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Articles

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Fur Trade between Joseon Dynasty and Jurchens in the Sixteenth Century

Soon-nam KIM
Korea University

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Fur Trade between Joseon Dynasty and Jurchens in the Sixteenth Century*

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I. Introduction

During the sixteenth century, Joseon dynasty actively engaged in ‘fur trade’ with the Jurchens in Manchuria.¹ The kinds of fur traded were that of sable, weasel, deer, leopard, fox, bear, tiger, lynx, and otter.² Among them, the fur of sable was the rarest and therefore became a major item of trade between Joseon and Jurchens at the time.

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¹ The Jurchens were a Tungusic people based in northeastern Manchuria. Among the Jurchens, Joseon maintained close relations with the Udige (兀狄哈) tribe along the Tumen River, the Wuliangha (兀良哈) tribe around the military outpost Maolianwei (毛憐衛), and the Odoli (斡朵里) tribe of the Jianzhou zuowei (建州左衛). In Joseon dynasty, the Jurchens were based north of the Tumen and Amnok rivers were referred to as yain (野人), which means ‘wild people.’

² Sable fur was referred to as chopi (貂皮), while weasel fur was seopi (鼠皮), deer fur was nokpi (鹿皮), leopard fur was pyopi (豹皮), tiger or fox fur was hopi (狐皮), bear fur was wungpi (熊皮), lynx fur was yipi (狸皮), and otter fur was sudalpi (水獺皮).

Throughout the fifteenth century, Joseon government tried to embrace the less socially sophisticated Jurchens. At the time, it attempted to stabilize its state system through a ‘good neighbor policy’ that sought to maintain relations with the other surrounding people by welcoming envoys from abroad and exchanging gifts and rewards. Circumstances changed, however, since the mid-fifteenth century when the Jurchen society’s development began to accelerate. And as the trade of sable fur grew vibrant in the sixteenth century, the societies of Joseon and the Jurchens entered into a new historical phase.

Bilateral trade between the two societies began around the end of the fifteenth century and became full-blown in the sixteenth century because the demand for sable fur in Joseon coincided with the demand for oxen and tools for farming among the Jurchens. To satisfy the domestic demand for sable fur and secure it for tributary purposes, Joseon had to allow horses, cows, and ironware to trickle across its border into Manchuria. This ended up weakening Joseon’s military capacity to defend its northern border and people living along the border would run away to Jurchen territories to escape the burden of making tributary payments and performing military duties which were required by Joseon government. The Jurchen society, on the other hand, quickly made use of the horses, cows, and iron goods from Joseon to expand farming and improve weaponry. As the Jurchens increasingly became able to secure the goods they desired through trade, they no longer felt the absolute need to send envoys to Joseon. This eventually led the relations between the two societies into a new historical phase.

Despite carrying historical significance, sixteenth century Joseon-Jurchen fur trade is yet to be studied in depth. Previous studies on the two societies have primarily tended to review their traditional neighborly relations, highlighting how Joseon took great pains to control the ignorant Jurchens.³ This approach, however, actually differed from the historical truth.

³ For studies on the traditional relations between Joseon and the Jurchens, see Lee Hyun-hee, “Joseon jeongi naejo yain cui jeongnyakjeok daeue daehayeo” [Diplomatic Treatment of Jurchens in the First Half of the Joseon Dynasty], *Sahak yeongu*, no. 18 (1964), pp. 299-328; Lee Hyun-hee, “Joseon jeongi ryugyeongsiwi yaingo,” *The Hyangto Seoul*, no. 20 (1964), pp. 55-96; Lee

The supposedly ignorant Jurchens managed to establish the Later Jin dynasty by the early seventeenth century and evolved into a power player in East Asia that came to dominate mainland China. Some studies took note of this fact and recognized the Jurchens as an entity separate from China and Joseon Korea⁴ and the latest studies on the Jurchens have confirmed that the Jurchen society had developed considerably by the mid fifteenth century.⁵

Based on research outcomes produced thus far, this paper aims to examine fur trade between Joseon and the Jurchens so as to uncover previously unknown aspects about the two societies during the sixteenth century.⁶ The paper first looks into the circumstances that led to the vibrant trade of fur at the time, then attempts to grasp how fur trade developed, and finally tries to understand how such trade caused the two societies to change and evolve. Delving into the reality of the societies of Joseon and the Ju-

Hyun-hee, "Joseon jeongi yain eui yugyeongsuhoechaek" [Strategies to Molli the Jurchens in the First Half of the Joseon Dynasty] in *Ilsan Kim Du-jong baksa huisu ginyeom nonmungip* [Essays in Celebration of Ilsan Kim Du-jong's Seventieth Birthday], 1966, pp. 61-121; Lee Hyun-hee, "Daeyeojin: Muyeok daeyain gyoseop jeongchaek baegyeyong" [Trade with the Jurchens: Conditions Surrounding Joseon's Negotiation Policy Toward with the Jurchens], *Hanguksaron*, no. 11 (1982), pp. 285-324; Suh Byung-kuk, "Joseon jeongi dae yeojin gwangye" [Relations with the Jurchens in the First Half of the Joseon Dynasty], *Guksagwan nonchong*, no. 14 (1990), pp. 135-170; Kang Sung-moon, "Joseon sidae yeojin jeongbeol e gwanhan yeongu" [A Study on Yeojin Conquests in the Joseon Period], *Gunsa*, no. 18 (1989), pp. 43-72; Han Sung-joo, "Joseon chogi sujik yeojinin yeongu: Sejongdae reul jungsim euro" [A Study on the Received the Office of Jurchens in the Early Chosun Dynasty-Focused into Sejong period], *Joseon sidaesa hakbo*, no. 36 (2006), pp. 67-108; Han Sung-joo, "Joseon chogi jomyeong ijung sujik yeojinin eui yangsok munje" [Study on the Jurchens who were dually appointed from both Chosun and Ming in the Early Chosun Dynasty], *Joseon sidaesa hakbo*, no. 40 (2007), pp. 5-43.

⁴ Kim Han-gyu, *Yodongsa* [The History of Liaodong] (Seoul: Moonji Publishing Company, 2004).

⁵ Kim Soon-nam, "Joseon Seongjongdae uljeokhape daehayo" [A Study of the Udige Clan during the Reign of King Seongjong of Joseon], *Joseon sidaesa hakbo*, no. 49 (2009), pp. 35-63; Kim Soon-nam, "Joseon Seongjongdae eui geonju samwi" [Jianzhou sanwei (建州三衛) during the Reign of King Seongjong of Joseon], *Daedong munhwa yeongu*, no. 68 (2009), pp. 223-54.

⁶ Yi Tae-jin studied the extent to which the Jurchens were involved in East Asian trade and its connection to fur trade. Yi Tae-jin, "16segi gukje gyoyeok eui baldal gwa seoul sangeop eui seongsae" [The Sixteenth Century Development of International Trade and the Ebb and Flow of Commerce in Seoul], in *Seoul sangeopsa* [The Commercial History of Seoul] (Taehaksa, 2000), pp. 79-142.

rchens in the sixteenth century should be able to confirm that fur trade played an important role in bringing change to the traditional relations between the two societies.

II. The Circumstances Surrounding Fur Trade

1. Farming Expands Among the Jurchens

The Jurchen society's development was what initiated the fur trade with Joseon since the end of the fifteenth century. After leading a semi-agricultural, semi-nomadic lifestyle throughout the first half of the fifteenth century, the Jurchens gradually transitioned into an agricultural society. As farming expanded since the mid-fifteenth century, the Jurchens found themselves in a set of political, social, and economic circumstances different from before. And fur trade with Joseon was one of the factors that facilitated such change within the Jurchen society.

During the early years of Joseon, the Jurchens were incapable of relying entirely on agriculture. Their farming had remained rudimentary up until the early fifteenth century so that their techniques and production lagged behind those of Ming China or Joseon Korea. Their own efforts were necessary in order to advance, but they were also in dire need of assistance from the outside world. This is why they kept abducting the Han Chinese in the Liaodong region who were familiar with farming methods or Joseon farmers living near the Amnok and Duman Rivers, forcing them to perform agricultural labor.⁷

Among the Jurchens, the Jianzhou Jurchens were the quickest to achieve agricultural development.⁸ This was because they had been geographically located close to Joseon and the Liaodong regional military commission (*Liaodong dusi*), the local defense headquarters of Ming Chi-

⁷ Suh, "Joseon jeongi dae yeojin gwangye."

⁸ The Jianzhou Jurchens resided along the upper Songhua River as well as the Amnok River and Pozhu River.

na.⁹ At a location where it was easier to be either assisted or threatened by Joseon and Ming China, the Jianzhou Jurchens made the most of their position to agriculturally evolve at a much faster pace than any of the other Jurchens.¹⁰ Like most Jurchens, they too abducted and made slaves of the Han Chinese or people from Joseon, particularly making them perform agricultural tasks in addition to other household labor. Joseon therefore played an influential role in the agricultural development of the Jianzhou Jurchens during that time.¹¹

Various records of the Joseon dynasty prove that the Jurchens did indeed abduct Ming Chinese and Joseon people and force them into agricultural slavery. One mentions how a Jurchen named Tong Möngke Temür led his tribe in an attack on Gyeongwon (慶源) County in 1410, the tenth year of King Taejong. After killing or injuring Joseon men and women in the area, some were taken away as slaves along with their horses and cows.¹² This invasion is mentioned once more in a report by an army deputy commander from Hamgil Province submitted in 1434, the sixteenth year of King Sejong.¹³ These are also mention of Ming Chinese taken away to have them perform farming tasks. Another record describes how the Jurchens approached a Joseon border commander and threatened him when in 1437, the nineteenth year of King Sejong, Joseon tried to repatriate some

⁹ The Jianzhouwei was a military outpost (*weisuo*) that belonged to Nuergan dusi (奴兒干都司) established by the Ming dynasty in 1409, the seventh year of the Yongle Emperor, to prevent the residual forces of the Yuan dynasty from collaborating with the Jurchens in eastern Liaodong. In November 1403, the Ming established Jianzhouwei and appointed Ahacu, the leader of the Huligai tribe, as the outpost's commander. Ahachu thereafter advised Möngke Temür, the leader of the Odoli tribe, to submit to the Ming dynasty and when he did a couple of years later in 1405, the Ming dynasty appointed him as commander-in-chief and installed the Jianzhou zuowei. Later on, the commander of Jianzhou zuowei Möngke Temür was murdered by Yang Mutawuta, Möngke Temür's son Tung-shan and brother Fancha came into conflict over the hegemony of Jianzhou zuowei. The Ming stepped in by having Tung-shan inherit his father's position as a commander of Jianzhou zuowei and newly installed Jianzhou youwei for Fancha to oversee.

¹⁰ *The veritable records of King Seongjong*, vol. 80, 1st of fifth month 1477, entry no. 2.

¹¹ Kim, *Yodongsa*, p. 544.

¹² *The veritable records of King Taejong*, vol. 19, 5th of fourth month 1410, entry no. 2.

¹³ *The veritable records of King Sejong*, vol. 65, 10th of eighth month 1434, entry no. 4.

Ming Chinese who had been captured by the Jurchens. The Jurchens claimed that the people of Joseon were trying to repatriate to Ming China were slaves they had duly acquired through trade and threatened that if Joseon refused to hand the slaves over, they would retaliate by taking Joseon people away instead.¹⁴

Hence, when the Joseon dynasty was in its infancy around the early fifteenth century, the Jurchen society was still inexperienced in agriculture to the degree that it was impossible to operate properly without external help. It was only by the mid-fifteenth century during King Sejong's reign when agriculture in the Jurchen society was able to develop to a certain extent due to a combination of internal and external factors. Such progress also prompted Joseon to determine the opportune time to launch a military conquest. In 1433, the fifteenth year of his reign, King Sejong ordered Choe Yun-deok to lead a conquest of the Jianzhou Jurchens. The attack was scheduled to take place after the 20th of fourth month when the Jurchens were likely to come down from the mountains for the farming season¹⁵ and make their way to Joseon to ask for seeds.¹⁶ Meanwhile, since the mid-fifteenth century, what Joseon bestowed to the Jurchens in return for the harvest they presented were items other than grain such as clothes, hats, or saddled horses.¹⁷ This implies that the Jurchen society steadily shifted from a semi-agricultural, semi-nomadic to a completely agricultural lifestyle between the early to mid-fifteenth century.

By the second half of the fifteenth century when King Seongjong ruled Joseon, the Jurchen society, especially that of the Jianzhou Jurchens, went through rapid development. Such development not only involved transitioning into an agricultural society, but the implementation of Confucian practices for weddings, harvest rituals, and funerals.¹⁸ Although no

¹⁴ *The veritable records of King Sejong*, vol. 76, 30th of second month 1437, entry no. 3.

¹⁵ *The veritable records of King Sejong*, vol. 59, 24th of third month 1433, entry no. 1.

¹⁶ *The veritable records of King Sejong*, vol. 63, 29th of third month 1434, entry no. 3.

¹⁷ *The veritable records of King Sejong*, vol. 92, 2nd of third month 1441, entry no. 3.

¹⁸ Kim, "Joseon Seongjongdae eui geonju samwi," p. 231.

match for the developmental level achieved by the Jianzhou Jurchens, some in the Jurchen-Udige tribe who maintained relations with Joseon made considerable progress in settling into agricultural routines, pounding rice all day long, keeping such rice in crates stored indoors, cooking it in cauldrons, or trading their harvested rice for animal skin with other Jurchen tribes.¹⁹

As farming spread within the Jurchen society, oxen or horses naturally became necessary to serve as draft animals. Oxen were a particularly valued asset in farming,²⁰ which is why the Jurchens tended them with care.²¹ However, there were not enough routes for them to acquire oxen or horses. Since the reign of King Taejong, Joseon banned the transborder sale of oxen or horses. In 1412, the twelfth year of King Taejong, a magistrate of Uiju (義州) County named Wu Bak was punished for the sale of horses. He was not directly involved in the sale but looked the other way when someone from Liaodong crossed the border into Joseon and left with his purchase of nearly one thousand horses. This, of course, was possible because Wu Bak had been bribed by a commander from Liaodong. The incident caused the Joseon government to require all horses owned by civilians in the northeastern and northwestern border regions to be branded so as to prevent their sale across the border.²² Oxen were also involved in similar incidents. Left with no means to acquire oxen or horses, the Jurchens had to resort to taking them by force from Joseon.²³ The Joseon government would send border garrison commanders over to persuade the Jurchens to return the oxen or horses they had stolen,²⁴ but the plundering was likely to persist unless the Jurchens were formally allowed to obtain oxen and horses whenever necessary. And that was indeed what happened all

¹⁹ Kim, "Joseon Seongjongdae uljeokhape daehayeo," pp. 43-44.

²⁰ *The veritable records of King Jungjong*, vol. 21, 13th of tenth month 1514, entry no. 3.

²¹ *The veritable records of King Seongjong*, vol. 12, 3rd of tenth month 1471, entry no. 7.

²² *The veritable records of King Taejong*, vol. 23, 18th of first month 1412, entry no. 1.

²³ *The veritable records of King Sejong*, vol. 1, 7th of ninth month 1418, entry no. 4.

²⁴ *The veritable records of King Sejong*, vol. 98, 10th of tenth month 1442, entry no. 2.

throughout the first half of the Joseon period.²⁵

As the demand for oxen and horses continued to rise with the Jurchen society's agricultural development, there were essentially two ways in which the Jurchens could acquire such draft animals while their trade remained prohibited. One was to steal or seize them by force and the other was to secretly engage in trade to acquire them. Since the reign of King Seongjong in the mid fifteenth century, luxury goods grew popular among the ruling class of Joseon and led to an increase in demand for fur goods produced by the Jurchens such as sable and weasel fur. As such, the exchange of oxen and horses for fur goods between Joseon and the Jurchens grew frequent during the sixteenth century.

2. Luxury Goods in Joseon Society

Sable and weasel fur were notable favorites among the fur items the Jurchens frequently traded with Joseon over the sixteenth century.²⁶ Such items were also produced in Joseon and made available at four counties along the border in Pyeongan Province as well as other locations in Hamgil Province.²⁷ However, their total output was restricted by the Joseon government, making them uncommon even among bureaucrats, some of whom could afford to wear clothes lined or trimmed with weasel fur.²⁸

The value of sable fur can be guessed from how it was bestowed by the king only to subjects he especially trusted. In 1409, the ninth year of his reign, King Taejong discussed state affairs at the council hall with several court officials including Ha Ryun, Seong Seok-rin, and Jon Yeong-mu

²⁵ *The veritable records of King Sejo*, vol. 23, 10th of third month 1461, entry no. 1.

²⁶ It has been suggested that the warm fur can offer was another factor that led to the rise of fur demand apart from the growing popularity of luxury goods. Yi Tae-jin pointed out that the sixteenth century was part of the Little Ice Age when temperatures dropped across the globe, which could have served as a more fundamental reason behind the rise in fur demand. Yi, "16세기 gulke gyoeyeok cui baldal gwa seoulsangeopuisongsoe," p. 103.

²⁷ *The veritable records of King Sejong*, vol. 29, 27th of eighth month 1425, entry no. 1.

²⁸ *The veritable records of King Sejong*, vol. 50, 23rd of tenth month 1430, entry no. 1.

and afterwards gave them each with fifty sheets of sable fur.²⁹ The ones who received fur had devoted themselves to helping Prince Yi Bang-won (King Taejong) seize power and eventually rise to the royal throne. Unlike some contributors who later grew distant from the royal court or became purged during the reign of King Taejong, the ones who were given fur had continued to serve as the king's closest advisors and as senior officials within the government.³⁰ The fact that sable fur was a token of trust and encouragement indicates that it was a fairly rare and expensive item.

Moreover, clothes made with sable fur were also bestowed to officials or officers traveling long distances for a mission. In 1455, the third year of King Danjong, Yi Sa-cheol was appointed as the inspector of Hamgil Province in order to check the accuracy of records pertaining to each county and village in the province. Since Yi was dispatched in cold weathered January, the Joseon government supplied him with a fur coat, hat, and earmuffs made of sable fur.³¹ In 1457, the third year of King Sejo, officials including Han Myeong-hoe and Gu Chi-gwan set out for China to earn the Ming dynasty's approval on installing Prince Haeyang as crown prince. They were given fur coats and hats upon their departure in eleventh month of 1457. King Sejo especially had a sable fur collar urgently made and delivered to Han Myeong-hoe not long after his departure.³²

Yet, Joseon bureaucrats were not alone in their desire for sable fur. Sable fur coats were also an important item that Chinese envoys prized the most. However, they were extremely difficult to procure during the Goryeo period.³³ This was why Ming envoys explicitly asked for sable fur items whenever they came to Joseon. During King Taejong's reign, a Ming en-

²⁹ *The veritable records of King Taejong*, vol. 18, 8th of twelfth month 1409, entry no. 1.

³⁰ Choi Sung-hi, "Taewangjo eui wanggwaeon gwa gukjeong unyeong cheje" [Royal Authority and the Government System during the Reign of King Taejong], in *Joseon chogi jeongchisa yeongu* [Studies on the Political History of Early Joseon] (Seoul: Jisik-sanup Publishing Co., Ltd., 2002), pp. 61-104.

³¹ *The veritable records of King Danjong*, vol. 13, 7th of first month 1455, entry no. 1.

³² *The veritable records of King Sejo*, vol. 10, 10th of eleventh month 1457, entry no. 1.

³³ *The veritable records of King Sejong*, vol. 38, 19th of tenth month 1427, entry no. 1.

voy named Huang Yan (黃儼) brought a Jurchen clothing made of blue silk to Joseon and asked for it to be lined with sable fur.³⁴ The Chinese envoys Jiang Yu and Jin Fu were offered clothes, hats, and earmuffs made of sable fur as gifts in 1468, the fourteenth year of King Sejo.³⁵

As such, sable fur items were not readily available to commoners. As a rule, only officials of the senior third rank such as *Bujehak* (副提學) or higher were allowed to wear sable fur items in Joseon. Then, King Sejong expressed his discomfort in 1432, the fourteenth year of his reign, about old, infirm subjects having to carry out rituals in the cold. While those serving in the position of *Bujehak* or higher wore sable fur and silk items, those of the sixth rank, such as *Sagan* (司諫), and down to the ninth rank thereafter became allowed to wear items made of weasel fur and blue silk.³⁶ Nevertheless, only court officials of the third rank or higher could wear sable fur earmuffs.³⁷ Until the reign of King Sejo, donning sable fur was strictly controlled so that other than for official purposes, it was scarcely consumed by civilians.

However, from the mid-fifteenth century during the reign of King Seongjong, a trend of extravagance emerged across all tiers of Joseon society. A reflection of that trend can be glimpsed through parties hosted by the nobility where women would be embarrassed to attend without wearing clothes made of sable fur. Although sable fur trimmings were technically permitted only to officials of the third rank and above, most of the lower ranked officials wearing silver belts³⁸ eventually trimmed their clothes with sable fur as well. The problem was that not only was it difficult to obtain

³⁴ *The veritable records of King Taejong*, vol. 34, 13th of seventh month 1417, entry no. 2.

³⁵ *The veritable records of King Sejo*, vol. 47, 11th of seventh month 1468, entry no. 1.

³⁶ *The veritable records of King Sejong*, vol. 58, 10th of eleventh month 1432, entry no. 2.

³⁷ *The veritable records of King Sejo*, vol. 10, 9th of twelfth month 1457, entry no. 2.

³⁸ In Joseon, the civil and military officials between the senior third rank and the junior sixth rank wore belts decorated with silver along the edges. Belt decorations differed according to rank so that senior and junior first ranks wore belts decorated with rhino horn, while the belts of senior second ranks and junior second ranks were respectively decorated with gold and gold plus red-colored ornaments. The senior seventh rank and lower ranks wore belts with ornaments made with black horn.

sable fur in Joseon, but even if it was possible, its inferior quality caused demand for it to be satisfied through the Jurchens.³⁹

To halt the trend, the Joseon government became compelled to issue a ban. In 1472, the third year of King Seong-jong, *Yejo*, the Ministry of Rites, drafted and submitted a list of bans including one that prohibited commoners from using sable or weasel fur to make clothes or earmuffs with the exception of weasel fur used by women.⁴⁰ A few years later, the royal secretariat *Seungjeongwon* once more devised a set of regulations for the prohibition of extravagance and presumptuousness in 1475, the sixth year of King Seongjong. The regulations concerning fur strictly forbid the use of sable or weasel fur in the clothes and earmuffs of court officials apart from those above the senior third rank and their wives. In addition, anyone caught engaging in the trade of silk, sable fur, or weasel fur would be subject to a punishment of one hundred flogs and then be sent far away to the frontier on military duty. In such cases, the magistrate of the village where the offender originally lives would also be deemed responsible for the offense so that he would be dismissed from his position, never to be hired again by the government. King Seongjong had the proposed regulations relaxed slightly and instead drew a sharper distinction between officials and commoners on what was to be permitted. Hence, only officials above the senior third rank could use sable fur while their wives were to be exempt from regulations. Weasel fur could be used by any other official, but commoners were banned from using either sable or weasel fur.⁴¹

Overall, the popular desire for luxury goods in Joseon from the mid-fifteenth century onward led to a surge in demand for fur items and drove their prices up. This formed circumstances for trade between people in Joseon who desired sable and weasel fur and the Jurchens who desired oxen, horses, and ironware.

³⁹ *The veritable records of King Seongjong*, vol. 55, 12th of fifth month 1475, entry no. 3.

⁴⁰ *The veritable records of King Seongjong*, vol. 14, 22th of first month 1472, entry no. 4.

⁴¹ *The veritable records of King Seongjong*, vol. 57, 17th of seventh month 1475, entry no. 3.

3. Sable and Weasel Fur as Tributary Items

The rise in civilian demand for fur due to a trend of extravagance in Joseon since the reign of King Seongjong is what spurred the trade of fur between Joseon and the Jurchens beyond the late fifteenth century, but there was another reason behind the vibrancy in fur trade. By King Seongjong's reign, sable fur and weasel fur, the most typically traded items among fur, became included in the list of tributary items presented to the Ming court.

Sable and weasel fur do not appear to have been items officially offered to China prior to 1478, the ninth year of King Seongjong.⁴² Until then, it was given to Chinese envoys as bribes to make adjustments to the list of tributary items. During the second year of his reign in 1420, King Sejong sent several officials including Minister of Rites Ha Yeon and Han Hwak, the vice minister of Guanglusi (光祿寺), to Beijing to ask whether gold and silver could be excluded from the list of tributary items since they were not produced in Joseon during that time. The envoys from Joseon presented the Ming official Huang Yan with numerous bribes including four bolts of hemp and *gyogi*, or tabby damask, six bolts of silk, an iron belt, and a sable fur coat.⁴³ Meanwhile, because Ming envoys who came to Joseon usually sought sable fur, the Joseon government catered to their wishes by permitting them to trade items such as sable fur and lynx fur. Proof of this would be the list of goods tradable at the envoy's quarter submitted by *Yejo* (Ministry of Rites) in 1423 to King Sejong during the fifth year of his reign. On the list were items favored by Ming envoys such as tabby damask, gold, silver, sappan wood, alum, black pepper, fabrics made of ramie or hemp, lynx fur, and sable fur.⁴⁴

In particular, Ming envoys brought silk to Joseon to purchase sable fur at bargain prices. In 1425, the seventh year of King Sejong's reign, *Yejo* assigned each province with different amounts of fur they were expected to

⁴² “上曰如土豹皮貂鼠皮之類我國自前不貢矣.” *The veritable records of King Seongjong*, vol. 99, 17th of twelfth month 1478, entry no. 2.

⁴³ *The veritable records of King Sejong*, vol. 7, 25th of first month 1420, entry no. 1.

⁴⁴ *The veritable records of King Sejong*, vol. 19, 21st of third month 1423, entry no. 4.

prepare. Pyeongan Province and Hamgyeong Province had to supply a total of two thousand sheets of sable fur, while other provinces had to together prepare one thousand sheets each of red fox fur, wild marten fur, and lynx fur. The Joseon government thereafter ordered for 150 sheets of sable fur, 80 sheets of lynx fur, 50 sheets of fox fur, and 100 sheets of wild marten fur to be delivered to the capital within twenty-five days.⁴⁵ The ordered items were purchased with the linen from the budget of the government offices *Insubu* (仁壽府), *Insunbu* (仁順府), *Naejasi* (內資寺), *Naeseomsi* (內贍寺), *Jeonnosi* (典農寺), and *Jeyonggam* (濟用監) because the Ming envoy Yin Feng visiting Joseon at the time wished to acquire them.⁴⁶ The fur items were then sold to Yin Feng at a rate of one bolt of Chinese silk for 25 sheets of sable fur, one bolt of patterned Chinese silk for 130 sheets of gray weasel fur, and one bolt of raw official silk for 10 sheets of fox fur. In the case of a different Ming envoy named Pu Shi, the applied rate was one bolt of official silk for 6 sheets of sable fur, one bolt of triple-weaved silk twill damask for 3 sheets of sable fur or 5 sheets of tiger fur, and one bolt of raw official silk for 130 sheets of gray weasel fur.⁴⁷ In essence, the Joseon government facilitated Ming envoys in exchanging the silk and other fabric they brought from China with furs they desired from Joseon.

This was, however, all before sable and weasel fur turned into gifts presented to the Ming emperor in 1478, the ninth year of King Seongjong. Previously they had been local goods prepared as a trivial offering on the side.⁴⁸ The Ming dynasty originally had the Jurchens regularly offer fur as a tributary item. The military commission established by the Ming government appointed Jurchen tribal leaders as military officials, and in return, those tribal leaders were obligated to regularly offer tributary items. Those items were sable and weasel fur, lynx fur, duck hawk, rabbits, crow fal-

⁴⁵ *The veritable records of King Sejong*, vol. 27, 25th of first month 1425, entry no. 6.

⁴⁶ *The veritable records of King Sejong*, vol. 27, 1st of second month 1425, entry no. 3.

⁴⁷ *The veritable records of King Sejong*, vol. 27, 22nd of second month 1425, entry no. 3.

⁴⁸ *The veritable records of King Sejong*, vol. 37, 25th of seventh month 1427, entry no. 3.

cons, year-old hawks, donkey hide glue, and ivory.⁴⁹ Sable and weasel fur therefore used to be tributary items presented by the Jurchens instead of Joseon. Whenever Joseon occasionally offered them, the quality of the items had to be good, meaning the head and feet intact on them. Unfortunately, it was difficult for Joseon to produce a satisfying amount and quality of such fur.⁵⁰

The list of tributary items Han Chi-hyeong brought back in 1478 confirms that the Ming dynasty had begun to officially request Joseon to pay tribute with sable and weasel fur.⁵¹ This turned into a source of frustration for the Joseon government. For instance, a controversy occurred in 1482, the thirteenth year of King Seongjong, when Ming China demanded Joseon to send five hundred sheets of sable fur. At the time, lynx fur, considered to be inferior than sable fur, was only produced in the provinces of Pyeongan and Yeongan (or Hamgyeong). This limitation meant the amount produced was not enough to satisfy the domestic demand in Joseon, let alone what the Ming court requested. The reason it was even more challenging to secure the fur of sable than any other animal may have had to do with the abolition of four counties in Pyeongan Province during the reign of King Sejo. The very counties that happened to be major areas of sable fur production in Joseon became abolished one by one, the last being Jaseong County in 1459, the fifth year of King Sejo. After the abolition, the areas turned into a hunting ground for the Jurchens that remained barely within the Joseon government's boundary of control.⁵²

As it became difficult to procure sable fur from Pyeongan Province,

⁴⁹ The Ming dynasty installed a provincial headquarters called *dusi* in Manchuria with guard units called *wei* and *suo* under its wing. Jurchen tribal leaders became appointed to positions that reported to the *dusi* such as commander (指揮使), vice commander (指揮同知), judge (鎮撫), battalion commander (千戶), deputy battalion commander (副千戶), and battalion prison warden (所鎮撫).

⁵⁰ *The veritable records of King Sejong*, vol. 38, 14th of tenth month 1427, entry no. 5.

⁵¹ *The veritable records of King Sejong*, vol. 99, 21st of twelfth month 1478, entry no. 4.

⁵² Kim Soon-nam, "Joseon Jungjongdae eui bukbang yain guchuk" [Joseon dynasty's Strategy of Pushing Back the Jurchens Militarily during the Reign of King Jungjong], *Joseon sidaesa hakbo*, no. 54 (2010), pp. 59-61.

the Joseon government had to resort to sending court officials to five garrison forts in Hamgil Province from time to time. However, that still failed to secure the required amount of sable fur. Discussions within the Joseon court arrived at the consensus that it would eventually be impossible to gather enough of the rare sable fur when it was already challenging enough to get lynx fur. The need to modify the Ming court's excessive request was raised.⁵³ When the Ming envoy Zheng Tong visited Joseon the following August, King Seongjong informed that Joseon no longer produced lynx, sable, and weasel fur. Since Joseon would be forced to procure the items through the Jurchens, he asked for them to be excluded from the list of tributary items.⁵⁴

The Joseon and Jurchen society were both on the verge of change since the late fifteenth century. Before fur trade flourished, several Jurchen tribes presented fur as tributary items to Ming China and Joseon in exchange for their tribal leaders' appointment to government positions, and depending on the volume of tributary items, silk from Ming China. From Joseon, they were rewarded with goods like cotton and paper. Such was the customs of trade in relations of investiture and tribute.⁵⁵ Yet, this pattern changed near the end of the fifteenth century. Agricultural development helped the Jurchen society evolve to a degree that no longer had to heavily depend on the economic interests it stood to gain from maintaining its customary relationship with Joseon established since the reign of King Sejong.⁵⁶ Moreover, by the reign of King Seongjong, change within the Joseon society triggered an increase in the trade of fur between the two societies, thereby launching a new historical phase in their relations in the sixteenth century.

⁵³ *The veritable records of King Seongjong*, vol. 137, 14th of first month 1482, entry no. 2.

⁵⁴ *The veritable records of King Seongjong*, vol. 157, 11th of eighth month 1483, entry no. 1; *The veritable records of King Seongjong*, vol. 157, 27th of eighth month 1483, entry no. 1.

⁵⁵ Kim, *Yodongsa*, p. 537.

⁵⁶ Kim Ku-jin, "Joseon jeongi dae yeojin gwangye wa yeojin sahoe ui siltae" [Joseon's Relations with the Jurchens and the Jurchen Society in the First Half of the Joseon Dynasty], *Dongyanghak* 14 (October 1984), pp. 513-21.

III. The Pattern of Fur Trade

1. The Fur Quotas of Pyeongan and Hamgil Province

Fur trade between Joseon and the Jurchens flourished in the sixteenth century because they were able to satisfy one another's needs. The Jurchen society's shift toward agriculture led to a rise in the need of draft animals such as oxen and horses while the growing popularity of luxury goods and the Ming court's request for fur as tributary payment increased the demand for sable and weasel fur within the Joseon society. Such coinciding interests was what made fur trade possible between the two societies.

Even without considering tributary purposes, government demand for sable and weasel fur was already on the rise in Joseon since its establishment. From the early fifteenth century, the central government mostly procured fur by requiring certain provinces to offer it as a form of tax payment. The provinces of Pyeongan and Hamgil were to make their tax payments with sable and weasel fur. Because sable fur was particularly favored, the quota of other goods as tax payment would sometimes be reduced to allow the provinces to focus their efforts on fur production. For instance, in 1407, the seventh year of King Taejong, the frontier was exempted from its quota of honey while the Gapju area was exempted from its quota of hide used in armor so that the two areas could make their tax payment with sable fur.⁵⁷ In 1425, the seventh year of King Sejong, the quota for sable and weasel fur as tax payment became fixed: 700 sheets of sable fur and 500 sheets of weasel fur for Pyeongan Province and 1,365 sheets of sable fur and 3,990 sheets of weasel fur for Hamgil Province. People in the two provinces had to annually present those fixed amounts to *Sanguiwon* (尙衣院), the Bureau of Royal Attire. In addition, Gapsan County (甲山郡) in Hamgil Province had to separately present an extra 200

⁵⁷ *The veritable records of King Taejong*, vol. 14, 6th of eighth month 1407, entry no. 2.

sheets of sable fur⁵⁸ as tax collected from shamans.⁵⁹ In total, Hamgil Province had to offer more than twice as much sable and weasel fur than Pyongan Province.

The annual quotas fixed in the seventh year of King Sejong was cut back considerably later on. According to the record of goods collected in 1465, the eleventh year of King Sejo, 115 sheets of sable fur, 260 sheets of weasel fur, and 375 sheets of birch bark were presented by Yeongan (Hamgil) Province. These numbers were changed once more in 1474, the fifth year of King Seongjong. The same province was to present 65 more sheets of sable fur, 20 more sheets of weasel fur, and 350 more sheets of birch bark, making the annual total 180 sheets of sable fur, 280 sheets of weasel fur, and 725 sheets of birch bark. Such an increase in the collection of furs since the reign of King Sejo brought about complaints from the people of Yeongan Province, especially those in Gapsan County who had to bear the extra burden of taxation against shamans.⁶⁰ Upon such complaints, King Seongjong ordered the Royal Treasury to cut back the amount of fur collected from the two border districts in Yeongan Province referred to as Yanggye for a limited period of five years since there was enough reserve of fur at the time.⁶¹

This adjustment in fur collection that only applied to Yeongan Prov-

⁵⁸ *The veritable records of King Sejong*, vol. 29, 27th of eighth month 1425, entry no. 1.

⁵⁹ Only South Hamgyeong Province levied a tax called *sinpo* (神布) on shamans. The reason was because the people there tended to be arrogant and imprudent enough to worship spirits, and more often than not, shamans would tempt and exploit them for profit. Hence, shamans became required to pay the same sort of tax levied on merchants, which was one bolt of hemp per shaman. Gradually, non-shaman commoners became taxed as well so that each household had to pay one bolt of hemp each year, which came to be referred to as *sinsepo* (神稅布). *The veritable records of King Jungjong*, vol. 29, 22nd of ninth month 1517, entry no. 2.

⁶⁰ People in Gapsan County at the time claimed it was difficult to fill the government assigned quota because although sable fur, weasel fur, and birch bark were produced in Yeongan Province, the amount was meager. Also, it was almost impossible to procure the goods from the Jurchens across the border, particularly sable fur because the price for one sheet amounted to one ox. The county therefore asked for the quotas on sable and weasel fur to be reduced and for tax payment with birch bark to be reassigned to the counties of Bukcheong and Hamheung. *The veritable records of King Seongjong*, vol. 40, 1st of third month 1474, entry no. 3.

⁶¹ *The veritable records of King Seongjong*, vol. 40, 17th of third month 1474, entry no. 2.

ince was probably because at some point between 1459, the fifth year of King Sejo, and 1465, the eleventh year of King Sejo, a large reduction was made to the quota of Pyeongan Province during the reign of King Sejong. In particular, the fifth year of King Sejo was when four out of the five counties that mainly produced fur in Pyeongan Province became abolished. With the exception of Wiwon County, the abolition of the counties Yeoyeon, Jaseong, Muchang, and Uye⁶² would have made it difficult to produce sable and weasel fur in those areas and certainly not enough to satisfy the quota fixed during the reign of King Sejong.⁶³ As such, the fur quota for those areas in Pyeongan Province would have been adjusted earlier than that of Yeongan Province. The fur quota assigned to other areas of Pyeongan Province became officially removed in 1477, the eighth year of King Seongjong. For the next three years from 1478, the ninth year of King Seongjong, the areas of Ganggye, Wiwon, Isan, Byeokdong, Changseong, Sakju, Uijubecame exempt from their quotas for sable, weasel, tiger, and lynx fur so that the people could recover their normal production levels.⁶⁴

While Pyeongan Province struggled with its fur production, Yeongan Province caused even more problems in producing the fur it was supposed to present to the central government. The areas that specialized in fur production in Yeongan Province were five garrison forts, which did not include Giljumok or Buryeong County.⁶⁵ The central government would urge the local magistrates at the five garrison forts to secure their assigned quota and those magistrates would in turn place pressure upon the people. The problem was that sable fur, the most crucial item, was produced in Jurchen territory. People under pressure from their local magistrates in Yeongan

⁶² According to the *Geographical Appendix to the veritable records of King Sejong*, the counties Yeoyeon, Jaseong, Muchang, Uye, and Wiwon were governed by the local administrative agency *Ganggye dohobu* of Pyeongan Province.

⁶³ Kim, "Joseon Jungjongdae cui bukbang yain guchuk," pp. 56-57.

⁶⁴ *The veritable records of King Seongjong*, vol. 81, 24th of sixth month 1477, entry no. 2.

⁶⁵ According to the *Geographical Appendix to the veritable records of King Sejong*, the counties Gapsan and Gyeongseong were part of Giljumok, Hamgil Province.

Province had no choice but to offer iron farming tools and oxen in order to acquire sable fur. This eventually led to an even bigger problem. The Jurchens used the farming tools they had obtained with sable fur to improve their weaponry. They managed to extract the iron from those farming tools to replace their arrowheads previously made out of antlers. The Joseon government was aware of such circumstances at the time, which is why some proposed that the five garrison forts should be exempt from presenting sable fur.⁶⁶

The five garrison forts in Yeongan Province thus received exemption earlier than Pyeongan Province from supplying sable fur to the central government for fifteen years since 1474.⁶⁷ When that period drew to an end in 1489, the twentieth year of King Seongjong, the time came to decide whether the exemption should be extended or not. The king hence sent an inspector to Yeongan Province to investigate whether sable fur was being produced at the five garrison forts. His intention was to find out whether the people in those areas still had to resort to trade with the Jurchens in order to secure enough supplies for the central government.⁶⁸ The inspector's findings indicated that sable fur was being produced in the areas. However, its subpar quality was what had prompted exchange with the Jurchens.⁶⁹ As a result, *Hojo*, the Ministry of Revenue, decided not to extend the exemption and people at the five garrison forts had to go back to supplying the originally required amount of fur.⁷⁰

Regardless of the government-imposed quotas, sable and weasel fur had been in demand since the early fifteenth century. What triggered its trade in the sixteenth century was its inclusion in the list of tributary items to the Ming court, which required an amount impossible for Joseon to procure on its own. Joseon would have been able to domestically secure enough for government purposes or rewarding bureaucrats and prominent

⁶⁶ *The veritable records of King Seongjong*, vol. 52, 2nd of second month 1475, entry no. 3.

⁶⁷ *The veritable records of King Seongjong*, vol. 225, 22nd of second month 1489, entry no. 8.

⁶⁸ *The veritable records of King Seongjong*, vol. 225, 28th of second month 1489, entry no. 2.

⁶⁹ *The veritable records of King Seongjong*, vol. 228, 30th of fifth month 1489, entry no. 1.

⁷⁰ *The veritable records of King Seongjong*, vol. 230, 1st of seventh month 1489, entry no. 9.

figures. Yet, the fur produced in Joseon was too thin to suffice as tributary items for the Ming court.⁷¹ This was the reason why Joseon had to rely on the Jurchens beyond the mid-fifteenth century to obtain good quality sable and weasel fur.⁷²

The Jurchens were willing to make the trade only for the oxen, horses, and ironware they desired from Joseon. The trade of sable and weasel fur picked up steam as the popularity of luxury goods in Joseon rose early on during the reign of King Seongjong. By the time King Yeonsangun (r. 1494-1506) took the throne, there was someone who even made a skirt out of sable fur.⁷³ While King Jungjong (r. 1506-1544) ruled Joseon, the wives of merchants came to publicly don sable fur that was technically allowed only to the wives of officials above the senior third rank.⁷⁴ Luxury goods had settled down as a part of everyday life by then. That drove the demand for more expensive, better quality sable fur. It was thus inevitable for the trade of sable fur to flourish between Joseon and the Jurchens in the sixteenth century.

2. The Role of Magistrates in Fur Trade

Although fur trade with the Jurchens grew beyond the late fifteenth century, the beginning of such trade in Joseon can be traced back to an earlier period, especially in terms of sable fur. Yet, the private trade of fur had been forbidden in Joseon until the mid-fifteenth century. In 1423, the fifth year of King Sejong, the *Gongjo panseo*, the Minister of Works, became indicted by *Saheonbu*, the Office of the Inspector-General, for attempting to engage in the trade of sable fur. Apart from the goods required for submission to the central government, the minister was caught and arrested for trying to pilfer and privately trade forty-four bolts of ramie and hemp fab-

⁷¹ *The veritable records of King Jungjong*, vol. 87, 16th of fifth month 1538, entry no. 1.

⁷² *The veritable records of King Myeongjong*, vol. 4, 6th of eleventh month 1546, entry no. 1.

⁷³ *The Diaries of King Yeonsangun*, vol. 46, 8th of tenth month 1502, entry no. 2.

⁷⁴ *The veritable records of King Jungjong*, vol. 17, 6th of second month 1513, entry no. 5.

ric as well as sixty sheets of sable fur.⁷⁵ There were also cases where interpreters were caught trying to take fur with them on their way to Beijing on official duty, one of which was Jo Sung-son in 1477, the eighth year of King Seongjong.⁷⁶

Fur trade continued to be officially banned in Joseon in the sixteenth century. In reality, however, it flourished under the lead of magistrates who were assigned to the northern border areas of Joseon. Even before fur trade grew, there were already signs of their involvement in matters related to sable fur. During the reign of King Sejong, a magistrate reportedly acted in the interests of those who bribed him with sable fur.⁷⁷ One magistrate was even caught making an explicit demand for sable fur to the Jurchens, which was precisely what happened to Bak Yang-sin in 1476, the seventh year of King Seongjong.⁷⁸ In 1485, the sixteenth year of King Seongjong, the magistrate of Hoeryeong (會寧) County Kim Ja-bun was flogged a hundred times for receiving three sheets of sable fur as a bribe from a Jurchen.⁷⁹ Nevertheless, magistrates, especially those assigned to the five garrison forts of Yeongan Province, considered it all too natural to acquire goods from the Jurchens such as fine horses, silks, pearls, and sable fur. Won Jung-geo is said to have been denounced by an envoy for purchasing too many goods from the Jurchens while serving as a military governor in North Yeongan Province, enough for his horses to collapse to death from carrying them back to his home in Wonju.⁸⁰

Yet, magistrates in border areas were the ones mainly responsible for spurring trade at the time because they urged locals to trade with the Jurchens to be able to fill the quota of sable and weasel fur assigned by the central government. It was considered a felony for a village to fail in securing its allotted amount of sable fur, which may sound like an exaggeration, but

⁷⁵ *The veritable records of King Sejong*, vol. 22, 18th of tenth month 1423, entry no. 2.

⁷⁶ *The veritable records of King Seongjong*, vol. 79, 12th of fourth month 1477, entry no. 1.

⁷⁷ *The veritable records of King Sejong*, vol. 62, 17th of twelfth month 1433, entry no. 2.

⁷⁸ *The veritable records of King Seongjong*, vol. 74, 6th of twelfth month 1476, entry no. 2.

⁷⁹ *The veritable records of King Seongjong*, vol. 185, 10th of eleventh month 1485, entry no. 4.

⁸⁰ *The veritable records of King Seongjong*, vol. 228, 28th of fifth month 1489, entry no. 3.

the consequences were grave, especially during the reign of King Yeonsangun. Hence, as much as the magistrates were aware of the harmful effects of fur trade with the Jurchens, they had no choice but to urge and compel people to engage in it.⁸¹ The reality of Yeongan Province was that when the magistrate's urging became unbearable, people would take their iron farming tools and pots and exchange them for fur with the Jurchens.⁸²

Furthermore, the rarity and commercial value of sable fur caused magistrates at the northern border regions to desire the profits it could raise. They pursued sable fur in the hope of creating an extra source of income, but this sometimes became problematic when they abused the Jurchens in the process. An example of this would be an incident in 1522, the seventeenth year of King Jungjong, caused by a second deputy commander (*cheomsa*) named Do Seo-rin who served at the garrison fort Donggwangjin.⁸³

One type of abuse Joseon magistrates would inflict upon the Jurchens were to force them into selling sable fur.⁸⁴ In those instances, the magistrates took advantage of government property for such transactions. A *cheomsa* at the garrison fort Hyesanjin named Kim Geuk-dal was charged in 1529, the twenty-fourth year of King Jungjong, for purchasing sable fur with oxen.⁸⁵ The problem was that he used government property to purchase oxen and secretly traded them with the Jurchens for sable fur and silk.⁸⁶ In 1563, the eighteenth year of King Myeongjong, there was rumor that people were performing labor usually meant for oxen in rice paddies because magistrates stationed at border areas had depleted the oxen to purchase fur goods.⁸⁷

Another reason Joseon magistrates abused the Jurchens had to do

⁸¹ *The veritable records of King Jungjong*, vol. 6, 16th of eighth month 1508, entry no. 1.

⁸² *The Diaries of King Yeonsangun*, vol. 29, 4th of fourth month 1498, entry no. 1.

⁸³ *The veritable records of King Jungjong*, vol. 44, 13th of fourth month 1522, entry no. 3.

⁸⁴ *The veritable records of King Jungjong*, vol. 62, 17th of seventh month 1477, entry no. 1.

⁸⁵ *The veritable records of King Jungjong*, vol. 66, 24th of sixth month 1478, entry no. 3.

⁸⁶ *The veritable records of King Jungjong*, vol. 67, 8th of second month 1479, entry no. 2.

⁸⁷ *The veritable records of King Myeongjong*, vol. 29, 7th of eighth month 1563, entry no. 1.

with preparing offerings to present to their king. Magistrates would use that as an excuse to acquire more sable fur than necessary from the Jurchens. This was the reason a magistrate named Gang Wi at Mijeonjin, a commander at Hunyungjin named Kim Yi, and a military officer named Yang Hong at Hwangcheokpa were interrogated and dismissed in 1531, the twenty-sixth year of King Jungjong.⁸⁸ What magistrates specifically did was falsify their reports in order to protect their own interests. They would extort the Jurchens and force them to offer sable fur to the Joseon king. The magistrates would then falsely report that yellow sable fur was replaced with black sable fur to be presented to the king or send less to the central government than the amount of fur they actually acquired so as to pocket the margins. As a result, the Jurchens would get paid less for their goods and end up resenting Joseon magistrates. This was precisely what happened in an incident in 1538, the thirty-third year of King Jungjong, which involved a magistrate at Yuwonjin named Yun Ju. Such exhibition of greed and abuse by magistrates in border regions became commonplace in Joseon by the second half of King Jungjong's reign. To redress the situation, the Joseon court had military officials in border areas report to an inspector once they acquired sable fur from the Jurchens. And to review fur submissions in detail, an official would be separately appointed and temporarily sent as a special auditor to investigate and report to the inspector who would then assemble the auditor's findings and present them to the central government.⁸⁹

These abuses Joseon magistrates inflicted eventually caused the Jurchens to commit revolts. In 1594, the twenty-seventh year of King Seonjo, some Jurchens living near the garrison fort in Onseong County revolted because they found it difficult to tolerate the excessive greed and abuse of Joseon magistrates in the area. Once, a magistrate of Onseong County named Jeon Bong handed some stale barley to an interpreter and made him distribute it to the Jurchens in the area. The Jurchens who unwillingly accept-

⁸⁸ *The veritable records of King Jungjong*, vol. 72, 12th of twelfth month 1531, entry no. 2.

⁸⁹ *The veritable records of King Jungjong*, vol. 88, 24th of tenth month 1538, entry no. 2.

ed the barley were charged with one sheet of black sable fur per mal (approximately 18 liters) of barley. And whenever Jeon Bong was working at his office, he would have fine quality sable fur on display in the front yard to remind the Jurchens of the quality of fur he expected from them. If a village failed to supply sable fur on time, people in that village would be arrested and severely punished. After years of such brutality, even the Jurchens who had defected to Joseon instantly decided to revolt.⁹⁰

Because sable fur was rare,⁹¹ Joseon magistrates at border areas also used it to advance their careers. To such magistrates, it was just another way to benefit from sable fur. In 1506, the first year of King Jungjong, Jeon O-ryun from Gyeongwon of Hamgyeong Province became appointed as the *moksa*, the magistrate, of Jeju Island. The man with a mediocre lineage had a military background but no commendable talent or insight. This is why royal scribes especially added a critical comment to the description about the appointment, stating that it had been earned through bribery with sable fur.⁹² Jeon had in fact been indicted in 1516, the eleventh year of King Jungjong, for purchasing sable fur with oxen and horses while serving as a *cheomsa* at Manpojin.⁹³

The end users of sable fur purchased and presented by such magistrates were high-ranking bureaucrats within the central government of Joseon. This is why royal scribes during the reign of King Myeongjong pointed out that the greed of high-ranking bureaucrats was as much to blame as that of magistrates in forcing people to cross the border and trade with the Jurchens. The magistrates who served bureaucrats well by bribing

⁹⁰ *The veritable records of King Seonjo*, vol. 55, 16th of ninth month 1594, entry no. 2.

⁹¹ Just how rare and expensive sable fur was can be gauged from the story about some people who presented sable fur as an offering and became recognized in the first year of King Jungjong's reign as a contributor to political restoration. The story is in fact mentioned as part of a comment Jo Gwang-jo made in November 1519, the fourteenth year of King Jungjong. Jo stated that there were five to six people including Choe Yu-jeong and Jang Han-gong who used sable fur to bribe their way to being recognized as a contributor to political restoration. *The veritable records of King Jungjong*, vol. 37, 9th of eleventh month 1519, entry no. 4.

⁹² *The veritable records of King Jungjong*, vol. 1, 23rd of tenth month 1506, entry no. 4.

⁹³ *The veritable records of King Jungjong*, vol. 23, 3rd of first month 1516, entry no. 1.

them with sable fur were commended while those who failed to do so were denigrated. Even evaluation results on the performance of magistrates would depend on whether sable fur was offered or not. These circumstances naturally drove magistrates in border areas to mobilize their resources for the acquisition of sable fur.⁹⁴

Military officials proved to be particularly problematic among the greedy, abusive magistrates. Most military officials assigned to a border region bribed high-ranking bureaucrats with sable fur.⁹⁵ There was a set amount of fur they would usually offer, which differed depending on their rank. For instance, the amount of fur officials with the titles *gweongwan*, *manho*, or *cheomsa* were expected to offer was different from what was expected of those with the titles *suryeong*, *busa*, *moksa*, *susa*, or *byeongsa*. Bureaucrats would thereby strive to have officials who offered bribes assigned to desirable posts. Royal scribes at the time considered a bureaucrat named Kim An-ro responsible for setting into motion such a self-interest-driven custom during the reign of King Jungjong. With recommendation from a bureaucrat, military officials were able to become immediately assigned to positions regardless of their rank. To ride on the back of a high-ranking bureaucrat guaranteed a fast track to a successful career. This, of course, served as an obvious excuse for such bureaucrats to elicit more bribes. A typical example was a magistrate of Jongseongjin named Yi Gwan who became appointed as *dongbuseungji*, the secretary at the royal secretariat *Seungjeongwon* in 1563, the eighteenth year of King Myeongjong. The reason Yi Gwan was able to rise to the position of royal secretary was because of Yi Ryang. Using oxen purchased for trade with the Jurchens, Yi Gwan purchased and presented fine horses and sable fur to Yi Ryang while he served as *gwanchalsa*, the governor, of Pyeongan Province. After Yi Ryang left to once more serve as a court official, Yi Gwan was able to rise to the senior third rank position of royal secretary.⁹⁶ Mean-

⁹⁴ *The veritable records of King Myeongjong*, vol. 4, 6th of eleventh month 1546, entry no. 1.

⁹⁵ Magistrates in border regions mostly bribed high-ranking bureaucrats with sable fur from the north, finely woven hemp from the south, and finely woven silk from the west.

⁹⁶ *The veritable records of King Myeongjong*, vol. 18, 21st of fifth month 1563, entry no. 2.

while, the ones who suffered from this custom of bribing with sable and weasel fur were the soldiers stationed in the northern border regions.⁹⁷

Sanjanghan, which refers a designated sable hunting family in the county of Ganggye, serves as proof of how brutally magistrates and commanders treated people in order to secure sable fur necessary for bribing bureaucrats. The reason *sanjanghan* became a subject of preoccupation was because of the sable fur quota assigned to the county.⁹⁸ The sable fur produced at Ganggye County was of a supreme quality and therefore used on the hat the king wore while tending to state affairs. The problem was that the county magistrate would demand a far greater supply of sable fur than what had to be presented to the central government. Kim Sun, who once served as *byeongmageoldosa*, the provincial military commander, of Pyeongan Province, selected thirty sable hunting families and designated them as *sangjanghan* while working as a *busa* at Ganggye County. The motive behind the designation had to do not with filling the assigned sable fur quota, but with securing more fur to bribe influential figures. A military officer named Yi Bal who later became the magistrate of Ganggye County added thirty more families to the register of *sanjanghan* and applied further pressure on them to capture more sables. Unfortunately, the abuse did not cease there. Yi Bal found fault with the submitted fur and thereby charged fines to be paid with hemp. That extra collection of hemp was used to purchase sable fur at markets in the capital city and present them to the central government. The sable fur ruthlessly collected from the doubled number of *sanjanghan* thereby completely fell into the hands of Yi Bal. Such practices under Yi Bal as well as his predecessor ravaged the lives of people in Ganggye County and led to its demise.⁹⁹

As aforementioned, fur trade between Joseon and the Jurchens was driven by Joseon magistrates stationed at the northern border regions and developed into a source of various issues. Bilateral trade to satisfy the

⁹⁷ *The veritable records of King Myeongjong*, vol. 16, 9th of sixth month 1554, entry no. 1.

⁹⁸ After the fur quota was reduced in the eight year of King Seongjong, Pyeongan Province must have at some point been ordered to pay tax with sable fur again.

⁹⁹ *The veritable records of King Myeongjong*, vol. 28, 2nd of eighth month 1562, entry no. 1.

needs of both sides should have been mutually beneficial, but the Joseon society instead continued to become sucked into a labyrinth.

IV. The Outcome of Fur Trade

1. The Drain of Oxen, Horses, and Ironware

According to *negative regulations (geumjejo)* included in the *Grand Code of State Administration (Gyeongguk Daejeon)*, sable fur and lynx fur were among the list of goods banned from being traded across the borders of Joseon. The regulations specified that “anyone who secretly trades banned items will be sentenced to one hundred flogs and three years of punitive labor,” and “selling such items at ports or guesthouses in the Yanggye districts was banned as well.”¹⁰⁰ In fact, the reason Kim Wu, who also went by as Huicheongun, was indicted by the Office of the Inspector-General in February 1409, the ninth year of King Taejong, was because he got caught secretly trading sable fur. At the time, Kim Wu had started in a new position at Ganggye. He secretly entrusted an interpreter traveling to Liaodong with 50 sheets of sable fur and 16 geuns (approximately 9.6 kilograms) of yellow beeswax so as to purchase two bolts of silk damask with ten sheets of sable fur and ten bolts of plain silk with twenty sheets of sable fur. However, by the time the interpreter returned to Ganggye County, Kim Wu had become replaced from his position. The interpreter thereby sent the silk purchased from Liaodong along with the remaining sheets of sable fur to Kim Wu and handed the yellow beeswax over to the county’s authorities. This prompted the county authorities to make an inquiry to the governor (*gamsa*) of Pyeongan Province since the goods Kim Wu smuggled across the border for sale had been items banned from trade outside Joseon.¹⁰¹ Yet, regardless of the ban on trading sable fur, there were people in the border areas of Pyeongan Province who still made their living by selling sable

¹⁰⁰ *The Diaries of King Yeonsangun*, vol. 32, 15th of fifth month 1499, entry no. 3.

¹⁰¹ *The veritable records of King Taejong*, vol. 17, 22nd of second month 1409, entry no. 2.

fur and ginseng.¹⁰²

The vibrant trade of fur with the Jurchens in the sixteenth century led to a drain of oxen, horses, and ironware from Joseon. As luxury goods began to grow popular early on during the reign of King Seongjong, the demand for sable and weasel fur rose in Joseon. To satisfy that rising demand, Joseon had to exchange corresponding volumes of oxen, horses, and ironware.¹⁰³ The continually increasing demand for sable fur drove up its price and attracted a swarm of people to North Yeongan Province in the hopes of profiting from the sale of sable fur.¹⁰⁴

The items those people offered in exchange for sable fur were oxen, horses, and ironware, which is precisely what the Jurchens desired from Joseon. The acquired oxen, horses, and ironware were used in farming, or in some cases, to improve weaponry. According to a testimony by Seong Dal-saeng, who survived a Jurchen raid on the Joseon fort Josanbo in 1491, the twenty-second year of King Seong-jong's reign, each Jurchen possessed around three hundred sheets of sable and weasel fur.¹⁰⁵ This meant they could afford to engage in trade with people who brought iron farming tools and pots from Joseon. Desperate to escape harassment from magistrates, someone all the way from Onseong even came to exchange two hoes for two sheets of weasel fur.¹⁰⁶

While people in the border areas of Joseon sought sable fur to make tax payments, profiteers sought it for a different purpose. They went from one garrison fort to the next along the border with loads of cotton and conspired with local interpreters to acquire ironware and oxen, which they traded at every opportunity with the Jurchens for sable and weasel fur. Such fur would be brought back to Seoul where it was sold at higher prices.¹⁰⁷ The price for one sheet of sable fur was ten bolts of cotton in 1502,

¹⁰² *The veritable records of King Sejong*, vol. 62, 26th of tenth month 1433, entry no. 2.

¹⁰³ This was also discussed by Kim Han-gyu. See Kim, *Yodongsa*, p. 545.

¹⁰⁴ *The veritable records of King Seongjong*, vol. 57, 14th of seventh month 1475, entry no. 2.

¹⁰⁵ *The veritable records of King Seongjong*, vol. 255, 13th of seventh month 1491, entry no. 4.

¹⁰⁶ *The veritable records of King Seongjong*, vol. 57, 14th of seventh month 1475, entry no. 2.

¹⁰⁷ *The Diaries of King Yeonsangun*, vol. 29, 17th of fourth month 1498, entry no. 1.

the eighth year of King Yeonsangun.¹⁰⁸ In 1508, the third year of King Jungjong, it took one ox to buy one sheet of sable fur.¹⁰⁹ By 1516, the eleventh year of King Jungjong, a sheet of high-quality sable fur cost one horse.¹¹⁰ At Bukpyeongwan, the quarters for Jurchen envoys, a sheet of sable fur could be bought with four arrowheads in 1525, the twentieth year of King Jungjong.¹¹¹ And the price for one sheet of sable fur in 1538, the thirty-third year of King Jungjong, reached up to two hundred bolts of cotton.¹¹²

Oxen and horses from Joseon were mainly traded at Manpojin for the Jurchens' sable and weasel fur. Since King Sejo abolished the four counties in the upper region of Amnok River, the garrison fort served the northernmost point along the northern border of Joseon and a destination for trade to the Jurchens.¹¹³ In the sixteenth century, magistrates in the border regions of Joseon took the liberty of opening markets at Manpojin, so Joseon people continued to come and trade their oxen, horses, and ironware with the Jurchens.¹¹⁴

Although the drain of oxen and horses did not occur all across Joseon, the volume of the drain can be gauged from a story dating back to the reign of King Yeonsangun. In the eleventh year of his reign, King Yeonsangun claimed that the quality of sable fur being circulated in the domestic market was poor and ordered for twenty thousand sheets of sable fur to be purchased from Yanggye, the two border districts in Pyeongan and Yeongan Province. This was said to have drained all the oxen from the two provinces so that the locals had to use horses to plough rice paddies.¹¹⁵

¹⁰⁸ *The Diaries of King Yeonsangun*, vol. 46, 8th of tenth month 1502, entry no. 2.

¹⁰⁹ *The veritable records of King Jungjong*, vol. 5, 23rd of second month 1508, entry no. 1.

¹¹⁰ *The veritable records of King Jungjong*, vol. 25, 17th of fifth month 1516, entry no. 5.

¹¹¹ *The veritable records of King Jungjong*, vol. 52, 9th of first month 1525, entry no. 1.

¹¹² *The veritable records of King Jungjong*, vol. 88, 14th of eighth month 1538, entry no. 2.

¹¹³ Kim Soon-nam, "Joseon jeongi manpojing wa manpo cheomsa" [Manpo Garrison and Manpo Cheomsa during early Joseon], *Sahakyeongu*, no. 97 (2010), pp. 60-61.

¹¹⁴ *The veritable records of King Jungjong*, vol. 21, 13th of tenth month 1514, entry no. 3.

¹¹⁵ *The Diaries of King Yeonsangun*, vol. 60, 3rd of tenth month 1505, entry no. 3.

The exportation of oxen, horses, and ironware from Joseon turned into a source of various problems. Once in the hands of the Jurchens, the oxen and horses from Joseon helped advance the agricultural practices of the Jurchens while the ironware was used to upgrade Jurchen weaponry. Contributing to the acceleration of the Jurchen society's development came back as a threat to the border regions of Joseon.¹¹⁶ What further aggravated the circumstances was the fact that Joseon's military strength had weakened in those regions. By 1508, the third year of King Jungjong, the number of cavalymen fell from one thousand to a mere forty to fifty because there was almost no oxen or horses left after they became heavily consumed by trade with the Jurchens during the latter half of King Yeonsangun's reign.¹¹⁷ Weakened military power made it impossible for Joseon to actively carry out its military policy. After the Jurchens were driven away from the Joseon border in 1524, the nineteenth year of King Jungjong, for trespassing on the four abolished counties, Joseon was unable to subjugate the Jurchens when they later brutally murdered a magistrate of Manpojin, the northernmost point of Joseon.¹¹⁸ This ultimately caused an even graver problem, which was that people in Yeongan Province increasingly fled to Jurchen territories to escape the burden of having to fill the sable and weasel fur quota.

2. Runaways from Yeongan Province

As fur trade between Joseon and the Jurchens thrived in the sixteenth century, it generated drifters from Yeongan Province. At the time, people in Yeongan Province had no choice but to engage in fur trade to fill the quota assigned by the central government. And those driven to exhaustion from the obligation began to flee to Jurchen territories.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁶ *The veritable records of King Jungjong*, vol. 25, 1st of sixth month 1516, entry no. 1.

¹¹⁷ *The veritable records of King Jungjong*, vol. 5, 23rd of second month 1508, entry no. 1.

¹¹⁸ Kim, "Joseon Jungjongdae eui bukbang yain guchuk," pp. 79-83.

¹¹⁹ Kawachi Yoshihiro shed light on the impoverished circumstances the people of Yeongan Province were under at the time. See Kawachi Yoshihiro, "Chūsō Meisō jidai no chōsen to

A record on 1516, the eleventh year of King Jungjong, offers a glimpse into this departure of people from Yeongan Province. According to the record, fur trade involved human trafficking in which the Jurchens would lure or take Joseon people worn out by cold and hunger or too young to travel on foot and secretly trade them. Meanwhile, there were people from Joseon who crossed over to Jurchen territories of their own accord. Some who were old and lazy slipped into Jurchen territories, choosing to believe the devious words of the Jurchens that life in their society was easier than in Joseon.¹²⁰ Moreover, the Jurchens who lived near Joseon garrison forts were not executed but only flogged for trafficking Joseon people.¹²¹ Since the consequences were less severe than expected, the Jurchens would have found it worth the risk to continue engaging in human trafficking.

Despite such instances of being taken away by the Jurchens, there were more people from Yeongan Province who voluntarily crossed over to Jurchen territories to escape the burden of having to procure excessive amounts of fur. In Hamgyeong Province, tax payment with fur was imposed on the *bongjok* of soldiers at the time. *Bongjok* (奉足) referred to common farmers who served as aides to men performing their military duty so that such men could maintain a minimum level of living while they served.¹²² The purpose of the *bongjok* system was to ensure that a continued, stable number of commoners served in the military. In Hamgyeong Province, however, the *bongjok* were forced to perform all sorts of labor usually carried out by petty officials. This was because there were no petty officials serving at government offices in the Yanggye districts, which left no *bongjok* available to aid commoners serving in the military. The dual burden of having to perform labor duties and simultaneously offer goods

joshin” [Joseon and the Jurchens During the Reign of King Jungjong and Myeongjong], *Chōsengakuhō*, no. 82 (1977), p. 83.

¹²⁰ *The veritable records of King Jungjong*, vol. 21, 13th of tenth month 1514, entry no. 3.

¹²¹ *The veritable records of King Jungjong*, vol. 46, 28th of first month 1523, entry no. 2.

¹²² Lee Jee-woo, “Joseon chogi bongjokje eui chui wa siltae” [The Development and Reality of Early Joseon’s Bongjok System], *Gyeongnam sahak*, no. 5 (1989).

like fur as tax payment caused the *bongjok* to bolt.¹²³ When a *bongjok* ran away, the head of the *bongjok*'s household would instead be held responsible for supplying the amount of fur originally assigned to the *bongjok*.¹²⁴ Men performing military duty started to refuse being assigned with a *bongjok* to help during their absence. The heads of households ran away to avoid the burden imposed by a runaway *bongjok* in the family. The run-aways aware of the rumor that there were no labor duties in the Jurchen society made their way to Jurchen territories. And people who fell captive to the Jurchens did not wish to return to their hometowns.¹²⁵ Such were the circumstances in Yeongan Province during the sixteenth century.

Fur was, of course, not the sole source of problems that drove people in Hamgyeong Province across the border into Jurchen territories. Grain loans called *hwanja* was also something that increased the burden people suffered from. Around the time, people in the Yanggye districts were forced to take out grain loans from the government. Although most people did not wish to take out *hwanja*, they had to at least make a relative take it out. The problem would arise when the time came to pay back the loaned grain. People couldn't afford to keep and serve, so they had to separately purchase grains to pay back the *hwanja*. In lean years, they had to hire themselves out to the Jurchens living near garrison forts in order to survive one day at a time. Amid such hardships, rumors spread among people in the Yanggye districts that life was easier in Jurchen territories where food and clothing were aplenty. People who figured living in Jurchen territories would be better than suffering in Joseon relocated with their family members. Moreover, Jurchen tribes were situated fairly close to the border regions of Joseon, usually fifteen to thirty kilometers or one to two days of travel away. Jurchen villages were typically comprised of twenty to thirty houses, and with no forts surrounding them, they did not appear to be ene-

¹²³ *The veritable records of King Jungjong*, vol. 60, 21st of third month 1528, entry no. 2.

¹²⁴ *The veritable records of King Jungjong*, vol. 25, 17th of fifth month 1516, entry no. 5.

¹²⁵ *The veritable records of King Jungjong*, vol. 60, 21st of third month 1528, entry no. 2.

mies of Joseon.¹²⁶

The fact that assigning an excessive amount of fur had driven people out of Hamgyeong Province was mentioned in a report on civil affairs the province's governor Min Je-in submitted to the king in 1540, the thirty-fifth year of King Jungjong. In his report, Min Je-in stated that people troubled by the fur quota kept running away from the counties of Gapsan and Samsu in Hamgyeong Province. The statement was supported by a detailed account of the population remaining in those counties and the number of runaways. The remaining number of household heads in Gapsan County as well as the garrison forts nearby was 270 after 77 ran away, while 559 *boin* (*bongjok*) ran away on an annual basis, leaving a total of 486 in service. As for Samsu County and its nearby garrison forts, 212 heads of households remained after a total of 61 ran away each year and the annual number of *boin* who ran away was 182, which left a total of 238 *boin* in the area. The fur quota assigned to the two counties was as follows. Gapsan County had to present a total of 150 sheets of sable fur, 20 to the king and 130 to the central government, in addition to 271 sheets of weasel fur. Samsu County had to offer 20 sheets of sable fur to the king as well as 90 sheets to the central government, amounting to a total of 110 sheets of sable fur apart from 249 sheets of weasel fur. These annual quotas were assigned while many in the two counties fled to the Jurchen territories to escape the duties, taxes, and loan payments.¹²⁷

Fur trade between Joseon and the Jurchens in the sixteenth century eventually weakened Joseon's military power along its northern border and forced its people to depart to Jurchen territories. On the other hand, this contributed to the growth of the Jurchen society, one that no longer consisted of barbarians.

3. Change in Relations with the Jurchens

The shape of Joseon's relations with the Jurchens ultimately changed due

¹²⁶ *The veritable records of King Jungjong*, vol. 61, 21st of fourth month 1528, entry no. 1.

¹²⁷ *The veritable records of King Jungjong*, vol. 94, 3rd of eleventh month 1540, entry no. 2.

to fur trade between the two during the sixteenth century. From its foundation up to the reign of King Seongjong in the mid-fifteenth century, Joseon's policy toward the Jurchens was to avoid physical clashes as much as possible. Joseon maintained domestic control in order to solidify its border defense while granting the economic requests the Jurchens made to keep them from causing disturbances in border regions.¹²⁸ Since the reign of King Taejong, Joseon set up a trading post to facilitate the Jurchens in obtaining the goods they needed.¹²⁹ In addition, whenever the Jurchens came to Seoul to present their harvest to the Joseon court, gifts were bestowed in return basically to avoid clashing with the Jurchens.

The Jurchens' purpose for maintaining relations with Joseon was primarily economic. During the fifteenth century, they sought to acquire daily necessities from Ming China or Joseon. This was why they traveled to Seoul and paid their respects to the king of Joseon. Since they couldn't come empty-handed, they brought their most commonly produced local goods as harvest offerings,¹³⁰ which happened to be fur and fine horses.¹³¹ In return, Joseon would bestow goods the Jurchens needed such as rice, beans, fabric, or paper.¹³² Another means through which the Jurchens were able to procure daily necessities was to take their fur and fine horses and trade them at the few trading posts or horse markets operated by the Joseon or Ming government.¹³³ Although there were limits set on the volume of exchange allowed at such posts or markets, they did help avoid physical clashes.

The quantity and quality of goods secured from paying respects or

¹²⁸ Kim Soon-nam, "Joseon chogi eui bibyeon daechaek eui surip gwa sihaeng: Jaesangeup gukbang jeonmunga eui hwalyakeul jungsimeuro" [A Study on the Border Defense Policy and the Minister-level National Defense Experts in early Choson Dynasty], *Joseon sidsaesa hakbo*, no. 45 (2008), pp. 58-59.

¹²⁹ *The veritable records of King Taejong*, vol. 11, 10th of fifth month 1406, entry no. 2.

¹³⁰ *The Diaries of King Yeonsangun*, vol. 42, 26th of first month 1502, entry no. 6.

¹³¹ In the case of horses, the Ming dynasty had forbidden Joseon and the Jurchens from trading the horses each other.

¹³² Lee, "Daeyeojin: Muyeok dae yain gyoseop jeongchaek baegyong."

¹³³ Kim, *Yodongsa*, pp. 548-49.

engaging in trade was not enough to satisfy the Jurchens' needs. Hence, yet another way for the dissatisfied Jurchens to obtain more daily necessities was to randomly pillage the border regions of Joseon or Liaodong in Ming China. They were capable of pillaging whenever and wherever they wished. This was why the Jurchens continued to intrude into the border regions of Joseon since the dynasty's foundation and up until the sixteenth century.

Meanwhile, the circumstances surrounding the Jurchens' relations with Joseon started to change since the mid-fifteenth century. The trade of fur between them flourished and the price of fur skyrocketed due to the surge in demand for sable and weasel fur in Joseon. Ming China also preferred the fur supplied by the Jurchens to the extent that their attendance at the Ming court was denied without offering at least one fine horse and thirty sheets of black sable fur.¹³⁴

As the marketability of their sable fur became recognized, the Jurchens were able to trade it to obtain necessary goods. They no longer had to be tied down by their relations with Joseon, but they were not about to immediately abandon it either. The Jurchens would come to Seoul and trade fur at Bukpyeongwan where they lodged. In principle, fur trade was not allowed within the quarters, but it was overlooked in reality. Staff members at the quarters like the keeper would bury banned items such as arrowheads or ivory for making bows in front of a Jurchen lodger's door as agreed beforehand and pick up the fur the lodger would leave behind. Joseon merchants would also rendezvous with the Jurchens at a hilltop meeting point on their way back home to sell banned items.¹³⁵ Such illicit transactions carried risks but the Jurchens weren't necessarily at a disadvantage because selling their fur at a high price allowed them could purchase whatever they desired.

By the mid-sixteenth century, however, the Jurchens grew reluctant about traveling to Seoul. The foremost reason was because they felt the

¹³⁴ *The veritable records of King Sejo*, vol. 40, 3rd of eleventh month 1466, entry no. 1.

¹³⁵ *The veritable records of King Jungjong*, vol. 52, 9th of first month 1525, entry no. 1.

trips were no longer economically beneficial. What the Joseon court paid for the sable fur they brought was less than the price they were traded at home. The usual reward was equivalent to the market price of the lowest quality fur, leaving the Jurchens with no reason to travel all the way to Seoul.¹³⁶ The Jurchens were typically required to offer eight sheets of sable fur whenever they visited Seoul, but they could not profit more through such visits than what they could make from sales at border regions. Furthermore, Joseon's treatment toward the Jurchens grew less courteous by 1531, the twenty-sixth year of King Jungjong. The Joseon court would occasionally grant the title of *gveomsabok*, or cavalry bodyguard, to especially talented Jurchens or those from a stronger Jurchen tribe, but this practice nearly disappeared by 1531. King Jungjong was, of course, aware that the Jurchens had grown reluctant about traveling to Seoul, but he did not make any gestures other than ordering the court to fairly appraise and pay for the goods they brought.¹³⁷

The drop in the frequency of the Jurchens' visits to Seoul during the reign of King Jungjong can be confirmed through mentions about relations with the Jurchens in Joseon's historical records. During the mid-fifteenth century when King Seongjong reigned, Joseon maintained good relations with the Jianzhou sanwei, the three Ming commanderies populated by the Jurchens in the Jianzhou area. Each commandery visited Joseon once on average every year during the reign of King Seongjong¹³⁸ while the Udige tribe made a total of seventy-one visits over the same period.¹³⁹ However, between the second and tenth year of King Jungjong's reign, only five visits by the Jurchens are mentioned in *Jungjong sillok*, or the *Annals of King Jungjong*.

It is, of course, possible that mention of some visits could have been omitted from such official records. Yet it is more likely that fur trade with

¹³⁶ *The veritable records of King Jungjong*, vol. 72, 9th of eleventh month 1531, entry no. 1.

¹³⁷ *The veritable records of King Jungjong*, vol. 72, 9th of eleventh month 1531, entry no. 2.

¹³⁸ Kim, "Joseon Seongjongdae cui geonju samwi," pp. 240-41.

¹³⁹ Kim, "Joseon Seongjongdae uljeokhapse daehayeo," pp. 57-58.

Table 1. Mentions of Jurchen Visits in the Annals of King Jungjong

Date of Visit	Jurchen Visitors
21 st of first month, 1507	Ten Jurchens including Sacha (撒察)
22 nd of twelfth month, 1508	Mangha (莽哈)
First month 1511	Mangha, Shede
Second month 1513	Liuwuyiwei (劉吾乙未)
First month 1515	Mangha

Joseon changed the circumstances surrounding the Jurchens in the sixteenth century, enough for them to reconsider their regular visits to Joseon as a means of securing daily necessities.¹⁴⁰

As the Jurchens' visits grew sparse, some in Joseon suggested that the Jurchens should be required to pay their respects with horses instead of expensive sable fur.¹⁴¹ During the first half of the Joseon dynasty, 120 Jurchens made formal visits to Seoul on bumper years and 90 on lean years. Each of those Jurchens were required to offer sable fur. However, some of them did not have enough sable fur to offer, so they had to exchange oxen, horses, or ironware with the Udige tribe to purchase it. These circumstances led to the suggestion of assigning a fixed number of fine horses for each Jurchen to present according to the title they were given from Joseon.¹⁴²

Fur trade in the sixteenth century thus changed the traditional relations between Joseon and the Jurchens. Joseon allowed the Jurchens to pay their respects and satisfied their economic needs in order to avoid physical clashes with them in its border regions. As fur trade made it possible for the Jurchens to obtain necessary goods, there was less reason for them to visit Seoul and pay their respects to the king of Joseon. This in turn made it

¹⁴⁰ Flourishing fur trade in the sixteenth century did not necessarily stop the Jurchens from raiding Joseon. When the Jurchens began to settle down during the reign of King Jungjong in areas that were once part of the four abolished counties, Joseon launched military operations to chase them away and it continued to experience conflicts with the Jurchens such as the brutal murder of Manpojin's second deputy commander.

¹⁴¹ *The veritable records of King Myeongjong*, vol. 19, 25th of eleventh month 1555, entry no. 1.

¹⁴² *The veritable records of King Jungjong*, vol. 21, 13th of tenth month 1514, entry no. 3.

increasingly challenging for Joseon to control the Jurchens, which partly explains why Ni Tangjie and the Jurchens living nearby the six Joseon garrison forts revolted against Joseon during the reign of King Seonjo.

V. Conclusion

General Kim Jong-seo (1383-1453), who led the establishment of six garrison forts during the reign of King Sejong, suggested that fur goods would surely engender negative effectives and make it impossible for later generations to maintain the six garrison forts.¹⁴³ The general's comment was a testament to how much change fur trade brought to the societies of Joseon and the Jurchens, not to mention the issues it caused.

After remaining less advanced than Joseon until the mid-fifteenth century, the Jurchen society began to gradually develop thereafter. That development involved the spread of farming that permitted the Jurchen society to proceed to a stage beyond a semi-nomadic, semi-agricultural lifestyle. Oxen and iron farming tools became necessary for the Jurchens to boost agricultural production. Around the same time, the ruling class of Joseon became infatuated with luxury goods. In terms of fur, sable fur was the most rare and expensive and those produced in Jurchen territories were especially coveted because of their fine quality. Around the same time, sable fur became included in the list of tributary items Joseon had to offer to the Ming court.

It was under these circumstances that fur trade flourished between Joseon and the Jurchens. The Jurchen society's need for oxen and horses coincided with the Joseon society's need for sable and weasel fur. A major variable in fur trade was the magistrates serving in the northern border regions of Joseon. Such magistrates pushed people to secure good quality sable and weasel fur not only to fill the quota of fur assigned to each village by the central government, but to profit from the rarity and marketability of sable fur as well.

¹⁴³ *The veritable records of King Myeongjong*, vol. 10, 29th of first month 1550, entry no. 1.

The vibrant trade of sable fur led to a rapid leak of oxen, horses, and ironware from Joseon. This helped the Jurchens achieve agricultural development but weakened the military strength of Joseon along its northern border. Moreover, people in the Yanggye districts of Joseon who increasingly found it difficult to endure the pressure from magistrates to procure sable fur began to run away to Jurchen territories. And when the Jurchens became capable of securing enough of necessary goods through trade, they no longer felt motivated to seek economic benefits from visiting Seoul and paying their respects to the Joseon court.

Fur trade between Joseon and the Jurchens thereby changed the traditional relations between the two in the sixteenth century. Without the capability to satisfy the economic needs of the Jurchens, Joseon eventually lost control over them. These developments eventually gave rise to a revolt by Ni Tangjie and the Jurchens residing around the six Joseon garrison forts during the reign of King Seonjo. In essence, it was a seemingly trivial factor like fur, more specifically sable and weasel fur, that became responsible for initiating political, economic, social advancements and forming a new historical phase in the sixteenth century for Joseon and the Jurchens.

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Unfolding Relations between Joseon and Ming during the Ming-Qing Transition

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Keywords: Ming-Qing Transition, King Seonjo, King Gwanghae, King Injo, Mao Wenglong, King Injo Restoration in 1623, Yi Gwal's Rebellion in 1624, Jurchen Invasion in 1627, Manchu Invasion in 1636, Grace of Restoring the Dynasty, Refusing Peace Settlement, Discourse of Using Japan to Check the Qing

Unfolding Relations between Joseon and Ming during the Ming-Qing Transition*

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I. Introduction

The Joseon dynasty (1392-1910) suffered devastating damage during the Imjin War (*Imjin waeran* 壬辰倭亂: 1592-1598) that rocked the Korean peninsula for seven years. Although the war was brought to an end with the death of Toyotomi Hideyoshi 豊臣秀吉 in 1598, the pains on the part of Joseon did not end soon. In the early seventeenth century, Joseon had barely begun the struggle to overcome the severe damage inflicted by the seven-year war when it was faced with another foreign crisis. The crisis had been wrought by the threat from the north as a result of the rise of the Jianzhou 建州 Jurchens under Nurhaci 奴兒哈赤 (1559-1626) in Liaodong and by the military demands from the Ming which tried to use Joseon to counter the Jurchens according to the time-honored Chinese strategy of “using one barbarian to check against another” (*yiyi zhiyi* 以夷制夷). Joseon was placed at a crossroad where it was forced to make a crucial decision between the rising military power of the Jianzhou Jurchens and the existing hegemony of Ming China in East Asia.

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Before the rise to power of the Jianzhou Jurchens, Joseon officials did not take the threats from the Jurchens very seriously. For example, Sin Heum 申欽 (1566-1628) describes the Jurchen threats in the following statement:

For about 200 years since the founding of our country, we have not suffered an invasion by the Jurchen barbarians. One Jurchen rebellion in the *gyemi* year (1583) was just an inflection on the surface, and not serious enough to compare it to an infection inside the stomach. Even though the court was not unaware that Nurhaci, if arising in rebellion, would make a formidable bandit, it did not issue any order or take measures in preparation of defending against his forces.¹

Sin Heum anticipated much more serious consequences of Nurhaci's rise to power by comparing it to an infection in the stomach than that of the Nit'anggae's 泥湯介 uprising in 1583 (the sixteenth year of King Seonjo's reign) which he compared to a skin infection.

As Sin had predicted, the rise to power of Nurhaci was rapid. He established the "Later Jin" (Hou Jin 後金) in 1616, declared a rebellion against the Ming in 1618, seized the Liaodong region in 1625, and renamed his regime the "Great Qing" (Da Qing 大清) in 1636. In the meantime, the Joseon state under the Ming pressure sent troops to participate in joint attacks against the Jurchens, but suffered a crushing defeat at Sarhū in 1619. In 1623, a palace coup d'état, known as the King Injo Restoration (*King Injo banjeong* 仁祖反正), deposed King Gwanghae 光海君 (r. 1608-23) and installed King Injo 仁祖 (r. 1623-49). The King Injo regime suffered the first invasion by the Later Jin in 1627, and the second invasion by the Qing in 1636, when it surrendered and was forced to enter a suzerain-vassal relation with the Jurchens. As Sin Heum had warned, the Jianzhou Jurchens turned out to be an "infection inside the stomach," and eventually vanquished Joseon. After subjugating Joseon, the Qing armies entered into mainland China proper by way of the Shanhai Pass (Shanhaiguan 山海關),

¹ (Joseon) Sin Heum, "Biro seol" (Debate on defending against the barbarians), in *Sangchon jip* (The collection of Sim Heum's works), vol. 34.

and finally took over Beijing without a fight in 1644, thus achieving the dynastic transition from the Ming to the Qing. Ergo, since the end of the Imjin War in 1598 until the Manchu Qing's entrance into mainland China in 1644, the Joseon state had been painfully involved in the cataclysmic changes of the international order in East Asia.

This article examines this Ming-Qing transition from Joseon's perspectives. The questions to be addressed will be: What were the perceptions of the court and ruling elites towards the Ming-Qing transition? What were the impacts of the transition on the Joseon state, and its reactions? And, what made the Joseon state suffer the Jurchen / Manchu invasions twice and surrendered to them? To be more specific, the topics include: 1) the rise of the Jianzhou Jurchens in the wake of the Imjin War and the reactions on the part of Joseon; 2) the military trends of the Later Jin during the reign of King Gwanghae and the foreign policies of his regime towards the Ming and the Later Jin; 3) the consequences of the coup of the King Injo Restoration on Joseon's foreign relations; 4) the background of the 1627 (Jurchen) invasion and its course; and 5) the causes and consequences of the 1636-37 (Manchu) invasion.

II. The Rise of the Jianzhou Jurchens in the Wake of the Imjin War, and Reactions of the Joseon State

1. The Rise of the Jianzhou Jurchens under Nurhaci

By the early twelfth century, the Jurchens under the leadership of Wanyan Aguda 阿骨打 (1068-1123) began to challenge the Khitan Liao 遼 dynasty (916-1125), establishing the Jin 金 dynasty (1115-1234), and destroying the Liao in 1125. The Jin then occupied Kaifeng 開封 in 1127, and took the Song emperors Huizong 徽宗 and Qinzong 欽宗 as captives, forcing the Song 宋 to retreat to the south. In the meantime, the Korean state of Goryeo 高麗 styled itself as a vassal state to the Jin, thus shifting its alliance and loyalty away from the Liao.²

² Kim Yanggi, *Dongbangsa nonchong* (Studies on east Asian history) (Seoul National University

Defeated by the Mongols in 1234, the disunited Jurchen groups lived scattered across Manchuria and northern Hamgyeong, engaging in hunting, fishing, foraging, and agriculture. Since its inception in 1368, Ming 明 dynasty had tried to “pacify” (*zhaofu* 招撫) the Jurchen tribes by giving favors because it was well aware of their potential dangers. In the past, the Khitans had come up with the saying, “The Jurchens adding up to ten thousand, there would be no match.”³ The Ming policy towards the Jurchens had the unmistakable aim to prevent a second advent of a formidable hegemon such as Wanya Aguda. The Ming court tried to bring the native Jurchen leaders into control by bestowing on them such military titles as Commander-in-Chief, Commissioner-in-Chief, Commissioner, junior officer. Additionally, they attempted to pacified officers by presenting them the official seals and decrees. In 1404, Yongle emperor 永樂帝 established the Liaodong Military Command and the Nurgan Military Command with a network of affiliated guards and posts bring the Jurchen population under the monarch-subject relationship. That Ming system was introduced in order to preempt possible unification attempts by ambitious Jurchen chieftain, and also to serve as a check against the Mongols by following the traditional policy of using one barbarian group to control another barbarian group.⁴

While the Yongle emperor was busy pacifying the Jurchens in 1405, Möngke Temür, the chieftain of the Odoli whom the Joseon government had tried hard to persuade to yield to it, accepted the Ming title of Commissioner-in-Chief of the Jianzhou Guard, creating deep sense of anxiety among Joseon officials.⁵

Along with conferring the military titles, the Ming employed economic strategies to contain the Jurchen chiefs. In their trade with the Ming, the Jurchens traded luxury items as ginseng, furs, and pearls in exchange

Press, 1984), pp. 568-75.

³ (Ming) Mao Ruizheng, *DongYi kaolue in Qing ruguan qian shilitao xuanji (yi)* (Beijing: Renmin daxue chubanshe, 1984), p. 45.

⁴ (Ming) Chen Jian, *HuangMing tongji* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2008), vol. 4, Yongle Jiashen era.

⁵ Kawachi Yoshihiro, *Mindai Joshin shi no kenkyū* (Kyōto: Dōhōsha, 1992), pp. 41-45.

for livelihood necessities such as foodstuff, textiles, and iron implements. The Ming court allowed trade privileges only to Jurchen chiefs who possessed specially issued printed patents (勅書). Thus, the Ming tried to bring the Jurchen chiefs under their control through dominating their economic lifeline through a system of patent trade.⁶

The Ming's policy towards the Jurchens met critical moments in the later years of the Wanli reign (1572-1620). At that time, the general in control of the Ming effort to contain the Jurchens, was Li Chengliang 李成梁 (1526-1615) of Joseon origin, appointed to Assistant Commissioner of the Tieling Guard in the last years of the Jiajing reign (1521-1566) and promoted to commander in 1570, in control of the Ming forces in the Liaodong area. Li suppressed the rebellion of Wang Gao of the Jianzhou Jurchen confederation in 1575, and also that of Wang Gao's son Atai who sought for revenge on behalf of his father. In the latter campaign against Atai's Fort Gure in 1583, Giocangga (Nurhaci's grandfather) and his son Taksi (Nurhaci's father) secretly allied with Li Chengliang, but were massacred along with the fort's inhabitants at the hands of the Ming forces.

Although his father and grandfather had been killed by the Ming forces, Nurhaci's power had not yet grown enough to confront the Ming forces under Li Chengliang. Nurhaci started with thirty patents given by Li Chengliang, and continued to accumulate a great number of patents as he expanded his control over his fellow Jurchen chiefs who had held patents. Taking advantage of monopolistic patent trade, he could amass enormous wealth as a result of acquiring Ming products in exchange for such Jurchen products as furs, ginseng, and pearl. Relying on the growing military pow-

⁶ Wada Sei, "Shin no Taiso to Ri Seiryō to no Kankei" (Relations between the Emperor of Qing China and Li Chengliang), *Tōashi ronsō* (Tokyo: Seikatsusha, 1933); Kim Duhyeon, "Cheongjo jeonggweon eui seongnip gwa baljeon" (Establishment and development of the Qing dynasty), *Gangjwa Jungguksa IV* (Seoul: Jisik san'eopsa, 1989), 143-54; Wei Bide (Frederic E. Wakeman Jr.), *Hongye: Qingchao kaiguo shi* (Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 1992), pp. 22-43; Meng Shen, "Qing Taizu qibing wei fuzu baochou shi xiangkao," *Ming Qingshi lunzhujikan* (Shijie shujū, 1980); Yan Chongnian ed., *Qingchao tongshi Taizu chao* (Zijincheng chubanshe, 2003); Takao Ishibashi, Hong Seonggu, trans., *Dae Cheong jeguk* (Great Qing empire) (Seoul: Hyumeonist, 2009); Liu Xiaoming, Yi Heun, Yi Seon'ae, and Kim Seonmin, trans., *Yeojin burak eseo Manju gukka ro* (From Jurchen villages to the Manchu state) (Seoul: Peureun yeoksa, 2013).

er based on newly acquired economic wealth, in 1583 Nurhaci launched an attack against Nikan Wailan swearing revenge for the deaths of his father and grandfather. Subsequently, in 1587, he established his seat at the Jiulao fortress in Fe Ala for further subjugation of the Jianzhou Jurchens. In the face of Nurhaci's ever expanding power the Ming court appointed him to Assistant Commander-in-chief of the Jianzhou Guard in a preemptive effort to block him from becoming the 'second Aguda 阿骨打.'⁷

Nurhaci unified the Jianzhou Jurchens in 1589. The Imjin War broke out in 1592, upon which the Ming forces stationed across the Liadong area were assembled to compose an expeditionary force to counterattack the Japanese invaders who put forth the scheme of "using [Joseon] routes to enter into the Ming." It should be noted that Li Rusong 李如松 (1549-98), the commander of the Ming forces, was the first son of Li Chengliang who had been in charge of containing the rise of the Nurhaci forces. Thus, a large number of the Ming forces in the Liadong region were diverted from their original mission in the region for the defense of Joseon. Nurhaci wasted no time taking advantage of this power vacuum created by the switch of the main thrust of the Ming forces toward Korea.⁸ In 1593 Nurhaci defeated a force of nine allied tribes led by the Yehe tribe of the Haixi Jurchens and the Korchin tribe of the Mongols at Gulu Mountain. Thereafter, Nurhaci established himself as an unrivaled hegemon in the region. From 1601 onward Nurhaci vanquished the Haixi Jurchen tribes one after another, including the Hada tribe. Placed in jeopardy, the Yehe tribe of the Haixi Jurchens turned to the Ming seeking succor. The Ming now supported their former enemy in an attempt to use the Jurchen tribe as a check against Nurhaci.

2. Joseon's Policies towards the Jianzhou Jurchens

The Confucian elites in Joseon referred to the Jurchens as *yain* 野人 (barbarian

⁷ Yan (2003), ed., *Ibid.*, pp. 18-30.

⁸ Yan Chongnian, "Lun Nuerhachi," in *Yan Chongnian zixuanji* (Beijing: Jiuzhou chubanshe, 2016), pp. 39-40.

outsiders), despising them by using such colloquial pejoratives as ‘*orangk’ae*’ (barbarians) and ‘*kaedwaeji*’ (dogs and pigs). Joseon’s Confucian-inspired policy towards the Jurchens directed that as surrendered men they be treated well, and even as a defector, they would not be chosen after, thus creating neither grievances nor seeds of hostility on their part. As a Joseon general Kim Jongseo 金宗瑞 once pointed out, Joseon styled itself as a superior state vis-à-vis the Jurchens, and took pains in addressing the question of how to combine royal favors with state authority in handling them.⁹

On the one hand, Joseon treated generously the Jurchens, who had submitted to its court, by granting them official titles and return gifts, but launched punitive attacks against those Jurchens who had raided the borderlands on the other hand. For example, in 1433 when Li Manchu, one Jurchen leader in Jianzhou, undertook a raid against Luyan, the Joseon government sent an expedition army as far north as the Pozhu River to attack him. By 1437, the Four Counties (*sagun* 四郡) of the upper Yalu River region and the Six Garrisons (*yukchin* 六鎮) of the lower Tumen River region had been established to subjugate the Jurchens in the northeast. In 1467, as a response to the request from the Ming in 1467, Joseon accepted a joint campaign with the Ming against Li Manchu, resulting in the death of Li Manchu and his son. And in 1479, an expedition army led by Yun Pilsang was sent to assault the Jianzhou Jurchens.¹⁰

Nonetheless, controlling of the Jurchens became increasingly difficult and dangerous from the sixteenth century. From the late fifteenth century on, the northwestern region of the Korean peninsula suffered from natural disaster such as drought, starvation, burdens of military service, and extortion by local officials, which triggered a growing outflow of the local population migrating into Jurchen regions or other areas. As a consequence, many in the Joseon government began to worry that depopulation

⁹ (Joseon) *Sejong sillok* (Veritable Records of King Sejong), vol. 75 (18th year of King Sejong, 11th lunar month, *gyeongja* day).

¹⁰ Kim Gujin, “Yeojin gwa eui gwangye” (The Relations with the Jurchens), in *Han’guksa* 22 (Seoul: Guksa pyeonchan wiweonhoe, 1995); Kim Gujin, “Joseon sidae Yeojin e daehan jeongchaek” (Joseon’s Policies towards the Jurchens), *Baeksan hakbo* 88 (2010).

in the frontier regions could cause difficulties in defending those regions. Moreover, it was noted with alarm that with the upsurge in demand for Jurchen furs at the time in Joseon, numerous cows and iron implements were being delivered to the Jurchens in exchange for luxury goods such as sable fur. The Jurchen leaders, amassing wealth through selling native products such as furs, expanded their power and wealth sufficiently to incorporate the border people of Joseon.¹¹

Following the destructive rebellion of Nit'anggae, a former Jurchen subject of Joseon, in 1583, Joseon made a difficult effort to lure and support a class of Jurchens referred to as *beonho* 藩胡 (fence Jurchens), whom Joseon regarded as playing a vital role in its northern border defense. With the outbreak of the Imjin War in 1592, the effect of the rising power of Nurhaci came to the fore with increasing urgency. On the fourteenth day of the ninth lunar month of 1592 when the Joseon court took refuge in the border city of Euiju, it was reported that Nurhaci offered to send armies to aid the Joseon-Ming endeavor to repel the Japanese invaders. The ministers of the Border Defense Command (*Bibyeonsa* 備邊司) voiced strong objections, warning that “once Nurhaci entered Joseon, it would mean the end of the state.” Then, the Joseon government decided to reject Nurhaci's offer for an alliance,¹² yet had to recognize the transformed status of the Jurchens whom they had hitherto looked down upon as ‘barbarian outsiders (*yain* 野人)’ and ‘evils (*soch'u* 小醜).’

Taking advantage of the crisis precipitated by the Japanese assault on Joseon's Hamgyeong Province, some of the Jurchen inhabitants there (referred to as *beonho* 藩胡) launched raids. With Joseon fully engaged in driving out the Japanese invaders, the government could not afford to send troops to combat the Jurchens on the other war front. Hence, the Joseon court, by bestowing gifts such as cotton cloth, tried to win over the *beonho*

¹¹ Kawachi, *Ibid.* (1992), chapter 18, 「貂皮交易の展開」; Kim Sunnam, “16 segi Joseon gwa Yain sai eui mopi gyoyeok eui jeon'gae” (Unfolding of the Fur Trade between Joseon and the Jurchens in the Sixteenth Century), *Han'guksa yeon'gu* 152 (2011).

¹² (Joseon) *Seonjo sillok* (Veritable Records of King Seonjo), vol. 30 (25th year of Seonjo, 9th lunar month, *sinmi* day).

Jurchens who could not make a courtesy visit to the capital (that is Hanseong, today's Seoul) and the court because of the war.¹³ Revolts and unrest prevailed among the Hūlun tribes, and other *beonho* Jurchens were upset by the ever intensifying pressure from Nurhaci, as the Joseon Neo-Confucian scholar Yi Ik 李穡 (1681-1763) recorded.

Since 1591, Bujantai, a chief of the Hūlun tribe, subjugated all of the *beonho* Jurchens north of the Tumen River, and undertook frequent raids upon our border towns. Some of them sought our government titles, but those requests were not granted. The [Joseon] government ordered the border commanders to intimidate them with armed forces, or to allow loose ties with them. Previously, the Not'o *beonho* Jurchens had been prohibited from crossing over into our territory for crop cultivation by a [Joseon] border commander. When he was murdered by them, the commanders Yi Suil and Yi Gwal retaliated by raiding and burning their settlements. Originally, the Not'o Jurchens had been descendants of Yi Manju, and had lived in the vicinity of the Pozhu River and Jiangjie, before they migrated to the west of Mt. Baekdu, not far from our northern border. As for the Hūlun tribe and Bujantai, they had been descended from the Udige decent group, and were closer to the deep (further north) dwelling Jurchens rather than to the Not'o tribe. In 1605, the inspector Seo Seong raised armies to punish Bujantai of the Hūlun tribe. However, his armies were ambushed and decimated to the dismay of the Joseon court. Henceforth, the Hūlun Jurchens grew in power and prestige, and attempted to annihilate the *beonho* Jurchens in Gyeongheung, who sought rescue by the Not'o tribe. In response, the Not'o cavalry of 5,000 men dashed out from Mt. Baekdu, broke through our Onseong fortress, and dealt a crushing blow to the Hūlun Jurchens at Ogaldong. From then on, Bujantai of the Hūlun fell into decline. This is a general overview of [the rebellious conditions] in the north.¹⁴

¹³ Bak Jeongmin, *Joseon sidae Yeojinin naejo yeon'gu* (Study of the Jurchens' submission to Joseon) (Seoul: Gyeongin munhwasa, 2015), pp. 208-22.

¹⁴ (Joseon) Yi Ik, "Jeongni macha," in "Gyeongsa mun" (Classics and histories), in *Seongho saseol*

It has been widely recognized that the participation of the Ming forces in the Liaodong region during the Imjin War in the Korean peninsula gave rise to the expansion of Nurhaci's power and the radical changes in the political and military situations in Manchuria.¹⁵ Yet, it should be also noted that the rise of Nurhaci had a profound impact on the border security of the Joseon state, because his emergence begot the violent revolts of those Jurchens pressured by Nurhaci—in particular, the aggressions of the Hūlun tribal chief Bujantai, as described by Yi Ik—and the eventual removal of the *beonho* Jurchens, that is, Joseon's Jurchen allies. In his attempt to muster forces from the 1593 defeat by Nurhaci, Bujantai launched raids on Joseon's settler communities and the *beonho* Jurchens in its border area. One of his raids in the third lunar month of 1605 against Donggwanjin, a garrison town located northeast of Hamgyeong, was particularly extreme, massacring Joseon officials and civilians as well as *beonho* Jurchen inhabitants in the area. Infuriated, the Joseon government dispatched 3,000 troops in retaliation, only to be routed by Bujantai's forces.¹⁶ The depth of the disaster on Joseon forces can be surmised by Yi Ik's account above that “six or seven men out of ten met death.”

Then, the *beonho* Jurchens threatened by Bujantai turned to Nurhaci *en masse*. In the process, the rivalry between Nurhaci and Bujantai escalated to a showdown between them at Menyan across the Tumen River in 1607, where Nurhaci gained final victory.¹⁷ Thereafter, almost all the *beonho* Jurchens near the borderlands of Joseon were incorporated into the Jianzhou Jurchens. With the loss of a buffer zone heretofore filled by the *beonho* Jurchens, Joseon came into direct confrontation with the Jianzhou Jurchens.

(The essays by Yi Ik), vol. 19.

¹⁵ Inaba Iwakichi, *Zōtei Manshū hattatsushi* (Tōkyō, Nihon Hyōronsha, 1934), pp. 215-16, and 519; Inaba Iwakichi, *Shintōa kensetsu to shikan* (Tōkyō: Chikura Shobō, 1939), 72-78; Yan (2016), *Ibid.*, pp. 39-34.

¹⁶ Seo Byeongguk, *Seonjo sidae Yeojik gyeoseopsa yeon'gu* (Study on relations with the Jurchens in the King Seonjo era) (Seoul: Gyomunsa, 1970), pp. 141-55.

¹⁷ Bak Jeongmin, *Ibid.* (2015), pp. 230-41.

In addition to the security issue, another vexing matter with the Jianzhou Jurchen inhabitants was the problem of their gathering ginseng at Joseon's territories. The border transgressions by Jianzhou Jurchen ginseng collectors multiplied about the time of the Imjin War. Especially during the harvest seasons of wild ginseng, a wide range of Jurchens not only covered mountain valleys, but also frequently pillaged mountain villages in search of women and livestock.¹⁸

King Seonjo 宣祖 (r. 1567-1608) was keenly concerned with the new situations along the northern border, and deliberated policy options with his ministers. Notably, in 1595 he sent Sin Chung'il to Hetu Ala to detect recent trends among the Jianzhou Jurchens in a firsthand manner. Sin Chung'il left a travelogue titled *Jianzhou gijeong dogi* 建州紀程圖記 (Record of a Trip to Jianzhou) based on what he saw and heard there. The dispatch of an envoy to a Jurchen base amid the desperate war against the Japanese attests to the depth of crisis felt by the Joseon court in the face of the rise of Nurhaci. Warning against Nurhaci's military maneuvering skills and prowess, Seonjo demanded countermeasures in anticipation of the surprise attack of his armies. In addition, he ordered the frontier officers to refrain from killing the Jurchen ginseng diggers lest local disputes between Joseon settlers and Jurchen inhabitants should erupt into major conflicts. Further, Seonjo informed the Ming court of the growing threats of the Jianzhou Jurchens to the Ming court with a view to bringing them to alert and to using the Ming military authority in curbing the Jurchen threats to Joseon.

As noted above, Joseon's control over the Jurchens near its northern border had been seriously weakened during the Imjin War, as shown in its failure to overcome the aggressions of the Hūlun tribe's Bujantai, for instance. As Nurhaci had vanquished the Hūlun tribe on the occasion of the battle at Menyan, most of the *beonho* Jurchens came under Nurhaci's dominance. Since Joseon had lost its possible allies in border defense, the sentiment of national crisis within the Joseon court further heightened, as expressed in a memorial addressed to the Wanli emperor by King Seonjo.

¹⁸ (Joseon) Ryu Mongin, "Anbyeon samsip'i chaek" (Thirty-two strategies for stabilizing the northern frontier), in *Eou jip hujip* (Sequel to the collection of Ryu Mongin's works), vol. 5.

Your subject has been granted Your Majesty's profound 'grace of restoring the [Joseon] dynasty (*jaejo ji eun* 再造之恩).' Though deeply moved by the grace, your subject is unable to find the way by which to repay your grace. Unfortunately, our country had hardly been freed from the worries [of the Japanese invaders] in the south when it was faced by another urgent alarm [from the Jurchen threat] in the north. Though we exert ourselves fending off these threats, we are afraid that we are unable to sustain ourselves because of our power being divided and weakened. Unless appealing to the parents of this world for help, it seems truly difficult to ward off the external threats.¹⁹

As indicated above, Joseon in the aftermath of the Imjin War was caught under the twin pressures of the possible renewal of Japanese hostilities in the south and the expansion of Nurhaci's power in the north. Joseon, sandwiched between the two threats, continued to rely on the Ming military power to overcome its national crisis.

III. Joseon's Policies towards the Later Jin and the Ming during the King Gwanghae Era

1. The Capture of Fushun by the Later Jin, and Debates over Joseon's Reinforcement Armies

With the passage of time, Nurhaci's military power and prestige grew with great magnitude. The growth of his power had been backed by the accumulation of economic wealth made possible by new agricultural techniques and crafts, and enormous trade profits in luxury goods such as furs and ginseng.²⁰

Following his establishment of the Later Jin in 1616 (the eighth year

¹⁹ (Joseon) "Bukno guheun geolmyeong chikyu jhu," in *Sadae mungwe* (Official communications between the Ming and Joseon), vol. 46 (34th year of Wanli, 2nd lunar month, 9th day).

²⁰ (Ming) Cheng Kaigu, *DongYi Nuerhachi kao in Qing ruguan qian shiliao xuanji (yi)* (Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 1984); Liu (2013), *Ibid.*, pp. 181-88.

of King Gwanghae's reign), Nurhaci announced the "Seven Great Grievances" against the Ming, and captured the garrison of Fushun in 1618. Although Nurhaci listed first the killing of his father and his grandfather by the Ming force among the seven grievances, he gave vent to his bitter inner feeling towards the Ming that had attempted to use the Yehe tribe to check against his new dynasty.²¹

While the Ming began to assemble a massive expedition army against Nurhaci, it demanded Joseon to join in its campaign against Nurhaci. When the Ming Board of War demanded reinforcements from Joseon in the intercalary fourth lunar month of 1618, its justification was again the "gratitude for restoring the dynasty" (*jaejo ji eun* 再造之恩).²² The board insisted on repaying the gratitude for saving the Joseon dynasty from destruction during the Japanese invasions by joining hands with the Ming for a strategic campaign against the Later Jin.

In 1610, the second year of King Gwanghae's reign, the Liaodong Military Command of the Ming maintained, "During the Imjin debacle the Ming saved Joseon by mobilizing its people [practically] into the fire ground," referring to the Imjin War as "a war to rescue Joseon" (*dongyuan yiyi* 東援一役).²³ On the other hand, a majority of ministers from the Border Defense Command urged the sending of troops for the sake of the Ming whom they referred to as "parent country" and "savior" [of Joseon]. They insisted on repaying the moral debt owed to the Ming that had "restored the dynasty (i.e., Joseon) as parent country." Many ministers of the Joseon court in fact agreed with that view. For example, Kim Sangheon (1570-1652) recalled, "Thanks to the Wanli emperor's (r. 1573-1619) imperial grace, our country recovered from its loss and our people regained

²¹ Iwai Shigeki, "Kanjin to Chugoku ni totte no Shin-cho, Manju" [The Qing Empire and the Manchus with Regard to the Chinese and China], in *Shin-cho to wa Nani ka* [What is the Qing Empire?], ed. by Okada Hidehiro (Tōkyō: Fujiwarashoten, 2009), p. 95.

²² (Joseon) *King Gwanghae ilgi* (Daily Records of King Gwanghae), vol. 127 (10th year of King Gwanghae, intercalary 4th lunar month, *eulhae* day).

²³ (Joseon) *King Gwanghae ilgi* (Daily Records of King Gwanghae), vol. 25 (2nd year of King Gwanghae, 2nd lunar month, *gyeongsul* day).

their lost lives.” And he also asserted that the Imjin War had transformed Joseon’s relationship with the Ming from that of lord and vassal or that of *hua* 華 (civilized center) and *yi* 夷 (barbarian periphery) to that of father and son, thus making one single family.²⁴ While the moralists empathized with Joseon’s indebtedness to the Ming, the proponents of *realpolitik* paid attention to the Joseon’s difficult conditions when the Ming as “parent” and “savior” pressed on Joseon a recompense for its imperial magnanimity.

The question of accepting the Ming request for sending troops threw the Joseon court into uproar. King Gwanghae was in a cautious position to avoid the Ming request, while the Border Defense Command was in favor of sending troops.²⁵ In the fourth intercalary lunar month of 1618, King Gwanghae asked his ministers to put forth their respective opinions, as described by a historian official in the *King Gwanghae ilgi* (Daily Record of King Gwanghae’s Reign).

In an effort to decline the [Ming] demand for reinforcements, King Kwanghae ordered many times that the Board Defense Council send notes to the [Ming] commands in Liaodong and Guangning, yet the council would not follow the order. Then, the king ordered to extend the deliberations to include all the officials ranked at the second rank and

²⁴ (Joseon) Kim Sangheon, “Sajedok jusa jeungdong seo,” in *Cheongeum jip* (Collection of Kim Sangheon’s Works), vol. 9.

²⁵ Han Myeonggi, “King Gwanghae dae cui Daebuk seryeok gwa jeongguk cui donghyang” (The Great Northerner faction and court politics during the King Gwanghae era), *Han’guksaron* 20 (1988), pp. 326-37; Han Myeonggi, *Imjin waeran gwa Han Jung gwangye* (The Imjin War and Korea-China relations) (Seoul: Yeoksa bipyeongsa, 1999), pp. 244-50. Gye Seungbeom has provided a good summary of the debate between King Gwanghae and the Border Defense Command over the sending of troops. “King Gwanghae dae cui daeoe jeongchack gwa geu nonjang eui seonggyeok” (Foreign policies during the King Gwanghae era, and the characteristics of the policy debate), *Han’guk Bulgyosa yeon’gu* 4 (2013). Yet, his remarks that “all the court officials including censors were united in supporting the foreign policies of the Border Defense Command, which represented the collective opinion of all officials,” or that “only King Gwanghae struggled to voice a different opinion, refusing to accept the collective opinion” (*Ibid.*, p. 35) do not conform to the historical facts, because many court officials such as Bak Seungjong, Bak Jaheung, Bak Jeonggil, Yun Hwi, Yi Sibal, Yi Wigyeong, Im Tae, Jeong Jun, Jo Chanhan, and Hwang Jungyun supported the King Gwanghae line, going beyond their factional affiliations.

higher who also presented the same opinion. Even the arch villain (Yi Icheom of the Great Northerner faction) could not dare to go against the great cause [of repaying the Ming]. Nonetheless, Yun Hwi became the first to voice opposition to sending troops, and was followed by Hwang Jung'yun, Jo Chanhan, Yi Wigyeong, and Im Tae, all of whom, comprehending the intent of the king, presented their open proposal phrased in deceitful and absurd words. In the end, in the campaign in 1619, the king instructed the two commanders (Gang Hongnip and Kim Eungseo) to communicate secretly with the Jurchens and surrender to them [in anticipation of the Ming defeat]. Internally, he ordered to place the mother of prince (Queen Dowager Inmok) into custody, and externally he refused to follow the order from the emperor, thus being in breach of the three human bonds (*samgang* 三綱).²⁶

Even though the Westerner's (*Seoin* 西人) bias is transparent, this account conveys important facts; most of all, King Gwanghae's efforts to avoid sending Joseon troops and to persuade the Ming commanders and commissioners stationed in the Liadong and Guangning regions. Though the ministers of the highest Border Defense Command—including Yi Icheom (1560-1623) whom the Westerner historian condemned as the “principal culprit” of the King Gwanghae's regime—advocated the sending of the troops, a substantial number of high officials, such as Yun Hwi, Hwang Jung'yun, Cho Chanhan, Yi Wigyeong and Im Tae, supported the King Gwanghae's position.

When the Liaodong governor Li Weifan sent a letter urging preparation for sending the troops, King Gwanghae ordered to send a return letter that warned against “any rash move of troops without full preparation.”²⁷ In addition, he pointed to the fact that the Joseon troops in such a weak and poorly trained state would not be of much aid to the Ming expedition. King

²⁶ (Joseon) *King Gwanghae ilgi*, vol. 127 (10th year of King Gwanghae, intercalary 4th lunar month, *gapsin* day).

²⁷ (Joseon) *King Gwanghae ilgi*, vol. 127 (10th year of King Gwanghae, intercalary 4th lunar month, *gyeyu* day).

Gwanghae's compromise in case he had to send the troops was to bring them only to the point of the Joseon's border towns such as Euiju without crossing into Liadong, and to build defense against the Jurchens.²⁸ He also took issue with the fact that the capacity of the person, supposed to request the military troops and supply them, was merely the Liadong governor instead of the minister of the Board of War or the emperor himself.²⁹

Reiterating the King Gwanghae's ideas, in the fifth lunar month of 1618 a letter was sent to the Ming court that underlined the difficult conditions facing Joseon, such as the "lack of forces to defend Joseon beset by enemies on all sides, the poorly trained Joseon soldiers who were farmers at the same time, and the ever lingering threat from the Japanese." Notably, the letter marked the everlasting fear about a possible Japanese invasion.

On the other hand, a majority of the Border Defense Command ministers insisted on sending the troops to fulfill Joseon's obligation as a vassal state to come to the aid of the Ming now deemed as "parent" and "savior." They urged repaying the gratitude owed to the Ming that "as a parent country that restored the Joseon dynasty."³⁰ Remarkably, Yi Icheom, as head of the Great Northerners faction and the real power of the King Gwanghae's regime, brought the court's attention to the possible punitive measures by the Ming in case Joseon would not accept its demand.³¹ Jang Myeon argued that "the great cause [of aiding the Ming] should be upheld even if it leads to the death of the country." For Jang, "it was more miserable to lose the confidence of the Ming than to allow the Jurchen cavalry to overrun the country."³² Many high officials turned a blind eye to the retaliatory attack

²⁸ (Joseon) *King Gwanghae ilgi*, vol. 127 (10th year of King Gwanghae, intercalary 4th lunar month, *eulmyo* day); (Joseon) *King Gwanghae ilgi*, *gweon* 129 (10th year of King Gwanghae, 6th lunar month, *byeongja* day).

²⁹ (Joseon) *King Gwanghae ilgi*, vol. 127 (10th year of King Gwanghae, intercalary 4th lunar month, *gveongjin* and *imo* days).

³⁰ (Joseon) *King Gwanghae ilgi*, vol. 127 (10th year of King Gwanghae, intercalary 4th lunar month, *imo* day).

³¹ (Joseon) *King Gwanghae ilgi*, vol. 128 (10th year of King Gwanghae, 5th lunar month, *imjin* day).

³² (Joseon) Jang Myeon, "Bu Chechalsa wang gwanseo si jingye cha," *Nakseo jip* (Collection of Jang Myeon's Works), vol. 2 .

from the Jurchens when Joseon would remain neutral. Instead, they believed it more important to maintain the country's loyal relations with the Ming by fulfilling its duty as a vassal state.

2. Joseon's Foreign Policy after the Defeat at the Sarhū Battle

King Gwanghae's reluctance to sending the troops had multiple reasons. There had been a possibility that he came to have an anti-Ming sentiment because of the Ming court's objection to his accession to the throne. He feared a strong possibility of a retaliatory attack from Nurhaci as well as a domestic rebellion against him in case the Joseon troops' participated in the Ming campaign against the Jurchens. In addition, King Gwanghae worried that due to the heavy cost of the war preparation his ambition to build palaces would be thwarted.³³

Faced by strong opposition from the ministers of the Border Defense Command, King Gwanghae sought for a breakthrough by rallying support from the proponents of caution, such as Bak Jaheung, Bak Jeonggil, Yun Hwi, Yi Wigyeong, and Im Yeon, who sided with him during the debate over the sending of troops, as well as Bak Seungjong and Hwang Jung'yun who sympathized with him in adapting new relations with the Later Jin after the Sarhū battle.

Yun Hwi proposed that the Joseon government should inform the Ming court of its inability to mobilize its armies because of the manpower shortage and the financial strain, and that in the event of mobilizing armies they should not cross the border. Bak Jaheung warned that since the Joseon troops were not trained for open field battle, their defeat would only damage the imperial authority, and he counseled similar to Yun Hwi that the Joseon troops should form a rear defensive position at the country's border. Im Yeon argued that in case the Ming was under attack and thus put into jeopardy, that might well mandate the sending of Joseon troops, but it was not necessary for Joseon to join in the Ming's punitive campaign against

³³ Han (1999), *Ibid.*, pp. 250-55.

the Jurchens.³⁴ Yi Wigyeong was of a similar opinion with Bak Jaheung in that the Joseon troops should remain as a defensive barrier along its border in anticipation of the possible resurgence of Japanese hostility. Bak Jeonggil proposed that the Ming emperor should be notified of Joseon's difficulties and the Ming generals in Liaodong should be advised against rash actions in their military operations against the Jurchens.³⁵

Yun Hwi, Im Yeon, and Hwang Jung'yun all were doubtful that the Ming forces could ever defeat Nurhaci. Therefore, they agreed to King Gwanghae's strategy of providing a defensive barrier at the border. In the fifth lunar month of 1618, he appointed Im Yeon to the emissary to be sent to the Ming court.³⁶ Subsequently, he dispatched Bak Jeonggil, Yun Hwi, and others to Beijing in endeavors of informing the emperor of the difficult situations in Joseon and avoiding any dispatch of troops to the Ming.

However, no such diplomatic effort materialized because of the Ming military commissioner Yang Hao's interference. Yang, stationed in Liaoyang, checked the Joseon envoys on their way to Beijing and inspected their state letters and communications. He charged the Joseon envoys for trying "to communicate insubordinate letters, forgetting the Ming rescue mission during the Japanese invasions."³⁷ In the end, a congratulatory delegation led by Yun Hwi returned with an imperial order that demanded the Joseon king to send the troops and to follow Yang Hao's command. All of the diplomatic efforts by King Gwanghae came to naught.³⁸

King Gwanghae acquiesced to sending 13,000 Joseon troops to Liaodong, yet he did his best to minimize the damage to be suffered by the Jo-

³⁴ For the opinions of Yun Hwi, Bak Jaheung, and Im Yeon, see (Joseon) *King Gwanghae ilgi*, vol. 128 (10th year of King Gwanghae, 5th lunar month, *imjin* day).

³⁵ For the opinions of Yi Wigyeong and Bak Jeonggil, see (Joseon) *King Gwanghae ilgi*, vol. 128 (10th year of King Gwanghae, 5th lunar month, *gichuk* day).

³⁶ (Joseon) *King Gwanghae ilgi*, vol. 128 (10th year of King Gwanghae, 5th lunar month, *gichuk* day).

³⁷ (Joseon) *King Gwanghae ilgi*, vol. 134 (10th year of King Gwanghae, 11th lunar month, *gyeongin* day).

³⁸ (Joseon) *King Gwanghae ilgi*, vol. 132 (10th year of King Gwanghae, 10th lunar month, *gapsin* day).

seon soldiers. The appointment of Gang Hongnip, then Vice Minister of the Ministry of Punishment, to commander-in-chief of the expeditionary army was of his own accord. In Gang Hongnip's experience as a translator of Chinese envoys in the court and his colloquial Chinese ability, King Gwanghae saw the merit of forthright communication with Chinese generals. He gave Gang an instruction that he should not be swayed easily by the Ming leadership and avoid losing battle.³⁹

The Joseon troops were assigned to serve under the command of the regional commander Liu Ting after crossing the Yalu River into Liaodong. Yet they suffered a crushing defeat at Sarhū in the third lunar month of 1619. Gang Hongnip surrendered together with his remaining forces. A theory that "King Gwanghae gave a secret instruction for Gang Hongnip to surrender to the Later Jin army" had already been presented,⁴⁰ yet it appears to be untrue. Shortly after the Sarhū defeat in the fifth lunar month of 1619, the Border Defense Command reported the deaths of 8,000 to 9,000 Joseon troops,⁴¹ almost seventy percent of the entire army. Such a large death toll could not occur, if the Joseon troops were scheduled to surrender.

Nevertheless, the theory that King Gwanghae and his collaborators conspired with Gang Hongnip to reveal military plans [to the enemy] with the consequence of damaging the Ming expedition had gained currency.⁴² Yet, many scholars since the Ming scholar official Xu Guangqi have judged that the defeat of the Ming expedition army at the hands of the Later Jin army was a foregone conclusion. They concluded that the Ming army was inferior in all factors of war, such as the number and the readiness of the troops, military equipment such as firearms and military supplies including grain supplies, the leadership of the commanders, and the

³⁹ (Joseon) *King Gwanghae ilgi*, vol. 137 (11th year of King Gwanghae, 11th lunar month, *jeongsa* day).

⁴⁰ Kōzō Tagawa, *Mo Bunryu to Chosen to no Kankei ni tsuite* (Regarding Mao Wenlong and His Relations with Joseon), in *Seikyu Sessō* (Joseon Treatises) 3 (1932), pp. 6-15.

⁴¹ (Joseon) *King Gwanghae ilgi*, vol. 140 (11th year of King Gwanghae, 5th lunar month, *giyu* day).

⁴² Han (1999), *Ibid.*, p. 309.

morale of the soldiers.⁴³ In particular, the commander Liu Ting harshly pressured the Joseon troops to charge forward in spite of the bad weather and the scarce provisions.⁴⁴ The theory of the conspiracy between King Gwanghae and Gang Hongnip had been a constructed memory to justify the coup d'état that removed King Gwanghae and installed King Injo.

After the defeat at Sarhū, the Ming court showed a conflicting attitude toward Joseon. On the one hand, it extolled Joseon's sacrifice for the sake of the Ming, while it was suspicious of the Joseon army's surrender, and demanded further reinforcements from Joseon. At the time of Guangning's fall at the hands of the Later Jin troops in 1622, Ming generals desperately sought for refuge in and aid from Joseon.⁴⁵

King Gwanghae tried to dispel the Ming suspicion on the one hand, and also tried to evade the Ming demand for reinforcements on the other. He ordered the construction of a shrine dedicated to Kim Eungha who died heroically at the Sarhū battle, and the publication of Kim's memoir entitled *Chungryeol nok* 忠烈錄 (Record of Loyalty) and to distribute the memoir in the Liaodong area. That was a tactical gesture to dispel the Ming suspicion by informing the Ming court that the Joseon government commemorated countrywide a war hero who had died for a Ming cause. When the Ming general Liang Zhiyuan arrived to press for reinforcements, he was given a bribe to discourage his demands. Moreover, citing the possibility of the Later Jin's invasion against Joseon, the Joseon court asked for the deployment of the Ming armies at Kuandian and Zhenjiang along the Jurchen invasion route. Under-scoring Nurhaci's imminent retaliatory attack was also a stratagem to preempt the Ming demand for the Joseon reinforcements.⁴⁶

King Gwanghae's policy toward the Later Jin can be summarized in three points. First, he kept an eye on the recent trends of the Later Jin and

⁴³ (Ming) Xu Guangqi, *Xu Guangqi ji* (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1984), vol. 3; Huang Rehyu, "1619 nian de Liaodong zhanyi," *Mingshi yanjiu luncong* (Jiangxi guji chubanshe, 1991), vol. 5; Yan (2003), *Ibid.*, pp. 347-58.

⁴⁴ (Joseon) Yi Minhwan, "Chaekjung ilnok," *Ja'am jip* (Collection of Yi Min Hwan's Works), vol. 5.

⁴⁵ Han (1999), *Ibid.*, pp. 265-72.

⁴⁶ Han (1999), *Ibid.*, pp. 273-79.

gathered related information in a firsthand manner whenever possible, while he took precautions not to expose Joseon's situations to them. Second, he avoided confrontation with the Later Jin, and instead pursued a 'loose reign (*jimi* 羈縻)' policy of loose engagement. Third, in anticipation of their invasion, he also built up military preparedness. While trying to import muskets and swords from Japan, he ordered the domestic manufacture of muskets and cannons. Not only military equipment, he was also concerned with strengthening manpower by recruiting and training soldiers and officers. In sum, King Gwanghae tried to maintain a *status quo* with the Later Jin by employing a policy of *jimi* while at the same time taking self-strengthening measures to fend off their possible invasion.⁴⁷

King Gwanghae was consistent in that line of policy. After the defeat in the Sarhū battle, he harkened back to the diplomacy of Goryeo toward the Jin state in the past. He predicted that the Ming could not stay the aggression of the Later Jin which had grown as strong as its predecessor under Aguda in the early twelfth century. For him, the best policy for Joseon for now was "to follow the Goryeo strategy of preserving the dynasty by accommodating with [the Jurchens] externally to avoid their invasion, and in the meantime building strength domestically."⁴⁸ Accordingly, envoys were exchanged between the two states, and Gang Hongnip's letters were related by Joseon envoys to the court which had eagerly looked forward to the recent information about the Later Jin.

A substantial number of high officials supported King Gwanghae's conciliatory policy toward the Later Jin. For example, Hwang Jung'yun went so far as to say that "Joseon should cut off its tributary relations with the Ming and enter into friendly relations with the Later Jin," and that "the territory outside the Shanhaiguan Pass no longer belonged to the Middle Kingdom."⁴⁹ Hwang also left an explicit record that King Gwanghae ad-

⁴⁷ (Joseon) *King Gwanghae ilgi*, vol. 147 (11th year of King Gwanghae, 12th lunar month, *sinmi* day).

⁴⁸ (Joseon) *King Gwanghae ilgi*, vol. 166 (13th year of King Gwanghae, 6th lunar month, *byeongja* day).

⁴⁹ (Joseon) *King Injo sillok* (Veritable Records of King Injo), vol. 1 (1st year of King Injo, 4th lunar

opted a conciliatory policy toward the Later Jin despite strong opposition to the peace talks from the Border Defense Command, citing an ancient episode of Taiwang (the posthumous title of Duke Gu of the Zhou dynasty) making concessions to a barbarian of the Xunyu tribe.⁵⁰ Bak Seungjong, Chief State Councilor in the last years of King Gwanghae's reign, also argued for maintaining the *status quo* through accommodation with the Later Jin.⁵¹

With the blockade of the Liaodong route that connected Joseon to the Ming, King Gwanghae became all the more pronounced in advocating his line of *realpolitik* in order to protect the security of the state by avoiding being drawn into the Ming-Jurchen confrontation. He gave voice to his views as follows: "Envoys should be exchanged even in a time of war." "Military strategies do not exclude an act of fraud." And "Lofty talks do not always help the security of the country."⁵²

Meanwhile, domestic conditions within Joseon became increasingly critical. First of all, the heavy war expenses, pivotal to expedition campaign, imposed extraordinary burdens on the ordinary people. With the hardship of the people's livelihood and the worsening fiscal status, the lavish palace construction project initiated by King Gwanghae came under vehement criticism, which he ignored, thus further impairing his reputation. Moreover, after the Sarhū battle he reinstated proponents of caution such as Yi Jeonggwi, Yi Kwi, and Choe Myeonggil, who had been ousted by their opponent Yi Icheom. King Gwanghae's action to bring about a countervailing force against Yi Icheom created tension between him and the most powerful man in ruling Great Northerner faction. With King Gwanghae's declining reputation and the schism with the ruling group at court,

month, *imsin* day).

⁵⁰ (Joseon) Hwang Jungyun, "Sang daein" (Great Men), in *Dongmyeong seonsaeng munjip* (Collection of Hwang Jungyun's Works), vol. 5.

⁵¹ (Joseon) *King Gwanghae ilgi*, vol. 172 (13th year of Kwanghaegun, 12th lunar month, *gyeongin* day).

⁵² *Joseon yeongjeop dogam docheong euigwe* (Illustrated Records by the Superintendent of Welcoming Ceremonies), (Ming) Tianqi 1st year.

the stage was set for the political upheaval that eventually removed him from the throne.⁵³

IV. The King Injo Restoration and the Outbreak of the 1627 Jurchen Invasion

1. The King Injo Restoration and Joseon's Relations with the Ming and the Later Jin

The King Gwanghae regime collapsed due to a coup d'état referred to as the King Injo Restoration (*King Injo banjeong* 仁祖反正) in the third lunar month of 1623. The leaders of the coup claimed that the fundamental principle of the new King Injo regime was the rectification of the “King Gwanghae regime's accommodation with the Later Jin” barbarians at the expense of the Ming.⁵⁴

The Ming court initially recognized King Injo's seizure of power as a usurpation.⁵⁵ Some Ming officials sent their men disguised as merchants to the Joseon capital to spy on the changed situations there. Still, many Ming officials leaned toward how to relate the event of a ‘usurpation’ in the Joseon court to the Ming agenda of war against the Jurchens. For example, the vice minister of the Ming Board of War Bi Ziyang, charged with military provisions, proposed that “the bestowal of investiture for the new King Injo be followed later by Joseon's military victory against the Later Jin first.” On the other hand, the coup leaders in the Joseon court appealed to Ming officials for the fastest investiture that would prompt Joseon's fight against the Later Jin.⁵⁶

⁵³ Han (1999), *Ibid.*, pp. 286-301.

⁵⁴ (Joseon) *King Injo sillok*, vol. 34 (15th year of King Injo, 1st lunar month, *gyehae* day).

⁵⁵ (Ming) *Xizong shilu* (Veritable records of Emperor Xizong), *Liangchao congxin lu* (fourth month of Tianqi third year, *wuzi* day).

⁵⁶ Han (1999), *Ibid.*, pp. 338-48; Han Myeonggi, “Han Jung gwangye eui gwanjeom eseo bon King Injo banjeong eui yeoksajeok euimi: Myeong eui Joseon e daehan ‘euijejeok jibaeryeok’ gwa gwallyeon hayeo” (Historical significance of the King Injo Restoration seen from the viewpoint of Joseon-China relations: The Ming China's ‘apparent’ control over Joseon), *Nammyeong hak* 16 (2011).

In the debate over ratifying King Injo as the new king of Joseon, the role of Mao Wenlong 毛文龍 (1576-1629) was crucial. Immediately after the coup, he reported to the Ming court that “King Gwanghae had been disloyal to the Ming whereas King Injo showed loyalty by executing the traitors.”⁵⁷ Then, the minister of the Board of War Zhao Yan argued for the investiture of the new king of Joseon in view of Mao Wenlong’s heavy reliance on Joseon for military resources.⁵⁸

It took almost two years for the Ming court to confer the investiture of King Injo. This was because the Ming court was divided between the moral justification to rectify a ‘usurpation’ in the vassal state and the strategic need to keep the Later Jin in check by using its forces. The factional politics in the Ming court between the moralist Donglin faction and the opposing Yan faction also were involved in this issue. Wei Dazhong from the Donglin faction insisted that King Injo, in violation of the monarch-subject relationship, should not be granted investiture.⁵⁹ Yet, since 1623 when Wei Zhongxian of the Yan faction assumed real power at the Ming court,⁶⁰ they were in favor of conferring the investiture upon King Injo and in support of Mao Wenlong who maintained good terms with them.⁶¹

In the first lunar month of 1625, the Tianqi emperor notified Mao Wenlong of King Injo’s investiture and ordered him to defeat the Later Jin by combined forces with Joseon.⁶² By enhancing Mao’s position as the primary contributor to King Injo’s investiture, the Ming court sought to use Mao as leverage in controlling the new regime in Joseon. In short, the King Injo regime was obliged to be at the disposal of Mao Wenlong.

⁵⁷ (Ming) *Ming Xizong shilu*, vol. 37 (eighth month of Tianqi third year, *Dingchou* day).

⁵⁸ (Ming) *Ming Xizong shilu* (liangben), vol. 42 (fifth month of Tianqi fourth year, *renxu* day).

⁵⁹ (Joseon) Hong Ikhan, *Hwapo jocheon hanghaerok* (Record of Hong Ikhan’s Voyage to Visit the Ming Court), vol. 1 (4th year of Tianqi, 11th lunar month, 20th day).

⁶⁰ Xie Guozheng, “Donglin tangyi ji Tianqi jian zhi tanghuo,” in *MingQing zhi ji Tangshe yundong kao* (Shanghai: Shanghai shiji chuban jituan, 2005), pp. 46-47; Yan Chongnian, *Mingwang Qingxing liushi nian* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2006), pp. 95-98.

⁶¹ (Ming) Bo Qizong, *Dongjiang shimo*.

⁶² (Ming) *Ming Xizong shilu*, vol. 55 (first month of Tianqi fifth year, *Dingchou* day).

What, then, were the attitudes of the new King Injo regime towards the Ming and the Later Jin that conditioned its policies towards them? Since an important justification for the coup to remove King Gwanghae had been his disloyalty to the Ming, it was inevitable for the regime to proclaim pro-Ming and anti-Jin policies. In the fourth lunar month of 1623, King Injo pronounced “caring about the people” (*hyulmin* 恤民) and “punishing the bandits (i.e., the Jurchens)” (*tojeok* 討賊) as the foremost tasks of his regime.⁶³ Yet, an expedition to “punish the Jurchen bandits” was out of the question given the devastated military and economic conditions in which King Injo and his supporters found themselves. Yi Sibal (1569-1626) asserted that it was mandatory to rescue the people from the dire conditions and to give relief to them, not to mention military affairs.⁶⁴

As a matter of fact, King Injo gave consent to the counsel of the royal secretary Han Yeojik that the circumstances at the time mandated waiting for the stabilization of the people’s living conditions while keeping friendly relations with the Later Jin. Han denounced the call for breaking ties with the Later Jin as a rash act of inviting invasion, maintained an appeasement attitude towards the Later Jin against any conflict with them, and demanded Mao Wenlong be discouraged from undertaking a rash raid on the Later Jin.⁶⁵

Within the Joseon court at that time, a sort of consensus seems to have been reached in which the *status quo* should be contained along with a policy of appeasement toward the Jurchens; even, the Border Defense Command was not in opposition to such a policy that had been initiated earlier, in fact, by King Gwanghae.⁶⁶ Although King Injo and his supporters in the coup proclaimed ‘anti-Jurchen’ as a key policy, they had no desire to place their regime in danger by risking war with the Jurchens. While

⁶³ (Joseon) *King Injo sillok*, vol. 1 (1st year of King Injo, 4th lunar month, *kapsin* day).

⁶⁴ (Joseon) Yi Sibal, “Deungdae hu non seonjang Yeonbyeong cha,” in *Byeog’o yugo* (Works Left by Yi Sibal), vol. 4.

⁶⁵ (Joseon) Yi Weonik, “Yeongsang si ingyeon ju sa,” in *Ori seonsaeng byeoljip* (Addendum to Collection of Yi Weonik’s Works), vol. 1.

⁶⁶ (Joseon) *King Injo sillok*, vol. 1 (1st day of King Injo, 3rd day, *jeongsa* day).

underscoring their ‘pro-Ming’ stance, they sought for a *status quo* with the Late Jin.⁶⁷ Their cautious action remained basically unchanged until the first invasion of the Jurchens in 1627.

The position of the King Injo administration further worsened because of the rebellion, led by Yi Gwal 李适 (1587-1624), one of the discontented participants in the 1623 coup against King Gwanghae. Yi Gwal managed to muster 10,000 men, defeated government forces, and captured the capital without precedent, thus forcing King Injo to flee to Gongju for refuge. Though the rebellion was put down in less than two months, it entailed profound damage both to government finance and the people’s livelihoods because during the course of the rebellion and its suppression a large number of casualties were produced on each side. The rebellion seriously weakened the defense capabilities of Joseon especially in the northern provinces.⁶⁸

Experiencing a near collapse of the regime due to the rebellion within just one year from its start, King Injo and his ministers committed the main armies to the protection of the regime. In order to protect the capital and the court, the Royal Division was increased in number, and the Anti-Jurchen Division was newly organized. The private troops commanded by the merit subjects of the coup were also reinforced in number, and engaged in searching out the new regime’s domestic political enemies with a vengeance. Since the main forces of the Joseon government were diverted from northern border defense to regime support, the slogan to “punish the

⁶⁷ Han (1999), *Ibid.*, pp. 361-66. Gye Seungbeom argues that the foreign policy of the King Injo court after the success of the coup was readjusted to adopt that of the Border Defense Command in the King Gwanghae era. He criticizes this author’s argument that “the foreign policy line of the Joseon state remained basically unchanged even after the coup” as oversimplifying, and adds that “Han Myeonggi’s argument does not indicate the principal force in charge of the King Injo government’s foreign policy” (Gye (2013), *Ibid.*, p. 32). Yet, I would like to draw attention to my statement that the Westerner faction’s policy towards the Later Jin can be understood as “designed to maintain the status quo,” and as basically identical with “King Gwanghae’s strategy to keep loose ties” (*kimi* 羈縻) with the Later Jin (Han (1999), *Ibid.*, p. 363). There remains the need for future study to examine more closely the operations of the Border Defense Command in its personnel and policies during the King Gwanghae and King Injo eras.

⁶⁸ Han Myeonggi, “Yi Gwal eui nan i King Injodae choban daenaeye jeongchaek e michin yeopa” (Impact of Yi Gwal’s Rebellion on the Foreign and Domestic Policies of the Early King Injo Era), *Jeonbuk sahak* 48 (2016).

Jurchen bandits” sounded hollow.⁶⁹

Mao Wenlong’s influence became more deeply felt by the Joseon court in the aftermath of Yi Gwal’s rebellion. Yi Gwal had commended Prince Heung’an, an uncle of King Injo, at the start of the rebellion when King Injo had not yet received investiture from the Ming. In case the Ming court had approved Prince Heung’an, the King Injo regime would have been bound to collapse. The Joseon court’s stake in Mao was raised greatly, and it came to rely on him further. In fact, what the King Injo court feared most was a situation in which the rebels would ally themselves with Mao Wenlong and pose a serious threat from the northern frontier.⁷⁰

In the second lunar month of 1624, Mao Wenlong kept up the pressure on the Joseon court to provide military supplies, claiming that he took it upon himself to suppress Yi Gwal’s rebellion.⁷¹ The King Injo court could not but accept Mao’s demand. The expenses spent to support Mao’s army had increased progressively to the extent that by 1627 the amount of grain supplies sent to them was reportedly equivalent to one third of the annual expenditures of the government. Moreover, the violence and extortion committed by Mao’s soldiers and the Liaodong people against the Korean residents in the northern region were so extreme that they were condemned as another group of the Red Turban bandits.⁷²

The task of catering to the Mao army culminated in the erection of a eulogy monument in the seventh lunar month of 1624. Composed by Kim Ryu, one of the top merit subjects in the 1623 coup, the monument’s text was fraught with praise that was exactly contrary to reality. Despite Mao and his troops’ blatant oppression and extortion, he was extolled as a “disinterested protector of the Joseon state and people from the Jurchen aggression.”⁷³

⁶⁹ Han (2016), *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ (Joseon) Kim Gijong, *Seojeongnok* (Record of Travel to the West).

⁷¹ (Joseon) *Bibyeonsa deungnok* (Records of the Border Defense Command), vol. 3 (2nd year of King Injo, 2nd lunar month, 24th and 25th day).

⁷² Han (1999), *Ibid.*, pp. 374-84.

⁷³ (Joseon) Kim Ryu, *Bukjeo jip* (Collection of Kim Ryu’s Works), vol. 8.

In the sixth lunar month of 1625, the Ming envoy entered the capital to confer investiture on King Injo. In order to welcome the Ming mission that brought a happy ending to the political turmoil infest with the coup and the rebellion, the King Injo court spent profusely. Some 200,000 *ryang* worth of silver was spent to entertain Ming envoys and their retinues—an amount capable of purchasing 200,000 *seok* or approximately 200,000 bushels of rice.⁷⁴ In short, Yi Gwal’s rebellion forced the King Injo regime not only to spend a large amount of military expenditures, but also to bear the extraordinary burden of the ‘cost of the pro-Ming relationship,’ resulting in a worsening financial status and a worsening of the people’s livelihood. Ultimately, the regime’s professed commitments to “state security” and the “punishment of the Jurchen bandits” were seriously compromised.

Yi Gwal’s rebellion also had a negative effect on Joseon’s relations with the Later Jin. To begin with, there were renegade officers of the rebel camp who defected to the Later Jin and tried to drive a wedge between the two states. For example, Han Yun, the son of the rebel leader Han Myeongryeon, submitted to Nurhaci, and tried to inspire him to attack Joseon by providing recent information about the Joseon court.⁷⁵ Furthermore, though the King Injo court was obliged to support Mao Wenlong and to allow him to recruit local soldiers, that action constituted a serious challenge to the Later Jin, thus detracting from its policy of avoiding hostility with the Jurchens. The supportive measures for Mao Wenlong were deemed necessary for the security of the precarious regime in the aftermath of the rebellion. However, such measures did create military tension with the Later Jin.

2. Outbreak of the 1627 Jurchen Invasion and Its Results

What were the reasons for Joseon suffering the invasion by the Later Jin, even though it struggled for the *status quo* by conducting a policy of ap-

⁷⁴ (Joseon) *Seungjeongweon ilgi* (Daily Record of the Royal Secretariat), vol. 6 (3rd year of King Injo, 6th lunar month, 13th day); (Joseon) *King Injo sillok*, vol. 1 (1st year of King Injo, 1st lunar month, *gapsin* day).

⁷⁵ (Qing) *Manwen laodang*, sixth day of first month of Tianming era.

peasement towards the Jurchens? To begin with, there were pressing reasons derived from the domestic conditions of the Later Jin. Though acceding to the position of khan in 1626, Hongtaiji's hold over power was still not firm. While his power was checked by his three elder brothers, Daisan, Amin, and Manggultai, he needed to consolidate his leadership with successful campaigns. The economy was in crisis, too. Due to the severe famine around this time, the price of rice soared, and an increasing number of people died of starvation, too. Thus invading Joseon in search of grain supplies was an attractive option.⁷⁶ In launching an attack on Joseon, Hongtaiji made it clear that he aimed to chastise Joseon for supporting Mao Wenlong and to make Joseon side with the Later Jin against the Ming. Hongtaiji was determined to terminate Mao Wenlong's resistance, blaming him for attracting the rebellious defectors from the Later Jin.⁷⁷

Since the last years of King Gwanghae, Mao Wenlong's troops and his Chinese followers from Liaodong established their bases around the Yalu River region, and increasingly became a nuisance to the Later Jin. The difficulties with them became worse, as the King Injo regime was obliged to treat Mao Wenlong well in the aftermath of Yi Gwal's rebellion. Mao's soldiers and Chinese followers were allowed to use the fields in Joseon's northwest frontier, and their acts of violence and extortion towards local residents of Joseon were largely condoned. They provoked the Jurchens by bluffing a joint campaign with Joseon against them, thus serving as a kind of 'trigger' of the Later Jin invasion against Joseon.⁷⁸

The Joseon troops, wrecked by Yi Gwal's rebellion, had no time for recovery, and thus could not hold their ground against the Jurchen invasion in 1627. Their vulnerability was witnessed by Gang Honip who recalled that "the undermanned Joseon unit at the Neunghan mountain fortress

⁷⁶ Kim Jongweon, "Jeongmyo horan si eui Hu Geum kun eui chungbyeong donggi" (Motivations of the Later Jin Armies in the 1627 Invasion), *Dongyangsa yeon'gu* 12 (1978); No Gisik, "Manju eui gulgi wa Dongasia jilseo eui byeondong" (Rise of the Manchus and Changes in the East Asian World Order), *Jungguksa yeon'gu* 16 (2001).

⁷⁷ (Qing) *Qing Taizong shilu*, vol. 2 (First month of first year of Tiancong era, *bingzi* day).

⁷⁸ Han Myeonggi, *Jeongmyo, byeongja horan gwa dong asia* (The 1627 Jurchen and the 1636 Manchu invasions) (Seoul: Pureun yeoksa (2009), pp. 46-53).

quickly collapsed when they saw the overwhelming Later Jin armies.”⁷⁹

Driven by the Later Jin forces out of his stronghold at Cheolsan in the northern Pyeong’an province, Mao Wenlong escaped to an island in the estuary of the Yalu River. King Injo took refuge on Gwanghwa Island. The Later Jin forces led by Amin did not sweep across the country, but came down only to Hwanghae Province, north of the capital, and offered peace terms, because the Jurchen commanders feared that a prolonged campaign against Joseon might invite a counterattack from the Ming governor Yuan Chonghuan, who was stationing in Ningyuan in Liaodong. Eventually, an “elder and younger brother” alliance with tribute missions to be sent three times each year was agreed upon between Joseon and the Later Jin.⁸⁰

What were the effects of the 1627 Jurchen invasion on Joseon, which had barely recovered from Yi Gwal’s rebellion of 1624? The King Injo regime had to commit all military capabilities to the defense of Gangwha Island in order to protect the king there. The regime had to halt a number of reform measures, such as imposing identification tags, compiling military registers, and levying military tax on *yangban* nobles, in fear of going against the peoples’ sentiment. Moreover, King Injo had to issue an edict of apology for so many killings in the aftermath of the coup of 1623, the forceful implementation of the identification tag law, and the worsened living conditions.⁸¹

The King Injo court brought back some key officials from the ousted King Gwanghae government, such as Yun Hwi, Yi Minhwan, Bak Nanyeong, Yi Ilweon, and Mun Heuseong. Some coup leaders such as Kim Ryu and Yi Gwi played a leading role in reinstating those officials who had supported Gwaehaegun’s cautious foreign policies, arguing that protecting the people by seeking peace with the Jurchens was undertaken as an expediency without losing the sense of fealty towards the Ming.⁸²

⁷⁹ (Joseon) Sin Daldo, “Gangdo illok,” in *Man’o seonsaeng jip* (Collection of Sin Daldo’s works), vol. 7 (*jeongmyo* year, 2nd lunar month, 10th day).

⁸⁰ Han (2009), *Ibid.*, pp. 53-57.

⁸¹ (Joseon) Jang Yu, “Paldo seonyu gyoseo,” in *Yugok jip* (Collection of Jang Yu’s Works), vol. 2.

⁸² Kim Yongheum, *Joseon hugi jeongchisa yeon’gu* (Study on Political History in Late Joseon)

The peace accord with the Later Jin provoked fierce opposition from both within and without the court. For example, the censor Yun Hwang (1571-1639) denounced the peace agreement as an “act of capitulation” to the Jurchens, and urged the king to decapitate the Jurchen envoys and the Joseon officials who solicited peace with them.⁸³ King Injo and the coup leaders were placed in a deeply embarrassing situation. King Injo was extremely offended by Yun Hwang’s wording, such as “act of capitulation.” Yet he could not punish Yun severely because it was a great compromise to the justification for the coup to enter into a peace agreement with the Jurchen ‘barbarians’ and to swear submission to them before heaven (*gocheon maengse* 告天盟誓).

What were the reactions of the Ming to the 1627 invasion? Yuan Chonghuan, the Ming general in charge of the northeast forces, dispatched envoys to Shenyang, the capital of the Later Jin, to criticize the invasion to Joseon, and demanded prompt withdrawal of the troops.⁸⁴ Furthermore, he sent forces close to the Sancha River in order to apply military pressure on the rear of the Later Jin forces, but he could not forestall the invasion. Mao Wenlong condemned Joseon’s peace accord with the Jurchens as a betrayal to the Ming’s grace.⁸⁵ The Ming Board of War also suspected Joseon of secret communications with the Jurchens, and feared their conquest of the country.⁸⁶ Thus, the King Injo government was beset not only with the domestic accusations but also with doubtful suspicions from Mao Wenlong and the Ming court, as well.

What economic benefits did the Later Jin acquire through the victorious 1627 invasion? To begin with, it gained an annual tribute payment of 10,500 *pil* worth of cotton cloth as well as the promise of opening markets in the border region.⁸⁷ Thereafter, through the border markets Joseon

(Seoul: Hyeon (2006), pp. 202-4).

⁸³ (Joseon) *King Injo sillok*, vol. 15 (5th year of King Injo, 2nd lunar month, *imja* day).

⁸⁴ (Qing) *Qing Taizong shilu*, vol. 2 (Third month of first year of Tiancong era, *renshen* day).

⁸⁵ (Joseon) Sin Daldo, “Gado bongsa si gyeonmun gye,” in *Man’o seonsaeng jip* (Collection of Sin Daldo’s Works), vol. 5 (4th lunar month, 27th day).

⁸⁶ *Liangchao congxin lu*, vol. 33 (Third month of seventh year of Tiancong era).

⁸⁷ (Joseon) *King Injo sillok*, vol. 15 (5th year of King Injo, 5th lunar month, *imja* and *gyeonsin* day).

served as a supplier of not only daily necessities such as grains, fruits, and medicinal materials, but also of rare goods such as Chinese silk, Japanese pepper and timber, and books. Those various goods, acquired through trade with Joseon, were used in turn for trade with the Mongols or for presentation as gifts to them. In short, since the Later Jin succeeded in pressing Joseon into the economic role of a supplier of much needed goods, it could tide over an economic crisis and bring stability to the regime.⁸⁸

Much strategic and political gain, too, could be enjoyed by the Later Jin. The invasion assured the Later Jin that there would be no need to worry about a Joseon attack to its rear in a future confrontation with the Ming. In fact, in the fifth lunar month of 1627 Hongtaiji lost no time in attacking the Ming Jinzhou fortress shortly after the return of the Later Jin army from the Joseon expedition. And Hongtaiji was eager to inform other countries that the Later Jin had subjugated Joseon, as he did to the Ming general Ji Yong.⁸⁹ Furthermore, with the successful campaign against Joseon, Hongtaiji became more confident, and wanted to place his state on a par with the Ming. Thus, in the state letter entrusted to the king's brother Prince Weonchang who was returning to Joseon, he asserted that "since the Ming claims to be the only kingdom of the Son of Heaven, and looks down on the Later Jin, we will launch a pacification attack on the Ming after offering an oath to heaven."⁹⁰ Because the King Injo court agreed to the 1627 peace accord with the Later Jin on the premise that Joseon would continue to maintain a vassal relationship only with the Ming, Hongtaiji's claim to equality between the Later Jin and the Ming increasingly rendered such a premise irrelevant.

⁸⁸ Han (2009), *Ibid.*, pp. 76-82.

⁸⁹ (Qing) *Qing Taizong shilu*, vol. 3 (Fifth month of first year of Tiancong era, *dingchou* day).

⁹⁰ (Qing) *Qing Taizong shilu*, vol. 3 (Fifth month of first year of Tiancong era, *gengwu* day).

V. The 1636 Manchu Invasion and the Transformation of Joseon-Qing Relations

1. Breakdown of the 1627 Peace Accord

Although Joseon and the Later Jin had entered into an alliance of “elder and younger brother,” the relationship between the two states had not stabilized. To begin with, “younger brother” Joseon and “elder brother” Later Jin had differing perspectives on the 1627 peace accord. Joseon perceived the peace accord with the “animal-like barbarians” as an “expedient measure to tide over the national disaster,”⁹¹ whereas the Later Jin saw it as a favor sparing Joseon from certain destruction.⁹²

Moreover, Mao Wenlong who took refuge on Gado 椴島 (or Pido 皮島) Island at the mouth of the Yalu River, continued to undertake acts of hostility toward the Later Jin, thus creating thorny issues between the two states. In 1628, for example, Mao had his men launch ambushes in the northwest border region and launch raids on the Later Jin envoys traveling back and forth to the Joseon court. Then, the Later Jin charged that Joseon secretly allied itself with Mao, and undertook raids against them in violation of the peace accord. In retaliation, the Later Jin launched a surprise attack on Seonsa port and killed Mao’s men there.⁹³ Joseon found itself ‘sandwiched’ between Mao Wenlong and the Later Jin.

Joseon could not break its relations with the Ming general Mao Wenlong, insofar as it wanted to maintain the vassal relationship with the Ming. The Later Jin pressed for his surrender, threatening that the fate of the Ming was sealed.⁹⁴ In the end, it was by the hands of the Ming commander Yuan Chonghuan that Mao Wenlong was executed in 1629. Still, the Ming camp at Gado Island remained a source of nuisance to both Joseon and the

⁹¹ (Joseon) *King Injo sillok*, vol. 15 (5th year of King Injo, 2nd lunar month, *sinchuk* day).

⁹² (Qing) *Qing Taizong shilu*, vol. 8 (First month of fifth year of Tiancong era, *gengzi* day).

⁹³ (Joseon) *King Injo sillok*, vol. 19 (6th year of King Injo, 8th lunar month, *gapjin* day); (Joseon) *Seungjeongweon ilgi*, vol. 20 (7th year of King Injo, 2nd lunar month, 2nd day).

⁹⁴ (Ming) Tan Qian, “Mao Wenlong,” in *Zaolin zazu* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2006), p. 597.

Later Jin, because the Ming officers who came after Mao essentially repeated his practice of freebooting, marauding, and interfering.⁹⁵

Furthermore, the Later Jin exerted pressure on Joseon to increase the frequency of the border markets and the size of the annual tribute payments. In reaction, many Joseon officials were strongly opposed to transferring supplies such as imported Chinese silk to the Jurchens.⁹⁶ And the Later Jin demanded placing their envoys to the Joseon court on a par with the Ming counterparts. The King Injo court was in deep distress under such heavy economic and political demands from the Later Jin.

However, a more fundamental reason for the breakdown of the 1627 peace accord lies in a drastic shift in the power balance between the Ming and the Later Jin that would not allow for an ambiguous attitude by Joseon towards the Later Jin. After the success of the 1627 campaign against Joseon, the Later Jin turned its attention to the Ming. Beset by the increasing Jurchen threats, the Ming sought more aid from Joseon while the Later Jin requested also assistance from Joseon or at least its neutrality. Joseon found itself in a very difficult situation in which it was obliged to decide on only one side to the exclusion of the other.

In 1629, Hongtaiji decided to launch his first attack on China through Xifengkou, which was outside the Great Wall, and his banner armies reached the very walls of Beijing. Although eventually repulsed by the Ming general Yuan Chonghwan, the Later Jin armies succeeded in capturing major cities inside the Great Wall, such as Zhuhua, Yongping, and Luanzhou. Later, Amin's armies drove the region near the capital into a panic by massacring civilian residents, and looted livestock and goods completely. Outraged by the debacle, the Chongzhen emperor ordered the execution of Yuan Chonghuan on the alleged charge of "secret communications" with

⁹⁵ A study on Mao Wenlong argues that his death weakened the rear threat to the Later Jin, and triggered the rebellion of Kong Youde and Geng Zhongming, thus providing an important cause for the demise of the Ming ((Qing) Zhao Lian, "Mao Wenlong zhi sha," in *Xiaoting zalu* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1997), p. 363).

⁹⁶ (Joseon) Kim Sangheon, "Cheong mul i Jungguk mulhwa yeono cha," in *Cheong'eum jip* (Collection of Kim Sangheon's Works), vol. 17.

the Later Jin commanders, thus expediting the dynasty's self-destruction.⁹⁷

Faced with the disappointing news that the imperial capital had been besieged by the Jurchen barbarians, anti-Jurchen feeling deepened further among Joseon officials. However, a cautious line of action was in operation too. For example, in the second lunar month of 1630, when the Ming officer Chen Jicheng and his men from Gado Island attacked a Later Jin envoy to Joseon, the magistrate of the Euiju border town Yi Siyeong provided cover for him to escape the Ming attackers.⁹⁸ As a result, the Joseon court received suspicion from both sides—the Ming officers at Gado and the Jurchen leaders at Shenyang as well.⁹⁹

Another crisis occurred in the first lunar month of 1633, when Hong-taiji again pressed for boats and sailors from Joseon, following his previous demand in the fifth lunar month of 1629. Although the Jurchen armies prevailed in field battles against the Ming forces, the Jurchen commanders eagerly wanted boats and sailors in order to defeat the Ming forces at Gado Island and to transport manpower and supplies to the ever expanding war fronts. The Joseon court turned down both requests with a vehemence that may have risked a breakdown of the 1627 peace accord.¹⁰⁰ Two months later, two Ming renegade generals Kong Youde and Geng Zhongming, who rose in rebellion at Dengzhou, defected to the Later Jin with their boats and sailors. The Ming asked Joseon to participate in a joint attack on the rebels, while the Later Jin asked Joseon for grain supplies needed to support the armies of Kong and Geng. Caught between the two extreme choices, Joseon decided to side with the Ming. The Joseon government mobilized naval forces to persecute the Kong-Geng armies around the Yalu River region, and eventually engaged in skirmishes with the Jurchen forces who came to rescue the Kong-Geng armies.¹⁰¹ To the Later Jin commanders, Jo-

⁹⁷ For the attack on the imperial capital, see Yan Chongnian, "Qiandao yuanxi Yanjing zhi yi," in *Qingchao tongshi – Taizongchao* (2003), pp. 103-42.

⁹⁸ (Joseon) *King Injo sillok*, vol. 22 (8th year of King Injo, 3rd lunar month, *gyeongja* day, and 4th lunar month, *gabin* day).

⁹⁹ Han (2009), *Ibid.*, pp. 117-22.

¹⁰⁰ (Qing) *Qing Taizong shilu*, vol. 9 (Fifth month of fifth year of Tiancong era, *xinchou* day).

¹⁰¹ Han (2009), *Ibid.*, pp. 472-81.

seon's inability to break its tie with the Ming became all the more evident.

The boats and seamen earned the Later Jin an added mobility. From then on, the Later Jin forces could circumvent Gado Island and the Shanhaiguan pass, and attack interior lands of the Ming. Ganghwa Island in Joseon, where King Injo took refuge during the 1627 invasion, also became vulnerable. Pessimism about the 1627 peace accord and anti-Joseon sentiment can be detected among the Later Jin commanders as well. For example, one Jurchen general in the fourth lunar month of 1633 asserted that "we should learn from the past mistake of losing a heaven-endowed chance to conquer Joseon and enter into a peace agreement."¹⁰²

With his military power reinforced by the boats and seamen, Hongtaiji decided on the grand strategy of conquering the Ming by securing its flanks (i.e., the Mongols and Joseon) first in a conference with *beiles* (banner lords) in the sixth lunar month of 1633.¹⁰³ A majority opinion was that the 1627 peace accord might be kept effective as a means to secure grain supplies and trade, depending on how the situation surrounding Joseon unfolded. Given Joseon's renewed hostility towards the Later Jin as manifested in its joint operation with the Ming to stop the rebel armies, led by Kong Youde and Geng Zhongming, from submitting to the Jurchens, the 1627 peace accord became immensely precarious.¹⁰⁴

2. The 1636 Manchu Invasion and Joseon's Foreign Relations

In 1634, Hongtaiji subjugated the Chahar 察哈爾 Mongols, and captured the Yuan empire's seal then in the possession of their leader Ligdan Khan 林丹汗. The capture of Ligdan's imperial seal allowed Hongtaiji to style himself as successor to the Mongol emperors who had ruled Inner Asia and

¹⁰² Luo Zhenyu, ed., "Ning wan wo qingshou fu Kongtan bianfa zou," in Tiancong chaochen gong zouyi (Eighth day of fourth month of seventh year of Tiancong era) in *Qing ruguan qian shiliao xuanji (er)* (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 1989), pp. 55-56.

¹⁰³ (Qing) Qing Taizong shilu, vol. 14 (Sixth month of seventh year of Tiancong era, *wuyin* day).

¹⁰⁴ Han (2009), *Ibid.*, pp. 135-40.

mainland China together.¹⁰⁵

Immediately upon obtaining the Yuan imperial seal, the Later Jin officials began to prepare for the transfer of the ‘Mandate of Heaven’ (*tianming* 天命) to Hongtaiji. On the fourth day of the second lunar month of 1636, the multi-ethnic Manchu, Mongol, and Chinese officials prompted Hongtaiji to ascend to the imperial throne. He refused several times according to the Chinese ritual convention, but ordered that emissaries be sent to Joseon to discuss the matter with the Later Jin’s “younger brother.” In order to gain the Joseon court’s endorsement of his plan to adopt the imperial title, Hongtaiji dispatched a Manchu delegation including seventy seven Mongol officers led by Inggūldai 龍骨大 and Mafuta 馬夫大, who arrived at the Joseon border town of Euiju on the sixteenth day of the second lunar month of the same year.¹⁰⁶

The arrival of the Qing delegation threw the Joseon court and literati circles into an uproar. Hong Ikhan 洪翼漢 (1586-1637) made an impassioned statement that “I had only known the Great Ming Son of Heaven, yet this unacceptable state of affairs (i.e., Hongtaiji’s assumption of the emperorship) had been already anticipated when Joseon officials had acquiesced to the terms of peace with the Jurchen barbarians,” and proposed that the Qing envoys be decapitated. The court debate was dominated by a majority of bellicose anti-Manchu officials who argued for cancellation of the 1627 peace agreement while some cautious officials such as Choe Myeonggil, Yi Gyeongseok, and Jo Ik urged restraint, arguing for maintaining the peace agreement.¹⁰⁷

In the end, King Injo promulgated a decree to the effect that Joseon would break off the peace accord with the Later Jin, and that all the subjects of the eight provinces should prepare for war. The decree reads in

¹⁰⁵ Sugiyama Masaaki, *Mongoru Teikoku to Nagai Sonogo* (The Mongol Empire and the Long Thereafter) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2008), pp. 298-302.

¹⁰⁶ Nakamura Hidetaka. “Hidetaka. no Chosen Seibatsu ni Kansuru Komonjo” (Historical Documents Relating to the Emperor of Qing China’s Invasion of Joseon), in Nakamura Hidetaka, *Nissen Kankeishi no Kenkyu* (Studies in Japan-Joseon Relations) (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kobunkan, 1969).

¹⁰⁷ Han (2009), *Ibid*, pp. 140-50.

part: “The 1627 peace accord was an expedient measure under unavoidable circumstances to allow loose engagement (*gimi* 羈縻) [with the Jurchens];” “Now, since we cannot bear to hear of the usurpation of the imperial title [by Hongtaiji], we rejected the state letter [from him] without weighing our country’s strength and fate;” “The subjects of all of the eight provinces should arise in anger according to the court’s righteous action to fight the enemy even to the death;” “Loyal literati are encouraged to present war strategies, while brave men are expected to volunteer to fight so as to repay the state’s grace.”¹⁰⁸ One copy of the decree was sent to the governor of Pyeong’an Province via a messenger on the seventh day of the third lunar month of 1636. Unfortunately, the messenger was arrested by the Inggüldai’s men, and the decree fell into the hands of the Manchus,¹⁰⁹ who came to confirm the written evidence of the Joseon court’s denial of the 1627 peace agreement.

Recently, a new interpretation regarding the decree in point has been presented; the decree did not intend to negate the diplomatic tie with the Later Jin or to denounce the Later Jin as an enemy of Joseon. Thus, the new interpretation has challenged the conventional theory of this author and others who have defined the decree as “severing the diplomatic tie” (*jeolhwa* 絶和) with the Later Jin.¹¹⁰ O Suchang correctly points out that the *Veritable Records of King Injo*’s (*King Injo sillok* 仁祖實錄) description of the intercepted decree in point as calling for “the severing of the diplomatic tie and preparing for defense” (*jeolhwa bieo* 絶和備禦; See footnote 110) has provided the source for the conventional view of it. Yet, he argues that the *King Injo sillok*’s historical description represented not the contem-

¹⁰⁸ (Joseon) *King Injo sillok*, vol. 32 (14th year of King Injo, 3rd lunar month, *byeong’o* day).

¹⁰⁹ (Joseon) *King Injo sillok*, vol. 32 (14th year of King Injo, 3rd lunar month, *inja* day).

¹¹⁰ O Suchang, “Byeongja horan e daehan gieok cui waegok gwa geu hyeonjaejeok euimi” 「병자호란에 대한 기억의 왜곡과 그 현재적 의미」 (Distorted memories of the 1636 Manchu invasion, and their present meanings), *Yeoksa wa hyeonsil* 104 (2017). O Suchang argues that the King Injo decree in point merely meant to justify his refusal to receive the diplomatic communications from the Qing, and to call for preparing for a possible invasion, but the Qing leaders read more meaning into it to seek out a *casus belli*. In particular, he interprets the phrase, “*seosa donggu* 誓死同仇” as meaning to “confront the enemy all together” rather than following the conventional meaning to “swear death to avenge the enemy.”

porary but rather the post—the 1636-37 invasion view of cemented antipathy towards the Manchus. Still, it can be argued that the historian of the *King Injo sillok* who defined the decree as such might well have actually represented contemporary majority opinion at the Joseon court. Moreover, to the suspicious minds of the Manchu leaders, the decree was certainly read as an act of hostility towards them.

With regard to the meaning of the phrase “*seosa donggu* 誓死同仇 (to swear death to avenge the enemy),” O Suchang offers a toned-down translation meaning “*gongdong bujeok* 公同赴敵 (to confront the enemy altogether).” O Suchang thus argues that King Injo’s intention when he used this phrase was to call for the unity of all the people in an anticipated war with the Manchus rather than to urge actual revenge upon them. Still, it is doubtful that the Manchu leaders took pains to find any subtle meaning of the word “*gu*” 仇 other than “sworn enemy.”

The decree contains the word “*ro* 虜 (barbarian)” to refer to the Manchus with hatred and disdain. Even though the Joseon court had used decent terms such as *gwisa* 貴使, *gwigae* 貴价, and *gwicha* 貴差 (all meaning honorable envoy) to refer to the Jurchen and Manchu envoys in its state letters since the 1627 peace accord,¹¹¹ it had been extremely provoking to the Manchus that the Joseon court had used such pejoratives as “*ro* 虜 (barbarian)” and “*jeok* 賊 (bandit)” to refer to them in its documents.¹¹² Those wordings such as “*ro* 虜” and “*jeok* 賊” may be taken as unmistakable evidence of the Joseon court’s hostility and disdain towards the Manchus.

The breakdown of the 1627 peace agreement had been already anticipated, when the Joseon armies engaged in battle against the Later Jin forces, which protected the renegade Ming generals Kong Youde and Geng Zhongming in 1633. Around that time, one Later Jin general denigrated the peace agreement as a colossal mistake, lamenting that “in 1627, a heaven-

¹¹¹ The terms of address, such as *gwiguk* 貴國, *gwisa* 貴使, *gwigae* 貴价, and *gwicha* 貴差 can be found in *Chaoxian guo laishu boce* which contains state letters from Joseon.

¹¹² (Joseon) *Seungjeongweon ilgi*, vol. 55 (15th year of King Injo, 1st lunar month, 17th day). Hongtaiji defined the meaning of *jeok* 賊 as “those who stole in hiding,” and mocked the Joseon leaders who did not assault what they called *nojeok* 奴賊 (barbarian bandits).

given opportunity to conquer Joseon had been lost.”¹¹³ Later, alarmed by the extremely hostile atmosphere of the Joseon court, the Qing delegation, led by Inggūldai to discuss Hongtaiji’s adoption of the title of emperor and to extend his condolences for the death of Queen Inyeol of Joseon, departed hurriedly without meeting the king. When reaching Pyeongyang on his flight to the north, Inggūldai refused to stay in an official mansion, but rather chose to a mountain fortress for safety.¹¹⁴ When he captured the decree fraught with hostile and bold language such as *charo* 此虜 (these barbarians), *seosa donggu* 誓死同仇 (To swear death for avenging the enemy), and *jaweon jongjeong* 自願從征 (To volunteer to join the expedition), it was natural for the Manchu commanders to read the decree as that of “severing diplomatic ties” with their state. In short, it is reasonable to see the decree of King Injo as that of “severing diplomatic ties” with the Qing, reflecting the opinion of bellicose ministers against it.

In the third lunar month of 1636, Hongtaiji ascended to the imperial throne. Joseon envoys who happened to attend the ceremony—Na Deokheon and Yi Gwak—refused to prostrate themselves as a sign of defiance. In the fourth lunar month of the same year, Hongtaiji sent a letter blaming Joseon for betraying the alliance. He listed a number of grievances and complaints harbored by the Jurchens/ Manchus since the era of Nurhaci, and made an issue of the Joseon court’s obstinate loyalty only to the Ming emperor. He asserted that any ruler of superior virtue was eligible for the position of Son of Heaven, and that the Ming founded by “Zhu Yuanzhang 朱元璋, a Buddhist monk [sic] of the Huangjuesi temple lost its mandate to rule the world.” He charged that Joseon [rather than the Qing] had first created a source of conflict as “King Injo had listened only to the voices of Confucian scholars, civilian officials, and literati,”¹¹⁵ referring to the anti-Manchu censors and ministers in the Joseon court.

¹¹³ See footnote 103.

¹¹⁴ (Joseon) *King Injo sillok*, vol. 32 (14th year of King Injo, 3rd lunar month, *inja* day).

¹¹⁵ Jinhan ze Chaoxian guowang beimeng shu” (Fifteenth day of fourth month of tenth year of Tiancong era), in *Qing ruguan qian yu Chaoxian wanglai guoshu huibian 1619-1643*, eds. by Zhang Cunwu and Ye Quanhong (Taipei: Guoshi guan, 2000).

On the ninth day of the twelfth lunar month of 1636, the Qing forces led personally by Hongtaiji invaded Joseon for the second time. The failure to reconnoiter correctly the enemy situation at the beginning of the invasion resulted in an inordinate delay in communicating news of the invasion to the capital—belatedly after the Qing forces had crossed the Yalu River. In particular, because the supreme field commander Kim Jajeom had fled from his post, the cavalry vanguard of the Qing forces entered the Joseon capital of Hanseong only five days after they had crossed the Yalu River. Blocked off from their route of escape to Ganghwa Island, King Injo and his ministers were forced to take refuge at Namhan Mountain Fortress south of the capital on the fourteenth day. The undermanned mountain fortress was poorly provided with grain supplies and winter clothes. Besieged by the Qing forces, the Joseon court in the mountain fortress survived the “cold and hungry” winter for forty seven days before it surrendered to them.¹¹⁶

In a surrender ceremony at Samjeondo witnessed by the Manchu, Mongol, and Chinese officials lined up, King Injo presented himself before Hongtaiji, and knelt down three times, each time bowing his head three times (*sambae gugodu*; Ch. *sanbai jiukoutou* 三拜九叩頭) before the Qing emperor. The ceremony symbolized the complete isolation of the Ming, as the last loyal vassal state that had persistently opposed the Qing finally accepted Qing overlordship. On his way back to Shenyang, Hongtaiji brought the crown prince Sohyeon (1612-1645) of Joseon as a hostage and as many as 100,000 captives from Joseon. Consequently, Joseon society would undergo serious difficulties and discord regarding how to address the problems of repatriating a large number of hostages and captives.¹¹⁷

In the aftermath of the 1636 invasion, the Qing did its utmost to ensure Joseon’s compliance with its role as a vassal state. It argued that the

¹¹⁶ As for the aggressive advance of the Qing armies in the early stage of the war, see (Joseon) Na Mangap, “Geupbo ihu illok,” in *Byeongja rok* (Record on the Year of 1636) .

¹¹⁷ Han Myeonggi, “Byeongja horan sigi Joseonin poro munje e dachan jaeron” (Rethinking of the Problem of Joseon War Prisoners during the 1636-37 Manchu Invasion), *Yeoksa bipyeong* 85 (2008).

Qing bestowed the “grace of reviving the dynasty” (*zaizao zhi en* 再造之恩) on Joseon by allowing King Injo to continue his kingship.¹¹⁸ From time to time, the Qing court applied pressure on the Joseon court by circulating such rumors as that King Injo might be summoned to the imperial court, or that King Injo might be replaced by other candidates. As time passed, the king’s relationship with the crown prince detained at Shenyang became estranged because they found themselves in an awkward rivalry in gaining recognition from the Qing court. The Qing court did not loosen its tight grip on the Joseon officials either. Many officials accused of an anti-Qing stance were taken to Shenyang to be interrogated, tortured, and even put to death. The sons of high ministers were also taken to Shenyang as hostages to ensure their accommodation with the Qing demands.¹¹⁹

After the state surrender to the Qing in 1637, King Injo strove to preserve his regime by a realistic acceptance of the Qing hegemony. He accused anti-Jurchen and Manchu officials of “placing the country in jeopardy,” and ousted those belligerent officials who insisted on “taking revenge to wipe out shame” (*boksu seolchi* 復讐雪恥) in favor of moderate officials such as Choe Myeonggil. Choe also strove to preserve the dynasty by taking a cautious approach not to antagonize the Qing, yet he was dismissed when he was found to have been involved with the incident of the secret communications with Ming ships in 1642. King Injo persisted in keeping those ministers who complied with his pragmatic line of policy towards the Qing by his side. Typical examples were Kim Ryu and Kim Jajeom, who continued to remain in key posts in the government, though their official careers had been seriously flawed because of grave errors made in the military operations during the 1636-37 invasion.

King Injo’s pragmatic stance towards the Qing met with fierce criticism from a majority of moralist officials in the court. Some even asked such incisive questions as “Was this the purpose of the coup?” calling the justification for the King Injo regime into question.¹²⁰ King Injo, however,

¹¹⁸ (Qing) *Qing Taizong shilu*, vol. 33 (First month of second year of Chongde era, *wuzhen* day).

¹¹⁹ Han (2009), *Ibid.*, pp. 172-84.

¹²⁰ (Joseon) *King Injo sillok*, vol. 44 (21st year of King Injo, 9th lunar month, *jeongsa* day).

was persistent in his pragmatism to such a degree that one dynastic historian recorded that “King Injo hated those officials who were ashamed of serving the Qing.”¹²¹ It appears that King Injo saw a chance for his own course of action in his pragmatic stance towards the Qing apart from the coup leaders who had installed him on the throne.

From the Qing perspective, what were the benefits gained from the successful 1636-37 invasion? First of all, the Qing commanders could set out their long-anticipated attack on the Ming without worrying about a Joseon attack to their rear. Moreover, the Qing commanders could extract much-needed boats and firearms from Joseon, and use them in their attacks on Gado Island and Jinzhou. In light of the Qing’s empire building, the subjugation of Joseon was an epochal event. By defeating Joseon, which had persistently remained as a loyal ally of the Ming, Hongtaiji and his commanders’ confidence in conquering the Ming was greatly enhanced. Hongtaiji boasted of himself to the Ming general Zu Dashou that he had converted Joseon into the “most trusted subject (*gugong zhi chen* 股肱之臣)” to the great dismay of the Ming general.¹²² By taming Joseon from the most die-hard opponent against the Jurchens to the “most trusted subject,” the Qing took a large step in its enterprise to build an empire that extended beyond the Mongolian and Manchurian plains.¹²³

On the other hand, even after Joseon’s submission to the Qing in 1637, the Ming tried to use Joseon’s aid in countering the Qing aggression. For example, when the Songshan area was besieged by the Qing forces, the Ming Board of War dispatched Wang Wuwei who tried to extract military aid from Joseon in countering the Qing forces. Wang sent the Buddhist monk Dubu to Joseon to gain firsthand knowledge on recent matters. He examined the mind of the Joseon people still leaning towards the Ming rather than the Qing in a “ratio of six to four.” Dubu observed that the Joseon people’s fear of the Qing came from its military prowess and threats

¹²¹(Joseon) *King Injo sillok*, vol. 46 (23rd year of King Injo, intercalary 6th lunar month, *sinsa* day).

¹²² (Qing) *Qing Taizong shilu*, vol. 37 (Seventh month of second year of Chongde era, *wuzhen* day).

¹²³ Han (2009), *Ibid.*, pp. 214-34.

as well as its holding of the king's son and subjects as hostages. And he reported that Joseon harbored "rebellious feelings inside though appearing submissive" (*yangshun yinni* 陽順陰逆) to the Qing.¹²⁴

Remarkably, in the wake of the 1636-37 invasion there appeared signs of change in Joseon's attitude towards Japan. Since the Imjin War, Japan had been perceived as the "sworn enemy for good." Yet after the 1636-37 Qing invasion, such intense antipathy towards the Japanese eased relatively, and instead was directed toward the Manchus. With such shifting perceptions of Japan there emerged a discourse of "using Japan to counter the Qing" (*iwae je Cheong* 以倭制清) prominently put forth by Cho Gyeong and Song Siyeol,¹²⁵ who advocated for a placatory approach towards Japan in the shift from enemy to ally.

VI. Conclusion

The end of the Imjin War (1592-98) did not mark the end of an external threat to Joseon because the rise of the Jianzhou Jurchens under Nurhaci posed a growing threat to the country's northern front. The move of the Ming forces commanded by Li Rusong (the first son of Li Chengliang) from Liaodong to Joseon in order to expel the Japanese invaders stimulated the expansion of the Jianzhou Jurchens power. Moreover, Joseon, preoccupied with the war against the Japanese, could not prevent its Jurchen allies near the Tumen River region from being incorporated under the Nurhaci's control. Joseon had no other alternative but to rely on Ming power to counter the rising threat from the Jianzhou Jurchens.

During the reign of King Gwanghae, the Joseon court was caught between the Ming demand for military reinforcements in its campaign against the Jurchens and the threat of retaliation from the Later Jin in case

¹²⁴ Zhongguo guojia bowuguan, ed., *Zhongguo guojia bowuguan guanzang wenwu yanjiu congshu - MingQing dangan juan* (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2006), p. 157.

¹²⁵ (Joseon) Jo Gyeong, "Sa sagan so" in *Yongju yugo* (Works Left by Jo Gyeong), vol. 6; (Joseon) Han Weonjin, "Uam Seonsaeng seo dongp'a si bal," in *Namdang seonsaeng jip* (Collection of Han Weonjin's Works), vol. 31; Han (2009), *Ibid.*, pp. 352-57.

Joseon accepted the Ming demand. King Gwanghae's cautious policy of maintaining the *status quo* with the Later Jin came into conflict with the moralist officials who argued for military assistance to the Ming to repay the great debt of gratitude owed to the Ming during the Japanese invasions. When the Korean expedition, sent under the pressure from the Ming and the anti-Jurchen Joseon officials to join the Ming forces, suffered a crushing defeat in 1619, a hawkish opinion was voiced over the court. Supported by more cautious ministers such as Yun Hwi, Hwang Jungyun, and Bak Seungjong, he managed to reject the Ming's demand for further reinforcements and continued the policy of loose relations with the Later Jin. The prudent foreign policies to avoid national disasters notwithstanding, he faced a fatal political crisis created by the people's grievances against his costly palace construction project as well as by the defection of some of his close aids.

The 1623 coup that deposed King Gwanghae and installed King Injo resulted in a renewal of room for the Ming court to intervene in the affairs of the Joseon court. The Ming court initially defined the coup as an act of 'usurpation,' yet granted investiture for King Injo in a strategic calculation to use Joseon in confronting the Jurchens. The anti-Jurchen King Injo court was willing to support the Ming attempts to subjugate the Jurchens, citing "punishment of the [Jurchen] bandits" as the regime's legitimate agenda. Yet, the Yi Gwal rebellion of 1624 seriously weakened the regime's ability to protect itself, let alone its goal of "punishing the [Jurchen] bandits." The vulnerable King Injo regime had to provide added support to the Ming general Mao Wenlong in order to demonstrate its pro-Ming stance further, and consequently had to bear heavy burdens entailed by the pro-Ming activities.

Joseon's harboring of Mao Wenlong within its territory served as a trigger for the Later Jin invasion in 1627. The King Injo court took refuge at Ganghwa Island, still it accepted the terms of peace with the Later Jin. King Injo and his supporting ministers wanted to see the 1627 peace accord as "an expedient means to tide over the national crisis," but their opponent regarded it as a serious compromise to the regime's anti-Jurchen stance for which its coup had been justified.

The “elder brother and younger brother” alliance with the Later Jin placed Joseon in an ambiguous position in its relations with the neighboring powers. As a “subordinate to the Ming while at the same time a “younger brother” to the Later Jin, the Joseon state was “sandwiched” and oppressed between the two opposing powers. Mao Wenlong accused Joseon of forgetting a debt of gratitude to the Ming while the Later Jin suspected Joseon of covering Mao.

The breakdown of the precarious 1627 peace agreement started with the two incidents that greatly escalated the Jurchen threats to the Ming and alarmed Joseon to come to its aid—the Later Jin siege against the imperial capital in 1629, and the submission of the Ming generals Kong Youde and Geng Zhongming to the Later Jin in 1633. Faced with these mounting threats to the Ming dynasty, anti-Jurchen sentiment and the sense of indebtedness to the Ming were refreshed and strengthened among the Joseon officials. When the Joseon armies responded to the Ming call for a joint attack on Kong and Geng and fought against the Jurchen forces who provided cover for them, the Jurchen leaders confirmed where the hearts of Joseonns lay. By the time Hongtaiji took actions to assume the emperorship in 1635, the breakdown of the two states’ diplomatic relationship had become irreversible. When the Qing delegation led by Inggūldai arrived to discuss the matter of Hongtaiji’s adoption of the title of emperor with the Joseon court, anti-Manchu officials of Joseon demanded that the Qing envoy be decapitated, and that the 1627 peace accord be abrogated. “Pretending to the title of emperor by the barbarians” was out of the question to them. On the other hand, more cautious officials proposed that the conciliatory policy based on the peace agreement be maintained. Following the anti-Manchu officials’ hard line, King Injo proclaimed the decree that announced the end of diplomatic ties with the Qing and called for all provinces to prepare for war. Unfortunately, however, one copy of the decree fell into the hands of the Inggūldai delegation.

Assured of the unchanging anti-Manchu stance of the Joseon court, Hongtaiji led an army 100,000 strong to subjugate Joseon. The Joseon troops were overwhelmed by the Qing forces, and King Injo and his ministers took refuge at the Namhan mountain fortress to resist to the end. How-

ever, they were forced to surrender and accept the Qing overlordship. Until the Qing entered Beijing in 1644, it had imposed strict surveillance and heavy tribute payments upon Joseon. King Injo and cautious ministers tried not to antagonize the Qing by accommodating its demands. Still, in the eyes of anti-Manchu officials and literati, King Injo's 'pro-Qing' activities were seen to subvert the moral justification of his regime.

The successful 1636-37 campaign against Joseon brought many advantages to the Qing. To begin with, Joseon's close tributary ties with the Ming were severed, leaving the Ming stripped of its staunchest ally. The Qing acquired the sources for military supplies and manpower from Joseon, which it could mobilize in its attack against the Ming. Moreover, converting Joseon, steadfastly loyal to the Ming, into a vassal state of the Qing vastly enhanced Hongtaiji's prestige required in his enterprise to transform his regional power, based on Manchuria and Mongolia, into an imperial power in East Asia. The Ming dynasty made a last-ditch attempt to seek military aid from Joseon, but to no avail. As for Joseon, its hostility towards the Manchus never ceased, while its perception of Japan began to show a subtle sign of change as some officials proposed a "discourse of using Japan to counter the Qing."

In the early seventeenth century, which witnessed great political upheaval in East Asia involving the dynastic transition from the Ming to the Qing and the ruling house change in Japan, Joseon lacked power and leverage of its own to exert influence on such great change, and thus remained an object of contention and rivalry between neighboring powers. The 1636-37 Manchu invasion almost ended the Joseon dynasty, yet the dynasty survived on the condition of stopping its long hostility towards the Jurchens and Manchus. By the mid-seventeenth century, Joseon had settled into stable diplomatic relations with the Qing and Tokugawa Japan, yet its deep-rooted anti-Jurchen/Manchu sentiment cast a long shadow while giving rise to more reserved and placatory feelings toward Japan condemned once as a sworn enemy since its invasion of Joseon from 1592 to 1598.

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An Analysis on Maps Related to Northeast Asia in Major Western Historical Atlases: Focusing on Cartographic and Historical Geographical Issues

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I. Introduction

A historical atlas is a compilation of historical maps containing geographical information from the past including state borders, administrative districts, and the locations of mountains and rivers. As such, historical atlases are important objects of geographical study, particularly for cartographic and historical geographical studies.¹ However, there has been a lack of comprehensive research on historical atlases among Korean scholars of geography, and previous studies were largely limited to historical maps in-

* This article is translated from the Korean manuscript originally published in the *Journal of the Korean Cartographic Association* 한국지도학회지 18, no. 2 (2018): 1-21.

¹ See, for instance, Kim Jong-hyuk, “Yeoksajido jejakеul wihan yeogsajiri hwangyeongbokwon” [Restoring the Historical-Geographical Environment to Produce Historical Maps], *Hanguk jidohakhoeji* 13, no. 2 (2013): 77-94; Kim Jong-geun and Yi Saang-kyun, “Yeoksajido pyeongga gijunан gaеbalgwa pyeonggasarye” [Developing and Assessing a Criterion for Historical Map Evaluation], *Hanguk jidohakhoeji* 16, no. 2 (2016): 59-69; Jeon Jong-han and Lee Myeong-hee, “Jungguk eui yeoksajido pyeonchan e gwanhan gichoyeongu” [A Foundational Study on the Compilation of Historical Atlas in China: From the Perspective of Historical Geography], *Dongbuga yeoksa nonchong* 56 (2017): 92-135.

cluded in elementary and secondary school textbooks.² This has gone in tandem with the overall lack of interest in publishing historical atlases in Korea besides school textbooks.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, historical atlases assumed a new significance in Korean society, and this led to the translation and publication of a number of historical atlases.³ However, most of those atlases were made primarily by historians and graphic designers and little involved geographers. For the most part, translated historical atlases only featured translations of place names in major historical atlases originally published in the Anglosphere. In rare cases in which historical atlases were newly compiled, conventional map drawing methods such as projection techniques were directly adopted from Western atlases with little consideration to the unique conditions in Korea. As such, such Korean historical atlases were fraught with cartographic inaccuracies involving scale, direction, display of legends, projection technique, and the selection of a central meridian.

In response to these problems, this study undertakes a cartographical and historical geographical analysis of major Western historical atlases used as source material for historical atlases recently published in Korea to illuminate the origin of the problems that continue to haunt them. Specifically, this study takes a close look at *The Times Complete History of the*

² See, for instance, Kim Kam-young, “Junghakgyo sahoe gyogwaseo e natanan jujedo pyohyeon eui munjejeom mit gaeseon banghyang” [Problems and Improvement of Thematic Mapping in Middle School Social Studies Textbook], *Hanguk jiri hwangyeong gyoyuk hakhoeji* 21, no. 2 (2013): 43-55; Jung Jae-jun, “Godeunghaggyo sahoegwa gyogwaseoui jido olyu bunseog” [Analysis of Errors in Maps Featured in High School Social Studies Textbooks], *Hanguk jidohaghoeji* 15, no. 3 (2015): 127-41.

³ These include Kim Yong-man and Kim Jun-soo, *Jidoro boneun Han'guksa* [Korean History Through Maps] (Seoul: Sumaksae, 2004); Song Ho-jung, Lee Byung-hee, Kim Dong-jin, Kim Jung-chan, and Kim Han-jong, *(Atlas) Hanguksa* [History of Korea] (Paju: Sakyejul, 2004); Geoffrey Parker, *The Times Compact History of the World*, 2nd ed., trans. Kim Sung-hwan (Paju: Sakyejul, 2004); Park Han-je, Kim Hyung-jong, Kim Byung-joon, Lee Geun-myung, and Lee Jun-gap, *(Atlas) Jungguksa* [History of China] (Paju: Sakyejul, 2007); Kim Ho-dong, *(Atlas) Jungang yurasiasa* [History of Central Eurasia] (Paju: Sakyejul, 2016); Richard Overy, *The Times Complete History of the World*, 8th ed., trans. Wang Soo-min and Lee Ki-hong (Seoul: Yekyung, 2016).

World (2015) and the *DK World History Atlas* (2008), as they are well known in the Anglosphere and have been translated into various languages besides Korean including French, German, and Japanese. The two publications and their translations are also widely quoted in textbooks and news reports or used by museums. By analyzing these two atlases, this study therefore aims to throw light on the origin of issues related to maps of Korea in Western historical atlases.

The present study is comprised of three parts. Firstly, it surveys the history of Western historical atlases featuring maps involving Northeast Asia to determine when they started to be featured and how they evolved to reach their present form. Secondly, it analyzes how maps of Northeast Asia are featured in the two aforementioned Western historical atlases. Lastly, this study delineates the diverse issues related to the maps of Northeast Asia in the two historical atlases based on an analysis of their cartographical format and historical geographical details.

II. The History of Historical Atlases Related to Northeast Asia in the Anglosphere

1. Overview

When was a historical atlas first made in the history of mankind? The earliest known historical atlas is *Lidai dili zhizhang tu* published in the twelfth century under the Song dynasty of China. This historical atlas was mainly concerned with the list of geographical name changes for administrative districts in China and neighboring countries from ancient times to the eleventh century.⁴

In the Anglosphere, historical atlases only started to be created since the sixteenth century. In 1570, Abraham Ortelius (1527-1598) published the first modern map collection called *Theatrum Orbis Terrarum*, which remained in publication until its fortieth edition was issued in 1612. It be-

⁴ A reproduction of this map is currently available from the National Digital Library of Korea (<http://www.dlibrary.go.kr/>).




Figure 1. Partial View of the Map *Gujin huayi quyu zongyao tu* in *Lidai dili zhizhang tu* Listing the Names of Korean Kingdoms such as Buyeo, Balhae, Goryeo, Baekje, Silla, Okjeo, on a Landmass that Supposedly Represents the Korean Peninsula (Source: National Library of Korea).

gan as a simple collection of available maps, but in 1579, historical maps of the Classical World became added to the section called “Parergon.” With each new edition, more historical maps were added: 12 in 1584, 26 in 1591, 32 in 1595, 38 in 1603, and 43 in 1606. In 1624, after the death of Ortelius, Balthasar Moretus (1574-1641) turned “Parergon” into a separate volume of ancient historical maps titled *Theatri Orbis Terrarum Parergon*. That was the first historical atlas published in the West that consists only of historical maps.⁵

The research and publication of historical atlases beyond the seventeenth century were also fueled by purposes other than scholarship and education, as they were used to buttress nationalistic territorial ambitions. In seventeenth-century France, for instance, the House of Bourbon wanted to greatly expand its realm to a series of natural barriers that bordered the

⁵ Jeremy Black, *Maps and History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997): 9.




Figure 2. The Cover Page of "Parergon" by Abraham Ortelius (Source: Bibliothèque Nationale de France).




Figure 3. Galliae Antiquae Descriptio Geographica by Nicolas Sanson (1641), Royal Geographer of the House of Bourbon (Source: Bibliothèque Nationale de France).

Rhine, Alps, Pyrenees, and Atlantic. To legitimize its territorial expansion, France claimed that the desired land used to be Gallia, which belonged to her ancestors: the Gauls. *Galliae antiquae descriptio geographica* by Nicolas Sanson (1600-1667) was used as a key propaganda tool for this nationalistic territorial assertion.⁶

According to Jeremy Black, an authority on the history of Western historical atlases, historical atlases began developing in the nineteenth century with the rise of nationalism and Eurocentrism. Naturally, the scope of the newly published historical atlases in the West was limited to the European continent and Asia Minor where Europeans were active at the time, and was clearly preoccupied with documenting the locations and territorial boundaries of ancient nations, war sites, and the former names of major cities and notable geographical features. The nineteenth century was, after all, a time when nation-states were being formed in Europe, imperialism was developing, and European powers were actively expanding overseas. It is thus suggestive that the development of historical atlases in Europe around the time was directly and indirectly correlated with the territorial competition among European nations inside and outside Europe.⁷

2. Historical Atlases Involving Northeast Asia

Since the scope of interest for nineteenth century European historical atlases was largely aligned with European history, there was an enormous lack of information on other regions such as Africa and Asia. Northeast Asia, including Korea, China, and Japan, was only very briefly and inaccurately treated in nineteenth century European historical atlases. In China, on the other hand, a great number of historical atlases were made in the nineteenth century, which the British government would translate into English to procure historical geographical information on the country.⁸ A prime ex-

⁶ Peter Sahlins, "Natural Frontiers Revisited: France's Boundaries since the Seventeenth Century," *The American Historical Review* 95, no. 5 (1990): 1423-51.

⁷ Black, *Maps*, 1997.

⁸ Sin Deok-yong, "19segi huban ihu cheongjo hakjadeul cui yeoksajido jejkseonggwa" [The Main




Figure 4. The Cover of the First Edition (1888) of the Historical Atlas of the Chinese Empire (left) and a Map of China at the Time of Han dynasty (right).




Figure 5. Maps of Han China in the Second Edition of the Historical Atlas of the Chinese Empire (1898). The Map on the Right is a Reproduction of the Original Chinese Map, While Its English Version is on the Left (Oxenham, Historical Atlas, 1898).

ample of this was the *Historical Atlas of the Chinese Empire*. The book published in 1888 by E. L. Oxenham, a British consul in Zhenjiang, Jiangsu Province at the time, was created by adding English names and notes to a reproduced Chinese historical atlas (Figure 4). The second edition of the work was published in 1898 with fully translated English maps juxtaposed with the original Chinese maps.

Outcomes of Historical Map of The Ching Dynasty Since late 19C], *Hanguk jidokhwojei* 8, no. 1 (2008): 1-27.




Figure 6. *Historical and Commercial Atlas of China* by Herrmann (1935: 22-23). The Upper Half of the Korean Peninsula is Marked as Part of the Han dynasty.

The translated versions of Chinese historical atlases, however, posed limitations to studying Chinese historical geography in the West. The publication of the *Historical and Commercial Atlas of China* in 1935 by Harvard University marked the first serious attempt by Western scholarship to overcome such limitations. Published as the first volume of the Harvard Yenching Institute Monograph Series, this work was authored by Albert Herrmann (1886-1945), a professor of historical geography at Humboldt University in Berlin, Germany, and the maps were made by Georg Westermann. The atlas was designed and made in Germany instead of the United States because at the time Germany was the center of Chinese studies and

mapmaking. It was the first ever meaningful scholarly historical atlas on China made in the West, and the far-reaching significance of this work is demonstrated by the fact that, since its reissue in the United Kingdom in 1966, it is still being used in many college-level courses on Chinese history at Cambridge and other major universities.⁹

However, it took over forty years for Herrmann's work to start making impacts in the Anglosphere due to the Eurocentric approach in the western scholarship. This myopic focus eventually began to change in the late 1970s, and *The Times Complete History of the World* (*The Times*, henceforth) was at the center of the emerging trend. As clearly indicated in the foreword, *The Times* first published in 1978 was conceived from the beginning as an attempt to overcome Eurocentrism, and thus adopted revolutionary formats and contents. Its scope covered vast areas outside Europe including Northeast Asia, Africa, Oceania, broke away from the conventional description revolving around nation-states, and presented a broader treatment of diverse historical ebbs and flows. *The Times* also utilized diverse map projection methods as needed without being hobbled by the ubiquitous Mercator projection.¹⁰ This novel surge of interest in civilizations outside Europe continued into the 1980s, and new historical atlases introducing the history and culture of China and Japan were made in the United Kingdom and the United States.¹¹

But the innovative trend of going beyond the framework of individual nation states was confined to Europe, and the historical atlases on Northeast Asia still mainly covered the histories of China and Japan. This marginalized the history of the Korean peninsula in historical atlases published in the Anglosphere so that treatment of it would be perfunctory, elided, and frequently inaccurate. The History Atlas of Asia published in 1997, for instance, erroneously denotes the areas down to the Gangwon

⁹ Peter Bol, Dongbuga yeoksa jaedan, et al., *Yeoksa jidojip eui gaenyeom gwa jejak bangbeomnon* [The Concept and Production Methodology of Historical Atlases] (Seoul: Dongbuga yeoksa jaedan, 2016): 64.

¹⁰ Geoffrey Barraclough, *The Times Atlas of World History*, 1st ed. (London: Times Books, 1978): 14-15.

¹¹ Bol et al., *Yoksa*, 2016.

and Chungcheong Provinces on the Korean peninsula as part of Han dynasty in 2 AD (Figure 8(a)), and another map dated in 264 AD identifies the northwestern part of the peninsula as the realm of the Wei dynasty while its southeastern part and the Ulleung Island are marked as part of Japan (Figure 8[a]).





Figure 7. Covers of the Cultural Atlas of China (Blunden, 1983) and the Cultural Atlas of Japan (Collcutt, 1988).



(a) The mid-north Korean peninsula erroneously indicated as “Lo-Lang” in the ‘The Han Empire, AD 2’ map (b) The southeastern Korean peninsula incorrectly indicated to be part of Japan in the ‘Three Kingdoms, AD 264’ map

Figure 8. Inaccuracies from the History Atlas of Asia by Barnes and Hudson (Macmillan, 1998: 49).

In the 2010s, however, this lopsided treatment of Northeast Asian history and geography in Western historical atlases gave way. *The Korean History in Maps* published in 2014 by Cambridge University Press is representative of this new movement. The central axis of this work is firmly anchored on the history of Korea which in older historical atlases was often relegated as a subset of Chinese and Japanese history. With the direct involvement of four Korean history experts in Korea and the United States, the *Korean History in Maps* was edited by Michael Shin of Cambridge University. Another example is the *Historical Atlas of Northeast Asia, 1590-2010* published in 2014 by Robert Cribb and Narangoa Li of the Australian National University. Cribb and Li questioned the traditional myopia of Western historical atlases engrossed in China and Japan that practically ignored a vast region of land, people, and culture outside the two countries, and attempted to take an in-depth look at Manchuria, the Korean peninsula, Siberia, and the diverse groups of people who lived in those regions.

III. Major Modern Western Historical Atlases and Northeast Asia

1. *The Times Complete World History* (2015)

Since its first edition published in 1978, *The Times Complete World History* sold more than 225 million copies worldwide and has been translated into eighteen languages including French, German, Italian, and Korean. The ninth edition published in 2015 was edited by Richard Overy of the University of Exeter along with six experts in the histories of Europe, Africa, and China, modern world history, and archaeology. A total of 166 editors were involved between the first and eighth edition. The maps in *The Times* were drawn by graphic designers, which was different from the traditional method of mapmaking.

The Times covers a selection of notable world events from the origin of humanity until 2015 through chronology, pictures, tables, and graphs accompanied by historical maps that help readers gain a diachronic understanding of the world. The geographical scope of this work encompasses




Figure 9. Pages from *The Times Complete History of the World, 'Korea Up To 1392'*

Table 1. *The Chapter Arrangement of The Times*

Chapter	Subsections	Topics	Maps
1. Human Origins and Early Cultures	11	30	30
2. The First Civilizations	11	35	35
3. The Classical Civilizations of Eurasia	14	44	44
4. The World of Divided Regions	30	99	101
5. The World of the Emerging West	30	102	102
6. The Age of European Dominance	24	100	100
7. The Age of Global Civilization	40	151	155
Total	160	561	567

the entire globe, divided into topical subsets that focus on a particular continent, nation, region, or city through a variety of maps in diverse scales.

The Times consists of seven chapters and the second chapter covers the history of Korea including the periods of the Three Kingdoms, North-South States, and Goryeo. The chapter has eleven subsections and covers thirty-five topics (Table 1).

The number of maps on Northeast Asia in *The Times* is 98 in total,

Table 2. *The Number of Maps Featuring Northeast Asia in The Times*

Chapter	World	Asia	China	Korea	Japan	Total
1	5	0	0	0	0	5
2	0	1	4	3	0	8
3	0	3	8	0	0	11
4	0	4	4	0	3	11
5	2	12	5	3	2	24
6	4	3	3	0	3	13
7	9	4	9	1	3	26
Total	20	27	29	7	11	98

accounting for roughly 17% of the 567 maps included in the atlas. In terms of proportion, 47 out of the 98 maps (48%) featured Northeast Asia as part of larger maps of the world or Asia. In terms of nationality, the maps of China number 33, Korea 6, and Japan 16. The editorial thrust of *The Times* thus seems to rest on China, Japan, and Korea, in that order (Table 2).

2. The *DK World History Atlas* (2008)

The *DK World History Atlas* (henceforth *DK Atlas*) was first published in 2000 and its second and third editions subsequently came out in 2005 and 2008. DK (formerly known as Dorling Kindersley) is a major British publisher specializing in a diverse array of pictorial books, and many of their books have been translated into Korean. The *DK Atlas* was not one of them, but the work has been translated into German, Italian, Norwegian, Icelandic, and Japanese, to name a few.¹² Jeremy Black at the Department of History of the University of Exeter, who authored a number of books involving ancient cartography and historical maps, served as the editor-in-chief for a group of thirty-eight authors specializing in the histories of the world, North and South Americas, Europe, Africa, South and Southeast Asia, Australia and Oceania. The expertise of the authors was not limited

¹² Jeremy Black, *DK World History Atlas*, 3rd ed. (London: Dorling Kindersley, 2008).




Figure 10. Pages from the DK World History Atlas that Combines Historical Maps with Text, Photos, Tables, Timeline, and Projection Method, “The War in the Pacific” (Black, 2008: 272-73).

to history, but extended to diverse fields including geography, anthropology, humanities, and regional studies. While the direct involvement of geographers is a quality that distinguishes the *DK Atlas* from *The Times*, both had a historian as the editor-in-chief. Moreover, Richard Overy and Geoffrey Parker, both editors of *The Times*, served as advisors for the *DK Atlas*. The high quality of the maps should be credited to the large mapmaking team of DK with over 50 specialists. A typical page of the *DK Atlas* consists of topic, text, map, photo, timeline, map projection. An interesting feature is that, unlike *The Times*, the map projection is presented in the form of an illustration.

The chronological scope of the *DK Atlas* begins at the birth of humanity and leads up to the present, and its geographical scope encompasses the entire globe. Maps of diverse scale are featured from ones that cover the world to ones that focus on an individual continent, region, nation, or city. The *DK Atlas* is divided into two parts: the first part covers the world

Table 3. *The Chronological Structure of the DK Atlas and the Number of Maps*

Part	Time Period Covered	Subdivision	Map
Part 1: Eras of World History	- 30,000 BCE	1	2
	- 10,000 BCE	2	6
	10,000 - 5,000 BCE	2	3
	5,000 - 2,500 BCE	2	3
	2,500 - 1,250 BCE	2	6
	1,250 - 750 BCE	2	4
	750 - 500 BCE	2	5
	500 - 250 BCE	2	3
	250 BCE - 1 CE	2	3
	1 - 250 CE	2	5
	250 - 500 CE	2	3
	500 - 750 CE	2	4
	750 - 1000 CE	2	4
	1000 - 1200 CE	2	4
	1200 - 1300 CE	2	3
	1300 - 1400 CE	2	4
	1400 - 1500 CE	2	11
	1500 - 1600 CE	2	4
	1600 - 1700 CE	2	3
	1700 - 1800 CE	2	4
	1800 - 1850 CE	2	6
	1850 - 1900 CE	2	5
1900 - 1925 CE	2	4	
1925 - 1950 CE	2	5	
1950 - 1975 CE	2	6	
1975 - Present	2	5	
Part 2: Regional History	North America	11	52
	South America	6	24
	Africa	7	34
	Europe	22	96
	West Asia	9	43
	South and Southeast Asia	8	39
	North and East Asia	10	51
	Australasia and Oceania	5	19
Total		129	473

and the second zooms into areas of a smaller scale such as continents or regions (Table 3). The first part is further divided into 25/26 separate time periods from “10,000 BCE” to “1975-present.” Each period contains one world map and one historical map presenting a topic. A world map depicts the events that occurred across the globe during a certain period, and a topical section introduces a topic involving a certain period through historical maps of varying scale—from the world down to a city. In the period “10,000-5,000 BCE,” for instance, the world map shows the locations of known civilizations in the world while the topical historical map illustrates the worldwide emergence of agriculture. Another interesting feature is that a historical map does not always precisely match the time period it is labeled under. Also, the length of each time period division varies: each division can be 20,000, 5,000, 2,500, 1,250, 500, 250, 200, 100, 50, or 25 years long, with a general tendency to shorten as it approaches present day. While these time divisions may seem random, it was probably the best possible strategy to give a justifiable treatment to all significant events around the world during any given time period.

The second part covers regional histories in eight chapters, largely following the continental divisions: North America, South America, Africa, Europe, Western Asia, South and Southeastern Asia, North and East Asia, and Australia and Oceania. Asia is divided into three separate chapters in accordance with the distinct historical and cultural backgrounds of each region. Each chapter is split into several time periods as in the first part of the book, but the first chapter “North America: Exploration and Mapping” acts as a guide to introduce readers to the process of mapmaking and how the geographical information was acquired. Following the first chapter, the rest of the book is partitioned by historical time periods such as “The First East Asian Civilization to 200 BCE,” “The Han and the Great Migrations 21 BCE-c. 60 CE,” “Early Medieval East Asia 618-c.1300,” “The First States in Japan and Korea 300 BCE-1333 CE,” “East Asia and the Ming 1368-1600,” “The Era of the Qing Empire 1644-1914,” “The Modernization of East Asia 1860-1936,” “The War in the Pacific 1937-1945,” “Communism and Capitalism in East Asia since 1945.”

As for maps involving Northeast Asia in the *DK Atlas*, there are 71 in

Table 4. Number of Maps on Northeast Asia in the *DK Atlas*

Part	Northeast Asia	China	Korea & Japan	Korea	Japan	Total
Part 1: Eras of World History	71	0	0	0	0	71
Part 2: Regional History	14	26	4	2	5	51
Total	122	26	4	2	5	122

the first part and 51 in the second part (Table 4). The cartographical treatment of Northeastern Asia in the first part tends to be brief throughout the twenty-six world maps. The region is more prominently featured through the five topics dealing with the rise of Buddhism and Confucianism in “The emergence of organized religion,” the expansion of Buddhism in “World religions,” “Mongol campaigns,” “The spread of agriculture,” and “The Korean War,” which brings the total up to 71 for maps including Northeastern Asia in the first part. In the second part of the atlas, except for the two maps on Tibet and North Asia, there are 51 maps featuring Northeastern Asia out of a total of 53 maps (Table 4). Out of the 51 maps, 14 maps cover the whole of Northeast Asia, 26 China, 4 Korea and Japan together, 2 Korea, and 5 Japan. As such, China’s presence dwarfs Korean and Japan while Japan receives relatively more attention than Korea. Furthermore, the two maps devoted to the Korean peninsula are not actually interested in Korea per se but presented in the context of the First Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War.

As seen above, there are 122 maps in the *DK Atlas* that feature Northeastern Asia, which account for about 26% of the total of 473 maps. Of the 51 regional historical maps, 14 feature Northeast Asia in its entirety, 26 are dedicated to China, and the remaining 11 concern Korea and Japan, which includes only two that are solely focused on Korea. Similar with *The Times*, China again dominates the *DK Atlas*’ treatment of Northeast Asia, followed by Japan, leaving Korea as the least featured country.

IV. Current Issues in Cartography and Historical Geography Concerning Historical Atlases on Northeast Asia

1. Cartographical Issues

1) Incomplete Display of Basic Cartographic Elements

The basic cartographic elements are scale, direction, and legend.¹³ Scale indicates how big areas are represented in a map in relation to their actual size. Without a scale, it can cause serious misunderstanding as there would be no other means of knowing the actual distance and size of geographical features shown on a map. It is therefore an element essential to a proper map which must be clearly marked. Direction indicates the north-south and east-west positions within a map, and the lack of direction can severally compromise the usability of a map and the geographical understanding of a mapped area. Legend is the system of symbols noted on the map. Since a map cannot exhaustively list all surface features of an area, it selectively describes only the notable features and marks them using a system of symbols. If there is no legend of any kind or only limited explanation of very few symbols, the map would not avail the readers of the full extent of the geographical information regarding a certain area.¹⁴

Scale, direction, and legend, therefore, are essential elements that must be marked in accordance with the accepted rules of mapmaking. Should there be a map without these elements, it ought to be labeled as a “map-like illustration.” It is also possible to derive the direction and scale with a certain level of accuracy, provided that the map contains proper latitude-longitude lines. Since longitude lines run from north to south, they can be used to indicate the north-south position of a map. If there is no indication of direction at all, it is also customary in the art of mapmaking for the top of the map to point north. Scale also can be roughly estimated from

¹³ Mark Stephen Monmonier, *How to Lie with Maps*, trans. Son Il and Jeong In-chul (Seoul: Pureungil, 1998).

¹⁴ Han Kyun-hyung, *Jidohak wollon* [The Principles of Cartology] (Seoul: Minumsa, 2006).

Table 5. Cartographic Elements in the Maps of Northeast Asia in *The Times* and the *DK Atlas*

	Maps of Northeast Asia in <i>The Times Atlas</i> (out of the total 98 maps)	Maps of Northeast Asia in the <i>DK Atlas</i> (out of the total 122 maps)
Scale	0 (0%)	61 (50%)
Direction	0 (0%)	17 (14%)
Legend	93 (95%)	122 (100%)
Latitude & Longitude	50 (51%)	82 (67%)


the latitude and longitude, as one degree of latitude is about 111 kilometers in length. While the length of one degree of longitude varies between 117.5 km and 0 km depending on its distance from the equator, it can be estimated by the latitude it intersects. However, the distance within a map cannot be accurately appraised if there is no precise numeric notation of the latitudinal and longitudinal degree or the map reader does not have the necessary knowledge. Obviously, the best way to avoid all these issues is to mark the scale on the map.

Despite the importance of these elements, however, *The Times* and the *DK Atlas* have many maps that are deficient in this area, as shown in Table 5.

Regarding scale, it was not marked in any of the Northeastern Asia maps in *The Times*, and the *DK Atlas* had 61 maps with a scale. Direction is not indicated in any of the maps in *The Times*, and the *DK Atlas* had 17 maps with direction marks. While scale and direction can be gleaned from latitude & longitude lines as previously explained, only 51% of the maps in *The Times* and 67% in the *DK Atlas* included them. On that the other hand, nearly all of the maps in *The Times* and the *DK Atlas*, 95% and 100% respectively, had the legend properly noted. Hence, from the perspective of cartography, *The Times* is better described as “a collection of map-like illustrations” and only about the half of the *DK Atlas* can be qualified as proper “maps.”

2) Inaccuracies in Expressing Geographical Features

Major geographical features such as coastlines, rivers, or tributaries, when represented on a smaller scale map, need to be drawn using the generalized



(a) Inaccurate descriptions about coastlines, rivers, and lakes of the Korean peninsula (from a map on 'Early agriculture' in 'The beginnings of Chinese civilization to 475 BC')

(b) Inaccurate descriptions about national borders and coastlines of the Korean peninsula (from a map on 'The dismemberment of the Ch'ing empire, 1842-1911' in 'The collapse of the Chinese empire, 1839 to 1911')

Figure 11. Samples from *The Times* with Geographical Inaccuracies.

data imported from a larger scale map; otherwise, the necessary data must be created afresh in accordance with the smaller scale in order to ensure the accuracy and precision of the geographical information it conveys.¹⁵ The accuracy and precision is also important for historical maps to safeguard the reliability of its information, as inaccurate and imprecise geographical information compromises the integrity of the historical account featured in the map.

A number of inaccuracies have been identified in *The Times* and the *DK Atlas*, where 32 maps in the former and 10 in the latter include erroneous representations of coastlines, rivers, or national borders among others (Figure 10).

Figure 11(a), for instance, shows a map marked with archaeological sites in China. The geographical depiction of the Korean peninsula in this map contains a number of errors. The Bay of Wonsan cuts deeper into the peninsula than it actually does, Janggigot (Homigot) is not marked, and the

¹⁵ Han, *Jidohak wollon*, 2006.

shape and location of Jeju Island are inaccurate. The line depicting Amnok (Yalu) River is incorrect, the Duman River is nowhere to be seen, and Cheonji, the caldera lake on Mount Baekdu appears to be out of proportion. The Figure 11(b) is a map of Northeast Asia toward the end of the Qing dynasty. The shape of the borders between Joseon and Qing, the coastline of the Korean peninsula, the shape of Jeju Island, and the shape and location of Tsushima Island are largely incorrect, which may undermine the credibility of the historical map itself.

3) Inaccurate Representations of the Korean Peninsula's Shape

Map projection allows a three dimensional globe to be transcribed onto a two dimensional plane, Map projection and the central meridian decides how land and sea will be arranged on a map. As such, the selection of map projection and the central meridian reveals the purpose of a map.¹⁶

The two historical atlases under investigation in this study are both made in the United Kingdom, and thereby cater to the habits and expectations of British readers. Therefore, most of their maps locate the central meridian in Europe or the Middle East. Accordingly, the map projection pushes Northeast Asia to the edges of the globe into a slanted position. In *The Times*, for instance, out of the 19 world maps that feature the Korean peninsula, 18 of them show Korea in either a slanted or supine position. The *DK Atlas* has 56 of 57 world maps showing Korea in a tilted position. This is the result of the central meridian being far away from Northeast Asia, which may come natural to British readers but not to readers in East Asia. Furthermore, there are instances in the historical atlases where the Korean peninsula in a slanted position even in smaller maps dedicated to Korea. There are seven maps each in *The Times* and the *DK Atlas* that centrally feature the Korean peninsula. Out of these seven maps, six maps in *The Times* and the *DK Atlas*, respectively show Korea in a slanted angle rather than being aligned due north and south. Should this trend continue, it may result in the normalization of the abnormal that could cause unsus-

¹⁶ Han, *Jidohak wollon*, 2006.







Figure 12. Depictions of a Slanted Korean Peninsula in *The Times* (Overy, 2015: 70, 71, 194, 195, 309).

pecting readers to believe that the slanted position is the “normal” shape of the Korean peninsula.¹⁷

¹⁷ Michael Shin, the chief editor of *Korean History in Maps*, once mentioned that in order to avoid this very problem, all maps in his historical atlas are precisely aligned along a north-south axis, including all the maps showing the Korean peninsula (Bol et al., *Yoksa*, 76).



(a) “State formation in Korea and Japan 100 BCE-650 CE” (b) “The first empires c.300-900 CE” (c) “The age of the Shoguns”




(d) “The Sino-Japanese War 1894-95” (e) “The Russo-Japanese War 1904-05” (f) “The Korean War 1950-53”

Figure 13. Depictions of a Slanted Korean Peninsula in the DK Atlas (Black, 2008: 109, 264, 265, 270).

2. Historical Geographical Issues

1) Overrepresentation of the Four Han Commanderies

While there are scholarly debates on the precise location and extent of the Four Commanderies of Han, no authoritative opinion places the commanderies in the middle or southern part of the Korean peninsula. But both historical atlases exhibit a tendency to exaggerate the alleged extent of the commanderies. Figure 14(a) is part of a map from *The Times* titled “The expansion of Han China,” which marks the northern half of the Korean peninsula as Han Chinese territory. Figure 14(b) is a map called “The Han




(a) "The expansion of Han China" of *The Times* (b) "The Han Empire 140 BCE-220 CE" of the *DK Atlas*

Figure 14. Overrepresentations of the Four Han Commanderies in *The Times* and the *DK Atlas* (Black, 2008: 260; Overy, 2015: 89).

Empire, 140 BCE-220 CE" from the *DK Atlas* that shows an even more exaggerated description of Han Chinese territory reaching down to the southwestern coast of the Korean peninsula. Although a scholarly consensus on the precise location and extent of the commanderies is yet to emerge, it is at the least evident that they were not situated in the lower half of the Korean peninsula from Gangwon Province down to the North and South Jeolla Provinces. These two maps, therefore, are misinformed about the Chinese influence on Korea at the time of the commanderies.

2) Historical nomenclature of Balhae

Balhae is perceived by Korean scholars as a successor of Koguryo for having been founded by its remnants. As such, the kingdom's name is pronounced in Korea as "Balhae." China, however, deems Balhae as part of its own history and uses the Chinese pronunciation of "Bohai" or "Pohai." Since there exists a difference of opinion on how to pronounce Balhae, third parties tend to take a neutral approach by listing both pronunciations. The *DK Atlas*, for instance, lists both pronunciations as "BOHAI (Palhae)" but seemingly lends more credence to the Chinese pronunciation by fully capitalizing it whereas the Korean pronunciation is placed in parentheses.



(a) “Tang China and its neighbors c.750” in the *DK Atlas* showing the Korean pronunciation in parentheses
 (b) “Japan and east Asia, 600-900” of *The Times* showing only the Chinese pronunciation

Figure 15. Misrepresentations of Balhae in *The Times* and the *DK Atlas* (Black, 2008: 262; Overy, 2015: 136).


The Times, however, lists only the Chinese pronunciation “POHAI” and omits the Korean pronunciation Balhae (Figure 15). The editorial perspective of these historical atlases, therefore, is not at all neutral but consistently supporting the Chinese claim on Balhae.

3) Oversimplification of Borders

The map in Figure 15(a) above is from *The Times* under the title “Japan and east Asia, 600-900” and describes the realms of Koguryo, Silla, Baekje, and Balhae. While this map has the latitudinal and longitudinal lines and legends to meet the minimum cartographical requirement, it oversimplified the borders among the listed countries with little regard to the natural geographical features such as coastline and rivers. If it proves difficult to ascertain the precise historical borderline, using other types of lines to indicate an approximate line could be a viable alternative. Oversimplification of border details, however, undermines the credibility of a map and therefore does not qualify as an alternative.

4) Representing the Korean Peninsula as a Vassal State of China

In the *DK Atlas*, there are four maps that list Korea as a vassal state to the reigning Chinese dynasty at the time such as Han, Yuan, Ming, and Qing. Figure 14(b), for instance, shows most of the Korean peninsula under the rule of Han China through its commanderies, and during the Yuan dynasty, the entire nation of Korea is represented as part of the Mongolian empire (Figure 16(a)). This trend also persists during the times of the Ming and Qing dynasties as shown in Figure 16(b) and (c).



(a) "The Mongol (Yuan) period c.1300"

(b) "The World in 1400"



(c) "Qing China, 1644-1911"

Figure 16. Misrepresentations of the Korean Territory in the *DK Atlas* (Black, 2008: 71, 263, 268).

5) Issues with the Notation of Dokdo and the East Sea

Generalization is one of the most crucial processes in the mapmaking. Based on scientific principles, a mapmaker must consciously decide which geographical features to mark on a map and which to leave out.¹⁸ For instance, when making a small-scale map of Northeast Asia, small islands associated with the Korean peninsula are mostly omitted. Dokdo is also frequently neglected in the process of generalization because of its small size and remote location. But the National Geographic Information Institute (NGII) of Korea has mandated that all maps published in Korea must include Dokdo.¹⁹ This is based on the need to clearly demarcate the easternmost point of the territory of the Republic of Korea. Similarly, the East Sea must be noted as “동해” or “East Sea” as mandated by the NGII to preserve the national identity of the sea.

Of course, any map made outside Korea can follow its own set of rules for generalization and is not legally bound by the rules of mapmaking set by the NGII of Korea. But in an effort to safeguard the sovereign interest of the nation, the Korean government has for years consistently asked governments, mapmakers, and publishers around the world to join in adopting correct notations for Dokdo and the East Sea. But even before South and North Korea simultaneously joined the United Nations in 1991, many overseas mapmakers had been following the notation guideline provided by Japan.

Figure 17 shows the history of how Dokdo and the East Sea were treated in *The Times* from the first edition (1978) to the ninth (2015). Between the first and third edition (1978-1989), *The Times* described Dokdo as “Takeshima or Tok-do island claimed by South Korea (unresolved)” and the East Sea as “Sea of Japan.” After 1991, however, the note on Dokdo being a disputed territory disappeared, and the East Sea is marked as “Sea of Japan (East Sea),” which has been maintained to the present.

Regarding the treatment of Dokdo in the latest editions of *The Times*

¹⁸ Han, *Jidohak wollon*, 2006.

¹⁹ As specified, among others, in the Guideline on Making and Maintaining World Maps established as Rule No. 81 of the Korean NGII (February 3, 2015).



(a) 1st edition (1978)

(b) 3rd edition (1989)



(c) 4th edition (1993)

(d) 5th edition (1999), 6th edition (2004)



(e) 7th edition (2007), 8th edition (2010), 9th edition (2015)

Figure 17. Changes to the Notation of Dokdo and the East Sea Over Editions of *The Times* (Barraclough, 1978: 279; Stone, 1989: 279; Parker, 1993: 275; Overy, 1999: 279; 2004: 307; 2007: 307; 2010: 309; 2015: 309).

Table 6. Renditions of Dokdo and the East Sea in the Latest Editions of *The Times* and the *DK Atlas* (Black, 2008: 269; Overy, 2015: 296, 311).

	Dokdo	Naming of the Sea between Korea & Japan
<i>The Times</i>	No Reference	No Reference: 67
		Parallel Reference: 29
		“Sea of Japan”: 1
<i>DK Atlas</i>	No Reference	No Reference: 89
		Parallel Reference: 32
		“Sea of Japan”: 1




Figure 18. Renditions of the East Sea in the Latest Editions of *The Times* and the *DK Atlas* (Black, 2008: 269; Overy, 2015: 296, 311).

and the *DK Atlas*, neither of them includes the island on their maps, as shown in Table 6. The East Sea is also frequently neglected in the majority of their maps, and, if at all noted, it is usually in the system of dual-naming with parentheses as in “Sea of Japan (East Sea).” There are three exceptions, however, in that two maps in *The Times* and one in the *DK Atlas* are marked only with “Sea of Japan” without the parallel reference to “East Sea.”

V. Conclusion

This study has analyzed two authoritative Western historical atlases that command worldwide influence through numerous translations: *The Times Complete History of the World* and the *DK World History Atlas*. While their focus predominantly remains on Europe and North America, they also substantially covers the history of Northeast Asia. But their perspective suggests a conformism to the conventional emphasis on China and Japan. This is evident in the majority of their maps on Northeast Asia in which Korea is denoted as a subordinate territory to China or Japan and usually depicted in a context of war and conflict between the two.

Cartographical issues have been revealed that made the two atlases seem lacking: the insufficient representation of scale and direction, the inaccurate representation of key geographical features such as coastlines and rivers, and the inaccurate representation of the Korean peninsula's shape and orientation. In terms of historical geography, the atlases showed various issues including the exaggerated boundaries of the Four Han Commanderies, the incorrect notations of Balhae, the ambiguous marking of national boundaries, the description of Korea as a vassal state of the Chinese dynasties Yuan (Mongol), Ming, and Qing, and the inaccurate nomenclature of East Sea.

The scope of the current study is limited to the two most influential historical atlases published in the Anglosphere. In the follow up study, the scope of analysis will be expanded to other historical atlases published in more diverse languages. Also, it seems necessary for Korean cartographic scholars to take serious interest in the cartographical and historical geographical issues regarding Korea reported in this study, as it is possible for such issues to be propagated and reproduced through textbooks, museums, media articles, and research studies in different countries around the world.²⁰

²⁰ In February 2017, for instance, an exhibition on Chinese immigration in New Zealand under the title *Being Chinese in Aotearoa* held at the Auckland War Memorial Museum used a map that showed the Korean peninsula as part of China (<https://www.facebook.com/groups/nzstory/permalink/1325487627517377>).

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Book Reviews



동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

The Mongol Conquests in World History

By Timothy MAY

London: Reaktion Books, 2012

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Research on the Mongol Empire began during the Ming dynasty in China and in the eighteenth century in the West. The study of the empire over such an extensive period has led to two research traditions that largely differ between the East and West, depending on whether the main object of research is the Yuan dynasty or the Ilkhanate. This ‘bifurcation’ of research may have resulted from different geopolitical interests as well as the vastness of an empire with a variety of cultures and languages. Both traditions, however, failed to study the Mongol Empire from the viewpoint of world history. Both China and the West have conducted research based on views confined to their own cultural sphere: researchers in China essentially studied Chinese sources while those in the West primarily used sources written in Persian. Furthermore, the branding of the Mongols as brutal barbarians and aggressors has been an obstacle to historical research on the Mongol Empire. Consequently, the Mongol Empire has tended to be treated merely as a fleeting episode in history.

As time passed, scholars have begun to question the existing perspectives regarding the Mongol Empire, which led to studies based on more diverse approaches. Scholars have stopped labeling the Mongols as aggressors and, instead, begun to consider them as rulers who shaped an epoch. Such progress prompted scholars to recognize the need to broaden their perspectives. Because the Mongol Empire wielded its influence throughout

most parts of Eurasia, it has grown increasingly obvious that fragmented research based solely on Chinese or Persian sources makes it difficult to draw closer to a historical portrait of the entire Mongol Empire. Currently, scholars studying the Mongol Empire face the challenge of equipping themselves with perspectives that transcend regional limitations to be able to describe world history.

Undertaking such a challenge, however, is not at all easy. First of all, it is difficult for an individual scholar to master all the various languages, including Chinese and Persian, used in sources related to the Mongol Empire. Moreover, it would take a considerable amount of time for an individual to examine all the research progress made in both the East and the West. Despite these difficulties, there have been continuous efforts to study the Mongol Empire from the perspective of world history. Those efforts led to the understanding that the influence the empire wielded was responsible for changing the course of world history. It thus became necessary to develop a framework for narrating the impact the Mongol Empire had on developments in world history. Thomas T. Allsen is the first scholar to perform this task in book form.

In his work entitled *Culture and Conquest in Mongol Eurasia*, Allsen reveals the global traits that the Mongols possessed. For this purpose, he describes the relations between the Yuan dynasty and the Persian Ilkhanate, the people who mediated their relations, and the diverse cultural exchange between the two empires in areas such as historical description, geography, agriculture, cookery, medicine, astrology, and printing. However, by largely focusing on Chinese and Persian Mongols and the political and cultural exchange between them, his research overlooks the task of unveiling various exchanges among other Mongol groups in Central Asia, Russia, and the Black Sea lowland, as well as the task of analyzing the effects of such exchanges.

Following in the steps of Allsen, Timothy May attempted to analyze the Mongol empire from a wider perspective, which resulted in *The Mongol Conquests in World History*. The book consists of an introduction and two parts. The introduction explains why analyzing the Mongol Empire's history is necessary for understanding world history, namely, because

the empire was responsible for forming an “integrated” Eurasia, and, by extension, an integrated world. The Mongol Empire’s rapid conquests and expansion steered the vast Eurasian continent toward a path of integration and exchange. Additionally, historical sources mentioning the Mongol Empire have been written in many languages other than Chinese and Persian, which establishes that people throughout Eurasia were influenced by the Mongol Empire, and which therefore makes the empire a topic that cannot be overlooked in the history of Eurasia and the world. Hence, the author emphasizes the need to consider the Mongol Empire as a “global empire” in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. This is made apparent through the statement that “many of the advances that occurred could not or would not have happened without the Mongol conquests.” (p. 21) As Part One’s title, “The Mongol Conquests as Catalyst” suggests, the first section of the book examines the process through which the Mongol Empire served as a catalyst for globalization. Part One comprises three chapters that describe the historical process the Mongol Empire underwent to integrate Eurasia and the empire’s legacy, illustrating the author’s view that “the Mongol Empire is world history and vice versa.” Part One also notes an issue that arises from the concurrent discussion of the Mongol Empire and world history: it is difficult for one scholar to cover in detail sources authored in such a variety of languages. Anyone studying the Mongol Empire is keenly aware of this, and although some scholars do collaborate to analyze sources in diverse languages, such efforts fall short of completely addressing the issue. A reliance on translations of historical sources and relevant research findings therefore becomes inevitable, which implies that appropriately interpreting and making use of such translations and findings is yet another challenge facing those who wish to advance research on the Mongol Empire.

The first and second chapters of Part One address the Mongol Empire’s formation and dissolution, respectively, which are the most frequently discussed topics in historical studies on the Mongol Empire. The process through which the empire was established by Chinggis Khan and then rapidly expanded until Khubilai and Ariq Böke began a civil war that led to the unified empire’s dissolution must still be covered in order to ex-

plain the empire's state structure. Therefore, while the first and second chapters offer an outline of the Mongol Empire's history, the third chapter of Part One describes how the empire started to fuse with world history.

The title "The World of 1350: A Global World" suggests that the third chapter is likely to describe how the world became "globalized" in the 1350s. However, a closer look at this chapter shows that it mainly illustrates developments in world history after the Mongol Empire. By 1350, the empire was already at an ebb: its impact had already changed the political situation and caused world history to take an entirely new turn. It is thus odd for the author to use this year in the chapter's title. Perhaps the author was trying to avoid using the term "Mongol Legacy," which in fact continues to this day. The most obvious evidence of this enduring influence is that, unlike other peoples, such as the Xiongnu, Uighurs, Khitans, and Manchus, a country named after the Mongols still exists.

While Part One portrays an overview of the Mongol Empire, Part Two delves into the details of how the empire influenced different realms of world history. The title of Part Two, "Chinggis Exchange," has significant implications. After Columbus discovered the New World, the Old World engaged in active exchange with the new Continent in terms of not only politics, economy, and culture, but also diseases, wild life, and resources. The term "Columbian Exchange" was coined to highlight how such exchanges changed the course of world history; this phrase must have inspired the book's author to coin the term "Chinggis Exchange." Although the author is wary of giving all the credit to a single hero, he must have chosen the term "Chinggis Exchange" over "Mongol Exchange" as an acknowledgement that the various changes described in Part Two would not have been initiated if not for Chinggis Khan. The use of the term "Chinggis Exchange" also underscores that this exchange prompted a transition in world history as massive as the worldwide change the Columbian Exchange caused during the Age of Discovery. After all, if not for the Chinggis Exchange, the Columbian Exchange may never have occurred.

Details of the Chinggis Exchange are described throughout Chapters Four to Ten. Chapter Four looks at trade, which tends to be closely tied with direct exchange. Descriptions of the system of horse relay stations

and the *ortagh* (the class of a trader) merchants lead to explanations about trade along both land and sea routes. The chapter goes as far as to cover the trade beyond the Silk Road that occurred around the Black Sea. Chapter Five explains how the Mongol Empire influenced modern warfare by disseminating military tactics and weapons around the world. Having thoroughly explored the Mongols' war tactics in his previous publications, the author focuses in Chapter Five on how new tactics were used and eventually caused world history to change. In covering the Mongol Empire's political and administrative system, Chapter Six reveals that the Chinggis Exchange involved the Mongols accepting the native cultures of those they had conquered and mixing them with their own culture. Chapter Seven addresses religion, particularly in terms of how the Mongol Empire utilized various religions to run state operations and govern its conquered subjects. This method caused changes in Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism, and prompts the need to analyze how the Mongol Empire transformed the world's religious landscape. The epidemic covered in Chapter Eight is the plague that swept across Eurasia. The fact that the plague contributed to the Mongol Empire's decline serves as a reminder that the fate of the empire was connected to the fates of other societies across the world, as they, too, experienced rapid change due to the epidemic. In dealing with migrations and demographic trends, Chapter Nine focuses on the fact that the migration of diverse peoples across Eurasia formed new ethnic landscapes, which is how the Mongol Empire came to contribute significantly to the Turkicization of Eurasia. Finally, Chapter Ten takes a closer look at cultural exchange to analyze how the exchange of ideas, art, culinary traditions, and other cultural artifacts contributed to the flow of world history.

Unlike other research publications, this book does not include a conclusion that summarizes the book's main content. Considering how the book's title ties the Mongol Empire to world history, a conclusion would have stated the obvious: that the empire substantially influenced the history of surrounding regions and therefore warrants examination within the context of world history. The fact that the Ming and Qing dynasties, the West Asian Safavid Empire, the Anatolian Ottoman Empire, and the Indian Mughal Empire were all born as successors of the Mongol Empire further

demonstrates how closely the empire links to world history. It is now up to other scholars to use the analytical framework provided in this book to develop diverse research topics and fill in the spaces left by the conclusion. At the end of the book, the author suggests that “in the future scholars will also give emphasis to a north-south exchange and indicate how the Mongol Empire impacted the culture of Siberia and south and Southeast Asia in greater detail.” (p. 256)

The significance of *The Mongol Conquests in World History* is already being academically recognized worldwide because the work suggests various research topics and a descriptive framework for analyzing the Mongol Empire in the context of world history. And as the author writes, “while the Mongols set the conditions and served as facilitators, most of the Chinggis Exchange was the result of the efforts of the subjects of the Mongols and outsiders.” (p. 23) In the process of globalization in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, not only the Mongols but everyone else in Eurasia each played a unique role. The book’s accessibility has recently been enhanced with the publication of its Chinese translation in China, which is proof that the book is becoming increasingly considered necessary for understanding the history of the Mongol Empire.

Toyotomi Hideyoshi's Invasion of Joseon *[Toyotomi Hideyoshi no Chōsen shinryaku]*

By Manji KITAJIMA

Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1995

Kyong-tae KIM

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Kitajima Manji (北島万次: 1934-2018) dedicated his entire career to studying the Imjin War (1592-1598). As a Japanese historian, he gained a reputation for his broad use of Korean historical sources. The inspiration to delve into Korean sources came from Nakamura Hidetaka (中村榮孝: 1902-1984). While serving for a long time on the Korean History Compilation Committee established by the Japanese Government-General of Korea, Nakamura conducted multiple studies on Korean history and Korea-Japan relations. Once the two scholars met, Kitajima became academically influenced by Nakamura and particularly took to heart Nakamura's advice on the need to directly analyze Korean historical sources. This is perhaps why Kitajima participated for so long as a key member of the Japanese reading group on the Veritable Records of the Joseon Dynasty. As a result, more than half of Kitajima's studies on the Imjin War have been based on Korean historical sources. Even today, there appears to be no Japanese scholar who uses sources from the Joseon period more actively than Kitajima to study the Imjin War. Considering that Kitajima's research interests originate from the history of Korea-Japan relations, his approach toward foreign historical sources gives cause to reflect on what skills scholars in different countries need to be equipped with in order to engage in transborder communication to research the Imjin War.

Among Kitajima's various publications, this review will focus on *Toyotomi Hideyoshi's Invasion of Joseon* [Toyotomi Hideyoshi no Chosen shinryaku] (1994). The book, based on the author's lecture notes, features the Imjin War from beginning to end in an arrangement accessible even to general readers unfamiliar with the topic. For those in pursuit of further academic expertise on the topic, another work by Kitajima titled *Chōsen nichinichiki Kōrai nikki: Hideyoshi no Chōsen shinryaku to sono rekishiteki kokuhatsu* [The Chosen nichinichiki and Korai nikki Diaries: Hideyoshi's Invasion of Korea and its Historical Denunciation] (Soshiete, 1982) may prove to be helpful. It is available to Korean readers through its Korean translation by Kim Yoo-jung and Lee Min-woong (Kyungin Publishing, 2008).

"Toyotomi Hideyoshi's invasion of Joseon" may sound unfamiliar to many in Korea. This is because the event is commonly known as *Imjin waeran* among Koreans. In Japan, it is referred to as *Bunroku-Keichō no eki*, meaning the "Battles of Bunroku and Keichō." The reason Kitajima chose to use a name unfamiliar to both Koreans and the Japanese is because he wishes to overcome the imperialist or colonial views of history that tend to regard Joseon as an object of conquest. Between a prologue and epilogue that conveys Kitajima's view of the Imjin War and the critical awareness he wishes to promote in relation to the historical event, this book consists of the following six chapters: Chapter 1 "The Inception of the Japanese Invasions," Chapter 2 "The First Invasion of Joseon to Conquer Ming China," Chapter 3 "The Counterattack from Joseon," Chapter 4 "The Ming-Japan Peace Negotiations Collapse," Chapter 5 "The Second Invasion of Joseon to Seize its Territory," and Chapter 6 "Wounds from the Japanese Invasions."

The prologue begins a story about a Japanese general named Sayaka who surrendered to Joseon and later took the name Kim Chung-seon. The activities of Kim Chung-seon and the existence of other Japanese surrenderers, referred to as *Hangwae*, were revealed through modern historical research methods by none other than Nakamura Hidetaka. When modern Japan started to take an interest in the history of Joseon-Japan relations, Kim Chung-seon was an eyesore. Japanese scholars identified the Japanese

general who surrendered to Joseon as a traitor or fictional character, which was something Nakamura sought to challenge. What Kitajima sought by introducing an episode related to Kim Chung-seon was to highlight the fact that the Imjin War has been an event that continuously affects the relations between Korea and Japan. He also sheds light on a figure who made his own decisions upon being called to serve in an unjustifiable war. This approach shines critical awareness Kitajima tries to maintain throughout the book and perhaps reveals the reason why he brings up Kim Chung-seon at the very beginning of the book.

Through Chapter 1, Kitajima unveils Toyotomi Hideyoshi's intent for invading Joseon. The letter the Joseon king handed a Tongsin mission in 1590 to deliver to the Japanese leader is reviewed to illuminate the logic behind Hideyoshi's purpose for going to war. To justify invading Joseon, Hideyoshi had to rely on a myth of divine descent, most likely created by a monk named Saisho Jotai who served as a diplomatic advisor. Hideyoshi's reply to the king of Joseon is mentioned only in the historical records of Joseon. Hence, without directly analyzing primary sources from the Joseon period, it would be impossible to pave the way for more fully grounded understandings of why Hideyoshi decided to invade Joseon.

Hideyoshi's intent to conquer East Asia began to manifest prior to his decision to invade Joseon. This is why he initially demanded that Joseon submit itself to Japan. The task of notifying Joseon of Hideyoshi's demand fell on the So clan of Tsushima. Hence, in Chapter 1, Tsushima's distress from having to pass on the delusion Hideyoshi was under and his unreasonable demands toward Joseon are juxtaposed with Joseon's understanding of the situation in Japan. Kitajima subtly compares Korean and Japanese historical sources describing developments that occurred in different places over the same issue around the same time. Such a comparison was possible because Kitajima chronologically collected and analyzed sources from each country, which eventually became published as a collection in 2017 that is proving to be a tremendous help to scholars.

Instead of faithfully conveying Hideyoshi's order to submit, Tsushima presented the order as a request to send a mission to congratulate the new Japanese king's enthronement. After carefully considering the request,

Joseon decided to dispatch a mission. During its visit to Japan, the mission witnessed the preparations being made to invade China, but envoys who took part in the mission gave contradictory accounts about the situation upon returning to Joseon. An explanation for this is offered in a subsection titled “Factional Conflict Among Joseon Bureaucrats: The Purge of Scholars and Party Strife.” Kitajima explains that such differing accounts were caused by factional conflict in Joseon, and that state decisions, even those upon which the fate of Joseon depended upon, were dictated by party strife. This leaves a slight margin for regret because emphasizing the negative aspect of Joseon politics was equally employed by the colonialist descriptions Kitajima has been critical of. Of course, it does not indicate that Kitajima agrees with colonialist historical views. Yet, despite being well versed in historical sources from the Joseon period and familiar with research findings on the political history of Joseon, he only seems to search for domestic reasons to explain the Joseon envoys’ conflicting accounts. To be certain, such accounts had little impact upon the way the invasions unfolded. Magnifying internal conflicts of Joseon should be treated with more caution because it can be used to mitigate the fact that the war was caused by Hideyoshi’s aggression.

Chapter 2 opens with the preparations Japan went through to initiate aggression. The chapter clearly points out that Hideyoshi carefully planned and prepared for a war of aggression. In May 1592, the Japanese forces disembarked on the shore of Busan and began to attack the next day. It is unusual for a Japanese author to primarily mention dates according to the calendar used in Joseon and Ming China, which was slightly different from that used in Japan at the time, but each difference is kindly annotated in the book to prevent confusion.

The first battles occurred at the fortresses Jinseong and Dongnaeseong in Busan. The description of battle scenes has been entirely based on historical records from the Joseon period. The route the Japanese forces proceeded through thereafter is described by relying on sources and studies still widely utilized today including *Seojeong illok* (西征日錄), a war diary authored by a Joseon government official, as well as research findings on the Imjin War by Ikeuchi Hiroshi (池内宏).

On April 30, the Joseon court abandoned the capital Hanseong in search of refuge. The fire, set immediately afterward on Jangyewon where slave-related records and documents were kept, is mentioned as an episode that contains a contradictory aspect of a society in which slaves existed. Alongside the dispute sparked by the Joseon envoys' differing accounts of their trip to Japan, Kitajima seems to introduce such episodes to remind Japanese readers of how different the social and political circumstances were between Joseon and Japan.

The figures who stood at the very forefront of the Japanese forces were Konishi Yukinaga and Katō Kiyomasa. While Konishi Yukinaga, involved in both combat and negotiations, stopped at Pyeongyang Fortress, Katō Kiyomasa chose to proceed further north in the direction of Hamgyeong Province. The book refers to documents left by Katō Kiyomasa to introduce his attempt to advance to and gain control over Hamgyeong Province. Although the aforementioned Ikeuchi Hiroshi previously performed a study on the activities of Katō Kiyomasa, Kitajima can be credited for further developing the study by exploring Korean historical sources produced around the time when Katō Kiyomasa was active in Joseon. The people in Hamgyeong Province had been resentful of the discrimination they received from the central government to the extent that some even cooperated with the Japanese forces. Kiyomasa's attempt to rule nevertheless failed because people in Joseon generally had a stronger sense of resistance toward Japan.

Chapter 3 primarily covers volunteer Joseon soldiers called *uibyeong*, Admiral Yi Sun-sin, and the counterattack by the Ming forces. The historical source central to this part is the Veritable Records of the Joseon Dynasty. In addition, a broad range of other sources were consulted from *Nanjung jamnok*, *Jingbirok*, and *Munso mallok*, authored by Joseon elites who participated in the war, to Japanese records by Kuroda Nagamasa, Nabeshima Naoshima, and Katō Kiyomasa. Quotes from the Veritable Records of the Ming Dynasty also sporadically appear in the chapter.

Voluntary Joseon soldiers are portrayed in comparison to the regular Joseon army that helplessly lost to the Japanese army. Although Koreans may be familiar with similar comparisons that appear in nationalist narra-

tives seeking to emphasize the activities of the voluntary soldiers, Korean academia has lately been attempting to critically revalue that approach toward voluntary soldiers during the Imjin War. It is Kitajima's balanced use of historical materials as above that helps bring textual analysis closer to the reality of the war in which the voluntary soldiers were engaged. This meticulous method also applies to the evaluation of main achievements of the Joseon Admiral Yi Sun-sin. Along this line, Kitajima provides an outline of the admiral's career, his victory in the Battle of Hansando, and how the damage the admiral caused Japan led Toyotomi Hideyoshi to forbid the Japanese naval forces from engaging in naval battles with Joseon.

At the same time, the chapter does not forget to touch upon the reinforcement sent by the Ming dynasty. Kitajima explains that Ming China's hierarchical relationship with Joseon dictated its decision to send reinforcement. From the Ming dynasty's point of view, Joseon served as a fence, which means that the ultimate purpose of sending reinforcement was to defend its suzerainty. The Ming forces, led by General Li Rusong, attacked and reclaimed Pyeongyang Fortress where Konishi Yukinaga had been stationed. The Japanese forces abandoned Hwanghae Province as well as Gaesong and retreated to Hanseong where they slaughtered the locals, presuming they would secretly communicate with the Ming forces advancing south. Such brutalities committed by the Japanese forces are constantly pointed out in the chapter with each development of the war.

However, when Li Rusong headed to Hanseong with a small number of troops in search of routes to advance south, he suffered an attack from some Japanese troops at Byeokjegwan and, after the battle, refused to advance any further into Joseon. This fight is what Kitajima regards as the decisive reason Li Rusong became dispirited about fighting in the Imjin War. Immediately after Li Rusong's defeat comes a description about the Battle of Haengju that resulted in Joseon's victory under the leadership of General Gwon Yul. The counterattack by Joseon and Ming China drove the Japanese forces onto the defensive. Hideyoshi, however, ordered the Japanese army to maintain its front. This, in turn, caused conflicts within the Japanese forces to surface. Kitajima's method of simultaneously using historical sources from three different countries to switch the subject of de-

scription while explaining developments in the war makes it easier to understand the reactions that each subject displayed in the face of rapid situational changes.

Chapter 4 provides an account of the peace negotiations. The chapter begins with the confrontation between Ming China and Joseon over entering into peace negotiations with Japan. Having lost their will to fight since losing the Battle of Byeokjegwan, the Ming forces were inclined toward negotiating for peace. Joseon, on the other hand, was against settling for peace because the Japanese forces robbed the tombs of former Joseon kings and abducted two of royal princes. Joseon actually named a few other reasons for refusing to engage in peace negotiations, which changed over time. Kitajima highlights the aforementioned two reasons in order to accentuate the ideological basis of Joseon that was rooted in Confucianism.

The Ming army disparaged the military capability of Joseon and criticized its argument against peace negotiations. However, Kitajima suggests a different opinion regarding Joseon's military capability. The Joseon forces had been capable enough to win the Battle of Haengju, another reason why Joseon refused to negotiate for peace. Still, the Ming ultimately ignored the opposition from Joseon and proceeded to engage in peace negotiations with Japan. To the delegate the Ming army sent, Toyotomi Hideyoshi suggested seven conditions for peace. Out of those seven conditions, Kitajima considered the most crucial to be the first requiring Ming China to form a marriage alliance with Japan, the second requiring Joseon to resume trade with Japan, and the fourth requiring four provinces out of the eight Joseon provinces to be ceded to Japan while the other four provinces and the capital Hanseong was to remain under the Joseon king's rule. The second battle at Jinju Fortress, which occurred around the time the peace negotiations began, is understood by Kitajima as a move Japan made to turn its fourth condition into a *fait accompli*.

After lengthy discussions, a Ming envoy visited Toyotomi Hideyoshi to perform a ceremony of investiture. Hideyoshi, however, was enraged. According to Kitajima, this was because Hideyoshi was being bestowed merely with the title "King of Japan" while the rest of his conditions were ignored, thereby prompting Hideyoshi to break off the negotiations. Kitaji-

ma therefore infers that Hideyoshi's demands had remained consistent from the moment he suggested the seven conditions for peace. Many studies have lately explored the significance of Hideyoshi's conditions, the developments during the peace negotiations, and the cause of the negotiations' rupture. Some of them have presented different views about the condition on territorial cession to Japan that Kitajima highlighted in the book. Readers, interested particularly in further details about the peace negotiations, will find it helpful to consult a variety of other studies that complement what is covered through this book.

Chapter 5, the longest chapter in the book, features *Jeongyu jaeran*, or the second invasion of Hideyoshi in 1597. The chapter begins with the attack order Hideyoshi issued to the Japanese generals right after the peace negotiations broke down. The order stated that a second invasion was inevitable due to Joseon's failure to fulfill the fifth out of Hideyoshi's seven conditions, which demanded that the Joseon king send one of his princes to Japan as a hostage in exchange for retaining four of its original eight provinces.¹ The fifth condition also stipulated that one or two government officials accompany the Joseon prince to attend on him as additional hostages. Why did Hideyoshi cite the fifth condition to justify the second invasion instead of the first, second, or fourth condition that Kitajima regarded as more crucial? According to the conditions Toyotomi Hideyoshi again suggested on June 22, 1595, a Joseon prince should be sent as hostage upon which that prince would be bestowed with the four Joseon provinces ceded to Japan. That revised set of conditions, however, is not mentioned in the book. The revised conditions have led some recent studies to conclude that by June 22, 1595, Hideyoshi had grown less demanding in that he requested to take a prince as hostage instead of territorial cession. Such a conclusion makes it understandable as to why Hideyoshi cited the unfulfilled fifth condition as he ordered the Japanese generals to launch a second invasion upon Joseon. In other words, it may be necessary to consider the possibili-

¹ The original copy of the order given by Hideyoshi does not literally mention the words "fifth condition" but describes what the condition entailed.

ty that by the time Hideyoshi ordered the second invasion, he was no longer interested in territorial cession.

During their second invasion, the Japanese forces behaved more brutally than before. Evidence of this would be records about their practice of “nose slicing.” The Japanese forces sliced off the noses of Joseon people to take them as war trophies. The number of sliced noses on record is alarming and multiple Japanese receipts issued for submitting sliced noses still exist to this day. Japanese historical sources also explicitly describe the practice of slicing noses, demonstrating that as the aggressor, the Japanese were well aware of its brutality. Such an atrocious order to cut off noses must have come from Hideyoshi since he collected the noses and ears from Joseon and erected a monument for their burial in Japan. Kitajima explains that the monument was a false gesture of offering repose that was in fact meant to demonstrate Hideyoshi's mercy. This clearly determines who should be held responsible for the Japanese forces' atrocious acts during their invasion of Joseon and how that person's legacy should be historically regarded.

Another indicator of the reality the Japanese forces faced was *Hangwae*, or the Japanese soldiers who surrendered to Joseon. There were surrenderers prior to Japan's second invasion in 1597, but the number of *Hangwae* increased during the second invasion. Skepticism about being mobilized for another war without just cause is likely to have prompted Japanese soldiers to escape. Kitajima in fact devotes quite a few pages to discuss *Hangwae*. In this chapter, he returns to further examine Kim Chung-seon who was introduced at the beginning of the book. The author particularly looks into records about *Hangwae* who advised Katō Kiyomasa to surrender during the Battle of Ulsan Fortress. Mentions of Kim Chung-seon can be found in historical sources from both Joseon and Japan. Based on a series of analysis, Kitajima concludes that Kim Chung-seon was someone who belonged to the forces that rebelled in opposition to the Toyotomi regime right before the eruption of the Imjin War. According to Kitajima, it is highly likely that the same person, forced to serve under Katō Kiyomasa, surrendered upon arriving in Joseon and became the man known as Kim Chung-seon. This deduction appears to be sufficiently convincing and

demonstrates that tracing the choices and activities of the Japanese, who disagreed with launching an aggressive war, is a task necessary to better understand the developments of the Imjin War.

The second invasion ended with the death of Toyotomi Hideyoshi. The Japanese forces attempted to totally withdraw from Joseon, which triggered the Battle of Noryang, the final major battle of the Imjin War. Kitajima offers a detailed description about the siege at the fortress the Japanese built in Suncheon and the famous Battle of Noryang that ensued at sea. The author's tremendous interest in Admiral Yi Sun-sin seems obvious not just through the book, but from the fact that he translated *Nanjung ilgi*, the war diary of the admiral, and also published a separate monograph about the admiral.

Chapter 6 is thus left to deal with the aftermath of the Imjin War. This chapter titled "Wounds from the Japanese Invasions" primarily discusses Joseon abductees and the artistry of ceramics introduced to Japan by potters abducted from Joseon. Although the abducted Joseon potters were forced to settle down and adjust to life in Japan, they managed to preserve their artistry through the Edo period and into the modern times. Through their history, Kitajima attempts to relay the pain the Imjin War inflicted and give a strong warning against the approach that reads the acquisition of pottery techniques as a positive case of "cultural dissemination" that resulted from the Imjin War. Kitajima stresses that the case "should be considered as a depredation instead of a normal instance of dissemination." As an expert on the Imjin War, he probably regards the aforementioned approach as an attempt to mask the atrocities of aggression and instead accentuate its softer aspects.

The epilogue turns to modern Japanese research on the Imjin War. The *Bukgwan daecheopbi* incident is mentioned as an attempt identical to the one government-friendly Japanese scholars who carried out to obliterate Kim Chung-seon (Sayaka). The *Bukgwan daecheopbi* is a monument Joseon erected to commemorate the victory the voluntary soldiers led by Jeong Mun-bu against the Japanese troops under Katō Kiyomasa. In 1905, the monument was brought to Japan where the content of its inscription

was identified as false.² However, this identification was later disproved by the Japanese historian Ikeuchi Hiroshi. Kitajima takes the incident as another opportunity to stress the importance of meticulously examining historical sources from all the countries that took part in a war in order to paint an accurate overall picture of that war. He then criticizes those in Japan who attempted to “distort history by mobilizing immature research methods, irrelevant to the study of history, and to obliterate and conceal historical facts inconvenient for Japan.”

The Imjin War carried out the idea of “conquering Joseon,” which later contributed to the colonization of Joseon. The idea was therefore not something that suddenly materialized but was formed during the Edo period and developed into the *Seikanron* argument at a time when Japan was under pressure from the Western powers. The “legacy” Hideyoshi left not only served as an ideological backbone for Japan’s colonization of Korea, but as the foundation for invading other countries as well. Through this book, Kitajima Manji offers a vivid illustration demonstrating how a historical event like the Imjin War eventually led to another series of invasions by a modern nation. This could serve as a reminder that the war should not be defined only within the context of the Toyotomi regime and contemporary Japan. Otherwise, scholars in Japan, as well as Korea and China, may one day all turn a blind eye toward historical truths from not only the time the Imjin War occurred but from the modern times as well.

Kitajima Manji maintains a balance among Korea, Japan, and China in terms of the historical sources cited throughout the book. Regarding Korean sources, the Veritable Records of the Joseon Dynasty were mainly used in addition to other works published around the time of the Imjin War. As for Japanese sources, the Red Seal permits (*shuinjō*) issued by Toyotomi Hideyoshi as well as letters written by Japanese generals were consulted. The Veritable Records of the Ming Dynasty and *Sadae mungwe*—a collection of diplomatic documents Joseon exchanged with Ming China—

² The *Bukgwan daecheopbi* was left in the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo until 2005 when it was sent to South Korea after persistent requests for its return by the South Korean government. The monument was thereafter sent back to its original site in North Korea in 2006.

were examined to describe the Ming dynasty's involvement in the war. Although quotes from sources are not individually annotated for general readers, the sources themselves are meticulously cited to support descriptions in the main text. From the beginning to the end, Kitajima does not look away from the brutalities of aggression but draws a clear distinction between aggressor and victim. He does not overlook the lives of various figures who became embroiled in the war. He issues a stern warning toward modern Japan's distortion of the Imjin War under the pretext of "historical research." That warning came from the unique research methods Kitajima developed as he critically examined previous research outcomes by those who were critical of such historical distortions as they studied the history of Joseon and its relations with Japan. Hence, this book will suit readers looking for a publication that covers the entire Imjin War and simultaneously traces the movements of all three countries that took part in the war.

All in all, the research methods Kitajima Manji developed, the findings his research produced, and the collections of historical sources he compiled have influenced many scholars studying the Imjin War, including the author of this review. That is why his sudden death in 2018 was all the more unfortunate because he left without being able to leave a summary of his own career as a scholar. Hopefully, this review may help remember and acknowledge the value of his work and serve as a reminder of academic integrity he sought to give to those interested in developing an understanding of the Imjin War.

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