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Contents

Articles

Articles (Translated)

Book Reviews

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Articles

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NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Learning to Coexist: Russia-ASEAN Ties from Enmity to Enmeshment

Andrea PASSERI
University of Bologna, Italy

Raimondo NEIRONI
Catholic University of Milan, Italy

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Learning to Coexist:
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Abstract

Over the course of their mutual history, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Russia have progressively moved from a background of enmity and distrust to a framework of burgeoning cooperation. To a large extent, this gradual shift has embodied a direct by-product of the Association's deliberate efforts to envelop Moscow in a growing net of interactions, so as to socialize the Kremlin in the highly distinctive normative architecture centred on the 'ASEAN Way' and turn it into a responsible regional stakeholder. Accordingly, by drawing upon Evelyn Goh's conceptualization of 'enmeshment strategy' the present article sheds light on the tools and initiatives put in place by the Association not only to engage Russia and maximize the positive returns of a cordial relation with Moscow, but also to influence its conducts, perceptions and regional agenda in a way that is consistent with the ideas of 'inclusive regionalism' and 'ASEAN centrality' professed in Southeast Asia. In doing so, the analysis will be structured around a three-staged periodization, covering the long era of animosity under Soviet rule (1967-1989), the embryonic and tentative exchanges established after the end of the Cold War (1989-2004), and the blossoming of the Russia-ASEAN partnership that materialized during the second, third, and fourth terms of the Putin presidency (2004-2019), which also coincided with the unravelling of his ambitious 'Asian pivot' aimed at countering Moscow's increasingly strained relations with the West. As a result, the article argues that the remarkable trajectory experienced over the course of the last two decades by the ASEAN-Russia dyad provides a further evidence of the successful legacy achieved by the Association's enmeshment blueprint in turning a former 'outsider' of Southeast Asian politics into a staunch supporter of regional stability.

Keywords: Russia, ASEAN, Enmeshment, Cooperation, 'ASEAN Way'

Learning to Coexist: Russia-ASEAN Ties from Enmity to Enmeshment*

Andrea PASSERI
University of Bologna, Italy

Raimondo NEIRONI
Catholic University of Milan, Italy

I. Introduction: ASEAN's Great Power Diplomacy and the Practice of 'Enmeshment'

Long considered as a peripheral spot within the overall picture of great power relations, Southeast Asia currently enjoys a sense of centrality in diplomatic circles around the globe that has absolutely no parallels in history. Quite unanimously, the credit for such an astonishing transformation of the sub-region in what is increasingly labelled as '*the geopolitical epicentre of our time*' or '*the place where giants meet*' has been accorded to ASEAN, a highly distinctive intergovernmental organization that in recent decades spearheaded the establishment of a network of institutionalized interactions both within its ranks and towards a wide range of external interlocutors.[1] In particular, the main source of ASEAN's uniqueness stems

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* This article reflects the joint outcome of the efforts of both authors. In practice, though, Andrea Passeri wrote the paragraphs 1, 4, and 5; while Raimondo Neironi wrote the paragraphs 2 and 3.

1 Ernest Z. Bower et al., "Southeast Asia's Geopolitical Centrality and the U.S.-Japan Alliance," Working Paper, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2015: 8. See also Andrea Passeri and Antonio Fiori, "Where Giants Meet: the Sino-American Soft Competition in Southeast Asia. The Cases of Myanmar and Vietnam," in *The Chinese Challenge to the Western Order*, ed. Antonio Fiori and Matteo Dian (Trento: FBK Press, 2014): 105-22; Ekaterina

from its absolute faith in a pretty unique model of regionalism, which stands in stark contrast with the blueprints and mechanisms pertaining, for example, to the European Union (EU), inasmuch as it has been historically led by a group of small and medium powers through a very low level of formalization, as postulated by their conceptualization of 'soft institutionalism.'[2] According to Amitav Acharya, the impetus displayed by ASEAN in assuming the driver's seat in East Asian regionalism and in advancing its characteristic recipe for institutionalised cooperation has emanated from the Association's deep-rooted aversion not only in acting as a passive imitator of notions borrowed from abroad, but also in surrendering its propulsive role to external great powers that could monopolize the stance and agenda of regional multilateral groupings.[3]

As a result, since its very genesis in 1967 the Association has given birth to a normative and procedural framework, also known as 'ASEAN Way,' whose initial task was to act as an intestine conflict-avoidance tool based on informal and consensual consultations, as opposed to overtly legalistic and adversarial decision-making processes.[4] With the end of the Cold War, however, the grouping was forced to totally rethink its stance and aspirations in the international arena, so as to cope with an increasingly multipolar regional scenario marked by numerous pushes and pulls, as epitomized by the rapid ascendance of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Consequently, the overarching values ingrained in the 'ASEAN Way' came to be used also in the attempt of building bridges vis-à-vis a list of great powers encompassing China, the U.S., Japan, India, and Russia. As illustrated by Laura Allison-Reumann's seminal investigation on ASE-

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Koldunova, "Russia's Involvement in Regional Cooperation in East Asia. Opportunities and Limitations of Constructive Engagement," *Asian Survey* 56, no. 3 (2016): 532-33.

2 Peter J. Katzenstein, *A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); Min-hyung Kim, "Why Does a Small Power Lead? ASEAN Leadership in Asia-Pacific Regionalism," *Pacific Focus* 27, no. 1 (April 2012): 111-12.

3 Amitav Acharya, "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism," *International Organizations* 58 (Spring 2004): 244-52.

4 Donald E. Weatherbee, *International Relations in Southeast Asia. The Struggle for Autonomy* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009, second edition): 128-29.

AN's attitudes and modus operandi as a 'norm-entrepreneur,' the paradigm endorsed by the Association to establish an inclusive and interdependent network of intergovernmental institutions in East Asia during this critical juncture revolved around two central tenets: the concept of 'cooperative security,' aimed at bringing about an open template of regionalism animated by a wide array of stakeholders, and the ideal of 'ASEAN centrality,' which postulated that the Association and its set of basic rules had to be retained as the cornerstones of future multilateral initiatives.[5] By the same token, ASEAN member States looked also adamant in voicing several important vetoes, as for their rejection of adversarial, confrontational, and zero-sum patterns of interstate interaction, while professing a strong attachment to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of their political counterparts.

Against this backdrop, it can be argued that ASEAN's tireless endeavours to include and socialize foreign great powers in its institutional architecture have thus underscored a clear emphasis on the transmission of prescriptive norms, so as to indicate what standards of action were regarded as proper or suitable according to the Association's 'logic of appropriateness.'[6] To a large extent, the prescriptive norms embraced by the grouping have been disseminated through persuasive and non-coercive instruments, stemming from the practice of ASEAN-sponsored 'institution-building' that entered a whole new era in 1993 with the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), as the first avenue erected by the Association with the deliberate purpose of engaging the main protagonists of East Asian politics. Since then, the ARF has been entrusted with the task of providing an informal and flexible venue for dialogue and cooperation with countries like the PRC, the U.S., Japan, Russia, Australia, South Korea, and Canada, plus several latecomers as in the case of India. Subse-

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5 Laura Allison-Reumann, "The Norm-Diffusion Capacity of ASEAN: Evidence and Challenges," *Pacific Focus* 32, no. 1 (April 2017): 6.

6 For a detailed analysis on the 'logic of appropriateness' and its persuasive tools, see: James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions: the Organization Basis of Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1998).

quently, this push acquired even greater momentum in the aftermath of the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, which further persuaded the Association to strengthen its steering role with the rest of the region by giving birth to a variety of brand-new, ASEAN-led institutions. Hence, after having backed the emergence of the 'ASEAN+3' (APT) format in 1997 to further bolster its ties with Tokyo, Beijing, and Seoul, the Association reached another important milestone in 2005 with the setting-up of the 'East Asia Summit' (EAS), and in the following year the proliferation of ASEAN-backed regional institutions led to the inception of yet another platform, based on the 'ASEAN Defence Ministers Plus' (ADMM+) meetings.

Each of these venues, most notably, has been attentively tailored to fit with the 'ASEAN Way' and its underlying norms, values, and worldview, as for those ingrained in the 'Treaty of Amity of Cooperation' (TAC) inked by the Association in 1975 in the attempt of creating an embryonic set of conflict-avoidance rules. Due to the activism displayed by ASEAN in its socializing endeavours within the ranks of regional institutions, various scholars have thus scrutinized the advancement of the Association's institution-building agenda as a crucial pillar of the grand strategy put in place by this peculiar grouping to cope with an increasingly multifaceted security dilemma.[7] In the words of John D. Ciorciari, for example, ASEAN's multilateral diplomacy and binding engagement have proved extremely relevant to achieving a positive 'entanglement' of the aforementioned plethora of great powers within a growing network of regular interactions, which proved as an essential prerequisite for the materialization of what he refers to as the 'complex balance of the external influences' operating in Southeast Asia's geopolitical perimeter.[8] Likewise, others have portrayed the Association's quest to erect an open, diversified, and cooper-

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7 Michael Leifer, "The ASEAN Regional Forum," *The Adelphi Papers* 36, no. 302 (1996); Muthiah Alagappa, *Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003); John D. Ciorciari, "The Balance of Great-Power Influence in Contemporary Southeast Asia," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 9, no. 1 (January 2009): 157-96.

8 John D. Ciorciari, "The Balance of Great-Power Influence in Contemporary Southeast Asia," 157.

ative security environment as a deliberate effort to establish a series of mutual counterchecks, so that key regional actors like China, the U.S., Japan, India, and Russia could act as responsible stakeholders by 'keeping an eye on each other.'[9]

Amongst the various tools experimented by ASEAN in order to advance its institution-building agenda and dissuade the recourse to power politics, the most successful one is certainly embodied by the practice of 'enmeshment.' According to Evelyn Goh, who formulated the most exhaustive elucidations of the concept, the idea of enmeshment primarily refers to:

> the process of engaging with an actor or entity so as to draw it into deep involvement into a system or community, enveloping it in a web of sustained exchanges and relationships, with the eventual aim of integration. In the process, the actor's interests are redefined, and its identity possibly altered, so as to take into greater account the integrity and order of the system.[10]

As a result, an enmeshment strategy transcends the ordinary goals of engagement, since it seeks to achieve way more than a temporary convergence of interests amongst the actors involved. Its ultimate target, in fact, lies in the subtle and progressive modification of the perceptions and behaviour of the counterpart, at least when it comes to the definition of few shared rules aimed at building a workable relation marked by a certain level of mutual trust. Additionally, the case of ASEAN seems to confirm that this specific blueprint unleashes its best dividends when pursued towards multiple targets simultaneously, under the banner of a 'omni-enmeshment'

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9 Evelyn Goh, "Southeast Asian Perspectives on the China Challenge," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 30, no. 4-5 (August/October 2007): 827.

10 Evelyn Goh, "Great Powers and Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies: Omni-Enmeshment, Balancing and Hierarchical Order," *RSIS Working Papers*, no. 84, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, July 2005: 9.

approach.[11] Furthermore, the practice of enmeshment brought about by the Association has also displayed a multi-layered nature, encompassing both bilateral and multilateral levels of interaction, which have complemented the initiatives endorsed by ASEAN as a whole in the establishment of a wide array of strategic partnerships with external interlocutors.

Concerning the implementation of enmeshment, the theorization proposed by Evelyn Goh entails the attainment of three consecutive steps.[12] First and foremost, the actual unravelling of similar initiatives involves the effort of identifying and reaching out to the external actors, who might embody the main targets of the whole campaign. In the case of ASEAN, this was achieved through the genesis of brand-new forums such as the ARF, which served the purpose of 'inviting' the aforementioned list of great powers in the open form of regionalism erected by the Association itself. Accordingly, the embryonic overtures voiced by ASEAN since the early 1990s represented an important act of 'legitimate inclusion,' inasmuch as they acknowledged the stakes and roles of foreign great powers in the management of Southeast Asia's security scenario. The stage was thus set for the opening of the second stage in the omnidirectional 'charm offensive' ignited by the Association, which revolved around the consolidation of 'institutionalized interactions' with these interlocutors as a way to entangle them in the intergovernmental frameworks sponsored by ASEAN. Finally, the strengthening in mutual cooperation and trust that descended from the multiplication of contacts during multilateral summits and the inking of preferential economic agreements has been conducive to the achievement of the final phase of the omni-enmeshment strategy unleashed by the Association, rooted in the adoption of a 'cooperative security' paradigm shared by all the parties involved.

Yet, the multi-vector emphasis ingrained in ASEAN's foreign policy does not find an equivalent picture in the literature, which has been exten-

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[11] Evelyn Goh, "Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia. Analyzing Regional Security Strategies," *International Security* 32, no. 3 (Winter 2008): 121.

[12] Evelyn Goh, "Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia. Analyzing Regional Security Strategies," 130-31.

sively hegemonized by the evolving ties cultivated by the Association with the PRC.[13] Due to this inherent bias, the remarkable trajectory enjoyed by the former in socializing a set of second-tier powers such as the Russian Federation has received little or no attention at all by the scholarly community, with few notable exceptions aimed at scrutinizing the prospects of engagement between the two sides.[14] Nevertheless, the ASEAN-Russia dyad is perhaps amongst the best suited in order to test the overall extent and ultimate by-products of the Association's enmeshment strategy, especially if one considers the tangible progresses experienced in their bilateral ties since ASEAN's very genesis in 1967. In fact, the relationship with Moscow has gone a very long way during the last decades, moving from a condition of reciprocal enmity and distrust in the Soviet era to the framework of a burgeoning partnership, marked by Russia's progressive 'entrapment' in the web of ASEAN-sponsored multilateral institutions. In doing so, most notably, the Association has successfully persuaded the Russian counterpart that it was also in Moscow's best interest to contribute to the establishment of a stable, open, and truly multipolar security architecture in East Asia, thus discouraging the adoption of unilateral and confrontational policies.

Building upon these premises, the following article sheds light on the process of gradual metamorphosis enjoyed in the bilateral relation between ASEAN and Russia, arguing that its success in transitioning from a state of friction and discord to an unprecedented era of fruitful dialogue and 'win-win' cooperation stands out as one of the most significant accomplishments produced by the Association's omni-enmeshment campaign. In or-

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[13] See Alice Ba, "China and ASEAN: Renavigating Relations for a 21st-century Asia," *Asian Survey* 43, no. 4 (July/August 2003): 622-47; Carlyle A. Thayer, "ASEAN, China and the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea," *SAIS Review* 33, no. 2 (Summer-Fall 2013): 75-84; Cheng-Chwee Kuik, "How Do Weaker States Hedge? Unpacking ASEAN States' Alignment Behaviour Towards China," *Journal of Contemporary China* 25, no. 100 (2016): 500-14.

[14] See Paradorn Rangsimaporn, "Russia's Search for Influence in Southeast Asia," *Asian Survey* 49, no. 5 (2009): 786-808; Elena S. Martynova, "Strengthening of Cooperation Between Russia and ASEAN: Rhetoric or Reality?," *Asian Politics & Policy* 6, no. 3 (2014): 397-412; Ekaterina Koldunova, "Russia's Involvement in Regional Cooperation in East Asia. Opportunities and Limitations of Constructive Engagement," *Asian Survey* 56, no. 3 (2016): 532-54.

der to test its main claim, the investigation relies on a three-staged periodization that is designed to illuminate the key junctures, turning points, and milestones faced by ASEAN-Russia relations during their half-century long journey. The first phase, accordingly, looks at the faltering start endured by both sides during the Cold War era (1967-1989), as the Soviet embroilment in Indochina and its traditional prejudices towards ASEAN as a 'fifth column' of the West hindered any possibility of kick-starting even basic contacts between the Kremlin and the freshly-formed Association. Still, the systemic changes brought about by the dissolution of the USSR and the end of the bipolar confrontation pushed both actors to totally reframe their roles, aspirations, and modus operandi in the international arena. As far as ASEAN is concerned, such a profound reassessment culminated in the aforementioned launch of a 'cooperative security' blueprint, centred on the Association's ability to advance an open and multipolar format of regionalism.

Consequently, this massive shift laid the foundations for the appearance of ASEAN's embryonic enmeshment initiatives directed at the Russian Federation, which kick-started an unprecedented period of tentative contacts (1989-2004) that will be extensively analysed in the second phase. Precisely as postulated by the incremental and piecemeal nature of enmeshment, this phase was inaugurated by the Association's initial overtures aimed at acknowledging Moscow as a 'dialogue partner,' which, in turn, paved the way for the emergence of a powerful act of 'legitimate inclusion' symbolized by Moscow's 2004 accession to the TAC. Moreover, during the following year the two sides also held the first ASEAN-Russia Summit, so as to further convey the idea that Moscow was no longer considered as an outsider of Southeast Asian politics. Since the mid-2000s, after having secured the Kremlin's commitment to regional governance through an expanding range of institutionalised interactions, the Association's enmeshment strategy has focused on the realization of its third step, aimed at forging a shared and cooperative security blueprint with the Russian Federation. In particular, Moscow's involvement in Southeast Asia's multilateral realm has grown significantly in concomitance with Vladimir Putin's third (2012-2018) and fourth (2018-) presidential terms, as epito-

mized by Russia's 2012 chairmanship of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. Subsequently, the 'divorce' from the West triggered in 2014 by the Ukrainian crisis has further persuaded the Putin administration to cultivate Moscow's political status and diplomatic reach in East Asia with a sense of urgency and a degree of dynamism that have no parallels in the country's history.[15]

Hence, the third and final phase scrutinizes the major breakthroughs emerged in the ASEAN-Russia relation under the banner of Putin's much-publicized 'pivot eastward,' that has been explicitly tailored with the goal of bolstering both the increasingly intimate Sino-Russian relation and Moscow's cooperative ties with the Association. With regards to the latter, the Kremlin's socialization in the normative framework of the 'ASEAN Way' has reached unprecedented heights between 2016 and 2018, following the celebration of the commemorative summit held in Sochi for the 20th anniversary of the Russia-ASEAN 'dialogue partnership' and the subsequent elevation of their bilateral ties to the rank of a full-fledged 'strategic partnership.' This upgrading, grandiosely announced in November 2018 during the 3rd ASEAN-Russia summit organized in Singapore, has therefore testified that after 22 years of growing interactions the two sides are finally eager to reap the benefits of the final stage of enmeshment, embodied by the adoption of a shared 'cooperative security' blueprint. As a result, the inking of the strategic partnership can serve as a further reminder of Moscow's consolidated commitment to the prescriptive norms at the core of the ASEAN-led model of regionalism, centred on the aforementioned concepts of 'ASEAN centrality' and 'open regionalism,' which proved essential to erase the scars of the Cold War era by moulding a whole new modus vivendi with the Association. Unsurprisingly, similar trends are nowhere more visible than in the gradual evolution of Moscow's posture in the South China Sea conundrum, which has gradually shifted from outright neutralism to a cautious support of several arguments voiced by regional

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[15] Anton Tsvetov, "After Crimea: Southeast Asia in Russia's Foreign Policy Narrative," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 38, no. 1 (April 2016): 57-64.

States in their confrontation with the PRC, as epitomized by Putin's repeated calls to uphold the ASEAN-backed 'Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea' (DOC).

II. ASEAN-USSR Ties in the Soviet Era (1967-1989): from Reciprocal Diffidence to an Incipient Form of Dialogue

Throughout the Soviet era, Moscow's relations with the freshly established ASEAN remained negligible and subject to mutual sentiments of suspicion and distrust, pushing some scholars to notice that there was no other area of the world just like Southeast Asia where the Kremlin had failed to exert political influence in the same way as it had showed its military capabilities.[16] Still, the interest of the USSR towards the sub-region dated back to the Leninist era, and it had gained further momentum in the late 1950s when Nikita Khrushchev spearheaded the launch of a new foreign policy doctrine devoted to the Third World. At that time, however, Moscow's key interlocutors in Southeast Asia were represented by the Communist movements involved in a series of national and anti-colonial struggles, which received an extensive support from the USSR also in light of the growing ideological rift unleashed between the Soviet Union and the PRC for the leadership of the Marxist camp. As a result, ASEAN States tended to regard Moscow's free-riding and confrontational policies as a relevant source of regional tensions, and this idea was largely reconfirmed in the late 1960s by the Soviet increasing embroilment in the Indochinese conundrum, where the USSR stepped-up its role as a key diplomatic and military partner of North Vietnam. A further evidence of this course was brought about in 1969 by the Association's reticence in backing Brezhnev's diplomatic initiative centred on the so-called 'Asian Collective Security Proposal.' The idea, tentative and vague, was largely unsuccessful also due to

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[16] Ronald D. Palmer, "The Soviet Union and Southeast Asia," *The Washington Quarterly* 9, no. 4 (1986): 169; Robert C. Horn, "Soviet Influence in Southeast Asia: Opportunities and Obstacles," *Asian Survey* 15, no. 8 (August 1975): 656-57.

China's vehement reaction, which inhibited other Asian states from taking the project into consideration.[17]

By the same token, during its formative years the Association often attracted harsh critical remarks from the Kremlin, which dismissed it as an organization merely aimed at disguising a pro-Western strategic alignment, as previously epitomized by the case of the 'Southeast Asian Treaty Organization' (SEATO).[18] To a large extent, the episodic and largely insufficient interest displayed by both sides in sketching-out the framework of a more cooperative relation was also a by-product of their exiguous economic ties. Between 1954 and 1979, the ASEAN perimeter ranked lowest in terms of Moscow's economic assistance amongst the non-aligned regions of the Third World, with the notable expectation embodied by Sukarno's Indonesia.[19] On top of that, and in spite of their self-proclaimed faith in a neutralist and equidistant diplomacy, the wide majority of Southeast Asian States had anchored themselves either to the U.S. through a flurry of bilateral security agreements, as symbolized by the Thai and Filipino accessions to the Manila Pact, or to their formal colonial overlord, by inking a series of *ad hoc* arrangements with the UK which granted access to their military facilities.[20] Moreover, Moscow's adventurism well beyond its sphere of influence during the Afghan War (1979-1989) further hindered any prospects of dialogue with ASEAN, and the overall mood of the Kremlin's interactions with the Association became even gloomier due to Brezhnev's support for the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. The net effect of these moves, cou-

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17 Arnold L. Horelick, "The Soviet Union's Asian Collective Security Proposal: a Club in Search of Members," *Pacific Affairs* 47, no. 3 (Autumn 1974): 276.

18 Fedor Mediansky and Dianne Court, "The Soviet Union in Southeast Asia," *Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence*, no. 29, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1984: 7.

19 Fedor Mediansky and Dianne Court, "The Soviet Union in Southeast Asia," 41.

20 In 1971, as a further example of this course, Britain signed the 'Power Defence Arrangements' (FPDA) with Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand. The FPDA were to replace the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement (AMDA), under which London was then responsible for the defence of the Federation of Malaya. For a detailed investigation, see: Ralf Emmers, "The Five Power Defence Arrangements and Defense Diplomacy in Southeast Asia," *Asian Security* 8, no. 3 (2012): 271-86.

pled with a stark recrudescence of the Sino-Soviet rivalry, thus persuaded the ASEAN's 'founding fathers' to preserve their traditional scepticism vis-à-vis the USSR and its allegedly subversive behaviour in the international arena, whilst inhibiting the Soviets from building a comprehensive diplomatic initiative in favour of the non-Communist countries of Southeast Asia.

Yet, by the time Gorbachev assumed office in March 1985 East Asia was emerging 'as a centre of world power equal to, if not greater than, that of Western Europe,'[21] whereas the USSR had faced since the mid-1970s deteriorating economic performances which required far-reaching reforms. Consequently, the emergence of a 'détente' with the region immediately acquired a central significance in the framework of the 'new political thinking' sponsored by the freshly installed Chairman of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). As a result, between the mid-1980s and the last CPSU Congress (July 1990) held before the dissolution of the USSR Gorbachev endeavoured to reshape the traditional and largely unsuccessful posture of Moscow towards East Asia, so as to adapt it to the new contingencies that were taking shape both domestically and in the international arena. In his own view, as explicitly mentioned during a famous speech given in Vladivostok in July 1986, the Soviet Union had to act as an 'Asian power with Asian responsibilities,' through the progressive framing of a modus vivendi with China, the two Koreas, and Southeast Asian countries.[22] As a matter of fact, this historic shift meant that the Kremlin desisted from treating the ASEAN perimeter primarily as a battleground in the global confrontation between revolutionary and conservative forces, while starting to look at Southeast Asia as a remarkable opportunity to rekindle the Soviet sluggish economy and get access to modern commodities and technologies.

In plain opposition with the legacy of Brezhnev, who had targeted his

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[21] Donald S. Zagoria, "The Kremlin Looks Bad in East Asia," *Journal of East Asian Affairs* 3, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 1983): 114.

[22] Roger Buckley, *The United States in the Asia-Pacific since 1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002): 178.

foreign policy efforts towards India and the socialist regimes located in Indochina, the new course brought about by Gorbachev thus showed an unprecedented interest in normalizing Moscow's heretofore strained exchanges with the Association and in giving birth to an embryonic form of dialogue between the two sides.[23] On the other hand, Gorbachev's willingness to secure a diplomatic thaw with China, which was symbolized by his State visit to Beijing in May 1989, added further momentum to the reshaping of the Kremlin's posture and image in the entire region, as it strongly contributed to further open the doors of the Asia-Pacific to the Soviet presence. Emblematically, Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech also coincided with a visible attenuation in the Soviet traditional rhetoric that sought to portray ASEAN as a subtle version of SEATO, which was replaced by a much more cooperative attitude in supporting a series of political initiatives put forward by ASEAN States, as in the case of Malaysia's plan to turn Southeast Asia into a 'Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality' (ZOPFAN), unburdened by the presence of proxy wars and foreign military bases.[24]

In March 1987, moreover, the Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze travelled to Thailand and Indonesia for the first State visit of a Soviet leader since the early 1960s, and its incipient 'shuttle diplomacy' across Southeast Asian capitals proved quite successful in persuading the wide majority of ASEAN countries that the USSR could be effectively tamed and enveloped in a growing net of institutionalised interactions. Even more importantly, the recalibration of Moscow's foreign policy in the region entailed a relevant change of posture also in terms of the Cambodian conundrum: in fact, with the Indochinese country dragged in a vicious cycle of war and instability the prospects for a lasting diplomatic breakthrough between the USSR and ASEAN remained quite remote. The Kremlin, as already mentioned, had long stood out as a key source of military and finan-

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[23] Stephen M. Young, "Gorbachev's Asian Policy: Balancing the New and the Old," *Asian Survey* 28, no. 3 (March 1988): 319-20.

[24] Sheldon W. Simon, "Superpower Cooperation in Southeast Asia," in *The Cold War as Cooperation. Superpower Cooperation in Regional Conflict Management*, ed. Roger E. Kanet and Edward A. Kolodziej (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991): 359.

cial assistance for Vietnam, and the Association considered the Cambodian issue as a key test to grasp the real extent of the political overtures voiced by Gorbachev. Accordingly, when the latter opted to utilize its leverage in the attempt of persuading Vietnam to identify a lasting arrangement with China over the future of Cambodia, Moscow's popularity in the region finally started to experience a positive trend, which was further reconfirmed in late September 1989 as Hanoi started to withdraw its troops from the war-torn neighbouring country.

Hence, it can be argued that the restructuring of Soviet-Vietnamese relations and the toning down in the ideological fervour of Moscow's diplomacy, together with the Kremlin's pull-out from Afghanistan and positive contribution to the Cambodian peace process, paved the way for the opening of a whole new era with ASEAN countries, as the two sides managed to absorb also the major shock ignited by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar confrontation. From its standpoint, the Association utilized the embryonic diplomatic rapprochement experienced with the USSR between 1985 and 1989 to sketch out a more coherent and consensual position towards the Soviet claim to embody a 'responsible East Asian power.' In doing so, most notably, ASEAN member States were progressively overcoming their long-standing fears rooted in the Kremlin's support for the communist parties still active all across Southeast Asia, which had been often considered as 'fifth columns' mobilized both by Moscow and Beijing to destabilize the sub-region.[25] As a result, when Gorbachev expressed for the first time an explicit call to become a 'dialogue partner' of the Association on the sidelines of his far-reaching speech given in May 1988 in Krasnoyarsk, ASEAN proved extremely receptive. In the meantime, Shevardnadze had also voiced the idea of an 'All-Asian Forum,' which reflected a flexible and inclusive blueprint of security cooperation amongst East Asian stakeholders modelled around the 'Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe' (CSCE) and its 'Helsinki process.' Ar-

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[25] Muthiah Alagappa, "Soviet Policy in Southeast Asia: Towards Constructive Engagement," *Pacific Affairs* 63, no. 3 (Autumn 1990): 337-40.

guably, similar moves were designed to showcase the Kremlin's unprecedented resolve in equipping its foreign policy with a 'device to disarm Asian critics of Soviet policy and to attach an aura of responsibility to Soviet involvement throughout the Asian continent,' and both the concept brought about by Shevardnadze and the example provided by the CSCE stood out as two important references for the actualization of the 'ASEAN Way' in the post-Cold War era.[26]

In the aftermath of the 'All-Asian Forum' initiative, as also noted by Robyn Lim, the Association thus started to employ a subtler and more accommodative approach towards Moscow, aimed at encouraging the Soviet aspiration to act as a responsible power while safeguarding the ASEAN's 'driver's seat' in East Asian regionalism.[27] With such an epochal change of attitude, the stage was set for the unravelling of ASEAN's enmeshment strategy vis-à-vis the Russian Federation, which, in December 1991, inherited the control of vast portions of the former USSR.

III. A New Dawn? The Genesis of ASEAN's Enmeshment Strategy towards the Russian Federation (1989-2004)

Since the very onset of the dissolution process that led to the Soviet collapse, ASEAN progressively desisted from perceiving Moscow as a noteworthy security threat, and the dynamic of incipient dialogue established between the two sides during the Gorbachev era gained further momentum. Accordingly, in February 1990 the then Prime Minister of the USSR Nikolai Ryzhkov became the first Soviet Premier to travel to Thailand and Singapore, which had formerly embodied one of the staunchest critics of Moscow's presence and involvement in Southeast Asian affairs. The visit turned into a ground-breaking event, since it laid the foundations for Rus-

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[26] Leszeck Buszynski, *Gorbachev and Southeast Asia* (Abingdon: Routledge, 1986): 607.

[27] Robyn Lim, "Implications for Southeast Asia," in *The Soviet Union as an Asian Pacific Power: Implications of Gorbachev's 1986 Vladivostok Initiative*, ed. Ramesh Thakur and Carlyle A. Thayer (London: Westview, 1987): 82-83.

sia's participation as an observer to the 24th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting held in Kuala Lumpur in July 1991. At the end of the summit, most notably, the status of bilateral ties between the Russian Federation and the ASEAN bloc was formally elevated to the rank of a 'consultative partnership,' as the Association's member States grew increasingly convinced that Moscow could be effectively enveloped in the expanding network of institutionalised exchanges that was taking shape in the post-Cold War East Asian scenario. Similarly, from the Kremlin's perspective the growing interest towards the multilateral realm showcased in Kuala Lumpur proved that Russian diplomats were increasingly aware of ASEAN's relevance as the key hub for Asian regionalism, inasmuch as they began to look at the strengthening of Moscow's interaction with the Association as a major precondition to expand Russia's influence in the whole Asia-Pacific.[28]

Yet, it must be also highlighted that throughout the 1990s the Russian Federation was in shambles both economically and strategically, after having rapidly dissipated the superpower status of the USSR. As a result, when it came to the conceptualization and implementation of a comprehensive foreign policy for East Asia, the Kremlin encountered inevitable difficulties and constraints. On top of that, the country's external projection still assigned a paramount priority to Europe, even though a peculiar strain of Moscow's political establishment started to revamp the idea of Russia as a 'Eurasian power': this vision gained further traction between 1996 and 1998 with the designation of Yevgeny Primakov as Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, who sponsored the launch of a multi-vector diplomacy shaped by a growing emphasis on Moscow's Eastern partners.[29] As far as ASEAN was concerned, the policy of multipolarity brought about by the 'Primakov doctrine' thus acted as an additional catalyst behind a mutual

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[28] Dmitry Gorenburg and Paul Schwartz, "Russia's Relations with Southeast Asia," *Russie.NEI. Reports*, no. 26, Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI), March 2019: 15, https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/gorenburg_schwartz_russia_relations_southeast_asia_2019.pdf. Accessed November 4, 2019.

[29] Vladimir N. Kolotov, "Main Trends of Russia's Foreign Policy in Transforming East and Southeast Asia," Brookings, April 1, 2008, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/main-trends-of-russias-foreign-policy-in-transforming-east-and-southeast-asia/. Accessed November 4, 2019.

rapprochement based on an analogous worldview between the two counterparts, which foresaw the emergence of multiple centres of power all across East Asia.[30] In July 1996, moreover, the 29th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting convened in Jakarta celebrated the upgrading of Russia-ASEAN ties into a full-grown 'dialogue partnership,' precisely as contended by the three-staged theory of enmeshment. Since then, Moscow was therefore acknowledged by the whole Association as a key target of its great-power diplomacy in the post-Cold War era, whose main aim resided in the consolidation of a complex balance of the external influences operating within the region.

Against this backdrop, the inking of the dialogue partnership paved the way for several breakthroughs in the fields of cultural and scientific cooperation, as symbolized by the establishment of a series of embryonic exchange programs involving students, scientists, and technicians from both sides. In addition, two-way trade between Russia and ASEAN skyrocketed by 716 per cent between 1993 and 1996, notwithstanding the fact that Moscow's trade share still ranked lowest amongst the Association's dialogue partners.[31] Yet, both actors also appeared reciprocally disillusioned and embittered at times. Russia, in particular, had to witness throughout the entire Yeltsin presidency (1992-1999) a quite disappointing trend not only in terms of the trade structure with ASEAN countries, which was dominated by natural resources, raw materials, and arms deals, but also in the sphere of foreign direct investments (FDIs), as the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis further hampered the attractiveness of Russia's Far Eastern *oblasts* for international investors.[32] On the other hand, ASEAN member States became increasingly mindful that in spite of Primakov's own influence the Yeltsin administration was still hegemonized by a pro-Western

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30 Vadim Kononenko, "From Yugoslavia to Iraq: Russia's Foreign Policy and the Effects of Multipolarity," *UPI Working Papers*, no. 42, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2003: 6-7.

31 Paradorn Rangsimaporn, "Russia's Search for Influence in Southeast Asia," 795.

32 Peggy F. Meyer, "The Russian Far East's Economic Integration with Northeast Asia: Problems and Prospects," *Pacific Affairs* 72, no. 2 (1999): 218-23.

camp, centred on the figure of the former Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, who claimed that Europe had to be firmly retained as the primary epicentre of the Kremlin's foreign policy. Unsurprisingly, his emphasis on the emulation of the democratic and market-driven regimes of the West raised numerous eyebrows within the Association, where this particular recipe was largely regarded as doomed to failure (Bazhanov and Bazhanov 1993: 101-02).

The permanence of certain residual elements of mutual scepticism and distrust, however, did not prevent the two sides from gradually enlarging the scope and frequency of their interactions, and the growing commitment displayed by the post-Soviet establishment in implementing a foreign policy based on multilateralism, cooperation, and dialogue convinced ASEAN to reciprocate similar overtures. In fact, the road that led to the ratification of the dialogue partnership in 1996 had been punctuated since its very genesis by a series of gradual and incremental steps, conducive to Russia's progressive 'entrapment' in the intergovernmental network erected by the Association. In 1992, more specifically, Moscow had entered the ranks of the 'Pacific Economic Cooperation Council' (PECC), and it had also joined the ARF since its very inauguration in 1994, thus emerging as one of the potential partners of the 'cooperative security' blueprint framed by ASEAN after the end of the Cold War era. Four years later, moreover, the Russian Federation was also welcomed as a full member of APEC, so as to contribute to a coordinated response against the regional financial meltdown.[33] With the Kremlin's participation as a 'founding father' of the ARF, ASEAN States were thus acknowledging Russia's stakes in Southeast Asia, as well as its positive contribution to the soft form of regionalism spurred by the Association: in 1996, as a further evidence of such course, Moscow's status as a 'consultative partner' of the Forum was officially up-

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[33] Against this backdrop, it should be highlighted that Moscow's increasing involvement in ASEAN-sponsored institutions also benefitted from the accession among the ranks of the Association of its long-standing partner Vietnam, which materialized in 1995. For an exhaustive analysis, see: Tsuneo Akaha, "Russia and Asia in 1995: Bold Objectives and Limited Means," *Asian Survey* 36, no. 1 (1996): 100-08.

graded to a full membership.[34]

As argued by Ziegler, the decision to acknowledge Yeltsin's Russia as a regional great power notwithstanding its profound weaknesses was largely rooted on one hand in the Association's perception of Moscow as a useful countercheck to the U.S. and China, and, on the other, in the imperative of rewarding both the Kremlin's incipient overtures and its 'desire for recognition and relevance' in East Asia.[35] From the Russian perspective, instead, this mounting inclusion in ASEAN-sponsored venues reflected the common geopolitical quest endorsed since the end of the Cold War by both actors, especially in inhibiting the ascendance of an hegemonic power in the region, while also confirming Moscow's self-defined status as a major diplomatic stakeholder.[36] As already recalled, this commonality of views started to flourish during Primakov's tenure as Foreign Minister in the late 1990s, before entering a whole new era with Vladimir Putin's first presidential mandate (2000-2004). In fact, with NATO's eastward enlargement towards the Baltic and Central European States the pro-Western camp of the Russian establishment had suffered a major blow, and the Asian 'near abroad' acquired an even greater emphasis within Putin's foreign policy discourse.[37] In line with this view, the first directives issued by the President in June 2000 along the pages of the new 'Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation' looked at the formulation of a more comprehensive and concerted strategy to nurture Moscow's political and economic standing in East Asia, which postulated a systematic use of arms and energy deals as the pivotal tools of Russia's diplomacy in the region.[38]

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[34] Noel M. Morada, "The ASEAN Regional Forum. Origins and Evolution," in *Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific. The ASEAN Regional Forum*, ed. Jürgen Haacke and Noel M. Morada (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010): 16-17.

[35] Charles E. Ziegler, "Russia in the Asia-Pacific: A Major Power or Minor Participant?" *Asian Survey* 34, no. 6 (June 1994): 543.

[36] Tsuneo Akaha, "Russia and Asia in 1995": 100.

[37] Astrid S. Tuminez and Mark Hong, "Russia in Southeast Asia: A New 'Asian Moment'?" In *ASEAN-Russia: Foundations and Future Prospects*, ed. Victor Sumsky, Mark Hong, and Amy Lugg (Singapore: ISEAS, 2012): 50-51.

[38] Mihoko Kato, "Russia's Multilateral Diplomacy in the Process of Asia-Pacific Regional

By the same token, the new course also doubled-down on the efforts displayed by the Yeltsin administration to further integrate the Russian Federation into the ASEAN-led institutional network and thus avoid its marginalization from nascent venues.[39] In other words, with the Association's metamorphosis into an inclusive regional bloc aimed at fostering a multipolar post-Cold War scenario, the Kremlin realized that in order to maintain its clout as a great power with a truly global reach, it had to be acknowledged as one of the main targets of the omni-directional diplomacy unleashed by ASEAN since the birth of the ARF. Accordingly, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks the two sides started to endeavour on a shared platform to contrast terrorism, which officially materialized in 2004 with the 'ASEAN-Russia Joint Declaration on Combating International Terrorism' and the 'ASEAN-Russia Workplan on Countering Terrorism and Transnational Crime,' whilst also launching a series of diplomatic initiatives such as the 'Partnership for Peace, Security, Prosperity and Development in the Asia-Pacific Region' inked in June 2003. The latter, in particular, showed that the process of 'legitimised inclusion' of the Russian Federation in Southeast Asia was finally ready to hit its final milestone, represented by the Kremlin's accession to the TAC, inasmuch as it reaffirmed Moscow's progressive socialization with the notion of 'open regionalism' and 'ASEAN centrality' professed by the Association. As a result, after having secured five months earlier a formal endorsement by the Russian Parliament, in November 2004 Moscow officially joined the treaty and became the 5th external signatory, along with China, Japan, India, and Pakistan, to enter the 2nd stage of the enmeshment strategy propelled by the ASEAN grouping.

Integration: The Significance of ASEAN for Russia," in *Eager Eyes Fixed on Eurasia. Russia and Its Eastern Edge*, ed. Iwashita Akihiro (Hokkaido: Slavic-Eurasian Research Center, 2007): 144.

39 Elena S. Martynova, "Strengthening of Cooperation Between Russia and ASEAN: Rhetoric or Reality?" 399.

IV. The Road towards the ASEAN-Russia Strategic Partnership and Putin's 'Pivot to Asia' (2004-2019)

Since the mid-2000s, thanks to the act of 'legitimate inclusion' triggered by the Russian accession to the TAC, Moscow's multilateral clout in Southeast Asia started to acquire more substance, and the embryonic enmeshment measures pursued over the course of the previous decade under the banner of the ASEAN-Russia 'dialogue partnership' gave way to a more intimate and institutionalised relation. In fact, with the grouping's enlargement towards the Indochinese States and the birth of innovative venues, the Association's normative architecture based on the idea of 'soft institutionalism' had reached a whole new level of sophistication and distinctiveness, encompassing various layers of dialogue as well as unprecedented spheres of cooperation in areas such as people-to-people exchanges and transnational security.[40] Against this backdrop, a major breakthrough that marked the inauguration of the 2nd stage in the enmeshment strategy unleashed by ASEAN vis-à-vis the Kremlin materialized in December 2005, following the first ASEAN-Russia Summit held in Kuala Lumpur. The event, in particular, paved the way for a joint declaration aimed at charting the roadmap for the establishment of a 'progressive and comprehensive partnership' amongst the two sides, which was officially laid out in the 'Comprehensive Programme of Action 2005-2015' (CPA) adopted during the summit.[41]

The plan called for a gradual enlargement in the functional scope of the cooperation initiatives sponsored by the two actors, especially in terms of security, trade and investment, energy, and infrastructural development.

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[40] Ekaterina Koldunova, "Russia's Involvement in Regional Cooperation in East Asia. Opportunities and Limitations of Constructive Engagement," 535.

[41] ASEAN Secretariat. *2005 Joint Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of the Member Countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Head of State of the Russian Federation on Progressive and Comprehensive Partnership*, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 13 December 2005, https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/2005-Joint-Declaration-Of-ASEAN-and-Russia-1.pdf. Accessed November 5, 2019.

Yet, Russia's bids to enter the ranks of the newly born EAS and 'Asia-Europe Meeting' (ASEM) were put on hold for the subsequent five years, due essentially to Moscow's still negligible footprint in the region from an economic standpoint. This choice produced a certain sense of delusion and frustration in Russian diplomatic circles, inasmuch as Southeast Asia was regarded at that time as a pivotal fulcrum of the 'multipolar world' envisioned by the Kremlin since the launch of the 'Primakov doctrine' in the late 1990s.[42] On top of that, Russia felt entitled to a different treatment also because it had already endorsed the 'ASEAN Way' through the inking of the TAC, which stood out as the official prerequisite to accede the growing network of regional platforms backed by the Association. Nevertheless, Moscow's increasingly receptive attitude with ASEAN was largely reconfirmed also during Medvedev's four-year presidential interlude (2008-2012), as the impact of the global economic crisis further convinced the Kremlin to revamp the Russian Far East by turning it into the country's 'launchpad' towards the prosperous markets located in East Asia.[43] In 2010, accordingly, ASEAN opted to finally open the doors of its brand-new institutions not only to the Russian Federation, but also to the U.S., following Washington's decision to sign the TAC as postulated by the strategy of multilateral engagement brought about by the Obama administration.

Consequently, the 2nd ASEAN-Russia summit held in Hanoi at the end of October formalized Moscow's accession both to the EAS and ASEM, while commemorating the positive legacy of the dialogue partnership kick-started in 1996. In the occasion, the two sides also pledged to meet the goals listed in the CPA by further strengthening their economic interdependences, so as to nurture the positive trend experienced by two-way trade during the period 2005-2010, which had more than doubled

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[42] Paradorn Rangsimaporn, "Russian Perceptions and Policies in a Multipolar East Asia under Yeltsin and Putin," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 9, no. 2 (2009): 214-16.

[43] Natasha Kuhrt, "Russia and Asia-Pacific: Diversification or Sinocentrism?" in *Russia's Foreign Policy. Ideas, Domestic Politics and External Relations*, ed. David Cadier and Margot Light (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015): 175-77.

from around US$ 5 billion to US$ 12.5 billion.[44] More generally, the Association's choice of opening the membership of the EAS and ASEM to a wide list of external stakeholders, as it had already happened with the ARF, highlighted that the grouping was de facto doubling down on its omni-enmeshment campaign towards multiple poles of the international system, due to the increasingly uncertain and competitive security environment emerging in East Asia under the shadow of an incipient Sino-American rivalry. In this regard, ASEAN's response was thus consistent with the idea of 'going global' by opening the doors of its freshly-established venues to several latecomers of Southeast Asian politics, as an antidote to the pushes and pulls generated by major phenomena as the global economic meltdown and China's rise to the rank of global superpower. Additionally, the Association's renewed impetus in asserting its centrality as a true champion of multilateralism was also a by-product of the growing competition unleashed by alternative formulas of interstate cooperation that were taking shape in the region, as epitomized by the Rudd and Hatoyama initiatives that sought to raise Australia and Japan's credentials as key mediators and norm-entrepreneurs in the Asia-Pacific. Hence, pressured once again by the shadow of its marginalization as the key norm-maker in East Asia's regionalism, the Association decided to reward Moscow as a staunch supporter of the concept of 'ASEAN centrality,' whilst equipping its enmeshment blueprint with additional tools to consolidate institutionalised exchanges with the Kremlin.[45]

Building upon these accomplishments, in 2012 Moscow's commitment to frame a productive partnership with ASEAN laid the foundations for Russia's first-ever APEC chairmanship, as the city of Vladivostok was selected to host the forum's annual meeting. During the summit, most notably, Moscow's agenda-setting and honest brokerage received vast praises

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[44] Victor Sumsky, "The Enlargement of the East Asia Summit: The Reasons and Implications of Bringing Russia in" in *ASEAN-Russia: Foundations and Future Prospects*, ed. Victor Sumsky, Mark Hong, and Amy Lugg (Singapore: ISEAS, 2012): 71.

[45] Victor Sumsky, "The Enlargement of the East Asia Summit: The Reasons and Implications of Bringing Russia in," 74-75.

by the Southeast Asian delegates, who acknowledged the important contribution provided by the Russian Federation in rekindling the idea of 'regional connectivity' after the sudden slowdown produced by the global economic crisis.[46] In parallel, Putin's return at the helm of the country's government ignited an escalation of tensions with the West marked by the Ukrainian conundrum in 2014, and also by Moscow's military embroilment in the Syrian war over the course of the following year, which acted as a real game-changer in terms of Russia's political projection in East Asia. Since then, the Kremlin has therefore turned its eyes eastward with an unparalleled degree of activism, in order to offset Western sanctions and keep the Russian economy afloat. As could be expected, this process has persuaded Moscow to ignite a powerful 'charm offensive' towards China and the ASEAN grouping, as the potential surrogates to its increasingly strained relations with the U.S. and the EU, while also entailing visible efforts to rediscover once again the country's 'Eurasian identity.' Accordingly, at the start of 2015 the Kremlin's rebalancing policy (also known in the Russian political jargon as Putin's 'pivot to Asia,' or 'turn to the East') has gained additional momentum with the launch of the 'Eurasian Economic Union' (EAEU), a brand-new multilateral organisation that in the subsequent year started to make inroads in Southeast Asia by inking a free trade agreement with Vietnam.

Then, as ASEAN-Russia ties were moving towards the full attainment of the 2nd stage of the enmeshment campaign through the enhancement of institutionalised interactions and the realization of the CPA, the 20th anniversary since the birth of the dialogue partnership provided an ideal opportunity to further showcase Moscow's unwavering socialization in Southeast Asia's multilateral realm. This special milestone, most notably, has been celebrated in the 'Commemorative ASEAN-Russia Summit' held in Sochi in May 2016, under the emblematic catchphrase 'Moving Towards a Strategic Partnership for Mutual Benefit.' At the end of the two-

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[46] Ekaterina Koldunova, "Can Russia Be a Leader in East Asian Economic Integration?" *East Asia Forum*, August 17, 2016, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/08/17/can-russia-be-a-leader-in-east-asian-economic-integration/. Accessed November 2, 2019.

day meeting, the eleven State delegations that gathered on the Black Sea formulated the 'Sochi Declaration,' which reaffirmed the remarkable breakthroughs brought about between 2005 and 2015 thanks to the roadmap delineated by the CPA, whilst also reiterating an unyielding attachment to the prominence of both the EAS and the ARF as key regional security forums, in line with the notion of 'ASEAN centrality.'[47] On top of that, the summit has also introduced a new action plan for the period 2016-2020, calling on both parties to step-up their diversified partnership in the framework of the Association's community-building efforts, culminated a few months earlier with the genesis of the 'ASEAN Economic Community' (AEC). In the occasion, moreover, the Kremlin has sought to revamp its standing as 'honest broker' in the sphere of East Asian regionalism by voicing once again Putin's concept of 'integration of integrations,' which looks at the establishment of a cooperative network of formalised interactions between ASEAN, the Kremlin-backed EAEU, and China's signature blueprint centred on the 'Belt and Road Initiative' (BRI).[48]

Similar moves clearly hinted that the two actors were laying the foundations for the opening of the 3rd and final phase of the enmeshment campaign officially kickstarted in 1996, as they endeavoured to further refine a shared conceptualization of 'cooperative security.' From an official standpoint, this massive landmark has been pompously presented to regional and global audiences alike in November 2018, under the banner of the 3rd ASEAN-Russia summit held in Singapore. The meeting, most notably, has celebrated the visible improvements achieved over the course of the past two decades in the progressive transformation of Moscow's attitudes and perceptions towards the Association, by formally elevating the pre-existing dialogue relations into a full-fledged 'strategic partnership.' Unsurprisingly, the joint declaration issued by the Kremlin and the ASEAN Secretariat to motivate the upgrading of their mutual ties stands out as the

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[47] Ian Storey and Anton Tsvetov, "ASEAN and Russia Look to Achieve their Full Potential," *The Straits Times*, June 2, 2016. https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/asean-and-russia-look-to-achieve-their-full-potential. Accessed November 3, 2019.

[48] Ekaterina Koldunova, "Can Russia Be a Leader in East Asian Economic Integration?."

epitome of the founding values and operating axioms at the core of the 'ASEAN Way,' which have been gradually endorsed by Russia as defining features of its own diplomatic projection in Southeast Asia. The statement, in particular, portrays the strategic partnership between the two actors as forged on a series of prescriptive norms, as for the pledge to safeguard the multipolar structure of the regional security environment by upholding the pivotal notions of 'ASEAN centrality' and 'open regionalism.'[49] Likewise, the document also depicts in very positive terms Moscow's constructive role not only in contributing to the management of a complex, inclusive, and stable balance of the external influences operating in the Association's geopolitical perimeter, but also in displaying a tangible commitment to erase the scars of the Soviet legacy.

Still, for those involved in the assessment of the enmeshment campaign pursued by ASEAN one of the most revealing features incapsulated in the joint declaration revolves around the shared position sketched-out by the two sides on the South China Sea issue. In such regard, the document expresses an unconditional support both for the principle of freedom of navigation and for the aforementioned DOC, while envisioning its future metamorphosis into a binding yet consensual code of conduct. The inclusion of this specific reference, which was absent in the joint statements issued in 2005 and 2010 at the end of the first and second ASEAN-Russia summits, does not embody a sharp departure from the neutralist and low-profile posture showcased by the Kremlin on the South China Sea dispute, which has attracted repeated criticism amongst Southeast Asian governments either for being quite ambivalent or too lenient towards the PRC. Yet, the mention also hints Moscow's growing willingness to conform with the norms and values embraced by the Association in coping with the South China Sea conundrum, as indicated by Putin's restraint in backing Beijing's historical claims based on the so-called 'nine-dashed line.'[50] For

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[49] ASEAN Secretariat. *Joint Statement of the 3rd ASEAN-Russian Federation Summit on Strategic Partnership*. Singapore, 14 November 2018, https://asean.org/joint-statement-3rd-asean-russian-federation-summit-strategic-partnership/. Accessed November 5, 2019.

[50] Vitaly Kozyrev, "Russia-Southeast Asia Relations: In China's Shadow?," *The Asan Forum*, April

some scholars, this slight re-orientation may actually imply the emergence of a deliberate hedging policy vis-à-vis the PRC, entrusted with the task of recalibrating Moscow's overdependence on Beijing as its paramount diplomatic interlocutor through the cultivation of a more diversified portfolio of regional partnerships, centred in particular on countries such as Vietnam and Malaysia.[51]

Regardless of its underlying rationale in the framework of China-Russia relations, when analysed from the Association's perspective the Russian incipient tilt towards ASEAN on the South China issue and its growing endorsement of the arguments postulated by the 'ASEAN Way' seem to provide the final testaments of the extremely successful legacy unleashed in this particular instance by the practice of enmeshment. After 22 years of burgeoning institutionalised interactions, conducive to the transformation of a former 'pariah' of Southeast Asian politics into a reliable advocate of the current status-quo, the ASEAN-Russia partnership has therefore witnessed the genesis of a consensual, albeit embryonic, security blueprint to safeguard regional stability, rooted in the promotion of a non-confrontational and rule-based logic of appropriateness. In its relations with the Association, most notably, the Kremlin has apparently found a like-minded interlocutor who shares an analogous worldview both diplomatically and in terms of domestic politics, as symbolised by their similar attachment to the concepts of multipolarity, non-interference, and 'sovereign democracy,' which can be seen as the Russian equivalent to the centralized model of government postulated by the so-called "Asian values."[52] This common mindset, in turn, has paved the way for a socialization process that persuaded the Kremlin to set aside its prejudices towards ASEAN

19, 2016, http://www.theasanforum.org/russia-southeast-asia-relations-in-chinas-shadow-2/. Accessed November 4, 2019.

51 Tony Rinna, "The China Factor in Russia-Vietnam Security Ties," *Foreign Policy Journal*, January 5, 2016, https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2016/01/05/the-china-factor-in-russia-vietnam-security-ties/. Accessed November 4, 2019. See also Alexander Korolev, "Russia in the South China Sea: Balancing and Hedging," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 15, no. 2 (2019).

52 Elizabeth Wishnick, "Russia: New Player in the South China Sea?," *PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo*, no. 260, Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (IERES), July 2013.

by taking a series of binding commitments especially in terms of the management of regional security challenges, even at the cost of casting some shadows behind its 'quasi-alliance' with the PRC.

V. Concluding Remarks

The historical investigation conducted in the previous pages has sought to illuminate a quite remarkable and yet generally overlooked phenomenon, by looking at the visible blossoming of diplomatic ties experienced by the Russia-ASEAN dyad since the early 1990s. In such perspective, the diachronic analysis of the evolving relations nurtured by the two actors seems to strongly validate the central claim of this study, which contends that the progressive shift from a condition of enmity and distrust to the framework of a flourishing partnership responded to a deliberate strategy put in place by the Association, with the final aim of enmeshing Moscow in the behavioural code of the 'ASEAN Way.' After the faltering start of the Soviet era, the Kremlin's socialization in the soft and inclusive form of regionalism sponsored by the Association has thus represented a successful application of the great-power diplomacy pursued by ASEAN in order to achieve a complex balance of the external influences operating in Southeast Asia. As indicated by Evelyn Goh's three-staged theory of enmeshment, this process has first entailed an act of 'legitimate inclusion' towards various regional stakeholders, conducive to their admission to brand-new venues such as the ARF, the EAS, and the ASEAN+3. Subsequently, the endorsement of the 'rules of the game' enshrined in Russia's accession to the TAC has paved the way for a further blossoming of institutionalised and multi-layered ties between the two sides, aimed at inducing restraint, cooperation, and a greater degree of predictability in the Kremlin's regional stance. Similar achievements, in turn, have laid the foundations for the formulation of a shared roadmap towards the genesis of a full-fledged Russia-ASEAN partnership, rooted in the adoption of a 'cooperative security' paradigm and symbolized by the aforementioned CPA. Undoubtedly, the common quest embodied by both sides in supporting a multipolar world has gained an additional propellent with Putin's return at the helm of Russian politics

and Moscow's 'divorce' from the West, marked by Russia's military intervention in the Ukrainian and Syrian war. Since then, the 'turn eastward' pursued by the Kremlin's foreign policy has further fostered its cooperative relation with ASEAN, as clearly epitomized by the evolution of Russia's posture in the South China Sea dispute, which is increasingly characterized by a cautious support of the arguments claimed by several ASEAN States in their long-standing dispute with the PRC.

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Singing Mongolian: Language Preservation, Cultural Representation, and Resistance

Jamie N. SANCHEZ
Biola University, USA

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Abstract

Language serves as an important ethnic boundary marker in China. Additionally, language holds significant value for national and ethnic identity. Yet, despite its value, Mongolian language use has been in decline while Mandarin and English are promoted. This linguistic hegemony is upheld by an unofficial ideology in which China's ethnic minority groups are labeled as *backwards*.

Still, Mongolian language remains a symbol of identity even for Mongols who do not speak Mongolian. As such, Mongols look for modes through which the state will allow, and even promote, the preservation of the Mongolian language.

In this article, I suggest that Mongols have created spaces through which the Mongolian language will continue. I analyze lyrics in songs by the Mongolian language band *Anda Union* as evidence of a language of resistance launched in response to the destruction of the Mongolian cultural space and the ongoing threat to Mongolian cultural identity.

Keywords: Inner Mongolia, Mongols, cultural identity, resistance, language

Singing Mongolian: Language Preservation, Cultural Representation, and Resistance

Jamie N. SANCHEZ*
Biola University, USA

Introduction

I lived in Inner Mongolia for eight years between 2001-2012. During that period of time I witnessed many changes throughout Hohhot, the capital city in which I lived. There were changes in the city's physical infrastructure, in the population surge, and in the daily interactions I had with the ethnically diverse people that lived in the city. The changes I noticed were partly due to my extended period of living in Hohhot in which I developed cultural intelligence concerning the many cultural, historical, political, and social layers throughout the city. For example, over time I began to understand the complex nature of the relationship that Mongols, the city's largest minority group, and the Chinese state have concerning everything from the demise of Mongolian grasslands to the fear of the loss of Mongolian language.

Fears about the loss of Mongolian language use in daily lives is well founded. Language serves as an important ethnic boundary marker.[1] Addi-

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* Jamie N. Sanchez is Associate Professor and Program Director of the PhD of Intercultural Studies in the Graduate Department of the Cook School at Biola University. Prior to her career in academia, Jamie lived and worked in China. Her research interests include China area studies and refugee studies.

tionally, it holds significant value for national and ethnic identity.[2] So much so that it remains one of the official criteria for defining an ethnic group in China. However, despite the importance of Mongolian language to cultural identity and its seemingly inherent political value to the Chinese state, Mongolian language use in daily life has long been in rapid decline, a phenomenon which is telling of the social and political environment in Inner Mongolia.

Rapid urbanization coupled with historical assimilation policies throughout the province has displaced Mongols from rural grasslands to sprawling urban centers. Forced migration, which Mongols have had no other choice but to leave a nomadic lifestyle for a settled one, has also displaced them from cultural identity markers including pastoralism and language fluency. The result has been a "dual-displacement," one that displaces Mongols from both a physical space and a cultural space which has created what Bulag termed linguistic anxiety and what I have termed cultural identity anxiety.[3]

Linguistic and cultural anxiety are intensified by the hierarchy of languages in China which situates Mandarin at the top of the hierarchy as the nation-wide standard language.[4] That is not to say that the state does not *officially* promote ethnic languages through various policies. For example, in Inner Mongolia there are Mongolian language newspapers, radio programs, television programs, and schools. Street signs and public announcements are in both Mandarin and Mongolian. Policies ensure there is a bilin-

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1 See: Fredrik Barth, "Introduction" in *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference*, ed. Fredrik Barth (1969); Andre Tabouret-Keller, "Language and Identity," in *The Handbook of Sociolinguistics,* ed. F. Coulmas (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997): 315-26. Bucholtz, M and Hall, K., "Language and Identity," in *Companion to Linguistic Anthropology*, ed. A. Duranti (Malden, MA: Blackwell), 369-94.

2 Stephen May, *Language and Minority Rights: Ethnicity, Nationalism, and the Politics of Language* (New York: Routledge, 2012): 135.

3 Uradyn Bulag, "Mongolian Ethnicity and Language Anxiety in China," *American Anthropologist* 104, no. 4 (2003): 753-63; Jamie N. Sanchez, Tumultuous Times: Shifts in Mongolian Cultural Identity Since 1947," *Journal of Northeast Asian History* 12, Issue 2 (Winter 2015): 148.

4 Arienne M. Dwyer, *The Xinjiang Conflict: Uyghur Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse* (Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2005): 14.

gual presence throughout the province. Yet, policy does not always uphold practice. The decline of Mongolian language use in the daily lives of Mongolians throughout the city demonstrates that there is a constructed "hegemony of language."[5]

This hegemony is perpetuated by an unofficial ideology in China in which ethnic minority groups are labeled as backwards.[6] Additionally, English and Mandarin are promoted as the languages that carry scientific progress and provide marketplace opportunities. Yet, because Mongolian language still holds ideological and cultural value for Mongols, it is a symbol of identity even for Mongols who do not speak Mongolian. In light of Mongolian language decline, and of the value it still holds for Mongols, there is an ongoing negotiation with the state concerning the Mongolian language. Mongols are seeking modes of expression through which the state will allow, and even promote, the preservation of Mongolian language and cultural identity.

The Chinese state continues to exert a direct role in how ethnic identity is constructed. Several studies have explored the history, intervention, and modalities of the state's construction of the identity of its minority ethnic people.[7] Additionally, other studies have suggested that some ethnic minority groups have, at various points in recent history, been allowed to exercise agency in how they are represented, or at least a negotiation with the state in how they are represented.[8]

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5 Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (London: Sage Publications, 1995): 29.

6 Bulag, "Mongolian Ethnicity and Language Anxiety in China," 759.

7 See: Paul Clark, "Ethnic minorities in Chinese films: Cinema and the exotic," East-West film Journal, 1, 2 (1987): 15-32. Dru Gladney, "Representing nationality in China: refiguring majority/minority identities," *Journal of Asian Studies* 53, 1: 92-123. Stevan Harrell, "Ethnicity, local interest, and the state: Yi communities in Southwest China," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 32, 3: 515-48. 1994.

8 Melissa J. Brown, editor. *Negotiating Ethnicities in China and Taiwan*. Berkeley: Institute of East Asia Studies, University of California, 1996; Gladney, Dru, *Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People's Republic*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Council on East Asian Studies, 1991. Schein, Louisa, "Multiple alterities: the contouring of gender in Miao and Chinese nationalism," 79-102, in *Women Out of Place: The Gender of Agency and the Race of Nationality*, ed. Brackette F. Willams. London: Routledge, 1996.

Mongols, in response to the decline of Mongolian use in daily life throughout Inner Mongolia, have negotiated new spaces for the Mongolian language and a distinct cultural identity to be preserved and expanded. Such spaces are Mongolian language songs which represent a distinct cultural identity and are modes of resistance against the ongoing Hanificiation by the Chinese State.

Because this article is situated in Inner Mongolia, I provide a brief contextual introduction to the province, the recent history of language decline, and a discussion about other modes of resistance in which Mongols have engaged. It should be noted as well that this article is also situated within the larger discussion of the impacts of rapid urbanization and economic growth on China's ethnic minority groups and the resistance amongst China's marginalized minority groups, which include Tibetans and Uyghurs. Contemporary issues of the state's management of ethnic minority groups and ethno-politics in China's frontier regions are the backdrop for what follows.

In this article, I highlight the Mongolian language band *Anda Union* and some of their songs that were included in a performance at the Lied Center of Kansas in 2013. I chose this performance program to analyze because it is in English; it includes song lyrics in English, and includes information about the band and the songs they performed. The lyrics included below are artifacts through which I assert claims about the language of resistance in Mongolian music. I will demonstrate how the song lyrics are used to construct a distinct cultural identity, to maintain ethnic boundaries in which they are distinct from Han, and to resist the total Hanification aimed at lines that demarcate a distinct Mongolian cultural identity.

Methodology: Material Culture Analysis

In the introduction of the edited volume, *Handbook of Material Culture*, it is stated that "Empirically material culture studies involve analysis of a domain of things, or objects, which are endlessly diverse: anything from a packet of fast food to a house to an entire landscape, and either in the past

or in the present…."[9] Additionally, Appadurai and Breckenridge have posited that cultural forms are everywhere and have emerged as "films, packaged tours, specialized restaurants…."[10] As such, because the field of material culture is flexible artefacts can include just about anything including songs. In the same vein, Berger asserted that "The process of analyzing artifacts to find out about the culture in which they were made works two ways: the objects tell you about the culture, and the culture tells you about the objects."[11] In this article I analyze lyrics from different songs by the band *Anda Union*, giving special consideration to the historical and political environment in which the songs were produced, to posit notions about the historical and contextual relationship Mongols have with the Chinese state. Additionally, I demonstrate how song lyrics reify a distinct Mongolian cultural identity which resists the Hanification of Mongolian culture. In sum, material culture analysis allows for a deeper discussion of ethnopolitical themes which include resistance, ideologies, and discourse.

Understanding Inner Mongolia

In order to understand the song lyrics included below, and my assertions that they are modes of resistance by which Mongolians reify a distinct cultural identity, it is necessary to understand some of the context in which the songs were written. In this section of the article, I will give a brief introduction to the geographic context of Inner Mongolia, followed by some history of the decline of the Mongolian language throughout the province. I will also provide an overview of other modes of resistance in Inner Mongolia.

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9 Arjun Appadurai and Carol A. Breckenridge, "Debates and Controversies: Why Public Culture?" *Public Culture* 1, no. 1 (Fall 1998): 5.

10 Appadurai and Breckenridge, "Debates and Controversies: Why Public Culture?" 5.

11 Arthur Asa Berger, *What Objects Mean: An Introduction to Material Culture*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge Publishers, 2014): 22.

Geographic Context

Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, referred to as Inner Mongolia throughout this article, was established as an autonomous region for Mongols living in the Chinese territory on May 1, 1947, more than two years prior to the establishment of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949. Its vast size comprises roughly 12% of China's land mass. By the end of 2017 the population was estimated to be roughly 25 million people.[12] Major cities in Inner Mongolia include Hohhot, the capital city and where I lived, and other notable cities like Baotou and Ordos.

Inner Mongolia's population is comprised of many different ethnic minority groups. Han are the most populous ethnic group in the country and in Inner Mongolia. The most populous ethnic minority groups are Mongols. Over time, state-directed assimilation policies, economic development, and rapid urbanization have increased the Han population throughout the province.[13] According to the most recent national census conducted in 2010, Han comprise 79.5%, Mongols comprise 17.1%, and other ethnic groups comprise 3.36% of the population.[14]

Mongolian Language Decline: A Reflection of a Political Ideology

Language ideology is loaded with political interests.[15] Although "language seems straightforwardly a piece of culture," it is simultaneously a result of "politics and power interplays."[16] That is not to say that language is only a

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12 Staff, "China: Nei Menggu," *City Population*. Accessed November 6, 2019, http://www.citypopulation.de/en/china/cities/neimenggu/.

13 See: Jamie N. Sanchez, "Tumultuous Times: Shifts in Mongolian Cultural Identity since 1947," *Journal of Northeast Asian History* 12, no. 2 (Winter 2015): 133-68.

14 Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Bureau of Statistics, 2010, May 17, 2010, Accessed March 27, 2014, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/tjgb/rkpcgb/dfrkpcgb/201202/t20120228_30397.html.

15 Judith T. Irvine, "When Talk Isn't Cheap: Language and Political Economy," *American Ethnologist* 16, 1989: 255.

16 Manning Nash, *The Cauldron of Ethnicity in the Modern World* (Chicago: Chicago University Press,1989): 6.

political tool because it is also connected to cultural identity. The ideological divide between cultural and language practices in China cannot be exaggerated. Language practices in China display linguistic and hegemonic interplays.[17]

Another symbol of identity for Mongols is the pastoral identity. Bilik asserted that a division over the use of Mongolian language is rooted in the division between the two culturally based economic practices, something Bilik termed as "the right to move" and the "right to camp."[18] The connection between language and pastoralism and the simultaneous decline in both is due, in part, to geography. Indeed, Mongols who once lived in pastoral regions no longer practice pastoralism in cities for reasons that are self-evident. Additionally, Mongols living in cities find themselves forced to choose between learning Mongolian and learning Mandarin, which remains to be the marketplace language. Mandarin fluency promises to afford China's citizens social and economic mobility in addition to educational and professional opportunities.

In addition to the change in physical geography there is a simultaneous decline in both pastoralism and Mongolian language use which is also a function of political ideology. The state has regarded language as a marker of modernization since the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911). Hanses stated that, since the Qing Dynasty many Chinese leaders "have regarded institutionalized education as a means of integrating, controlling, and civilizing the various peoples who inhabit the border or peripheral regions of what was the empire, then the Republic, and now is the People's Republic of China (PRC)."[19] The education system, for example, is one of the institutions through which the state has sought to deny "significance of the mi-

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17 Stevan Harrell, "Linguistics and Hegemony in China," *International Journal of Sociology of Language* 103 (1993): 97-114.

18 Naran Bilik, "Language Ideology and semiotic negotiation in Mongolian use," in *Cotemporary Chinese Discourse and Social Practice*, eds. Linda Tsung and Wei Wang (Sydney: John Benjamins, 2015), 82.

19 Mette Halskov Hansen, "Introduction," in *Lessons in Being Chinese*, ed. Mette Halskov Hansen (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1999), xi.

norities' own languages, histories, religions, and cultural values…."[20] There are clearly distinct challenges concerning cultural and identity preservation for ethnic minority groups in China.

In the same way that Mongol pastoralists were, and still are, termed *barbaric* or *backward* and in need of state-led modernization, the Mongolian language is also framed as "not suitable for modernity and should be replaced by Chinese at the earliest convenience."[21] The state ideology embedded in China's hierarchy of languages is detailed in a study about language policy and use in Xinjiang.[22] Dwyer has argued that while official language policies in China have remained consistent, covert language policies have sought to assimilate Mandarin throughout China's border regions. Further, she suggested that Mandarin is the national standard in China, with minority languages ranked below it.[23] Power is communicated in the hierarchy of languages. In other words, those that speak Mandarin may have more power in all realms of social life than those who are only fluent in minority languages.

Following Dwyer, Bilik asserted that "Mongolians in China will continue with their uphill struggle to revive and maintain their native language while trying to keep their life going in a commercialized world where Chinese (Mandarin) and English are dominant communicative media in every sector of public life."[24] However, the vast changes in Inner Mongolia's social and economic environment do not necessarily aid Mongolian language use development. The reality is that Mongols who want to maintain native language fluency and who want as many opportunities for economic and social mobility as Han speakers must become fluent in three languages. The struggle to attain fluency in Mongolian, Mandarin, and English may cause some to forgo native language fluency.

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[20] Mette Halskov Hansen, "Introduction," xiii.

[21] Bilik, "Language ideology and semiotic negotiation in Mongolian use," 84.

[22] Dwyer, *The Xinjiang Conflict*, 14.

[23] Dwyer, *The Xinjiang Conflict*, 14.

[24] Bilik, "Language ideology and semiotic negotiation in Mongolian use," 97.

Inner Mongolia's changing social environment is also telling of the political ideology that directs Mongolian language use. The decline of Mongolian language use in Inner Mongolia is due, in part, to state policies, concerted efforts to assimilate more Han into the province, and the focus on modernization and development. The view that acculturation of ethnic minorities is necessary to build a Chinese civil society remains strong in Inner Mongolia.[25] Fluency in any language is "accompanied by explicit and implicit values, beliefs, purposes, and activities…."[26] As such, fluency in Mandarin promotes the ideology that it is *the* modern language, and that by extension, the Han culture is *the* modern culture.

Although the Chinese state posits that minority languages are not suitable for modernity, this view is not accepted by Mongols, at least not in an ideological sense. Bilik stated that "Mongolian elites are extremely proud of their own language and culture."[27] The political stakes are too high for Mongolians to fully give up any language expression. If they did, they would be yielding to state ideologies and become yet another embodied evidence of the state's power to homogenize and sinicize. Instead, Mongols are developing alternative modes of language preservation and transmission. As already stated, one mode through which Mongols have sought to preserve language use, and thus promote the symbolic ideology that language holds for cultural identity, is through Mongolian language songs.

Ongoing Resistance: Mongol Protests in Inner Mongolia

While this article asserts that Mongolian language songs are evident of

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[25] Bilik, "Language ideology and semiotic negotiation in Mongolian use," 85.

[26] Naran Bilik, "Language education, intellectuals and symbolic representation: Being an urban Mongolian in a new configuration of social evolution," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 4, Issue 1-2, 1998: 47.

[27] Naran Bilik, "Language education, intellectuals and symbolic representation: Being an urban Mongolian in a new configuration of social evolution," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 4, Issue 1-2, 1998: 86

Mongol resistance against state ideology and cultural identity anxiety, they are not the only forms of resistance throughout the province. Rapid urbanization that has displaced Mongols and turned grasslands into sprawling cities has prompted continuous land-based protests in Inner Mongolia.

The emotional connection between the loss of cultural space and perceived threats to cultural identity has been elucidated by other scholars. For example, the term "domicide" was developed to express the deep sense of loss that is felt when one's living place is destroyed.[28] Indeed, there is a "sheer emotional and psychological trauma associated with forced displacement."[29] Thus, the loss of the grasslands due to aggressive urbanization and development policies has resulted in a cultural identity shift and prompted some resistance in the form of protests.

This article is, once again, informed by my personal experience of living in Inner Mongolia during a time of political upheaval in China's borderlands. The Mongol protests that took place in Inner Mongolia in May 2011 prompted my initial interest in conducting this research. On May 10, 2011, a Mongolian herdsman was struck and killed by a Han coal truck driver near Xilinhot, Inner Mongolia. Mergen, the Mongol herdsman, was trying to block the Liaoning Chencheng Industry and Trading Group from driving vehicles onto his pastureland. Li Lindong, a Han truck driver who worked for the Liaoning Group, struck Mergen with his vehicle and then dragged him to his death.[30] The Mongolian community living in the surrounding area responded to Mergen's death by organizing protests. On May 24, the local government in Xilinhot, which had become aware of the organized protests, attempted to stop the demonstrations by announcing the arrest of the truck driver and ensuring that there would be "a series of mea-

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28 Douglas Porteous and Sandra E. Smith, Domicide: *The Global Destruction of Home* (McGill-Queen's Press, 2001).

29 Steven Hess, "Nail-Houses, Land Rights, and Frames of Injustice on China's Protest Landscape," *Asian Survey* 50, no. 5 (September/October 2010): 919.

30 Jonathan Watts, "Herder's death deepens tensions in Inner Mongolia," *The Guardian*, May 27, 2011, Accessed February 22, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/08/ chinese-trucker-killing-mongolian-herder.

sures" taken regarding coal and mineral extraction in the grasslands.[31] But the state's efforts were too late. On May 25, Mongols protested at various government buildings in West Ujimqin Banner near Xilinhot. That same day, more than 2000 Mongols protested in Xinlingol and in East Ujimqin Banner. By that time, the sentiments of the protestors had evolved from centering on the unjust death of Mergen to focusing on the issues of land degradation throughout Inner Mongolia.

Perhaps because the protests were gaining momentum, on May 27, the state declared martial law in several areas of the region. By this point, although I was living in Hohhot, I still had not heard of the protests taking place in and around Xilinhot because the state closely monitored any discussion about the situation including mention of it on the internet, in any social media, and through phone calls and text messages. But, on the morning of May 29, murmurings of university closures began to spread throughout Hohhot. The next day, on May 30, Mongols protested throughout the city. By that time, all universities, large public spaces, and public parks were closed.

The incident that launched the protests is a good point of departure to explain both the ethnic tensions and historical shifts I witnessed in Inner Mongolia: A Han truck driver, who worked for a large Han owned corporation, was driving through the Mongolian cultural space, and was perceived to be destroying the land in the process. A Mongol shepherd, which is the quintessential Mongolian occupation, was protecting his land and his livelihood. The standoff was between a Mongol and a Han. What happened next is even more telling of the plight of Mongols. Lin Lidong, the Han truck driver, ran over Mergen, crushing his body and dragging him to his death. Though a crude analogy, this situation mirrors the overall situation in Inner Mongolia. That is to say, Mongols have been dragged by state-driven policies throughout the province, often resulting in the "death" of some parts of the Mongol culture.

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[31] Translated from Staff, "In Inner Mongolia 2000 students protest the death of a herdsman that was crushed by a coal truck," *BBC*, May 25, 2011, Accessed February 24, 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/zhongwen/simp/chinese_news/ 2011/05/110525_inner_mongolia_protest.shtml.

These protests are part of a narrative of Mongol resistance to cultural destruction. Together with a decline in Mongolian language, they provide a greater context of the political climate in which Inner Mongolian Mongols live.

Ethnic Songs: State Intervention, Ethnic Participation

In the years leading up to 1949, the Communist Party deployed Han musicians to minority areas throughout the country so that they could become familiar with the local culture. This was in effort to train musicians to write new songs which combined cultural norms with socialist messages.[32] Most orthodox minority songs were aimed at legitimizing state control and perpetuating state ideologies like national unity.[33] By 1964, Vice Premier Lu Dingyi delivered a speech at the national festival of amateur minority performances.[34] He stated, "The revolutionary cultural art of the national minorities must pay attention to using ethnic forms, for thus it can be more easily accepted by the people of the national minorities. The cultural art of each nationality must be revolutionary in content and must be beneficial to socialism."[35] In the 1950's, many regional song and dance troupes were also established in minority areas. In Inner Mongolia, a dance troupe known as the *wulanmuqi* was established in 1957 to travel throughout the region in order to spread Maoist thought to the countryside. The expectation that the dance troupe members to be loyal to the Chinese state is evident in the name *wulanmuqi*. These cultural troupes are still in operation throughout Inner Mongolia today.

In 1952, the China Central Nationalities Song and Dance Troupe,

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[32] Nimrod Baranovitch, "Between Alterity and Identity: New Voices of Minority People in China," *Modern China* (July 2001): 364.

[33] See: Nimrod Baranovitch, "Between Alterity and Identity: New Voices of Minority People in China," and Nimrod Baranovitch, *China's New Voices: Popular Music, Ethnicity, Gender, and Politics, 1978-1997* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003): 208-19.

[34] Helen Rees, *Echoes of History: Naxi Music in Modern China* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000): 124.

[35] Quoted in Helen Rees, *Echoes of History: Naxi Music in Modern China*, 124.

hereafter referred to as CNSDT, was established.[36] The CNSDT is a Soviet-style state run troupe that specializes in the collection, arrangement, and promotion of minority song and dance traditions.[37] Mackerras asserted that the CNSDT is *also* a highly politicized cultural organization, which displays state policies through the performance of ethnic minorities.[38] Given the politicization of cultural organizations, it can be understood that cultural expression is presented through the state's constructed framework whereby ethnic minority groups must be of benefit to national policies. One academic inquiry about music in Inner Mongolia suggested that, when Inner Mongolian music artists aim to create and produce songs about Mongolian culture, there must not be any overt ethnic pride that could disrupt social harmony or debunk Chinese nationalist ideology.[39]

Singing Mongolian: Songs as Spaces of Cultural Preservation

Ethnomusicologists, sociolinguists, and anthropologists agree that the revitalization of songs is key to ensuring the ongoing vitality and viability of endangered languages.[40] Further, scholars have written about the connection between songs and cultural distinction and preservation. For example, in *Methods and Nations*, Shapiro highlighted the attempt of native Hawaiians to use music to both resist the ongoing colonial projects and preserve a distinct Hawaiian culture.[41]

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36 Rees, *Echoes of History*, 20.

37 Rees, "Writing Lives in Chinese Music," in *Lives in Chinese Music*, ed. Helen Rees (University of Illinois Press, 2009), 20 and 206.

38 Colin Mackerras, "Folksongs and Dances of China's Minority Nationalities: Policy, Tradition, and Professionalization," *Modern China* 10, no. 2 (April 1984): 208-17.

39 Wing-Wah Law and Wai-Chung Ho, "Music education in China: In Search of Social Harmony and Chinese Nationalism," *British Journal of Music Education* 28, no. 3 (2011): 380-83.

40 See: Catherine Grant, "The links between safeguarding language and safeguarding musical heritage," *International Journal of Intangible Heritage* 5 (2010): 46-59; Suzanne Romaine, "Preserving endangered languages," *Language and Linguistic Compass* 1, Issue 1-2 (2007): 115-32.

41 Michael J. Shapiro, *Methods and Nations: Cultural Governance and the Indigenous Subject* (New York: Routledge, 2004): 100.

He stated:

> "Activist musicians, who constitute one dimension of a growing, multi-dimensional
> Hawaiian sovereignty movement, have recently produced a set of songs that convey an indigenous political initiative aimed at reconvening a Hawaiian nation that was destroyed at the time of the U.S. annexation at the end of the 19th century."[42]

In Inner Mongolia, the increase in the number of Mongolian language music groups can be attributed, in part, to a response to linguistic and cultural identity anxiety. Songs have become one mode of language preservation. These songs are created spaces through which Mongolian cultural distinction may be expressed. In her extensive study on Mongolian music of Inner Mongolia, D'Evelyn posited that:

> "A rising interest in cultural heritage and preservation in China and Inner Mongolia has led musicologists, government authorities, and media producers alike to look outside the professional conservatory system for models of great artists, whom they promote in scholarship, commemorative events, festivals or television programs."[43]

Whereas music groups were once formed through the official CNSDT system, they now are formed under the direction of other musical professionals like musicologists and media producers. However, it should be noted that Chinese government authorities are still one of the key actors involved in the promotion of Mongolian music through events, festivals, and television programs.

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[42] Shapiro, *Methods and Nations*, 100.

[43] D'Evelyn, "Music Between Worlds," 137.

Anda Union

One popular Mongolian language commercial band is *Anda Union*, which hails from Inner Mongolia and was formed in 2003. They explicitly state on their website, one reason to form the band was, in part, so that their music could help to preserve the Mongolian culture: "Keenly aware of the threat to the Grasslands and their age old Mongolian culture, *Anda Union* is driven by their fight for survival of this endangered way of life, by keeping the essence of the music alive."[44] Additionally the band's website states that "They are on a mission to stimulate their culture and reengage young Mongols, many of who can no longer speak their own language" and that "our culture is broken and needs to be mended."[45] The fact that many young Mongols can no longer speak Mongolian drives *Anda Union*'s musical "mission" to sing and produce songs in Mongolian.

A picture of *Anda Union* is showcased on their website. The picture demonstrates that *Anda Union* has constructed its image with the use of traditional Mongolian elements which include band members wearing traditional clothing. In addition, their music is played using traditional Mongolian musical instruments including the horse-head fiddle, Mongolian lute and Mongolian drum. Additionally, *Anda Union* incorporates traditional Mongolian throat singing into many of their songs. The constructed image of traditional Mongolian musicians promotes an image of an intact Mongolian culture to the audience. In some ways, this mitigates the cultural identity anxiety that permeates Mongol life in Inner Mongolia. The image also works in tandem with the language of resistance that is subtly embedded in some of the band's songs, something that will be further discussed below. This is especially true because part of the "mission" is also to educate the Western world about Mongolians and their quest to preserve cultural distinction. Thus, the band needs to "perform" its "culture" for *Western* audiences as part of the message of resistance.

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[44] Anda Union, Accessed August 1, 2019, http://andaunion.com.

[45] Anda Union, Accessed August 1, 2019, http://andaunion.com/about.php.

Anda Union's first commercial album is *The Wind Horse*, which was released in 2011 and features 13 songs. All of the songs on the album are old Mongolian folksongs that have been "updated" for a modern Mongolian audience. For example, *Altargana* was produced based on a Buriat folksong and *Boomborai* is a folksong about ancient shamanistic traditions.[46] *Anda Union*'s performances at international venues affirm that Mongolian bands are "sometimes engaging in new meanings and subtle discourses of resistance at the same time."[47] In other words, the promotion of Mongolian culture through music is one way in which they resist the end of cultural distinction that is felt in everyday life in Inner Mongolia.

Singing Mongolian: Songs as Language of Resistance

Mongolians are not the only ethnic minority groups to have songs of resistance. Throughout the world, ethnic minority groups have been known to use songs as modes of political resistance against an oppressor.[48] Commonly known examples are the pantheon of songs in which Black slaves sung various songs as a resistance to the dominant ideology that pervaded America in order to justify slavery.[49] Additionally, in South Africa, songs were one mode of expressing resistance and endurance through the long years of Apartheid.[50] And Bob Marley reminded his fellow Jamaicans that they should "Get Up, Stand Up."[51]

Like the examples above, *Anda Union*'s songs can be understood as

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46 Anda Union, http://andaunion.com/docs/Anda_Union_History_&_Music.pdf, Accessed August 1, 2019.

47 D'Evelyn, "Music Between Worlds," 58.

48 Lakeyta Bonnette, *Pulse of the People: Political Rap Music and Black Politics* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015): 32.

49 Bonnette, 32.

50 Michaela E. Vershbow, "The Sounds of Resistance: The Role of Music in South Africa's Anti-Apartheid Movement." *Inquiries* (2010): 2, no. 6, Accessed September 17, 2019, http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/a?id=265.

51 Mike Alleyne, "Positive Vibration?: Capitalist Textual Hegemony and Bob Marley," *Carribean Studies* 27, no. 3 (1994): 224-41.

modes of resistance. The band regularly performs throughout various venues in the United States and Europe. Each venue generally posts a performance program which introduces the band members, the traditional Mongolian instruments, and some information about the different singing styles.

As mentioned above, in this article, I analyze lyrics from songs that *Anda Union* performed at the Lied Center of Kansas in 2013. I chose to only analyze these particular song lyrics because the performance program included English lyrics and was readily available online. Thus, this article does not compare songs *Anda Union* may have performed in other venues throughout the United States, Europe, or in China.

Tellingly, the introductions of some of the songs demonstrate a language of resistance that *Anda Union* mobilizes in order to educate international audiences about the plight of Mongols in Inner Mongolia. For example, the introduction to the song *Ode to Mongolia* stated, "The mighty Mongolian Empire and Genghis Khan are of central importance to Mongolian culture and a source of immense pride for Mongolians today."[52] This song directly references the ongoing importance of Genghis Khan and the storied Mongolian Empire to modern-day Mongols. The reference may be viewed as null but those familiar with the ongoing political maneuvering of the Chinese state may read the reference as a reification of Genghis Khan as a *Mongolian* hero, which resists the state's normalization of Genghis Khan as a *Chinese* hero.[53]

The lyrics for this song include:

To be the world's master O Genghis Khan's Mongolia
The ancient history of Mongolia
Urlan is the mother of Genghis Khan and Mongolia
The Mongolians have 800 years of history

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[52] Lied Center of Kansas, "Anda Union: The Wind Horse," October 1, 2013. Accessed August 1, 2019, https://issuu.com/liedcenter/docs/anda_insert-press.

[53] Uradyn Bulag, *The Mongols at China's Edge: History and the Politics of National Unity* (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002): 243.

The lyrics above demonstrate a "pan-Mongolian" ideology which essentially posits that there is solidarity of Mongols worldwide. Although, Liu argued that the notion of a "pan-Mongolia" is a political tool and has been a "central theme in any spontaneous Mongolian nationalist movement of the 20th century."[54] In contrast, Bulag asserted that the notion of "pan-Mongolia" has developed over time to become more of an identity concept than one meant to position one nation-state against another.[55] Either way, the connection that Mongols throughout the world have demonstrates Anderson's assertions that communities can be connected, even without ever meeting one another.[56] In other words, the notion of "pan-Mongolia" is a concept that connects Mongols culturally without the need for a nation-state demarcation. Given this brief discussion about "pan-Mongolian" ideology, it can be argued that *Anda Union*'s song lyrics communicate the connection Mongols have to one another.

While *Mongolia* is positioned as a significant cultural marker in the song, there is also some hints of resistance embedded in the last line of lyrics included above. The state touts China as having 5000 years of history, a maneuver that has attempted to build a strong sense of nationalism. This rhetoric is contingent on assimilating Genghis Khan into the history of China, broadly speaking. The logic is that because Mongols are one of China's officially categorized ethnic groups, then Mongol history becomes China's history. Yet, in the song above, *Anda Union* intentionally touts *Mongolian* history, resisting any discourse the Chinese state attempts to secure.

Another song often included in the performance program is *Hometown*, a song about the destruction of the grasslands in Inner Mongolia.

The program stated:

"This song is inspired by the steady destruction of the grasslands as

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54 Liu, *Reins of Liberation*, 6.

55 Uradyn Bulag, *Nationalism and Hybridity in Mongolia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998): 62.

56 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, London: Verso, 1991.

> farming and mining encroach ever further combined with the effects of global climate change.
> The lyrics were written by *Anda Union*'s Urgen, who left his home in the grasslands when he was 13 years old to train at a music school in the city. He has never returned but his heart remains there, as do all the hearts of *Anda Union*'s performers. But the grasslands are no longer the grasslands of their childhood. This song appeals for the grasslands to be saved and preserved."[57]

This description is replete with a language of resistance against the Chinese state's modernization efforts. For example, *Anda Union* expresses the "steady destruction of the grasslands as farming and mining encroach...." This is a direct reference to the state's assimilation policies, the state's preferences for agriculturalism (described as *farming* in the program) over pastoralism and to economic development in general. Rather than explicitly criticize the state, the description passively, but effectively, posits that farming and mining have "encroached" upon Mongolian space and culture.

In addition to the song introduction, the song lyrics also contain a language of resistance, albeit subtle and indirect. Some of the lyrics are:

> *My hometown the place where I was born was far away from here*
> *My close family, how is your health?*
> *My missing hometown is far away from here, my missing relatives how is your health?*
> *There is no water in the river, I am sad about that from my heart*
> *There is no water in the spring, I am sad about this from my mind.*[58]

Hometown's lyrics express a lament about the destruction of the

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[57] "Anda Union and the Wind Horse," *The Clarice*, September 20, 2013, Accessed March 11, 2016, https://theclarice.umd.edu/sites/default/files/program-notes/cspac_092013_AnDa.pdf.

[58] Lied Center of Kansas, "Anda Union: The Wind Horse," October 1, 2013. Accessed August 1, 2019, https://issuu.com/liedcenter/docs/anda_insert-press.

grasslands. But the lyrics are also a critique of the negative impacts of modernization and of a stated preference for sedentary economies, which have driven Mongols away from their hometowns. The modernization ideology, in which pastoralism is typically viewed with contempt, means that "roads are built, trees cleared, wetlands trained, common property parceled, multiple land uses eliminated, settlement patterns reorganized, and everywhere, new boundaries are erected."[59] This is reflected in the lyrics, which describe the grasslands and the people that once lived there are now *missing*. There is recognition that the transformation of the grasslands and the transplantation of the people from the grasslands are a permanent phenomenon.

The song lyrics included above articulate the struggle of Mongols in the internal colonial projects of the state. The state has confiscated history, heroes, and hometowns. Yet, as marginalized actors which have been displaced from hometowns and from cultural distinction in daily life, *Anda Union* reasserts a Mongolian cultural identity and history. These songs are symbolic and cultural spaces in which *Anda Union* resists state modernization projects that aim to render the Mongolian culture sinicized and modernized. *Anda Union* connects modernization to the destruction of the environment, which further prompts the audience to question the methods of the Chinese state's economic expansion.

As already mentioned, these songs are not included in the commercial album that is available in China. Presumably, *Anda Union* intentionally performs these songs, and perhaps other songs with similar themes of resistance, at international venues but not in domestic performances.

Singing Mongolian: Spaces of Negotiation

Anda Union is mobilizing the Mongolian language through songs. The songs mentioned above are sung in Mongolian. Though they are traditional

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[59] Dee Mack Williams, *Beyond Great Walls: Environment, Identity, and Development on the Chinese Grasslands of Inner Mongolia* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2002): 11.

Mongolian cultural songs, *Anda Union* has mobilized them in response to the local political environment which impacts distinct expressions of cultural identity. Because Mongolian language use is in decline, there is more at stake to the proliferation of Mongolian language music bands than mere cultural expression. The social environment in China in which Mandarin fluency is key to economic opportunities is not likely to change any time soon. The waning use of Mongolian language in daily life, which is juxtaposed to the state's ideology of modernization in which Mongolian is posited as a backward language that should be left behind, has resulted in a criticism of the state as destroyer of ethnic identity.[60]

The tension between Mongols and the state is evident in the language ideology of the state. As such, Mongolian language songs become a space of tension and ideological negotiation. Songs facilitate the preservation of Mongolian language and allow for the expression and transmission of cultural identity. Coupled with language is the emphasis on traditional Mongolian folksongs and the reemergence of traditional instruments. These elements work together to construct an imagined reality in which ethnic boundaries are reconstructed and that "Mongolness" can be seen, heard, and celebrated. Thus, songs create a symbolic and cultural space through which Mongols who have been displaced from rural geographies can now exist.

But, the state also needs Mongolian language songs to remain in order to dispel criticisms that indigenous cultures in China have no chance to survive. Songs, then, also work to help the state to promote the notion that China remains a multiethnic state. This means, however, that there are limits that Mongols must recognize as demonstrated by *Anda Union*'s decision not to include songs of resistance on its commercial album. If Mongol songs are perceived to be tinged with hints of separatism, their songs will be censored.

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[60] Bulag, "Mongolian Ethnicity and Linguistic Anxiety in China," 753.

Summary

Mongols continue to grapple with cultural identity anxiety in the face of factors such as language decline. Material culture is one vector through which Mongols can represent and preserve a distinct cultural identity. The songs included in this article remain essential in the development of a shared Mongolian history for generations of Mongols who may have never lived in the grasslands or do not speak Mongolian. Current and future urban Mongols will likely look to art, performances, songs, and other forms of material culture as representations of a past reality.

Ethnic minority groups in China are aware of the shifting limits of cultural identity expression. There is awareness in China that those who cross the blurred boundaries of the state which determines how a group may or may not resist, will run the risk of being labeled as a separatist. If Mongols want to continue to be able to express their distinct cultural identity on the national and global stages, they will also need to continue to collaborate with the state.

Thus, Mongols are constantly negotiating ethno-political challenges in China, the impacts of economic expansion, urban policy shifts, and their own ethnic minority status. Because Mongols' daily lives are undergoing constant changes due to urbanization, assimilation, and economic development policies, songs by bands like *Anda Union* may well be one source of identity making for Mongols.

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Articles

(Translated)

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Japanese Pirates and Rural Communities in Late Goryeo

Jong-ki PARK
Kookmin University

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Japanese Pirates and Rural Communities in Late Goryeo*

Jong-ki PARK**
Kookmin University

Introduction

This article explores how the raids by Japanese pirates brought changes to rural communities in late Goryeo, specifically in the late 14th century, and how the Goryeo government reacted to those changes. In order to trace the changes in rural Goryeo communities, this article first examines entries of prefectures and counties, attacked by Japanese pirates, in Korean chronicles such as *Goryeosa* (the History of Goryeo) and *Goryeosa jeoryo* (the Abridged History of Goryeo). Different from the existing approach of focusing on how Japanese pirate attacks made an immediate impact on the country as a whole, this article focuses on how such attacks affected individual prefectures (*kun*) and counties (*hyeon*). Uncovering the characteristics of damaged regions, prefectures, or counties will help elucidate the characteristics of Japanese pirate attacks on Goryeo. This article also charts historical records regarding the damage of each prefecture or county in-

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** The author of this article is an emeritus professor in the Department of Korean History at Kookmin University.

cluded in *Sejong sillok jiriji* (the Geographical Appendix to the Annals of King Sejong) or *Gyeongsangdo jiriji* (the Geography of Gyeongsang Province). Although these two historical sources have not attracted significant academic interest to date, they have proven to be highly useful for this article's topic. Finally, this article touches on the *gammu* policy the Goryeo government, adopted during the reign of King Gongyang (r. 1389-1392), in terms of reviving rural Goryeo communities which were devastated by Japanese pirate attacks.

Methodologically, the article takes into consideration the latest research findings related to Japanese pirate attacks in late Goryeo, or one of the most interesting topics among studies of Goryeo during the 1990s. Since Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910, research on this theme was directed by Japanese scholars who had based their studies upon the colonialist theory of heteronomy. After the liberation in 1945, Korean scholars have been countering the colonialist narrative, which helped cumulate a considerable number of findings pertaining to Japanese pirate attacks. However, such findings only summarized historical facts according to a framework of "invasion and resistance," thereby failing to achieve notable progress in further research methodology. After the 1990s, Korean scholars have begun producing more diverse findings that, for instance, delved into the background and the characteristics of Japanese pirate attacks on Goryeo in association with the domestic political circumstances in contemporary Japan. The approach has broadened the range of research topics and achieved important progress in the development of research methodologies.[1] Along this line, this article sheds new light on changes that rural Go-

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[1] Evidence of such research progress includes Kim Ki-seob, "14segi waegu eui donghyang gwa goryeo eui daeeung" [The Movements of Japanese Pirates and Goryeo's Response in the Fourteenth Century], *Hanguk minjok munhwa* 9 (1997): 85-123; Yi Young, "Waegu eui gongbaekgi e gwanhan gochal" [A Study on the Period of the Absence of Wako], *Ilbon yeoksa yeongu* 5 (1997): 33-63; Yi Young, "Ilbonin i boneun waegue ui jeongche: Gyeongin ihu waegu wa ilbon gungnae jeongse reul jungsim euro" [The Japanese Recognition of Japanese Pirates: Focused on Pirates beyond 1350 and Domestic Circumstances in Japan], *Yeoksa bipyeong* 46 (1999): 299-311; Yi Young, "Gyeonginnyeon waegu wa ilbon eui gungnae jeongse" [Japanese Pirates of 1350 and the Domestic Circumstances of Japan], *Guksagwan nonchong* 92 (2000): 119-52; Yi Young, "Jeonhwangi eui dongasia sahoe wa waegu" [Japanese Pirates and East Asian

ryeo communities underwent during the periods of the Japanese pirate raids.

I. Goryeo Prefectures, Counties, and Japanese Pirates

1. The Characteristics of Attacked Prefectures and Counties

Instead of adopting the approaches of previous studies that aggregate the number of Japanese pirate attacks from the chronicles of late Goryeo to examine the characteristics of such attacks,[2] this article treats on the Goryeo prefectures and counties targeted by Japanese pirates, particularly those recorded in *Goryeosa* and *Goryeosa jeoryo*. In those two records, the names of prefectures and counties have been noted regardless of whether the counties were regular (*juhyeon*) or subordinate (*sokhyeon*). This indicates that the two materials accurately and faithfully reflect details regarding the areas that suffered from Japanese pirate attacks. For instance, they refer to Yangju (楊州) as Hanyang Prefect (漢陽府), Suju (樹州) as Bupyeong Prefect (富平府), Geumju (金州) as Gimhae (金海), Heungju (興州) as Sun-

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Society: Focusing on Waegu After the Year of 1350], *Hanguksa yeongu* 123 (2003): 209-45; Yi Young, *Icheojin jeonjaeng, Waegu: Geu yeoksae ui hyeonjang eul chajaseo* [Japanese Pirates: In Search of Historical Scenes from a Forgotten War] (Seoul: Episteme, 2007); Kim Bo-han, "Haeyang munhwa wa waegu eui somyeol: Ohdo yeoldo gongdong eoeopgwon gwa gwallyeon haeseo" [The Sea Culture and the Disappearance of Wako: In Connection with the Common of Fishery Right in Kotoretto], *Munhwa sahak* 16 (2001): 171-89; Kim Bo-han, "Jungse Yeo-Il gwangye wa waegu eui balsaeng wonin" [Medieval Goryeo-Japan Relations and the Cause of Japanese Pirate Attacks], in *Waegu wisa munje wa Hanil gwangye* [Japanese Pirates, Fake Missions, and Korea-Japan Relations] (Seoul: Kyungin Publishing, 2005), 99-134.
These are only a list of previous studies representative works of the progress made in related research. Further progress in the related research has recently been made, which will be mentioned through the main section of this paper.

2 There are minor discrepancies between the scholars in their findings on how many times and when Japanese pirate attacks occurred, but the following papers are representative works of the previous approach to studying Japanese pirate attacks: Na Jong-woo, "Honggeonjeok gwa waegu" [Red Turban Forces and Japanese Pirates], in *Goryeo hugi eui sahoe wa daewae gwangye* [The Society and Foreign Relations in Late Goryeo], vol. 20, 55 vols., Hanguksa [History of Korea], 1994, 395-407; Yi Young, "Goryeo mal eui waegu wa masan" [Waegu in the End of Goryeo Dynasty and Masan city], *Hanguk jungsesa yeongu,* 17 (2004): 122.

heung (順興), Sunan (順安) as Yeongju (榮州), Seungpyeong Prefecture (昇平郡) as Suncheon Prefect (順天府), Yangju (梁州) as Yangsan (梁山), Garim County (嘉林縣) as Imju (林州), Seorim County (瑞林縣) as Seocheon (舒川), Yeju (禮州) as Yeonghae (寧海), Haeyang County (海陽縣) as Gwangju (光州), Yeju (豊州) as Munhwa County (文化縣), Gongam County (孔岩縣) as Yangcheon (陽川), Dangseong Prefecture (唐城郡) as Namyang County (南陽縣), Gyoju (交州) as Hoeyang Prefect (淮陽府), and Yeomju (鹽州) as Yeonan (延安). The year in which a name change occurred can be determined through *Goryeosa jiriji* (the Geographical Appendix to the History of Goryeo). What also demonstrates the accuracy and fidelity of the records in the two historical materials is the fact that the attacked areas have been profiled in detail down to the special administrative units as well as the infrastructure in such areas: *hyang* (鄕) as in Gongi-*hyang* (工二鄕) of Suju (水州), *bugok* (部曲) as in Singok-*bugok* (薪谷部曲) of Gyeongsan Prefect, *so* (所) as in Cheonjam-*so* (天蠶所), *yeok* (驛) as in Sageunnae-*yeok* (沙斤乃驛) of Yian County (利安縣), *chang* (倉) referring to warehouses for collecting and transporting grain, and docks identified to as *po* (浦).

As below, Table 1 provides an overview of the trends in Japanese pirate attacks. According to the table, 242, or 46.5 percent, out of a total of 520 prefectures and counties suffered damage by the attacks from 1350, when the attacks grew serious, until the end of the Goryeo dynasty.[3] The degree of damage varied widely among each prefecture, county, or larger administra-

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[3] These numbers are a summation of prefectures and counties explicitly named in *Goryeosa* and *Goryeosa jeoryo* for being attacked by Japanese pirates. Vague descriptions noting that an area in Jeolla-do (Southwestern part of modern Korea) was attacked or giving an unclear place name have been excluded from the count. Hence, a far greater number of prefectures and counties are likely to have actually suffered from Japanese pirate attacks. The sixteen prefectures and counties in the two northern border regions Donggye and Bukgye, which were recovered during the reign of King Yejong and King Gongmin, have been included in the total of 520 prefectures and counties noted in *Goryeosa jiriji*, the Geographical Appendix to the History of Goryeo. This is because the prefectures and counties in those regions also suffered damage once Japanese pirate attacks grew serious from the reign of King Chungjeong. Meanwhile, Na Jong-woo notes that a total of 226 districts were attacked by Japanese pirates, which is markedly different from the numbers given in Table 1 of this paper, but it is unclear as to whether Na's use of the term "district" refers to prefectures and counties. Na, "Honggeonjeok gwa waegu," 397.

Table 1. Damage Statistics by Province, Regular and Subordinate County

Province	Total number of Prefectures and Counties	Attacked number of Prefectures and Counties	Percentage	Regular Counties	Attacked Regular Counties	Percentage	Subordinate Counties	Attacked Subordinate Counties	Percentage
Gaeseong Prefect	14	2	14	1	1	100	13	1	8
Yang-gwang Province	111	66	57	14	12	86	97	54	56
Gyeong-sang Province	128	73	59	17	13	93	114	60	53
Jeolla Province	104	57	52	17	15	88	87	42	48
Gyoju Province	28	9	32	3	3	100	25	6	24
Seohae Province	25	12	48	8	3	38	17	9	53
Eastern Border Region	58	14	24	41	10	24			
Northern Border Region	52	9	17	46	9	19			
Total	520 (410)	242 (219)	46.5 (53)	146 (57)	66 (47)	45 (82)	353	172	49

* The numbers in parentheses present the number and the percentage of prefectures and counties except for those in the two northern border regions Dong-gye and Buk-gye.

tive units defined in *Goryeosa jiriji* such as the capital Gaeseong Prefect (開城府), the five provinces (道), or the two northern border districts (界).

Table 1 indicates that 14 percent, or two of the fourteen prefectures and counties belonging to Gaeseong Prefect, suffered from Japanese pirate attacks. In the case of the two northern border regions, 24 percent, or the fourteen of the 58 prefectures and counties in the Northeastern Border District suffered while 17 percent, or nine out of the 52 prefectures and counties in the Northwestern Border District suffered. These percentages are similar to that of the capital Gaeseong Prefect, but significantly lower than the average of 46.5 percent of all Goryeo prefectures and counties that suffered from the attacks. With 32 percent of prefectures and counties in Gyoju Province and 48 percent of prefectures and counties in Seohae Province having been attacked, the affected percentages for the two provinces were closer to the average percentage. However, the number of affected prefectures and counties for the two provinces was smaller than those of other provinces, which renders it difficult to assign much significance to the damage the two provinces suffered. Overall, apart from the two border regions that sustained relatively less damage, 53 percent, or 291 of a total of 410 prefectures and counties experienced damage from Japanese pirate attacks.

On the other hand, some provinces show the higher percentages of attacked prefectures and counties than the average percentage of 46.5; 59 percent, or 66 of 111 prefectures and counties in Yanggwang Province; 57 percent, or 73 of 128 in Gyeongsang Province; and 52 percent, or 57 of 104 in Jeolla Province. The total number of affected prefectures and counties from these three provinces amounted to 81 percent of the 242 prefectures and counties. This leads to the conclusion that Japanese pirate attacks were concentrated in the three provinces of Yanggwang Province, Gyeongsang Province, and Jeolla Province in late Goryeo.

Meanwhile, a comparison among the number of attacks each regular or subordinate county suffered indicates that 45 percent of regular counties were attacked, which is similar to the overall average percentage of 46.5 among all prefectures and counties as noted in Table 1. This may give us a misleading impression that regular counties did not particularly sustain

heavier damage. Table 1 offers separate statistics for regular and subordinate counties, showing that with the exception of counties in the two border regions, 82 percent, or 47 of the 57 regular counties suffered from Japanese pirate attacks. Moreover, among the three provinces attacked the most by Japanese pirates, 12 of 14 regular counties in Yanggwang Province, 13 of 14 regular counties in Gyeongsang Province, and 15 of 17 regular counties in Jeolla Province were attacked by Japanese pirates.

This means that nearly every regular county in those three provinces was attacked at some point in time, except for Gwangju District (廣州牧) and Wonju (原州) in Yanggwang Province, Hapju (陜州) in Gyeongsang Province, and Geumgu (金溝) and Jindo (珍島) in Jeolla Province. As for subordinate counties except those in the two northern border regions, 172 out 353 subordinate counties were attacked. The figure illustrates that only 49 percent of subordinate counties underwent Japanese pirate attacks. Regular counties with larger populations and greater concentrations of products tended to be more heavily pursued by Japanese pirates than subordinate counties.

Tables 2 and 3 in the following offer a summary of the prefectures and counties which were attacked the most by Japanese pirates according to records in *Goryeosa* and *Goryeosa jeoryo*. As displayed in Table 2, the most frequently attacked areas of Goryeo were Ganghwa (江華) and Gyodong County (喬桐), which were each attacked fourteen times. Happo County (合浦) suffered thirteen attacks and Ulju (蔚州) suffered twelve attacks. Milseong Prefecture (密城郡) and Seungpyeong Prefecture (昇平郡) were attacked eleven times; Goseong County (固城縣) was attacked ten times; Suju (水州), Geumju (金州: formerly Gimhae), Yangju (梁州: formerly Yangsan), and Jinju (晉州) were attacked eight times; Garim County (嘉林縣: formerly Imju County), Saju County (泗州縣: formerly Sacheon County), Jeonju (全州), and Gyeongju (慶州) were attacked seven times; Inju (仁州: formerly Incheon), Seorim County (瑞林縣: formerly Seocheon County), Dongnae (東萊), Heonyang (巘陽: formerly Eonyang), Yeju (禮州: formerly Yeonghae), and Haeju (海州) were attacked six times. The place names, annotated with their former names, were previously known by their former names when Japanese pirate attacks occurred.

Importantly, Table 2 shows that a considerable number of subordinate counties were included in the list of relatively frequently attacked prefectures and counties. This demonstrates another characteristic of Japanese pirate attacks, which is that normal, not subordinate, counties were not exclusively targeted. Among the twenty-nine prefectures or counties attacked more than five times, eight were subordinate counties according to Table 2. These were Gyodong, Happo, Seorim, Hanju, Dongnae, Saju, Hyeonyang, and Gwangseong (管城: formerly Okcheon).

According to Table 3, a total of seventy-one prefectures or counties were attacked by Japanese pirates more than three times.[4] Thirteen of the nineteen areas attacked four times were subordinate counties; thirteen of the twenty-three areas attacked three times were subordinate counties. Therefore, approximately one-half, or thirty-four of the seventy-one areas attacked more than three times, were subordinate counties. As pointed out above, most regular counties in the three Goryeo provinces of Yanggwang Province, Gyeongsang Province, and Jeolla Province were attacked more than once by Japanese pirates because they were central to local administration, well-populated, and well-stocked with merchandise. Yet, purely in terms of areas that suffered more than three attacks, there appears to be no stark difference between regular and subordinate counties. This gives reason to further explore other features of Japanese pirate attacks.

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[4] The statistics compiled by the author of this paper significantly differs from the numbers presented through previous studies such as Na, "Honggeonjeok gwa waegu," 397; Yi Young, "Goryeo mal eui waegu wa masan," 129-31.

Table 2. Prefectures and Counties Attacked More Than Five Times

Number of Attacks	Prefecture / County Name	Number of Prefectures / Counties	Time of Attack
14	Gyodong	2	Gyodong: third month of 1351, third month of 1352 (2), seventh month of 1352, fifth month of 1357, Leap ninth month of 1357, fifth month of 1358, Leap fifth month of 1360, fourth month of 1363, third month of 1365, fourth month of 1365, fifth month of 1366, seventh month of 1373, seventh month of 1376
	Ganghwa		Ganghwa: third month of 1351, fifth month of 1358, fifth month of 1360, Leap fifth month of 1360, sixth month of 1364, third month of 1365, fourth month of 1365, third month of 1367, tenth month of 1376, third month of 1377, fifth month of 1377 (2), second month of 1378, first month of 1387
13	Happo	1	Second month of 1352, sixth month of 1352 (2), seventh month of 1352, ninth month of 1352, ninth month of 1353, fourth month of 1358, fourth month of 1374, eleventh month of 1376, twelfth month of 1376 (2), first month of 1377, fourth month of 1379
12	Ulju	1	Fourth month 1361, eighth month 1361, fifth month 1374, Wu 2.11, Wu 2.12, fourth month 1377 (2), fifth month 1377, Leap fifth month 1379, sixth month 1379, seventh month 1379, sixth month 1381
11	Milseong	2	Milseong: eighth month 1361, third month 1364, twelfth month 1374, first month 1375, eleventh month 1375, eleventh month 1376, fourth month 1377, fifth month 1377 (2), sixth month 1379, eleventh month 1381
	Seungpyeong		Seungpyeong: fourth month 1352, fifth month 1352, third month 1364, third month 1372, sixth month 1377, twelfth month 1377, seventh month 1378, eighth month 1378, second month 1379, third month 1379, third month 1380
10	Goseong	1	Second month 1352, sixth month 1352, seventh month 1358, fourth month 1361, third month 1364, third month 1376, eleventh month 1376, twelfth month 1376, eleventh month 1378, seventh month 1381
			Suju: third month 1354, eighth month 1358, fifth month 1377, third month 1378, fifth month 1378, sixth month 1378 (2), eleventh month 1384

8	Suju Geumju Yangju Jinju	4	Geumju: eighth month 1361, third month 1364, eleventh month 1375, fourth month 1377, eleventh month 1377, ninth month 1380, sixth month 1381, seventh month 1381
			Yangju: eighth month 1361, third month 1364, eleventh month 1376, twelfth month 1376, fourth month 1377, fifth month 1377, sixth month 1381, eighth month 1384
			Jinju: third month 1376, eleventh month 1376, twelfth month 1378, fifth month 1379, ninth month 1379, eighth month 1388, seventh month 1389, second month 1392
7	Garim Saju Jeonju Gyeongju	4	Garim: sixth month 1376, third month 1378, tenth month 1378, eighth month 1380, second month 1382, Leap second month 1382, tenth month 1387
			Saju: third month 1358, fourth month 1360, eighth month 1361, third month 1364, twelfth month 1378, eighth month 1379, ninth month 1379
			Jeonju: third month 1362, ninth month 1376, ninth month 1378, eighth month 1383, eleventh month 1387, fourth month 1388, sixth month 1388
			Gyeongju: fifth month 1374, fourth month 1377, Leap fifth month 1379, sixth month 1379, fifth month 1381, sixth month 1382, eighth month 1388
6	Inju Seorim Dongnae Eonyang Yeju Haeju	6	Inju: eighth month 1353, eighth month 1358, fourth month 1374, ninth month 1375, second month 1378, twelfth month 1384
			Seorim: third month 1352, tenth month 1376, ninth month 1377, tenth month 1382, tenth month 1387, fifth month 1388
			Dongnae: eleventh month 1352, eighth month 1361, eleventh month 1376 (2), twelfth month 1376, tenth month 1377
			Eonyang: eleventh month 1376, fourth month 1377, fifth month 1377, sixth month 1379, seventh month 1379, sixth month 1381
			Yeju: sixth month 1372, second month 1381, third month 1381, fifth month 1381, sixth month 1381, fifth month 1385
			Haeju: second month 1371, ninth month 1373, eighth month 1377, ninth month 1377, eighth month 1378, seventh month 1388
			Cheonan: eleventh month 1369, ninth month 1375, tenth month 1377, sixth month 1378, sixth month 1390

5	Cheonan Hansan Buseong Gwanseong Andong Haeyang Pungju Uljin	8	Hansan: fourth month 1358, tenth month 1376, ninth month 1377, third month 1378, tenth month 1387
			Buseong: third month 1352, ninth month 1375, ninth month 1378, seventh month 1380, ninth month 1381
			Gwanseong: ninth month 1378, tenth month 1378, seventh month 1380, eighth month 1383, eighth month 1388
			Andong: third month 1382, sixth month 1383, eighth month 1383 (2), first month 1385
			Haeyang: tenth month 1378, second month 1380, fourth month 1381, eleventh month 1387, seventh month 1388
			Pungju: sixth month 1377, seventh month 1377, eighth month 1377, fifth month 1379, fourth month 1388
			Uljin: seventh month 1379, third month 1381, sixth month 1381, seventh month 1381, third month 1382

1) The numbers in parentheses indicate the number of attacks on the same area during a particular month.
2) County names with an asterisk indicate that they are subordinate counties.

Table 3. Prefectures and Counties Attacked Four Times or Less

Number of Attacks	Prefecture / County Name	Number of Prefectures / Counties
4	Gaeseong, Gongam*, Dangseong*, Buyeo*, Yeonsan*, Onsu*, Ahju*, Hongsan*, Pyeonghae*, Banseong*, Hamyang*, Geoje, Yeongdong*, Cheongsan*, Nagan*, Jangheung, Boseong, Anju, Ongjin	19
3	Jeongju*, Yongseong*, Gongju, Hongju, Jiksan*, Yeongju*, Uian*, Gijang*, Hadong*, Namhae, Ilseon*, Daegu*, Uiseong*, Hamyeol*, Namwon, Gurye*, Jinrye, Gimje, Gyoju, Yeomju, Sinju*, Samcheok, Hamju	23
2	Namgyeong, Geumju*, Tongjin*, Suan*, Ansan*, Goeju*, Yeongwol*, Jeju*, Dansan*, Cheongju, Mokju*, Hoedeok*, Yuseong*, Seokseong*, Jeongsan*, Hyeseong*, Gyeolseong*, Sinpyeong*, Deokpung*, Pyeongtaek*, Anseong*, Biin*, Yeongdeok*, Haman*, Akyang*, Yeongseon*, Jinhae*, Nanpo*, Jungmo*, Gyeongsanbu, Hwanggan*, Yean*, Hamju*, Sunan*, Geumma*, Imsil*, Jangsu*, Unbong*, Boan*, Buryeong*, Jeongeup*, Ineui*, Impi, Jindong*, Yeongwang, Dogang*, Dongbuk*, Tamra, Anak*, Jangyeon*, Yeonggang*, Bongju*, Myeongju, Iknyeong*, Dongsan*, Bukcheongju, Seonju	56

1	Simak*, Dongseong*, Yeongsin*, Ssangbu*, Yangseong*, Jukju*, Yonggu*, Chungju, Jangyeon*, Uemjuk*, Uemseong*, Cheongpung*, Pyeongchang*, Yeongchun*, Jucheon*, Jinjam*, Nisan*, Sinpung*, Boryeong*, Cheongyang*, Yeomi*, Yesan*, Sotae*, Jangsan*, Angang*, Sinryeong*, Jain*, Cheongha*, Gigye*, Songsaeng*, Ungsin*, Dongpyeong*, Cheongdo*, Gasu*, Saneum*, Dangye*, Yian*, Yaro*, Choye*, Geochang*, Myeongjin*, Sangju, Boryeong*, Hoeryeong*, Gongseong*, Biak*, Eomo*, Chungna*, Goryeong*, Indong*, Jirye*, Geumsan*, Aneup*, Isan*, Hwawon*, Imha*, Euiheung*, Giyang*, Nangsan*, Gosan*, Unje*, Georyeong*, Gobu, Daesan*, Sangjil*, Hoemi*, Okgu*, Mangyeong*, Jugye*, Mupung*, Naju, Muan*, Damyang*, Gokseong*, Bannam*, Jinwon*, Hwasun*, Hoeryeong*, Jangtaek*, Tamjin*, Jangseong*, Mopyeong*, Hanpung*, Jangsa*, Yeongam, Haenam*, Joyang*, Okgwa*, Buyu*, Neungseong, Tonggu*, Chunju, Gapyeong*, Nangcheon*, Hoengcheon*, Hongcheon*, Yanggu*, Geumhwa*, Pyeonggang*, Baekju*, Pyeongju*, Deungju, Goju, Jinmyeong, Wugye*, Jeongseon*, Heupgok, Bokju, Yongju, Cheolju, Gwakju, Yeongcheong, Hamjong, Yonggang*, Samhwa*	115

1) County names with an asterisk (*) indicate that they are subordinate counties.
2) The date each attack occurred has been omitted due to space limitations.

2. The Characteristics of Japanese Pirate Attacks

In late Goryeo, western and southern coastal areas of the Korean peninsula, where warehouses and ports were located to collect and to transport tax grains, were the foremost targets for Japanese pirates. This is why the counties of Gyodong County and Ganghwa County became the most frequently attacked areas.

Located along the river and sea routes leading to the capital Gaegyeong, these two particular counties were gateways where grains paid as tax were temporarily aggregated before being transported to the capital. These geographical and economic conditions were the very reason why the two counties became victimized most severely by Japanese pirates. For instance, there is an entry in *Goryeosa* regarding Japanese pirates attacking Gapsan Warehouse (甲山倉) in Gyodong County in the third lunar month of 1352.[5] Apart from this entry, Gapsan Warehouse is not mentioned in any

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5 *Goryeosa* [History of Goryeo], vol. 38, Year 1 of King Gongmin (1352), third month section.

other record, which warrants the possibility that it may has been a temporary warehouse to store tax grains from other areas destined for the Goryeo capital of Gaegyeong. In the intercalary fifth month of 1259, Japanese pirates attacked the Buddhist temples Seonwonsa (禪源寺) and Yongjangsa (龍藏寺), killed nearly 300 people, and stole 40,000 sacks of rice.[6] Considering that 15,000 sacks of grains were accrued from the Jinju area in 1259,[7] when the area was a prebend of the Choe family that ruled a military regime at that time, it seems more likely that the 40,000 sacks of rice were tax grains rather than the respective private property of the two temples.[8] This estimation is also supported by the fact that there were many facilities for storing grains in Ganghwa County from having previously functioned as a temporary capital of Goryeo.

For being the gateway to Gaegyeong where tax grains were aggregated, the two countries sought precautions against Japanese pirates early on. In the seventh lunar month of 1376, residents of Gyodong County were instructed to relocate to other nearby areas and avoid Japanese pirate attacks.[9] In the third lunar month of the following year, the Goryeo government realized that strategically important points should be protected. The government thereby expropriated private fields in the corresponding area and had them farmed by men performing military duties prepared in an emergency.[10] Perhaps because of such precautionary measures, Japanese pirate attacks in Gyodong County no longer appeared in Korean historical records as can be seen through Table 2. Were it not for those measures, the area is likely to have suffered from many more attacks by Japanese pirates.

After serving as a temporary capital under the military regime of the

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6 *Goryeosa jeoryo* [Abridged History of Goryeo], vol. 27, Year 9 of King Gongmin (1360), Leap fifth month section.

7 Kim Jae-myoung, "Goryeo eui joeunjedo wa sacheon tongyeongchang" [Tongyangchang as a Section of the Marine Transportation System in Goryeo Period], *Hanguk jungsesa yeongu* 20 (2006): 181-82.

8 There is still, of course, the possibility that the grains could have been collected from branches of each temple in different areas or from farms owned by the temples.

9 *Goryeosa*, vol. 133, Yeoljeon [Biographies] part, Year 2 of King Wu (1376), seventh month section.

10 *Goryeosa*, vol. 113, Choi Yeong yeoljeon.

Choe family during the 13th century Mongol invasions, the prominence of Ganghwa County fell into the shade and the county gradually became merged into Inju after the Goryeo government moved back to Gaegyeong in 1270. However, in 1377, the county was elevated to the status of Ganghwa Prefect (江華府).[11] This reinstatement seems to have been a restorative measure taken after the area was severely damaged and left destitute by Japanese pirates who had attacked not only Ganghwa but also the neighboring counties of Suan, Tongjin, and Dongseong.[12] According to other records, residents were unable to reside and pay taxes in the Ganghwa area due to the Japanese pirate attacks, which subsequently turned the area into an uninhabited land. Only when the government had naval forces stationed in the area and placed warships in the nearby waters did the area become stabilized.[13] These measures seem to have been taken when the area was promoted to the status of Ganghwa Prefect. The Goryeo government's intention must have been to promote the area so as to turn it into a defense base against Japanese pirates.

In the meantime, Happo was the county that facilitated one of the thirteen waterside coastal called Seokdu Warehouse (石頭倉). This warehouse stored tax grains from prefectures and counties in the areas of Ulju (Ulsan), Geumju (Gimhae), and Yangju (Yangsan).[14] In the nearby area was an annex of Seokdu Warehouse called Hoewon Warehouse (會原倉), which also fell prey to a Japanese pirate attack in the first lunar month of 1377.[15] Happo was the base and the departure point from which the com-

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11 *Goryeosa*, vol. 56, Ganghwa County.

12 *Goryeosa*, vol. 113, Choi Yeong yeoljeon.

13 *Sinjeung dongguk yeoji seungnam* [Newly Augmented Survey of the Geography of Korea], vol. 12, Ganghwa-dohobu (江華都護府) Gungsil (宮室) section.

14 Han Jeong-hoon, "Goryeo sidae 13 jochang gwa jubyeon gyotongno yeongu" [The Research of 13 Rice-warehouses and the Surrounding Traffic Route in the Goryeo Dynasty], *Hanguk jungsesa yeongu* 23 (2007): 176. The reason Ulju (twelve attacks), Geumju (eight attacks), and Yangju (eight attacks) were more heavily damaged was not only because they were coastal areas along waterways, but also because their tax grains were collected and stored at Seokduchang.

15 While prefectures and counties attacked by Japanese pirates were labeled by their changed names, Happo was an exception. The name Happo was changed to Hoewon in 1282, the eighty years

bined forces of Goryeo and Yuan China set out to conquer Japan during the reign of Kubilai Khan. This was because the county was located closest to the shortcut past Geoje, which led all the way to Tsushima Island in Japan.[16] This, in turn, made Happo the forward operating base in Goryeo for Japanese pirates from Tsushima, and having a waterside warehouse for tax grains made the area all the more desirable for Japanese pirates. As a result, approximately 5,000 Goryeo soldiers were killed when 350 Japanese ships came to Happo in the fourth lunar month of 1374.[17]

There was another warehouse near Happo called Saju (currently Sacheon). This warehouse called Tongyang Warehouse (通陽倉) was attacked seven times (See Table 2). When Japanese pirates began to attack Goryeo more fiercely from 1350, they first struck Goseong (固城), Jungnim (竹林),[18] and Geoje (巨濟) near Tongyang Warehouse.[19] As can be seen from Table 2 and Table 3, the same areas suffered heavily from Japanese pirate attacks: ten times at Goseong County and four times at Geoje County. Other areas where warehouses were situated also suffered relatively greater damage: eleven attacks were made on Seungpyeong (currently Suncheon) where the warehouse Haeryong Warehouse (海龍倉) was located, four attacks on Ahju where the warehouse Hayang Warehouse (河陽倉) was located, and five attacks on Buseong County (富城縣) where the warehouse Yeongpung Warehouse (永豊倉) was located.[20]

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of King Chungnyeol's reign, which was maintained until the end of the Goryeo dynasty. The name change appears to have been made after the Mongol expedition to conquer Japan failed in 1281. However, the name Happo seems to have remained in use alongside Hoewon even after the name change. This is because military units named Happo jinbyeonso (合浦鎭邊所) and Happo deungcheo jinbyeonmanhobu (合浦等處鎭邊萬戶府) were installed in the area after the expedition to conquer Japan ended.

16 Kim Gwang-cheol, "Goryeo sidae happo jiyeok sahoe" [Happo local society in the Goryeo Dynasty], *Hanguk jungsesa yeongu* 17 (2004): 18.

17 *Goryeosa*, vol. 44, Year 23 of King Gongmin (1374), fourth month section.

18 Jungnim refers to Jungnim-bugok (竹林部曲) where the military camp Jungnimsu (竹林戍) was stationed to defend the warehouse Tongyangchang. At the nearby Gaksan-hyang (角山鄕) was the camp Gaksansu (角山戍). Kim, "Goryeo eui joeunjedo wa sacheon tongyeongchang," 183-86.

19 Han, "Goryeo sidae 13 jochanggwa jubyeon gyotongno yeongu," 175.

20 *Goryeosa*, vol. 37, Year 2 of King Chungjeong (1350), fourth month section; *Goryeosa*, vol.

However, Japanese pirate attacks were not limited to locations where tax grains were collected. The attacks also caused considerable damage by targeting ships and ports used to transport tax grains. Before the tax grain shipping system was introduced under King Jeongjong (r. 945-949), sixty points of tax grain transportation were spread out countrywide along major rivers and coasts.[21] This is why prefectures and counties with ports were more heavily pillaged by Japanese pirates.[22] Records indicate that by 1370, areas as close as thirty to fifty *ri* (or eleven to twenty kilometers) from the coast remained deserted and desolate.[23]

To prevent further damage from Japanese pirate attacks, warehouses in coastal areas were relocated to inland sites in the fourth lunar month of 1358.[24] By the following month, shipping circumstances had worsened to such a degree that the state became unable to pay government officials their salary. Two months later, Chinese ships and some Han Chinese were hired to ship tax grains for Goryeo. In the second lunar month of 1358, tax grains had to be transported by land instead of being shipped by sea. In the ninth intercalary lunar month of 1376, shipping tax grains discontinued in the three provinces of Jeolla, Yanggwang, and Gyeongsang, thus tax grains all started to be transported by land.[25] From that time on, tax grains were not shipped through water again for fourteen years until 1390. This caused Japanese pirates to gradually shift their targets to inland areas. As such, some posts along waterways and land routes, extending to inland areas or coastal prefectures and counties with easier access to inland areas, came under intensive attack by Japanese pirates.

38, Year 3 of King Gongmin (1354), fourth month section; *Goryeosa*, vol. 38, Year 4 of King Gongmin (1355), fourth month section; *Goryeosa*, vol. 39, Year 10 of King Gongmin (1361), eighth month section.

21 Kim, “Goryeo eui joeunjedo wa sacheon tongyeongchang,” 173.

22 Examples of such prefectures or counties include Gongam-hyeon (four attacks) where the port Gwangtongpo (廣通浦) was, Nagan-hyeon (four attacks) where Papyeongpo (波平浦) was, and Yeju (five attacks) where Seohagunpo (西河郡浦) was located.

23 *Goryeosa*, vol. 42, Year 17 of King Gongmin (1368), fifth month section.

24 *Goryeosa*, vol. 39, Year 7 of King Gongmin (1358), fourth month section.

25 *Goryeosa*, vol. 133, Year 2 of King Wu (1376), Leap ninth month section.

Based on the number of attacks noted in Table 2, Milseong (eleven attacks), Geumju (eight attacks), Yangju (eight attacks), and Jinju (eight attacks) were all key points along inland and water transportation routes that suffered greater damage. Jinju was an area key to land routes towards to the northern areas of today's Jeolla Province such as Unbong or Namwon. The rest of the areas Japanese pirates attacked were key points along the Nakdong River as they traveled by ship into inland areas of the northern and southern parts of today's Gyeongsang Province. In the eleventh month of 1375, Japanese pirates set the government office in Geumju on fire and clashed with Goryeo soldiers in Daegu (大丘). The most convenient way to travel from Gimhae to Daegu was use of the Nakdong River. Approximately ten Japanese ships started out from Gimhae and sailed upstream along the Hwangsan River, a branch of the Nakdong River, to attack Milseong.[26] In the fourth lunar month of 1377, Commander Bak Wi decapitated twenty-nine Japanese pirates at the mouth of the Hwangsan River while serving as the deputy magistrate of Gimhae.[27] Gimhae was at the corner of the lower Nakdong River and frequently suffered from Japanese pirate attacks. This was the same case with Yangju, a key water transportation point along the lower Nakdong River.

Coastal areas still suffered heavily for being easily accessible to Japanese pirates approaching Goryeo by ship. Examples of such areas were Ulju, Dongnae, Goseong, and Yeju along the eastern and southern coasts of the Korean peninsula. However, as tax grains were no longer being shipped by water from 1376, Japanese pirates in search of economic gains shifted their predatory gaze toward inland areas.[28] In particular, Japanese pirates took Chuksan Island (丑山島) along the eastern coast as a principal base for advancing into inland areas. The island, which was part of Yeju, had become a new entry into Goryeo for Japanese pirates. Staging the is-

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[26] *Goryeosa jeoryo*, vol. 30, Year 1 of King Wu (1375), eleventh month section.

[27] *Goryeosa jeoryo*, vol. 30, Year 3 of King Wu (1377), fourth month section.

[28] Na Jong-woo explains that Japanese pirates broadened their attack range to inland areas of Goryeo as grain production at coastal prefectures decreased sharply and as tax grains started to be transported by land since the reign of King Wu. Na, "Honggeonjeokgwa waegu," 405-06.

land as a base, the pirates invaded inland areas of Gyeongsang Province, Gyoju Province, and Yanggwang Province.[29]

Yeju was attacked three times in 1381. The Confucian scholar Gwon Geun wrote that the attacks ravaged and burned all the houses in the villages of Yeju. Moreover, government officials fled to other regions, thus for the next few years Yeju remained a den for Japanese pirates. In the summer of 1383, Japanese pirates swept through Wonju and Chuncheon to attack Cheolwon and then moved on to make victims of Yangju, Gwangju, and Gongju. These attacks were all made by Japanese pirates who infiltrated Goryeo through Chuksan Island. Gwon Geun quoted the proverb "When the lips are gone, the teeth are cold" to illustrate how failing to defend a single island resulted in damage in the three provinces. This suggests that Chuksan Island under the district of Yeju served as a major point of entry for Japanese pirates into inland areas across Gyeongsang Province, Gyoju Province, and Yanggwang Province.

II. Damages Ascertained from Geographical Appendixes

While nearly one-half of the prefectures and counties of Goryeo were raided by Japanese pirates, the southern areas of Goryeo particularly suffered from such raids. Innumerable people were killed, lost family members, or became captives.[30] This section will delve more deeply into the changes that Goryeo prefectures and counties experienced after the attacks. Annals, such as *Goryeosa,* only indicate that Japanese pirate attacks occurred and do not provide details regarding how those attacks impacted Goryeo prefectures and counties. On the other hand, various geographical appendices compiled in early Joseon include records regarding the prefectures and counties that were not covered by the chronicles.

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[29] *Sinjeung dongguk yeoji seungnam*, vol. 24, Yeonghae-dohobu (寧海都護府) Nujeong (樓亭) section, Gweongeungi (權近記).

[30] *Gyeongsangdo jiriji* (慶尙道地理志) [Geography of Gyeongsang Province], Milyang-dohobu (密陽都護府) section.

Some prefectures and counties lost their administrative functions as Japanese pirate attacks drove their residents away. One such case was the county of Nampo County (藍浦縣) which was attacked by Japanese pirates in 1380. Only when a fortress was installed in 1390 and people were brought back to the area did the county recover its function as an administrative unit.[31] Jinbo County (眞寶縣), known as Boseong Prefect (甫城府) during the Goryeo dynasty, was ruined by Japanese pirates until a lower ranking magistrate with the title of *gammu* (監務) was assigned to the county during the Joseon dynasty.[32] However, the damages these two counties incurred were not chronicled in *Goryeosa*. In fact, damages due to Japanese pirate attacks are likely to have been far more extensive than what was implied by the number of attacks introduced above. Cases similar to the two counties include Heungseon County (興善縣),[33] Nanpo County (蘭浦縣), and Pyeongsan County (平山縣).[34]

Some prefectures or counties managed to remain afloat as their government officials and residents temporarily relocated to other prefectures or counties. Japanese pirate attacks in 1271 caused people in Geoje County (巨濟縣) and Myeongjin County (溟珍縣) to respectively relocate to Gajo County (加祚縣) in Geochang (居昌) and the Jinju area.[35] In the case of Namhae County, the county's residents lost their houses due to a Japanese pirate attack in 1358, and temporarily relocated to Daeyacheon-*bugok* (大也川部曲) in the district of Jinju.[36] Such temporary relocation of residents from one county to another was referred to as *gyowu* (僑寓) while the temporary relocation of county authorities was described as *gyogun* (僑郡). According to recent studies,[37] *gyowu* or *gyogun* occurred in the southern

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31 *Sejong sillok jiriji* (世宗實錄地理志) [Geographical Appendix to the Annals of King Sejong], Nampo-hyeon (藍浦縣) section.

32 *Sejong sillok jiriji*, Jinbo-hyeon (眞寶縣) section.

33 *Sejong sillok jiriji*, Jinjumok (晉州牧) Heungseon-do (興善島) section.

34 *Sejong sillok jiriji*, Gonnam-gun (昆南郡) section.

35 *Sejong sillok jiriji*, Geoje-hyeon (巨濟縣) section and Jinseong-hyeon (珍城縣).

36 *Sejong sillok jiriji*, Gonnam-gun (昆南郡) Namhae-hyeon (南海縣) section.

37 Yoon Kyeong-jin, "Goryeo mal joseon cho gyogun eui seolchi wa jaepyeon" [The Implementation

coastal areas of Goryeo such as Yangju as well as Geoje County, Namhae County, and their subordinate counties. Most of the relocated counties returned to their original locations early in the reign of King Sejong during the Joseon Dynasty. On the other hand, when a Japanese pirate attack caused the authorities of the island of Jindo to relocate ashore to Haenam County in 1350, the incident was labeled as *naecheon* (內遷),[38] which appears to be a synonym for *gyowu*. The same relocation applies to the case of Jangheung Regional Military Command.[39] These temporary relocations seem to have continued into the early Joseon.

Apart from destroying prefectures and counties or forcing them to relocate, Japanese pirate attacks also dissolved special administrative units and gave rise to new settlements referred to as *wolgyeongji* (越境地). In terms of the dissolution of special administrative units, Goseong County along the southern coast of Goryeo serves as an example. Originally, this county had nineteen special administrative units: six *hyang* (鄕), seven *bugok* (部曲), and six *so* (所).[40] Among these units, four *hyang*, six *bugok*, and all six *so* eventually were dissolved by the end of the Goryeo dynasty. The *Gyeongsangdo jiriji*, printed in 1425, shows that only three of the nineteen special administrative units continued into the first half of the 15th century. Goseong County suffered ten Japanese pirate attacks, which, according to Table 2, makes it the seventh most frequently attacked area among all the prefectures and counties of Goryeo. The dissolution of other prefectures and counties is thought to have occurred mostly around the same time as Japanese pirate attacks were likely to have played a certain role in that dissolution.

The dissolution of special administrative units such as the *hyang* or the *bugok* is likely to have contributed to the creation of new settlements called *wolgyeongji*. Let's take for example the *wolgyeongji* (new settle-

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and the Reorganization of Gyogun units in the Final clays of Goryeo and the Beginning of Joseon dynasty], *Hanguk munhwa* 40 (2007): 182-207.

38 *Sejong sillok jiriji*, Haejin-gun (海珍郡) Haenam-hyeon (海南縣) section.

39 *Sejong sillok jiriji*, Haejin-gun (海珍郡) Jangheung-dohobu (長興都護府) section.

40 *Gyeongsangdo jiriji*, Goseong-hyeon (固城縣) section.

ments) in the southern coastal areas severely damaged from Japanese pirate attacks. *Wolgyeongji* would usually appear in times of famine, poor harvest, war, or searches for better arable land.[41] Notably, however, in late Goryeo, the appearance of *wolgyeongji* seems to be related to the movement of people in special administrative units. For instance, the people of Wanpo *hyang* (莞浦鄕) in the district of Gimhae moved to the southern part of Changwon and formed *wolgyeongji* in three different villages.[42] The residents of Malmun *hyang* (末文鄕) and Gaksan *hyang* (角山鄕) in Jinju came to form a *wolgyeongji* in Baekcheon-*ri* (白川里) in the southern part of Sacheon County.[43] The members of Geumyang-*bugok* (金陽部曲), originally in Jinju, also went to Baekchon-*ri* (白村里) on the east side of Hadong County to form a *wolgyeongji*.[44]

Compared to the residents of regular prefectures or counties, those of special administrative units tended to be imposed with heavier taxes and corvée labor, which kept them under substandard socio-economic circumstances. Such duties made them more likely to flee to other areas. Specific examples of this would be the aforementioned residents of special administrative units in Gimhae and Jinju who fled and formed a *wolgyeongji* in a different county. In fact, approximately ninety percent of the new settlements were formed by people who had crossed over from a *hyang*, *bugok*, or *so* belonging to a different prefecture or county. In some cases, residents from a prefecture or county would come to a special administrative unit and form a village there.[45] And when external triggers, such as Japanese pirate attacks, came into play, they especially served as an excuse for residents in special administrative units to run away.

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41 Lee Woo-sung, "Yijo sidae milyang gomae bugok" [On Gomae-Bugok of Milyang during the Yi Dynasty], in *Hanguk jungse sahoe yeongu* [A Study on Medieval Korean Society] (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1991), 147-61.

42 *Gyeongsangdo jiriji*, Changwon-dohobu (昌原都護府) section.

43 *Gyeongsangdo jiriji*, Sacheon-hyeon (泗川縣) section.

44 *Gyeongsangdo jiriji*, Hadong-hyeon (河東縣) section.

45 Park Jong-ki, *Jibae wa jayul eui gonggan, Goryeo eui jibang sahoe* [The Rural Society of Goryeo, a Space of Control and Autonomy] (Seoul: Pureun yeoksa, 2002): 373-85.

III. Restoration Measures and King Gongyang's Gammu Policy

Japanese pirate attacks greatly changed rural communities in late Goryeo in various ways. Southern prefectures and counties that suffered the most became dissolved or were forced to temporarily relocate to other areas. Special administrative units such as *hyang* or *bugok* gradually disappeared as their members exhibited a greater tendency to flee from impositions of heavier taxes and corvée requirements.

What policies did the Goryeo government employ to restore pillaged rural communities? Regarding this particular matter, there is a study on the construction of fortress in Gyeongsang Province to prevent Japanese pirate attacks.[46] The study took a new approach by using geographical appendices to review fortress walls as a preventative measure. Still, the study carried limitations in that it explored a measure that could not be applied to all areas, nor could it help to permanently restore rural communities. Other commonly discussed measures against Japanese pirate attacks emphasize the reorganization and the reinforcement of the military system in order to increase the number of soldiers stationed at local encampments, reshuffle naval units specifically charged with preventing Japanese pirate attacks, or form temporary military units out of farmers who support fighting against Japanese pirates. Diplomatic measures such as dispatching envoys have also been discussed.[47] In this article, I touch on the dispatch of lower ranking magistrates called *gammu*. While the *gammu* has been a topic that

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[46] Lee Kyung-hee, "Goryeo mal waegu eui chimip gwa daewae jeongchaek ui ildanmyeon" [Japanese Pirate Attacks in Late Goryeo and Goryeo's Policy Toward Japan], *Busan yeodae sahak* 10 & 11 (1993): 269-96. Meanwhile, the following paper offers a comprehensive summary about the studies on the damage Japanese pirates caused in Gyeongsang province and what defensive measures were taken in the area: Koo San-woo, "Ilbon Wonjeong, Waegu Chimip gwa Gyeongsangdo Jiyeok eui Donghyang" [The Mongol and Goryeo's Expedition to Japan, Invasion of the Japanese Pirates and the Movement in Gyeongsang-Province], *Hanguk Jungsesa Yeongu*, 22 (2007): 217-49.

[47] Cha Yong-geol, "Goryeo mal waegu bangsuchaek eroseo eui jinsu wa chukseong" [Military Presence and Fortification as Defense Against Japanese Pirates in Late Goryeo], *Sahak yeongu* 38 (1984): 129-57; Na, "Honggeonjeok gwa waegu," 407-15.

gained much attention from the scholars interested in the system of prefectures and counties, this paper seeks to examine how the dispatch of *gammu* officials during the reign of King Gongyang (r. 1389-92) helped restore the rural communities of Goryeo.[48]

To eliminate the instability that arose from the surge of settlements elevated to the status of county, King Gongyang's dispatch of *gammu* officials was an extension of the measure adopted by his predecessors King Yejong (r. 1105-25) and King Myeongjong (r. 1170-97). When a *gammu* official was dispatched to a particular prefecture or county, a small subordinate county or *bugok* officials nearby would come under the jurisdiction of that particular prefecture or county. This was different from previous *gammu* dispatches during the reigns of King Yejong and King Myeongjong which were aimed at preventing people from fleeing and thus strengthening the central government's control over rural areas. Dispatches of *gammu* officials under King Gongyang's reign sought to resolve the inconsistency in the system of regular and subordinate counties. This article highlights King Gongyang's dispatch of *gammu* officials as a means to restoring rural communities, ruined by Japanese pirate attacks, and realigning the tax grain collection system.

Near the end of King Wu's reign, Goryeo suffered considerably fewer attacks from Japanese pirates. Generals such as Yi Seong-gye, Choe Yeong, and Jeong Ji played significant roles in repelling Japanese pirates. When Goryeo troops led by Yi Seong-gye withdrew from Wihwa Island in 1388, Yi Seong-gye's faction seized power in Goryeo and launched a series of extensive reforms. Representative of the reforms was land reform. To readjust the ownership of land and slaves, the government needed to recalibrate the tax grain collection system. Because major sources of tax grains such as Yanggwang Province, Gyeongsang Province, and Jeolla Province suffered the most from Japanese pirate attacks, their administrative systems required support from the central government. The reformers looked for a

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[48] Yoon Kyeong-jin, "Joseon chogi gunhyeon cheje eui gaepyeon gwa eunyeong chegye eui byeonhwa" [The Restructure and Operational Changes of the Prefecture-County System in Early Joseon], *Hanguksaron* 25 (1991): 108-09.

commissioner able to execute land reform. Likewise, the dispatch of *gammu* officials during King Gongyang's reign was related to land reform.

Gammu dispatches were concentrated in the southern provinces of Goryeo. A total of 38 *gammu* officials were sent to those areas, including twenty-five to Gyeongsang Province, nine to Yanggwang Province, and four to Jeolla Province. During his reign, King Gongyang dispatched *gammu* officials to forty-four different locations, which was the third highest number of dispatches next to the seventy-seven sent by King Yejong and the sixty-six dispatched by King Myeongjong in the previous years.[49] During the reign of King Yejong, *gammu* officials were mostly sent to subordinate counties in the western coastal provincial areas or to areas near the capital in the Gyeonggi Province where people suffered from heavy taxes and corvée duties by reason of the state's attempt to conquer the Jurchens and relocate the capital. Dispatches of *gammu* officials during King Gongyang's reign, on the other hand, were focused on supporting the recovery from the damage that southern rural communities sustained due to the Japanese pirate attacks.

1. Defense against Japanese Pirates and Stable Tax Collection

In 1172, a *gammu* official was dispatched to Hamyang Prefecture for the first time in Korean history. Two centuries later, in 1390, the military officer, stationing in the same area as a *manho* (萬戶 local military official), was ordered to serve as a *gammu* because that district was a major target for Japanese pirates.[50] This indicates that *gammu* officials were dispatched or appointed for different reasons depending upon who ruled Goryeo, and at least during King Gongyang's reign the mission of a *gammu* official was to stabilize Hamyang Prefecture and defend the area against Japanese pirates.

Once the port of Seojang was built to the west of Sinchang County (新昌縣), a *manho* official, who would also serve as a *gammu* official, was

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[49] Kim Dong-soo, "Goryeo jung-hugi eui gammu pagyeon" [The Dispatch of Gammu in Mid to Late Goryeo], *Yeoksahak Yeongu* 3 (1989): 78.

[50] *Gyeongsangdo jiriji*, Hamyang-gun (咸陽郡) section.

assigned to the area in 1391, so that tax grains from nearby prefectures and counties could be collected there.[51] In the previous year, King Gongyang appointed a *gammu* official for Yeonil County (延日縣) who also served as the *manho* official in the area.[52] As a rule, the *manho* was a military position mainly charged with the mission of defending a particular area against Japanese pirates and thereby securing safety for shipping. The fact that *manho* officials took on the role of a *gammu* official hints that a *gammu* official, dispatched during the reign of King Gongyang, was expected to perform the duties of a *manho* official. Although there were discrepancies between the duty of *manho* officials, who originally served external defense, and that of *gammu* officials, who originally worked in civil administrative affairs such as tax collection, *gammu* officials were sent to key points along coastal areas or land routes frequently ravaged by Japanese pirates and charged with military duties as well. Hence, the purpose of dispatching *gammu* officials during the reign of King Gongyang was mainly three-fold: defense against Japanese pirates, steady collection of tax grains, and restoration of rural communities.

In 1172, a *gammu* official was assigned to Muan Prefecture and Hampung County.[53] During the reign of King Gongyang, *gammu* officials in those areas were ordered to concurrently serve as Supervisor of Agricultural Affairs (*gwonnongsa* 勸農使) and Supervisor of Defense (*bangeosa* 防禦使) alike, to nearby *hyang* and *bugok* within their jurisdiction. *Gammu* officials and magistrates, assigned to counties in Jeolla Province, such as Yeoryang County, Unbong County, Changpyeong County, Jinan County and Jangsu County, were also expected to perform the duties of both supervisors as above.[54] In other words, aside from their original responsibilities, *gammu* officials were also expected to prevent people from drifting and to encourage them to engage in agricultural activities.

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51 *Goryeosa*, vol. 56, Jiri (地理) [Geography] 1, Sinchang-hyeon (新昌縣) section.

52 *Goryeosa*, vol. 57, Jiri 2, Yeonil-hyeon (延日縣) section.

53 *Goryeosa*, vol. 57, Jiri 2, Muan-gin (務安郡) section and Hampung-hyeon (咸豊縣) section.

54 *Goryeosa*, vol. 57, Jiri 2, Section for Yeoryang-hyeon, Unbong-hyeon, Changpyeong-hyeon, Jinan-hyeon, and Jangsu-hyeon.

When Japanese pirates attacked Jinbo County (眞寶縣) and Bonseong Prefect (甫城府), they set fire to the government office in the area and made all its residents flee. The region became incapable of performing its administrative functions until a *gammu* official was sent there in 1394 during the Joseon dynasty.[55] This indicates that the early Joseon government had inherited King Gongyang's policy of dispatching *gammu* officials to revive rural communities ravaged by Japanese pirates.

2. Restructuring Boundaries and Jurisdictions

Among the forty-four prefectures and counties to which *gammu* officials were dispatched during King Gongyang's reign, twenty-seven of them had been attacked by Japanese pirates. Assuming that *gammu* officials at that time were to engage in defense against Japanese pirates and restore administrative capabilities, there should be an explanation as to why *gammu* officials were dispatched to districts that had not been attacked by Japanese pirates. Finding that explanation would reveal an alternate purpose for dispatching *gammu* officials during King Gongyang's reign.

When a *gammu* official was dispatched to Tongjin County (通津縣) in 1390, Suan County and Dongseong County were brought under the jurisdiction of Tongjin County.[56] The area was close to Ganghwa and Gyodong County, both of which suffered the most from Japanese pirate attacks. After attacking Ganghwa in 1377, Japanese pirates were being chased away, and in the process attacked Suan County, Tongjin County, and Dongseong County. In particular, Dongseong County had been left unguarded without military presence to the extent that Japanese pirates referred to the area as a paradise.[57] Most of its people ran away and the district was only recovered near the end of King Wu's reign or during the reign of King Gongyang when Japanese pirate attacks dwindled significantly. The dispatch of a *gammu* official to Tongjin County and the coun-

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55 *Sejong sillok jiriji*, Jinbo-hyeon (眞寶縣) section.

56 *Sejong sillok jiriji*, Tongjin-hyeon (通津縣) section.

57 *Goryeosa*, vol. 113, Choi Yeong (崔瑩) yeoljeon.

ty's subsequent incorporation of Suan County and Dongseong County practically resulted in the creation of a new administrative district. Similar forms of restructuring occurred at twenty-six of the forty-four areas where *gammu* officials were dispatched during the rule of King Gongyang.

Restructuring by placing small subordinate counties under the control of a prefecture or county assigned with a *gammu* official was a practice that had started even before King Gongyang's rule of Goryeo. In 1313, Gwanseong County, a subordinate county of Gyeongsan Prefect, was raised to the status of a regular county and gained administrative control over the other three subordinate counties of Isan County (利山縣), Aneup County (安邑縣), and Yangsan County (陽山縣).[58] Twenty years before this measure when Yuan insurgents, called Qadan (哈丹), attacked Gwanseong County, Aneup County and Isan County in 1292, the residents fled and became unable to engage in agricultural activities. Those counties were temporarily excused from corvée duties.[59] After nearly two decades had passed, the three counties were placed under the control of Gwanseong County in order to form a new district for tax collection. This measure had been adopted as an alternative to the failed practice of consolidating prefectures and counties during the reign of King Chungnyeol (r. 1274-98, 1299-1308) according to the Yuan dynasty's orders.

Reinstating administrative capabilities during King Chungseon's reign by newly creating a regular county and placing smaller prefectures and counties under the new county's control was not different from the restructuring undertaken during King Gongyang's reign in which to dispatch a *gammu* official to a prefecture or a county that would absorb small subordinate counties nearby. This form of restructuring was quite adequate and practical for eliminating the unreasonable tax collection system based on a stratified network of regular counties, subordinate counties, *hyang*, and *bugok*. Although Goryeo experimented with such restructuring at a time when the Yuan dynasty meddled in its domestic affairs, King Gongyang's

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58 *Goryeosa*, vol. 57, Jiri 2, Gwanseong-hyeon (管城縣) section.

59 *Goryeosa*, vol. 80, Sikhwa (食貨) [Food and Goods] 3, Jinhyul jemyeonjije (賑恤 災免之制) [Exemption for famine relief and disaster recovery].

dispatch of *gammu* officials helped this method settle as a standard form of restructuring prefectures and counties.[60]

King Gongyang's dispatch of *gammu* officials was not simply about reassigning small subordinate counties under the control of another prefecture or county with a *gammu* official. In 1390, the second year of King Gongyang's reign, a *gammu* official was sent to Hyeonpung County and had the county take over Gujisan-*bugok* of Milseong Prefecture.[61] In the same year, a *gammu* official was sent to Bonghwa County, which merged with both Mulya-*bugok* (勿也部曲) and Maeto-*bugok* (買吐部曲) that originally belonged to the jurisdiction of Andong.[62] In 1390, two stations (K. *yeok*) in Yeongwol Prefecture, Jeongyang (正陽) and Onsan (溫山), were consolidated to create a new station named Yangyeon (楊淵) at Yangdeung-*so*.[63] This indicates that during King Gongyang's reign special administrative units such as *bugok* or *yeok* were also brought under the control of a prefecture or a county to which a *gammu* official had been dispatched.

Jugye County became a subordinate county of Mupung County in 1176 when a *gammu* official was dispatched to Mupung County.[64] Then in 1191, fifteen years later Jugye County lost its status as a subordinate county and was completely incorporated into Mupung County. This demonstrates that restructuring prefectures and counties during King Gongyang's reign also involved the practical choice of merging districts, which had lost their capability as a source of taxation, into other larger counties. When the waterway through Baengnyeong Garrison grew too rough, people in the garrison temporarily moved to the east side of Munhwa County and formed a village there in 1357. That village later came under the direct control of Munhwa County in 1391.[65] Gap-*hyang* (甲鄕) and Jangpyeong-*bugok* (長平部曲) were special administrative units that almost lost their

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60 Park, *Jibae wa jayul eui gonggan, goryeo eui jibang sahoe*, 463-87.

61 *Goryeosa*, vol. 57, Jiri 2, Hyeonpung-hyeon (玄風縣) section.

62 *Sejong sillok jiriji*, Bonghwa-hyeon (奉化縣) section.

63 *Sejong sillok jiriji*, Yeongwol-gun (寧越郡) section.

64 *Goryeosa*, vol. 57, Jiri 2, Mupung-hyeon (茂豊縣) section.

65 *Goryeosa*, vol. 58, Jiri 3, Baengnyeongjin (白翎鎭) section.

purpose as they came under the control of the neighboring Changpyeong County.[66] The aforementioned cases of Muan Prefecture (務安郡) and Hampung County (咸豊縣), in which *gammu* officials had to act as the supervisor of agricultural affairs and local defense, indicates the consolidation of *hyang* and *bugok* into a nearby prefecture or county. Many similar cases can be found in geographical appendices from *Goryeosa* and some other official documents during the first half of the Joseon dynasty. To sum up, the other reason for dispatching *gammy* officials was to restructure prefectural or county boundaries, restore administrative capabilities, and secure fiscal stability for the state.

Concluding Remarks

Rural communities in late Goryeo greatly suffered from Japanese pirate attacks. 81 percent of the prefectures and counties were located in the southern provinces of Yanggwang Province, Jeolla Province, and Gyeongsang Province. Except for the northeastern and northwestern border regions, nearly all regular counties throughout Goryeo fell victim to Japanese pirate attacks. Regular counties are likely to have been principal targets for Japanese pirates because they were symbolic administrative hubs where local magistrates were present and developed enough to attract greater volumes of people and products. Yet, a considerable number of subordinate counties also experienced as much damage as did regular counties. Areas with ports or warehouses used to transport tax grains were primary targets for Japanese pirates, thus subordinate counties in such areas did heavily suffer.

Japanese pirates initially attacked the coastal areas of Goryeo, particularly those areas along shipping routes where ports or warehouses were located because they were easily accessible from the Japanese archipelago. Once Goryeo strengthened its defense of coastal areas and utilized land routes to transport tax grains, Japanese pirates started to target hubs of land and water transportation such as Jinju or Gimhae to establish bridgeheads

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[66] *Sejong sillok jiriji*, Changpyeong-hyeon (昌平縣) section.

into the inland areas of Goryeo. Especially, the areas along the east coast turned into major entry points that offered easy access into the midlands of Goryeo. Many prefectures or counties in the southern regions lost their administrative capabilities. Government officials and residents in some coastal prefectures or counties relocated to inland areas and had to temporarily coinhabit a certain prefecture or construct new settlements. Many subordinate counties and special administrative units, which had already been suffering socially and economically from heavy taxes and corvée duties, ended up breaking away from the existing administrative system or became extinct.

Japanese pirate attacks ceased almost entirely by the end of King Wu's reign. And a series of reforms were launched after Yi Seong-gye had Goryeo troops withdraw from the Wihwa Island in 1388. Some measures were taken to restore the southern regions that suffered the most from Japanese pirate attacks. One of those measures included the dispatch of lower-ranking magistrates called *gammu* during King Gongyang's reign. The purpose of this action was to restructure prefectures and counties by placing small subordinate counties and special administrative units under the control of a nearby county to which a *gammu* official was dispatched. The foremost goal of dispatching *gammu* officials during King Gongyang's reign was to restore rural communities severely damaged by Japanese pirate attacks. This was evident from the fact that *gammu* officials were mostly dispatched to the southern regions.

Restoring the administrative capabilities of prefectures and counties was also necessary for the central government to secure enough fiscal resources through taxation. Such restructuring coincided with land reform actively implemented by Yi Seong-gye and young literati who had newly gained power in late Goryeo. The fact that the Joseon dynasty inherited Goryeo's dispatch of *gammu* officials during King Gongyang's reign indicates that sending *gammu* officials to restore the southern prefectures and counties, suffering harshly from Japanese pirate attacks, corresponded not only with the economic motive of securing major sources of taxation, but also with the political motive of successfully carrying out land reform promoted by Yi Seong-gye and his group.

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Contacts between Korean and Japanese Frontline Commanders during the Imjin War: Focusing on the Letters between the Two Camps in 1594

Kyong-tae KIM
Chonnam National University

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Contacts between Korean and Japanese Frontline Commanders during the Imjin War: Focusing on the Letters between the Two Camps in 1594*

Kyong-tae KIM
Chonnam National University

Introduction

On the eighth day of the first lunar month of 1593, the Ming armies, led by the Ming commander in chief Li Rusong 李如松, dealt a devastating blow to the Japanese armies at the Battle of Pyeongyang. The Japanese commanders withdrew their troops to Hanseong 漢城 (today's Seoul), yet gained a victory against the Ming armies at Byeokjegwan, a suburb of Hanseong. Thereafter, the war reached a stalemate and the commanders on both sides preferred peace talks to costly battles as a means to end the impasse of the Imjin War (1592-1598).

The Joseon court, witnessing its territory turn into a horrible battlefield, had little inclination for peace talks with their sworn enemy, Japan. Nevertheless, the court also felt obliged to speak with their adversaries for some practical purposes. In this precarious situation, realistic considerations could not be avoided. And, given that Joseon's military power was far from superior to that of Japan, it may well have been difficult for the

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Joseon leaders to rule out peace talks as one measure. Especially, some field commanders, if abiding by the official attitude of their government to the Japanese armies as 'no negotiation,' found themselves in need of contact with their adversaries in order to obtain relevant information and to take care of immediate problems caused by the hostilities.

The primary Ming and Japanese negotiators were Shen Weijing 沈惟敬 and Konishi Yukinaga 小西行長, respectively. The Joseon officials were not informed of the negotiations between them. As the peace talks between the Ming and Japanese armies had become the *fait accompli*, Joseon began to move to open its own channel of communication with the Japanese. The Joseon court sent the Buddhist monk Yujeong 惟政 (penname Samyeongdang, 1544-1610) to meet with Katō Kiyomasa 加藤清正 (1562-1611) in order to gather information regarding what was occurring at the peace talks, and at the same time to incite Kiyomasa who wanted to see the peace negotiations between the Ming and his rival Yukinaga failing.[1] This case of Korean contact with Kiyomasa had been carried out with the approval of the Ming commander Liu Ting 劉綎 who then encamped in Korea.[2]

Yet, there was another type of Korean contact different in nature from the case of Yujeong, as carried out by Joseon's frontline commanders such as Kim Eungseo 金應瑞 (1564-1624), Baek Sarim 白士霖, and Yi Bin 李賓. An account regarding Kim Eungseo's contacts with the Japanese commanders are found in the *Seonjo Sillok* 宣祖實錄 (The Veritable Records of King Seonjo) and the *Nanjung japnok* 亂中雜錄 (The Miscellaneous Records during the War). Still, these records focus only on reactions by the Joseon army, thus making it difficult to know more fully the interactions between the Joseon and the Japanese armies. In this context, this article examines the communication letters between the two parties, represented by

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1 The contacts between Yujeong and Katō Kiyomasa occurred four times—three times from the fourth lunar month to the twelfth month of 1594, and the last time in the third month of 1597 just before the second invasion. For the activities of Yujeong during and in the wake of the Imjin War, see Samyeongdang ginyeom saeophoe pyeon [Committee for commemorating Yujeong, ed.], *Samyeongdang Yujeong* [A biography of Yujeong] (Seoul: Jisik saneopsa, 2000).

2 Kim Kyong-tae, "Imjin jeonjaenggi Ganghwa gyoseop yeon'gu" [Study on the peace talks during the Imjin War], Ph. D. dissertation, Korea University (2014), 156-60.

Kim Eungseo and his Japanese counterpart Nabeshima Naoshige 鍋島直茂 (1538-1618), in the *Taichōin monjo*.[3] Crosschecking these documents and the Joseon's historical sources will cast more light on what actually occurred during the talk between the Joseon and the Japanese commanders in the front lines and equip us with a better understanding of the Imjin War.

I. Skirmishes between Korean and Japanese Armies and the Clues for Their Contacts

To begin with, the short biographies of the two protagonists of the talks between the Korean and Japanese armies—Kim Eungseo and Nabeshima Naoshige—are necessary. Kim passed the military examination and became an inspector in 1588. Though dismissed subsequently, he was reinstated with the posts of auxiliary defense officer (K. Jobangjang 助防將) and defense commander (K. Bang'eosa 防禦使) of Pyeong'an Province in 1592 when the war broke out. After the start of the peace negotiations between the Ming and Japan, Kim served as the defense commander and the provincial commander (K. Byongma Jeoltosa 兵馬節度使) for Right Gyeongsang Province. During the second Japanese invasions in 1597, he was known as one of the eminent field commanders who fought against the Japanese armies and as one of the main negotiators with Japan. Further, he organized

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3 *Taichōin Monjo* 泰長院文書 documents tell of little known contacts between Korean and Japanese field commanders during the Imjin War. The documents are not preserved at the Taichōin Buddhist Temple, Saga City, Saga Prefecture. The documents covering the period of 1562 through 1622 consist of those regarding management of the Taichōin Temple and the diplomatic letters composed by the monks affiliated with the temple. Notably, more than one-half of the 105 documents pertain to Nabeshima Naoshige's communications with the Joseon Korean troops. This article draws on the printed version of the entire documents, which are available in *Saga-ken shiryō shūsei komonjo hen* 佐賀縣史料集成古文書編, vol. 5.
Using these documents, several recent studies throw light on rarely known episodes of the communications between the Korean and Japanese field generals during the Imjin War period. See Kim, "Imjin Jeonjaeng gi ganghwa gyoseop yeon'gu," Sin Yunho, "Imjin Waeran ganghwa gyoseop sigi Joseon eui daeil jeongchaek" [Joseon Korea's policy toward Japan during the negotiation period of the Imjin War], *Yi Sunsin yeon'gu nonchong* 23 (2015); Min Duk-gi, "Jeong'yu jaeran gi Hwangseoksanseong jeontu wa Gimhae busa Baek Sarim" [Hwangseoksanseong Fortress Battle and Gimhae Prefecture Governor Baek Sa-rim during the Second Japanese Invasion of Korea in 1597], *Hanil gwan'gyesa yeon'gu* 57 (2017).

the surrendered Japanese soldiers (K. *hangwae* 降倭). After the Imjin War, he was appointed to strategic posts in the north against the Jurchens. It was at that time that he changed his name to Kim Gyeongseo 金景瑞. When the Ming demanded Joseon to join its campaign against the Later Jin during the reign of King Gwanghae (r. 1608-23), Kim, then the provincial commander of Pyeong'an Province, was appointed to vice commander of the Joseon army under the commander in chief Gang Hongnip 姜弘立 (1560-1627). However, the Ming and Joseon armies suffered a crushing defeat at the Battle of Sarhū near Fushun in 1619, and the Korean commanders, including Kim, and the rest of their soldiers surrendered to the Later Jin. Since then, the context of his death had remained unclear.[4]

Nabeshima Naoshige was a *daimyō* 大名 (Japanese feudal lord) from the Saga area of Hizen in Kyushu. His ancestors had served the Ryūzōji forgenerations. Nabeshima took an unrivaled position among the retainers, grew in power through the Imjin War and the Battle of Sekigahara in 1600, and eventually took over the regional power of the Ryūzōji descent group. At the outbreak of the Imjin War, he belonged to the second division of the invasion armies under Kiyomasa, which advanced as far as Hamgyeong Province. During the second Japanese invasions, he joined the fourth division.[5] During the negotiation interval, his soldiers built a fortress and stationed themselves on Juk Island in Gimhae along the southern coast of Joseon.

The peace talks between the Ming and Japan commenced from the fourth lunar month of 1593, but Joseon was not included there. The peace talks were conducted principally between Shen Weijing and Konishi Yukinaga, which thus motivated Joseon to create its own channels of information. Then, several frontier commanders, besides the far-famed Buddhist

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[4] Yi Jangheui, "Kim Gyeongseo," in *Hanguk minjok munhwa dae baekgwa sajeon* [Great Encyclopedia of the Korean Nation's Culture] (1996).

[5] For Nabeshima Naoshige's activities during the Imjin War, see Tsuno Tomoaki, "Chōsen shuppei ni okeru Nabeshima Naoshige no ichiji kikoku ni tsuite" [On Nabeshima Naoshige's temporary return at the time of the expedition to Joseon Korea], *Jinbun kagaku kenkyu* (Kōchi Daigaku jinbun gakubu) 13 (2006); Tsuno Tomoaki, "Keichō no eki ni okeru Nabeshima shi no dōkō" [Nabeshima's activities during the second Japanese invasion], *Shokuhoki kenkyu* 8 (2006).

monk Yujeong, attempted to make contact with the Japanese army.[6] For example, the provincial commander for Left Gyeongsang Province Go Eonbaek sent his messengers to establish a link between Kiyomasa and the Ming commander Liu Ting as well as between Kiyomasa and Yujeong. In the case of Kim, he endeavored to talk with Yukinaga to the extent that Kim persuaded Gweon Yul 權慄 (1537-99), one of the greatest senior commanders during the war, by boastfully promising to obtain surrender from the Tsushima lord Sō Yoshitoshi 宗義智 (1568-1615) and his retainer Yanagawa Shigenobu 柳川調信.[7]

And, making the other point of contact with Kiyomasa involved initially the magistrate Baek Sarim in Gimhae, the border defense commissioner Yi Bin, and the commander in chief Gweon Yul on the Korean side, and Nabeshima Naoshige and his colleagues, staying in Juk Island off the Gimhae coastal town, on the Japanese side. Later, after joining the Korean party, Kim added more issues to the talks and eventually met with Yukinaga in person. Likewise, the fact that some commanders of the Joseon armies took great labor to open new channels of negotiation with Kiyomasa, while striving to block the talks between Shen Weijing and Yukinaga, questions what benefits they expected from the communication with their enemy.

By the second half of 1594, most of the Japanese armies had returned to Japan and those left behind held their ground in newly constructed fortresses scattered along the southern coast from Ulsan through Busan to Geoje Island. Yukinaga was in charge of the peace negotiations but Kiyomasa was deeply opposed to the way in which Yukinaga carried out the ne-

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6 Such contacts made by the Joseon field commanders culminated in a meeting in person between Kim Eungseo and Konishi Yukinaga at Hamam, in the southern coastal area, on the twenty-second lunar day of the eleventh month, 1594. For that meeting there are several previous studies: Yi Hyeongseok, *Imjin jeollansa* [History of the Imjin War] (1967): 892-99; Kim Munja, "Bunroku-Keichōki ni okeru Nichi-Ming kōwa kōshō to Chōsen" [Joseon Korea and the Japan-Ming Peace Negotiations, 1592-98], Ph. D. dissertation, Ochanomizu joshi daigaku (1995): 72-75; Sajima Akiko, "Bunroku eki kōwa no uragawa" [Behind the scenes of the peace negotiations during the first Japanese invasion], in Itsuwari no Hideyoshi zō o uchikowasu, eds. by Yamamoto Hirofumi et al. (Kashiwa shobō, 2013).

7 Gweon Yul's report in *Seongjo sillok* 宣祖實錄 [The Veritable Records of King Seonjo], *gweon* 卷 (fascicle) 65 (fourteenth day of the seventh month, 1595).

gotiations. Kiyomasa's meeting with the Korean monk Yujeong was among his attempts to take the lead from Yukinaga. Still, his opposition was directed to the terms of peace as negotiated between Shen Weijing and Yukinaga rather than to the peace talks *per se*. Nabeshima under Kiyomasa was also in no position to oppose the peace negotiations. Still, even though joining the Kiyomasa camp in the battles, Naoshige interacted with Yukinaga and Yoshitoshi encamped near him. Probably, Naoshige wanted his service to be recognized by his superior, or Kiyomasa in producing a successful negotiation by aiding Yukinaga.[8] As for Yukinaga, it appears that he tried to induce Joseon into the peace talks with the Ming, which had been dragged on, with a view of locating a breakthrough beyond the deadlock.

The Joseon court officially refused to participate in the peace talks. Nevertheless, the court was anxious to know what was occurring at the peace talks, not least because they could offer reasons for rejecting the peace talks. That is why the monk Yujeong was sent to the Kiyomasa camp with the chief aim of collecting information on the peace negotiations currently underway. The court, for its part, had no objection to collecting information insofar as it was done unofficially outside the court. As for some Joseon frontline commanders in their efforts to make contact with the Japanese, they saw the practical benefits of preventing possible misunderstandings and unnecessary conflicts between Joseon and Japanese armies. Moreover, some other commanders such as Kim Eungseo wanted to distinguish themselves by eliciting concessions or even submissions from their enemies.

The initial issues between Joseon and Japanese armies were to prevent border incidents and looting. The first letter, sent by the Korean general Yi Bin to Shigenobu, raised these issues. The main contents of the text are shown below in order to explore what rationale was used by the Joseon side to create a contact point with Yukinaga.

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[8] A man dispatched to the Joseon camp by Nabeshima was quoted as having said that the Japanese who participated in the peace talks would be listed in the records and be awarded accordingly. See *Seonjo sillok*, *gweon* 57 (eighteenth day of the eleventh month, 1594); On Nabeshima's attempt to participate in the peace negotiations, Sajima Akiko suggests that every Japanese commander was eager to achieve something during his station in order to show it to Hideyoshi. See Sajima, "Bunroku eki kōwa no uragawa," 164.

• **Serial number**	Number 1
• **Date**	twenty-fifth day, ninth lunar month, 1594
• **Source:**	*Seonjo sillok* (fifth day of the tenth lunar month of the twenty-seventh year of the reign of Seonjo)
• **Sender:**	Yi Bin 李賓
• **Receiver:**	Yanagawa Shigenobu

• Main contents

(1) Your country Japan raised troops without justification and invaded our innocent country, bringing to naught all the diplomatic efforts of friendship over the past 200 years, inflicting countless casualties, setting fire to our royal shrine and altar for the Gods of Earth and Grain and digging up our royal tombs, and then advanced as far as Pyeongyang.

(2) Enraged, the celestial emperor of the Great Ming sent Song Yingchang 宋應昌 and Li Rusong 李如松 to subjugate the invaders. Upon recapture of Pyeongyang by the Ming, the vanguard Konishi Yukinaga and his hordes fled only to preserve their lives. The Ming armies pitied them and allowed then for peace talks, and the Japanese armies withdrew to the south.

(3) If the Japanese commanders want peace, they should prevent their soldiers from raiding villages. But, since the last autumn, killing and plundering had been rife. Last time, Yukinaga told the commander Liu Ting that the bandits were from Tsushima and not from his camp, and hence could be subject to decapitation. Recently, in areas such as Hamam and Goseong bandits are roaming in hordes of tens and hundreds, killing and looting such that victims have reached hundreds in number. People in coastal areas do not trust the Japanese request for peace.

(4) Since the bandits are said to leave and return to Geoje Island, they must be subordinates of Yukinaga who has failed to keep his men under control. Henceforth, in the event of further banditry, Joseon armies will chase them and raze their strongholds so that both the people's woes and Yukinaga's charges will be resolved.

(5) We are under the impression that Katō Kiyomasa has taken good control of his men since the start of the peace negotiations. He displayed the heads of bandits and returned Korean captives. Who could have imagined that Yukinaga is inferior to Kiyomasa in handling his men? The prolonged stay of the troops in a neighboring country and the failure to discipline them are reasons for the lack of progress in the peace talks. Please convey these messages clearly to Yukinaga.

(6) The letter which you and Sō Yoshitoshi sent to the provincial governor has already been delivered to the court. We are expecting a reply soon.

• Remarks

The title of the letter reads “Yu Gaseondaebu Taira Shigenobu cheop” 諭嘉善大夫平調信貼 (Letter addressed to Gaseon Daebu (嘉善大夫) Yanagawa Shigenobu 柳川調信)

The contents of the letter can be summarized into: (1) Blame for the Japanese barbarous invasion; (2) Arrival of the Ming armies to rescue Joseon and the Japanese request for peace; (3) Killing and looting by the Japanese soldiers in Joseon; (4) Possibility of looting by Yukinaga’s men and a counterattack plan by Joseon; (5) Contrasts between Kiyomasa and Yukinaga; and (6) Reply for a request from Yanagawa Shigenobu and Sō Yoshitoshi.

It comes as no surprise that the letter, addressed to a Japanese general by a Korean general, started with a verbal attack on the unprovoked war and the atrocities committed by the Japanese armies. The author Yi Bin charged that the continued atrocities such as killing people and pillaging villages were all the more outrageous because the Japanese were supposed to seek for peace. In the second half of the letter, however, the blame for the killing and the pillaging by the Japanese soldiers was strategically directed to Yukinaga in a stark contrast to Kiyomasa who was recognized as an able general who tried his best to keep his men under control. By deliberately provoking Yukinaga with an unfavorable and humiliating contrast with his rival Kiyomasa, Yi Bin sought to elicit a direct response from Yukinaga.

The next letter is indicative of certain communications between the generals of Joseon and the Japanese camps even prior to Yi Bin’s letter above.[9]

• Serial number	Number 2
• Date	the second half of the ninth lunar month, 1594

[9] The *Taichōin monjo* included in *Saga-ken shiryō shūsei komonjo hen* 佐賀縣史料集成古文書編 has been typeset from the original manuscript. The process of typesetting cannot rule out the possibility of typographical errors. The Korean translation of the individual letter has not been done in a verbatim manner, but as a summary of main points.

• **Source**	*Taichōin monjo* 87
• **Sender**	Baek Sarim
• **Receiver**	Naritomi Shigeyasu[10] (presumed)

• Main contents

(1) I thank you for the repatriation of thirty Korean captives of men and women. It has been confirmed that the Japanese bandits who committed recent robberies were not under your own command. I have heard that Katō Kiyomasa executed those Japanese who committed robbery and displayed their bodies, and sent back Korean captives. Now, you have followed his precedents, so we may take this good event as a chance to start peace talks.

(2) However, the Japanese soldiers from Geoje Island roamed along the seacoast and sacked coastal towns, such as Goseong and Sacheon, killing and plundering people. Previously, Konishi Yukinaga was informed of such depredation but he said he would not feel sorry even if all would be killed because they were from Tsushima [not from his camp]. Accordingly, our naval generals will soon lead their soldiers to drive out all of them.

(3) Now that we have already set out talking about peace, General Yi Bin felt obliged to inform you of our plan [to punish the Japanese bandits]. Thus, he had me deliver the letter to Yanagawa Shigenobu on his behalf.

The repatriation of thirty Korean captives is indicative of the main agenda for Baek Sarim's previous contacts with his Japanese counterpart, most probably Shigeyasu who replied to Baek in the following letter (marked Number 3). Baek took the repatriation of Joseon captives as a credible evidence of Japanese good will. However, the Japanese soldiers coming from Geoje Island continued to engage in killing and looting, thus they were to be punished by the Korean armies. Despite the communications of good will until that time, still, the plan to launch an attack was notified to the Japanese side.

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[10] Naritomi Shigeyasu (1559-1634), a retainer of the Nabeshima clan, landed on Joseon soil with 882 men on the fifth day of the third lunar month, 1593. See *Nabeshima-ke monjo* 鍋島家文書 [The Documents of the Nabeshima clan] 52.

[11] The letter seems to refer to that (marked number 1) dated the twenty-fifth day of the ninth lunar

• **Serial number**	Number 3
• **Date**	twenty-seventh day, ninth lunar month, 1594
• **Source**	*Taichōin monjo* 70
• **Sender**	Naritomi Shigeyasu
• **Receiver**	Baek Sarim

• Main contents

(1) The thirty Korean captives have been sent back because the peace talks between the Great Ming and Japan are well underway. There is no other intent on the part of the Japanese armies.

(2) Have the Joseon warships already launched an attack on the Japanese bandits from Geoje who attacked the towns such as Haman and Goseong to kill and loot people of the coastal towns such as Sacheon? Your letter has been delivered to Nabeshima Naoshige, my superior at Juk Island, who honored Joseon's decision. However, he was of the opinion that Konishi Yukinaga would be consulted before the planned operation would be executed and that if the Joseon forces would stop attack he was willing to be instrumental in assuring Yukinaga to keep the Japanese bandits from committing robberies. Deliver this letter to Yi Bin and let us know his decision via letter.

As stated above, Naritomi wanted Baek to consider the return of Korean captives as a sign of good faith in the context of the peace talks between the Ming and Japan. Upon receiving the last letter from the Joseon side that gave a written warning for retaliation against the Japanese bandits, he reported this matter to his master, Naoshige who, in turn, raised no objection to the Joseon army's plan but offered to consult with Yukinaga to work out a non-military solution.

It appears that the contacts between Baek and Naritomi had been made quite a while earlier regarding such immediate issues as setting boundaries, policing areas, and returning the Korean captives, which had eventually led them to form a mutually beneficial relationship. Yet, since Geoje Island was located farther south from his lord's (Naoshige) camp at

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month, 1594, addressed to Yanagawa Shigenobu.

Gimhae, Naritomi expressed difficulty in monitoring the Japanese bandits entrenched there. Yi Bin and other Korean field commanders also seemed to seek to communicate with Yukinaga in order to deal with such immediate concerns as prohibiting the Japanese bandits from sailing near Geoje Island. Yi Bin had written the letter (marked Number 1) addressed to Yanagawa Shigenobu, and used the existing contact point between the junior officers Baek and Naritomi for the letter to be forwarded to Yanagawa and ultimately to Yukinaga.

The Geoje attack plan mentioned in the letter was an offensive action discussed previously at the Joseon court. The aims of the attack were not only to punish the Japanese bandits but also to demonstrate the prowess of the Joseon forces to their enemies. The attack plan had been first put forth by the Border Defense Council (*Bibyeonsa* 備邊司), and enthusiastically pursued by Yun Dusu (1533-1601), then the second state councilor and the commander of three provinces. Yun planned to mobilize large combined land and sea forces while the Border Defense Council expressed reservations regarding Yun's ambitious plan.[12] At any rate, this letter confirmed the fact that the Joseon navy had skirmished with Japanese raiders and repeated the previous demand to execute the Japanese bandits and to display their bodies. And Yi Bin was anxious to know if his previous letter (marked Number 1) had been delivered to Yukinaga to whom Yi wished his intent be known.

Later, as shown below, the contact points remained Baek Sarim on the Joseon side, while Toyo Shigemori 豊茂守—a subordinate of Naoshige—appeared on the Japanese side. The letters were not delivered separately one by one but in collections. Thus, Baek gathered the letters from Yi Bin and Kim Eungseo before sending them to the Japanese while Toyo Shigemori collected the letters from Naoshige, Yanagawa, and Yukinaga altogether.

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[12] The attack plan was actually enacted, but failed because of the lack of coordination among the units of the Joseon troops. The naval forces returned without results worth mentioning. Taking the responsibility, Yun Dusu resigned from office. See *Seonjo sillok*, *gweon* 55 (twenty-seventh day of the ninth lunar month, 1594); *Ibid*., *gweon* 56 (thirteenth day of the tenth lunar month, 1594); *Ibid*., *gweon* 56 (twenty-third day of the tenth lunar month, 1594).

• Serial number	Number 4
• Date	third day, tenth lunar month, 1594
• Source	*Taichōin monjo* 61
• Sender	Baek Sarim
• Receiver	Toyo Shigemori

• Main contents

The bandits entrenched in Geoje Island should not go unpunished.
The general Yi Bin ordered our seamen to charge against the bandits' strongholds. Yet, if they are executed and sent to us, there will be no need to expose the peace atmosphere to a risk. If we receive a guarantee from Yukinaga, then the attack can be spared. Convey this intent to Yukinaga.

• Serial number	Number 5
• Date	fifth day, tenth lunar month, 1594
• Source	*Taichōin monjo* 86
• Sender	Yi Bin
• Receiver	Gaseon Daebu (嘉善大夫) Yanagawa Shigenobu

• Main contents

Have you received the previous letter and delivered it to Yukinaga?
Three enemy ships from Geoje about to raid Jinhae were detected and immediately chased by our naval officers. The enemy fled leaving behind their empty ships.
Yukinaga should be informed immediately of this incident, and asked to hand over the bandits to our navy for their executed bodies to be displayed.
Then, suspicions between the two forces will be resolved and peace will follow.

• Remarks

The honorary title "Gaseondaebu (嘉善大夫)" had been awarded to Yanagawa by the Joseon court before the outbreak of the war.

• Serial number	Number 6
• Date	seventh day, tenth lunar month, 1594
• Source	*Taichōin monjo* 86
• Sender	Toyo Shigemori
• Receiver	Unknown (presumed to be Baek Sarim)

• Main contents

Your letter addressed to Yanagawa Shigenobu had been delivered to him, and he wrote a reply (marked Number 7). Also, the matters you addressed had been reported to Yukinaga whose intents can be found in that reply.
In my view, it is only Yukinaga who is waiting for a reply from the celestial dynasty, following the order from the taikō 太閤 (that is, Toyotomi Hideyoshi). In the future, Yukinaga should be the sole partner in your talks with our armies. The peace talks between you and our general (that is, Konishi Yukinaga) will lead to the best methods for maintaining the state and saving the people.

• Serial number	Number 7
• Date	seventh day, tenth lunar month, 1594
• Source	*Seonjo sillok* (eighth day, eleventh lunar month, twenty-seventh year of the reign of Seonjo)
• Sender	Yanagawa Shigenobu
• Receiver	Yi Bin

• Main contents

(1) The letter (marked Number 1) you had sent on the twenty-fifth [day] of last month was received on the sixth [day] of this month. I have delivered the contents to Konishi Yukinaga. Then he said:

(2) “It is universally true that the small serve the great. The streams all join in the sea, and the polestar occupies its place while the host of other stars pay homage to the polestar.[13] Previously, the taikō had sent the monk Keitetsu Genso 景轍玄蘇[14] and Shigenobu to the Joseon court to seek appointments only to be rejected. The next year, he intended to obtain permission to conduct tribute trade directly from the celestial dynasty by sending troops using Joseon’s route. However, the war broke out because Joseon refused to yield route to Japan. Then, the Japanese troops triumphed, advancing all the way to Pyeongyang.

(3) At that time, the celestial general Shen Weijing arrived to request peace talks; we did not cross the Amnok River (Ch. Yalu). But, in the following year, due to Joseon's instigation, the hostilities resumed. My [Yukinaga's] armies alone confronted successfully the large celestial armies, yet when provisions ran out and the roads were perilous, they were forced to withdraw to Hanseong to await battle along with other generals. When the celestial armies came close to the royal palace, they were defeated by our armies. Yet, in honoring the principle of serving the great, we sent a letter to Shen Weijing asking for peace negotiations. Thereupon, the general Li Rusong dispatched the two celestial envoys Xie Yongzi 謝用梓 and Xu Yiguan 徐一貫, accompanied by Yukinaga to Nagoya, in Kyushu to hear directly from the taikō. We do not know what has caused a delay in the reply [from the emperor] since the envoys' reporting.

(4) Why is it that Koreans together with the commander Liu Ting put trust to others [not Yukinaga], and try to block the progress of the peace talks? What is wrong with Yukinaga who has done his utmost to persuade the taikō? Moreover, he has withdrawn half of the troopsat the request of the Ming, and awaited the arrival of an imperial envoy [charged with investiture]. Yet, your country together with the commander Liu Ting have been hindering a reply from the Ming court by interfering with the peace process.

(5) Under these circumstances, launching battleships to patrol the waters is a shallow tactic. Regarding the bandits in question, I have no knowledge. The Joseon commanders, for their part, have failed to check the dens of thieves. It is Konishi Yukinaga, not Katō Kiyomasa, that the taikō has entrusted with the task of awaiting an imperial envoy."

(6) I am of the same opinion as Yukinaga [placed previously]. You would rather drop the charges against us and engage in policing the areas. At the end of last month, when the left defense commander (Kim Eungseo) sent his man to the Tsushima magistrate (Sō Yoshitoshi), I escorted Kim to Yukinaga's camp. He had the opportunity to hear in person from Yukinaga and Yoshitoshi. I suggest that you may well persuade Kim Eungseo to hold back the battleships already launched. It is regretful that you did not report directly to Yukinaga, the [Japanese] bandits around the Haman and Goseong areas. In the future, if you have anything to discuss, you should notify Yukinaga directly.

Just as the Joseon generals wanted their letters to be delivered to Konishi Yukinaga, so the Japanese generals under him tried to assure their Joseon counterparts that Yukinaga should be the sole representative of Toyotomi Hideyoshi and that all the concerns should be directed to him.The Joseon general Yi Bin could first receive the direct quotations of Yukinaga's words in the letter (Number 7) sent under the name of Yanagawa Shigenobu, dat-

ed the seventh day of the tenth lunar month of 1594. The letter (marked Number 7) was Yukinaga's response to Yi Bin's letter (marked Number 1)[15] blaming the Japanese for the unprovoked invasion and the war atrocities as well as their depredations even during the peace negotiations.

• Serial number	Number 8
• Date	eighth day, tenth lunar month, 1594
• Source	*Taichōin monjo* 71
• Sender	Nabeshima Naoshige
• Receiver	Yi Bin

• Main contents

Your letter, addressed to Yanagawa, dated twenty-fifth day, last month (marked Number 1), has been delivered immediately to his camp. The contents of the letter seem to be all true. Your country has had a difficult time confronting the Japanese armies still stationed in southern Gyeongsang Province, which, however, is not comparable to the hardships that Japan and the Great Ming have undergone.
The taikō has already ordered Yukinaga to wait an answer to the peace negotiations from the celestial dynasty. An immediate peace agreement may well be a good policy to bring order and stability to the state and the people.

Yukinaga's words (from the paragraph (2) to the paragraph (5) of the letter (Number 7)) were hardly apologetic regarding Yi Bin's charges. The Koreans were blamed for causing the war in the paragraph (2). Yukinaga attributed the outbreak of the war to the Joseon court's rejection of Japanese requests for the conferment of official tite to Genso and Shigenobu[16]

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13 Original text: 以小事大 乃天地通理也 細流歸海 衆星拱辰者 是也.

14 Keitetsu Genso was a Buddhist monk from Tsushima who was in charge of diplomatic affairs.

15 This letter was meant to be a pronouncement (*gyeokseo* 檄書). See *Seonjo sillok*, *gweon* 57 (eighth day of the eleventh lunar month, 1594).

16 The Joseon court had awarded Yanagawa Shigenobu with the title of *Gaseon daebu* 嘉善大夫 (Gaseon grand master), and raised his rank in the fourth lunar month of 1591. See *Seonjo sujeong sillok* 宣祖修正實錄 (The Corrected Veritable Records of King Seongjo), *gweon* 25 (first day, fourth lunar month, 1591).

and for the opening of a tribute route to the Ming. His explanation of the events leading to the Battle of Pyeongyang was quite contradictory to that of Yi Bin. He asserted that the Japanese armies suspended offensive actions as Shen Weijing offered peace talks, but the Koreans instigated hostilities and the Japanese found themselves in a situation where they had to confront the Ming offensive. (the paragraph (3))

In the paragraph (4), Yukinaga also criticized Joseon and the Ming commander Liu Ting for establishing contact with Katō Kiyomasa. As in the paragraph (5), he presented himself as the sole negotiator entrusted by Hideyoshi. With regard to the Japanese thieves in question, he claimed that he had no knowledge about them and that it was a shallow tactic to launch the battleships to chase them at the time of peace negotiation. And, the paragraph (6) was Yanagawa Shigenobu's statement. As a vassal of Yukinaga, he had guided a messenger from Kim Eungseo to Yukinaga and went on to say that all of the Korean concerns, including the banditry, should be directed to Yukinaga's attention. Thus, Yanagawa did his best to lead the Koreans to believe that it was only with Yukinaga that they should contact for handling their problems and concerns.

The reply from the Joseon generals was composed on the thirteenth day of the tenth lunar month of 1594. The letters (marked Number 9 and 10) tell of the messengers going back and forth between the two camps carrying verbal messages, in addition to written correspondence. The Joseon commanders accepted the Japanese measures to control their soldiers and returned the battleships ready to attack the Japanese bandits.

• **Serial number**	Number 9
• **Date**	thirteenth day, tenth lunar month, 1594
• **Source**	*Taichōin monjo* 60
• **Sender**	Baek Sarim
• **Receiver**	Toyo Shigemori

• Main contents

I thank you for sending repeated letters.
Your proposed security plan between the two countries has been heard in

detail from the messenger. Although the regions are divided into east and west and the languages are different, there are certain rules to be followed.
I commend your show of sincerity.
Let there be no error, large or small, by way of continued communications between each other.

- **Serial number** Number 10
- **Date** thirteenth day, tenth lunar month, 1594
- **Source** *Taichōin monjo* 63
- **Sender** Yi Bin
- **Receiver** Nabeshima Naoshige

• Main contents

I expect you to hear from our messenger that the battleships [sent to punish the Japanese bandits] returned. The contents in the letter, carried by the messenger, are all true.

- **Serial number** Number 11
- **Date** thirteenth day, tenth lunar month, 1594
- **Source** *Taichōin monjo* 85[17]
- **Sender** Yi Bin
- **Receiver** Gaseon Daebu (嘉善大夫) Yanagawa Shigenobu

• Main contents

(1) I thank you for your willing effort to send the letters. I am all the more impressed to see the grand master not forgetting old grace.

(2) The expressions in the previous letter (Number 7) that "the small serves the great," and that "the streams all join to the sea and the polestar occupies its place while the host of other stars pay homage to it" are all universally true and correct. The peace talks [predicated on this principle of tributary relations] will be trustworthy. Yet, since it is the Great Ming that commands the world, it is beyond our power to decide whether to conduct war or peace.

(3) Your country, on the pretext of seeking appointments or borrowing the route [to the Ming], raised troops without justification and inflicted

calamity upon our country, stopping nowhere in pillaging and violations. Our fathers, sons, and brothers gnash their teeth with rage to take revenge upon the enemies, willing to endure ordeals such as sleeping with their heads laid on thorns and tasting gall bladders of animals.

(4) However, the great general of the celestial dynasty with merciful feelings could not bear to annihilate the invaders and accepted the request for peace talks, thus suspending hostilities. As for our people, high and low, all could not dare to go against the request until today.

(5) The fallen bandits have run amok in such areas as Changweon, Chirweon, Jinhae, and Goseong, killing people, thus turning these areas into empty towns. Since their depredations have become all the more severe these days, we had no choice but to order the generals in the sea to charge against them. Such plans of ours were notified immediately to Naoshige.

(6) The letter, dated the first day of the tenth lunar month and sent by a Japanese officer to the Gimhae magistrate Baek Sarim, stated, "Since our commanders, not knowing who the marauding thieves were, reported to Yukinaga regarding them and had them executed and displayed at the borders. The Joseon battleships should be returned immediately." Accordingly, our troops have already returned and we have sent a messenger to notify you of this communication.

(7) The direct communication to Yukinaga as suggested by you is quite correct. The road to Gimhae has been cleared of the bandits, but the road to Ungcheon [where another Japanese unit stationed] is still plagued with bandits who come aboard the ships from Geoje Island. There are few days when the enemies do not kill and loot. How can the messengers be exchanged between the camps? The situation is like "inviting a guest while the door remains closed."

As in the letter (marked Number 11), Yi Bin sent a reply to Yanagawa in anticipation of its being delivered to Yukinaga. This letter was sent to make progress in communications between the two camps. Yi accepted Yukinaga's expression of the small serving the great, all the streams coming into the sea, and all the stars paying respect to the polestar on the grounds that all of them adequately symbolized the tributary relations of lesser states

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17 The letter also appeared in *Seonjo sillok*, *gweon* 57 (eighth day, eleventh lunar month, 1594). The letter's conciliatory remarks, such as *gwiguk* 貴國 (your esteemed country) were severely censured by the comments attached later by a historian. Original text: 胡雜莫倫甚於倭書以如此貿貿不學之將而寄之專閫之任欲望解芬息爭不亦難乎況甘受殘花鼎魚之譏而曾無一言折之反稱讐賊爲貴國其辱國之罪所勝誅哉.

toward China. (paragraph (2))

However, that purpose did not deter Yi from rejoining sharply to Yukinaga with regard to the causes of the war and the motivations of the peace talks. He made it clear that Koreans who fell innocent victims of the unprovoked war were bound to harbor feelings of revenge against the Japanese invaders (paragraph (3)) and that the peace talks started entirely due to the Ming's pity toward the Japanese. (paragraph (4)) He charged that the Japanese bandits continued to rampage even after the peace negotiations began. Then, the Joseon navy launched battleships to annihilate them and the warning had been already notified Naoshige. (paragraph (5)) Following the execution of the bandits by the Japanese commanders, the Joseon battleships stepped back without further attacking. (paragraph (6)) Lastly, the request was made to ensure safety so that both sides could communicate with each other more effectively. (paragraph (7))

At this moment, both sides achieved minor results through the contacts and were able to earn a measure of credibility from each other. As a result, they became naturally attracted to the possibility that greater results could come if their commanders were to meet in person beyond the exchange of letters.

• **Serial number**	Number 12
• **Date**	eighteenth day, tenth lunar month, 1594
• **Source**	*Taichōin monjo* 97[18]
• **Sender**	Nabeshima Naoshige
• **Receiver**	Yi Bin

• Main contents

Your letter (Number 11), addressed to Yanagawa Shigenobu, was delivered immediately to him.
Yukinaga and Shigenobu suggested to me that in order to discuss the security concerns of Joseon, the Joseon commanders might well send one

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[18] This letter also appeared in *Seonjo sillok*, *gweon* 57 (eighteenth day, eleventh lunar month, 1594).

worthy man to Gimhae where he would consult with Genso and Shigenobu to determine a way to pass safely between the two camps and further to discuss Joseon's role to mediate between the great Ming and Japan.
If you find this suggestion agreeable, your envoy may accompany [our Korean messenger] Choe Eok 崔億 on his return trip.
The remaining details may be obtained verbally from Cheo Eok.

- **Serial number** Number 13
- **Date** eighteenth day, tenth lunar month, 1594
- **Source** *Taichōin monjo* 98
- **Sender** Toyo Shigemori
- **Receiver** Baek Sarim

• Main contents

On reading your letter, Yukinaga and Shigenobu suggested to me that in order to discuss the security concerns of Joseon, the Joseon commanders might well send one worthy man to Gimhae where he would consult with Genso and Shigenobu to determine a way to pass safely between the two camps and further to discuss Joseon's role to mediate between the great Ming and Japan.
Please report promptly this suggestion to Yi Bin.
If Yi Bin finds this suggestion agreeable, Korean envoy may accompany [our Korean messenger] Choe Eok 崔億 on his return trip.
The remaining details may be obtained verbally from Cheo Eok.

- **Serial number** Number 14
- **Date** eighteenth day, tenth lunar month, 1594
- **Source** *Seonjo sillok* (eighteenth day, eleventh lunar month, twenty-seventh year of the reign of Seonjo)
- **Sender** Yanagawa Shigenobu
- **Receiver** Yi Bin

• Main contents

(1) Your letter (Number 11) was reported to Yukinaga, and he said,

(2) “As for the wretched bandits, why is it that their harm was not reported promptly to me? If you want to discuss a path to peace with me, you may well send one worthy envoy. With him, I will design the measures to stop the wretched bandits from rampaging, so that the envoys from the two camps may pass safely.

(3) Yukinaga and Yoshitoshi were in the vanguard [of the Japanese troops]. The monk Genso and Shigenobu were dispatched several times to one reception officer O Eoknyeong 吳億齡 to inform Joseon of the imminent calamity [that is, the war], and again to another reception officer Sim Heuisu 沈喜壽, but he refused to report our message to the king by citing its absurdity. Genso and Shigenobu were given the order from Yukinaga and Yoshitoshi to initiate peace talks with Joseon. Upon arriving at Busan, they, bearing the letter, tried to explain our intention to the commander [Song Sanghyeon], but he rejected it. That eventually led to the collapse of your country, but we did not mean so. Our message of this intent was also sent to the left defense commander Kim Eungseo.”

(4) In my view, a “clever strategy” (奇策) to bring peace to your country lies in the success of the peace negotiations between the great Ming and Japan. The Ming is vast in its size while Japan is strong in its military, making it difficult to decide the victor even in hundreds or thousands of battles. Joseon, caught between the Ming and Japan, turns into a battlefield with the country laying empty and the people starving. What the previous envoys of ours intended to deliver was not beyond this message. The Joseon court, however, did not give trust to the sincerity of the message. Therefore, Yukinaga and Yoshitoshi had to earn the disrespect of being disloyal and the suspicion [from Koreans against their will].

(5) As for all of these faults are affairs of bygone days, I wish you to put them aside. From now onward, rectifying the past faults, you are advised to consult with Yukinaga and Yoshitoshi to work out measures to protect the country and to save the people. How can Yoshitoshi possibly forget about the tributary relationship [with Joseon]? Yukinaga and Yoshitoshi are on good terms with each other. I wish you to send one man to Gimhae to meet with Genso, where the Japanese side will listen to your concerns and at the same time give expression to what lies in our mind. The rest of the details may be obtained verbally from Choe Eok.

Naoshige, Shigemori, and Shigenobu asked the Joseon generals to send an envoy to Gimhae with a view to starting peace talks according to Yukinaga’s will. Particularly, the reply letter (marked Number 14) by Shigenobu to Yi Bin’s letter (marked Number 11) contained the direct quotation of Yukinaga’s words. Yukinaga expressed his willingness to collaborate

with the Joseon generals in clearing the regions of bandits so that both parties may pass safely. (paragraph (2)) He again placed the blame for the outbreak of the war on the Korean parties who dismissed his warning against the imminent war. (paragraph (3)) In this context, Shigenobu, reiterating Yukinaga's idea of peace negotiations, emphasized the collaboration as a "cleaver strategy" (*gichaek* 奇策) to bring peace to Joseon, and urged the Joseon generals to start peace talks by sending an envoy to the Japanese camp (paragraphs (4) and (5)).

As in this set of three letters (marked Number 12, 13, and 14), the Japanese commanders, still staying near the Busan and Gimhae areas, went beyond simple talks regarding security measures between the two sides and moved to initiate peace talks with their Joseon counterparts under Yukinaga's leadership. In the previous written communications, both of them agreed to open channels to settle certain immediate issues such as border definition and the curbing of thieves. As will be seen next, having sensed some signs of credibility in the Japanese considerations and cooperation in dealing with their security concerns, the Joseon commanders responded with caution to the Japanese initiative for peace talks tête-à-tête.

II. Progress during the Peace Talks

With the progress of written communications regarding the issue of preventing Japanese banditry, Kim Eungseo and Yukinaga came to the fore in the contacts between the two camps. Their face-to-face meetings reached a kind of peace talks, going beyond addressing the security problems around the areas where the Japanese armies were stationed. It is not clear what motivations they had in mind when they agreed to meet in person. Still, it can be argued that the sharper the tension between the two adversaries grew, the greater the need for expedient contact was felt and that the expectations for constructive results became greater as the contacts progressed.

And again, as aforementioned, Kim had told his superiors of his purpose of persuading the Japanese commanders such as Yoshitoshi into submission in contacting them. However, it is not clear whether he had a preconceived plan or a stratagem for the talks. He may have estimated that the

positive results to be reaped from the talks would be attributed to his initiatives and even expected that small results might lead both parties to move on to bigger matters such as peace negotiations.

As for Yukinaga, on the other hand, it appears that he wanted to encourage the Joseon court to demand the Ming court to dispatch a Ming envoy who would invest Hideyoshi as a Ming vassal and that he needed an official proof that displays Joseon's request to the Ming court in order to report this to Hideyoshi.[19] Shigenobu, for his part, argued that in case the Ming refused the terms of the peace agreement offered by Japan, Joseon still could work out a peace agreement with Japan and then the Japanese armies would withdraw.[20] In the following, the progress of the contacts between the Joseon and the Japanese generals is reconstructed based upon the letters exchanged between the two camps.

• **Serial number**	Number 15
• **Date**	twenty-third day, tenth lunar month, 1594
• **Source**	*Taichōin monjo* 51
• **Sender**	Baek Sarim
• **Receiver**	Toyo Shigemori (presumed)

• Main contents

It seems to me that our communications prevented the Gimhae people from becoming victims of the bandits and that we are on good terms. General Yi Bin's reply to Yanagawa Shigenobu along with the defense commander Kim Eungseo's letter has been sent.

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[19] See the message to Yi Hongbal from Yanagawa Shigenobu and Sō Yoshitoshi in *Seonjo sillok*, *gweon* 57 (first day, eleventh lunar month, 1594); A discussion at the Border Defense Council in *Ibid*., *gweon* 57 (seventh day, eleventh month, 1594); A report by Gweon Yul in *Ibid*., *gweon* 57 (eighteenth day, eleventh month, 1594); A report by Gweon Yul in *Ibid*., *gweon* 58 (seventh day, twelfth month, 1594); A report by Gweon Yul in *Ibid*., *gweon* 65 (fourteenth day, seventh month, 1595).

[20] *Seonjo sillok, gweon* 57 (eighteenth day, eleventh month, 1594).

• Serial number	Number 16
• Date	twenty-third day, tenth lunar month, 1594
• Source	*Taichōin monjo* 52
• Sender	Kim Eungseo
• Receiver	Konishi Yukinaga (presumed)

• Main contents

It was all good to see the news delivered by the officer Yi Hongbal, which have been sent immediately to the Joseon commander in chief Gweon Yul who in turn reported them to the court in the capital. Song Chung'in fell ill, thus Kim Dalmang was sent to carry my letter to your esteemed camp. Though Yi Hongbal is a man affiliated with my army, how can this be comparable to my meeting your honor in person? I would like to meet you in person at Euryeong so I wonder if you are able to come soonest to a place, say, Haman, by yourself and send a messenger to inform me.

• Remarks

First appearance of Kim Eungseo's letter

• Serial number	Number 17
• Date	twenty-third day, tenth lunar month, 1594
• Source	*Taichōin monjo* 53
• Sender	Yi Bin
Receiver	Toyo Shigemori (presumed)

• Main contents

Yanagawa Shigenobu's proposal (marked Number 14) seems to be a good strategy. I hope the defense commander Kim Eungseo and two generals from your side will have an opportunity to discuss a long-term strategy for the sake of both countries. I ask that the letters of Kim Eungseo and mine be carried by the messenger from your camp to be delivered promptly to Yanagawa.

• **Serial number**	Number 18
• **Date**	twenty-third day, tenth lunar month, 1594
• **Source**	*Taichōin monjo* 88
• **Sender**	Yi Bin
• **Receiver**	Nabeshima Naoshige

• Main contents

Yanagawa Shigenobu's proposal (marked Number 14) seems to be a good strategy. I hope the defense commander Kim Eungseo and the two generals from your side will have a chance to discuss a long-term strategy for the sake of both countries. I ask that the letters of Kim Eungseo and mine be carried by the messenger from your camp and be delivered promptly to Yanagawa.

It is in response to Shigenobu's request for sending one envoy that Kim made a bold proposal for a meeting of high-ranking generals in person, shown in the letter (marked Number 16), in anticipation of its reaching to Yukinaga. The suggested venue for the meeting was Euryeong, a halfway point between the two camps and a minimum number of attendants were requested.

In the meantime, Kim's messenger Yi Hongbal went to Hanseong and reported the Japanese messages to the court; 1) that the Joseon court should prompt the Ming to dispatch an envoy to grant Japan status as a tributary state; 2) that upon receiving the recognition as a vassal state Japan would withdraw its troops immediately, repatriate Korean captives, and supply food and seeds; 3) that if the Japanese requests would not be met, an attack against the Ming under Hideyoshi's personal command would be mounted in the first month of next year; and 4) that Kiyomasa's conditions for peace, such as a marriage tie with the Ming emperor and a cession of Joseon's land, were not genuine.[21]

Yi Bin also agreed to Shigenobu's proposal for direct talks in a personal meeting of generals between the two camps. And he expressed his wish for a long-term strategy of the two countries to be discussed between Kim

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[21] *Seonjo sillok*, *gweon* 57 (first day, eleventh lunar month, 1594).

and Yukinaga as well as Kim and Naoshige (or Shigenobu).[22] The Japanese armies were ready to accept the offer from the Joseon generals as seen below in their letters dated the twenty-sixth day of the tenth lunar month.

• Serial number	Number 19
• Date	twenty-sixth day, tenth lunar month, 1594
• Source	*Taichōin monjo* 99
• Sender	Toyo Shigemori (presumed)
• Receiver	Baek Sarim

• Main contents

I have received your letter with gratitude.
Upon being informed of the date when the general Yi Bin and the defense commander Kim Eungseo come to Changweon to meet Yukinaga and Shigenobu for discussing peace measures, they will rush by themselves to the site of the conference.
If this will be done, we will return the Gimhae residents who are under captivity. We are looking forward to the day of a happy encounter.

• Serial number	Number 20
• Date	twenty-sixth day, tenth lunar month, 1594
• Source	*Taichōin monjo* 100
• Sender	Toyo Shigemori
• Receiver	Yi Bin

• Main contents

I have received your letter of gratitude and the gift of a falcon with joy.
Yukinaga agreed on the left defense commander Kim Eungseo's offer to meet in person to discuss peace measures. Upon being informed of the date of the meeting selected by Kim, Yukinaga and myself will be certain to appear there.

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[22] Konishi also wished to talk with Kim Eungseo. See *Seonjo sillok*, *gweon* 57 (first day, eleventh lunar month, 1594); Original text: 平行長通書于金應瑞 欲見更事之人 與之議事.

• Serial number	Number 21
• Date	twenty-sixth day, tenth lunar month, 1594
• Source	*Taichōin monjo* 101
• Sender	Toyo Shigemori
• Receiver	Defense Commander Old Master Kim Eungseo

• Main contents

In the recent correspondence between General Yi Bin and Yukinaga, Nabeshima has served as a good intermediary. Your honor may well use Naoshige, too, in the communication with Yukinaga.
Upon being informed of the date of the meeting between your honor and Yi Bin from Joseon and Yukinaga and Shigenobu from Japan, I will be at the service of assuring a smooth meeting.

• Remarks

An honorific address "Old Master" (K. *Noya* 老爺) was presented to Kim Eungseo.

• Serial number	Number 22
• Date	twenty-sixth day, tenth lunar month, 1594
• Source	*Seonjo sillok* (eighth day, eleventh lunar month, twenty-seventh year of the reign of Seonjo)
• Sender	Konishi Yukinaga
• Receiver	Kim Eungseo (presumed)

• Main contents

Your letter has been received with pleasure.
Your offer to meet at Changweon seems agreeable.
Upon being informed of the date of the meeting, I will certainly come to Changweon single-handedly along with Yoshitoshi and Shigenobu.
I do not write in detail because we will meet and talk to each other soon.

While the Joseon generals suggested the rather vague topic of "long-term strategies" (*manse jigye* 萬世之計) as the agenda for the prospective

meeting between the generals of the two countries, Shigemori mentioned "peace talks" (*ganghwa* 講和) as the agenda by including security concerns as a topic. Since these Japanese letters reflected Yukinaga's intent, it is highly probable that he expected some type of breakthrough in the stalled peace talks with the Ming to be made through cooperation with Joseon. Yukinaga suggested that he had an important topic to discuss soon at the meeting in person. Meanwhile, King Seonjo demanded a cautious approach and ordered the Border Defense Council to discuss the matter.[23] Along this line, the commander in chief Gweon made Kim meet the Japanese commanders and test their response to the possibility of surrender.

• **Serial number**	Number 23
• **Date**	first day, eleventh lunar month, 1594
• **Source**	*Taichōin monjo* 54
• **Sender**	Yi Bin
• **Receiver**	Toyo Shigemori (presumed)

• Main contents

I thank you for sending messengers three times each month and also for timely replies.
I have intended to accompany the defense commander (Kim Eungseo) to discuss peace between the two countries but inopportunely catching a cold deters me from attending the meeting. I am looking forward to another opportunity.

• **Serial number**	Number 24
• **Date**	first day, eleventh lunar month, 1594
• **Source**	*Taichōin monjo* 55
• **Sender**	Baek Sarim
• **Receiver**	Toyo Shigemori (presumed)

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[23] *Seonjo sillok*, *gweon* 57 (eighteenth day, eleventh lunar month, 1594).

• Main contents

I thank you for the repeated replies. Peace between the two countries is a long-standing strategy that will bring comfort to their peoples. Your honor puts virtues before other considerations.
I have intended to accompany Old Master Kim (Kim Eungseo) to exchange frank discussions with your generals but a sudden illness of General Yi Bin deters me from attending the meeting. I will send Kim Pildong on my behalf.

• Serial number	Number 25
• Date	first day, eleventh lunar month, 1594
• Source	*Taichōin monjo* 56
• Sender	Yi Bin
• Receiver	Nabeshima Naoshige (presumed)

• Main contents

I have intended to accompany the defense commander (Kim Eungseo) to exchange frank discussions, but I regret that my illness deters me from attending the meeting.

• Serial number	Number 26
• Date	first day, eleventh lunar month, 1594
• Source	*Taichōin monjo* 57
• Sender	Kim Eungseo
• Receiver	Toyoshige Mori (presumed)

• Main contents

I have received your reply with gratitude. The proposed strategy is truly a good strategy. I have intended to exchange frank discussions with Konishi Yukinaga and So Yoshitoshi in person. Now that the meeting has materialized, I hope that your honor will join.

The three Joseon generals of Baek Sarim, Yi Bin, and Kim Eungseo had been scheduled to come to the meeting site but Yi Bin's inopportune

illness deterred him and Baek from participating. Nonetheless, they assured their Japanese counterparts of the meeting to be held as planned by informing them that Kim and other substitutes should come to the meeting. Given that the following letters from Baek and Yi sought to dispel some doubts, the Japanese seemed to protest the changes in the personnel and the site for the meeting.

• **Serial number**	Number 27
• **Date**	ninth day, eleventh lunar month, 1594
• **Source**	*Taichōin monjo* 58
• **Sender**	Baek Sarim
• **Receiver**	Toyo Shigemori (presumed)

• Main contents

I regret that I will be unable to accompany the general Kim Eungseo because I must remain at the side of the general Yi Bin who has fallen ill. How can there be an ulterior intent?

• **Serial number**	Number 28
• **Date**	ninth day, eleventh lunar month, 1594
• **Source**	*Taichōin monjo* 59
• **Sender**	Yi Bin
• **Receiver**	Unknown

• Main contents

I cannot understand why some doubts have arisen regarding the agreed meeting between the defense commander Kim Eungseo and his Japanese counterparts. Regrettably, I am simply unable to go to a place of rough winds because of my illness.

What about Yukinaga? Even though agreeing on the date of meeting as the twelfth day of the eleventh lunar month, 1594, he expressed disap-

proval of the site for the meeting as suggested by Kim Eungseo who pointed to a place between Changweon and Haman. Yukinaga was concerned that if he were to move his forces and stay one night at Changweon in order to reach the meeting place, then feelings of suspicion might be stirred among his Japanese colleagues, most probably among rival generals from Kiyomasa's camp, by dint of the unusual move of his army. Hence, he was worried that some of his suspicious colleagues might raise their own armies to catch up with him, which, in turn, would be disturbing to the Joseon generals. Yukinaga and his aides had to be mindful of any suspicion from their rival colleagues, especially from Kiyomasa.

• Serial number	Number 29
• Date	eleventh lunar month, 1594
• Source	*Taichōin monjo* 73
• Sender	Konishi Yukinaga
Receiver•	Kim Eungseo

• Main contents

I have received your suggestion that we meet at a border point, Geomam, between Changweon and Hamam on the twelfth day.
However, it seems impossible for us to meet at that site at dawn on that day after we would spend one night at Changweon and Haman respectively. If I were to spend one night at Changweon, my suspicious colleague generals might pursue me, which would, in turn, raise doubts among your generals. Thus, Changweon seems to be the best choice.
At dawn of the twelfth day, I will come to Changweon without leading troops and will be accompanied by Yoshitoshi, Naoshige, and Shigenobu.

• Serial number	Number 30
• Date	eleventh lunar month, 1594
• Source	*Taichōin monjo* 74
• Sender	Yanagawa Shigenobu
• Receiver	Kim Eungseo

• Main contents

I have nothing to add regarding the meeting site on the twelfth day, apart from what has been said with respect to Yukinaga's letter.
The reason why Yoshitoshi could not reply to your letter is that he did not receive the letter; because at that time he was at Yukinaga's camp busy writing his reply.
I have not yet answered to General Yi Bin's letter because I hope that I will be able to visit your camp and meet him face to face after the meeting on the twelfth day.

As it happened, the meeting scheduled on the twelfth day of the eleventh lunar month, 1594 was postponed two times and held afterwards on the twenty-second day of the same month at a border point (Jigokhyeon) of Changweon and Hamam. The Japanese side spent one night at Changweon before coming to the meeting the next day. Shigenobu, Genso, and Chikukei 竹溪 arrived first and were followed by Yukinaga and Yoshitoshi. Also joining were Yukinaga's brother and two other generals who were, most probably, Naoshige and Shigemori. The number of Japanese troops was reported to reach 3,000 men while Kim Eungseo led only 100 men. Thus, the Japanese generals did not keep their promise of coming by themselves.[24]

The talks between the two camps no longer remained solely with security measures. The Japanese strongly called for cooperation from Joseon for the sake of providing a breakthrough to the stalled negotiations with the Ming. However, the Japanese repeated themselves in glossing over the invasion as an attempt to present tribute to the Ming emperor via Joseon and in placing blame for the war on Joseon which did not accept Japan overtures. In response, Kim censured Japan for forsaking trust and attacking a neighbor by surprise. Kim also mentioned Kiyomasa's objection to the

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[24] See the report by Gweon Yul in *Seonjo sillok*, *gweon* 58 (seventh day, twelfth lunar month, 1594); Jo Gyeongnam, *Nanjung japnok* 3 亂中雜錄 [Miscellaneous records during the [Imjin] war] (twenty-first day, eleventh lunar month, 1594). A Japanese general mentioned that every Japanese general wanted to be part of this meeting in anticipation of future reward. See *Seonjo sillok*, *gweon* 57 (eighteenth day, eleventh lunar month, 1594).

peace talks between Yukinaga and Shen Weijing.

Then, Yukinaga, expressing regrets for the plundering by the Japanese troops and also for the vandalism against the royal tombs, announced that if Joseon would address itself to persuading the Ming to allow Japan's presentation of tribute, then Japan should be immensely grateful to Joseon. Kim responded that asking for permission to present tribute on behalf of Japan would be out of the question. Still, Kim suggested that the Japanese generals, with the exception of Yukinaga, who was in charge of the talks, all withdraw to Japan and compose a "surrender letter." Then, he would present the "surrender letter" to the Joseon and Ming courts to resolve the stalemate. Genso asked for an active participation of Joseon in the peace process by asserting that peace talks between the Ming and Japan would not be sufficient to bring peace to Joseon.[25]

When both sides met in person, there was a clear progress. Although limited to Yukinaga and his aides, the Japanese generals expressed feelings of regret for the war atrocities while the Joseon generals expressed a willingness to do their part to expedite the peace talks, provided the Japanese troops would completely withdraw, except for a delegation of negotiators led by Yukinaga. Such an exchange of peace overtures might not have been possible without a measure of trust built through continuous contacts between the two sides.

At last, the channel of communications was maintained between the two camps. The Japanese commanders sought to show their good faith in maintaining the semblance of border security by executing those Japanese soldiers who had transgressed the boundaries of the two camps for plundering (*Taichōin monjo* 79 and 90), thereby maintaining a trusted relationship with the Joseon commanders. In response, Kim also showed a gesture of gratitude by sending a falcon as a gift to the Japanese (*Taichōin monjo* 64). Additionally, the two camps conducted, if limited, a form of trade. The field commanders of the two camps felt the need to keep the communication channel alive in order to address the security concerns and further to

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[25] Jo, *Nanjung japnok* 3 (twenty-first day, eleventh lunar month, 1594).

discuss a possible peace agreement between the two countries. What follows in the next chapter looks into the reactions and measures of the Joseon court to these developments in the frontline of the war.

III. The End of the Frontline Contacts and the Joseon Court's Decisions

The planned meeting between the Joseon generals and the Japanese generals had been reported to the Joseon court before its implementation around the seventh day of the eleventh lunar month, making it impossible for the court to reply to its generals on site prior to the planned date of the twelfth. Thus, the report became a kind of *fait accompli*. The government sent a directive hurriedly and cautioned that "since the Ming is deferring the Japanese from presenting tribute because of their arrogant demands, Joseon should not serve as a mediator of their wishes," and that "since the Ming has officially decided to grant the Japanese presentation of tribute, it is not permissible for Joseon to meet with the Japanese separately to discuss further the matter."[26] Regardless, the field generals had conducted deliberations regarding what to offer to Japan at the scheduled meeting.[27] On receiving the report, the court again issued the order for the field generals to stop continuing the talks, thus making no further mistakes from then on.[28]

The Joseon court did not want any contact with the Japanese armies to develop into a possible peace initiative on its own, as was the case with Kiyomasa. The court did not have any will to initiate peace talks with Japan. What the court expected of the contacts with the Japanese was primarily nothing more than spying on the Japanese camps or creating schisms among them, and at most delaying their attacks. Hence, the initiatives tak-

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[26] See the discussion at the Border Defense Council in *Seonjo sillok*, *gweon* 57 (seventh day of eleventh lunar month, 1594).

[27] Gweon Yul proposed that a Joseon court letter asking for the Ming approval for the Japanese to present their tribute would deter Japanese attack, thus responding to Konishi's request for a letter of the same nature. See *Seonjo sillok*, *gweon* 57 (thirteenth day, eleventh month, 1594).

[28] *Seonjo sillok*, *gweon* 57 (eighteenth and nineteenth day, eleventh month, 1594).

en by Kim and other field generals were somewhat out of line with the Joseon court's stance. Furthermore, the Joseon court feared the situation in which the Ming suspected that Joseon engaged itself in peace negotiations on their own with Japan. What if the meeting between the Joseon and Japanese field commanders would be reported to the Ming court?[29]

The court sent a directive that dictated the reply to Yukinaga that since the Ming had already allowed Japan to present tribute, the Japanese armies should not press Joseon to ask the Ming to dispatch an investiture envoy, and that since all authorities and responsibilities lay in the hands of the Ming, any presumptuous words from the Joseon generals should be avoided. And, the directive contained some more matters. The Japanese demand to hand over the documents to be used to impeach Kiyomasa should not be met but their responses and actions should be closely and continuously watched. Gweon and Kim were told to use expedient means in handling the Japanese demands.[30] However, they were given basic lines of action, such as the existing channel of communication with Yukinaga, and the Japanese demands, concerned with the peace negotiations, were to be directed to the care of the Ming. And, a neutral position should also be maintained in dealing with the rivalry between the Japanese commanders. Finally, a summary of recent contacts with the Japanese would be reported to the Ming authorities in Liaodong.

In the twelfth lunar month of 1594, the Joseon court was notified that the Ming court had decided to invest Hideyoshi as king of Japan.[31] The Joseon court had to admit that now it was impossible to reverse the decision. Then, there was a need for a scapegoat to bear the anger of the hardliners in the court. In the milieu of heightened opposition against the peace talks,

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29 *Seonjo sillok*, *gweon* 57 (nineteenth day, eleventh month, 1594). King Seonjo was afraid that the Ming might lay responsibility for the peace negotiations on Joseon, saying that "if your country would argue for the peace talks, you could handle them on your own." Original text: 予恐中朝以講和推之於我國也若以爲爾國亦主和爾國自可爲之云則奈何. See *Seonjo sillok*, *gweon* 59 (twenty-second day, first lunar month, 1595).

30 *Seonjo sillok*, *gweon* 58 (seventh day, twelfth month, 1594).

31 *Seonjo sillok*, *gweon* 58 (fourth day, sixth day, twenty-second day, and twenty-seventh day, twelfth month, 1594); *Ibid*., *gweon* 59 (fourth day, first month, 1595).

censuring voices were raised against the frontline generals, including Kim, who had made unauthorized contacts with the Japanese.[32] Apparently, unaware of what was occurring at the court, Kim continued to communicate with his Japanese counterparts, such as a request for Japanese tolerance for the Gimhae residents to farm near their camps.[33]

Despite the misgivings of the court,[34] when Kim dispatched a messenger to Yukinaga to continue the talks,[35] the court officials asserted that he be stripped of office and summoned for interrogation.[36] At first, considering the wartime condition of confronting the enemies, he was censured in communicating with the Japanese front commanders by means of exchanging letters.[37] Accusations against him did not cease at court and in the end Kim was subjected to the penalty of flogging together with his aides Go Eonbaek and Gweon Eungsu.[38]

It seems inconceivable that such contacts, initiated by the Joseon field commanders, opened any chance of developing immediate major peace talks to end the war because the Joseon court was inclined to see their negative effects and the written communications as well as one event of a direct meeting in person were essentially local in nature. Nonetheless, the written and personal contacts between the two sides, moving beyond simple war tactics such as spying or creating schisms against unnecessary conflicts, started even eliciting the Joseon court's reaction to Yukinaga's overtures. The Joseon court, for its part, was disinclined to see any peace initiative between the field commanders of the two camps and was concerned with the responsibility it should bear when the Ming would become

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32 See Jeong Gyeongse's speech in *Seonjo sillok*, *gweon* 59 (sixth day, first month, 1595); Conversation between King Seonjo and Sin Sik and Jeong Gyeongse in *Ibid*., *gweon* 59 (eighth day, first month, 1595).

33 *Seonjo sillok*, *gweon* 60 (thirtieth day, second month, 1595).

34 See remarks by the Border Defense Council and Yu Seongnyong in *Seonjo sillok*, *gwon* 61 (first day and eighteenth day respectively, third month, 1595).

35 *Seonjo sillok*, *gweon* 62 (twenty-fifth day, fourth month, 1595).

36 *Seonjo sillok*, *gweon* 63 (first day, third day, and fourth day, fifth month, 1595).

37 *Seonjo sillok*, *gweon* 63 (third day and tenth day, fifth month, 1595).

38 *Seonjo sillok*, *gweon* 65 (fourteenth day and twenty-seventh day, seventh month, 1595).

aware of any peace negotiations conducted separately between Joseon and Japan. As the Ming court officially had decided to invest Japan as its vassal, the Joseon court delimited contact with the Japanese only to that of spying purposes. Therefore, when Kim attempted to go beyond the boundary, he was held back by the court.[39]

The punishment for those accused generals did not extend further and Kim was soon reinstated. The Joseon court gave them a token warning, which was done as a gesture to assure the Ming that the court had nothing to do with the contacts with the Japanese, made by the frontline generals on their own, and would never allow the Joseon commanders to communicate with them and seek peace with the Japanese invaders.[40] The adamant objection to the peace negotiations notwithstanding, the Joseon court managed to secure its own information channels first with Kiyomasa and later with Yukinaga. These channels could be activated whenever the court deemed it necessary to collect information about the peace negotiations between the Ming and Japan.

In 1596, when the dispatch of envoys for investiture and communication was imminent, the Joseon court collected information on the Chinese investiture mission as well as the domestic conditions of the Hideyoshi regime via Kim's contacts with Yoshitoshi and Yōjirō 要時羅.[41] Moreover, from the ninth lunar month of 1596 when Hideyoshi declared the collapse of the peace negotiations to the seventh lunar month of 1597 when the second Japanese offensive was mounted, the Joseon court made active efforts to seek for measures to prevent the second invasion by dispatching Yu-

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[39] For the Joseon court's measures to the field commanders' contacts with the Japanese in the southern coastal areas after it was informed of the Ming decision to dispatch an investiture envoy to Japan, see Kim, "Imjin jeonjaeng gi ganghwa gyoseop yeon'gu," 160-65.

[40] For the worries of the Joseon court about these contacts, see *Seonjo sillok*, *gweon* 57 (seventh day, eleventh month, 1594); Original text: 且唐人方在其處而我國主將與賊相會亦恐致疑於釋怨講和事理非便.

[41] *Seonjo sillok*, *gweon* 71 (twenty-third day and twenty-fifth day, first month, 1596); *Ibid*., *gweon* 73 (second day, third month, 1596); *Ibid*., *gweon* 74 (seventeenth day, fourth month, 1596; *Ibid*., *gweon* 76 (eighteenth day and nineteenth day, sixth month, 1596).

jeong to the Kiyomasa camp and allowing Kim to contact Yukinaga.[42] Kim's contacts with Yukinaga and his aides prior to the second invasion did make it possible for the Joseon court to obtain information on the war strategies and the debacle of the peace negotiations from Japanese sources.[43] Such information was invaluable to the Joseon court and commanders in strategizing for how to fight back against the Japanese armies.

Conclusion

Joseon Korea, whose land turned entirely into battlefield, did not participate in the peace negotiations between the Ming and Japan during the Imjin War—the Japanese Invasions of Korea—of 1592 to 1598. Joseon vehemently refused to join peace talks with the Japanese invaders in any capacity. However, it was out of the question to respond effectively to the war without knowledge of what had transpired during the negotiations. Joseon might be in danger of becoming completely alienated from the course of the war and utterly bereft of the means of how to end it. Under tacit approval from the Joseon court, then, Joseon's frontline field commanders sought a breakthrough by establishing both written communications and personal contacts with the Japanese field commanders.

The contacts, aimed initially to address such pragmatic concerns as avoiding unnecessary conflict between Joseon and Japanese armies in the front lines, began to discuss how to influence the stalled peace negotiations owing largely to the initiatives and will of the field commanders of the two sides. The Joseon court allowed for the contacts, initiated by the field commanders, insofar as they were able to collect information on the peace nego-

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[42] Kim Kyong-tae, "Jeong'yu jaeran jikjeon Joseon eui jongbo sujip gwa jaechim daeeungchaek" [Joseon's Collecting of Information and Preparation of Countermeasures before Japan's Second Invasion (1597)], *Hanil gwan'gyesa yeon'gu* 59 (2018). The Joseon court could obtain information about the collapse of the peace negotiations through Kim Eungseo's channel of communication even prior to the return of the Joseon communication envoy from Japan. See *Seonjo sillok*, *gweon* 82 (third day, eleventh month, 1596).

[43] *Seonjo sillok*, *gweon* 86 (twenty-fifth day, third month, 1597); *Ibid*., *gweon* 89 (fourteenth day, sixth month, 1597); *Ibid*., *gweon* 91 (seventh day, eighth month, 1597).

tiations between the Ming and Japan, led by Shen Weijing and Konishi Yukinaga, in 1594 and to pose obstacles to the success of the negotiations. The Joseon court ordered to a halt any communication with the Japanese army when the Ming court decided to dispatch an investiture envoy to Japan. The Joseon court, however, never abandoned the existing channels of communication with the Japanese armies in virtue of certain benefits gained through the contacts with the Japanese enemy in a firsthand manner.

Communication between enemies occurs even in fierce battlefields. During the Imjin War, as well, many involved in the war felt the need for communication and negotiation with their adversaries. However, among Joseon people who suffered tremendously as grievous victims of the unprovoked war, few came forth to initiate contact with the Japanese invaders. In consideration of their highly unpopular and risky attempts to make contact with their enemy, what the Joseon generals achieved in securing communication channels and collecting information can be viewed in a constructive light. The Joseon court demonstrated a degree of flexibility in terms of giving to the field commanders some initiatives and moving between a conciliatory policy and a hard-line policy. In this manner, I contend, opening up the communication channels of the Joseon court with the Japanese armies in 1594 illuminates a Joseon perspective in endeavors to voice its own demands and wishes in the peace talk staged by the Ming and Japan.

Appendix 1. List of letters exchanged between the Korean and the Japanese camps, included in the *Taichōin monjo* 泰長院文書 (The Documents Preserved at the Taichōin Buddhist Temple) and in the *Seonjo sillok* 宣祖實錄 (The Veritable Records of King Seonjo), in 1594 and 1595

Serial number	Date	Sender	Recipient	Source
1	twenty-fifth day, ninth lunar month	Yi Bin	Yanagawa Shigenobu	*Seonjo sillok* 宣祖實錄 fifth day, tenth lunar month
2	ninth lunar month	Baek Sarim	Naritomi Shigeyasu (presumed)	*Taichōin monjo* 87
3	twenty-seventh day, ninth lunar month	Naritomi Shigeyasu	Baek Sarim	*Taichōin monjo* 70
4	third day, tenth lunar month	Baek Sarim	Toyo Shigemori	*Taichōin monjo* 61
5	fifth day, tenth lunar month	Yi Bin	Yanagawa Shigenobu	*Taichōin monjo* 86
6	seventh day, tenth lunar month	Toyo Shigemori	Baek Sarim (presumed)	*Taichōin monjo* 81
7	seventh day, tenth lunar month	Yanagawa Shigenobu	Yi Bin	*Seonjo sillok* (eighth day, eleventh lunar month, twenty-seventh year)
8	eighth day, tenth lunar month	Nabeshima Naoshige	Yi Bin	*Taichōin monjo* 71
9	thirteenth day, tenth lunar month	Baek Sarim	Toyo Shigemori	*Taichōin monjo* 60
10	thirteenth day, tenth lunar month	Yi Bin	Nabeshima Naoshige	*Taichōin monjo* 63
11	thirteenth day, tenth lunar month	Yi Bin	Yanagawa Shigenobu	*Taichōin monjo* 85
12	eighteenth day, tenth lunar month	Nabeshima Naoshige	Yi Bin	*Taichōin monjo* 97
13	eighteenth day, tenth lunar month	Toyo Shigemori	Baek Sarim	*Taichōin monjo* 98
14	eighteenth day, tenth lunar month	Yanagawa Shigenobu	Yi Bin	*Seonjo sillok* (eighteenth day, eleventh lunar month, twenty-seventh year)
15	twenty-third day, tenth lunar month	Baek Sarim	Toyo Shigemori (presumed)	*Taichōin monjo* 51
16	twenty-third day, tenth lunar month	Kim Eungseo	Konishi Yukinaga (presumed)	*Taichōin monjo* 52
17	twenty-third day, tenth lunar month	Yi Bin	Toyo Shigemori (presumed)	*Taichōin monjo* 53

18	twenty-third day, tenth lunar month	Yi Bin	Nabeshima Naoshige	*Taichōin monjo* 88
19	twenty-sixth day, tenth lunar month	Toyo Shigemori (presumed)	Baek Sarim	*Taichōin monjo* 99
20	twenty-sixth day, tenth lunar month	Toyo Shigemori	Yi Bin	*Taichōin monjo* 100
21	twenty-sixth day, tenth lunar month	Toyo Shigemori	Kim Eungseo	*Taichōin monjo* 101
22	twenty-sixth day, tenth lunar month	Konishi Yukinaga	Kim Eungseo (presumed)	*Seonjo sillok* (eighth day, eleventh lunar month, twenty-seventh year)
23	first day, eleventh lunar month	Yi Bin	Toyo Shigemori (presumed)	*Taichōin monjo* 54
24	first day, eleventh lunar month	Baek Sarim	Toyo Shigemori (presumed)	*Taichōin monjo* 55
25	first day, eleventh lunar month	Yi Bin	Nabeshima Naoshige (presumed)	*Taichōin monjo* 56
26	first day, eleventh lunar month	Kim Eungseo	Toyo Shigemori (presumed)	*Taichōin monjo* 57
27	ninth day, eleventh lunar month	Baek Sarim	Toyo Shigemori (presumed)	*Taichōin monjo* 58
28	ninth day, eleventh lunar month	Yi Bin	Unknown	*Taichōin monjo* 59
29	eleventh lunar month	Konishi Yukinaga	Kim Eungseo	*Taichōin monjo* 73
30	eleventh lunar month	Yanagawa Shigenobu	Kim Eungseo	*Taichōin monjo* 74
31	twenty-first day, twelfth lunar month	Kim Eungseo	Nabeshima Naoshige (presumed)	*Taichōin monjo* 90
32	twenty-fourth day, twelfth lunar month	Yi Bin	Unknown	*Taichōin monjo* 62
33	twenty-fifth day, twelfth lunar month	Nabeshima Naoshige	Kim Eungseo	*Taichōin monjo* 79
34	first day, second lunar month, 1595	Kim Eungseo	Unknown	*Taichōin monjo* 64
35	third month	Toyo Shigemori	Kim Eungseo	*Taichōin monjo* 72
36	twenty-fifth day, fourth lunar month	Baek Sarim	Toyo Shigemori (presumed)	*Taichōin monjo* 65

Appendix 2. The Meeting Place (Haman 함안) between Kim Eungseo and Konishi Yukinaga on the twenty-second day of the eleventh lunar month, 1594, marked on the Daedong yeojido (Map of the Great East [Korea])



*Courtesy of the Jangseogak Library of the Academy of Korean Studies, K2-4957

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Book Reviews

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

*The Zen Monks in Isolated Island Tsushima: A Study on the Early Modern History of Japan – Joseon Diplomacy**

By Ikeuchi SATOSHI (池內敏)
Nagoya, Japan: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai, 2017

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Sung-il CHUNG
Kwangju Women's University

I

This book review features a text regarding of the history of Korea-Japan relations written by Ikeuchi Satoshi (池內敏), which was published in Japan in February 2017. Ikeuchi studied Japanese history at Kyoto University, specifically Japan's relations with Joseon Korea during the early modern period. He served as professor at Tottori University and now teaches at Nagoya University.

The title of the book under review is *Zekkai no sekigaku* (絶海の碩学). "*Zekkai*" literally translates as an "isolated sea," or a body of water far off the coast. This term is also used to refer to an island Koreans call Daemado (對馬島) and the Japanese call Tsushima (對馬; 津島). The island is also called Zekkai no kotō (絶海の孤島) for being a remote island at the edge of the Japanese border between mainland Japan and Joseon.

The term *sekigaku* usually indicates a great scholar with profound knowledge. *Sekigaku* in the book reviewed, however, refers to Zen monks, specifically those who belonged to the five great Zen temples of Kyoto

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* The original title for this book is *Zekkai no sekigaku: Kinsei Nitchō gaikōshi kenkyū* 絶海の碩學: 近世日朝外交史研究.

collectively known as the Kyoto Gozan. With the exception of Manjuji (萬壽寺), the other four Gozan temples Tenryūji (天龍寺), Shōkokuji (相國寺), Kenninji (建仁寺), and Tōfukuji (東福寺) took turns in sending a monk to serve at the Iteian temple (以酊庵) on Tsushima. At one point, the bakufu, or the Tokugawa shogunate, provided financial support to such Gozan monks. This stipend the bakufu offered was called *sekigaku-ryō* (碩學料), which is why the Gozan monks receiving them were referred to as *sekigaku*.

According to Ikeuchi, the beginning of *sekigaku-ryō* was when the shōgun Tokugawa Ieyasu allocated stipend funds to the Gozan temple Tōfukuji. The *sekigaku* discussed in the book therefore refers to the Kyoto Gozan monks who received stipends from the bakufu for going to Iteian in Fuchū, Tsushima to perform tasks involving diplomatic documents exchanged between Japan and Joseon. The book presents an analysis of the 126 chief monks of Iteian during a period of 230 years between 1635 and 1867. Also subjected to the same analysis are the 203 monks dispatched to Tōkōji (東向寺), a temple on the grounds of the Japan House (K. Waegwan) in Busan, between 1654 and 1870.

The book's subtitle *Kinsei Nitchō gaikōshi kenkyū* (近世日朝外交史研究) can be understood as "A Study on the Early Modern History of Japan-Joseon Diplomacy." The early modern period in Japanese history is defined as the Edo period when the Tokugawa shogunate ruled Japan. This definition generally corresponds to the latter half of the Joseon dynasty in Korean history, which is from the end of the Imjin War of 1592-98 until Joseon opened its ports. To shed further light on the diplomatic history of Joseon and Japan, the book's analysis consequently focuses on Kyoto Gozan monks dispatched to Iteian on Tsushima between 1600 and the 1860s to the 1870s.

II

The reviewed book is composed of a prologue, fifteen chapters with two appendixes inserted in between, and an epilogue, all of which are grouped into four parts. The keywords of the book can be summarized as Iteian and

its monks (*sekigaku*), Tsushima (*zekkai*), and the bakufu. Combining those keywords thus appears to be an apropos way to come up with the title *Zekkai no sekigaku* (絶海の碩學).

The first topic to be covered in the book is the rotation system of Iteian monks. This is an indication of how central this topic is to the book. In fact, the first 150 pages of the book, amounting to thirty percent of the book including the prologue and the four chapters of Part 1, are dedicated to the temple Iteian and its monks.

Through the prologue, Ikeuchi criticizes the common historical view toward the rotation system of the Iteian monks. He raises questions regarding the existing understanding on how the rotation system became introduced and what purpose or role it served. The central issues the book deals with are as follows. As of 1635, did the bakufu intend to control Tsushima from the outset by taking part in drafting diplomatic documents exchanged with Joseon? Did the bakufu henceforth succeed in keeping an eye on or controlling Tsushima?

Regarding these issues, some Japanese scholars such as Tanaka Takeo (田中健夫), Itō Kōji (伊藤幸司), and Arano Yasunori (荒野泰典) have argued that the Tokugawa shogunate clearly took the lead in establishing the rotation system for the Iteian monks. Although the wording is slightly different, other Japanese scholars including Tashiro Kazui (田代和生) and Izumi Chōichi (泉澄一) determined that after the so-called Yanagawa Incident (柳川一件), which called for the bakufu's decision regarding the accusation of a state document forgery against Tsushima's Sō clan, the bakufu sent monks to Iteian in rotation as a follow-up measure to keep an eye on Tsushima. On the other hand, Tsuruta Kei (鶴田啓) suggested that the bakufu may not have introduced the rotation system at Iteian for the purpose of surveillance, but the system ended up indirectly limiting Tsushima domain from taking arbitrary actions. Is there empirical evidence solid enough to support these arguments and suggestions? Ikeuchi does not think so. In order to resolve this issue, he chooses to trace the process through which Iteian was introduced to a rotation system and how the Yanagawa Incident was involved in that process.

Chapter 1 provides an overview of previous studies on Iteian. The re-

search findings of eight scholars are noted from a 1919 study by Kamimura Kankō (上村觀光) to a 2002 study by Nishimura Keiko (西村圭子). Among these eight scholars, Ikeuchi takes particular interest in Kobayakawa Kingo (小早川欣吾, 1900-44), a law professor at Kyoto Imperial University. Through the research paper "Iteian rinbankō" (以酊庵輪番考) published in 1934, Kobayakawa argued that the Tsushima domain was the first to propose that diplomatic documents sent between Japan and Joseon be placed under the bakufu's direct supervision.

Chapter 2 is devoted to how the rotation of Iteian monks has historically been viewed. The understanding so far has been that the rotation system was adopted in 1635 as the bakufu reached its conclusion regarding Tsushima domain's forgery of state documents. To verify the accuracy of this understanding, Ikeuchi delves into the duties Iteian monks specifically performed for the Tsushima domain. Based on the analysis of such duties, an assessment is made on the historical nature of Iteian's rotation system. Listed below are some of the specific points of criticism that Ikeuchi made against the current understanding of the system.

First, did the duties Iteian perform reflect the bakufu's intention? Ikeuchi concludes that there is no evidence to support that they did, and criticizes the argument made by Arano Yasunori (荒野泰典), which has been widely accepted since 1988. Second, were Iteian monks in charge of the diplomatic documents exchanged between Joseon and Japan? According to Ikeuchi's research, Tsushima domain would first draft a diplomatic document in Japanese. Iteian monks would then take the draft and translate it into Chinese characters. Tsushima domain would then review the translation before finally creating a clean copy. Among these steps to drafting diplomatic documents, Ikeuchi concludes that the role of Iteian monks was limited to the second step of translating drafts from Japanese to Chinese characters. Third, did the bakufu directly intervene in the friendly relations between Tsushima domain and Joseon? Since the publication of a research article by Kamimura Kankō (上村觀光) in 1919, the general understanding has been that the bakufu had Iteian monks surveil Tsushima domain so as to stop the domain from secretly forming its own relations with Joseon. Ikeuchi does not agree with this understanding because it is not substantiat-

ed by any historical records. Even if he were to accept that the bakufu used the monks for surveillance as per Kobayakawa Kingo's argument, Ikeuchi suspects that the attempt is unlikely to have been effective. Moreover, no evidentiary documents have been uncovered to prove that the bakufu had intended from the outset to use the monks for surveillance purposes.

Chapter 3 examines the rotation of monks at a different temple called Tōkōji (東向寺). The temple was built by the Tsushima domain within the grounds of *Choryang Waegwan* (草梁倭館), the Japan House the Joseon government had provided in Busan. Through previous studies, Tōkōji has been regarded as an independent diplomatic organ of Tsushima domain. This prompted Ikeuchi to analyze the rotation system at Tōkōji, a temple associated with Tsushima domain, and compare it to that of Iteian, a temple associated with the bakufu.

Chapter 4 covers the discussion surrounding the abolition of Iteian's rotation system. In 1780, a petition by a Kyoto Gozan monk named Baisō Kenjō (梅荘顕常, 1720-1802) was submitted to the bakufu. The petition's point was that the bakufu should not neglect the fact that, due to strenuous economic circumstances, Tsushima domain was forsaking sincerity and trust, factors that were most important in the relations between Japan and Joseon. Since the domain was in need, the petition proposed that the bakufu take direct control of Japan-Joseon diplomacy and exempt Kyoto Gozan monks from serving rotations at Iteian. However, the bakufu dismissed this petition in 1782 and refused to discontinue Iteian's rotation system.

Opinions have been divided as to how this incident should be understood. The current view has been to regard the Kyoto Gozan monk's proposal for Iteian's rotation system to be abolished as evidence that the monks were aware of their duty to surveil Tsushima domain. Ikeuchi, on the other hand, raises the criticism that the petition fails to justify viewing Iteian or its monks as "the vanguard of bakufu diplomacy" or "the agency for surveilling Tsushima domain." Moreover, despite the fact that the proposal was made by a Kyoto Gozan monk, the bakufu took Tsushima domain's opinion into consideration and decided that Iteian's rotation system was to be maintained. At some point, the bakufu may have considered directly engaging in diplomacy with Joseon. However, in the end, the bakufu

chose to continue delegating diplomatic affairs to Tsushima domain. Based on how the petition was ultimately handled, Ikeuchi finds it difficult to agree with the existing view that regards Iteian's rotation system as a means for the bakufu to conduct surveillance upon Tsushima domain.

Part 2 considers the issues surrounding diplomatic missions that traveled between Joseon and Japan. In particular, the second part of the book focuses on how Iteian monks received diplomatic missions from Joseon. Chapters 5 and 6 are dedicated to a type of mission called *yakkanshi* (譯官使) in Japan and known as *munwihaeng* (問慰行) in Joseon. And the more widely known type of mission called *tongsinsa* (通信使) is covered later in Chapters 7, 8, and Appendix 1. This rather unexpected sequence is likely to show that Ikeuchi highlights the progress he made in researching *yakkanshi*, which has been studied far less than the *tongsinsa* in Japan.

Chapter 5 attempts to provide an overview of the *yakkanshi* who were dispatched nearly sixty times during the Edo period and the role Iteian monks performed on such occasions. Chapter 6 describes the spaces where the *yakkanshi* were received at the Tsushima daimyo's residence and the formalities that took place there. Chapter 7 reveals the reason why Iteian monks would accompany Tongsinsa missions sent from Joseon. Accounts authored by Tongsinsa mission members are utilized to depict in detail how they perceived Iteian monks. Chapter 8 covers the policy change that the bakufu introduced in 1811 when it went against the custom of receiving Tongsinsa missions in Edo and instead received a mission in Tsushima. Previous studies have determined that this policy change was led by Matsudaira Sadanobu (松平定信, 1759-1829), a senior councilor (J. *rōjū*) of the bakufu. Yet, Ikeuchi points out that Baisō Kenjō, a monk who once served at Iteian, also contributed to the policy change. Unlike earlier studies preoccupied with reading disdain toward Joseon from Matsudaira's negative perception of Tongsinsa missions, Ikeuchi is the first to discover the following mentioned in a book by Matsudaira: "A Gozan monk at Shōkokuji was summoned for consultation." This at least confirms that Baisō Kenjō did respond to Matsudaira's request for consultation. However, it remains uncertain as to how much Matsudaira was influenced by Baisō Kenjō, which is why Ikeuchi suggests that the monk had played a support-

ing role rather than a leading role in policy changes involving Tongsinsa missions. This further demonstrates the author's basic approach of attempting to question the common understanding that Iteian was an instrument used to scrutinize Tsushima domain's activities related to Japan-Joseon diplomacy. Appendix 1 outlines the use of certain terms related to Tongsinsa missions.

Part 3 examines the drifters who appeared in the waters between Joseon and Japan. Some readers may wonder what maritime drifters have to do with Iteian. People who drifted to Japan had to be interviewed individually because Tsushima was required to report on them to the bakufu. Iteian monks were those who conducted those interviews by communicating in writing with each drifter. Through Chapter 9, Ikeuchi provides an overview of the repatriation system for drifters in East Asian waters from the 17th to the 19th century. The chapter also describes how the system headed toward modernization after the 1870s and the 1880s. Chapter 10 reviews previous studies on drifters and accounts of their experiences. Being aware of how research interests in Japan are focused on cases of drifting to Europe or America, Ikeuchi chooses to instead outline accounts written by Japanese who drifted to Joseon. Chapter 11 introduces the account of a warrior of Tsushima domain who drifted to Joseon. The full account has been made available through a different publication by Ikeuchi and is considered a masterpiece among Japanese accounts of drifting to Joseon (Ikeuchi Satoshi, *Satsuma hanshi Chōsen hyōryū nikki* [The Diary of a Tsushima Warrior Who Drifted to Joseon], Kodansha, 2009).

Part 4 deals with the goods the people of Joseon and Japan exchanged and their means of communicating with one another. Chapter 12 looks into the conversations Joseon people had with Japanese during the Edo period. Descriptions of such conversations in accounts by Tongsinsa members are presented, featuring instances of communicating in writing with Chinese characters or through gesticulations. In Chapter 13, the author reveals, on the basis of a diary written by the monk Baisō Kenjō of Shōkokuji, how the people of Joseon and Japan communicated with each other. In Chapter 14, cases involving *yakkanshi* are analyzed to illustrate the cultural exchange that occurred between Joseon and Tsushima during

the 18th century. What is notable about this chapter's analysis is that it compares records from both Joseon and Tsushima. Chapter 15 discusses the gifts and items Joseon and Japan exchanged with or ordered from each other. Ikeuchi substantiates in detail how Iteian monks would sometimes receive requests to acquire items produced in Joseon or the monks themselves would request that certain items be procured from Joseon. Appendix 2 offers a comparison between the perception bakufu officials had of Joseon without having any direct contact with Joseon people and the perception Iteian monks had of Joseon as they frequently interacted with Joseon people and became well informed about Joseon's domestic affairs.

III

At the beginning of each chapter, Ikeuchi reviews common understandings of the diplomatic history between Joseon and Japan and discusses controversial points in those understandings. He then consults an extensive range of materials to verify those controversial points. Based on such substantiation, Ikeuchi shares his opinions regarding common historical understandings to conclude each chapter. This narrative style seems to be what stands out most from this book.

As its subtitle indicates, the author's ultimate purpose for the book is to critically examine the diplomatic history between early modern Korea and Japan. For that purpose, in-depth analysis has been carried out on monks referred to as great scholars (J. *sekigaku*) who served in rotations at the Iteian temple on a remote island called Tsushima. This constitutes Part I of the book that focuses on Joseon diplomatic offices and Iteian.

Ikeuchi's analysis reveals that in the fifth month of 1635, the daimyo of Tsushima Sō Yoshinari (宗義成) met a senior councilor of the bakufu named Sakai Tadakatsu (酒井忠勝, 1587-1662) and proposed for the bakufu to appoint an observer to henceforth inspect Tsushima domain. However, Sakai rejected the proposal on the spot, saying that there was no separate need for an observer since Tsushima was in charge of affairs with Joseon. Ikeuchi considers this incident as a reason to contradict the common understanding that the bakufu took the lead in installing the rotation system of

the Kyoto Gozan monks at Iteian in order to keep an eye on Tsushima.

According to Ikeuchi's argument, the bakufu had Confucian scholars draft state documents to be exchanged through Tongsinsa missions. Iteian monks were therefore not directly involved in drafting such state documents known as *kokusho* (國書). What the Tsushima domain oversaw instead of the bakufu was the drafting of informal letters called *shokei* (書契) exchanged between Joseon and Japan. In Ikeuchi's opinion, the bakufu had no intention of intervening in the drafting of *shokei*, nor was it capable of doing so. His explanation is that Tsushima domain brought Iteian monks in on purpose as an excuse to receive financial assistance from the bakufu. Hence, when authoring informal diplomatic letters, Tsushima domain received assistance from learned monks who could read and write in Chinese characters. Unless the bakufu was willing to directly take charge of its diplomatic relations with Joseon, it had no reason not to follow the custom of entrusting Tsushima domain with drafting informal letters. Maintaining the rotation system at Iteian was beneficial for Tsushima as well. The island actively took advantage of opportunities to interact with great Kyoto Gozan scholars in Fuchū, Tsushima. As introduced above, Iteian monks would translate drafts of informal diplomatic letters into Chinese characters, which Tsushima domain would thereafter review before creating a clean copy. Meanwhile, the monks Tsushima domain sent to Tōkōji on the premises of the Japan House in Busan were supposed to review informal diplomatic letters from Joseon in advance and report about them to Tsushima domain. Ikeuchi argues that mutual connections between the bakufu (Iteian) and Tsushima domain were at work when handling diplomatic documents exchanged with Joseon.

Another controversial point that Ikeuchi discusses regarding common historical views is the idea of an East Asian international order. When attempting to reveal the characteristics of Japan's relationship to the early modern East Asian international order, previous studies did not perform a positive analysis on individual developments such as the Yanagawa Incident or the rotation system's adoption at Iteian. They would instead form conclusions based on the international awareness or the world view of officials who were part of the central government.

Such conclusions included Taikun diplomacy suggested by the historian Nakamura Hidetaka (中村榮孝) and the Japanese perception of the Hua-Yi distinction suggested by Asao Naohiro (朝尾直弘). Literally meaning "great prince," *taikun* (大君) was used as a diplomatic title for the Japanese shōgun. Taikun diplomacy was a term that Nakamura used to describe early modern Japan's diplomacy that had diverged from the Sinocentric international order. Asao further developed Nakamura's argument by concluding that Edo Japan broke away from the Sinocentric world and conceived an East Asian international order that revolved around Japan, primarily around its relations with Joseon and secondarily around its relations with the Ryukyu Kingdom. That conception is what Asao referred to as the Japanese perception of the Hua-Yi distinction. Meanwhile, Tashiro Kazui (田代和生) believed that, although the friendly relationship between Japan and Joseon were asymmetrical, it was professed to be equal only because Tsushima served as a buffer between Japan and Joseon. Based on a painting showing the Sō clan bowing deeply to the Joseon king, Tashiro took note of how the Sō clan constantly made tributary gestures to the Joseon king. She pointed out that such diplomatic efforts behind the scenes were the reason a nominally equal diplomacy could be carried out between the Tokugawa shōgun and the Joseon king.

Ikeuchi, however, rejects all of the aforementioned interpretations. He finds that the Japanese perception of the Hua-Yi distinction has not been substantiated in detail because it was derived solely from analyzing the world view of officials. Tashiro may have helped supplement Asao's argument, but Ikeuchi offers the criticism that there is still no solid evidence to claim that Tsushima's role as a cushion made equal diplomacy possible for the Tokugawa shōgun and the Joseon king.

Ikeuchi instead suspects that equal diplomacy between the Joseon king and the Japanese shōgun would have been possible without Tsushima acting as a buffer. Once *taikun* became established as a diplomatic title for the shōgun, it was no longer necessary for Tsushima to tamper with state documents issued in the shōgun's name by purposefully adding the Chinese character for king (王). If *taikun* included the meaning of king, there was no need to have Iteian monks involved to prevent tampering with dip-

lomatic documents. This in turn, according to Ikeuchi, also makes it unnecessary to struggle to glean Japan-centrism from the title *taikun*.

As an expert in research on drifters, Ikeuchi highlights the repatriation of drifters as a system that brought Joseon, Japan, and the Ming and Qing dynasties of China under a single East Asian international order between the 17th and the 19th centuries. Regardless of how Joseon and Japan perceived one another, Ikeuchi claims that the repeated free repatriation of drifters between East Asian countries allowed them to take pride in the fact that they contributed to establishing a peaceful and stable international order, which is a claim the reviewer of this book can accept as well.

Despite being focused on the diplomatic history of early modern Korea and Japan, the book barely mentions anything regarding the two countries' dispute over the island of Ulleungdo, which was referred to as the Takeshima Ikken (竹島一件) in Japan. For instance, the book briefly mentions that among diplomatic documents the 37th monk to serve at Iteian drafted between 1692 and 1694, there was a document related to negotiations on the Genroku Takeshima Incident. This is bound to leave readers wondering how the Iteian monk perceived the issue surrounding Ulleungdo, the island the Japanese used to call Takeshima. However, the book does not indicate whether that Iteian monk left any separate descriptions regarding the issue nor does it attempt to explain why the monk failed to leave any record of such a major diplomatic issue at the time. Perhaps the reason Ikeuchi chose not to further cover the Ulleungdo issue was because doing so would create an overlap with another book he published in October of the same year. The only way to determine whether this speculation is accurate is to read *Nihonjin no Chōsen-kan wa ikani shite keisei sareta ka* [How the Japanese Perception of Joseon Was Formed] (Kodansha, 2017).

*Early Modern Korea-Japan Relation Reference: Yanagawa Shigeoki Kuji Kiroku**

Translated and annotated by Sang-Joon KIM and Yu-Sook YOUN
Seoul: Northeast Asian History Foundation, 2016

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Min-jung SHIM
Tongmyong University

Overview

The *Yanagawa Shigeoki Kuji Kiroku* ("The Record of the Yanagawa Shigeoki Trial") is the record of a lawsuit between Sō Yoshinari, the lord of Tsushima, and Yanagawa Shigeoki, his feudal vassal. The Yanagawa clan was a key member of the nobility in Tsushima domain from the time of Shigeoki's grandfather, Shigenobu. At the same time, the family held another status as a direct subject of the Tokugawa shogunate. While enjoying the unique privilege of simultaneously belonging to both Tsushima domain and the shogunate, the Yanagawa family never neglected their loyalty to either side. When Shigeoki became the head of the clan, however, he shifted the focus of his allegiance to the shogunate and worked on matters of the central government. This led to a feud with Sō Yoshinari, the lord of Tsushima, who was displeased by signs of the wavering loyalty of his vassal. The deteriorating relationship eventually culminated in a lawsuit in 1631 in which both sides accused the other in the court of the shogunate. Shigeoki wanted to officially sever his ties with Tsushima domain and become a di-

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* The original title for this book is *Kŭnse Han-Il kwan'gye saryojip: Yanagawa Sigeok'i Kuji kirok.* 근세한일관계사료집: 야나가와 시게오키 구지기록.

rect vassal of the shogunate. Sō Yoshinari charged Shigeoki with being a traitorous vassal who attempted to disrupt the established feudal order of Japan. The litigation eventually ended in favor of the lord of Tsushima in 1635. Yanagawa Shigeoki was declared a “disloyal vassal” and sentenced to banishment.

A shocking discovery was made in the process of the lawsuit, though. It was revealed that the local government of Tsushima domain had forged and tampered with the official diplomatic correspondence between Joseon and the shogunate since the Imjin War in the late 16th century. What had begun as a personal legal dispute now suddenly took on an international significance that affected the formal diplomatic relationship between the two neighboring countries. The matter promptly led to an investigation by the shogunate on the ramifications of the forgery and its impact on the diplomatic relations between Joseon and Japan. In response to the incident, the title of shogun and the reign year in the diplomatic correspondence were changed, and a series of broad-level measures were implemented to monitor the creation and the transit of diplomatic correspondence to prevent tampering. The importance of the security of the official diplomatic channel was clearly recognized by the shogunate, which led to extensive and systematic modifications to safeguard against a similar failure.

The revamping of the diplomatic communication system has attracted the majority of the scholarly interest in the Yanagawa affair while its far-reaching repercussions on the relations among Joseon, Japan, and Tsushima have tended to be overlooked. This was in part due to the difficulty of deciphering the original documents.

This book is a detailed translation of the original record of the Yanagawa affair, Yanagawa Shigeoki Kuji Kiroku, by two specialists in early modern Korean-Japanese relations, Yu-Sook Youn and Sang-Joon Kim. Youn is widely recognized for her expertise in using primary source materials written in Japanese, as displayed in her previous books, Japanese References on Ulleungdo and Dokdo and Joseon-Japan Relations in the Early Modern Period and Ulleungdo. The authors’ knowledge of early modern Japanese history is also evident in the current book, which is characterized by a vast array of well-informed footnotes explaining the inci-

dents in detail, people, and special vocabulary featured in the book. These additions will enable readers of every level to easily understand the text.

This book is composed of two parts: The first comprises the bibliographical explanation of Yanagawa Shigeoki Kuji Kiroku and its annotated translation, which is subdivided into three sections; the second is the Original Facsimile. The explanation and annotation contain a collection of relevant documents including contemporary reactions to the trial, the aftermath of the lawsuit, the sentencing statement, and other matters. The book thus facilitates a broad understanding of the international relation between Joseon and Japan at the time. This publication is expected to make a significant contribution to expanding the scope of relevant historical research.

The bibliographical explanation covers the content of the Yanagawa affair and its historical context as well as a brief evaluation of the historical significance of the Record. The evaluation, however, is perhaps too brief to do it justice, thus I would like to explore further to supplement it and unearth more meaning and points of interest. Since this book is fundamentally a translation rather than a scholarly argument with value judgments, I would like to focus on a few keywords to illuminate and evaluate this book.

Yanagawa Shigeoki (柳川調興) and Sō Yoshinari (宗義成)

The bibliographical explanation devotes much attention to explaining who Yanagawa Shigeoki (1603-84) was, which is quite natural, if not required, as the title of the Record and the legal case centers around the surname "Yanagawa."

The Yanagawa family enjoyed a dual status as a local retainer of Tsushima domain and as a salaried official of the shogunate since the time of Shigeoki's grandfather Shigenobu down to Shigeoki's father Toshinaga. While they had authority and privilege stemming from their unique situation, such as receiving a separate fief from the shogunate and an international trade license with Joseon, the Yanagawa clan remained faithful to both Tsushima and the shogunate until the time of Shigeoki.

After becoming the leader of the clan, Shigeoki increasingly sought

to achieve independence from the lord of Tsushima domain. As written in the *Record*, it is possible to glean what Shigeoki was thinking from the testimonies of Sō Yoshinari: "Since the time of his grandfather and his father, I have placed (Shigeoki) in charge of all internal and external affairs despite his shortcomings and have treated him well. However, even last year he filed a lawsuit concerning the fiefdom." "When the Joseon Tongsinsa (envoys) arrived, Yanagawa acted insolently and suddenly changed the ensign of his ship to a bird feather and the symbol to two heads." "When I told Yanagawa to come down to Tsushima, he refused to heed my order." Shigeoki himself made no attempt to attenuate his claim of independence, frequently arguing that he was an official of the Tokugawa shogunate and not a vassal of the Sō family. He was also absent from Tsushima until 1617 when he finally returned to meet the Tongsinsa. This continual aggravation of the falling out ultimately resulted in the trial of 1631.

While the *Record* is concerned with the litigation between Sō Yoshinari, the lord of Tsushima, and Yanagawa Shigeoki, his feudal vassal, as well as the use of the surname "Yanagawa" in the title, there is no record of Shigeoki's own testimony regarding the trial. This is mainly due to the fact that, since the victor in the trial was Sō Yoshinari and the Record was part of his family library, "The Tsushima Sō Family Documents," there was no need to devote much attention to what Shigeoki said and argued during the trial. This can be clearly seen from the first sentence of the Record, which stated, "The record of all relevant documents of the trial in which Yanagawa Buzen Shigeoki appealed to the shogunate on the alleged wrongdoings in the diplomatic relations between Japan and Joseon, but eventually lost due to his own failings." Thus the Record works as propaganda material to advocate the perspective of the lord of Tsushima and to emphasize the fact that Yanagawa lost the trial due to his own faults. The Record also presents the questions posed by the shogun and the disputations of Sō Yoshinari against the allegation of Shigeoki. Thus it is impossible to know exactly what questions were put to Shigeoki and what his answers were. All researchers studying the material thus can only see a one-sided view of the affair. It is regrettable that there is no alternative balanced source of information that covers both sides of the trial.

Yanagawa Shigeoki Kuji Kiroku Section I

Section I of the *Record* deals with the entire process of the trial initiated by Shigeoki with his petition to surrender the fiefdom (J. *chigyō*) his family had received from the lord of Tsushima domain. Prior to the main body of the trial, a brief survey of background information is given regarding the history of the Yanagawa family, how they won the trust of the shogunate, and the Tongsinsa (envoys). Once the trial started, the proceedings of the trial were collated in order, including the questions posed by the "elders" who were the senior advisers of the shogun (J. roju), the questions asked by the shogun himself, the final sentence, and the related documents. The related documents are thirty-five in total and include the request to temporarily cease the dispatch of the annual trade emissary from Tsushima to Joseon, the circumstances surrounding the exposure of Tsushima's tampering with official diplomatic correspondence, and other matters.

1. The Sequence of Events and the Result of the Yanagawa Affair

The official beginning of the Yanagawa affair started in 1631 when Yanagawa Shigeoki petitioned to officially relinquish his license to send Sōshisen (送使船), the annual trade and diplomatic emissary to Joseon. Prior to this, Shigeoki frequently neglected his duties to his feudal lord, the lord of Tsushima, while devoting his time and service to the shogunate. With his petition, Shigeoki desired to shed his ties and duties to Tsushima domain and to become a direct officer of the shogunate based in the fief in Kyushu that he had received from the shogunate. The trial, of which we only know what the lord of Tsushima thought and said, took several years. However, in 1635 the Tokugawa shogun Iemitsu (1604-51) personally intervened and issued the final verdict in favor of the lord of Tsushima. Having been acquitted of any wrongdoing, Sō Yoshinari received back his rights to trade with Joseon and to govern the Tsushima domain. Shigeoki, on the other hand, was sentenced to exile in Tsugaru-han and died there in 1684.

2. Exposure of the Tampering of Diplomatic Correspondence

What had begun as a personal dispute in terms of the domestic feudal order took a serious turn in the eleventh lunar month of 1634 when Shigeoki exposed the fact that the diplomatic correspondence regarding the dispatch of the Joseon Tongsinsa between Joseon and Japan had been forged. Now an international issue, shogunate officials quickly jumped into the trial which had previously been languishing in the typically stagnant shogunate bureaucracy, as indicated by a decree dated on the second day of the twelfth lunar month of 1634, which read, "Until the end of this trial, all maritime traffic to and from Joseon will be halted." The most interesting part of this section is the "shogun's own questions," as these were no doubt the critical points that decided the outcome of the trial. These questions examined only the points of contention where the allegations by Shigeoki and Yoshinari conflicted.

The interrogation of the lord of Tsushima by the shogun in the third lunar month of 1634 was primarily focused on the forgery of the diplomatic correspondence. The shogun Iemitsu asked several questions including how Yoshinari came by the forged letters and the seal, whether the allegation that Yoshinari's father Yoshitoshi had forged the diplomatic correspondence was true, how Yoshinari could be unaware of the crimes perpetrated by his subordinates, and other issues. The interrogation was clearly aimed at clarifying the degree of knowledge and involvement of the lord of Tsushima in the forgery of the diplomatic correspondence. While the shogun Iemitsu eventually sided with the lord of Tsushima, it was the result of these questions that measured Yoshinari's capability as the principal actor in the communication and trade with Joseon.

3. How the Joseon Tongsinsa was Received in Japan

In the introduction of Section I of the *Record*, there is an entry titled the "Preface on the Visit of the Joseon Tongsinsa," which is seemingly irrelevant to the trial and makes one wonder why the "Preface" was included. However, the "Preface" is a valuable guide that shows how the shogunate

viewed the Joseon Tongsinsa and, based on that view, the significance of the diplomatic correspondence the Tongsinsa carried during that time. This understanding was the standard by which the main actors in Japanese international relations were selected.

According to the Preface, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, who had unified Japan, sought to establish the legitimacy of his rule through the recognition by foreign countries as tangibly expressed by the Joseon Korea Tongsinsa. The Tongsinsa sent in 1607, 1617, and 1624 were all seen under the same light, as a tangible expression of foreign political approval that justified the hereditary rule of the leader of the Tokugawa shogunate. The allegation that the official diplomatic correspondence carried by the Tongsinsa could have been forged, therefore, raised a very serious problem that could undermine the legitimacy of the shogunate, a problem which led to the direct intervention by the shogun Iemitsu himself.

The symbolic significance of the Tongsinsa can also be seen at the end of the sentence issued by the shogun. When Yoshinari was acquitted, a direct command was added at the end of the sentence which stated, "(The shogun) commanded that the Tongsinsa should come from Joseon in this year or the next year." In exchange for political absolution, the lord of Tsushima had to use all his influence to persuade Joseon to send the Tongsinsa to once again legitimize the shogunate.

Yanagawa Shigeoki Kuji Kiroku Section II

Section II of the *Record* preserves the aftermath of the verdict, including the reorganization of the trade and diplomatic procedures with Joseon between Tsushima and the shogunate, the pledge of Tsushima domain, and other matters. The main points of interest include notifying Joseon of the conclusion of the trial, the resumption of the saikensen (歲遣船, the annual trade and diplomatic emissary from Tsushima to Joseon) rotation, the provision for recruitment of the personnel to be in charge of the composition of the diplomatic letter, the revision of the basic format of the diplomatic letter, the process of writing the pledge letter, and other documents.

The overall impression is that Tsushima domain was very cautious

and careful regarding the demands of the shogunate.

1. The Notification of the End of the Yanagawa Affair and the Resumption of the Shisōsen (使送船)

After the conclusion of the trial, Tsushima domain immediately notified Joseon of the conclusion of the issue. Certainly, the main interest could have been in resuming normal relations and the flow of trade traffic with Joseon in order to replenish Tsushima which had been constrained by the trade embargo during the trial. However, there seems to have been the more urgent issue of persuading Joseon to send another Tongsinsa as the shogun had commanded. In order to make a request for the Tongsinsa, the resumption of the Shisōsen was a prerequisite.

It is evident that Tsushima urgently sought to notify Joseon of the conclusion of the trial, as Tsushima even tried to employ the service of a Korean equestrian acrobat who was returning to Joseon in less than a month after the end of the trial. But Tsushima was being remarkably cautious at the same time, as it ostensibly stated that it would await orders from the shogunate.

Furthermore, the diplomatic correspondence with the details of the trial that would be sent to Joseon had to be examined and approved in Edo government first. This procedure took approximately eight months to pass through the censorship process, and the correspondence finally arrived in Joseon in the eleventh month. This also suggests that the lord of Tsushima was very restrained in his dealings with Joseon and sought approval from Edo every step of the way.

In the eleventh month of 1635, before the resumption of the Shisōsen dispatch, Tsushima temporarily returned to Joseon the trade license (J. *tosho*, K. *Toseo*) and the official attire belonging to Yanagawa Shigeoki, Iteian (以酊庵), and Ryūhōuin (流芳院), the guilty party in the trial. But in Section III of the *Record*, the lord of Tsushima again requested the restoration of the trade license and the assigned Shisōsen.

It is unfortunate that there is no record of how the trade and the diplomatic relations between Joseon Korea and Tsushima changed as a result of

the trial. For instance, the circumstances surrounding the resumption of the Shisōsen of Yanagawa Shigeoki and of Iteian are recorded in Section III of the *Record*. However, there is no mention of the reduction of the Shisōsen system after the implementation of the Gyeomdaeje system (兼帶制: one emissary from Tsushima carrying multiple diplomatic correspondence representing different parties in Japan rather than each party sending its own emissary). One must wonder whether the omission was due to a sense of embarrassment on the Tsushima side or perhaps there was simply no need to mention the Gyeomdaeje system. It is nevertheless regrettable that there is no record of Japanese reaction to the substantial changes Joseon Korea introduced on the occasion of the end of the trial in regard to the rules of diplomatic and trade relations, including the reception of the Shisōsen. It would also have been better for the book to have included a footnote on the Gyeomdaeje in order to explain the system even briefly.

2. The Iteian (以酊庵) Monks on Rotation and the "Secretary for Writing Letters" (書翰役人)

Because the forgery of the diplomatic correspondence was uncovered during the trial, writing the diplomatic correspondence to Joseon became a great concern for Tsushima. The concern was also compounded by the shogun's stern command at the end of the trial to solicit the visit of the Joseon Tongsinsa as soon as possible. Since Tsushima could not afford to fail again the expectations and the trust of the shogunate, on the fourth month of 1635, soon after the conclusion of the trial, Tsushima resorted to requesting the shogunate to establish a clerical secretariat and to appoint a shogunate official to oversee the drafting of the diplomatic correspondence.

The officials in the shogunate, however, were again at their usual ease and slow to react. The first response from Edo government read, "It would be well to invite a knowledgeable Buddhist monk from among the Gozan monks to serve as the elder on (Tsushima's) salary (the fourth month of 1635)." The second reply from Edo to Tsushima's request for the members of the secretariat only stated, "The shogunate will issue an order (the seventh month of 1635)." The full guideline from Edo regarding the

secretariat finally arrived in the 8th month of 1635, four months after the persistent requests from the lord of Tsushima.

The Buddhist monks called “Iteian” were to receive a salary of 100 koku (石) and there were to be three members in the office taking turns serving on a duty rotation. Every letter they wrote had to be approved by the shogunate. Each letter also had to be copied and the duplicate had to be preserved at their office. Through this new system, the shogunate became deeply involved in the process of the trade and diplomacy between Joseon and Tsushima that had previously been mainly managed by Tsushima before.

Section II of the *Record* has a considerable amount of detail on the Iteian system. In the Tongsinsa embassy of 1636, for instance, the diplomatic correspondence from Japan was written by the Iteian monk in a different format, which is also recorded in Section II. Some of the main points of change included the title of the shogun being changed to “Taikun” (大君) and the letter goes on to elaborate the achievements of the shogunate for a considerable length. Furthermore, in Section III of the Record, the new version of the diplomatic correspondence format is featured in detail, which serves as the main reference for the reform of the diplomatic process with Joseon after the trial.

Yanagawa Shigeoki Kuji Kiroku Section III

In Section III of the *Record*, nineteen documents relevant to the trial were collected, such as briefs on the relations with Joseon Korea before and after the trial, supporting evidence for and elaborations on the arguments put forward by the lord of Tsushima, and other matters.

Most of the information supplements the documents in Section I and II, thus it helps to improve the overall understanding of the trial and its result.

1. Additional Data for the Yanagawa Affair

More than one-half of Section III of the *Record* is filled with supplementa-

ry information regarding the trial. Section III begins with a collection of letters exchanged between the lord of Tsushima and the elder of the shogunate (*roju*) in the form of questions and answers on the relationship between the Yanagawa clan and the lord of Tsushima, the background on Yanagawa Shigeoki's relocation to Sunpu, the lawsuit on fiefdoms filed in 1626, what led to the trial of 1631, and other issues.

The second supplement is titled, "The beginning of the trial of 1631." This supplement records in detail how Shigeoki disrupted the feudal order of the lord and vassal relationship and the eleven crimes Shigeoki allegedly committed. These crimes included, to name a few, how Shigeoki stayed in Sunpu and attempted to build a patron relationship with the shogunate; how Shigeoki acted as if he was an equal peer of the lord of Tsushima after having received an official title from Joseon together with his lord; how the underlings of Shigeoki ignored the lord of Tsushima and spread many innuendos against him; how Shigeoki appointed unauthorized Jaepan (裁判, court trials), the diplomatic emissary between Joseon and Tsushima, and other matters.

There are also some additional details regarding Shigeoki's crimes as reported by the diplomat monk Genpō (玄方), such as how Shigeoki tried to raise the status of Ryūhōuin (流芳院) Songsasun without permission, and how Shigeoki misappropriated the folding screen sent from the shogun to the Tongsinsa by switching it with a fake. In addition to these, every minute detail that could undermine and incriminate Shigeoki is also copied and collected, such as how Shigeoki divorced his wife who was the sister of the lord of Tsushima.

Why was it necessary to collect all these compromising documents against Shigeoki even after the trial had ended with a victory for the lord of Tsushima? The most important reason would have been to buttress the claim of legitimacy for the lord of Tsushima. Another reason was to use the information as an example for any possible future challenges against the received feudal order of lord and vassal. Coupled with a copy of the pledge of loyalty the lord of Tsushima sent to the Tokugawa shogun, these documents were expected to serve as a stern warning against any would-be rebelling vassal to safeguard the status quo of the Japanese feudalism.

The Value of the Record as a Historical Reference

The *Yanagawa Shigeoki Kuji Kiroku* (柳川調興公事記錄: "Record of the Yanagawa Shigeoki Trial") is a primary historical source that shows the formation of rules that governed the trade and diplomatic relations between Joseon Korea and Tokugawa Japan after the Imjin War. In 1609, the Giyu Treaty (己酉約條) laid the foundation for the resumption of the trade and diplomatic relations between Joseon and Japan through Tsushima. However, the shogunate did not become actively involved in the process. But when the forgery of diplomatic correspondence was exposed during the Yanagawa affair, it became necessary for the shogunate to intervene and take control of the Japanese system of trade and diplomatic relations established by the Giyu Treaty. The documents contained in this book help to improve our understanding of the circumstances surrounding the reform the shogunate made as a result of the trial.

Research on the Yanagawa affair has been led by Japanese scholars such as "*Nitchō tsukō bōekishi no kenkyū*" [Study on the history of Japan–Joseon trade] 日朝通交貿易史の研究 by Tashiro Kazui (1981), "*Kinsei Nitchō kankeishi no kenkyū*" [Study on the history of Japan–Joseon relations in the early modern period] 近世日朝關係史の研究 by Miyake Hidetoshi (1986), "*Kinsei Nihon to Higashi Ajia*" [Japan and East Asia in the early modern period] 近世日本と東アジア by Arano Yasunori (1988). While research on the *Record* has been conducted in Korea, scholars have tended to focus on how the contents of the diplomatic correspondence were changed due to the forgery and the tampering rather than on trying to understand the history and the context of the trial as a whole. This is mainly because of the level of difficulty involved in deciphering the old Japanese cursive script in which the *Record* was written. The publication of the current book, therefore, is welcome news for the researchers studying this material.

The exposure of the forgery of the diplomatic correspondence between Japan and Korea not only brought about the reorganization of the Joseon Tongsinsa and the format of the diplomatic correspondence, it also fundamentally changed how the trade and the diplomatic relations between

the two countries were conducted. Joseon also reformed the customs and the rules for how the emissaries from Tsushima were to be received; the implementation of Gyeomdaeje system (兼帶制) and Chawae (差倭, temporary emissary from Tsushima) are two of the notable examples. On the Japanese side, the most important change was the direct intervention and oversight by the Tokugawa shogunate including the establishment of the Iteian rotation. As this *Record* serves as the primary source of these changes, this book will prove useful for all interested researchers.

Regarding the study of Japanese local history, the *Record* is sometimes used as an example of a legal dispute that occurred within the samurai class. In the case of a dispute between lord and vassal, the shogunate would often also penalize the lord for the failure to properly control his vassals, thus largely resulting in the reduction of the *chigyō*. However, in the Yanagawa affair, the lord of Tsushima was acquitted of any wrongdoing on his part and was never penalized, which was a rare case.

But there are also regrettable limitations to the Record in that it contains no mention of any defense or an argument made by Yanagawa Shigeoki or the implementation of Gyeomdaeje.

*Assimilation and Exclusion: Assimilation Policy and Japanese-Korean Intermarriage during the Japanese Colonial Rule**

By Jeongseon YI
Seoul: Yeoksa bipyeongsa, 2017

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Ho-Chul SEO**
The Academy of Korean Studies

The term *naisen kekkon* 內鮮結婚, referred to intermarriage between the Japanese and Koreans during the colonial period in Korea (1910-45). Even before it gained currency, there had been cases of *naisen kekkon*, albeit rare, either in reality or in imaginative discourse, due to increasing contacts between Koreans and Japanese after opening of Korea to Japan in 1876. It

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* The original title for this book is *Donghwa wa baeje: Ilje eui donghwa jeongchaek gwa naeseon gyeorhon* 동화와 배제: 일제의 동화정책과 내선결혼. This review is an English translation of Ho-Chul Seo, "Naeseon gyeorheon, jeongchak/damron gwa gaeindeul eui unmyeong" (Japanese-Korean Intermarriage: Its Discourse and Policy, and Fortunes of Individuals), *Yeoksa bipyeong*, issue 125 (Winter 2018).

**The reviewer has been affiliated with the Academy of Korean Studies as an associate professor. His research interests include modern system of weights and measures, time, and standards. Over the past several years he has been trying to complete a dictionary compilation of the organization and function of the Japanese Government-General of Korea. His articles include "Nuga gungmin igo nuga yugweonja ga doenunga?–Namhan eui choecho chongseongeo wa jumin eui jagyeok·bunryu·deungnok" (Who will be a national citizen? Who will be a voter?: South Korea's first general election, and qualification, classification, and registration of residents), "Seoul eui ddong ojum sugeo chegye eui hyeongseong gwa byeonhwa" (Formation and change of collection methods of Seoul's human excrement), "Joseon chongdokbu naemu buseo wa singminji eui naemu haengjeong–jibanggwa wa sahoegwa reul jungsim euro" (The GGK's departments for internal affairs and colonial domestic administration: focused on the departments for society and province), and so on.

was in no way a far-fetched metaphor in a male-oriented society that colonial rule by the alien was compared to the sexual union of the ruling male and the subject female. As a matter of fact, at the time of the annexation of Korea in 1910 and the imminent establishment of the Government-General of Korea (Chōsen sōtokufu 朝鮮總督府, hereafter the GGK), the *Tokyo Puck* (東京パック), a popular Japanese *manga* magazine of current affairs, featured an amicable image of a Japanese husband and his Korean bride as an epitome of the annexation.[1]

The imaginative discourse that associated alien rule with sexual union between ruler and ruled—more exactly, sexual exploitation of the ruled female—had real effects. The *Maeil sinbo* 每日申報, a pro-Japanese Korean newspaper, reported "a recent rumor that a number of Korean men and women have married hurriedly without selecting an auspicious day or preparing ceremonious food before a law for intermarriage between Japanese and Korean youths comes into effect from the first day of the coming month."[2] And several ensuing articles tried to persuade Korean people that they were not to be misled, and that such misunderstanding would risk instigating underage marriage. Nevertheless, Korean parents had reason to feel anxiety about it and parents with unmarried daughters surely had more reason to do so.

As Japanese colonial rule over Koreans progressed over time, contact between the two peoples increased, resulting in a steady increase of cases of Japanese-Korean (J. *naisen*) marriages. Insofar as Korea remained a colony of Japan, *naisen* marriage could not be counted as an 'international' marriage. But, since there was no legal mechanism in which to report and register the naisen marriage at the beginning of colonial rule, such marriage followed the procedure of international marriage in order to gain the

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1 Han Jeongseon, "HanIl hapbyeong gwa siseon eui jeongchihak: geundae Ilbon jeguk eui sigak munhwa wa manhwa maeche" (Japanese annexation of Korea and viewer politics: Japanese empire's visual culture and manga media), *Dongyangsahak yeon'gu* 93 (2005), p. 249.

2 *Maeil sinbo* (Daily news), September 18, 1910, *jappo* (Miscellaneous), "Pungseol oin" (Rumor misleads people); Yi Jeongseon, *Donghwa wa baeje*, p. 55, note 45. Hereafter, citing from the author's work will use parenthetical in-text citation.

state's recognition. If marriage was viewed purely as a matter of personal relationships between individuals, the state might limit itself to the role of instituting legal apparatuses to ensure its legal and administrative validity. The event of a *naisen* marriage, however, was touted as a telling symbol of the assimilation policies by the colonial authorities that put forth the assimilation slogans such as *isshi dōjin* 一視同仁 (impartiality and equal favor), *naisen yūwa* 內鮮融和 (harmony between Japanese and Koreans) and *naisen ittai* 內鮮一体 (Japan and Korea as one unity), as Japan's colonial rule progressed. From the beginning, the GGK didn't simply push ahead with legalizing the *naisen* marriage practices in colonial Korea by establishing legal procedures and institutions. But, it also articulated several times its position to champion such marriages between the two peoples, as in the case of the highly publicized royal intermarriage between Crown Prince Ŭimin (Yi Ŭn) and Crown Princess Yi Pangja (Masako) in 1920 as an ideal symbol of Japan's principle of *naisen yūwa*. Apart from a few high-profile strategic cases, however, the Japanese government and the GGK never fully supported the *naisen* marriage with policies and institutions. Most of the cases of the *naisen* marriage were arranged among Koreans and Japanese of lower classes who were driven by either free love or by necessity due to a hard life.

In this context, Yi Jeongseon's book, *Assimilation and Exclusion: Assimilation Policy and Japanese-Korean Intermarriage during Japanese Colonial Rule*, grasps the nature of Japanese colonial domination, including assimilation policy, by exploring the gap between the discourse on and the reality of the *naisen* marriage as well as between its propaganda and its actual policy. Needless to say, the first merit of this monograph lies in its latest and scrupulous research into topics encompassing its legal institutions, propaganda, actual legal cases, and the like. The book consists of the following three parts. The first part concerns the legal institutions of the *naisen* marriage and their operation, from 1910 to the 1930s. The second part treats the propaganda on the *naisen* marriage and its actual status, from 1910 to the 1930s. And, the third part explores the policy of *naisen* marriage and the problems of a mixed-blood population.

The first part of the book examines how the GGK amended and man-

aged the legal institutions pertaining to *naisen* marriage in order to give it legal sanction from the beginning of colonial rule until the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. As mentioned above, *naisen* marriage had been treated as a *de facto* international marriage. Even though colonial Korea was an integral part of the Japanese empire, the Japanese authorities were mindful that the same Japanese rights and duties could not be extended to the Koreans. Therefore, they designated colonial Korea as a separate "legal realm" (J. *hōiki* 法域) in order to distinguish it from mainland Japan in legal jurisdiction. Because Japanese law did not automatically take effect in Korea, though some parts did, its extension to Korea, if in part, had to be authorized by imperial ordinance or revised by the governor-general's ordinances.

At the beginning of colonial rule, the *naisen* marriage entailed basically two legal problems. First, there existed no legal mechanism by which to link the civil register of Korea (*minjeok* 民籍) and the family register (J. *koseki* 戶籍) of Japan, which belonged to separate legal realms, respectively. The legal identity of both Koreans and Japanese was based on their place of residence. However, the transfer of individual and family to the other country's family register through marriage or adoption was out of the question since its allowance could obscure the boundaries of the national identity of the two people, respectively. Then, according to the modern Japanese family registration system, a Korean woman, once married to a Japanese man, should be omitted from her native family register, and be newly entered into her husband's family register.

Second, the civil registration system of Korea in the 1910s, based on the civil registration law in conformity with the Japanese family registration system during the time of the Korean Empire, was at variance with the Japanese system in several regulations due to Korean traditional customs including a reporting of marriage. The Japanese family registration system provided that marriage could be recognized by the state when both parties reported it. On the contrary, Korean customs had it that marriage had been acknowledged by marriage ritual and was followed by reporting to the state by the male family head. Besides, as had been practiced in Japan, Korean customs had not recognized adoption of the son-in-law as the heir, nor

the husband's marrying into the wife's family.

The differences of Korean customs from the Japanese laws notwithstanding, the GGK recognized the *naisen* marriage as a legal relation and tried to solve its procedural problems by amending some legal provisions in consultation with the mainland Japanese government. With regard to the matters (both civil and criminal) of family transfer and registration, a general law was issued in April, 1918, and applied both to the metropole and its colonies. The regulation, which stipulates an abrogation of one's membership in a family (J. *ie* 家) by reason of marriage or other cases, finally came into effect starting from July, 1921, after a period of its suspension. Two years later, when the Regulation of the Joseon Family Registration (J. *Chōsen hosekirei* 朝鮮戸籍令), in tune with the Japanese family registration system, was enforced, the GGK decreed that marriage be recognized through its reporting by the concerned couple to the state authorities, thereby removing almost all legal difficulties on behalf of the *naisen* marriage.[3]

The first and second chapters of the first part of the book describe the above-mentioned procedural problems and legal amendments pertaining to the *naisen* marriage. The third chapter describes actual cases of permissible and non-permissible transfers of family registration between Korea and Japan in the legal event of such relations as marriage, adoption, divorce, dissolution of adoption, and other issues. This chapter constitutes, to date, one of the most detailed researches into the legal aspects not only of the *naisen* marriage, but also of colonial Korea's family registration system.

The author depends largely on the primary sources centering on the Established Rules on Family Registration (J. *hoseki reiki* 戸籍例規). The *hoseki reiki*, delivered to the local functionaries from the GGK's judiciary bureaus in response to their questions on such difficult cases, is a collection

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[3] The *Chōsen hosekirei* 朝鮮戸籍令 (1923) of that magnitude should have been enacted under an imperial edict, but was issued by the ordinance of the GGK. This fact is indicative of serious conflict between the mainland Japanese government and the GGK over the issue of to what extent traditional Korean customs of family membership and inheritance ought to be acknowledged, even though the ordinance was considered much closer to the Japanese family registration system than to the *minsekihō* 民籍法, previously issued. See Yi Seung'il, *Joseon chongdokbu beopje jeongchaek* (Legal policy of the GGK) (Seoul: Yeoksa bipyeongsa, 2008), pp. 241-47.

of rules and standards regarding the knotty and difficult cases of family registration. The cases first appeared in the official bulletin (J. *Kanpō* 官報) of the GGK for national circulation and later were edited and published in book volumes. The author highly appreciates the value of the *hoseki reiki* for understanding and clarifying the difficult and complicated issues of the *naisen* marriage. To be certain, the cases contained in the *hoseki reiki* were brought up to the colonial central government for authoritative interpretation and clarification by local clerks who vividly encountered a variety of patterns of difficulty in executing family registration. The author's endeavor to sort out such highly complex and convoluted cases needs to deserve great attention.

The second part of the book that examines the propaganda and actual status of the *naisen* marriage seems much more dynamic than the first part. The first chapter focuses on the GGK's promotion and propaganda of *naisen* marriage. The author summarizes that "the GGK launched the promotion of the *naisen* marriage in earnest, only after its legal foundation was laid." (p. 447) In other words, it was not until the enactment of the Regulation of the Joseon Family Registration in July 1923 that the GGK started the promotion of *naisen* marriage in a serious manner. The priority of the GGK's assimilation policy in the 1920s shifted to the extension of mainland Japan's laws into colonial Korea in order to achieve the goal of *naisen yūwa* 內鮮融和 (harmony among Japanese and Koreans) in service of the cultural and racial unity under the ideology of *dōbun dōshu* 同文同種 (same script, same race) in the 1910s. The *naisen* marriage did receive considerable attention as a symbol of harmony and unity between Koreans and Japanese. Still, at the intersection of national separation, attributable possibly to the family registration system, and the racial assimilation through intermarriage (p. 30), the GGK did not provide full support for it. (p. 190)

The second chapter discusses statistics regarding *naisen* marriage, the numbers of which vary substantially depending on the materials used. Such differences seem to be derived from the unclarified nature of the statistical materials regarding whether they included the actual intermarriages in addition to the legally recognized ones or whether they also covered the intermarriages registered in mainland Japan in addition to colonial Korea.

Nevertheless, it can be assured that the *naisen* marriage never proliferated even if one chooses the most inclusive statistical material. Further, contrary to the common expectation, an overwhelming majority of the intermarriages were between low-class Japanese women and Korean men in the Japanese mainland, as mentioned above. The third chapter classifies the motivations for the intermarriages into several categories. And the fourth chapter explains the constraints on *naisen* love and marriage, as well as its conflicts and contradictions with other social institutions.

The third part of the book explores the policy changes concerned with *naisen* marriage during the period of wartime mobilization starting especially from the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. With the focus on the discourses and practices of *naisen ittai* 內鮮一体 (Japan and Korea as one unity) campaigns, such as name changing (*sōshi kaimei* 創氏改名), conscription (*chōhei* 徵兵) of Korean youths, some studies have explored literatures and institutions such as the Marriage Consulting Center. These researches have given rise to an assumption that a more rigorous launch of the *naisen*-marriage promotion policies were achieved by the GGK in this period.

However, the author refutes such assumptions as mistaken by pointing out two facts. First, the GGK never implemented its official promotion policy of *naisen* marriage as rigorously as the other assimilation projects such as name changing, use of the Japanese language, Shintō worship, and military conscription, even though they did make a significant effort to bring the *naisen* marriage closer to the goal of *naisen ittai*. For example, Governor-General Minami Jirō (August 1936 to May 1942) maintained that “the meaning of the *naisen* marriage can be found less in its effect of bringing integrity and harmony to the family through emotional relationships than in its effect of assimilating Korean values and lifestyles with those of the Japanese.” Second, confronted with the unintended increase of *naisen* marriages within the Japanese mainland due to the expanded migration of Korean men to Japan through labor and military mobilization, the officials from the Ministry of Health and Welfare (Kōseishō 厚生省) and the eugenicists voiced their anxieties about the drastic increase of intermarriage between the two peoples and their mixed-blood descendants in demo-

graphic policies. (p. 360) The Ministry of Health and Welfare was in charge of producing and raising healthy national subjects by healthy mothers in order to mobilize robust military forces; still, its policy was fundamentally intended for the increase of the ethnic Japanese population. The eugenics, geared to controlling the quality of the Japanese population, had a direct bearing on the maintenance of racial purity rather than the enhancement of the population qualities of Imperial Japan *en masse*.

Taken altogether, this monograph with its thick information defies easy reading. The coverage of source materials for the *naisen* marriage, including law revisions, the *hoseki reiki* 戸籍例規, actual cases and contemporary works on eugenics, is exhaustive. What is more, the skill to bring these varied materials together in a way to construct a coherent narrative on the *naisen* marriage merits high praise. Nonetheless, a question remains especially regarding the author's premise that the *naisen* marriage was part of assimilation policy of the GGK. Admitting that the GGK policy makers assumed an ambiguous attitude toward the *naisen* marriage, she holds on to the framework of assimilation in explaining the *naisen* marriage as the title of the book, *Assimilation and Exclusion*, suggests. Regardless of the challenge to the conventional studies, which tend to see the *naisen* marriage in terms of interracial and mixed-blood hybridity, she locates the assimilation policy in the dimensions of ideology, public sentiment, and education.

The author states that the *naisen* marriage was a form of assimilation conducted at the most intimate level. Yet, the idea of the *naisen* marriage could not be easily translated into the assimilation program of the GGK. This type of assimilation, given the nature of personal relationships, required a long-term change of the people's attitude toward the state, which was difficult for the state to wait and see. Moreover, there would be no guarantee that hybridity of intermarriage and mixed blood would result in one-sided assimilation. In fact, as in the second part, the author shows a number of *naisen*-marriage families that were rather assimilated into Korean practices according to class or residential conditions. Some of the *naisen*-marriage families might well resemble a new hybrid family of two cultures that can be found less in today's multicultural context than that of

the reality of colonial Korea at that time. We can sense, as illustrated in the third part, the anxieties of the Japanese officials during the wartime mobilization who took into serious account a racial and cultural blending in the process of the *naisen* marriage.

The author frequently mentions the GGK's 'promotion policy' of the *naisen* marriage while acknowledging it as lukewarm at most. If the policy just remained as rhetoric without being substantiated by some concrete programs, it can hardly be counted as a *bona fide* policy. In my estimation, a certain proactive policy maker of the GGK might give thought to the match making whose function is similar to the 'continental brides' (*tairiku hanayome* 大陸花嫁) sent to Manchuria. It should be remembered that during the time the ideals of 'free love' and 'marriage based on love' were celebrated. The GGK denounced the Korean custom of arranged underage marriage and lent legal recognition to marriage registration (thus willed) by spouses. It means that the GGK legalized the *naisen* marriage on the basis of the free will of both parties. Beyond such legal provisions, however, could they pursue promotion methods for the *naisen* marriage to achieve the goal of assimilation?

I would like to have an opportunity to listen to the author's answers to the questions and criticism, intended not to defame the author's exhaustive study on the topic by any means, as above. I expect future research, equipped with a perspective of 'coolness and warmth' (p. 8), to maintain the author's enthusiasm for and devotion to the theme of assimilation and exclusion.

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