Province tried to either evade or directly resist forced labor. They constantly attempted to run away from points of assembly, while being transported to Japan, and even after being placed to work. They also took collective action against violence or harsh working conditions by going on strike or slowing down their work pace. Koreans were aware of the fictionality in the idea that Japan and Korea were one and therefore continued to exhibit various forms of resistance. This made recruitment an increasingly ineffective method of mobilization for Japanese companies so that they were later compelled to pursue more coercive methods such as conscription or using government agencies as brokers.

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# The History and Reality of Issues Surrounding Japanese Textbooks: Contention between Internationalism and Patriotism

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# The History and Reality of Issues Surrounding Japanese Textbooks: Contention between Internationalism and Patriotism\*

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## 1. Introduction

For the 2012 Japanese general election, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) pledged through its election manifesto *J-file 2012* to revise the Neighboring Country Clause (近隣諸国条項 kinrinshokokujōko), stating that “many textbooks still include biased descriptions based on a masochistic view of history.” As an advocate of overcoming such a view of history, Prime Minister Abe Shinzō touted the Fundamental Law of Education’s amendment in December 2006 as a major achievement of his first cabinet. Through a statement on the law’s amendment, Prime Minister Abe claimed that “according to the spirit of the Fundamental Law of Education established today, education shall be renewed to make it possible for individuals to develop their diverse potential, nurture them into citizens with a purpose, and shape Japan into a beautiful, dignified country.”<sup>1</sup> The amend-

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<sup>1</sup> Kyōiku kihon hokai seihō seiritsu o ukete no naikaku sōridaijin no danwa [Prime Minister’s Statement Following the Passage of the Fundamental Law of Education’s Amendment] (December 15, 2006, Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology website).

ment sparked domestic controversy between those who were for and against it, especially surrounding the addition of the article promoting patriotism. Advocates of the article called for the importance of patriotism in overcoming a masochistic view of history while their opposition pointed out the danger behind enforced patriotism. Prime Minister Abe has actively taken advantage of textbook issues to present himself as a symbol of conservatism. Yet, among the objectives of education stated in the revised Fundamental Law of Education, Article 2-5 not only aims for patriotism through the phrase “respect our traditions and culture, and love the country and the region that nurtured them,” but also seeks to inspire internationalism by fostering “respect for other countries and a desire to contribute to world peace and the development of the international community.” In other words, a more in-depth review based on facts seems necessary to determine how Abe’s representation of “conservative, patriotic education” has actually been implemented in Japan.

Media reports titled “Historical Distortions in Japanese Textbooks Grow Increasingly Elaborate” (Hankook Ilbo editorial, March 18, 2016) and “Japan’s Abe Administration Strikes Out Large Portions of Textbook Descriptions Approved Four Years Ago” (Yonhap News, March 19, 2016) indicate how critical South Korea has been of the worsening distortion of history in Japanese textbooks. Japanese right-wingers, on the other hand, argue that their textbook descriptions have been based on masochistic views of history that regard Japan as subordinate to China and Korea.<sup>2</sup> These contrasting views over Japanese textbook descriptions may have been caused by their concurrent accommodation of patriotism and internationalism.<sup>3</sup> Hence, based on the idea that patriotism and internationalism have been contending throughout changes made to Japanese textbook descriptions since August 1945, this article seeks to examine specific changes in descriptions of Japan’s colonial rule, wars of aggression, and territorial issues as

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<sup>2</sup> Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform website (<http://www.tsukurukai.com/hikaku/hikaku.html>).

<sup>3</sup> In this paper, patriotism is identified as attempts to curtail descriptions of colonial rule and wars of aggression due to love of country and internationalism as attempts to describe facts about colonial rule and wars of aggression to facilitate international understanding.

well as the Japanese government’s involvement in such changes.<sup>4</sup>

Table 1. Chronology of Japanese Textbook Issues

Year	Patriotism	Internationalism
1946		Textbook published by the Japanese Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and Culture (MESSC) includes description of the Nanjing Massacre.
1949		Textbook screening system replaces state-issued textbooks.
1955	Japan Democratic Party (ruling party) distributes the booklet “The Problem of Deplorable Textbooks.”	
1965		Ienaga Saburō files a lawsuit against the Japanese textbook screening system.
1970		First trial of Ienaga’s second lawsuit finds the screening system in violation of the Japanese constitution and the education law.
1974		The Nanjing Massacre reappears in high school textbooks.
1975		The Nanjing Massacre reappears in middle school textbooks.
1980	The ruling LDP publishes a serial in its bulletin titled “Textbooks Now: Proposals to Normalize Education.”	
1982	High school textbook screening results are announced (The Asahi Shimbun reports the change in describing Japan’s entry into North China as an advance instead of an invasion).	Chief Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa Kiichi issues a statement introducing the “neighboring country clause” as a new criterion for textbook screening.
1984		All middle school history textbooks include a description of the Nanjing Massacre.

<sup>4</sup> For research on historical developments in the Japanese textbook issue between August 1945 and 2001, refer to *Tawara Yoshifumi, Kyōkasho kōgeki no shinsō* [The Depths of the Textbook Attacks] (Tōkyō: Gakushu no tomosha, 1997) and Nam Sang-gu, “Ilbon yeoksa gyogwaseo munje reul boneun nun” [A Perspective to Viewing the Japanese History Textbook Issue], *Yeoksa yeongu*, no. 9 (2001): 293-326.

1985		All high school history textbooks include a description of the Nanjing Massacre.
1986	The National Conference to Defend Japan publishes the high school history textbook <i>New Edition of Japanese History</i> through Hara Shobō Press.	
1993	LDP launches a “History Review Committee.”	Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono Yohei issues a statement, extending an apology and expressing remorse regarding the Japanese military “comfort women” issue.
1994		High school Japanese history textbooks approved in 1993 and 1994 include descriptions of comfort women (22 out of 23 textbooks).
1995		Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi issues a statement extending an apology and expressing remorse for Japan’s invasion and colonial rule of Korea.
1996	“Diet Members’ Alliance for a Bright Japan” and the “Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform” (JSHTR) are formed.	All seven approved middle school history textbooks include descriptions of comfort women.
1997	The group “Parliamentarians with the Future of Japan and History Education in Mind” is formed.	
1999	The Act on the National Flag and the Anthem is ratified.	
2001	The JSHTR publishes middle school history and civics textbooks through Fusosha Publishing.	The first Korea-Japan Joint History Research Committee is established.
2005	The number of middle school history textbooks describing the comfort women issue falls from eight to two.	The Korea-China-Japan Common History Compilation Committee publishes <i>A History to Open the Future</i> .
2006	“The Organization for Japan’s Educational Renewal” splits from the JSHTR. The Fundamental Law of Education is amended (with the addition of the “patriotism” article).	
2007		The second Korea-Japan Joint History Research Committee is established.
2008	Middle school curriculum guidelines note that Dokdo is a subject of territorial dispute.	

2011	The JSHTR and the Organization for Japan's Educational Renewal publishes a history/civics textbook through the publishers Jiyūsha and Ikuhōsha. Descriptions of comfort women disappear from middle school history textbooks. All middle school geography/civics textbooks include descriptions of Dokdo.	
2014	Middle and high school curriculum guidelines stipulate Dokdo as inherently Japanese territory illegally occupied by Korea.	
2015	All approved middle school geography, civics, and history textbooks (18) describe Dokdo as Japanese territory.	Manabisha's middle school history textbook includes a description of comfort women.
2016	All approved high school geography A/B, politics and economy, modern society, and Japanese history A/B textbooks (24) describe Dokdo as Japanese territory.	
2017	Elementary and middle school curriculum guidelines stipulate that Dokdo is an inherent territory of Japan.	
2018	High school curriculum guidelines stipulate that Dokdo is an inherent territory of Japan.	
2019	All eight social studies textbooks for fifth grade and sixth grade elementary students describe Dokdo as Japanese territory.	

## 2. Historical Developments in the Japanese Textbook Issue<sup>5</sup>

### 1) Stage One: From the End of the Pacific War to the First Textbook Attack (1945-55)

As per instructions given by the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers that occupied Japan in 1945, history text-

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<sup>5</sup> This part is a revised and supplemented version of Nam, "Ilbon yeoksa gyogwaseo munje reul boneun nun."

books based on imperialist views and used during the Pacific War were discarded and replaced. In 1946, the Japanese Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and Culture (hereafter as MESSC) published *Traces of Our Nation* (*Kuninoayumi*, elementary school), *History of Japan II* (日本の歴史 下 *Nihon no rekishi ge*, middle school), *History of Japan* (日本歴史 *Nihon rekishi*, high school), *History of Japan* (college of education), all of which noted that Japan “invaded Nanjing” and “committed atrocities during its occupation of Nanjing” in their description of the Nanjing Massacre.<sup>6</sup> From 1949, a screening system replaced state-issued textbooks so that some textbooks described the Mukden Incident, the Sino-Japanese wars, and the aggressions in Southeast Asia as “invasions” by Japan.<sup>7</sup> However, textbook descriptions of Japanese wars of aggression were not the result of changes in the Japanese perception of history, but due to policies under the Allied Powers’ occupation.

## 2) Stage Two: From the First Textbook Attack to the Ienaga Lawsuits (1955-65)

Once the Allied Powers’ occupation ended, conservative forces began to attack textbook descriptions of Japanese wars of aggression and acts of violence. MESSC Minister Okano Kiyohide mentioned that “while the good and the evil of the Pacific War may not be discussed, the fact that Japan fought against world powers for four years demonstrates the superiority of its people, which is why they need to believe in themselves again.”<sup>8</sup> This comment indicated that instilling confidence back into the Japanese became a mission for the conservatives. With such a sense of mission, the ruling Japan Democratic Party (JDP) distributed the three-volume booklet *The Problem of Deplorable Textbooks* (うれうべき教科書の問題 *Ureubeki kyōkasho no mondai*) from August to November of 1955, an incident

<sup>6</sup> Tawara, *Kyōkasho kōgeki no shinsō*: 169-70.

<sup>7</sup> Tawara, 29.

<sup>8</sup> This comment that appeared in the regular column *Tensei Jingo* (天声人語 *tenseijingo*) was quoted from the minutes of the House of Representatives’ budget committee session (February 9, 1953).

which has since been referred to as the First Textbook Attack. The attack was meant to point out that the Japan Teachers Union was providing left-leaning education on politics through biased textbooks. Textbooks covering Japan's invasion of China were criticized as "questionable whether it can serve as proper Japanese textbooks," which subsequently intensified the Japanese government's screening of textbook descriptions.

As a result, thirty percent of the textbook submissions failed to pass the screening in 1957, including *A New History of Japan* (新日本史 *Shinnihonshi*) by Ienaga Saburo.<sup>9</sup> The reason for disqualifying Ienaga's high school history textbook was that the author's "extreme anxiousness to reflect on the past is too distant from the purpose of teaching Japanese history so that students may be aware of the efforts their ancestors made, grow conscious of their Japanese identity, and nurture abundant affection for their nation."<sup>10</sup> This strict approach in screening textbooks led to decreasing descriptions about the aggressions and the violence that Japan inflicted.

In December 1957 and in December 1965, textbook authors expressed concern about the government's heavy regulation of textbooks. In 1960, the Japanese Historical Council and nine historical research societies each declared their concern over the government's infringement of academic freedom. In 1965, Ienaga filed his first lawsuit to argue that the textbook screening system was unconstitutional and unlawful. In 1967, he filed a second lawsuit against the government which had rejected his textbook for 1968, due to three detail descriptions at six different places in it.

### 3) Stage Three: From the Normalization of Korea-Japan Diplomatic Relations to the Second Textbook Attack (1965-82)

Upon his visit to Korea on February 17, 1965, the Japanese Foreign Minis-

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<sup>2</sup> Namimoto Katsutoshi, "1950-nendai no kyōkasho mondai" [The Textbook Issue in the 1950s], *Risshō Daigaku Bungakubu ronsō*, no. 83 (1986): 71.

<sup>10</sup> Ienaga Saburō, *Kyōkasho kentei: Kyōiku o yugameru kyōiku gyōsei* [Textbook Screening: Educational Administration That Distorts Education] (Tōkyō: Nihon Hyoronsha, 1965): 71.

ter Shiina Etsusaburō issued a statement before signing a treaty made through a series of bilateral talks. The statement noted that “it is most unfortunate and deeply regretful that there was such a tragic period in the long history that Japan has shared with Korea.” Once he returned to Japan, Shiina attended a Lower House Foreign Affairs Committee meeting on February 24, 1965, and made it clear that the statement he had given in Korea was to express remorse for Japan’s unjust colonial rule of Korea. He commented, “I hope you understand the statement as a gesture to show how deeply Japan regrets the tragic part of its past with Korea and how determined she is to build friendly relations with Korea for the sake of its future. Moreover, from the standpoint of national sentiment or international politics, it does not seem just for one nation to rule another nation that has its own cultural and historical traditions.”<sup>11</sup> After the diplomatic relations between Japan and Korea had been normalized, descriptions related to Japan’s colonial rule of Korea began to increase as can be seen in Table 3 (p. 130).

In the 1970s, descriptions of colonial rule and wars of aggression multiplied for two reasons. First, through the first trial of Ienaga’s second lawsuit, Judge Sugimoto Ryōkichi ruled that textbook screening goes against the constitution and the education law, pointing out that “it is inadmissible to perform an ideological screening of textbook descriptions and there are certain limitations to intervening in them.” Second, the Japanese government’s policy changed after the diplomatic relations between Japan and China had been normalized in 1972. Such change could be sensed from an answer the then MESSC Minister Inaba Osamu gave at a parliamentary hearing on September 29, 1972: “The people of Japan need to be fully aware of how gravely the Chinese suffered from the war. Thus, I agree with Representative Yasunaga’s opinion that there is much to be done as regards elementary, middle, and high school education as well as social education. Regarding its invasion of China, Japan stated through a

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<sup>11</sup> Nam Sang-gu, “Abe jeonggwon eui yeoksa insik gwa Han-II gwangye” [The Recognition of History by the Government of Prime Minister Abe Shinzō and Korea-Japan Relations], *Hanil gwangyesa yeongu*, no. 46 (2013): 234-35.

draft of its joint communiqué with China that “The Government of Japan is deeply repentant over the damages that Japanese militarism has caused the people of China in the past.” Minister Inaba’s comment could be regarded as a reflection of the Japanese Government’s view at the time, meaning that the reestablishment of Japan-China relations seems to have influenced descriptions in Japanese textbooks.

Consequently, descriptions of the Nanjing Massacre reappeared in the 1974 edition of high school Japanese history textbooks as well as in the 1975 edition of middle school Japanese history textbooks. Efforts made by Japanese civil society and academia, notably the Ienaga lawsuits, in tandem with external factors such as the normalization of Korea-China relations all brought internationalist descriptions back to the surface.

As descriptions of Japanese aggressions increased, the conservatives began to launch an attack on textbooks, which is referred to as the second attack. From January 1980, the LDP began to publish through its bulletin *Jiyū Shinpō* (自由新報) a series titled “Textbooks Now: Proposals for the Normalization of Education.” A few months later, in July, full-scale attacks on textbooks followed after the Minister of Justice Okuno Seisuke had argued during a press conference that “current textbooks have serious issues such as avoiding expressions of love for our country.” The regulation of descriptions through textbook screening subsequently grew markedly heavier.

#### 4) Stage Four: From the 1982 Textbook Crisis to the 1996 Approval of Middle School Textbooks with Comfort Women Descriptions (1982-96)

Around the time that the second attack on textbooks occurred, the daily Asahi Shimbun reported on June 26, 1982, that the MESSC was using the screening of high school history textbooks to force Japanese aggressions in north China to be described as an “advance” instead of an “invasion” and to drastically cut back descriptions of Japanese wars of aggression. However, none of the textbooks that passed the screening in 1982 replaced “invasion” with “advance”. Instead, such a change was made to the 1976 mid-

dle school social studies (history) textbook, the 1977 high school world history textbook, and the 1979 middle school social studies (history) textbook. There was also a case in the 1981 screening in which Japanese aggressions in Southeast Asia were described as an advance.

When the Asahi Shimbun report incited strong reactions from Korea and China, the Japanese government issued a statement through Chief Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa Kiichi two months later on August 26, 1982 to announce the creation of the “Neighboring Country Clause.” The clause was to be Japan’s promise to the international society that it would truthfully describe its past through textbooks including facts related to its colonial rule and wars of aggression so as to “be considerate of international understanding and cooperation when dealing with modern to contemporary historical facts related to neighboring Asian countries.” Unlike the conservatives’ intention to curtail descriptions of Japan’s wars of aggression, the second attack on textbooks resulted in improving textbook descriptions. As a result, the 1984 editions of middle school textbooks and the 1985 editions of high school textbooks all included descriptions of the Nanjing Massacre.

In the 1990s, the Japanese military comfort women issue came to the surface. Asian victims began to increasingly question Japan’s postwar treatment by taking actions such as filing lawsuits against the Japanese government to demand postwar compensation. In 1993, the Japanese government issued a statement through Chief Cabinet Secretary Kōno Yōhei to admit and apologize for the Japanese government and the military’s involvement in installing comfort stations and mobilizing comfort women. In 1995, Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi issued a statement, apologizing and expressing remorse for Japan’s wars of aggression and colonial rule. These gestures by the Japanese government influenced textbook descriptions around that time. Twenty-two of the twenty-three high school Japanese history textbooks A/B that passed the screening in 1993 and in 1994 included descriptions about the comfort women issue as did all seven middle school history textbooks that passed the screening in 1996. Also, a question about the comfort women issue and the forced mobilization of Koreans and Chinese appeared in the 1997 National Center for University

Entrance Examinations (equivalent to the College Scholastic Ability Test in Korea).<sup>12</sup>

### 5) Stage Five: New Attacks on Textbooks (1993-Present)

As Japanese government officials offered apologies and expressed remorse for colonial rule and wars of aggression and descriptions of them increased in textbooks, conservatives in Japan once again began to launch efforts to counter such developments. In August 1993, the LDP formed a “History Review Committee (歴史検討委員会 Rekishikentōiinkai).” This committee also argued for the launching of a national campaign with scholars to “confront” textbooks describing Japanese aggression and wrongdoings, and established that the Pacific War’s purpose had been to liberate Asia, and that the Nanjing Massacre and the Japanese military comfort women were fabrications. The “Diet Members’ Alliance for a Bright Japan,” formed in June 1996, and the “Parliamentarians with the Future of Japan and History Education in Mind” formed in February 1997 demanded that descriptions of comfort women be removed from textbooks, arguing that “it is impossible to agree with servile, apologetic diplomacy and masochistic perceptions vilifying our country’s past as an aggressor nation.” During a parliamentary session on June 5, 1998, MESSC Minister Machimura Nobutaka claimed that textbook descriptions of Japanese history beyond the Meiji Restoration were skewed toward negative aspects.

In tandem with the above actions in the political sphere, the Japanese scholar Nishio Kanji led the formation of the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform (hereafter as JSHTR, 新しい歴史教科書をつくる会 *Atarashi irekishi kyōkasho wo tsukuru kai*) in December 1996. Early on, the

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<sup>12</sup> Fujioka Nobukatsu, “Saku toi no gensoku o itsudatsu shita sentan yūshi mondai” [Entrance Exam Questions that Deviate from the Principle of Creating Questions] (<http://www.jiyuushikan.org/rekishi/rekishi79.html>).

According to Fujioka, questions about forced mobilization appeared seven times in Japanese history and world history examinations between 1990 and 2004. After the question in the 2004 exam was criticized, no further questions on forced mobilization have appeared in the National Center for University Entrance Examinations.

JSHTR focused on criticizing the existing textbooks for including descriptions about comfort women based on masochistic views of history. From 2001, the JSHTR began to directly publish its own history and civics textbook. The issues surrounding Japanese textbooks since 2001 have been centered around historical distortions in textbooks such as those committed by the JSHTR or the Organization for Japan's Educational Renewal that split from the JSHTR in October 2006. Due to the attacks by conservatives including the JSHTR, middle school history textbooks with descriptions of comfort women fell from seven out of seven textbooks in 1996 to three out of eight textbooks in 2001 and two out of eight by 2005. By 2011, none of these textbooks contained descriptions of comfort women and there were fewer descriptions of Japan's colonial rule and wars of aggression.<sup>13</sup> For the 2011 screening of middle school textbooks, the number of submitted history textbooks based on the JSHTR approach increased from one to two and the authorization rate of such textbooks rose from 0.039% (2001) to 3.8% and then to approximately 6.3% by 2015. On the other hand, the authorization rate of history textbooks published by Nihon Shoseki (Nihon Shoseki Shinsha since 2005), which most faithfully describe the comfort women issue, continued to drop from 13.7% in 1996 to 5.9% in 2001, and then to 3.1% by 2005 until the publisher halted submissions for screening in 2011.

After Prime Minister Abe began his second term in December 2012, the “Council for Educational Renewal (教育さいせい実行会議 Kyōiku saisei jikkō kaigi)” was installed as an advisory body to the prime minister and the “Headquarters for Educational Renewal (教育さいせい実行本部 Kyōiku saisei jikkō honbu)” that formed within the LDP took the lead in reforming education-related systems in Japan and in applying pressure on textbook descriptions about wars of aggression. On May 28, 2013, the Headquarters for Educational Renewal's Special Department to Review Textbook Screening Issues summoned the presidents and the chief editors

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<sup>13</sup> The Manabisha middle school history textbook approved in 2015 included a description of the Japanese military comfort women.

of the major textbook publishers Tōkyō Shoseki, Jitsukyō Shuppan, and Kyōiku Shuppan to answer questions from nearly forty-five LDP parliamentarians about textbook descriptions regarding the Nanjing Massacre, the comfort women issue, and territorial controversies. The parliamentarians responded to the publishers' answers by saying they "offered an insufficient explanation" and were "biased."<sup>14</sup> On January 17, 2014, the textbook screening criteria was partially revised. The newly inserted guidelines demanded to not excessively highlight certain historical facts, to prevent students from developing misunderstandings by stipulating the lack of a common view about certain incidents in modern to contemporary history, and to base descriptions on high court rulings or on the government's unified opinion whenever it is available through cabinet decisions as well as other relevant channels. A few days later, on January 28, the commentary on middle and high school curriculum guidelines was revised to instruct textbook authors to reflect the Japanese government's view in descriptions about territorial controversies over Dokdo or the Senkaku Islands.

### 3. Changes in Descriptions of Colonial Rule and Wars of Aggression

In Japan, textbooks are authored based on curriculum guidelines. Table 2 summarizes the history of revisions those guidelines for middle schools went through after Japan's defeat in 1945 and how long each revised and approved history textbook remained in use.

Table 3 summarizes which aspects of Japan's colonial rule and wars of aggression were described in textbooks published between 1952 and 2011 by seven different publishers including Tōkyō Shoseki, Kyōiku Shuppan, Shimizu Shoin, Teikoku Shoin, Ōsaka Shoseki (Nihon Bunkyo Shuppan), Chūkyō Shuppan (Nihon Bunkyo Shuppan), and Nihon Shoseki (Nihon Shoseki Shinsha).

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<sup>14</sup> *Asahi Shimbun*, May 30, 2013.

**Table 2.** History of Middle School Curriculum Guideline Revisions and Textbook Publications

Curriculum Guidelines		Duration of Use of Approved History Textbooks									
Announced	Implemented										
	1952	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	
1958	1962	1962	1966	1969							
1969	1972	1972	1975	1978							
1977	1981	1981	1984	1987	1990						
1989	1993	1993	1997								
1998	2002	2002	2006	2010							
2008	2012	2012	2016								

**Table 3.** Changes in Descriptions of Colonial Rule and Wars of Aggression

	Topic	Use
Colonial rule	Korea's annexation (colonization)	1952 (Nihon Shoseki, Shimizu Shoin), 1955 (Kyōiku Shuppan, Teikoku Shoin), 1956 (Tōkyō Shoseki, Osaka Shoseki), 1957 (Chūkyō Shuppan)
	Violence in colonies	1966 (Nihon Shoseki), 1975 (Tōkyō Shoseki, Kyōiku Shuppan), 1978 (Teikoku Shoin, Chūkyō Shuppan, Shimizu Shoin, Chūkyō Shuppan)
	Japanization policy (Korea)	1984 (Tōkyō Shoseki), 1987 (Chūkyō Shuppan, Osaka Shoseki), 1990 (Kyōiku Shuppan), 1993 (Nihon Shoseki, Teikoku Shoin), 1997 (Shimizu Shoin)
	March First Movement	1957 (Nihon Shoseki), 1962 (Kyōiku Shuppan, Chūkyō Shuppan), 1969 (Osaka Shoseki), 1972 (Teikoku Shoin, Shimizu Shoin), 1975 (Tōkyō Shoseki)
	Killing of Koreans during the Great Kantō Earthquake	1966 (Nihon Shoseki), 1975 (Chūkyō Shuppan), 1978 (Tōkyō Shoseki, Kyōiku Shuppan, Chūkyō Shuppan, Teikoku Shoin, Shimizu Shoin)
	Forced mobilization (Korea)	1966 (Nihon Shoseki), 1974 (Kyōiku Shuppan), 1978 (Chūkyō Shuppan, Teikoku Shoin, Shimizu Shoin), 1981 (Tōkyō Shoseki, Osaka Shoseki)
	Japanese military comfort women	1997 (Nihon Shoseki, Tōkyō Shoseki, Kyōiku Shuppan, Teikoku Shoin, Shimizu Shoin, Osaka Shoseki, Nihon Bunkyo Shuppan) 2002 (Nihon Shoseki Shinsha, Shimizu Shoin, Teikoku Shoin), 2006 (Nihon Shoseki Shinsha, Teikoku Shoin), 2012 (none) ※ 2016 (Manabisha)

	Colonization and Resistance (Taiwan)	1978 (Tōkyō Shoseki), 1993 (Nihon Shoseki), 1997 (Teikoku Shoin, Osaka Shoseki, Nihon Bunkyo Shuppan), 2002 (Kyōiku Shuppan), 2012 (Shimizu Shoin)
	Assimilation (Japanization) Policy (Taiwan)	1997 (Teikoku Shoin, Nihon Bunkyo Shuppan), 2002 (Nihon Shoseki, Kyōiku Shuppan), 2006 (Tōkyō Shoseki), 2012 (Shimizu Shoin)
	Forced mobilization (Taiwan)	1981 (Nihon Shoseki), 1990 (Kyōiku Shuppan), 1993 (Shimizu Shoin, Chūkyō Shuppan), 2012 (Teikoku Shoin)
Wars of aggression	Invasion of China	1984 (Nihon Shoseki, Tōkyō Shoseki, Kyōiku Shuppan, Osaka Shoseki, Shimizu Shoin, Chūkyō Shuppan), 1990 (Teikoku Shoin)
	Nanjing Massacre	1975 (Nihon Shoseki), 1978 (Tōkyō Shoseki, Kyōiku Shuppan), 1981 (Chūkyō Shuppan), 1984 (Osaka Shoseki), 1987 (Shimizu Shoin), 1990 (Teikoku Shoin)
	Invasion of Southeast Asia	1981 (Nihon Shoseki), 1978 (Tōkyō Shoseki, Kyōiku Shuppan, Teikoku Shoin, Osaka Shoseki), 1981 (Shimizu Shoin), 1987 (ChūkyōShuppan)

The trends and characteristics of textbook descriptions regarding Japan's colonial rule and wars of aggression are as follows. First, until the 1950s, textbook descriptions of Japan's colonization of Korea emphasized that it was an internationally acknowledged outcome of the Russo-Japanese War. For instance, the textbook published by Kyōiku Shuppan in 1957 stated that "after its war with Russia, Japan immediately renewed its alliance with [Great] Britain to gain approval for it to take leadership in Korea, and in 1910 (Meiji Year 43), Japan finally annexed Korea. ... [Great] Britain and the United States thus acknowledged Japan's annexation of Korea." From the 1960s, textbook descriptions changed to admit that resistance in the process of colonization was suppressed by force, but turning Taiwan and Korea into colonies (protectorates) of Japan was still noted as an outcome of the treaties of Shimonoseki and Portsmouth. Japan's wrongdoings toward its colonies began to be described in Japanese textbooks from 1966, and by 1982 all textbooks contained such descriptions. Meanwhile, descriptions related to the Japanese military comfort women appeared in all Japanese textbooks in 1997, but gradually disappeared subsequently so that none of the textbooks contained such descriptions

**Table 4.** Comparison of Descriptions of Japan's Colonial Rule of Korea and Taiwan

		Resistance & Armed Repression	Japanization Policy	Acts of Violence	War Mobilization	Development
Tōkyō	Taiwan	1978-	2006-			
Shoseki	Korea	1966-	1984-	1975-	1981-	
Kyōiku Shuppan	Taiwan	2002-	2002-		1990-	2006-15
	Korea	1962-	1990-	1975-	1974-	2006-11
Nihon Shoseki (Nihon Shoseki Shinsha)	Taiwan	1975-1980, 1993-	2002-		1981-	
	Korea	1957-	1993-	1966-	1966-	1975-96
Teikoku Shoin	Taiwan	1997-	1997-	1997-	2002-	1997-2001
	Korea	1975-	1993-	1978-	1978-	
Osaka Shoseki	Taiwan	1997-		2002-05		
	Korea	1970-	1987-	1978-	1981-	
Chūkyō Shuppan (Nihon Bunkyo Shuppan)	Taiwan	1997	1997		1993	
	Korea	1957-	1987-	1978	1978-	
Shimizu Shoin	Taiwan	2012-	2012-	2002-	1993-	
	Korea	1973-	1997	1978-	1978-	1974-86

by 2012. In 2016, the textbook published by Manabisha included a description regarding comfort women and passed the screening.

Second, there is an imbalance in the coverage between Japan's colonial rule of Korea and of Taiwan. Except for a few textbooks, Japan's colonial rule of Taiwan began to be described in Japanese textbooks after 1993. Such descriptions tended to be introduced briefly after Japan's colonial rule of Korea and offered only a few details regarding the policies of assimilation/Japanization that Japan practiced in Taiwan. Regarding independence movements, the March First Movement in Korea has been largely featured in all Japanese textbooks whereas only the textbook published by Teikoku Shoin in 2012 managed to introduce the League for the Establishment of a Taiwan Parliament and the textbook published by Ōsaka Shoseki in 2005 introduced the Musha Incident. Meanwhile, the textbooks published by Kyōiku Shuppan and Ikuhōshain 2012 used boxed columns about Hatta

Yoichi to indicate that Japan's colonial rule contributed to the modernization of Taiwan. There have also been a few textbooks that described Japan's colonial rule of Taiwan as comparable to that of Korea. The 2002 Teikoku Shoin textbook included a subsection titled "Colonial Policies in Korea and Taiwan" and the 2012 Shimizu Shoin textbook had a subsection titled "Taiwan under Japanese Rule."

Third, colonial rule tends to be described not as part of the Japanese Empire, but within a framework of oppression and exploitation, and of resistance to a lesser degree. Regarding the damage Korea suffered as a colony, Japanese textbook descriptions cover land exploitation through land surveys and the compulsory education of the Japanese language and history. Forcing Koreans to change their name and worship at Shinto shrines are mentioned as examples of the Japanization policy. In terms of resistance, the activities of righteous armies are described as a form of resistance through force, but nothing is mentioned regarding cultural resistance. As for the influence Japan's colonial rule had on Korean society and the people, descriptions note the discrimination Koreans suffered in terms of wages and lifestyle. The forced mobilization of Koreans described in Kyōiku Shuppan textbooks (1981-2005) through boxed columns titled "Considering History at the Regional Level" or in the 1997 Tōkyō Shoseki textbook's boxed column "Forced Mobilization of Koreans" shows that forced mobilization has been suggested as representative of the damage Japanese colonies suffered. However, since 2006, such columns have either been shortened or removed.

Japanese textbooks have basically stated that although the March First Movement developed into a nationwide protest as Koreans suffering from colonial rule continued to identify with the movement's purpose, the movement was successfully subdued by the Japanese military and police. In the 1990s, the Korean activist Ryu Gwan-sun's participation and death was added to descriptions about the March First Movement in the textbooks Tōkyō Shoseki published in 1997 and 2002. From 1997, Japanese textbooks began to introduce descriptions of the few Japanese such as Yanagi Muneyoshi who had been critical of Japan and sympathized with colonial Korea and its movements for independence. Descriptions of such

Table 5. Descriptions Related to the March First Movement

		Tōkyō Shoseki	Kyōiku Shuppan	Nihon Shoseki (Nihon Shoseki Shinsha) <sup>15</sup>	Teikoku Shoin
<b>Text</b>	Account of the March First Movement	1975-2015	1962-2015	1957-2011	1972-2015
	The suffering public's identification with the movement against colonial rule	1975-96		1993-2011	
	Nationwide spread of the movement	1975-2015	1962-2015	1957-2011	1978-2015
	Suppression by the military and police	1975-96	1981-2015	1957-2011	1978-2001
	Suppression (through force)	1997-2015	1962-80		
	Specific number of victims	1975-77	1987-2005	1966-2011	1990-2001
	Declaration of Independence		1981-2005, 2012-15	1993-2011	
	Continuation of the movement	1981-2015		1962-87	1990-2001
	Changes to colonial policies due to the movement	1997-2015	2012-15		
	Ryu Gwan-sun	1997-2005	1993-2005	2006-11	2002-15
	Japanese who sympathized with colonial Korea	2002-15	1997-2001, 2012-15		2012-15
	Columns		1993-2001		
<b>Figures/ Images</b>	Areas where the movement occurred (map)	1975-97	1975-2015	1978-2011	
	Protests by female students	1993-2001	1993-2001	2002-11	1990-96
	Ryu Gwan-sun	1997-2005	1993-2005	2006-11	2002-15
	Sculpture of Independence		2006-15		
	Declaration of Independence		2012-15		

Japanese figures increased, with a column on Asakawa Takumi and a poem by Ishikawa Takuboku included in Tokyo Shoseki's textbook for 2012.

Table 6. Descriptions Related to the Nanjing Massacre

		Tōkyō Shoseki	Kyōiku Shuppan	Nihon Shoseki (Nihon Shoseki Shinsha)	Teikoku Shoin
<b>No. of Victims</b>	Many	1978-84, 2002-15	1978-85, 2002-15	1977-86	1990-2015
	Hundreds of thousands, 200,000, 300,000 Chinese	1985-2001	1987-2001	1987-2011	
	42,000		1975-77	1975-77	
<b>Type of Victims</b>	Captives	2012-15	1997-2015	1987-2011	
	Soldiers	1978-96	1981-2001		2001-15
	Residents (Civilians)	2012-15	1975-1980, 2006-15	2002-11	
	Women, Children	1978-2011	1981-2001	1975-97	1990-2015
<b>Massacre (term)</b>		1997-2001	1987-2001	1987-2001	1990-2015

Fourth, the Nanjing Massacre began to be described in Japanese textbooks from 1978. From 2002, related descriptions noted that “many” or a “massive number of” people were killed due to the massacre instead of providing a specific number of fatalities. Until 2001, Tōkyō Shoseki text books mentioned that “around 200,000 Chinese are estimated to have been killed.” This was changed to “a massive number of Chinese were killed” in 2002, and in 2012 the description noted that “despite various investigations and research efforts, the number of victims remains undetermined.” The Japanese government may have admitted its responsibility for causing “tremendous damage and suffering” through the statement Prime Minister Murayama issued in 1995, but changes in Japanese textbook descriptions since then have made the reality of such damage and suffering seem increasingly obscure.

## 4. Changes in Descriptions of Territorial Issues

### 1) Changes in the Japanese Government's Perception and Policies

The Commentary on the Curriculum Guidelines (hereafter as the Commentary), which serves as the standard for authoring textbooks in Japan, reflects how the Japanese government regards education on territorial issues.

For this article, middle school civics, geography, and history textbooks have been analyzed because they exhibit changes in descriptions more distinctly than any other tier of compulsory education. Table 7 summarizes descriptions in the Commentary that are related to territorial issues.

Table 7 indicates that territorial issues were first described in the Commentary on Middle School Curriculum Guidelines in 1970. The issue over the Kuril Islands was first specified in the Commentary in 1989, the Dokdo issue in 2008, and the Senkaku Islands issue in 2014. The Commentary first described in 2014 that Korea was illegally occupying Dokdo despite the island being an inherent part of Japanese territory. It was also in 2014 when the Commentary first associated the Kuril Islands with the term “illegal occupation.” These changes reflected the Japanese government’s shift in 2014 to a firmer stance on territorial issues due to the Abe administration’s conservative nature. Unlike descriptions of colonial rule or wars of aggression, descriptions of territorial issues in the Commentary headed toward a unilateral dissemination of the Japanese government’s stance.

About the 2014 revision’s significance, Prime Minister Abe remarked at a parliamentary hearing that “it is very important to clearly specify that the said territories have been an inherent part of our country according to history and international law, and to make it possible for children to support Japan’s argument in debates overseas.”<sup>15</sup> Minister Shimomura

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<sup>15</sup> 186th session of the House of Councilors Budget Committee, February 5 (2014). Search Engine for Diet Records, <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/>.

**Table 7.** Changes in Descriptions of Territorial Issues in the Commentary on Middle School Curriculum Guidelines

Date	Description ( <u>Underline by author</u> )
Sep. 1959	No relevant descriptions
May 1970	<p><b>&lt;Geography&gt;</b>                      With regard to <u>territorial issues, especially those that remain unresolved, students need to be aware of the just arguments our country is making</u> covering the main points of each issue it faces.</p>
May 1978	<p><b>&lt;Geography&gt;</b>                      It is important to bring to the students' attention the issues of territory and <u>economic zones that our country is facing</u> and furnish them with a foundation upon which they may deepen their understanding of such issues. Regarding unresolved territorial issues, students need to gain an accurate understanding of each issue's main points based on the just arguments our country has been making.</p> <p><b>&lt;Civics&gt;</b>                      Regarding territory, the limit of territorial waters should be discussed as a matter pertinent to real life.</p>
July 1989	<p><b>&lt;Geography&gt;</b>                      Issues of territory and economic zones that our country is facing should be brought to the students' attention so that they are equipped with the foundation to further their understanding of such issues. The Northern Territories dispute needs to be treated accurately based on the just arguments our country has been making, noting that the islands have been part of our inherent territory and that <u>our country has been demanding their return.</u></p> <p><b>&lt;Civics&gt;</b>                      Although some territorial (including territorial waters and sky) <u>matters remain unresolved, students need to understand that such matters must be resolved through peaceful means</u> and at the same time ...</p>
Sep. 1999	<p><b>&lt;Geography&gt;</b>                      It is important to bring to the students' attention the issues our country is facing in terms of territory and economic zones. When "pointing out that the Northern Territories have been an inherent part of our country and raising awareness toward the issues surrounding our country's territorial boundaries," it is necessary to <u>confirm the location and the extent of the Northern Territories (Habomai Islands, Shikotan Island, Kunashiri Island, Etorofu Island).</u> At the same time, it will also be necessary to specify that our country is making a just argument in demanding the return of our inherent territory currently occupied by the Russian Federation.</p> <p><b>&lt;Civics&gt;</b>                      It is important for students to understand that our country is still involved in international disputes over territory (including territorial waters and the sky) and that it is striving to resolve them through peaceful means.</p>

<p>July 2008</p>	<p><b>&lt;Geography&gt;</b>                  Based on just arguments our country is making, it is important to bring to the students' attention the issues our country is facing in terms of territory and economic zones. When "pointing out that the Northern Territories have been an inherent part of our country and raising awareness toward issues surrounding our country's territorial boundaries," it is necessary to confirm the location and the extent of the Northern Territories (Habomai Islands, Shikotan Island, Kunashiri Island, Etorofu Island). At the same time, it will also be necessary to specify that our country is demanding the return of our inherent territory because it is currently occupied by the Russian Federation. Likewise, it is necessary to cover <u>the difference between our country and Korea's respective arguments over the territorial sovereignty of Takeshima, which will be as helpful as the Northern Territories issue in furthering the students' understanding of our country's territory and its boundaries.</u></p> <p><b>&lt;Civics&gt;</b>                  Students should understand that our country is still involved in international disputes over territory (including territorial waters and the sky), striving to resolve them through peaceful means, and that groups other than individual countries and international organizations are working on such issues in an international capacity.</p>
<p>Jan. 2014</p>	<p><b>&lt;Geography&gt;</b>                  Regarding the Northern Territories (Habomai Islands, Shikotan Island, Kunashiri Island, Etorofu Island) and Takeshima, it is necessary to confirm their respective location and extent as well as the fact that they are each being <u>illegally occupied</u> by the Russian Federation and Korea despite having <u>inherently been part of our country</u>. To deepen the students' understanding of our country's territory and its boundaries, it is necessary to inform of the fact that our country is demanding the Russian Federation to return the Northern Territories and <u>repeatedly making protests to Korea regarding Takeshima.</u></p> <p>Also, besides confirming the location and extent of the Senkaku Islands, it is necessary for students to understand that <u>there are no sovereignty issues</u> pertaining to the islands since our country is currently exercising effective control over what has <u>inherently been part of its territory.</u></p> <p><b>&lt;Civics&gt;</b>                  Regarding international disputes over territory (including territorial waters and the sky), students should be able to draw from their scholastic progress in geography and history to understand that our country is still involved in issues related to its <u>inherent territory, namely the Northern Territories and Takeshima.</u> Students should understand the history and current situation of such issues, the just arguments our country is making, and that our country is striving to resolve the issues through peaceful means.</p> <p>Also, regarding the current situation surrounding our country's inherent territory the Senkaku Islands, students should understand the history leading up to our country's currently lawful control over the islands and that there are no sovereignty issues over the islands that need to be resolved.</p>

	<p><b>&lt;History&gt;</b>                  The textbook chapter “Delimitation of Territory” covers the territorial demarcation between Japan and Russia, the Ryūkyū Islands issue, and the development of Hokkaido. <u>The chapter will offer the opportunity to additionally mention how our country formally and legitimately incorporated Takeshima and the Senkaku Islands based on international law</u> as well as to cover our country’s diplomacy with China and Korea.</p>
<p>July 2017</p>	<p><b>&lt;Geography&gt;</b>                  Regarding Takeshima and the Northern Territories (Habomai Islands, Shikotan Island, Kunashiri Island, Etorofu Island), it is necessary to confirm their respective location and area. Since they are each illegally occupied by Korea and the Russian Federation <u>despite being inherently part of our country’s territory, it is also necessary to point out that our country is repeatedly making protests to Korea about Takeshima and demanding the Russian Federation to return the Northern Territories.</u> Students need to be accurately informed that our country’s arguments are just both in terms of history and international law and thus gain a deeper understanding of our country’s territorial boundaries. On “pointing out that the Senkaku Islands have inherently been our territory and are therefore not involved in any territorial issues,” students need to understand not only the islands’ location and extent, but also that there are no unresolved sovereignty issues over the islands because they are under our country’s effective control <u>based on historically and legally just reasons.</u></p> <p><b>&lt;Civics&gt;</b>                  Having learned about the extent and characteristics of or changes to territory through geography lessons and about the demarcation of territory through history lessons, students should be able to recognize issues involving territory (including territorial waters and the sky) as international matters. Students should be aware that our country has unresolved issues over Takeshima and the Northern Territories (Habomai Islands, Shikotan Island, Kunashiri Island, Etorofu Island). This means being aware of the <u>developments in each territorial issue from past to present as well as the difficulties Japan experienced due to the illegal occupation of those territories such as restrictions on sailing, fishing, or developing marine resources, the seizure of boats, and the detainment of sailors and resulting casualties.</u> Based on such an awareness, students should comprehend state sovereignty in relation to the <u>just arguments on territorial issues our country is making in terms of history and international law</u> and its efforts to resolve such issues through peaceful means. Also, regarding the circumstances surrounding our country’s inherent territory Senkaku Islands, students should be aware of the past developments leading up to the present as well as the historical and the legal legitimacy of our country’s position, allowing them to understand that there is no sovereignty issue to be resolved regarding the islands.</p> <p><b>&lt;History&gt;</b>                  The textbook chapter “Delimitation of Territory” covers the territorial demarcation between Japan and Russia, the Ryukyu Islands issue, and the development of Hokkaido. In addition, it should be mentioned that the Northern Territories (Habomai Islands, Shikotan Island, Kunashiri Island, Etorofu Island) have consistently</p>

<p>been delimited as part of our country's territory. At the same time, students should be informed about <u>how our country formally and legally incorporated Takeshima and the Senkaku Islands based on international law</u>, which will allow them to understand the historical and the legal legitimacy of our country's stance.</p>
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Hakubun of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) explained at the hearing that “in order to provide a proper, solid education on modern to contemporary history, a plan to reform the textbook screening system was announced at the end of last year. The plan's aim was to establish the precise description of modern to contemporary history as a prerequisite for curriculum guidelines as per the revised education law. The Commentary should also reflect this change through an immediate revision.”<sup>16</sup>

The ruling LDP as well as the opposing Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and the Japan Innovation Party all consented to the MEXT's revision of the Commentary, saying that “the Senkaku Islands and Takeshima have inherently been Japanese territory, so there should be no problem with stating the fact in descriptions” or that “it's a natural decision, which makes it surprising that such facts have not been described so far.”<sup>17</sup> An editorial in the daily Yomiuri Shimbun also expressed support for the Commentary's revision, noting that “acquiring precise knowledge about a territory is important for children since the future of Japan depends on them.” The editorial further mentioned that “it is natural for the MEXT to faithfully support lessons about territory based on the government's view. It means talents capable of arguing for Japan's stance in international society can be cultivated.”<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> 186th session of the House of Representatives Fourth Budget Subcommittee, February 26, 2014. Search Engine for Diet Records, <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/>.

<sup>17</sup> *Sankei Shimbun* (January 29, 2014).

<sup>18</sup> *Yomiuri Shimbun* (January 29, 2014).

## 2) Changes in Textbook Descriptions

From 1947 to 2015, 222 geography textbooks, 204 civics textbooks, and 247 history textbooks passed the screening for Japanese middle school curricula.<sup>19</sup> As for changes since 1947 in the coverage of Dokdo in Japanese middle school textbooks under the social studies category, such coverage increased mainly in geography textbooks since 2001 and became a steady part of geography, civics, and history textbooks by 2015.<sup>20</sup>

Table 8-1. Proportional Changes in the Coverage of Dokdo in Japanese Middle School Geography Textbooks

Approved Year	No. of Textbooks	Text + Map	Text	Map	Total (Percentage)
1955	19			1	1 (5%)
1971	8			2	2 (25%)
1974	8			1	1 (13%)
1977	8			3	3 (38%)
1980	8		2	2	4 (50%)
1983	8		2	2	4 (50%)
1986	8		1	3	4 (50%)
1989	8		1	4	5 (62%)
1992	8			5	5 (62%)
1996	7			4	4 (57%)
2001	7	1		6	7 (100%)
2005	6	2		4	6 (100%)
2011	4	4			4 (100%)
2015	4	4			4 (100%)

<sup>19</sup> Japanese Textbook Library Information Database, <http://mokuokudb.textbook-rc.or.jp/kyoka/KYL010.aspx>.

<sup>20</sup> Nam Sang-gu, "Jeonhu Ilbon junghakgyo gyogwaseo eui Dokdo gisul chuiwa hyeonhwang" [Japanese History Textbook: Claiming Sovereignty over Dokdo and Its Progress], *Yeongto haeyang yeongu* 1 (2011): 176-209.

**Table 8-2.** Proportional Changes in the Coverage of Dokdo in Japanese Middle School Civics Textbooks

Approved Year	No. of Textbooks	Text + Map	Text	Map	Total (Percentage)
1961	13			1	1 (8%)
1971	8			1	1 (13%)
2001	8	1		1	2 (25%)
2005	8	3		1	4 (50%)
2011	7	6		1	7 (100%)
2015	6	6			6 (100%)

**Table 8-3.** Proportional Changes in the Coverage of Dokdo in Japanese Middle School History Textbooks

Approved Year	No. of Textbooks	Text + Map	Text	Map	Total (Percentage)
2011	8		1	2	3 (37%)
2015	8	7	1		8 (100%)

Textbook descriptions that passed screening in 2015 displayed a stark difference from previous versions. The textbook Shimizu Shoin published and passed screening in 1980 simply described that “the Senkaku Islands at the westernmost of Japanese territory and Takeshima off the shore of Shima-ne Prefecture are both part of Japan but their sovereignty is being questioned because China has been making claims over the former while Korea has been doing so over the latter.” Some of the other textbooks from the 1980s simply inserted a map of Japan that included Dokdo labeled as Takeshima. Among the textbooks that passed screening in 2001, a civics textbook by Fūsosha Publishing briefly noted that Dokdo “has historically been an inherent territory of our country,” while a geography textbook by Nihon Shoseki mentioned that “there is an issue surrounding Takeshima in the Sea of Japan between Japan and Korea. The two country’s governments negotiated and concluded a new fisheries agreement which temporarily defines the waters around Takeshima as a jointly controlled fishing

zone.” However, as can be seen through Table 9, textbooks began to include further details related to Dokdo from 2005, particularly those that supported the Japanese government’s claim over the island’s sovereignty. The textbook screening in 2011 was conducted under the administration of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) but exhibited a substantial increase in Dokdo-related details. This was not a result of the DPJ administration’s policies, but because of the Commentary revised in 2008.

**Table 9.** Changes in Dokdo-related Descriptions in Japanese Middle School Social Studies Textbooks (2005-15)

	<b>Approved in 2001</b> (7 geography, 8 civics, 8 history)	<b>Approved in 2005</b> (6 geography, 8 civics, 9 history)	<b>Approved in 2011</b> (4 geography, 7 civics, 7 history)	<b>Approved in 2015</b> (4 geography, 6 civics, 8 history)
Korea is illegally occupying Dokdo		1 civics textbook	1 geography textbook, 3 civics textbooks	(all) 4 geography textbooks, 5 civics textbooks, 4 history textbooks
Dokdo is an inherent territory of Japan	1 civics textbook	2 civics textbooks	3 geography textbooks, 4 civics textbooks, 1 history textbook	(all) 4 geography textbooks, (all) 6 civics textbooks, 5 history textbooks
Dokdo is labeled as Takeshima, included within the borderline or the exclusive economic zone of Japan	1 civics textbook	(all) 6 geography textbooks, 3 civics textbooks	(all) 4 geography textbooks, (all) 7 civics textbooks, 2 history textbooks	(all) 4 geography textbooks, (all) 6 civics textbooks, 6 history textbooks
Specific grounds supportive of Japan’s sovereignty argument are suggested			3 civics textbooks, 2 history textbooks	
Japan has fished at Dokdo since the early seventeenth century				3 geography textbooks, 2 civics textbooks, 3 history textbooks

Japan established sovereignty over Dokdo in the mid-seventeenth century			2 civics textbooks	2 civics textbooks, 3 history textbooks
Dokdo was (legally) incorporated into Shimane Prefecture in 1905			2 geography textbooks, 2 civics textbooks	3 geography textbooks, 3 civics textbooks, (all) 8 history textbooks
Japan gained recognition of its jurisdiction over Dokdo even after World War II			2 civics textbooks	1 civics textbook
Dokdo was excluded from the territories to be returned through the San Francisco Peace Treaty. This fact proves that Dokdo was recognized as Japanese territory				3 civics textbooks, 2 history textbooks
The United States stated that it never recognized Dokdo as Korean territory				2 history textbooks
Korea claimed sovereignty and occupied Dokdo since 1952 (or 1953, 1954)			2 geography textbooks, 2 civics textbooks	3 geography textbooks, 4 civics textbooks, 5 history textbooks
Korea unilaterally proclaimed the Syngman Rhee Line, and occupied Dokdo			1 civics textbook	3 civics textbooks, 2 history textbooks
Korea is refusing to resolve the issue through the International Court of Justice			2 civics textbooks	2 geography textbooks, 3 civics textbooks, 3 history textbooks
Korea is making a starkly different argument / Korea claims that Dokdo is Korean territory	1 geography textbook		2 geography textbooks, 1 civics textbook	

Details related to Dokdo increased gradually from 2001 and then sharply in civics textbooks as well as in geography and history textbooks after the Commentary was revised again in January 2014.

## 5. The Japanese Government's Involvement in Textbook Descriptions

### 1) Instructions Through the Commentary

The Japanese government has had two ways to become involved in textbook descriptions: encouraging government views to be actively represented through the curriculum guidelines and commentary on such guidelines or ordering descriptions to be corrected through screening to better reflect government views. In Japan, the curriculum guidelines serve as a legal basis for textbook descriptions, but because they only sketch an outline, specific standards are suggested through the commentary on curriculum guidelines that offer detailed explanations. The curriculum guidelines are revised approximately every ten years and are therefore limited in terms of reflecting an administration's perceptions or views of history.<sup>21</sup> Table 10 summarizes the changes in descriptions of colonial rule and wars of aggression in the commentary for middle school curriculum guidelines.

The Commentary began to describe the damage from the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki since 1978, but only from 1998 did it begin to describe the damage Japan inflicted upon the people of other Asian countries. One reason for disqualifying Ienaga's 1963 textbook on Japanese history was that it contained photos featuring dismal aspects of war such as the air raids on the Japanese mainland or Hiroshima in ruins due to the atomic bombing. The Commentary's 1978 edition offered details on the damage from atomic bombs in relation to the calamity of war.

Textbooks could still include content not covered in the Commentary, which is how some were able to contain descriptions about the reality of colonial rule (including the damage had caused) since the 1970s. However, the Commentary has carried significance for representing the Japanese

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<sup>21</sup> On January 28, 2014, the Japanese government partially revised the Commentary revised in July 2008 to reinforce education on Dokdo and the Senkaku Islands.

**Table 10.** Changes in Descriptions of Colonial Rule and Wars of Aggression in the Commentary for Middle School Curriculum Guidelines

Time	Major Descriptions (Underline by Author)
Sep. 1959	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Japan took a <u>path to war by advancing onto the continent</u>.</li> <li>- In particular, it is important to deeply consider the tragedy the war (Pacific War) caused for humanity.</li> </ul>
May 1970	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Curriculums should cover how this war (Russo-Japanese War) uplifted the national self-awareness of Asians. They should also note that there were domestic arguments against the war in Japan and that the self-awareness of the Japanese later developed into a sense of themselves as a powerful nation superior to other Asian nations. On <u>the moves Korea made between the late Meiji period to the early Taishō era</u>, curriculums should cover <u>Japan's annexation of Korea</u> in association with the circumstances in Japan and East Asia.</li> <li>- On its connection to Japan's <u>advancement into the continent</u>.</li> <li>- Regarding the livelihood of people during the war, curriculums should indicate how the war's escalation and extension, especially after the Japan-China Incident, led to the mobilization of all resources, which drove people into hardship due to an extreme shortage of supplies. Regarding the defeat in the war, students should comprehend the circumstances that contributed to the defeat including the <u>atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki</u> as well as the Soviet Union's declaration of war on Japan.</li> </ul>
May 1978	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Students should realize that the victory in the war (Russo-Japanese War) on the one hand promoted national self-awareness for several Asian countries. On the other hand, this led the Japanese to assume a sense of leadership over multiple nations. <u>Regarding the relations with the continent after the Russo-Japanese War, students should comprehend the situation in the context of Japan's annexation of Korea.</u></li> <li>- Students should understand that national movements arose in Asia and Africa, and that the trend at the time was visible, especially through the development of the Chinese Revolution and the independence movement in India.</li> <li>- Students should understand the fact that such a trend emboldened the military and led to its <u>advancement into mainland China</u>.</li> <li>- At the same time, <u>taking into consideration the fact that atomic bombs were dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima</u>, students should understand the importance of making efforts to prevent the <u>calamity of war</u> from recurring in this age of nuclear power and realize a democratic, peaceful international society.</li> </ul>
July 1989	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Regarding the First Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, students should comprehend in detail the cause, developments, outcomes, and domestic and foreign reactions to the wars. They should also <u>broaden their grasp of developments in Asia after the Russo-Japanese War including the colonization of Korea, the national movement in China, and the establishment of the Republic of China.</u></li> <li>- Students should realize that national movements were supported in Asia around the time.</li> <li>- Students should understand that such movements emboldened the military and eventually led to the advancement into mainland China.</li> <li>- In addition, based on the fact that world wars have caused much calamity for humanity, students should comprehend the importance of making efforts to realize world peace.</li> </ul>

Dec. 1998	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Regarding the First Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, curriculums should cover our country's movements, the outline of each war, domestic and foreign reactions toward the wars, and the colonization of Korea.</li> <li>- At the same time, students should be made aware of the <u>rise of national movements in Korea</u> and China and efforts to promote world peace by establishing the League of Nations and signing an arms limitation treaty.</li> <li>- Students should understand the fact that the emboldened military <u>extended its influence to mainland China</u> ...</li> <li>- Curriculums should help students comprehend that our country <u>inflicted tremendous damage upon many people in different countries, especially those in Asia</u>, that our country suffered the ravages of war, and that world wars have brought calamity upon mankind, which will lead to the realization that it is important to contribute to achieving international cooperation and world peace.</li> </ul>
July 2008	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Regarding the First Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, curriculums should cover our country's movements and relations with the continent at the time, the outline of each war, domestic and foreign reactions toward the wars, and the <u>colonization of Korea</u>.</li> <li>- On the rise of national movements and international cooperation, curriculums should cover the <u>rise of national movements in Korea</u> and China as well as the establishment of the League of Nations and the conclusion of arms limitation treaty.</li> <li>- The fact that the military was emboldened and <u>extended its influence to the continent</u>, that the war with China became drawn out ...</li> <li>- Curriculums should help students comprehend that our country <u>inflicted tremendous damage upon many people in different countries, especially those in Asia</u>, that our country suffered the ravages of war through air raids on various regions, the Battle on Okinawa, and the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and that world wars have brought calamity upon mankind, which will lead to the realization that it is important to contribute to achieving international cooperation and world peace.</li> </ul>
July 2017	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Identical to revisions made in July 2008.</li> </ul>

government's official views. The Commentary has been shifting toward the inclusion of descriptions, albeit concise, of the damage caused by colonial rule and wars of aggression. In particular, the description changes in 1998 seems to have reflected the 1995 Murayama Statement that expressed remorse for the damage and suffering due to colonial rule.

Meanwhile, the Commentary has required textbooks to describe the Japanese government's position on issues involving historical perception and territory, as can be seen from the review in part four of this article on how the Commentary influenced changes in textbook descriptions on territorial issues. Moreover, the Commentary for Type A High School History Textbooks (December 2019) indicates that textbooks should help students "realize that Japan's war victories inspired other Asian nations to pursue

movements for independence and modernization.” Such descriptions in the Commentary are not reflections of academic findings but those of the Japanese government’s views.

## 2) Involvement through the Screening System

The Japanese government has been controlling descriptions of colonial rule and wars of aggression through the textbook screening system since the mid-1950s. The Ienaga lawsuits were aimed at pointing out that this very system was unconstitutional. However, the system instead induced history textbooks based on the JSHTTR approach to include descriptions about colonial rule and wars of aggression. In other words, the screening system’s role has changed over time.

The feedback the screening system provided from the late 1950s to the 1960s led to the downplay of textbook descriptions on colonial rule and wars of aggression. Such feedback would suggest “not to be preoccupied with Japan’s wrongdoings in the Pacific War and instead romanticize the facts,” and advise that “it is unfitting to define the past wars of Japan as imperialist wars of aggression. It is inappropriate to state that Japan’s rule of China was a misfortune for the Chinese.” It would also recommend “the use of the term ‘Great East Asia War’ since the ‘Pacific War’ is not a historical term” or “the removal of this description because despite the statement that ‘our country inflicted unfathomable damage and suffering upon other Asian nations, especially through the Pacific War,’ some find that the war served as an opportunity for several Asian nations to gain independence.”<sup>22</sup>

The following account from 1973 amply illustrates the fact that the Japanese government has utilized the screening system to control textbook descriptions and that its policy changes have been responsible for the varying degrees of screening applied to textbook descriptions on wars of aggression. “After the former Prime Minister Satō remarked during a budget committee session that ‘the Second Sino-Japanese War was regrettable’

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<sup>22</sup> Tawara, *Kyōkashokōgeki no shinso*: 168-69.

and the U.S. President Nixon’s visit to China became announced, no instructions were given on the inclusion of the subtitle ‘Second Sino-Japanese War’ in the manuscripts that publishers submitted for screening in the second half (Normally, an instruction would be given to change the war name to the ‘Japan-China Incident’). The term ‘invasion of China’ also managed to pass screening. Such changes clearly indicate a change in the government, or in the LDP’s policy and demonstrates how faithfully the government’s intention has been reflected in screening textbooks.”<sup>23</sup>

The Japanese government loosened its control over such details after the normalization of Japan-China relations in 1972. However, up to the early 1980s it continued to involve itself in textbook descriptions on colonial rule and wars of aggression as can be seen in the summary of representative cases below.<sup>24</sup>

Table 11. Cases of Instructions to Revise Descriptions of Colonial Rule and Wars of Aggression

Screened Year	Subject	Submitted Manuscript	Instructions for Revision <sup>26</sup>
1973	High School Japanese History	Pacific War	This was referred to as the Great East Asia War in Japan. (1974, p. 19)
1976	Middle School History	(invasion of Joseon, annexation of Korea) “(people of Joseon) were deprived of land,” “lost their land.”	Is contrary to the fact. This was the outcome of land surveys. (1977, p. 12)

<sup>23</sup> “73 Kyōkasho Repōto” [73 Textbook Report] (Nihon shuppan rōdōkumiai kyōgikai, 1973): 12.

<sup>24</sup> Refer to the annual textbook reports published by Nihon shuppan rōdōkumiai kyōgikai [Japan Federation of Publishing Workers Unions].

<sup>25</sup> The year of publication and the page numbers correspond with the year of each Textbook Report’s publication and the page number of each report that contains the instructions for revision listed herein.

	High School Japanese History	The people of Joseon ... were taken by force, and along with the Chinese prisoners of the Second Sino-Japanese War, they were forced to work like slaves deprived of their human rights.	“Taken away by force” may have been a reality, but it cannot be referred to as forced labor because the people were considered Japanese. Perhaps change the phrase to “due to an order for national mobilization.” Many most likely had to “work like slaves deprived of their human rights” but whether that applied to all laborers is a matter that requires further review of the circumstances at the time. (1977, p. 20)
1977	High School World History	Japan’s invasion of China	Unacceptable. “invasion” should be changed to “advancement” or “intrusion.” (1979, p. 24)
1979	Middle School History	Many people from Joseon were forced to relocate to the Japanese mainland.	Joseon was part of Japanese territory at the time, and since the relocation was based on the order for national mobilization, it cannot be characterized as enforcement. (1980, p. 31)
1981	High School Modern Social Studies	Invasion	The use of “aggression,” “intrusion,” or “infiltrate” is recommended. “Invasion” carries a negative value judgement. (1982, p. 13)
	High School Japanese History	The Xi’an Incident in China prompted the Republic of China’s government to form the Second United Front with the Communist Party of China, marking the beginning of a hardline approach to resisting Japan’s invasion and recovering the sovereignty of China.	Consistency should be maintained in referring to the content as “Japan’s invasion,” which is referred to as “advancement” or “intrusion” in other parts of the same book. Considering that the textbook is covering the history of our own country, the use of the term “invasion” seems questionable. (1982, p. 49)

The Japanese government became less involved in textbook descriptions about colonial rule and wars of aggression as the Neighboring Country Clause was introduced to resolve the 1982 Textbook Crisis. In June 1986, when Korea and China criticized the approval of the high school history textbook *New Edition of Japanese History* (新編日本史 Shinpennihonshi) authored by the National Conference to Defend Japan, the then Prime

Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro ordered the MESSC to conduct a secondary complete review of the textbook. The MESSC made the exception of giving the publisher four sets of instructions to perform revisions on 127 different places in the textbook.<sup>26</sup> The notably conservative Nakasone administration reduced its involvement in textbook descriptions, which in turn led to an increase of descriptions about colonial rule and wars of aggression. This demonstrated how much the Nakasone administration valued Japan's diplomatic relations with China and Korea<sup>27</sup> and that the connection between a conservative administration and textbook descriptions on colonial rule and wars of aggression is not one-dimensional.

As can be seen through the cases featured in Table 12, feedback from screening even caused the JSHTR history textbook to improve some of its descriptions on colonial rule and wars of aggression.<sup>28</sup>

Meanwhile, textbook screening has steered high school textbooks toward diluting the Japanese military's involvement and the use of force when describing the Japanese military comfort women. Regarding the description that "the Japanese military sent Korean and Taiwanese females to battlefields to serve as comfort women, which has now developed into an international issue," the MESSC suggested through a screening in 1996 that "since the Japanese military's involvement in the operation of comfort women is currently under investigation, a way should be found to describe the matter so that there can be no misunderstandings." Eventually, the subject "Japanese military" was removed and thus there remained a statement that "in some cases females from Korea and Taiwan were sent to battlefields to serve as comfort women." Through a high school textbook screening in 2003, the term "Japanese military comfort women" was

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<sup>26</sup> "87 Kyōkasho Repōtō": 16.

<sup>27</sup> Yoshida Yutaka, *Nihonjin no sensōkan: Sengo-shi no nakano henyō* [The Japanese View of the War: Changes over Postwar History] (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 1995).

<sup>28</sup> For research on JSHTR textbooks and feedback from screening, refer to Nam Sang-gu, "Saeyeongmo balgan gyogwaseo eui geomjeong siltae e natanan Ilbon gyogwaseo geomjeong jedo eui munjejeom" [Loopholes in Japan's Textbook Screening System Shown in Screening the JSHTR's History Textbook], *Yeoksa gyoyuk nongip*, no. 43 (2009): 219-47. Table 12 has been quoted from the same article.

Table 12. Feedback from Screening the JSHTR Textbook and Corresponding Revisions

Screened Year	Submitted Description	Feedback	Revised Description
2001	<p>In 1910 (Meiji 43), Japan annexed Korea.</p> <p>① This was part of a policy to stabilize East Asia that the American and European powers supported.</p> <p>② Korea's annexation was necessary to defend Japan's safety and Manchuria's interests, but it did not necessarily offer economic or political benefits.</p> <p>③ At the time, the annexation was carried out legally according to the principles of international relations.</p> <p>④ However, Koreans were naturally divided over the annexation and some resisted fiercely.</p>	<p>① This wording can be misconstrued to suggest that Western powers expressed their support when Japan annexed Korea.</p> <p>② This one-dimensional mention of "necessity" and "interests" with regard to Korea's annexation can be misleading in understanding the reality of annexation and rule.</p> <p>③ Simply stating that the annexation was "carried out legally according to the principles of international relations" can spawn misunderstandings about the reality of the annexation process.</p> <p>④ This can be misconstrued to suggest that only some of those against the annexation in Korea "resisted fiercely."</p>	<p>① Great Britain, the United States, and Russia raised no objections toward it because they were wary that one country's influence might expand on the Korean peninsula. In 1910 (Meiji 43), Japan thus used force to quell the opposition in Korea and proceeded with its annexation of Korea.</p> <p>② The Japanese government believed its annexation of Korea was necessary to defend the safety of Japan and the interests of Manchuria.</p> <p>③ Removed</p> <p>④ Some in Korea voiced their acceptance of the annexation, but there was fierce resistance against Koreans losing their independence so that movements to regain it persisted henceforth. After its annexation of Korea, Japan developed Korea into a colony by improving railroads and irrigation facilities and conducting land surveys. However, more than a few Korean farmers were driven out of their farmland due to the land surveys. The assimilation policy such as teaching the Japanese language intensified the animosity Koreans held against Japan.</p>

	[Mobilization of People] (Entire description)	With barely any mention of the circumstances in Taiwan and Korea, the description generally lacks balance.	[Addition of the Following Description] Such requisition and conscription were carried out in colonies as well so that many in Korea and Taiwan sacrificed and suffered. In addition, many Koreans and Chinese under Japanese control were taken away to mines in Japan and forced to work under poor conditions. Moreover, Japanization as a policy of assimilation became reinforced so that Koreans and the Taiwanese were referred to by their Japanese names.
2005	Damage from Air Raids  ...since the Meiji Restoration, it was the first defeat in war that the people of Japan experienced.	Considering that the “content” (5) in the curriculum guidelines requires students to “comprehend that world wars have brought calamity upon mankind,” it is inappropriate for descriptions to only cover the damage the Japanese suffered.	Since the Meiji Restoration, this was the first war defeat the people of Japan experienced. The surrender of Japan brought World War II to an end. It is estimated that a total of 22 million people were killed in action and 34 million people were wounded. (In response to the above feedback, the sacrifice of China was added to page 206 while the sacrifice of Southeast Asia was added to page 207.) *P. 206: <u>The war inflicted tremendous damage and suffering upon the people of several regions in Asia that turned into battlefields. In particular, many Chinese people and soldiers were sacrificed due to the Japanese military’s invasion.</u> *P. 207: <u>Many were sacrificed including civilians.</u>

<p>2009</p>	<p>[Greater East Asia Conference] After the conference, Japan gave a clearer reason for going to war, which was to allow Asia to build the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere without the involvement of American and European powers.</p>	<p>The description can cause misunderstandings about the Greater East Asia Conference.</p>	<p>[Greater East Asia Conference] After the conference, Japan underlined “building the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere without the involvement of American and European powers” as the nominal reason for the war.</p>
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corrected to “comfort women” because the former was considered to be an uncommon expression. Feedback from screening also demanded the removal of the subject “Japanese military” from the description “the Japanese military forcibly took away many women and brought unbearable pain to them.” A high school textbook screening in 2006 found that the expression “turned into comfort women by the Japanese military” left room for misunderstanding and became corrected to “turned into comfort women of the Japanese military.” Through the 2015 Korea-Japan Comfort Women Agreement, the Japanese government stated that “the issue of comfort women, with an involvement of the Japanese military authorities at that time, was a grave affront to the honor and dignity of large numbers of women, and the Government of Japan is painfully aware of responsibilities from this perspective. As Prime Minister of Japan, Prime Minister Abe expresses anew his most sincere apologies and remorse....” It will therefore be necessary to monitor how this statement will be reflected in Japanese textbooks in the future.

Through screenings in 2015 and 2016 based on the screening criteria revised on January 17, 2014, detailed numbers and statistics linked to the Nanjing Massacre or Korean deaths during the Great Kanto Earthquake have been replaced by the term “many.”

Since 2015, the Japanese government has been actively involved in textbook descriptions on territorial issues. Descriptions admitting that Korea and Japan have different views about Dokdo were previously allowed, but from 2015, such descriptions have not been allowed unless they are based on the premise that Dokdo is Japanese territory.

## 6. Conclusion

Changes in textbook descriptions on colonial rule, wars of aggression, and territorial issues can be delineated as a contention between patriotism and internationalism.

First, after Japan's defeat in the war, had contended each other, but textbook descriptions ... settled down to increasingly including facts about war damage. As of late, a rise of patriotism has had effects on reducing descriptions.... and using general terms. Nevertheless, the basic internationalist approach has remained in shape, which deems it...

Second, the conservative tendencies of the Japanese government and society are not directly reflected in textbook descriptions of colonial rule and wars of aggression, and only to a limited degree when they do become reflected in such descriptions. Changes have been extremely limited, even in textbooks approved under the Abe administration that has been calling for the disposal of a masochistic view of history. The reason changes have been limited is that textbook descriptions are based on the curriculum guidelines and its commentary is revised every ten years; that Japan's diplomatic relations with its neighbors including Korea and China as well as the Japanese government's perception of history have changed; that the accumulation of civic movements and research findings have been taken into consideration. The evidence can be found in the fact that under the Nakasone administration descriptions of colonial rule and wars of aggression increased and calls for the revision of descriptions in right-wing textbooks were made more actively.

Third, the Japanese society's conservative and patriotic tendencies have been actively reflected in textbook descriptions regarding territorial issues. The Abe administration has been eagerly involved in textbook descriptions of territorial issues through the Commentary on the Curriculum Guidelines revised in January 2014. As a result, the amount of such descriptions faithfully representing the Japanese government's view has been increasing rapidly and with no sign of internationalism in them.

Fourth, textbook descriptions of colonial rule and wars of aggression are increasingly exhibiting the humanitarian side of the Japanese. The mid-

dle school textbook published by Tōkyō Shoseki and approved in 2015 was the first to include a description about Sugihara Chiune, known as the Schindler of Japan.<sup>29</sup> Tokushima Prefecture and the city of Naruto announced in 2017 that they planned to jointly apply for materials related to the Bando Prisoner of War Camp<sup>30</sup> to be inscribed on the UNESCO World Heritage List. These two cases may be based on impartial facts, but they have the potential to dilute or distort images of the inhumane policies the Japanese military committed during the Asia-Pacific War. We must be on our guard against such attempts which may be misled into creating a wrong historical image.

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<sup>29</sup> The description about Sugihara began to appear in the Japanese right-wing middle school history textbook by Fusōsha Publishing, and among the eight middle school history textbooks approved in 2015, Sugihara was described in three (Tōkyō Shoseki, Ikuhōsha, Jiyūsha) of them.

<sup>30</sup> The Bando Prisoner of War Camp held up to as many as 1,000 soldiers between 1917 and 1920. The prison warden at the time (Colonel Matsue Toshihisa) treated the prisoners humanely and allowed them to engage in musical, theatrical, and sports activities. The German captives formed a symphony orchestra and performed Beethoven's Ninth Symphony for the first time in Japan on June 1, 2018.

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# Book Reviews (Translated)



*Peaceful Frontier: Goryeo's Diplomacy with the Khitans  
and Its Consequences\**

*[Taepyeonghan byeonbang: Goryeo ui dae Georan  
oegyo wa geu sosan]*

By Mi-ji LEE  
Seoul: Gyeongin munhwasa, 2018

—  
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I

A variety of academic conferences on the Goryeo dynasty (918-1392) took place in 2018 to celebrate the 1100 anniversary year of its founding. These conferences created an atmosphere to stimulate historical research on the dynasty and offer wider opportunities for researchers to communicate with each other. There were also multiple related publications as well, mostly in the form of popular topical books, which aim at making their research outcomes accessible to the general public. Amidst these, *Peaceful Frontier: Goryeo's Diplomacy with the Khitans and Its Consequences* (Gyeongin munhwasa, 2018), written by Mi-ji Lee stood out as one of the most meaningful projects.

This book is the extended version of the author's doctoral dissertation, "The Development and Characteristics of Goryeo Diplomacy with the

\* The original title for this book is *Taepyeonghan byeonbang: Goryeo ui dae Georan oegyo wa geu sosan* (태평한 변방: 고려의 황거란 외교와 그 소산) published by Gyeongin Munhwasa (Paju) in 2018, and this review is translated from the Korean manuscript originally published in *The Journal of Korean Medieval History* (한국중세사연구), issue 57, May 2019: 311-24.

Khitans” [Goryeo sigi dae Georan oegyo ui jeongae wa teukjing] (February 2012). Her research on Goryeo-Khitans relations began from her master’s thesis concerning the issue of “border markets” near the Amnok River during the reign of King Seonjong (r. 1083-94) of Goryeo. She analyzes what caused the diplomatic and border issues between Goryeo and the Khitans and how Goryeo responded to them after the end of the Goryeo-Khitans War in the early eleventh century. Her doctoral thesis focuses on some major issues regarding the borderline during the reign of King Seonjong when Goryeo-Khitans relations unfolded in earnest. First, to capture a general territorial issue between the two states, she employs the expression of “border settlement” in which to treat an historical incidents usually referred to as the bargaining, negotiations, and talks between Goryeo diplomat Seo Hui (942-98) and Khitan general Xiao Sunning (d. 996). Second, to reveal the overall characteristics of Goryeo-Khitans relationship, she explores their relations from the reign of King Taejo (r. 918-943), the founder of Goryeo, onwards. Last, charting where Goryeo’s foreign policy was headed, she pays close attention to the changes in nomenclature of the Khitans in terms of an internal factor inseparable from external factors such as exchange of envoys, wars, and investiture.

As the author mentions in the introduction, a very distinctive foreign relationship appeared during the Goryeo period. In Northeast Asia, many nomadic forces founded non-Han Chinese dynasties and became hegemonic powers of the region since the end of the Tang, where Goryeo maintained its diplomatic relations with these empires. The relationship with Khitan was Goryeo’s first test of such foreign relations in its history. Given that the author explores the entire span of their relations by focusing on a self-referential invention of diplomatic tactics and orders by the Goryeo, the present book deserves to be evaluated as a work that does attain a higher level of research on Goryeo’s international relations.

## II

The book consists of seven chapters, including the introduction and the conclusion, and a separate essay for additional discussion. The table of contents and a summary of each chapter go as follows.

I. Introduction

II. Goryeo's Relations with the Khitans Prior to the Establishment of Diplomatic Relationship

1. Goryeo-Kitan Relations during the King Taejo Period
2. Goryeo's Perception of the Khitans in Terms of Nomenclature and Calendar Systems

III. The Establishment of Tribute-Investiture Relations and Changes in the Perception of the Khitans

1. The Khitan Request for Diplomatic Relations during the Reign of King Seongjong and the Peace Agreement
2. Changes in the Perception of the Khitans after the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations

IV. Goryeo-Khitan Disputes on the Continuation of Tribute-Investiture Relations

1. The Goryeo-Khitan War after the Accession of King Hyeonjong and the Reestablishment of Tribute-Investiture Relations
2. Tribute-Investiture Relations during the Reign of King Hyeonjong in Terms of Nomenclature and Calendar Systems

V. Goryeo-Khitan Diplomatic Conflicts with Tribute-Investiture Relations in Place

1. Changes in the Diplomatic Stance on the Khitans in the Reigns of King Deokjong and Jeongjong
2. Goryeo's Relations with the Khitans: Diplomatic Documents from the Reign of King Munjong
3. The Issue of Border Market during the Reign of King Seonjong

VI. Diplomatic Relations between Goryeo and the Khitans and the Decline of the Khitans

1. King Sukjong's Investiture and *bukgyonamsa* (北交南事)
2. Changes in International Relations and Investiture during the Reigns

of King Yejong and Injong

3. Changes in the Calendar System during the Reigns of King Yejong and Injong

VII. Conclusion: Characteristics of Goryeo's Diplomacy with the Khitans

Additional Discussion: The Investiture of King Sukjong and the Jurchen-Liao Relations

1. Introduction

2. The Investiture of King Sukjong

3. Goryeo's Strategy

4. The Investiture of King Sukjong and the Jurchen-Liao Relations

5. Conclusion

### III

The book describes the development of the Goryeo-Khitans relations with a focus on how to contextualize Goryeo's response to the diplomatic issues between the two states. As a result, changes in Goryeo's diplomatic strategy, set to the progress of the two dynasties' relationship, have been examined in depth and the actual process of their tribute-investiture relations is explained in detail. By doing so, this book offers its readers an insight into how the Goryeo dynasty had established diplomatic conventions in which to resolve conflicts with its neighbors: dealing with the Khitans was the pathbreaking step for this diplomatic procedure. Furthermore, the book also makes a broad use of epitaphs to analyze how the Goryeo court named the Khitans and how the court actively utilized the calendar system to their interests. In the process, what is vividly found is that the hegemonic power of the Khitans had been not only reflected in the Goryeo-Khitans relation, but also acknowledged even by the Goryeo court. This argument challenges the common prejudice of the Khitan state as an uncivilized polity full of barbarism. Importantly, the author reproduces the past as a history in a specific and realistic manner from the perspective of historical actors who breathed that history. For all these reasons, the book is a meaningful work

that has widened the understanding of the way Goryeo built its external relations with the outer world through the Goryeo-Khitans diplomatic ties. That being said, to fulfill my responsibilities as a reviewer, I would like to present some criticism as follows:

The first question concerns the sequence of the investiture from the Khitans and the adoption of the Khitan reign name. In Section 2 of Chapter 3, the author takes notice of the fact that Goryeo introduced Khitan Shengzong's reign name, Tonghwa 統和 (983-1012), in February 994 when the first Goryeo-Khitans War came to an end with a peace treaty. On the grounds that the Goryeo court conventionally accepted the reign name of the Khitan court after the process of investiture, the author attributes Goryeo's prompt adoption of Tonghwa to its intention to eliminate potential sources of conflict as quick as possible (pp. 92-93). In Section 1 of Chapter 5, the author also states that King Jeongjong restored diplomatic relations, severed during the reign of King Deokjong, and adopted Khitan Xingzong's reign name of Junghui 重熙 (1032-55); as a result, Goryeo received an investiture from the Khitans in the next year (1039) and additional titles along with the continuous diplomatic exchange (p. 214). Was it unusual for Goryeo to adopt the reign name before receiving an investiture from the Khitans?

When it comes to the use of reign names and investiture by the Five Dynasties in early Goryeo, Goeyeo King Taejo adopted Later Tang's reign name, Jangheung (Changxing, 長興, 930-34), after receiving the investiture for the first time from Later Tang in 933. On the other hand, Later Jin's reign name of Chonbok (Tianfu, 天福, 936-43) was introduced in 938 prior to the investiture in 939. In the case of King Jeongjong (r. 945-49), he adopted the reign name of Later Han, Geonu (Qianyou, 乾祐, 948-51) in 948 without an investiture. King Gwangjong (r. 949-75) used his own reign name, Gwangdeok 光德 (r. 949-51), but switched to Gwangsun (Guangshun, 廣順, 951-55), the reign name designated by Later Zhou. Two years later, however, King Gwangjong was invested by Later Zhou in 953. After Song emerged as a unified dynasty, King Gwangjong received an investiture from Song and adopted Song's reign name, Geondeok (Qiande, 乾德, 963-68), in the same year. The Song dynasty's investiture was given to

Gyeongjong (r. 975-81) and Seongjong as well. Then, it is not always fair to say that the Goryeo court traditionally took the reign name of the Khitans or the Song only after being invested. Rather, it would be reasonable to see that the use of the Khitan reign names came in step with the complex change in the diplomatic relations between Goryeo and the Khitans.

The second question is related to the understanding of *gibok* 起復 (return to duty practice). According to Section 3 in Chapter 5, even though it took two years for the Khitans to proclaim Seonjong to the throne of Goryeo, the king maintained the stable working relationship with the Khitans (p. 255). King Seonjong received an investiture from the Khitans on the 23rd day of the eleventh month, 1085 (2nd year of King Seonjong). However, the record on the 16th day of the eleventh month, which was a week before the investiture, indicates that *nakgiboksa* 落起復使 (envoy with an order to end *gibok*) came to Goryeo. Here, *nakgibok* 落起復 means the end of *gibok*. So the arrival of *nakgiboksa* implies that there was *giboksa* 起復使 who had been sent earlier. *Gibok* indicates “rising up (起) from mourning for one’s parents and returning (復) to duty,” referring to a situation where one inevitably has to return to public duties before completing a three-year mourning period. This practice, originally intended for Khitan officials, was extended to foreign kings and a royal succession of the foreign state was approved via public notification delivered by *giboksa*. The Khitans dispatched *chijesa* 致祭使 (envoy for memorial service), *wimunsa* 慰問使 (envoy for condolences) and *giboksa* upon the arrival of *goesa* 告哀使 (envoy to inform a state funeral), who notified a national mourning from Goryeo, and later sent *nakgiboksa* and *chaekbongsa* 冊封使 (envoy for investiture) toward the end of a mourning period. Therefore, King Seonjong performed the mourning ceremony before the arrival of the investiture. It would be fair to say that the Khitans had already acknowledged his status as the King of Goryeo through *giboksa*.

Meanwhile, Section 1 of Chapter VI mentions that King Heonjong was quite rapidly recognized as King of Goryeo by the Khitans when he was installed to the throne as soon as an envoy for condolences arrived (p. 273). The envoy who visited Goryeo at that time was *giboksa*, not *chaekbongsa*, and what was delivered by the envoy was a public notifica-

tion. King Heonjong never received an investiture because he abdicated before the end of the mourning period. Therefore, the part where the book says King Heonjong was “invested” as King needs to be revised and there is no need to differentiate the case of King Seonjong and that of King Heonjong. The Khitans treated both of them equally in terms of royal succession.

Third, there are doubts over some views that seem to be excessive or ambiguous interpretations. In Section 2 in Chapter V, the author pays attention to the fact that in the commemorative ritual, held in the eleventh month of 1046 when King Munjong ascended to the throne, the Goryeo court used Song’s reign name, Daejungsangbu. The ritual was conducted in memory of Yang Gyu, Kim Suk-heung and Kang Min-cheom who made contributions at the war with the Khitans during the reign of King Hyeonjong. The years 1010 (1st year of King Hyeonjong) and 1018 (9th year of King Hyeonjong) were marked as the third and eleventh years of Daejungsangbu. However, in 1010, it was customary to use the Khitan reign name. Song’s reign name was used in 1018, but the Song dynasty had already changed the reign name from Daejungsangbu to Cheonhui (Tianxi, 天禧, 1017-21) in 1017. Therefore, it was incorrect to use either the third or the eleventh year of Daejungsangbu. In this regard, the author views that the use of the Song’s reign name, far from a simple error, contained a deliberate intention. That is, King Munjong assumed Song’s reign name in public to show that he would not be completely reliant on the relations with the Khitans for investiture. In fact, this strategy was successful when the Khitans raised some issues (pp. 241-45). However, as the author also mentions, in an earlier ritual, held in the seventh month of the year when King Munjong was crowned, the Goryeo court kept the Khitan reign name, Junghui, which contradicts the former case.

In Section 1 of Chapter VI, the author focuses on the phrase, “*bukgyo dae Yo namsa dae Song*” 北交大遼南事大宋 (exchanging with the Liao in the north and serving the Song in the south), written in King Sukjong’s decree of 1101 (6th year of King Sukjong). Specifically, she argues that after establishing the normal relations with the Khitans, Goryeo promoted a tribute-investiture relationship with a specific diplomatic order between the

two states while forming a subordinate relationship with the Song. In this context, Goryeo continued to use “gyo” (交) when referring to its relations with the Khitans, or the Liao persistently. But, the book concludes inversely that the division between “gyo” and “sa” (事) is only a rhetoric and the real suzerain of Goryeo was the Khitans (pp. 283-95). The author offers a table to explain that the term *sa* was used for the Song with a high stress on its relations with the Song, the economic and cultural hub of East Asia, and that Goryeo’s relations with the Khitans were frequently expressed as *gyo*, *rin* (隣), and *gyeolho* (結好), which connotes exchange, neighbor, and favorable relations respectively. Nonetheless, the book gives little evidence for the argument that Goryeo internally perceived its relations with the Song as “sa” or “*sadae* 事大 (serving the great).” The examples of the terms “gyo” or “gyorin” 交隣 (interacting with a neighbor) in the table are most pertinent to the Goryeo-Song relations during the reign of King Munjong. Therefore, the inference on “interacting with the north and serving the south” requires additional constructive research.

On a final note, I would like to share a trivial yet unignorable opinion regarding the book title. *Peaceful Frontier: Goryeo’s Diplomacy with the Khitans and Its Consequences* [*Taepyeonghan byeonbang: Goryeo ui dae Georan oegyo wa geu sosan*] sounds a new ambitious turn when compared with the author’s doctoral dissertation, “The Development and Characteristics of Goryeo’s Diplomacy with the Khitans” [*Goryeo sigi dae Georan oegyo ui jeongae wa teukjing*]. The author explains in the preface that the title has been changed to reveal more directly the achievements and actual impact of Goryeo’s diplomacy. Reading the book, however, I came to think that the title, “Peaceful Frontier” is not well matched to the theme of this book. Goryeo’s frontier went through three wars with the Khitans. Even after the wars, the frontier was always restless, by no means peaceful, due to Boju (Poju) and other military facilities established by the Khitans after forcibly occupying the eastern region of the Amnok River. As a matter of fact, the frontier finally became peaceful when the Khitans went into decline with the emergence of the Jin (1115-1234). Thus, it would be difficult to say that the peaceful frontier was neither a process of the Goryeo-Khitan rapprochement nor a consequence of the Goryeo-Khitan diplomacy.

# *The Five Hundred Years of Pre-Modern Joseon and China\** *[Joseon gwa Jungguk geunse obaeknyeon eul gada]*

By Kishimoto Mio and Miyajima Hiroshi

Seoul: Yeoksa bipyeongsa

—  
Myung-gi HAN  
Myongji University

## “Global Perspectives”

This Japanese work, originally published by Chuokoronsha (中央公論社) as part of the “World History” series, is an introductory book on “Asian history” whose target was aimed at Japanese readers. Then, there must be certain limitations for a Korean reader to comment on this book. Particularly, the intentions and objectives of the authors may not be accurately understood if the book is reviewed solely from the Korean history perspective. Furthermore, the book not only discusses the history of The Joseon dynasty but also provides an introduction to the Ming-Qing histories while noting that I do not have any expertise in Chinese history. With these basic limitations for Korean historians in mind, I would like to be faithful to my duties as a reviewer by sharing some thoughts after my perusal in terms of “studying and learning.” By and large, the general readers, accustomed to the narratives of Korean historians on Joseon history may find the table of contents in the book unusual. The table of contents is as follows:

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\* The original title for this book is *Min shin to richō no jidai* 明清と李朝の時代 published by Chuō Kōronsha (Tokyo) in 1998, and this review is translated from the Korean manuscript originally published in the *Yeoksa bipyeong* (역사비평), issue 66, February 2004.

1. Upheaval of East Asia

Legacy of the Song-Yuan Dynasties / Faltering Goryeo Dynasty / Peasants' Rebellion during the Late Yuan and Zhu Yuanzhang / The Ming Dynasty's Establishment of Dominance / The Foundation of the Joseon Dynasty / Widening Global Perspective

2. Expansion of the Ming Empire

"The South and the North" during the Early Ming / Development during the Reign of Yongle / Tributary Systems during the Ming / The Ming Empire on the Defensive Strategy / State and Society during the Mid-Ming Period

3. The Century of *Yangban* (Aristocrat): Joseon in the 16th Century

Yu Hui-chun and *Miam ilgi* [Diary of Miam] / *Yangban* Bureaucracy / Composition of Relatives / Rural Society and Governance / *Yangban* Mentalité / Transition of the Era

4. The Light and Shadow of the Late Ming Empire

Defense of the North and Financial Crisis / Japanese Pirates in the Southeast Coast / Cities and Farming Villages during the Late Ming / Communities and Order/Seasons of Politics

5. Chinese-Barbarian Transformations

World System and East Asia / The Imjin and Jeongyu Wars / Self-Reliant Powers in the Frontier / Growth of the Qing Dynasty / Collapse of the Ming Dynasty / Establishment of Dominance under the Qing

6. Establishment of the Joseon Traditional Society

The Manchu Invasions and Another Center of Confucian Civilization / Victims of Political Strife / Reorganization of the Ruling Class / Formation of Traditions

7. Peace of the Qing Dynasty

International Circumstances during the Kangxi Period / Two Faces of the Qing Emperor / The Reversal of the Qing Dynasty / China Seen from Europe

8. New Contenders: Late Joseon

The Hegemony of Rural Society / Silhak and Catholicism / The Dreams and Frustration of King Jeongjo / Premonition of Social Changes / Forecasting the Modern Times

9. From Prosperity to Crisis

*Hong lou Meng* [Dream of the Red Chamber] and *Rulin waishi* [Unofficial History of the Literati] / Emperor Qianlong, “the Old Man of Ten Victories” / Era of Prosperity / The Economy of Mountain Areas and Religious Revolt

10. People and Society: Comparative Theory of Traditional Society

“Family” (家) and Social Groups of China / Joseon’s Social Organizations with a Focus on Intermediate Groups

The above table of contents of the book with ten chapters informs that the authors intend to understand Korean history from the perspective of “East Asian history,” interconnected with Chinese history, rather than as the history of Korea “itself.” This interstate aspect is clearly shown in Chapter 1 where the collapse of Goryeo and the foundation of Joseon are described under the title, “Upheaval of East Asia” as well as in Chapter 5 that deals with the Imjin and Jeongyu Wars under the title of “Chinese-Barbarian Transformation.” Such approach might be quite unfamiliar to Korean readers who are used to the descriptions that offer a glimpse of political, economic, social and cultural events and changes of the Joseon period from the late 14th to the late 19th century mostly in a chronological order.

Along this line, the titles of the chapters and subtitles show that the authors emphasize “global perspectives” in which a broader framework of “East Asia” is employed. Such examples can be included, “Widening Global Perspective” in Chapter 1, “Transition of the Era” in Chapter 3, “World System and East Asia” in Chapter 5, and “China Seen from Europe” in Chapter 7.

In “Widening Global Perspective” of Chapter 1, Miyajima takes *Honil gangni yeokdae gukdo jido* [Map of Integrated Lands and Regions of Historical Countries and Capitals], Shin Suk-ju’s *Haedong jegukgi* [Chron-

icle of the Countries in East Asia], and *Nosongdang Ilbon haengnok* [Nosongdang's Travelogue of Japan] written by Song Hui-gyeong as the constructive examples for his positive evaluation that Joseon made effort to properly understand the situations of Japan and other neighboring countries until the 15th century. However, after the 15th century Miyajima especially pays attention to Joseon's gradual shift of the global insight to a passive attitude towards new trends as in the case of the issue of silver trade. With an emphasis on political factors, he attributes this unproductive change to the Sarim faction's attempt to eradicate the evils of the Hungu faction without any particular pressure from the outer world in the 16th century. In this line, he also associates such a "home-oriented" attitude of Joseon with one of the ensuing causes for the Imjin War, or the East Asian War (1592-98).

Chapter 5 seems to be the most distinctive part of this book due to the topic of global perspectives. Silver, treated already with respect to the "mixed residence (雜居) of the Han Chinese and the non-Han Chinese barbarians (華夷)" in the previous chapter, reappears as an important issue in this chapter. Here, Kishimoto argues that global commerce, boosted by silver, made an impact on Japan and the New Continent in the 16th century to escalate tensions across regions and within social classes alike. This kind of phenomena came to invoke the intrastate and interstate disputes over integration, the emergence of new powers, the dynamic movement of human and material resources, urban development, religious reformation against social disturbance, and new social ideology for the source of sociopolitical order. In particular, Kishimoto explains, Ming's action to prevent trade by *kenminsen* 達明船 (The tribute ships from Japan to Ming) after the "Ningbo Incident" in 1523 served as a "barrier" to the movement of silver in East Asia. As armed smugglers, Japanese pirates made effort to destroy the barrier and finally witnessed the maritime blockade relived by the Ming.

Meanwhile, military tensions, caused by the Mongols and the Jurchens in the north, increased national defense revenue of the Ming, which led to the growing investment of silver in the border regions. This change in northern China begot "silver shortage" in south China where more of the armed smuggling, organized by the Japanese pirates in desperate pursuit of silver, stood out. The transformation, propelled economically and militarily

both from the northern and southern frontiers, gained a felicitous advantage of narrowing the breach between the Han Chinese and the barbarians in the Ming. At the same time, as compared with bureaucrats and merchants, benefited out of the transformation in one way or another, farmers became poor as they sold grains at an extremely low price in order to get silver and pay taxes, thereby falling into agricultural exodus or reaching the helpless state of economic dependence. It is the Yangming School (陽明學) which stressed “the fundamental solutions” for restoring social order and collectivity in counter to the egoism, spread unchallenged, and the severe gap between the rich and the poor in China.

Following the above theme of frontier or external impetus surrounding mainland China, this chapter characterizes the Imjin War from a different angle that reinterprets Japan in terms of the rise of the new military power less than mere invaders. This revisionist orientation also recontextualizes the significance of the war in the regional integration of East Asia under the “global mechanism,” thus connecting the war to the higher demand for silver in China, the increase of silver production in Japan, and the emergence of Portugal and Spain from the late 16th century to the early 17th century. It is worth noticing here that Joseon is defined as “the country that evinced the strongest objection to the introduction of silver.” The authors also take note of the growth of “outsiders” on the border lines especially by enumerating the prominent military leaders of Li Chengliang (李成梁) and Nurhachi in northern China and the famous maritime warlords of Zheng Zhilong (鄭芝龍) and Zheng Chenggong (鄭成功) in southern China, all of whom actually built up their power by way of control over border trade in silver. Still, the hegemonic competition among the powerful outsiders was finalized when the Qing mounted a successful campaign against the “Revolt of the Three Feudatories,” in modern Yunnan conquered Taiwan, and subsequently exerted full maritime control over South China before the influx of the western powers several centuries later. In other words, the last winner of the long-term struggle diplomatically and militarily among the neighboring powers of the Ming, as well as culturally between the confrontation between civilization and barbarism, was the Qing dynasty during the 17th century.

In brief, Chapters 4 and 5 shed ample light on the multi-layered and complex, far from separate and dispersive, development of the Joseon and Ming-Qing histories in the 16th and 17th centuries. What is added to this historical complication is the role of Japan as an integral factor. For instance, according to these chapters, the diplomatic, economic, social, and military impacts of Japanese silver, Japanese pirates, and the Imjin War on the dynamic shape of East Asian history at that time should not be discounted. That is, Japan took a very important part in the great transition of the Joseon and Ming-Qing histories during the times. From the global perspective, this period is also called the Age of Discovery when the Western powers such as Portugal and Spain started advancing into the rest of the world, including East Asia, beyond Europe. Japan was the most vigorous actor in contacting and trading with the western forces and that exchange had a crucial bearing on the historical change of East Asia in its entirety. In fact, the evaluation of Japanese invaders as “the cosmopolitans transcending regional and national barriers in pursuit of trade” instead of “Japanese pirates making a habit of pillage and slaughter” faithfully speaks for the stance of Japanese scholars, including Ishihara Michihiro (石原道博), Amino Yoshihiko (網野善彦), Arano Yasunori (荒野泰典) and Murai Syosuke (村井章介). Such interpretation may seem unfamiliar to Korean readers who are used to the Korean history narrative that Joseon history in specific, developed “independently” and “inherently,” but it is worth understanding how the Japanese historians reformulate East Asia into a pattern of regional history and colored this new version into a larger narrative of global history in order to rethink and to expand the perspective of Korean history.

## Strengths and Weaknesses

As a Korean historian, it is difficult for me to concretely and meticulously criticize the writing of Kishimoto. Still, my impression through the reading is that his descriptions on the Ming-Qing histories are highly refined and well organized. Therefore, an intensive reading of the book would be very useful in comprehending the broader, positive and negative picture of the Ming-Qing histories in conjunction with the history of the Joseon dynasty.

Meanwhile, I locate several interesting points in Miyajima's description of Joseon. First, with the focus on a yangban elite family of Yu Hui-chun (柳希春, 1513-77), or the author of *Miam ilgi* [Diary of Miam] in the 16th century, Miyajima makes use of the diversity and richness of the content of the diary to bring forth the various aspects of the Joseon society encompassing the composition of kinship, rural society and central government, social classes and status, the economic power and the mentality of *yangban* elites, the process of factional strife, and the like. What is interesting is that in explaining the *modus vivendi* of the yangban Miyajima stresses the passing of state service examination (*gwageo*) as an important precondition for the preservation of the *yangban* identity. Alongside this, he also intimates the nature of the *yangban* not so much as a category of status as that of class with reference to the stories of Yu's descendants in local registers (*hyangan*), thereby indicating the sensitivity of the *yangban* elites themselves to social change at that time.

Next, the book under review is distinctive from most of the introductory books on Korean history which tend to account for the 16th century as a "period when historical achievements from the 15th century crumbled." The author's view of the 16th century is shown in the following sentences: "Oligopoly was not very serious in the 16th century and the original purpose of *gwageo* was well preserved. The novelty of Yu Hui-chun, as captured in *Miam ilgi*, represents that of the other *yangban* elites of the day." (p. 101); "Joseon in the 16th century was a society with a fluidity of movement where massive migration and settlement took place." (p. 111); and "the vitality of the 16th century in search of new politics" (p. 130). These fresh points, which Kang Man-gil and Lee Tae-jin have already argued, deserves some attention for a better understanding of the history of Joseon in the 16th century.

What is more, what should not go unnoticed is the question of objectivity. Miyajima maintains that

[A]s is well known, Joseon made the world's first metal type in the history of printing, but opinions vary on this point. Some speak highly of the first-ever metal type while others refuse to acknowledge its histori-

cal significance. The second view estimates that the development of Western metal type and typography invented by Gutenberg had sufficient cultural, social, and political significance to the “printing revolution” whereas Joseon’s metal type did not play such a noticeable role. Both opinions, I think, seem to go to extremes; what I would like to point out is the characteristics of Hanja (Chinese character) which are probably not suitable for typography. It is easy to mechanize the type-casting for (western) alphabet composed of a small number of letters. Given tens of thousands of the Hanja characters, in contrast, we can expect something like the “printing revolution” with ease. Discussions without such a matter seem almost pointless. The significance of Joseon’s metal type has to be reviewed under the circumstances that Joseon was facing at that time (p. 126).

The author’s cautious evaluation of historical facts provides some implications for understanding the issues that we overlook oftentimes. An example would be how to compare the commercial development among Korea, China and Japan. The author mentions that “Joseon’s commerce lost its light” vis-à-vis China and Japan during the 16th and 18th centuries by reason of “the passive attitude of the government” towards commerce. In this regard, he takes up the ruling class’s way of living as the more fundamental cause on the grounds that the majority of the *yangban* elites, except for their relatives and bureaucrats living in Seoul, resided in agricultural villages and procured daily supplies from their servants or farmlands without the help of market economy. On top of this self-sufficient system, he counts the residence of the *yangban* families in a locality instead of downtown as an obstacle in promoting the development of commercial cities such as *Xiancheng* (縣城) of China or *joukamachi* (城下町) of Japan. Still, Miyajima asks for a more careful interpretation as follows:

During the colonial period, Japanese scholars identified the phenomena such as commercial doldrums and lack of urban development as the stagnant trait of Joseon society. Post-liberation Korean scholarship criticized this colonialist reading and conversely repacked the phenomena in

the embryonic capitalism theory (資本主義萌芽論). However, both of these arguments tended to ignore Joseon society's independent structure and apply historical experiences of Europe or Japan mechanically to Joseon. Far from remaining stagnant, Joseon witnessed certain changes in a self-referential mode. This is why a structure-based theory of transformation is required (pp. 263-64).

To be certain, some scholars in Korea have begun to reanalyze economic activities of the *yangban* families from the “self-sufficient” perspective by analyzing the massive amount of letters left by the *yangban* elites who resided in rural villages especially in the 19th century. Therefore, Miyajima's argument invokes the need for more elaborate research in this field.

Last, the way Miyajima distinguishes Korean Chinese from the Han Chinese also receives attention. Different from the characteristics of the Han Chinese in the two-folded spirits of “being calculating and ethical” on the one hand and “being selfish and friendly” on the other, he argues, Korean Chinese do not possess or accept these attributes and this divergence enabled them to prevent themselves from “assimilating into the Han Chinese” (pp. 380-81). Such a bold hypothesis, if controversial, would be very useful in addressing some important yet interesting questions including “why Korean Chinese could withstand the force of Chinese assimilation.”

However, the book also comes with quite a few weaknesses. I would like to leave out minor errors and touch on some salient flaws. First, the book deals with the history of Joseon and the Ming-Qing history in parallel and this direct comparison method can be both a strength and a weakness. The approach is helpful for securing a “global perspective” emphasized consistently by the authors but some essential premises to be more specified are missing. In particular, it is problematic to have little discussion on the history of the relationship between Joseon and the Ming-Qing China, other than the Manchu Invasions, in writing about the history of Joseon and the Ming-Qing history from the 15th to the 19th century. It is regrettable that the authors barely discuss the Korea-China relations as one of the main topics in such a limited way that the relations are intermittently treated for the roles of Japan or the West in the historical unfolding of Joseon or

the Ming-Qing China under the motif of “global perspective.”

Second, some important research achievements of Korean scholarship since the 1980s are not properly reflected in the overall narrative. Because the book was originally published in Japan, this matter might be inevitable but it can undermine the originality of this book. For example, even though acknowledging the new waves of research in Korea (p. 243), the book uncritically includes expressions such as “standing up all night for political strife” under the title of “Victims of Political Strife” to describe power struggle. The background of the “political strife” is simply rated as “competition over public posts.” It is lamentable that the book phrases the 400-year political history of Joseon merely in “political strife.”

These debilities may not be questionable considering that the book was originally written for “Japanese readers” but reconsideration will be required when the translated edition is meant to be an “introductory book on the Joseon history for Korean readers.”

## Conclusion

Concerns exist over the future of East Asia, especially the Korean Peninsula located between China and Japan, as the hegemonic rivalry between the United States and China intensifies due to the rapid and powerful reemergence of China. Further, a resolution of historical conflicts between Korea and Japan seems distant since last year. Koreans have no choice but to keep a close watch on the situations of China and Japan even if the two neighbors pledge to avoid “Sinocentric hegemony” and “pre-1945 conservative turn” since Korea had long been a “victim” of these movements maneuvered by the two countries. What should Korea do in order to play a leading role in bringing about peace in East Asia and stay away from regional turbulence in the future? First and foremost, Koreans need to have a complex and multi-dimensional perspective on Chinese history and Japanese history, maintain high-quality research capacity for the academic development of Korean history, and properly understand Northeast Asia and East Asia. Despite the fact that the book writes about Korean history and Chinese history from the eyes of Japanese researchers, it is useful to look

back on the established thoughts and viewpoints of Korean scholarship for a new start in a productive way. To some degree, I felt a sense of jealousy as I read the book by these two Japanese historians who have enough academic attainment to author an introductory book on the history of “foreign countries.” This scholarly adventure does attest to the breadth and depth of Japanese scholarship on Korea and China. When would we be able to write about our neighbors’ “past,” or better yet East Asian history from our own perspective in tandem with global perspective?

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