The Journal of Northeast Asian History

Volume 15 Number 1
Winter 2018

NORTHEAST ASIAN
HISTORY FOUNDATION

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Editorial Board

PUBLISHER

Northeast Asian History Foundation

CHIEF EDITORS

Patricia Ebrey, University of Washington

Edward Shultz, University of Hawaii

Dong Taek Kim, Sogang University

Se-yun Chang, Northeast Asian History Foundation

Jeong-il Lee, Northeast Asian History Foundation

EDITORIAL BOARD

Jong Chol An, Universität Tübingen

Byung-Yool Ban, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies

John P. DiMoia, Seoul National University

Tze-ki Hon, State University of New York at Geneseo

David Howell, Harvard University

Byongtaek Lee, Northeast Asian History Foundation

Chang Wook Lee, Northeast Asian History Foundation

James I. Matray, California State University at Chico

Richard D. McBride II, Brigham Young University

Simei Qing, State University of Michigan

Maurizio Riotto, University of Naples

Hyun Ju Seo, Northeast Asian History Foundation

Michael D. Shin, University of Cambridge

Odd Arne Westad, Harvard University

EDITORIAL ASSISTANT

Seung-hye Shin, Northeast Asian History Foundation

Subscriptions

The Journal of Northeast Asian History (ISSN 1976-3735) is published semiannually, in June and December, by the Northeast Asian History Foundation, Imgwang Bldg, Tongil-ro 81, Seodaemun-gu, Seoul, 03739, Republic of Korea. A one-year subscription, including shipping where applicable (excluding VAT), is US$100 for institutions, US$40 for individuals for their personal use, and US $35 for students. Without subscription, each issue is US$25 plus shipping for individuals, including students. Please send your subscription order and payment directly to the publisher.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Editorial Notes

From the beginning, the Journal of Northeast Asian History has been exploring competitive research performance. This year, the Journal starts introducing a series of notable articles of Korean history to a wider academic circle of East Asia historians. The new volume includes three translated articles, as well as a new article in English, and delivers a special section where three well-known Korean scholars review the significance of the March First Movement (MFM) in 1919 and seek new directions for further research. The special section, intended to celebrate its centennial anniversary, will revisit the meaning of MFM within the global context.

The first translated article, "Status and Characteristics of the Korean March-First Independence Activists imprisoned at Seodaemun Prison," finds not only the diverse background, specifically in terms of occupation and age, of Korean participants in the Movement but also the way they formed networks for massive mobilization. Remarkably, their voice for a better society was made inseparable from the political agenda of Korean sovereignty. The second translated article, "A Catalyst for the March First Independence Movement: Lyuh Woon-hyung's Letter and Petition to Charles Crane," marks the move of historical players by locating how Korean activists outside of Korea after the First World War, especially on the eve of Paris Peace Conference, attempted to read the changing situation in international relations from their vantage point and to mount an interregional maneuver by themselves. The third translated article, "Imperial Japan's 'Civilization' Rule in the 1910s and Korean Sentiments: the Causes of the National-Scale Dissemination of the March First Movement," counters the established notion on the cultural policy of Japanese colonialism in the 1920s and instead highlights vital interactions, even before the Movement, between the colonial authority that would legitimize a Japanese version of modern civilization for colonial Korea and the Korean people who would set cultural practice of traditional Korea in harmony with modern civilization. It is noticeable that the new article, "The Fractured Transna-

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

tional Lens: Motives, Representations & Historiographies in Deguchi Onisaburō's 1924 Mongolian Expedition," also charts the dynamic role of private organizations in constructing public dimension that enabled the Japanese society, if unwittingly, to support an expansion of the Japanese imperialism into Manchuria and beyond even in the 1920s.

Taken altogether, the thematic commonalty of the four articles in this volume is the intervention and interplay of agencies in the development of historical events, including the March First Movement, during the first two decades of the 20th century. The approach will lead us to rethink such important topics as society, state, civilization, and activism in modern East Asia from a comparative angle suitable for a broader analysis in connecting the First World War, the Russian Revolution, and the Versailles System. Hence, the Journal will continue to bring together various topics of East Asian history and to promote new interpretations open to historical studies for other parts of the world.

Jeong-il Lee, Editor in Chief,
The Journal of Northeast Asian History

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Contents

Article

Articles (Translated)

Discussion

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

ABOUT *THE JOURNAL OF NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY*

The Journal of Northeast Asian History (*JNAH*) is a peer-reviewed biannual journal published by the Northeast Asian History Foundation. JNAH seeks challenging research focusing on regional and trans-national issues within the context of historical Northeast Asia. The Journal concentrates on interdisciplinary, comparative, and cross-cultural approaches to issues such as borders, identity, international relations, history issues, history education, historiography, and other relevant themes within the humanities and the social sciences. In addition to this thematic diversity, the Journal's geographical scope extends to other areas of Asia and beyond, thus inviting scholarly engagement in rethinking globalism and localism in world history. For detailed information about the submission of manuscripts, please contact the Journal at jnah@nahf.or.kr or jnah.nahf@gmail.com.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Article

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

The Fractured Transnational Lens: Motives, Representations & Historiographies in Deguchi Onisaburō's 1924 Mongolian Expedition

Ian RAPLEY
Cardiff University, UK

The Journal of Northeast Asian History
Volume 15 Number 1 (Winter 2018), 9-36

Copyright © 2018 by the Northeast Asian History Foundation. All Rights Reserved.
No portion of the contents may be reproduced in any form without written permission of the Northeast Asian History Foundation.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

The Fractured Transnational Lens: Motives, Representations & Historiographies in Deguchi Onisaburō's 1924 Mongolian Expedition

In 1924, Deguchi Onisaburō, head of the Japanese religion, Ōmoto, skipped bail to flee to Manchuria, where he joined a Mongolian bandit by the name of Lu Zhankui on an armed expedition into Inner Mongolia. However, the mission ended in collapse, with Lu shot and Deguchi sent back to Japan in shackles.

The expedition is an example of practical Pan-Asianism. Because it has typically been studied as a political idea, an instance of Pan-Asianism on-the-ground offers new ways of studying the ideology. In particular the case shines a light on the "continental adventurers," a critical group of Japanese active in Manchuria who were vital links in the "colonial realities" of Japan's informal empire.

The article adopts a transnational methodology, arguing that this offers a wider possibility for the study of Pan-Asianism: enabling the recognition of the tensions inherent within the ideology without seeking to reduce them to a "paradox."

Keywords: Transnational History, Japan, Pan-Asianism, Ōmoto, Mongolia, Manchuria, Japanese Empire

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

The Fractured Transnational Lens: Motives, Representations & Historiographies in Deguchi Onisaburō's 1924 Mongolian Expedition

Ian RAPLEY
Cardiff University, UK

Introduction[1]

On the morning of 8th February 1924, the charismatic Japanese religious leader Deguchi Onisaburō (出口王仁三郎) was smuggled out of Japan, where he had been under house arrest since 1921, charged with lèse-majesté against the Imperial family.[2] From Kyoto he travelled with three followers, out of the country and across Korea into Manchuria. By the 15th of February he had reached the town of Fengtian.[3] That night, in a secret location and still under cover due to the official Japanese presence in Manchuria, he met Lu Zhankui (盧占魁), a Manchurian-Mongolian soldier, for the first time. Theirs was an unlikely alliance – Deguchi's spiritual mission and professions of pacifism were not an obvious match for Lu's past as a ban-

---

1 I would like to express my thanks to the editors of the Journal of Northeast Asian History, and the reviewers, for their help with this article.

2 Li Narangoa, "Universal Values and Pan-Asianism: The Vision of Omotokyo," in *Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders*, ed. by V. Koschmann and S. Saaler (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 59.

3 Contemporary Shengyan, Fengtian (奉天) was known by the Japanese as Hōten, and most commonly as Mukden in the West.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

dit-cum-independence fighter, and they had no common language.[4] However, the Japanese "continental adventurers" who brought them together had obviously seen some potential. With the aid of an interpreter, the two men hit it off and Deguchi joined Lu on a mission launched by the local Chinese warlord, Zhang Zuolin (張作霖), that rode out into Inner Mongolia with two thousand soldiers.

The objectives that were projected onto this expedition (known from the Japanese perspective as the Nyūmō, 入蒙, the "entry into Mongolia") were manifold – to act as a strategic bulwark in the struggles between different Chinese factions, to spread a religious message, to create an independent Inner Mongolia, to liberate Outer Mongolia from communism, even to search for hidden treasure.[5] However, after several months in the saddle, it was to end in ignominy. Lu, along with his core subordinates, was shot by his erstwhile sponsor, Zhang Zuolin, whilst the other bandits who had joined Lu's cause melted back into their previous lives. Deguchi and the other Japanese who had accompanied him were reportedly only rescued from the firing squad by the intervention of Japanese consular officials, who described Deguchi weeping tears of joy at the news that he was to be returned to Japan to stand trial.[6]

On one level, the account of Deguchi's mission to Inner Mongolia is an adventure story – the tale of an audacious expedition that ended in disaster or an expensive and tragic fiasco. But at the same time it represents a case study of Pan-Asianism in action. The historiography of Japanese Pan-Asian movements prior to the launch of the Second World War has tended to see them through the lens of political philosophy and lobbying, but examples of the ideology put into actual practice on-the-ground are rather

---

4 According to Deguchi, they relied upon an interpreter and, at times, on the "brushtalk" of written Chinese (Deguchi Onisaburō, *Deguchi Onisaburō Zenshū 6: Nyūmōki*, (Ayabe: Tenseisha, 1998), 51, 189).

5 J. G. Boyd, "Faith, Race and Strategy: Japanese-Mongolian Relations, 1873-1945," (Murdoch University, 2008), 186-88.

6 "Kuromaki ha Yobi-Taisa," *Osaka Mainichi Shinbun*, 2nd July 1924.

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

rarer.[7] Thus this case offers the chance to map the complex networks of intellectual and social connections between various Japanese groups and their continental allies, exploring the everyday on-the-ground realities of Japan's growing engagement in China.

In particular, the Mongolian expedition casts a light on the "*tairiku rōnin*" (大陸浪人), or "continental adventurers": a shadowy group of Japanese adventurers who are revealed as a vital glue between Chinese and Japanese interests. This article argues that they deserve greater scrutiny for their capacity to exhibit a deeper understanding of Pan-Asianism as a practice as well as an ideology.

The article examines the Mongolian expedition from inception to execution to its downfall, and its subsequent contested interpretation, charting the different motives and meanings embedded within it. After examining three perspectives—how the mission came together, what happened, and then how it was reinterpreted after its end—the article revisits the scholarship on Pan-Asianism, arguing that the transnational methodology mobilized to study the Nyūmō represents an alternative way of approaching Pan-Asianism, one that recognizes the tensions inherent within Pan-Asian coalitions without reducing them to a "paradox," or privileging one reading over another.

Deguchi, Lu, and Zhang

Transnational events are, by their very definition, the coming together of multiple different groups or individuals, each with their own perspectives and motivations. While we often concentrate on the common ground that they made possible, these links are nevertheless commonalities found within difference. The Nyūmō was an example of a transnational event par excellence: the two main protagonists brought very different perspectives to the expedition they engaged on together, and yet they were able to make

---

[7] One counter example to this is the early attempt by the Japanese to support a popular rebellion in the Philippines, see Marius B. Jansen, *The Japanese and Sun Yat-Sen*, (Stanford University Press, 1970), 68-74.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

common cause. Examining the different motives and hopes, written into the Mongolian expedition at its outset, by Deguchi, Lu and others displays a complex set of different visions embedded into a network of social relationships. The complexity demonstrates how Pan-Asianism was itself embedded into the realities of the Japanese imperial presence in Asia from its very outset.

First Deguchi Onisaburō. Deguchi was the second leader of the Shinto-based religion, Ōmoto, which had risen from rural roots in western Japan to become the largest of the Japanese "new" religions.[8] Deguchi was a charismatic leader whose message went beyond the religion's initial appeal to those disadvantaged Japanese modernization to attract "an amazing multitude of… all classes, "patrioteers," megalomaniacs, earnest seekers… especially from the ranks of the retired officers of the army and navy."[9] Indeed, Deguchi was so successful and his reluctance to submit to state regulation such that, in 1921, the government moved to suppress Ōmoto, perceiving its growing voice as a threat to the domestic order.[10] The state seized assets, destroyed property, and arrested key leaders, charging Deguchi and some others with crimes related to Ōmoto's ownership of a national newspaper, the *Taishō Nichinichi Shimbun* (大正日日新聞).[11]

In response to this suppression, Deguchi made some efforts to reform the religion, replacing practices and texts which the state perceived as problematic and launching what has become known as Ōmoto's international phase. Persecuted and discredited at home, the religion turned abroad to seek succor, forging connections with religions across Asia, en-

---

8 For an overview of Ōmoto's history, see Thomas Nadolski, "The Socio-Political Background of the 1921 and 1935 Ōmoto Suppressions in Japan," (University of Pennsylvania, 1975); or Nancy K. Stalker, *Prophet Motive: Deguchi Onisaburō, Oomoto, and the Rise of New Religions in Imperial Japan*, (University of Hawaii Press, 2008).

9 Kenneth Saunders, "Glimpses of the Religious Life of New Japan," *The Journal of Religion* 2 (1922): 76.

10 A more comprehensive account of Ōmoto's complex relationship to the state's regulatory framework is contained within Sheldon M Garon, "State and Religion in Imperial Japan, 1912-1945," *Journal of Japanese Studies*, (1986).

11 Stalker, *Prophet Motive*, 97-99.

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

gaging with the international language Esperanto, and opening an office in Paris.[12]

The Nyūmō then was a part of Deguchi's attempt to find a new source of legitimacy in the face of domestic assault, running from the shadow of prosecution in Japan and seeking to promote efforts at international expansion. However, what exactly Deguchi hoped to achieve in Manchuria is less clear. Whilst he produced an account of the expedition, this must be read carefully as a text, recognizing it as an attempt to justify the mission to his followers in the light of its collapse.[13] Holding this in mind, we can nevertheless still read it as a rich account of Deguchi's views of the mission. He suggested that his aims were:

> to go where people do not go... to make clear to the world the great spirit of the Japanese nation and to show the world, far and wide, the peerless majesty of the unbroken imperial line. Moreover [to show] that the spirit of the Japanese nation is not conquest, is not aggression, but to guide the peoples of the nations of the world to the path of the gods, by means of the power of the beautiful and virtuous language. To rule the people of the world, military force and intellect are useless; ultimately it will be spiritual union. Only new religions, unencumbered by the old customs, have the power.[14]

A visiting card Deguchi carried with him in Mongolia offers some corrobo-

---

[12] Ibid. 99-101, 148.

[13] Deguchi's account was first published in early 1925, the year after he had returned to Japan. He published it with the title *Ōni Mōko Iri Ki* (An Account of Oni [saburō]'s Mongolian Trip) using the pseudonym Ueno Kōen. It was later amended and republished, this time as a part of the Reikai Monogatari, a vast religious text that Deguchi dictated to followers in the years either side of the mission. This paper uses a copy of the *Rekai Monogatari* version of the account. However, various passages of the original *Ōni Mōko Iri* version are available in Ōmoto's internal history (Ōmoto Nanajūnen Shi Hensankai, *Ōmoto Nanajūnen Shi*, (Kyoto: Ōmoto, 1964)), in Deguchi Kyōtarō's biography of Onisaburō (Deguchi Kyōtarō, *Kyojin: Deguchi Onisaburō*, (Kodansha, 1975)) and elsewhere. Examination of these excerpts reveals that they are in almost all cases word for word matches for the later version used in this paper.

[14] Deguchi, *Deguchi Onisaburō Zenshū*, 38.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

ration not coloured by hindsight. On it, he laid claim to a variety of religious identities – as leader of Ōmoto, of course, but also ties to the "five Chinese religions" (中国五大教), Fukakyō (a Korean new religion,普化教), and the titles Dalai Lama and "Susano Khan," as well as Chairman of the Society For The Spread Of World Language (i.e. Esperanto).[15] Whilst the link to Fukakyō was reportedly a means of skirting a ban on Japanese religious missionary activity in Manchuria, the others reveal a syncretic attitude to religious allegiance, and an approach that fused Asian (and international) identity.

Whilst this is somewhat fuzzy, cast in the evocative language of the new religion, the broad aim seems to have been to continue to expand Ōmoto's base of support to constituencies beyond the Japanese homeland and potentially even to establish some form of religious community in the space of northern China. This latter aim seems superficially unlikely, and with the wisdom of hindsight, even foolhardy, but in the context of Taishō era Japan it can be read alongside other experimental communities such as the Atarashiki Mura, Arashima Takeo's liberated farm, and (later) Miyazawa Kenji's Rasuchijin Association. These were each an attempt to form a real community grounded in a set of philosophical ideas. Whilst they were based around the Japanese village and Deguchi's mission took place in Mongolia, drawing on Pan-Asian ideas, nevertheless there is a thread of continuity between them. Deguchi's aims were unlikely perhaps and even grandiose, then, but not unprecedented.[16]

Running from persecution at home, and carrying an idiosyncratic vision of Asian religious union, Deguchi landed in the midst of a complex and unstable setting, in which his partner-to-be Lu Zhankui was only a minor player. Manchuria in the early 1920s was an uneasy borderland between different powers. The warlord Zhang Zuolin controlled the area but had to deal with both the Japanese and the Russians, through their respec-

---

15 Kazuaki Deguchi, *Onisaburō Nyūmō Hiwa*, (Idzutomidzu, 1985), 79.

16 Angela Yiu, "Atarashikimura: The Intellectual and Literary Contexts of a Taishō Utopian Village," *Nichibunken Japan Review*, (2008). Notably the Atarashiki Mura continues to the present day.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

tive railway concessions. Moreover, the factional struggles that had rolled over China since the fall of the Qing government in 1911 meant that there was a shifting series of rivals, allies and enemies to the south. Zhang's Fengtian clique had shared control over Beijing between 1920 and 1922 together with Cao Kun (曹錕), at the head of the Zhili (直隸) faction. However, their alliance broke down and Zhang's armies were sent into retreat. Back in Manchuria, he had begun to rebuild, preparing for a new round of conflict.[17]

Despite the presence of Russia and Japan, Manchuria represented a fairly strategically advantageous base. The key threats from other warlords were concentrated to the south through a relatively narrow corridor bounded by the sea and by mountains. The only potential risk of a second flank came via Inner Mongolia. As a consequence of this, Inner Mongolia was a site of significant strategic importance in the early 1920s. To complicate matters further, Outer Mongolia had declared independence in 1911 after the collapse of the Qing, eventually falling under the control of communist forces supported by the Soviet Union. Zhang Zuolin, then, wanted to fill the vacuum in Inner Mongolia before his rivals did so, plug a strategic gap, potentially recruit more troops from the region, and ultimately even perhaps look towards expelling the communists from Urga to the north.

The man Zhang selected in order to pursue these goals was Lu Zhankui. Lu was a soldier/bandit of mixed Manchurian and Mongolian heritage, who had been involved in previous military endeavors in Inner Mongolia, most notably an ill-fated attempt at independence by a Mongolian prince, Babojab (巴布扎布), in 1916.[18] After the failure of that mission, Lu threw his lot in with Zhang Zuolin, remaining in Fengtian until Zhang looked to him to secure his Mongolian flank. Zhang's plan was, in the first instance, to station as many as 7,000 troops in the strategically important

---

17 Gavan McCormack, *Chang Tso Lin in Northeast China, 1911-1928: China, Japan and the Manchurian Idea*, (Folkestone: Dawson, 1978), 62 et seq.

18 Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, JACAR.or.jp, B Series (Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Ref. B03050190400, "*Rō Sen Kai no Kōdōni kan suru ken*," 15; For some background on the Babojab incident, see McCormack, *Chang Tso Lin*, 28-30.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

space, under Lu's control, with a view to expanding the mission as it developed.[19] Whilst Lu accepted the commission from Zhang, and seemed to welcome the chance to get back out into the saddle after time spent kicking his heels in Fengtian, he perhaps also harboured goals of reviving the dream of Inner Mongolian autonomy alongside his direct orders.[20]

Colonial realities and the *Tairiku Rōnin*

The ease with which Deguchi went from life at home in Kyoto prefecture to joining a band of Mongolian soldiers on the steppes of Northeast Asia is indicative of the connection between Japanese daily life & society and the very limits of Japanese continental influence. Manchuria and Mongolia were at once a distant, alien and yet romantic borderland and, at the same time, also geographically close and integrally connected to Japanese society.

Likewise, whilst Deguchi and Lu were very different figures with different backgrounds and motivations, their meeting did not occur by chance: it was brokered by a set of intermediaries, the "Continental Adventurers." Known in Japanese as the *Tairiku Rōnin*, or the *Shina Rōnin*, these were a loose set of Japanese, usually ex-soldiers, who were active in various ways on the Asian continent. Their position – on the margins of the Mongolian mission yet integral in getting it off the ground – reflects accurately their broader position in the Japanese informal empire. Whilst they have been somewhat overlooked, they occupied a vital role in between the various different Japanese factions and the locals, linking Japan and China, and bringing their own visions of Asian unity with them.

The first of these adventurers to bring Manchuria to Deguchi's attention was Hino Tsuyoshi (日野強). Hino was a Russo-Japanese War veteran who remained on the continent after his service as an explorer. He was best known for the account of a trip he made across China and the Himalayas

---

19 McCormack, *Chang Tso Lin*, 118-19.

20 Gojū Tōjin, "Yume No Mōko Ōkoku," in *Taiyō*, November December 1924, January 1925. Pt. 2, 208.

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

into India, *Iri Kiko* (「伊犂紀行」).[21] Back in Japan, Hino reportedly regaled Deguchi with tales from his own adventures, pushing him to take Ōmoto's message overseas.[22]

Hino died in 1920, before any concrete opportunity presented itself, so it was another two continental adventurers who were most directly involved in convincing Deguchi to leave Kyoto. Their names were Yano Yūtarō (矢野祐太郎) and Okasaki Tesshu (岡崎鉄首), and both were ex-soldiers based in Manchuria: Yano an arms trader in Fengtian and an Ōmoto follower, and Okasaki linked to printing activities for Zhang Zuolin's armies.[23] By Deguchi's account, Okasaki in particular was a boisterous figure, berating those about him regularly and serving as a symbol of the aggressive Japanese stance towards China.[24]

The continental adventurers occupy a fairly marginal position in the historiography of Japan's colonial presence on the Asian mainland: unofficial, and often acting in a clandestine fashion on behalf of the Japanese army, they left little concrete documentary trace – what stories do remain often make more for conspiracy theory and rumor than solid history. However, they were an integral part of the growing Japanese presence in Manchuria and surrounding regions, forming an invisible web of connections between the various groups of military and civilian, Japanese, Chinese and others – the "colonial realities" of Japan's informal empire.[25]

That the adventurers embraced the name "rōnin" was no coincidence:

---

[21] Nadolski, "The Socio-Political Background of the Ōmoto Suppressions," 127; Tsuyoshi Hino, *Iri Kikō*, (Fuyō Shobō, 1973).

[22] Stalker, *Propher Motive*, 147.

[23] Gojū, "Yume No Mōko Ōkoku." Pt. 3, 210; Michihito Tsushima, "Emperor and World Renewal in the New Religions: The Case of Shinsei Ryûjinkai," *Contemporary Papers on Japanese Religions*, 2: New Religions (1991).

[24] Deguchi, *Deguchi Onisaburō Zenshū*, 84-85.

[25] The phrase "colonial realities" is from Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka, *The Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904-1932*, (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2001); another concept that is helpful in thinking about the rich and direct connections between Japan and its presence on the continent is Louise Young's "Total Empire," Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

they saw themselves as the spiritual descendants of the *Shishi*, the Bakumatsu era rōnin (renegade samurai) who had agitated for pro-Emperor and anti-Western causes.[26] The continental adventurers aimed to bring the lessons of the Meiji Ishin to wider Asia. They were active on two fronts: on the continent, in their role as conduits between different factions, and at home, where they engaged in political pressure through the "patriotic" or "political associations." The best known of these were the Gen'yōsha (玄洋社) and the Kokuryūkai (黒龍会): they form the bulk of our understanding of these figures and their role in Japanese Pan-Asianism. Whilst the continental adventurers were often acting in secret in Manchuria, the patriotic associations conducted much of their business entirely in the open.[27]

Sven Saaler notes that the associations lacked a particularly wide social base, and so tended to operate as a political lobby rather than a mass movement in Japan, seeking to influence politics through a variety of means – culturing networks of contacts, writing memoranda and newspaper articles, and even using menace and threat.[28] However, paying closer attention to the adventurers' activities in north-eastern China through events such as the Nyūmō opens up another dimension to their activity: influencing the practical nature of Japan's presence in China, mediating between various different groups and extending the military's informal reach.

Scholarship, from the Second World War onwards, has marked these figures and the patriotic societies they formed as ultranationalist, noting the uncompromising approaches they took in trying to promote Japanese ex-

---

[26] E. Herbert Norman, "The Genyosha: A Study in the Origins of Japanese Imperialism," *Pacific Affairs* 17 (1944): 263-64.

[27] For example, Gavan McCormack's study of Zhang Zuolin notes the difficulty in really tracking the activities of even the official advisors embedded in Chinese factions (McCormack, *Chang Tso Lin*, 119-24), whereas Sven Saaler is able to trace the Kokuryūkai from their public magazines (Sven Saaler, "The Kokuryūkai (Black Dragon Society) and the Rise of Nationalism, Pan-Asianism, and Militarism in Japan, 1901-1925," *International Journal of Asian Studies* 11 (2014)).

[28] Sven Saaler, "Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History," in *Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders*, ed. by Sven Saaler and J Victor Koschmann (Routledge, 2007), 14-15, and Sven Saaler, "The Kokuryūkai and the Rise of Nationalism," 134-37.

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

pansion.[29] However, the portrayal of them as ardent Japanese nationalists is complicated by the relative ease with they found partners from Asia – for example, Kokuryūkai links to the Ilchinhoe (一進會, 일진회) in pre-annexation Korea, or leaders Uchida Ryōhei and Tōyama Mitsuru's associations with Sun Yat-sen.[30] This highlights a tension inherent within turn of the century Pan-Asianism identified by Christopher Szpilman: "Japanese Pan-Asianism was a contradictory doctrine.... it was anti-Western, but was partly inspired by Western writings; though it promoted egalitarianism Asian brotherhood, it insisted on Japanese superiority."[31] The continental adventurers were at the cutting edge of this tension, and so it is important that we pay closer attention to them and their actions.

Whilst Deguchi and Lu were the most prominent faces of the Mongolian expedition, the continental adventurers were important participants as well, and they also brought their own idealistic dimension to the mission. This is best seen through one of the smaller patriotic associations, the Chōkokukai (肇国会). The Chōkokukai was an offshoot of the likes of the Gen'yōsha and the Kokuryūkai which existed to advocate for the establishment of an idealized Asian state & society in Northeast Asia, covering parts of Manchuria, Siberia, Mongolia, and Korea.[32] The state was to be called Great Kōrai (大高麗, after the ancient Korean kingdom Goryeo) and

---

[29] See Hilary Conroy, *The Japanese Seizure of Korea, 1868-1910: A Study of Realism and Idealism in International Relations*, (Philadelphia: Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960), Norman, "The Genyosha," and Jansen, *The Japanese and Sun Yat-Sen*. The Kokuryūkai ("Black Dragon Society") and the Gen'yōsha ("Dark Ocean Society") were both named after geographical markers of Asia: the Amur river on the China/Siberia border & the sea between Japan and Korea respectively.

[30] Eri Hotta, *Pan-Asianism and Japan's War 1931-1945*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), Prasenjit Duara, "The Discourse of Civilization and Pan-Asianism," *Journal of World History* 12 (2001): 112; Jansen, *The Japanese and Sun Yat-Sen*.

[31] Christopher WA Szpilman, "Between Pan-Asianism and Nationalism. Mitsukawa Kametarô and His Campaign to Reform Japan and Liberate Asia," in *Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders*, ed. by Sven Saaler and J Victor Koschmann (Routledge, 2007), 87-100, 85.

[32] Yuichi Hasegawa, "Taishō Chūki Tairiku Kokka He No Ime-Ji: "Dai-Kōraikoku" Kōsō to Sono Shūhen," *Kokusai Seiji*, #71 (August 1982).

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

it was the idea of Suenaga Misao (末永節), a Japanese scholar.

Suenaga's first work was a 1917 treatise entitled "China is already a failed state"(「支那はすでに亡国せり」), which argued that Japan had a pressing need to act to protect the people of China from the vacuum created by the failure of the Chinese government.[33] In contrast with this fairly realist approach, Great Kōrai was, whilst motivated by similar concerns, a much more idealistic, utopian vision. Suenaga proposed a multiethnic state taking the rough shape of a bird with spread wings, ruled in accordance with a mix of different Asian traditions and principles including communal ownership of land and racial equality.[34] Suenaga's proposal received its first public articulation through Ōmoto's newspaper, the *Taisho Nichinichi Shinbun*.[35] An even more direct connection to the mission was the figure of Okasaki Tesshu, one of the participants on the expedition mentioned earlier, who was a prominent member of the Chōkokukai.[36]

Deguchi, then, arrived in Fengtian to find a coalition of different groups – Zhang eager to shore up his northern flank, Lu harboring dreams of independence back out on the steppe, and the continental adventurers with their complex vision of Japanese leadership and Pan-Asian alliance. Photographs of the start of the expedition reveal the men in high spirits, eager to get out on the road.[37] In March 1924, two of the continental adventurers (Yano Yutarō and Ōishi Ryō) remained in Fengtian to coordinate supplies, whilst Deguchi, Okasaki, and three other Japanese who had ac-

---

33 Kokuryūkai, *Tōa Senkaku Shishi Kiden*, (Tokyo, 1936), 21.

34 Hasegawa, "Taishō Chūki Tairiku Kokka He No Ime-Ji," 95; see also Kimitada Miwa, "Pan-Asianism in Modern Japan: Nationalism, Regionalism and Universalism," in *Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History. Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders*, ed. by *Sven Saaler* and *J. Victor Koschmann* (Routledge, 2007), 21-33, 27. – this description doesn't explicitly reference Suenaga's plan, but the timing, location and details make it almost certain that it is the same one.

35 Hasegawa, "Taishō Chūki Tairiku Kokka He No Ime-Ji," 94, fn 6 – the article was published in March 1921, shortly after Ōmoto had purchased the newspaper.

36 Gojū, "Yume No Mōko Ōkoku." Pt. 3, 208; *Ōmoto Nanajūnen Shi*, 729. The Japanese state remained interested in the Chōkokukai (and its relations to Ōmoto) after the Mongolian expedition was over (JACAR, B03050772200, 2).

37 For example, Deguchi, *Onisaburō Nyūmō Hiwa*, 20.

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

companied Deguchi from Kyoto, set out to the north.[38]

The Nyūmō from Outside and In

Lu and Deguchi departed from Fengtian separately, apparently to keep their alliance from coming to wider attention.[39] Deguchi departed, dressed as a lama, in a pair of cars and accompanied by the other Japanese participants. They moved north towards the towns of Tongliao (通遼) and Taonan (洮南), at the end of the railway lines which were the lifeblood of Manchurian development. From this jumping off point, they continued into Inner Mongolia, further north, where they were finally reunited with Lu and his troops. Throughout April, more troops joined the group and they relocated to Sōron (索倫), an old Russian emplacement.[40] Eventually there were some 2000 troops under Lu's command, together with a fluctuating number of Japanese: Deguchi, the followers who had accompanied him from Kyoto, and Okasaki Tesshu were permanent residents, while there were occasional Japanese visitors from Fengtian, bringing messages, winter clothes and the like.[41]

There is something of an absence at the heart of the Nyūmō: whilst the details of the protagonists and their motivations is well known, and the

---

[38] One of the followers who accompanied Deguchi from Japan was Ueshiba Morihei (植芝盛平), who was the founder of Aikido. Ōishi Ryō (大石良) is a less well documented figure, who may have represented a behind the scenes connection to the Japanese military.

[39] The precise details of Deguchi's relationship to Zhang and thus his overt connection to the mission are unclear: some (e.g. Itō Masao (ed.), *Gendaishi Shiryō,* vol. 32*: Mantetsu Part 2*, (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 1966), 272) suggest that Deguchi had Zhang's explicit approval, whereas others indicate he only managed this bu using a pseudonym, ("Rei no Onisaburō," *Asahi Shinbun*, 3rd May 1924). Indeed, the Japanese participants began the mission by taking on Chinese names and dress (*Ōmoto Nanajūnen Shi*, 733), so it is possible that the separate departures of Lu and Deguchi was designed maintain some level of deception.

[40] Itō, *Gss* Vol. 32, 269.

[41] The most detailed estimate for troop numbers comes from JACAR, B03050190400, *Kakkoku Naisei Zassan: Manshū #14*, 41 and is higher than some other estimates. This was still significantly short of the original plan which called for seven thousand men for the march into Outer Mongolia (Itō, *Gss* Vol. 32, 271-72 "*Chōnan-ha Shussho Jōhō*").

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

aftermath is also well documented, what actually took place once they reached Inner Mongolia is much more obscure. Photos depict Deguchi, often on a white horse, and clad in a range of outfits, interacting with the troops and residents of the Mongolian settlements they visited, as well as travelling through the steppe.[42] However, there is little in the way of really authoritative detail of the activities of the army beyond Deguchi's own account which, as discussed earlier, must be read with some caution. Nevertheless, this relative lack of direct evidence can be offset somewhat by a number of external sources which can be read alongside the lone internal account. Japanese officials stationed in Manchuria documented events as news began to filter back to them, and domestic newspapers too, reported on events (with an even greater lag). Together, these various different sources allow some sort of picture of Deguchi and Lu's progress over the course of the spring and summer. The nature of the source base is important because it means that the most pressing question: why the mission failed and Zhang Zuolin went from supporting Lu and his men to running them to ground, remains hard to answer.

In mid April, the army received a shipment of arms from Fengtian – some 200 guns, 30,000 rounds of ammunition, and a number of machine guns, observed by Japanese officials as originally marked for Taonan, but routed onwards to Lu.[43] At this point the army was presumably still supported by Zhang. However, a short time later, Lu changed the name of his force from the "North-Western Autonomous Army" (given to him by Zhang Zuolin) to the "Inner/Outer Mongolian Independence Army," also taking up a new banner.[44] The decision to change name seems to have been a mark of growing independence from his original sponsor.

---

[42] There are a number of photographs from the mission (including an iconic picture of the Japanese members of the force after they were rescued from arrest), Deguchi's calling card discussed earlier, and a map of where the expedition went over the months they were in the saddle, reportedly drawn by Deguchi soon after the mission was over. These are most comprehensively collected in *Ōmoto Nanajūnen Shi*, chapter 3: "Ōnisaburō ni Nyūmō," 716-60.

[43] Itō, *Gss* Vol. 32, 272.

[44] *Ōmoto Nanajūnen Shi*, 738-39.

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Even without Deguchi's presence, it is far from clear whether the army led by Lu was a stable coalition, given Lu's prior history and the addition of the Japanese continental adventurers, but the late addition of the Japanese religious leader was both a symbol of competing visions of the expedition and an additional source of potential discord. In particular, Deguchi brought with him another source of funds for the army—the mass following Ōmoto had in Japan gave it serious financial resources, and estimates of how much Deguchi took to Manchuria with him range between ¥200,000 and ¥300,000.[45] To Lu, this presented the possibility of independence from Zhang Zuolin—without an alternative source of monetary support, the tensions evident in Lu and Zhang's ideas might have remained dormant as Lu was forced by economics to toe Zhang's line. But with a competing source of funding came a competing set of loyalties, and the challenge of serving two masters.

Accounts differ about quite what happened to drive the wedge between Zhang and Lu. From late May into June, rumors of Lu betraying Zhang by making contact with the Zhili faction began to circulate, but there was also news of bandits running amok, and fingers pointed at Deguchi as a source of instability, including the suggestion that his increasingly outspoken preaching had led Zhang Zuolin to insert a spy amid the troops.[46]

Whatever the cause, from that point things unraveled rapidly. Zhang announced that he was sending troops north to suppress the increase in

---

[45] Estimates include: ¥230,000 (Gojū, "Yume No Mōko Ōkoku," 129), ¥250,000 (Nadolski, "The Socio-Political Background of the Ōmoto Suppressions," 126), ¥260,000 (*Yomiuri Shimbun*, July 19th 1924), and ¥280,000 (in both Eiji Deguchi, *Deguchi Eiji Senshū*, (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1979), 116 and Masa (ed.) Nishikawa, *Shisō Kenkyū Shiryō* 66*, Kōdō Ōmotokyō Jiken Ni Kansuru Kenkyū*, (Kyoto: Tōyō Bunka, 1977), 276). This last comes from a transcript of an interview with Onisaburō himself.

[46] For the most part, the consular accounts focus on the Chinese/Mongolian strategic elements of the expedition, and stress the banditry or Lu's allegiance as reasons for the split, whereas the Japanese press was more interested in Deguchi's presence and the impact of his preaching. E. g. "Oni no konkyochi he tōbatsutai shingunsu," *Osaka Mainichi Shinbun*, 21st June 1924; "Oni no Teikyo wo Waga Ryōji ni Yōkyū," *Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun*, 28th May 1924.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

bandit activity.[47] Under fire from an unexpected direction and with his numbers dwindling by the day, Lu marched south to try to meet and reach a rapprochement with Zhang. Lu initially sent some of the Japanese continental adventurers to mediate on his behalf, but when they failed to make progress he entered Liaotang (通辽) himself to seek a parlay.[48] Zhang was in no mood for negotiations however – on the 21st of June, Lu and the 30 or so men he had taken with him were seized and shot, whilst Deguchi and the five other remaining Japanese were also taken into custody by Zhang Zuolin's men.[49] According to some accounts, Deguchi and the other Japanese were rescued by consular officials only shortly before they were to be shot; regardless of whether this was hyperbole, or even a ploy to frighten the Japanese captives, a photo of them shows six bedraggled men, shackled at the ankles.[50] From Manchuria, they were shipped back to Osaka to await trial.

Interpreting the Nyūmō and Revisiting the "Paradox" of Pan-Asianism

According to observers, then, the mission fell apart because of some combination of Lu's inability to control the local bandits he'd been sent to corral, his own insubordination, and perhaps also Deguchi's presence sparking a greater degree of willfulness within Lu and his subordinates. Deguchi's part in the story was also contested. Was he indeed the fly in the ointment or a dupe taken advantage of (by both Lu and perhaps also the Japanese adventurers) due to his naivety, "a feeble-minded child [who] had 260 thousand yen taken from his own pocket by bandits"?[51]

---

47 Even here quite what happened is unclear: Lu is reported to have claimed that this was a ruse planned in advance to encourage further consolidation of the bandit groups under his umbrella (*Ōmoto Nanajūnen Shi*, 744).

48 Itō, *Gss* Vol. 32, 804.

49 Ibid., 804.

50 E. g. Stalker, *Prophet Motive*, 151.

51 "Mondai no hito: Deguchi Onisaburō," *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 23rd July 1924; "Oni wa 26man'en Bō ni Futta: Shina Rōnin ni Riyō sareta," *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 19th July 1924.

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

The ambiguity inherent in the mission evident as the events were occurring did not clear with the passage of time. Deguchi's account, the only one which was written by participants in the expedition, unsurprisingly, portrays Deguchi himself in a more positive light than other accounts. The end of the mission is perhaps the most direct demonstration of this: Deguchi claimed to have met the firing squad with resolve, crying three Banzais for Japan and three for Ōmoto, where the press reported him crying with relief at the news that he was being transferred to Japanese consular jurisdiction.[52]

Whilst there was much coverage in the daily newspapers, it was fragmentary day-by-day reporting, so did not amount to a sustained narrative of the mission. However, a rival account of the expedition did emerge in late 1924/early 1925. Stretching over three issues of the major monthly magazine *Taiyō* (太陽), "Yume no Mōko Ōkoku" ("Mongolian Kingdom of Dreams," 「夢の蒙古王国」) elaborated a tale that was rich with "the excitement of detective fiction yet entirely real," exploring the multiple perspectives of Deguchi, Lu, Zhang Zuolin, and the Japanese nationalists.[53] Who was behind the article is unclear: it was written under the pseudonym Gojū Tōjin (五重塔人, "Five Story Pagoda"), but the author claimed both a fascination with Deguchi born of a chance meeting two years before and expert knowledge of Fengtian and parts of Inner Mongolia, including the site where Lu was shot. The article characterizes Deguchi as a complex individual: casting him in a romantic light, but also mocking him by comparing his adventures to those of Don Quixote, stressing the incongruity of his luxurious life in Japan put next to the hardships he underwent in Mongolia, and highlighting the megalomania of some of his claims to religious identity.

At a time when Japanese interests in Manchuria were continuing to develop, and hence the everyday transnational, multi ethnic reality of life on the continent was projecting its influence back to mainland Japan via

---

[52] "Kuromaku ha Yobi-Taisa," *Osaka Mainichi Shinbun*, 2nd July 1924; Deguchi, *Deguchi Onisaburō Zenshū* 6, 240-44.

[53] Gojū, "Yume No Mōko Ōkoku." Pt. 1, 124.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

growing levels of trade and individual travel, the article can be seen as more than just the retelling of an adventure story. Rather it is an exploration of the growing connections between Japan and Manchuria or better yet the presence of Japanese in Manchuria, but also the proximity of events on the continent to everyday domestic Japanese life. Whilst the railway lines were at the heart of development in Manchuria and hence the "railway territory"—the thin strip of land along the railway lines and the towns it connected—were the core of these "colonial realities," even the very desolate and alien frontier into which Deguchi had ventured were integrally connected to Japan through its expanding presence in regional affairs and increasing economic expansion.

Among Deguchi, Japanese officials, the daily press and *Taiyō*'s in-depth investigation, a range of interpretations emerged, stressing variously Deguchi's own self-aggrandizement, the strategic dimensions of bandits and armies in China, the scandal and gossip of Deguchi's fall, and even the developing relationships between Chinese and Japanese, Manchuria and homeland Japan. Together they map the different elements of the Nyūmō coalition and represent a mirror to the range of motivations explored in the first sections of this article.

There is, however, one final account to consider, one which emerged fully 12 years after the events had come to a conclusion. It came, in 1936, as a part of the Kokuryūkai's history of activities in continental Asia. Entitled *Tōa Senkaku Shishi Kiden* (東亜先覚志士記伝, "A Record of the Pioneering Heroes of East Asia"), this text looked a long sweep of Japanese involvement in China and North-East Asia, seeking to place the 1931 Manchurian incident into a broader narrative of struggles for Asian independence and development. Deguchi's expedition was included alongside Suenaga Misao's Chokokukai project and Lu's prior attempts to free Inner Mongolia, and described as "an attempt to peacefully establish a Mongolian kingdom and realize an Asian league."[54]

By the mid-1930s the overlap between Ōmoto believers and the na-

---

[54] Kokuryūkai (ed.), *Tōa Senkaku Shishi Kiden*, (Tokyo, 1936), 28.

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

tionalist groups which helped prompt the Nyūmō had developed into a close relationship between Deguchi himself and the leaders of some of the key associations, such as Tōyama Mitsuru and Uchida Ryōhei.[55] This marked what has been seen as a "patriotic turn" away from Ōmoto's internationalist phase in the 1920s, although as I will explore later in this article, this chronology is open to criticism. Nancy Stalker links the transition to Deguchi's entrepreneurial sense and ability to reposition the religion to better reflect the prevailing sentiment in Japanese society.[56] These connections led the state to a second intervention in the religion, this time acting more finally to prevent Ōmoto's activity and holding Deguchi more successfully.[57]

By the mid 1930s, of course, Japan's relationship with China had changed and intensified. The Kokuryūkai history was published a year before war broke out between the two nation-states, whilst the range of possibilities offered by Pan-Asianism changed, too, narrowing until it eventually became no more than a hollow justification of the war effort expanding across Asia and the Pacific Ocean.

A central question, therefore, about 1920s Pan-Asianism is whether this reduction of the ideology into a justification for Japanese aggression was inevitable. Was the reality of Pan-Asianism the triumph of Japanese national interest over Asian collaboration, or were other possible outcomes embedded within it? The purpose of this article has been to argue that the Mongolian expedition, as an example of Pan-Asianism in action, represents an alternative perspective on the tensions inherent within Pan-Asianism, and hence a chance to develop new understandings of them.

Historians have looked to various methods to analyze the internal dynamics of Pan-Asianism. For Marius Jansen, it was a shared antipathy to the West which allowed the formation of an unlikely coalition of non-Japa-

---

55 Nadolski, "The Socio-Political Background of the Ōmoto Suppressions." 165, 199-201, 227.

56 Stalker, *Prophet Motive*.

57 According to Thomas Nadolski, Deguchi was quite plausibly tied to one of the attempted coups during the early 1930s (Nadolski, "The Socio-Political Background of the Ōmoto Suppressions." 199-201).

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

nese Asians (such Sun Yat-Sen) and a range of Japanese patriots, liberals and democrats.[58] Other scholars have sought to segment the space of Pan-Asianism in various ways. So, for example, Miwa Kimitada identifies a split between Pan-Asianisms based upon the identification of Western superiority (hence arguing for Asian unity) and those based upon Japanese strength (thus looking more towards Japanese leadership).[59] Eri Hotta, by contrast, identifies a nested sequence of forms, from the identification of cultural affinity ("teaism"), to proposals for political alliance, to the identification of Japan as savior. This structure effectively forms a map between chronology and the sphere of operation, arguing that as time passed, the dominant form of Pan-Asianism changed, and shifted the sphere in which it manifested, from culture, to politics, to the military.[60]

The conventional periodization of the history of Ōmoto-kyō confronts a similar problem and uses a similar strategy of segmentation. As discussed, the period of about 15 years between the first state suppression (1921) and the second, more final one (1935) is typically divided into two periods: an "international" phase, in which Deguchi pushed the religion towards the syncretic ties with other religions in Asia and Europe, followed by a "patriotic" phase in which he drew close to some of the nationalist groups agitating for a "Shōwa Ishin" (昭和維新).[61] Close scrutiny of the Nyūmō, however, reveals this periodization as quite problematic. It took place at the high point of the international phase but it grew out of ties between Ōmoto and the continental adventurers, and revealed Deguchi as surprisingly comfortable with military power for someone often described as a pacifist.[62] The inconvenient reality is that Ōmoto's ties to nationalists and the military long predated the Manchurian Incident, whilst the interna-

---

58 Jansen, *The Japanese and Sun Yat-Sen*, 4-5.

59 Miwa, "Pan-Asianism in Modern Japan," 21.

60 Hotta, *Pan-Asianism and Japan's War 1931-1945*, chapter 1.

61 See Nadolski, "The Socio-Political Background of the Ōmoto Suppressions," or Stalker, *Prophet Motive* for periodization.

62 Narangoa, "The Vision of Omotokyo," 54-55.

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

tionalist activity continued even after the religion's patriotic turn.[63] Whilst this periodization identifies different aspects of Deguchi and Ōmoto's philosophy, disaggregating them into distinct phases is too simplistic.

This complex relationship between nationalist and internationalist impulses prompts one final interpretive strategy for historical consideration of Japanese Pan-Asianism in the 1920s and 30s, a suggestion that it was "contradictory"[64] or even "paradoxical."[65] Whilst fully recognizing and acknowledging the interpretive difficulties that give rise to this characterization, I am somewhat cautious about the use of the terms. It seems to me that there is a risk of anachronism or teleology in using them: that is, I think we should seriously consider the possibility that we only identify a paradox at the heart of 1920s Pan-Asianism because of what we know about the "dark valley of Showa" and Japan's descent into war which followed. Rather than prefigure the 1930s by marking interwar Pan-Asianism as inherently contradictory, I would prefer to examine these internal tensions in their own terms, and seek to understand how they were recognized and reconciled in at the time.

In this light, this article proposes a new way of examining the diversity inherent within Pan-Asianism, one which neither denies the tension between different forms, nor seeks to reduce it to a "paradox." By examining the complex of motives which got the Nyūmō off the ground, how they struggled to coexist, and then the different interpretations and meanings which were projected onto events after their conclusion, I have sought to use a transnational method which overlays the different readings of the mission without privileging one over another, or arguing for a single correct understanding. This polyvocal approach requires the use of a diverse set of sources drawing on different perspectives, and it forces us as historians to recognize that we cannot come to a final conclusion about what ex-

---

[63] Nancy Stalker alludes to this categorical complexity by labelling the first phase as "paradoxical internationalism" (Stalker, *Prophet Motive*. Chapter 5).

[64] Szpilman, "Between Pan-Asianism and Nationalism," 85.

[65] Savitri Vishwanathan, "Paradox of Japan's Nationalism: Relations with Asia," *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 10 (3-4) (1975).

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

actly happened on the steppe of Inner Mongolia to bring the mission crashing down. However, by doing this, I believe that we can gain access to an understanding of the dynamics of different elements within Pan-Asianism in action that more top-down approaches cannot. This micro history of practical Pan-Asianism demonstrates the activities of coalition forming and execution, and the ways in which the stresses within the different participants' different visions represent a microcosm of wider Asian and Pan-Asian ideologies.

Conclusion

Deguchi Onisaburō escaped the fate of his partner Lu Zhankui, but in being shipped back to Japan he nevertheless faced the likelihood of severe official sanction. His trial for lèse-majesté had commenced in his absence, both prompted and compounded by his flight. After being found guilty, he was sentenced to 5 years of hard labour; however, he was released after 4 months on parole, and indeed was fully pardoned in 1927 as a part of a general amnesty tied to the death of the Taishō emperor.[66] Although Deguchi never returned to Manchuria, Ōmoto remained active in the region, even as war spread across the continent.[67]

It is hard to trace any lasting effects of the Mongolian expedition in China either: it doesn't seem to have had a dramatic impact in the second Zhili-Fengtian war, which broke out in late 1924 despite Zhang's inability to shore up the Mongolian flank. Nevertheless, as demonstrated in this article, it was an important event, not for its longer term consequences, but rather for what it tells us about Pan-Asian movements in the 1920s, the complex intellectual, political and social coalitions which formed around ideas of Asian unity, and the tensions which lay inherent within them. From brokered beginning to contested aftermath, the Nyūmō was an example of how Japanese, Chinese, and Mongolians came together in the bor-

---

[66] Sheldon Garon, *Moulding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life*, Princeton University Press, 1998, 74.

[67] Stalker, *Prophet Motive*, 163-64.

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

derlands of Manchuria-Mongolia.

To elucidate these connections, the article adopts what I have termed a transnational method, explicitly recognizing the event as a confluence of participants and motives, and therefore seeking to enumerate these in their multiplicity, rather than adopt a single dominant frame. There are difficulties to this polyphonic approach. The Japanese perspectives are better documented and so it is hard to avoid privileging them over the Chinese perspectives, especially those of Lu Zhankui and others who did not survive the expedition. However, I believe that the method pays dividends. In particular, the structure of this paper is intended to suggest connections between the different levels at which we can look at the mission. Multiple motives produced multiple ways of seeing the unfolding of events, which in turn led to multiple interpretations and even multiple possible historiographies. Remaining aware of these layered spectra is a corrective to the risk of focusing on one, partial historiographical interpretation.

The other key argument that this article aims to advance is that there are also insights to be gained from looking at an example of Pan-Asianism in practice, rather than Pan-Asianism as idea. Again, there are difficulties to be faced in seeking to read meaning into sets of events rather than political or philosophical texts. However I believe again that there are historiographical consequences, highlighting the need for a greater understanding of the role of the continental adventurers as agents at the fringes of Japanese influence, recognizing the direct connections between Japanese imperial and domestic affairs, and challenging straightforward models of the relationship between ideas of Pan-Asianism, nationalisms and internationalisms, with implications for our conventional categories and chronologies.

Examining how people put their ideas of Asian unity into actual practice on the ground represents an opportunity to expand how we understand the possibilities, tensions, and challenges faced by the ideology. Moreover, by retaining awareness of the different perspectives on a single event, we can remain alert to the multiple readings that are embedded within it.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Boyd, J. G. “Faith, Race and Strategy: Japanese-Mongolian Relations, 1873-1945” (Doctoral thesis, Murdoch University, 2008).

Conroy, Hilary. *The Japanese Seizure of Korea, 1868-1910: A Study of Realism and Idealism in International Relations* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960).

Deguchi, Eiji. *Deguchi Eiji Senshū* 2 (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1979).

Deguchi, Kazuaki. *Onisaburō Nyūmō Hiwa* (Tokyo: Idzutomidzu, 1985).

Deguchi, Kyōtarō. *Kyojin: Deguchi Onisaburō* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1975).

Deguchi, Onisaburō. *Deguchi Onisaburō Zenshū, vol. 6: Nyūmōki* (Ayabe: Tensei-sha, 1998 (reprint)).

Duara, Prasenjit. “The Discourse of Civilization and Pan-Asianism,” *Journal of World History* 12 (2001): 99-130.

Garon, Sheldon M. “State and Religion in Imperial Japan, 1912-1945,” *Journal of Japanese Studies* (1986): 273-302.

———. *Moulding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life* (Princeton University Press, 1998).

Gojū, Tōjin. “Yume No Mōko Ōkoku,” *Taiyō*, November December 1924, January 1925.

Hasegawa, Yuichi. “Taishō Chūki Tairiku Kokka He No Ime-Ji: 「Dai-Kōraikoku」 Kōsō to Sono Shūhen,” *Kokusai Seiji,* #71 (August 1982): 93-108.

Hino, Tsuyoshi. *Iri Kikō* (Fuyō Shobō, 1973).

Hotta, Eri. *Pan-Asianism and Japan's War 1931-1945* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

Itō, Masao. *Gendaishi Shiryō, vol. 32: Mantetsu Part 2* (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 1966).

Jansen, Marius B. *The Japanese and Sun Yat-Sen*, vol. 27 (Stanford University Press, 1970).

Kokuryūkai. *Tōa Senkaku Shishi Kiden* (Tokyo: 1936).

Matsusaka, Yoshihisa Tak. *The Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904-1932* (Cam-

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

bridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2001).

McCormack, Gavan. *Chang Tso Lin in Northeast China, 1911-1928: China, Japan and the Manchurian Idea* (Folkestone: Dawson, 1978).

Miwa, Kimitada. "Pan-Asianism in Modern Japan: Nationalism, Regionalism and Universalism,' in *Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History. Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders*, ed. by *Sven Saaler* and *J. Victor Koschmann* (Routledge, 2007), 21-33.

Nadolski, Thomas. "The Socio-Political Background of the 1921 and 1935 Ōmoto Suppressions in Japan" (Doctoral thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1975).

Narangoa, Li. "Universal Values and Pan-Asianism: The Vision of Omotokyo," in *Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders*, ed. by *Sven Saaler* and *J. Victor Koschmann* (Routledge, 2007): 52-66.

Nishikawa, Masa. *Shisō Kenkyū Shiryō; Volume 66, Kōdō Ōmotokyō Jiken Ni Kansuru Kenkyū* (Kyoto: Tōyō Bunka, 1977 (1939 orig.)).

Norman, E. Herbert. "The Genyosha: A Study in the Origins of Japanese Imperialism," *Pacific Affairs* 17 (1944): 261-84.

Ōmoto, Nanajūnen Shi Hensankai. *Ōmoto Nanajūnen Shi* (Kyoto: Ōmoto, 1964).

Saaler, Sven. "Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History," in *Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders*, ed. by Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann (Routledge, 2007), 1-18.

———. "The Kokuryūkai (Black Dragon Society) and the Rise of Nationalism, Pan-Asianism, and Militarism in Japan, 1901-1925," *International Journal of Asian Studies* 11 (2014): 125-60.

Saunders, Kenneth. "Glimpses of the Religious Life of New Japan," *The Journal of Religion* 2 (1922): 70-80.

Stalker, Nancy K. *Prophet Motive: Deguchi Onisaburō, Oomoto, and the Rise of New Religions in Imperial Japan* (University of Hawaii Press, 2008).

Szpilman, Christopher WA. "Between Pan-Asianism and Nationalism. Mitsukawa Kametarô and His Campaign to Reform Japan and Liberate Asia," in *Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders*, ed. by Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann (Routledge, 2007): 87-100.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Tsushima, Michihito. “Emperor and World Renewal in the New Religions: The Case of Shinsei Ryûjinkai,” *Contemporary Papers on Japanese Religions* 2: New Religions (1991).

Vishwanathan, Savitri. “Paradox of Japan’s Nationalism: Relations with Asia,” *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 10 (3-4) (1975): 155-64.

Yiu, Angela. “Atarashikimura: The Intellectual and Literary Contexts of a Taishō Utopian Village,” *Nichibunken Japan Review* (2008): 203-30.

Young, Louise. *Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1998).

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Articles
(Translated)

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Status and Characteristics of the Korean March-First Independence Activists Imprisoned at Seodaemun Prison

Gyeong-mok PARK
Seodaemun Prison History Museum

The Journal of Northeast Asian History
Volume 15 Number 1 (Winter 2018), 39-72

Copyright © 2018 by the Northeast Asian History Foundation. All Rights Reserved.
No portion of the contents may be reproduced in any form without written permission of the Northeast Asian History Foundation.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Status and Characteristics of the Korean March-First Independence Activists Imprisoned at Seodaemun Prison*

Gyeong-mok PARK
Seodaemun Prison History Museum

I. Introduction

The prison service cards (hereafter, the PS cards) analyzed in this paper are records of individual prisoners who were classified as "thought criminals" during the Japanese colonial period (1910-1945). This collection of PS cards also included cards for those prisoners who were wanted and needed to be carefully watched. A piece of paper 15 centimeters wide and 10 centimeters long, the PS card carries photographs, personal information, and sentences on the front and back sides.

In the late 1980s, the Compilation Committee for National History took over the collection of the original PS cards stored in the Public Security Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. From 1991 to 1993, the collection was photocopied and published in the *Addendum to Historical Materials of Korean Independence Movement* (nine volumes) for research purposes and public perusal. The preface mentions a total of 6,264 card pieces that had been handed over from the Security Department; however, upon reexamination of the image files of the original PS cards, the total of correct cards are 6,259 pieces. The number of prisoners recorded on the PS cards totals 4,837 persons, including 180 women, after removing the additional cards for overlapped offenders. A majority of the cards belong to

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

people imprisoned in Seodaemun Prison.[1]

Each PS card was serialized based on the number attached to the original photo of each prisoner. There were two kinds of original photo film—small size and medium size—yet the serial number of the PS card did not duplicate itself. It is estimated that an original total of 65,193 PS cards were made, starting from serial number 1 (of Park Jang-nok) and going to serial number 65,193 (of Han Geum-dol). The existing 6,259 PS cards remain part of this mother collection. There is no way to tell, for now, whether parts of entire collection of PS cards were missing in the course of archiving or whether only some parts of the whole collection were extracted and preserved.

The information recorded on these PS cards serves as a useful reference for understanding the characteristics of Korean independence activists who were imprisoned for their deed during the Japanese colonial period. There is no doubt that the collection remains an invaluable source for the study of Korean independence movement history. As a matter of fact, a few recent studies based on the whole or partial collection of 6,259 cards have been attempted to show the historical value of the collection as well as the overall status and characteristics of the prisoners involved in it.[2] However, detailed study of the independence activities by individual prisoners still awaits further research.

By using part of the collection, this paper will analyze the data and

---

* This paper is a shortened revision of Park Gyeong-mok's "Status and characteristics of the prisoners of the March First Movement imprisoned at the Seodaemun Prison," *Inmungwahak Yeongu* 26 (2018).

1 The name of Seodaemun hyeongmuso (Seodaemun Prison) has been changed over time; Gyeongseong gamok (1908), Seodaemun gamok (1912), Seodaemun hyeongmuso (1923), Seoul hyeongmuso (1945), and Seoul gyodoso (1948). This paper uses its most common name, Seodaemun hyeongmuso (Seodaemun Prison).

2 Park Gyeong-mok, "Ilje gangjeomgi Seodaemun hyeongmuso yeosugamja hyeonghwang gwa teukjing," [Status and characteristics of the female prisoners at the Seodaemun Prison during the forced Japanese occupation period] *Hanguk geunhyeondaesa yeongu* 68 (2014); Park Gyeong-mok, "Ilje gangjeomgi Seodaemun hyeongmuso sugamja hyeonhwang gwa teukjing," [Status and characteristics of the prisoners at the Seodaemun Prison during the forced Japanese occupation period] *Hanguk geunhyeondaesa yeongu* 78 (Hankguk geunhyeondaesa hakhoe, 2016).

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

information provided by the PS cards of those who were imprisoned in Seodaemun Prison for their participation in the March First Movement (hereafter, the MFM). First, the time at which the card was recorded and the card's format will be examined. Then, the prisoner's number, age, social status, and occupation will be examined to understand the person's social status as a whole. Last, the prisoner's crime, prison sentence, and connection with other prisoners will be examined to illustrate his/her characteristics as an MFM independence activist.

The PS card database for this study was constructed using the following methods: Out of the entire collection of 6,259 PS cards, the 1,013 PS cards of the MFM participants were selected.[3] The information extracted from these selected PS cards was sorted out and integrated into a large database for analysis. The time period of the selected PS cards spans from the outbreak of the MFM in 1919 to the time of the subsequent court verdict in 1920.

II. Prison Service Card

1. Card Creation Date and Entries

The time at which a PS card was created can be estimated on the basis of such details as the date of the photo, the date of the court verdict, and the date of imprisonment. The date of the photo means the date when the photo of the individual prisoner was taken to be attached to his/her PS card, the date of the court verdict means the date when the individual prisoner received his/her prison sentence, and the date of imprisonment means the date when the individual prisoner was put into his/her prison cell.

Based on the date of the photo, the earliest PS cards were those of Lee Jeong-no and Lee Il-yeong, on which were written "[photo] taken June in the second year of Taishō era (i.e., 1913)." Both were arrested while acting as members of the Independence Righteous Army, organized in 1912 as

---

[3] The full list of 1,013 prisoners can be found in the author's article above, "3.1 undong gwallyeon Seodaemun hyeongmuso sugamja hyeonhwang gwa teukjing," [Status and characteristics of the prisoners of the March First Movement imprisoned at the Seodaemun Prison].

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

a Korean independence activist group. Lee Jeong-no was sentenced to six months in prison by the Gyeongseong District Court. Lee Il-yeong's verdict is unknown, but he later joined the MFM in 1919 and received a sentence of one year with a suspension of five years. The next PS card was that of Kim Wuk-je, photographed on May 18, 1918. He was arrested while acting as the member of the Cheongnim Religion, organized as a religious group of Korean independence activists, and he was sentenced to ninety strokes by the Gyeongseong Appellate Court on June 26, 1918.

Apart from the above three cards, however, all the rest of the PS cards in this study were compiled after the outbreak of the MFM in 1919. Using the date of the court verdict and the date of imprisonment, the cards compiled in 1919 total 625, while the cards compiled in 1920 total 146. The remaining 239 cards carry only the photo and entries on name, crime, and assigned prison. Nevertheless, the identical card format used for the prisoner and the identical crime of "violating against the security preservation law" that was applied to these prisoners indicate that they belonged to the same group of MFM participants.

Included among these cards are those for some of the thirty-three national representatives who signed the Declaration of Independence announced on March 1, 1919: Kweon Dong-jin, Kweon Byeong-deok, Kim Wan-gyu, Kim Chang-jun, Na Yong-hwan, Park Dong-wan, Shin Seok-gu, Lee Pil-ju, Yang Jeon-baek, Yu Yeo-dae, Lee Gap-seong, Lee Myeong-yong, Lee Seung-hun, Lee Jong-il, Im Ye-hwan, Oh Se-chang, Oh Hwa-yeong, Jeong Chun-su, Choi Rin, Han Yong-un, Hong Byeong-gi, and Hong Gi-jo.

The above facts indicate that the PS cards were compiled primarily starting from the onset of the MFM in 1919 for the purpose of keeping records on and maintaining surveillance of Korean independence activists.

The entries on front side include basic personal identification data of each prisoner, such as photo, name, age, and finger print record number. The entries on back side include prison service records, such as crime, prison sentence, ruling court, date of prison entrance, date of release, and as

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION



Only the prisoner's name, crime, and assigned prison are completed.



All entries are fully completed.
(Kept at the National History Compilation Committee)

Figure 1. Card of Sin Seok-gu[4]

signed prison. The PS card entries vary slightly from one form to another, yet those used at the time of the MFM are as follows. The front side has five entries for the identification of each prisoner:

① Family name and given name: Real name and alias, if any
② Age: Date of birth in the format year, month, and day (The birth year is written with the era name, such as "Gwangmu," "Gaeguk," or "Meiji")
③ Height: Measured in East Asian length units, such as "*cheok*

[4] The PS cards can be accessed online at the homepage of the Compilation Committee for National History (http://db.history.go.kr/item/level.do?itemId=ia).

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

(foot),” “*chon* (inch),” and “*bun*” (one-tenth inch)”
④ Special physical features: Personal features, such as facial features and scars
⑤ Fingerprint number: Five fingerprints each of left hand and right hand

The back side has fourteen entries for the prisoner’s location, occupation, and prison service records:
① Permanent address
② Place of birth
③ Current address
④ Social status as *yangban* (nobility) or commoner
⑤ Occupation just before the imprisonment

Prison service records are as follows:
⑥ Name of crime either convicted of or indicted for
⑦ Type of penalty, either custody or imprisonment, and duration of penalty, in the form of year and month
⑧ Date of court verdict, in the form of Taishō year, month, and day
⑨ Beginning date of penalty period, in the form of Taishō year, month, and day
⑩ Name of the ruling court
⑪ Prison assigned
⑫ Date of release, in the form of Taishō year, month, and day, and reason for release
⑬ Previous records of crime, in the form of type and number of offenses
⑭ Remarks, such as place for return after serving prison term

Among the above entries, the following six entries were reserved only for the convicts whose crime had been already determined by court decision: ⑦ type of penalty, ⑧ date of court verdict, ⑨ beginning date of penalty period, ⑩ name of ruling court, ⑫ date of release, and ⑬ previous record of crime.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Since the work of compiling a PS card was a clerical duty based on recording hard facts, there is basically no need to question the accuracy of their data and information. One caveat is the need to check for clerical errors. The entry of the date of release is the case in question because the release date could be calculated from the time of the court decision and was thusly recorded on the PS card. However, there was a possibility of the prison term being altered or even the prisoner dying in the course of his/her prison service, leaving the entry date unmatched to the actual date of release. Thus, it is possible that the prisoner might well have been released earlier or even met death prior to the recorded date of release on the PS card.

The case of Yu Gwan-sun is a telling example. On her card, the date of release was written as January 2, 1921. However, she had already died at the prison on September 28, 1920 from injuries sustained under torture. Her official record is misleading. If one depends only on that record, one would be misinformed that Yu Gwan-sun was released on January 2, 1921.

The release date was wrongly written as January 2, 1921.

Figure 2. Card of Yu Gwan-sun

2. Change of Format

The PS card format can be divided into four categories according to the change of entries over time. For the sake of convenience, this paper distinguishes them as types A, B, C, and D. The Type A card, carrying a total of nineteen entries was widely used in 1919 and 1920. The front-side entries include the prisoner's photo, name, age, height, physical features, and fin-

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

gerprint number. The back-side entries include the prisoner's personal information, such as permanent address, date of birth, place of residence, social status, and occupation, as well as the prisoner's service records, such as name of crime, type of penalty and penalty duration, date of court verdict, beginning of penalty, ruling court, assigned prison, date of release, reason for release, previous crime record, and remarks. There are a total of 1,061 Type A cards, only two of which were used in 1921 and the last of which was used in 1923. Therefore, the Type A card was almost exclusively used for keeping the records of MFM participants.

To the Type B card were added ten more entries, such as alias, relation to household head, name of household head, names of parents, types and number of previous crimes, means of crime, name of accomplice, address of residence to return to, and number of original photocopy. Thus, the Type B card represents the effort of the colonial authorities to extend control over the prisoners even after their release by recording their family relations, accomplices, and post-release residence. There are a total of 388 Type B cards, beginning with six from 1923 and continuing until the last use in 1931. Since the Type B card first appeared in 1923 and was used until 1931, there are two era names (Taishō and Shōwa) printed to indicate the year in the entries for date of photo, date of entrance, and date of release.

The Type C card appeared in 1928. There are a total of 673 Type C cards, including 1 in 1928, 62 in 1929, 512 in 1930, 54 in 1931, and 44 in unknown year. In practice, some entries turned out to be difficult to fill in, so the number of entries was reduced from 29 to 22, and new entries, such as categorized number of crime methods, methods of crime, frequent location, and notable characteristic, were added to give more emphasis to the post-imprisonment surveillance of the prisoners.

The Type D card changed its writing style from vertical writing to horizontal writing. It was used from approximately 1930 to the liberation in 1945. For a total of 25 cards, the new category of usual methods of crime was added, in which the prisoner's main activities, ideological characteristics and related persons were recorded. There are a total of 4,137 Type D cards. Notably, some of the prisoners with Type D cards were pho-

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

tographed in 1919 (25 persons), 1920 (19 persons), 1923 (2 persons), and 1925 (1 person). Those prisoners were photographed when the Type D card was not in use. This means that the Type D card was used to rerecord information on former prisoners.

In this regard, it is worth noting that the security preservation law, which had come into effect on April 22, 1925 in Japan, was applied to Korea starting on May 12, 1925. The law signaled more severe punishment for thought criminals. As part of the enforcement of the security law, departments that specialized in thought control were installed in the Japanese police and judicial system from 1928 onwards. With the onset of full-scale thought control from 1928 on, it can be surmised that a review of some former prisoners was conducted and a retrospective compilation of their PS cards was done in support of the tightened control over thought under the colonial authorities.



Type A: No Sun-gyeong

Type B with the era name of Taishō printed: Kim Yeong-heui

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION



Type B with the era name of Shōwa printed: Gang Dal-yeong

Type C: Park Seong-yeo

Type D: Yeo Yun-hyeong

Figure 3. Card Form

It can be assumed that the change of the card format was due to the response of the Korean independence activists to the change in Japanese colonial policy and the increase in the number of prisoners. The change from Type A to Type B was related to the enactment and enforcement of the security preservation law in 1925. In line with this heightened security

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

concern, the colonial police officers tried to secure more detailed personal information about the prisoners, needed to strengthen the surveillance and control over thought criminals. The change from Type B to Type C was related to the heightened thought control that began in 1928. With the surge in prisoner population and the increase of protesters among the general public, the colonial authorities eliminated some of superfluous entries not necessarily related to security concerns. The change from Type C to Type D reflected the desire of the colonial authorities to conduct more focused and sustained control and surveillance of major prisoners by securing information about their personal relations and their connections with anti-Japanese organizations.

III. Status of the MFM Prisoners

1. Age

This study analyzes the PS cards of 1,013 prisoners selected from the 6,259 PS cards. The selection criteria are 1) name of crime—violation against the security preservation law, disturbance, and violation against the publication law—and 2) date of verdict ranging from 1919 to 1920. The PS card was initially made out right after detainment in the prison. Seodaemun Prison also had the role of keeping in custody those who had yet to be convicted, so it became very crowded from those indicted coming from Seoul and its neighboring Gyeonggi area, as well as those waiting for a second trial at the Gyeongseong (i.e., Seoul) Appellate Court. At the time of the initial recording, only the prisoner's name, crime, and assigned prison were written on his/her PS card, as shown in Figure 4. On one hand, prior to the court verdict, there was no way to write down penalty details. On the other hand, because of the sudden surge in prisoner population in the aftermath of the MFM, the limited prison management personnel could not afford to record all the personal and criminal details of every prisoner.[5]

---

[5] Right after the MFM, Seodaemun Prison housed a total of 3,075 prisoners—six times as many as its full capacity of 500 prisoners upon its opening in 1908.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Only the prisoner's name, crime, and assigned prison were written on some cards.

Figure 4. Card of Han Yong-un

When the crime was confirmed, the PS card was updated in the second round of recording. All 14 entries on the back were filled in. At that time, some prisoners were transferred from Seodaemun Prison to other prisons. They were, by and large, transferred to Gyeongseong Prison. Thus, if "Gyeongseong Prison" was written on the entry of assigned prison, it can be understood that the prisoner had already been detained in Seodaemun Prison. As shown in Table 1, an overwhelming majority of prisoners in this study, 951 out of 1,013 (98.25%), were either assigned to Seodaemun Prison or to Gyeongseong Prison; they were all sent to Seodaemun Prison first after the MFM. The rest were listed as Daegu Prison (14 persons), Pyeongyang Prison (2 persons), and Haeju Prison (1 person). They were transferred, together with their PS cards, from those prisons to Seodaemun Prison while waiting for appeal trials.

Table 1. Assigned Prison[6]

Prison Name	Seodaemun	Gyeongseong	Daegu	Pyeongyang	Haeju	Total
Number of Prisoners	680	271	14	2	1	968
Percent	70.25	28.0	1.45	0.21	0.10	100

[6] Some entries on the 1,013 PS cards are omitted or illegible, causing varying numbers of prisoners for each category.

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

The ages of the MFM prisoners ranged widely from the teens to the sixties. Out of the 756 PS for which age can be confirmed, the youngest at the time of imprisonment were fifteen years old. There were six of them: Im Gap-deuk (courier), Kim Dong-seok (student), and Son Heung-bok (student) were born in 1904 and imprisoned in 1919; Wang Jong-sun (student), Kim Seong-jae (student), and So Eun-myeong (student) were born in 1905 and imprisoned in 1920. The oldest was Kim Seong-seo (born in 1852), who was sixty-seven years old when he was imprisoned in 1919. Kim was arrested when he joined a demonstration march for Korean independence at Hoengseong-eup, Gwangweon Province. He was sentenced to one year and six months and served until June 17, 1920. The breakdowns of each prisoner's age at the time of imprisonment and his/her birth year are shown in Tables 2 and 3 below.

Table 2. Age Distribution at the Time of Imprisonment

Age Group	10s	20s	30s	40s	50s	60s	Total
Number of Prisoners	112	320	166	93	49	16	756
Percent	14.81	42.33	21.96	12.3	6.48	2.12	100

Table 3. Birth Year Distribution

Birth Year	1850s	1860s	1870s	1880s	1890s	1900s	Total
Number of Prisoners	16	43	90	172	322	122	765
Percent	2.09	5.62	11.77	22.48	42.09	15.95	100

The prisoners in their twenties were the largest group of participants in the MFM. Those in their thirties, teens, and forties came next, in that order. It can be ascertained that Koreans of all ages joined the MFM. The participation of all age groups can be shown more clearly by comparing the participants' ages with the ages of 4,377 other prisoners, whose ages can be identified on their PS cards, as shown in Table 4.[7]

---

[7] Park Gyeong-mok, "Ilje gangjeomgi Seodaemun hyeongmuso yeongu," [Study on the

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Table 4. Comparison of Age Groups between the MFM Activists and All Independence Activists

Age Group	10s	20s	30s	40s	50s	60s	70s	Total
MFM Activists (756 persons)	14.81%	42.33%	21.96%	12.3%	6.48%	2.12%	0.00%	100%
All Activists (4,377 persons)	10.56%	57.50%	19.87%	7.59%	3.47%	0.96%	0.05%	100%
Increase & Decrease	+4.25%	–15.17%	+2.09%	+4.71%	+ 3.01%	+1.16%	–0.05%	

According to Table 4, while more than half (57.50 percent) of the independence activists imprisoned in Seodaemun Prison during Japanese colonial rule were in their twenties, less than half (42.33 percent) of the MFM activists were in their twenties. The percentage of MFM participants who were in their twenties was 15.17 percent less than the percentage of all independence activists who were in their twenties, at least among those whose age can be identified by their PS cards. These statistics mean that there was relatively less concentration of participants in their twenties in the MFM, and the ages of MFM participants were spread more widely across other age groups, such as the teens, thirties, forties, and sixties. In other words, the MFM was joined by a relatively broader range of age groups than the Korean independence movement as a whole.

2. Social Status and Occupation

The Japanese colonial authorities initially took interest in identifying the MFM participants' social status. Until around 1919, their social status had been clearly identified on the PS card. In the field titled "social status" on the Type A card, either *yangban* (noble) or commoner status was written. There are 753 persons whose status identity was recorded. The distribution of social status among MFM prisoners recognized by the colonial authori-

---

Seodaemun Prison during the forced Japanese occupation period] (Ph. D. diss., Chungnam University, 2015), 100.

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

ties is presented in Table 5.

Table 5. Social Status of the Prisoners

Commoner	*Yangban*	Total
641 persons	112 persons	753 persons
85.13%	14.87%	100%

By 1919, however, the prisoner's social status had become irrelevant to his/her everyday life and occupation. There were teachers and students among those identified as *yangban*, and many farmers as well. Moreover, some of the *yangban* men had jobs that were hardly congruous to their *yangban* status, such as auxiliary policeman, Buddhist monk, print shop worker, sundry goods seller, or sales clerk. It is known that the breakdown of rigid social status systems that began in late Joseon Korea accelerated with the onset of Japanese colonial rule.

Meanwhile, the occupations of the MFM prisoners show a great variety. A total of seventy occupations were identified. Each occupation was recorded specifically, such as nurse, print shop employee, hired hand, second-hand materials trader, office clerk, sundry goods seller, Presbyterian missionary, Cheondogyo master, and Imje Sect Buddhist monk. The occupational diversity of the MFM participants is shown in Table 6 below.

Table 6. Occupations of the Prisoners

Category	Number of Prisoners	Percent	Occupations
Agriculture	391	52.98	
Student	104	14.09	
Religious practitioner	46	6.23	Christian (31), Buddhists (2), Cheondogyo (12), Confucian (1)
Merchant	40	5.42	grain dealers (2), confectioners (2), medicine sellers (2), medicine traders (4), fish merchants (2), sundry goods sellers (17), lumber dealer (1), Chinese merchant (1), gold product merchants (3), merchants (3), garment maker (1), tanner (1), pesticide dealer (1)

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Teacher	40	5.42	
Unemployed	28	3.80	
Employee	21	2.85	employees (20), shop clerk (1)
Official	15	2.03	subcounty office servant (1), subcounty clerks (6), subcounty chiefs (2), district chiefs (3), auxiliary policeman (1), postman (1), land investigator (1)
Artisan	15	2.03	artisan (1), print shop workers (2), automobile mechanic (1), tobacco makers (2), dressermaker (1), paper artisan (1), tanners (4), washer maker (1), tailors (2)
Self-employed	11	1.49	restaurant (4), sewing (3), textile (1), inn (3)
Manufacturer	7	0.95	porcelain (1), gold and silversmith (1), cotton product (1), painter (1), paper (1), oiled paper (2)
Medical professional	5	0.68	nurses (3), doctor (1), pharmacist (1)
Organization	4	0.54	school clerk (1), office clerk (1), officer of Christian youth association (1), American staff (1)
Other	11	1.49	photographer (1), secondhand goods dealers (4), money lender (1), legal clerk (1), horse-drawn carriage drivers (2), driver (1), daily laborer (1)
Total	738	100	

People from a wide range of specific occupations participated in the MFM, even though overall occupational categories were rather limited at the time. More than half of the participants worked in agriculture (52.98%), followed by students (14.09%), religious practitioners (6.23%), teachers (5.42%) and merchants (5.42%).

Notably, some subcounty (*myeon*) staff and chiefs, as well as district (*ku*) chiefs, played leading roles in the MFM, even though they served at the lowest units of the colonial administration. Song Jae-man, a messenger at the Daehoji Subcounty office of Dangjin County, South Chungcheong Province, played a leading role in the independence demonstrations in his neighborhood on April 4, 1919. Lee In-jeong, the chief of Daehoji Subcounty, succeeded in assembling a mob of 1,000 local residents for the independence demonstration. Sin Sang-myeon, the chief of Yean Subcounty of Andong County, North Gyeongsang Province, was arrested on the

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

charge of leading the independence demonstration in his neighborhood.

Meanwhile, some auxiliary policemen of the colonial police also participated in the MFM. For example, Jeong Ho-seok (born in 1886) was sentenced to a one-year imprisonment for violation of the security preservation law at the Gyeongseong Appellate Court on February 27, 1920 and was released on May 29 after serving the full term. As shown in Figure 5, he worked as a police assistant, keeping guard at the Daehan Gate of the Deoksu Palace. On March 5, 1919, he bit one finger of his left hand while in his house and painted a Korean national flag with his blood. He hung the sentimental flag on a bamboo stick and went to Heungyeong School, located at Daeheung-*dong*, Mapo-*gu*, Seoul, to encourage the students to join the demonstration for Korean independence. He led twenty students on a procession to the nearby Gongdeok-*dong*, Mapo-*gu*.[8]

Jeong's occupation was as an auxiliary policemen.

Figure 5. Card of Jeong Ho-seok

The participation of Jeong Ho-seok in the MFM while an employee of the Japanese colonial police indicates that other Korean employees of the colonial administration might well have joined the movement. Immediately after the MFM, the Japanese colonial authorities promoted Korean auxiliary policemen to regular policemen, like their Japanese colleagues, in

---

8 "Jeong Ho-seok Gyeongseong boksim beopweon pangyeolmun [Jeong Ho-seok's verdict at Gyeongseong appellate court]," February 27, 1920, kept at Gukga girokweon [National records archive] (CJA0000150).

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

an attempt to placate them. This measure signifies that a considerable number of Korean employees hired in the colonial administration, especially those at a lower level of the administrative hierarchy, estranged themselves from the alien rule.

IV. Characteristics of the MFM Prisoners

1. Name of Crime and Length of Penalty

The MFM participants were treated as "criminals who violated the so-called the "security preservation law." The security preservation law was a penal code that applied to thought crime. In the pre-decision phase, the appellation "the security preservation offender" was recorded on the PS card in lieu of the name of crime. When the sentence was confirmed, the names of crimes, such as "violation of the security preservation law," "violation of the publication law," "disturbance," and "crime related to politics," were used to indicate the MFM participants' treatment as "thought criminals." Therefore, the Japanese colonial authorities viewed the MFM participants as ideological subversive activists who attempted to shake the very foundation of the colonial regime.

The name of crimes included not only those mentioned above, which implied thought crime but also those of physical violence, such as robbery, damage to properties, vandalism, violation of the telecommunication law, obstruction of task, obstruction of official work, trespass on housing, and damage to building. A total of 100 such incidents can be identified on the PS cards. In reaction to the brutal Japanese suppression of the demonstration marches, Korean demonstrators began to resort to violent means of protest, such as storming into houses and buildings, inflicting damage to properties and buildings, and attacking Japanese policemen. The distribution of the MFM prisoners by crime is shown in Table 7.

The longest prison sentence found among the 772 PS cards that recorded prison terms was six years. However, this was a clerical error. Choi Hak-gil (born in 1876) was leading his home Yongcheon villagers at the market in Seo Subcounty of Yangyang County, Gangweon Province, before being shot and arrested April 4, 1919. His prison term was recorded as

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Table 7. Number of Prisoners by Crime

Crime	Number of Prisoners	Percent
Violation of the security preservation law	940	92.79
Disturbance	40	3.95
Violation of the publication law	29	2.86
Crime related to politics	2	0.2
Intimidation	2	0.2
Total	1,013	100

six years. However, as shown in Figure 6, the date of release was recorded on July 14, 1920 after a full prison service, indicating that his actual prison sentence was not six years but six months. The clerk erroneously entered the number six into the blank space for year instead of that for month.



The number six was erroneously written into the blank space for year.

Figure 6. Card of Choi Hak-gil

The next longest sentence was five years, given to both Jo Su-in (born in 1881) and Song Jae-man (born in 1896). Jo was accused of violation against the security preservation law and disturbance, while Song's additional accusations included theft, injury, trespass on housing, violation against the publication law, and forgery of a document. As the MFM became increasingly violent, they resorted to violent acts such as destroying facilities and attacking the Japanese police.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Those sentenced to four years, such as Lee Gye-yeop, Kim Hyeong-jin, and Kim Gil-hyeon, likewise acted violently. During their first demonstration, some of the participants were arrested. Then, they staged a second demonstration of violent protest, attacking Japanese public buildings and officials.

Among those who received the sentence of three years were Yu Gwan-sun, who was representative of other women participants, and her uncle, Yu Jung-mu. In addition, there were Ham Tae-yeong, Lee Jong-il, Baek Gwang-pil, Yu Yeon-hwa, Lee Jong-rin, and Chang Yang-keon, alongside whom the activities of Ham Tae-yeong and Lee Jong-il can be traced. Ham Tae-yeong, as a Christian and legal expert, was a part of the MFM leadership that planned the peaceful demonstration and reviewed and distributed the Declaration of Independence, thus contributing a great deal to the MFM. Lee Jong-il, of the Cheondogyo religion, was one of the thirty-three national representatives who signed the Declaration of Independence. Thus, Ham and Lee were religious leaders who had a pronounced role in propelling the MFM. The total number of participants who were sentenced to more than two years is seventy-seven (9.97 percent).

The majority of prisoners were sentenced to between one and two years of imprisonment (i.e., 12 months to 23 months) (340 persons, 44.04 percent). The next largest groups were those sentenced to eight months, followed by those sentenced to six months. On the other hand, there were only four prisoners sentenced to less than six months (0.52 percent). Of the 2,796 prisoners detained at Seodaemun Prison whose prison sentence was recorded on the PS card, those sentenced to less than six months account for 4.76 percent.[9] Thus, the number of MFM prisoners sentenced to less than six months was disproportionately lower than the average number of the total prison population sentenced to less than six months. The reason for this small figure was related to the manner in which the colonial authorities handled the MFM arrests. The MFM erupted simultaneously all

---

[9] Park Gyeong-mok, "Ilje gangjeomgi Seodaemun hyeongmuso yeongu [Study on the Seodaemun Prison during the forced Japanese occupation period]," (Ph. D. diss., Chungnam Daehakgyo, 2015), 114.

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

across the country, involving more than two million people. Since the massive number of MFM arrests far exceeded the prison capacity at the time, those sentenced to less than six months were punished by flogging instead of imprisonment. The number of prisoners by prison sentence is shown in Table 8.

Table 8. Number of Prisoners by Prison Term

In	-	5yr.	4yr.	3yr.	2.5yr.	2yr.	Total
Number of People	-	2	3	8	2	61	76
Percent	9.85%						

Term	1yr. 11 mon	1yr. 10 mon	1yr. 8 mon	1yr. 6 mon	1yr. 3 mon	1yr. 2 mon	1yr. 1 mon	1yr.	Total
Number of People	1	3	8	101	4	11	1	211	340
Percent	44.04%								

Term	10 mon	8 mon	7 mon	6 mon	5 mon	3 mon	2 mon	1 mon	Total
Number of People	87	135	12	118	1	1	1	1	356
Percent	30.31%			15.80%					

Grand total: 772 persons (100%)

The longest prison sentence recorded on a PS card is five years. However, when their verdict papers are examined, it can be confirmed that some of the prisoners whose prison sentences were not recorded on the PS card received sentences of more than five years. Hong Jun-ok, Mun Sang-ik and Wang Kwang-yeon, who led the protest movement on March 26 and 28, 1919 at Sagang-*ri*, Songsan-*myeon*, Hwaseong City, Gyeonggi Province, were sentenced to twelve years. They were accused of conspiring to kill Noguchi Kojo, a Japanese police chief. Kim Myeong-je was sentenced to ten years. Kim Gyo-chang, Min Yong-un, Cheon Do-seon, Hong Gwan-hu, Cha Gyeong-hyeon, Hong Myeong-seon, and Hwang Chil-seong were sentenced to seven years. Oh Gwang-deuk, Lee Yun-sik, and Choi Chun-

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

bo were sentenced to six years. Likewise, it appears that there are many prisoners who were sentenced to long-term imprisonment, though their records of prison sentence do not appear on the PS card. This will be the subject of future research.

2. Connections between the Prisoners

Following its inception in Seoul, the MFM subsequently spread to local provinces and districts across the country. Many MFM participants shared regional ties, blood relations, and school connections, which united them together in their collective action for the cause of Korean independence. These regional, blood, and school ties can be borne out by the analysis of the personal data of the MFM prisoners at Seodaemun Prison.

First, blood relation was one factor that mediated the participation in the MFM. A total of nine cases show blood relation of the prisoners in family units as in Table 9. Except for the case of Yu Gwan-sun, in all eight cases, the prisoners had the same permanent address, birth place, and current address and were born within a ten-year span. Therefore, they can be regarded as having a familial relationship.

Table 9. Blood Relationship of the MFM Prisoners

	Permanent address *do*/*gun*/*myeon*/*ri*	**Name (Birth year)**	**Verdict date**	**Release date**	**Prison term**	**Crime against**	**Relationship**
1	Gangweon-*do*, Yanggu-*gun*, Dong-*myeon*, Pallang	Jang Homyeon (1868) Jang Hongdo (1874)	08/14/1919	04/05/1920	8 mon	security law	brothers
2	Gangweon-*do*, Hongcheon-*gun*, Hongcheon-*eup*, Sinjangdae-*ri*	Cha Bongcheol (1897) Cha Bongan (1900)	07/23/1919 10/02/1919	07/01/1920 04/02/1920	6 mon 1 yr. 6 mon	security law	brothers
3	Gyeonggi-*do*, Gapyeong-*gun*, Buk-*myeon*, Mokdong-*ri*	Cheong Seonggyo (1894) Cheong Heunggyo (1900)	07/14/1919 07/14/1919	06/24/1920 09/24/1920	6 mon 2 yr.	security law	brothers

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

4	Gyeonggi-*do*, Gimpo-*gun*, Yangcheon-*myeon*, Nusan-*ri*	Park Seungman (1896) Park Seunggak (1897)	06/26/1919 09/04/1919	04/28/1919	1 yr.	security law	brothers
5	Gyeonggi-*do* Yeoncheon-*gun*, Baekhak-*myeon*, Duil-*ri*	Kim Munyu (1894) Kim Bokdong (1889)	09/16/1919 07/07/1919	09/16/1919 09/18/1919	1 yr. 1 yr. 6 mon	public order security law	brothers
6	Gyeongbuk-*do* Andong-*gun*, Imha-*myeon*, Odaedong-*ri*	Kim Gubyeong (1878) Kim Yongmun (1888)	05/24/1919	04/27/1920	1 yr.	public order, security law	brothers
7	Gyeongseong (Seoul) Jungnim-*dong*	Kim Gongno (1897) Kim Gongu (1902)	05/08/1919 06/23/1919	07/30/1919 03/02/1921	6 mon 1 yr. 6 mon	security law	brothers
8	Pyeongnam-*do*, Anju-*gun*, Anju-*eup*, Namcheon-*ri*	Kim Byeongje (1894) Kim Byeonggeon (1895)	06/05/1919	04/26/1920	1 yr. 6 mon	security law	brothers
9	Chungnam-*do*, Cheonan-*gun*, Dong-*myeon*, Yongdu-*ri* Chungnam-*do*, Cheonan-*gun*, Dong-*myeon*, Yongdu-*ri*	Yu Jungmu (1875) Yu Gwansun (1902)	07/04/1919 07/02/1919	01/02/1921 03/10/1921	3 yr.	public order, security law	uncle and niece

Among those listed above, the demonstration activities of the following persons can be traced:[10] Jang Ho-myeon and Jang Heung-do, followers of the Cheondogyo religion, joined a demonstration march in April 1919 at the town of Yanggu County, Gangweon Province; Cha Bong-cheol, after witnessing demonstration marches in Seoul on the occasion of the funeral ceremony of Emperor Kojong, returned to his home village of Sinjangdae-*ri*, Hongcheon County, Gwangweon Province, and started a demonstration

[10] See the list of merits at the website of the Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs (http://www.mpva.go.kr/narasarang/gonghun_list.asp).

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

march together with his brother Cha Bong-an on April 1; Jung Seong-gyo and Jung Heung-gyo started a demonstration march on March 15 in Gapyeong County, Gyeonggi Province; Jung Heung-gyo, carrying a circular calling for people to join the demonstration march, assembled sympathizers at the neighboring villages of Jeokmok-*ri*, Dannyeong-*ri*, Gwadae-*ri*, and Baekbi-*ri*; Park Seung-man and Park Seung-gak returned to their home village after participating in demonstration marches in Seoul, spread news to their neighbors, and conducted a demonstration march on March 23 at the Yanggok market of Yangcheon Subcounty, Kimpo County, Gyeonggi Province; two Christians, Kim Pyeong-je and Kim Pyeong-geon, joined the demonstration march planned by the priest Kim Chan-seong; in the afternoon, on the same day, they distributed the Declaration of Independence among the crowd before being arrested; as has been well known, Yu Gwan-sun and her uncle, Yu Jung-mu, led the demonstrators on April 1 at the Aunae market of Cheonan County. All the above people were proactive from the initial planning stages of the demonstration rallies held at their respective sites. Their blood relations afforded them the confidentiality, mutual commitment, and solidarity needed for such proactive acts.

Second, regional ties were another important factor that mediated participation in the MFM. Those prisoners sharing the same permanent address and successive serial numbers on the original photos mean that they originated from the same location and joined the same demonstration. The regional groups in which more than five prisoners shared the same permanent address (i.e., the same village community) are shown in Table 10.

Table 10. Regional Connection of the MFM Prisoners

	Permanent address (Demonstration date & site)	**Number of People**	**Name**
1	Gyeonggi-*do* Gapyeong-*gun* Buk-*myeon* Mokdong-*ri* (March 15 to 16, Buk-*myeon*)	8	Lee Man-seok, Lee Yun-seok, Jang Ho-hyeong, Jeong Seong-gyo, Jeong Heung-gyo, Jang Sun-hyeon, Jang Ho-ri, Lee Hong-bok
2	Gangweon-*do* Hongcheon-*gun* Hongcheon-*eup* Sinjangdae-*ri* (April 1, Hongcheon-*myeon*)	6	Kim Gi-hyeon, Lee Hong-geun, Yim Yun-hang, Jang Il-gyu, Cha Bong-eon, Cha Bong-cheol
3	Gangweon-*do* Hwacheon-*gun* Hwacheon-*myeon* Sin Eup-*ri* (March 23, Hwacheon)	5	Gang Seok-dae, Park Seong-nok, Kim Yong-gu, Kim Chang-eui, Kim Han-sik

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

4	Gyeonggi-*do* Gaeseng-*gun* Sangdo-*myeon* Pungcheon-*ri* (March 29, Sangdo-*myeon* & Daeseong-*myeon*)	5	Kim Sun-heung, Yu Gi-yun, Jang Gyeong-beom, Jang Seung-hwa, Jang Tae-su
5	Gyeonggi-*do* Gaeseong-*gun* Songdo-*myeon* Nambonjeong-*ri* (March 26, Yeongnam-*myeon*)	5	Kim Se-jung, Kim Hyeong-yeol, Kim Heun, Lee Hyeong-go, Lee Hyeong-sun
6	Gyeonggi-*do* Goyang-*gun* Hanji-*myeon* Hawangsip-*ri*	5	No Su-cheon, Kim In-sik, Lee Gwang-cheon, Lee Pil-ju, No Su-cheon
7	Gyeonggi-*do* Suweon-*gun* Songsan-*myeon* Sagang-*ri* (March 25 to 26 & 28, Sagang-*ri*)	6	Kim Do-jeong, Kim Seong-sil, Lee Jeong-jip, Hong Bok-yong, Hong Seong-mak, Hong Tae-geun
8	Gyeonggi-*do* Anseong-*gun* Yijuk-*myeon* (April 1 to 2, Yangseong & Weongok)	9	Kim Yong-gyu, Mun Jae-hong, Park Gwang-sun, Yang Nam-ok, Yun Gyu-heui, Yun Sang-gu, Lee Gi-hun, Choe Chang-dal, Choe Chang-hyeok
9	Gyeonggi-*do* Yangju-*gun* Wabu-*eup* Songcheon-*ri* (March 14 to 15, Wabu-myeon)	7	Kim Deok-yeo, Kim Deok-o, Kim Yun-gyeong, Kim Hyeon-yu, Park Gyeong-sik, O Seong-jun, Jeong Il-seong
10	Gyeonggi-*do* Yeoncheon-*gun* Baekhak-*myeon* Duil-*ri* (March 21, Baekhak-*myeon* & Misan-*myeon*)	5	Gu Geum-yong, Kim Mun-yu, Kim Bok-dong, Baek Cheon-gi, Hong Sun-gyeom
11	Gyeongbuk-*do* Yeongil-*gun* Songna-*myeon* Daejeon-*ri* (March 22, Deokseong-*ri*)	7	An Deok-hwan, An Sang-jong, An Seok-jong, An Cheon-jong, Yun Yeong-bok, Lee Yeong-seop, Lee Jun-seok
12	Pyeongnam-*do* Yonggang-*gun* Seohwa-*myeon* Jukbon-*ri* (March 6, Seohwa-*myeon*)	5	Kim Dae-yeop, Kim Dae-hyeok, Kim Du-weon, Kim Hong-se, Jang Byeong-sam
13	Pyeongnam-*do* Yonggang-*gun* Jiun-*myeon* Jinji-*ri* (March 3, Jiun-*myeon*)	7	Kim Gwan-sin, Kim Mong-han, Kim Byeong-ro, Kim Seung-il, Song In-seok, Lee Jeong-gyu, Jeong Hae-weon
14	Chungnam-*do* Seosan-*gun* Daehoji-*myeon* (April 4, Daehoji & Jeongmi)	5	Kim Yang-chil, Nam Seong-u, Song Jae-man, Lee In-jeong, Han Un-seok
Total		85	

The fourteen regional groups of 85 prisoners were connected through identical regional ties. If we lower the number included in the same regional group to two prisoners, then eighty-nine regional groups of 284 prisoners shared regional ties. The percentage of prisoners who shared regional ties amounts to 35.86 percent of the 789 prisoners whose permanent addresses can be verified on the PS cards.

The people in the fourteenth group in Table 10 were the core mem-

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

bers of the independence march conducted in Daehoji Subcounty of Dangjin County, and they were connected through teacher-student relations at the school of Dohoeusuk and through companionship at the subcounty office. The regional ties of Daehoji County brought them together with their neighbors at the initial rally in Daehoji Subcounty. Then, they marched approximately seven kilometers to the neighboring market town of Jeongmi Subcounty, recruiting more regional sympathizers along the way.

In the rapid spreading of the MFM to provinces, one typical pattern was that certain local men who witnessed or experienced the MFM in Seoul returned to their hometowns in the countryside and stimulated the local residents into action by transmitting the news from Seoul and making initial plans for demonstrations. It is unmistakable that having a regional bond was a potent conduit along which the MFM spread rapidly across the country.

Third, school connection was yet another important factor that mediated participation in the MFM. Such instances can be found mainly in the Seoul area. Nursing students at the medical college of Severance Hospital at Namdaemun (the South Gate of Seoul), No Sun-gyeong, Kim Sun-ho (alias Kim Hyo-sun), and Lee Sin-do (alias Lee Do-sin) were school mates who joined the demonstration march together. On their PS cards, their place of residence was recorded as "Dormitory of the Nursing School Attached to the Medical College, Namdaemun-*chō* (district), Gyeongseong."

On December 2, 1919, these students participated in the demonstration rally in front of the Royal Ancestral Shrine, Hunjeong-*dong* of Jongno-*gu* of Seoul. They made one Korean national flag and another flag with "Long Live Korean Independence" written in red before heading to the site in the evening. Arriving there, they cried out for Korean independence together with a crowd of 20 people. No Sun-gyeong waved the Korean flag and Kim Sun-ho waved the other flag of Korean independence, encouraging the crowd.[11] Three female school companions were arrested by the Jap-

---

[11] "No Sun-gyeong, Lee Do-sin, Kim Hyo-sun, Park Deok-hye Gyeongseong jibang beopweon pangyeolmun [Verdicts for No Sun-gyeong, Lee Do-sin, Kim Hyo-sun, and Park Deok-hye at Gyeongseong local court]," December 18, 1919, kept at Gukga girokweon [National records archive] (CJA0000417).

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

anese police and sentenced to six months in prison by the Gyeongseong District Court for violation of the security preservation law on December 18, 1919.

A group of female students at the Baehwa Girls' High School also ventured to demonstration meetings, shouting for Korean independence around the school campus (at the hill behind the dormitory and at the front playground) on the morning of March 1, 1920. Twenty-four female students, as listed below, were arrested and put into Seodaemun Prison, *en masse*.

> Lee Su-heui, Kim Gyeong-hwa, Son Yeong-seon, Han Su-ja, Lee Sin-cheon, Kim Maria, An Heui-gyeong, An Ok-ja, Yun Gyeong-ok, Park Ha-gyeong, Mun Sang-ok, Kim Seong-jae, Kim Eui-sun, Lee Yong-yeo, So Eun-suk, Ji Eun-weon, Park Sin-sam, Choe Ran-ssi, So Eun-myeong, Park Yang-sun, Park Kyeong-ja, Seong Hye-ja, Wang Jong-sun, and Lee Nam-gye.
> (In the order of serial number on the original photo films)

Little is known about this incident involving twenty-four female demonstrators. However, their extant PS cards inform us that they were imprisoned at Seodaemun Prison. On the cards, their current residences were all recorded as "the dormitory of the Baehwa Girls' School, Gyeongseong," except for So Eun-myeong, So Eun-suk, and Ji Eun-weon. Living together at the same school, they planned and carried out the demonstration rallies as school companions.

In the meantime, some of the Baehwa school demonstrators came from the same regions. So Eun-suk and So Eun-myeong shared the same permanent address and birthplace at Namgye-*ri* (their homesteads numbered 102nd and 109th, respectively), Gunnae-*myeon*, Yeoncheon-*gun*, Gyeonggi-*do*. Moreover, they shared the character "Eun" in their names, signifying that they belonged to the same generation of sisters. An Heui-gyeong and An Ok-ja also shared the same permanent address and birthplace at Yidonggyo-*ri* (their homesteads numbered 140th and 203rd, respectively), So Heul-*myeon*, Pocheon-*gun*, Gyeonggi-*do*. Son Yeong-seon,

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Lee Sin-cheon, and Lee Yong-nyeo also shared the same permanent address and birthplace at Taetan-*ri* (their homesteads numbered 6th, 8th, and 22nd, respectively), Sokdal-*myeon*, Jangyeon-*gun*, Hwanghae-*do*. Thus, their independence demonstrations on March 1, 1920 were carried out with reinforced cohesion based on their regional and school ties.

All twenty-four demonstrators were indicted of violation against the security preservation law (Article 7 of the Security Preservation Act and Article 42 of the Korean Penal Code, to be specific). The main actors, Lee Su-heui and Kim Gyeong-hwa, were sentenced to one year in prison and a three-year suspension, while the remaining twenty-two participants were sentenced to six months in prison and a two-year suspension.[12] Their punishments were harsh, considering their young ages of fifteen and sixteen and the limited scope of their demonstrations that were confined within the school compound.

V. Conclusion

This paper has examined the status and characteristics of the MFM prisoners imprisoned at Seodaemun Prison by using their PS cards. The Japanese colonial authorities, facing nationwide Korean protests, began compiling PS cards in earnest right after the MFM in order to bring the Korean independence movement under their firm control and to impose surveillance over Korean independence activists by keeping records of their PS cards. Out of a total of the 6,259 PS cards, the PS cards of the 1,013 MFM prisoners were selected for analysis of their entries in this study. As a result, the following conclusions can be drawn.

First, the MFM participants came from all age groups, from teenagers to those in their sixties. Those in their twenties made up the largest group (42 percent), yet their proportion was 15.17 percent less than the

---

[12] "Lee Su-heui deung Gyeongseong jibang beopweon pangyeolmun [Verdicts for Lee Su-heui and others at Gyeongseong local court]," April 5, 1919, kept at Gukga girokweon [National records archive] (CJA0000403); *Maeil sinbo* [Daily newspaper], April 6, 1920; *Sinhan minbo* [New Koreans newspaper], May 7, 1920.

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

overall percentage of all independence activists who were in their twenties at Seodaemun Prison. This means that in the MFM, age groups other than people in their in twenties were relatively active compared to the age groups of the participants in other independence-related activities.

Second, the MFM was joined by Korean people from all walks of life, including both those with high and low social status. A total of approximately seventy occupational categories can be found among the MFM participants, such as students, teachers, and religion followers, who can be regarded as intellectuals, as well as farmers, merchants, self-employed tradesmen, and laborers from lower classes. Participants joined the MFM in their respective localities throughout the country. Remarkably, those working at the lowest hierarchy of the colonial administration, such as subcounty office chiefs and clerks and auxiliary policemen, also joined the MFM, further enforcing the fact that the MFM was joined by Koreans from all walks of life.

Third, the MFM prisoners were classified as "thought criminals" and indicted for violating the security preservation law. Therefore, they were convicted of violations against the security preservation law or disturbance of public order—criminal charges commonly applied to thought crimes. Almost all of them (99 percent) received a prison term longer than six months, and one was sentenced to as long as twelve years. Hence, heavier penalties were imposed on them than on other types of criminal offenders. This harsh treatment of the MFM prisoners reveals that the Japanese colonial authorities regarded the MFM as a politically subversive movement intending to overturn the colonial status quo, not as a collection of simple criminal acts.

Fourth, the solidarity and community based on blood, region, or school ties provided a strong impetus for joining the MFM. As a result of tracking the connections between the MFM prisoners, it is confirmed that many prisoners were connected through family relations, regional affiliation, or school associations. Therefore, it can be argued that participation in the MFM was effectively mediated by social connections based on blood, region, or school ties and that those who shared such ties acted as agents in spreading the MFM across the country.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Taken as a whole, the MFM was of profound political nature, joined by Korean people from all walks of life and united behind the aim of national independence by ending the Japanese colonial regime—going beyond a simple protest movement against the colonial regime.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Dongnip Undongsa Pyeonchan Wiweonhoe [Compilation Committee for History of Independence Movement]. *Dongnip Undongsa* [History of Independence Movement], vol. 2, Goryeo Seorim, 1983.

Guksa Pyeonchan Wiweonhoe [Compilation Committee for National History]. *Hanminjok Dongnip Undongsa Jaryojip Byeoljip*, [Addendum to Materials for History of Korean Independence Movement], vols. 1 to 9, 1993.

"Hi kaiji shiryō chosen Sōtokufu Kankeisha no rokuon kiroku [Unpublished recordings of related persons of the Government General in Korea]" 1 to 13, *Tōyō Bunka Kenkyū* 2 to 14, Gakushūin Daigaku, Tōyō Bunka Kenkyūjo, 2000 to 2012.

"Jeong Ho-seok Gyeongseong jibang beopweon pangyeolmun [Jeong Ho-seok's verdict at Gyeongseong local court]," August 30, 1919, kept at Gukga Girokweon [National Records Archive] (CJA0000401).

"Jeong Ho-seok Gyeongseong boksim beopweon pangyeolmun [Jeong Ho-seok's verdict at Gyeongseong appellate court]," February 27, 1920, kept at Gukga Girokweon [National Records Archive] (CJA0000150).

"Lee Su-heui deung Gyeongseong jibang beopweon pangyeolmun [Verdicts for Lee Su-heui and others at Gyeongseong local court]," April 5, 1919, kept at Gukga Girokweon [National Records Archive] (CJA0000403).

Mail sinbo [Daily Newspaper]. *Sinhan minbo* [New Koreans Newspaper], *Gyeonghyang sinmun* [Capital and Country Newspaper], *Yeonhap nyuseu* [United news].

Nam, Gi-jeong, trans., *Ilje eui Hanguk sabeopbu chimnyak silhwa*, [Real stories of imperial Japan's invasion against Korean judiciary] Yukbeopsa, 1978.

"No Sun-gyeong, Lee Do-sin, Kim Hyo-sun, Park Deok-hye Gyeongseong jibang beopweon pangyeolmun [Verdicts for No Sun-gyeong, Lee Do-sin, Kim Hyo-sun, and Park Deok-hye at Gyeongseong local court]," December 18, 1919, kept at Gukga Girokweon [National Records Archive] (CJA0000417).

Park, Gyeong-mok. "Ilje gangjeomgi Seodaemun hyeongmuso yeosugamja hyeonghwang gwa teukjing [Status and characteristics of the female prisoners at the Seodaemun Prison during the forced Japanese occupation period]," *Hanguk*

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Geunhyeondaesa Yeongu 68 (2014).

_____. Ilje gangjeomgi Seodaemun hyeongmuso yeongu. [Study on the Seodaemun Prison during the forced Japanese occupation period], Ph. D. diss., Chungnam Daehakgyo, 2015.

_____. "Ilje gangjeomgi Seodaemun hyeongmuso sugamja hyeonhwang gwa teukjing [Status and characteristics of the prisoners at the Seodaemun Prison during the forced Japanese occupation period]," *Hanguk geunhyeondaesa yeongu* 78, Hankguk Geunhyeondaesa Hakhoe, 2016.

Park, Geol-sun. "Daehoji, Cheoneui jangteo 4.4 dongnip manse undong eui 3.1 undongsa eseoeuiwichi [Stance of the April 4 independence march at the Cheoneui marketplace at Daehoji in the March First Movement]," *Dangjin jinjuyeok hangil dongnip undong gwa sajeokji* [Anti-Japanese independence movement in Dangjin area, and its historical sites], Dangjin-si: Chunnamdae Chungcheong Munhwa Yeonguso, 2017.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

A Catalyst for the March First Independence Movement: Lyuh Woon-hyung's Letter and Petition to Charles Crane

Byung-joon JUNG
Ewha Womans University

The Journal of Northeast Asian History
Volume 15 Number 1 (Winter 2018), 73-112

Copyright © 2018 by the Northeast Asian History Foundation. All Rights Reserved.
No portion of the contents may be reproduced in any form without written permission of the Northeast Asian History Foundation.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

A Catalyst for the March First Independence Movement: Lyuh Woon-hyung's Letter and Petition to Charles Crane*

Byung-joon JUNG
Ewha Womans University

I. Letter and Petition Revealed after Ninety-nine Years

On November 27, 1918, Lyuh Woon-hyung attended the welcoming reception for Charles Crane, a friend of the American President Woodrow Wilson, held at the Carlton Café on Ningbo Road in Shanghai. The visit by President Wilson's envoy added to the festive mood in Shanghai due to Germany's recent surrender on November 11 that ended World War I. Crane was an avid supporter of President Wilson and believed in his Fourteen Points, including his idea of national self-determination. Meeting with Crane altered Lyuh Woon-hyung's path in life.

Two days after meeting Crane, Lyuh asked Crane to deliver a petition on his behalf to President Wilson. Lyuh also handed a copy of the petition to the Shanghai-based journalist Thomas Millard, asking him to submit it to the Paris Peace Conference. Lyuh then invited Kim Kyu-sik to Shanghai and sent him to represent Korea at the peace conference. These seeds Lyuh and Kim planted would later develop into the March First Independence Movement. Lyuh Woon-hyung, an obscure Presbyterian minister, and Kim Kyu-sik, an employee of a foreign trading company, thus became independence activists central to the 1919 March First Independence Movement in

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Korea.

The general story behind Lyuh's meeting with Crane and his petition is public knowledge. The story was covered in statements and testimonies Lyuh gave while being interrogated and tried by the Japanese police and prosecution between 1929 and 1930.[1] It was also mentioned in the account of Lyuh's life that Yi Man-gyu, Lyuh's friend and relation by marriage, authored after Korea's liberation. The critical biography of Lyuh written by his younger brother Lyuh Woon-hong in the 1960s also includes recollections about the meeting and petition.[2] In addition, scholars have examined the story while studying the New Korean Young Men's Association and the March First Independence Movement.[3]

However, the story leaves room for doubt for the following reasons.

First, existing descriptions mention nothing about what happened to the original copy of the petition after Lyuh handed it to Crane. Moreover, the date when Lyuh and Crane met as well as the date when the petition was handed differs between such descriptions.

Second, Yi Man-gyu was the first to claim that the petition Lyuh

---

* This paper is a shortened revision of Jung Byung-joon's "Letter and Petition of Lyuh, Woon-hyung to Charles Crane on November 1918," *Critical Review of History*, 119 (May 2017).

1 Reports of interrogating Lyuh Woon-hyung at the Gyeonggi Provincial Police Agency, the Prosecutions Bureau under the Seoul District Court, the Seoul District Court, and the Seoul Court of Review are included in Hamyang lyuhssi daejonghoe [Hamyang Lyuh clan], *Mongyang Lyuh Woon-hyung jeonjib* [The Collected Writings of Mongyang Lyuh Woon-hyung], ed. Mongyang Lyuh Woon-hyung seonsaeng jeonjib balganwiwonhoe [Publication Committee for the Collected Writings of Mongyang Lyuh Woon-hyung] 1, 3 vols. (Seoul: Hanul, 1991).

2 Yi Man-gyu, *Lyuh Woon-hyung seonsaeng tujaengsa* [The History of Lyuh Woon-hyung's Struggles], Reprint (Seoul: Minju munhwasa, 1946); Lyuh Woon-hong, *Mongyang Lyuh Woon-hyung* (Cheonghagak, 1967).

3 Shin Yong-ha, "Sinhan cheongnyeondan eui dongnip eundong [The New Korean Young Men's Association's Independence Activities]," *Hanguk hakbo* [Journal of Korean Studies] 12, no. 3 (Autumn 1986): 94-142; Kim Hee-gon, "Sinhan cheongnyeondang eui gyeolseong gwa hwaldong [The New Korean Young Men's Association's Formation and Activities]," *Hanguk dongnip undongsa yeongu* [The Journal of the Korean Independence Movement] 1 (1986): 141-75; Nagata Akifumi, *Ilbon eui joseontongchi wa gukjegwangye* [The Rule of Korea by Japan and the International Relations], trans. Park Hwan-mu, Korean Translation (Seoul: Ilchogak, 2008); Lee Chong-sik, *Lyuh Woon-hyung: Sidae wa sangsang eul chowol han yunghwajueuija* [Lyuh Woon-hyung: The Korean Harmonist] (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 2008).

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

handed Millard was never submitted to the Paris Peace Conference because it fell into the hands of the Japanese police when Millard stopped by Yokohama on his way to Paris. Lyuh Woon-hong echoed Yi Man-gyu's argument, which then came to be recited by scholars later on. However, this argument does not quite concur with the circumstances Millard had been in at the time.

Third, despite having been chosen by Lyuh and his associates to attend the Paris Peace Conference, there is speculation that Kim Kyu-sik did not submit Lyuh's petition because he did not agree with its approach. Such speculation suggests that Kim had a different idea for the petition, which he intended to discuss with Rhee Syng-man instead of Lyuh Woon-hyung.[4]

The aforementioned reasons for doubt, however, are likely to be faulty or based on misunderstanding. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to use newly uncovered material to correct inaccuracies or supplement insufficiencies in the preceding research.

To do so, this paper will first introduce the original copies of the letter and petition Lyuh handed to Crane. The introduction will be followed by an analysis of the background to and significance behind drafting the letter and petition. The original copies consulted for this paper are located at the Rare Book and Manuscript Library of Columbia University.[5] They are being disclosed for the first time since Lyuh handed them to Crane ninety-nine years ago.

This paper will thereafter attempt to offer an interpretation different from the widely accepted view regarding the whereabouts of the petition Lyuh gave to Millard. This will entail considering the possibility that other versions of Lyuh's petition may exist and if so, where they might be.

---

[4] Ku Dae-yeol, *Korea Under Colonialism: The March First Movement and Anglo-Japanese Relations* (Seoul: Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1985): 40-41; Ku Dae-yeol, *Hanguk gukjegwangyesa yeongu* [A History of Korea's International Relations] 1 (Seoul: Yeoksa Bipyeongsa, 1995): 233-35.

[5] "Lyuh, W. H., 29 November 1918," Series I: Charles Richard Crane Correspondence, Subseries 1: Incoming Correspondence, Box 3, Folder 23, Crane Family Papers 1877-1986, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

This paper will also offer a new take on the relationship between Kim Kyu-sik and Lyuh Woon-hyung around the time the Paris Peace Conference took place and what roles they respectively played. Doing so is relevant to the study of how actions and developments overseas inspired the March First Independence Movement to occur and spread throughout Korea.

II. Crane's Visit to Shanghai as President Wilson's Envoy

Charles Richard Crane (1858-1939) was a sponsor and friend of President Wilson who visited Japan, Joseon (Korea), and China in 1918. Although he had no official title, many considered him as an envoy to promote Wilson's postwar policy called the Fourteen Points and that his 1918 visit to China was to prepare himself as the future United States Minister to China.[6] According to Frank Baldwin's description, "Crane added to the impression that he was an unofficial emissary of Wilson's by his unlimited praise for Wilson and the Allied war aims and his obvious confidence in, and support for, Wilson's principles." At each meeting, Crane would speak "always on the topic of the moment —Wilson, the Peace Conference, and a just peace."[7]

Crane had previously been sent on diplomatic missions to China in 1909 and Russia in 1912. He also served as a member of the Root Commission sent to Russia in 1917 to assess the newly established Kerensky government. Crane's visit to China in 1918 was aimed at detecting issues in the Far East in order to advise President Wilson. For that particular visit, there were no secret missions nor did any secret meetings take place.[8]

According to Crane's memoirs, Crane told President Wilson in the

---

6 Frank Prentiss Baldwin, "The March First Movement: Korean Challenge and Japanese Response" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1969), 33.

7 Ibid.

8 "Editorial statement regarding Mr. Crane's purpose in visiting China," Millard's Review of the Far East, November 30, 1918.

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

spring of 1918 that "All the attention of our people is directed to the Western Front. No one is paying any attention to what's going on in the Far East and as I followed affairs out there more or less I know of many things that are being done that ought not to be done. It may be worthwhile knowing something about the actual situation and I think I will go out there for a time." Wilson approved of Crane's plan and that was the beginning of Crane's journey to Hawaii, the Philippines, Japan, Korea, Manchuria, China, and back to Japan.[9]

Crane stopped by Hawaii and the Philippines on his twenty-one-day voyage by boat. Upon arriving in Japan, he met an old friend in Yokohama and traveled to Kyoto and Nara. The beauty of Kyoto and Nara had not changed since he last visited them four decades ago, but the same could not be said about Japan.[10]

Crane departed for Korea from Shimonoseki. Later, he noted that he was "deeply impressed by the beauty and grace of Korean life and by the Korean people."[11] One evening, the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) hosted a dinner party at a beautiful old Korean palace where there were ten Koreans, ten Japanese, and ten Americans. Based on Crane's account of passing on to a wide balcony looking down on a moonlit lake, the old Korean palace must have been Gyeongbokgung. Apart from a Korean story a Korean gentleman from an old family told him, Crane mentions in his memoirs that he "heard much in Korea of the ruthlessness of the Japanese and the way they did everything possible to break the spirit of these refined people" and that "the oppression of the spirit of the upper classes was even more harsh than the political and economic oppression of the lower classes."[12]

---

9 Charles Richard Crane, "China-1918," in *Memoirs of Charles R. Crane*, Columbia University Rare Book and Manuscript Library: 339. This 612-page memoir is accessible online at https://ia801404.us.archive.org/17/items/ldpd_10973088_000/ldpd_10973088_000.pdf. Accessed on April 20, 2017.

10 Ibid., 340-41.

11 Ibid., 342.

12 Ibid., 342-43; The old story went like this. Once upon a time a Korean king heard that there was a great deal of trouble between the wives and husbands of his town. So he sent a command

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

When Crane arrived in Beijing, he received a warm welcome from Paul Reinsch, the American Minister to China. Crane continued to travel to Shenyang, Harbin, Nanjing, Xuzhou, and Hangzhou. He arrived in Shanghai on November 26, two days ahead of Thanksgiving Day, and left two days later on the evening of the twenty-eighth.[13] It must have been a sea change for him to see Shanghai again in 1918, twenty-eight years after his first visit to the city. The following describes Crane's schedule over his three-day stay in Shanghai.[14]

On November 26, Crane arrived at the Shanghai train station where he was greeted by a Chinese diplomat, military and naval officers, and various American government officials. A Chinese military band, as well as soldiers, was lined up alongside 180 students from an American school in Shanghai. The students had come at the suggestion of Thomas Sammons, the American consul general in Shanghai, and Crane was indeed pleased to have them welcome him at such a grand ceremony. He gave a brief speech. Despite his short stay in Shanghai, Crane left a favorable impression on the locals. Sammons pointed out that the reason the Chinese were so hospitable toward Crane was because he was introduced as a personal friend to President Wilson, who was admired worldwide. The day Crane arrived, Sammons hosted an official welcoming dinner at the Shanghai Club where

---

throughout the town for all the Korean men to appear at the palace gate the next morning and when they assembled he went down to them. Then he said to the men, "Now I want all of those who obey their wives to go over and stand under the blue flag and all of those who do not obey their wives to stand under the red flag." Practically all the men crowded up under the blue flag but one lone little man walked over and stood under the red flag. When the king asked what the little man was doing under the red flag, he answered "Well, as I left the house this morning my wife told me I must avoid crowds." The gentleman from the Korean YMCA who told Crane such a witty story is likely to have been Yi Sang-jae or Yun Chi-ho. Yun Chi-ho kept a diary of his YMCA activities, but it contains nothing about Crane's visit to Korea.

13 American Consulate General, Shanghai (Thomas Sammons) to Secretary of State (Robert Lansing), "Visit of Honorable Charles R. Crane to Shanghai," 30 November 1918, State Department Decimal Files, 1910-1929, Box 307, 032.C85, Record Group 59 (hereafter RG 59), National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter NARA).

14 Information on Crane's schedule in Shanghai was also gathered from "Hon. Charles R. Crane's Visit to Shanghai," Millard's Review of the Far East, 30 November 1918, State Department Decimal Files, 1910-1929, Box 307, 032.C85, RG 59, NARA.

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

prominent public and private Chinese as well as foreign officials were present.

On November 27, Chinese organizations and the American University Club jointly hosted a welcoming luncheon for Crane at the Carlton Café. According to what was reported by Millard's Review of the Far East, 325 people attended the luncheon, making it the largest yet welcoming event to be held in Shanghai. Two-thirds of the attendees were Chinese. In the evening, the American Chamber of Commerce in China hosted a dinner reception at the Columbia Country Club with Crane as the guest of honor, which was attended by around one hundred American businessmen in Shanghai.

On the morning of November 28, Crane gave a speech at the American Thanksgiving celebration in front of his largest ever audience during his visit to Shanghai.[15] He highlighted the importance of defending China's constitution and strengthening China's administrative structure to do so, stressing that it would serve as the roof for protecting China's interests. The Chinese cheered keenly in response to Crane's speech. The American Thanksgiving celebration held at the Holy Trinity Cathedral saw the largest yet crowd of nearly 800 people gather for the occasion that day. In his memoirs, Crane noted that the event was attended by well-known politicians and members of distinguished families in China, including Sun Wen (孫文), Tang Shaoyi (唐紹儀), and Kong Xiangxi (孔祥熙).[16] Consul Generals from the Allied Powers were also officially invited guests at the celebration. In the afternoon, Crane gave another speech to prominent Chinese entrepreneurs at the American Chamber of Commerce. In the evening, he met with eminent Chinese figures at the official residence of Julean Arnold, a commercial attaché working at the American consulate, where Crane was staying. This list of events that occurred during Crane's 1918 visit to Shanghai was surmised from the report by the American Consul General in Shanghai and Millard's Review of the Far East.

---

15 "Speech by Charles Crane," 28 November 1918, Records of the Department of State Relating to World War I and Its Termination, 1914-1929, State Department Decimal File, 763.72119/3978, MF 367, Roll 393, RG 59, NARA.

16 Crane, *Memoirs of Charles R. Crane*, 353.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

The date Lyuh Woon-hyung met Crane at the Carlton Café was previously thought to be November 28.[17] However, according to the schedule listed above, the date Crane attended the welcoming luncheon at the Carlton Café was November 27.

This is how Lyuh remembered his meeting with Crane eleven years later while being interrogated by the Japanese authorities. "A welcoming reception for Crane was jointly hosted by the Shanghai diplomatic corps and the Pan-Pacific Conference" at the Carlton Café on Ningbo Road in Shanghai, where about a thousand people had gathered for the occasion. "Anyone from the Shanghai International Settlement was allowed to attend free of charge." Because the son of Fitch who managed the Mission Book Company where Lyuh worked was a member of the Pan-Pacific Conference, Lyuh stated that he too attended as a member of the conference.[18]

The son Lyuh referred to must have been George A. Fitch, whose father George F. Fitch worked as manager at the Mission Book Company. George A. Fitch headed the Chinese YMCA for many years, and the Millard's Review also mentioned that the one who introduced Lyuh to Crane had been "a member of the Chinese YMCA."[19]

III. Lyuh and Crane's Meeting on November 27, 1918

Lyuh Woon-hyung was greatly impressed by the speech Charles Crane

---

17 Nagata, *Ilbon eui joseontongchi wa gukjegwangye*, 101; Lee, *Lyuh Woon-hyung*, 152-53.

18 "Interrogation Report no. 1," July 8, 1929, Gyeonggi Provincial Police Agency; "Interrogation Report no. 5," August 5, 1929, Prosecutions Bureau under the Seoul District Court; "Interrogation Report no. 1 (Report of trial)," February 22, 1930, Seodaemun Prison from Hamyang Lyuhssi daejonghoe, *Mongyang Lyuh Woon-hyung jeonjib*, 409, 508, 560.

19 George A. Fitch was born on January 23, 1883 in Sozhou, China as the son of missionaries George F. Fitch and Mary McLellan Fitch. After spending his childhood in China, he went to study in the United States and graduated from Wooster Academy and College, Columbia University, and the Union Theological Seminary. He returned to China to work with the YMCA in Shanghai and later became a central figure within the Chinese YMCA. Fitch was sympathetic toward and supported the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai as well as Korean independence movements. For more, see George A. Fitch, *My Eighty Years in China* (Taipei: Mei Ya Publications, 1967).

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

gave at the welcoming luncheon. A summary of that speech can be found in Millard's Review. Crane spoke of President Wilson's approach to world issues. Once a topic was determined, President Wilson would consider it to the extreme before moving on to the next topic. That was how President Wilson would gain a surprisingly deep level of knowledge by the time he arrived at a policy decision, which is what made him a great, eminent personality of the world. Crane emphasized that President Wilson was trying to build a world republic based not on force, but on justice and mutual understanding. The one piece of advice Crane offered China was that it should be well prepared for the Paris Peace Conference to prevent anyone from interfering with its plans.[20] This is what Lyuh Woon-hyung later recalled about Crane's speech at the Carlton Café while being interrogated by the Japanese authorities.

> Crane mentioned how each country was striving to fulfill a critical mission through the peace conference to be held in Paris, which is likely to have major consequences. The conference would be aimed at removing emotional misunderstandings between different countries to bring about true world peace and because the conference will highlight the need to liberate oppressed peoples, it will be the best opportunity for such peoples to achieve liberation. Crane therefore suggested that China should aim for its own liberation by sending a representative to the conference to describe the oppression it has suffered. - Interrogation Report no. 1 (July 8, 1929, Gyeonggi Provincial Police Agency)[21]

The Chinese were heartened. Lyuh was also impressed and was able to meet Crane in a separate room because of having been especially introduced to Crane by the Chinese diplomat Wang Zhengting (王正廷).[22] Remaining interrogation reports include accounts with various nuances about

---

[20] "Editorial statement regarding Mr. Crane's purpose in visiting China," Millard's Review of the Far East, November 30, 1918.

[21] Hamyang Lyuhssi daejonghoe, *Mongyang Lyuh Woon-hyung jeonjib*, 409.

[22] Yi, *Lyuh Woon-hyung Seonsaeng Tujaengsa*, 21.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

the conversation Lyuh had with Crane.

> I told him how tremendously inspiring his speech was and how we too are oppressed people who wish to achieve liberation by sending a representative to make Korea's situation known and earn sympathy from other countries. When I asked whether Korea might encounter any problems in sending a representative to the conference, he said he expected none and that Korea should by all means send one because he would be more than capable of lending support.[23]

Lyuh Woon-hyung wished to send a Korean representative to the Paris Peace Conference to earn sympathy from the participating countries and thereby achieve liberation. What can be gathered from Charles Crane's response to Lyuh's questions is as follows: (1) On the matter of oppressed peoples, the Paris Peace Conference will deal with abstract generalities instead of referring to specific countries; (2) It is uncertain as to whether the matter of Korea will be formally selected as an item of discussion at the Paris Peace Conference; (3) There should be no problems with sending a Korean representative and submitting a petition to the Paris Peace Conference; and (4) If Korea does send a representative, he will offer his support.[24]

Crane's comments were somewhat vague. Considering his rank and position, Crane would not have been able to support a Korean representative at the Paris Peace Conference. In addition, because Crane had so many events to attend and crowds to face during his brief stay in Shanghai, there is no telling whether he gave Lyuh precise, detailed advice.[25]

According to Frank Baldwin, Lyuh did come and personally talk with

---

[23] Hamyang Lyuhssi Daejonghoe, *Mongyang Lyuh Woon-hyung jeonjib*, 409-10.

[24] Ibid., 409-10, 505-11.

[25] During his visit to China, Crane met and spoke to thousands of Chinese officials of various rank as well as businessmen. He also met without appointment any official, businessman, or missionary from the United States, Britain, Russia, France, Japan, and Italy who wished to speak with him. See "Editorial statement regarding Mr. Crane's purpose in visiting China," Millard's Review of the Far East, November 30, 1918.

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Crane at the reception, but because Crane was too busy, he asked Lyuh to write and send him a message later. Lyuh consulted other Koreans and drafted a petition in the name of the New Korean Young Men's Association. One of them brought the petition to where Crane was staying and left it with one of Crane's assistants, asking that it be delivered to President Wilson.[26]

Lyuh Woon-hyung was greatly buoyed by Crane's sympathy toward China's situation and his suggestion to send a representative to the Paris Peace Conference. The festive mood in Shanghai due to the end of World War I and the Chinese society's enthusiastic welcoming of Crane as Wilson's envoy is likely to have felt promising as well. Moreover, Lyuh must have come to hold detailed expectations for the Paris Peace Conference because of the way Crane highlighted Wilson's fourteen points, especially in terms of national self-determination and the liberation of oppressed peoples. Such expectations must have led Lyuh to hope it would be possible to send a Korean representative to Paris, make colonial Korea's situation known, and gain enough sympathy from the Allied Powers to liberate Korea.

Such positive expectations and the mood of the times prompted Lyuh to begin seeking diplomatic ways to launch an independence movement by sending a Korean representative to the peace conference and petitioning for Korea's independence.

IV. Lyuh's Letter to Crane on November 29, 2018

After meeting Charles Crane, the first person Lyuh Woon-hyung went to meet was Jang Deok-su, who had been in Shanghai since the summer of 1918. Lyuh relayed the details of Crane's speech and his meeting with Crane. He then suggested to Jang that a Korean representative be sent to the Paris Peace Conference. In case enough travel expenses could not be raised to send one, he also proposed that they should report about Korea's

---

[26] Baldwin, "The March First Movement," 35.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

situation in writing. Below is from Lyuh's recollection of what he discussed with Jang.

> At the time, it was impossible to send a representative on my own, so we created two copies of a petition aimed at reporting about and earning sympathy for Joseon's situation. We arranged for one copy to be delivered to President Wilson, and in case it became impossible to send a representative to the peace conference, we entrusted the other copy's delivery with Millard, the editor-in-chief of the English language weekly Millard's Review of the Far East published in Shanghai (Millard had come from the United States and served as an adviser to the Chinese delegation to be sent to the peace conference.) - Interrogation Report no. 2 (August 1, 1929, Prosecutions Bureau under the Seoul District Court).[27]

In essence, Lyuh Woon-hyung and Jang Deok-su made two copies of a petition and sent one to President Wilson through Crane and the other to the Paris Peace Conference through Millard. According to the statement Lyuh gave while being interrogated by the Japanese, he spent three days drafting the petition at Jang's place at Beile Road within the French Concession.[28] Although Lyuh was older and therefore entitled to take the lead, Jang wrote the petition because he was more knowledgeable.[29] Once Jang finished writing the petition, Lyuh translated it into English, typed it, and signed the petition.[30]

At this point, it seems necessary to consider the copy of Lyuh Woon-hyung's letter and petition kept at Columbia University. To Crane, Lyuh sent a total of five pages, a one-page letter and an untitled four-page petition. Several copies of Lyuh's petition exist and their content has partly

---

27 Hamyang Lyuhssi daejonghoe, *Mongyang Lyuh Woon-hyung jeonjib*, 467-70.

28 "Interrogation Report no. 1 (Report on trial)," February 22, 1930, Seodaemun Prison from Hamyang Lyuhssi daejonghoe, *Mongyang Lyuh Woon-hyung jeonjib*, 560.

29 Hamyang Lyuhssi daejonghoe, *Mongyang Lyuh Woon-hyung jeonjib*, 505, 602.

30 According to Yi Man-gyu's account, Lyuh Woon-hyung drafted two copies of the petition in English with help from Cho Dong-ho, Jang Deok-su, and Shin Guk-gwon, then had the copies proofread by George A. Fitch. See Yi, *Lyuh Woon-hyung seonsaeng tujaengsa*, 22.

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

been disclosed, but the copy kept at Columbia University has never been disclosed prior to this paper's publication. Below is a list of the existing copies of Lyuh's petition, which includes two copies in English, one copy in Korean mixed with Korean-Chinese characters, and one copy in Japanese.

I. Letter (November 29, 1918):
   1. English: Crane Family Papers 1877-1986 at Columbia University.[31] (Figure 1)

II. Petition (November 28, 1918):
   1. English: Crane Family Papers 1877-1986 at Columbia University. (Figure 2)
   2. English: RG 165 at the National Archives and Records Administration.[32]
   3. English: Thomas Millard's Democracy and the Eastern Question.[33]
   4. Korean with Korean-Chinese Characters: First issue of *Sinhan cheongnyeon* (新韓青年) (December 1, 1919).[34]
   5. Japanese: "On the submission of a petition for independence" (獨立請願書提出二關又ル件) Affairs (January 15, 1920) at the Diplomatic Archives of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign.[35]

---

[31] "Lyuh, W. H., 29 November 1918," Series I: Charles Richard Crane Correspondence, Subseries 1: Incoming Correspondence, Box 3, Folder 23, Crane Family Papers 1877-1986, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University.

[32] File 1766-1391-3, Box. 544, Correspondence, 1917-1941, Military Intelligence Division, RG 165, NARA.

[33] Thomas F. Millard, *Democracy and the Eastern Question: The Problem of the Far East as Demonstrated by the Great War, and Its Relation to the United States of America* (New York: The Century Co., 1919): 38-40.

[34] Lyuh Woon-hyung, "Sinhan cheongnyeondang caepyo chi miguk daetongnyeong wiil sonseo" [The Message from the Representative of the New Korean Young Men's Association to the United States President], *Sinhan cheongnyeon* [The Young Korea], December 1, 1919.

[35] Chosen sotokufu keimu kyokucho [Head of the Japanese Government-General of Korea's Police Bureau] to Haniwara Masanao (Gaimu jikan) [Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister], "Futeidan kankei zakken-chosenjin no bu-shanhai kariseifu" [On the submission of a petition for independence], 15 January 1920, Ichigatsu nanoka Heian-hokudo chiji hokoku yoshi [Summary of the North Pyongan Province Governor's January 7 Report], Overseas information alert no. 648.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Regarding the letter, it was dated November 29, 1918 and personally signed by Lyuh as "W. H. Lyuh." Below is the full text of the one-page letter Lyuh typed.

> Shanghai, Nov. 29th. 1918.
> Mr. C. R. Crane,
> Dear Sir: -
> Your coming to China we welcomed with all the warmth of our hearts. We want to pay our homage to your noble character and farsightedness. We respect for your being a personal friend of President Wilson, who is the greatest upholder of the Justice and Liberty in the world, and also for your occupying a high position in your government, which is so closely related with Asia. So we welcome you with heart and soul.
>
> Asia, as you know, is the place, where innumerable wrongs, both political and economical [economic], have been done for many years, and they are, we regret to say, still left unredressed and remained a great mystery. There are, therefore, many things to be righted and settled.
>
> Pray give an ear, Mr. Crane, to the appeals of the Asians, especially of us Koreans, who have been, and still are, under a terrible oppressed rule and yet nearly forgotten and unobserved by the world. Thereby please be kind enough to convey this condition, as described in the accompanying papers, to President Wilson and your fellow citizens.
>
> It is a great regret to us that, on account of your being too busy, we could not personally receive you. We can do no better at present than to wish you a pleasant and safe journey to your country and a great success in your future.
> Very respectfully yours,
> The New Korean Young Men's Association in China
> Secretary
> W. H. Lyuh

The letter has been typed on white, letter-size paper and is presumed to be the oldest surviving original copy made by Lyuh. Oxidization has

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION



Shanghai, Nov. 29th. 1918.

Mr. C. R. Crane,

Dear Sir:-

Your coming to China was welcomed with all the warmth of our hearts. We want to pay our homage to [illegible] personal friend of President Wilson, who is the greatest upholder of the Justice and Liberty in the world, and also for your occupying a high position in your government, which is so closely related with Asia. So we welcomed you with heart and soul.

Asia, as you know, is the place, where innumerable wrongs, both political and economical, have been done for many years, and they are, we regret to say, still left unredressed and remained a great mystery. There are, therefore, many things to be rightied and settled. I beg give an ear, Mr. Crane, to the appeals of the Asians, especially of us Koreans, who have been, and still are, under a terribly oppressed rule and yet nearly forgotten and unobserved by the world. Thereby please be kind enough to convey this condition, as described in the accompanying papers, to President Wilson and your fellow citizens.

It is a great regret to us that, on account of your being too busy, we could not personally receive you. We can do no better at present than to wish you a pleasant and safe journey to your country and a great success in your future.

Very respectfully yours,

The New Korean Young Men's Association
in China.

Secretary,
W. H. Lyuh

Figure 1. Lyuh Woon-hyung's Letter to Charles Crane (November 29, 1918)

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

The great world war is,at last , over. It is indeed the greatest confliot and sacrifice since the world began.and we thank God that He has worked and smitten the Devils x to dust and the world is cleared of evils through the war. The voice of Righteousness and Liberty was exalted to Heaven and its reward come in the form of a complete victory. We offer our heartfelt thanks to the great accomplishment of the Allies and especially to the Americans for their high spirit and noble action during the war. And the victory was, it must be said,much due to the Americans . So our heartest congratulation to you and your country men.

The world is going to open a new page of its great history .It is going to start a new progress with new spirit and new arrangement.An eternal world peace called the League of Nations as advocated by President Wilson will be discussed at the coming peace conferenceain Europe.Thus we are going to enter the greatest epoch in the world history.

It would not be out of place to seriously consider now how Korea and Japan are related with world peace.

Let us consider Japan first.Japan has only two thousand and five hundred years of history. She received her civilisation from Korea, such as religion, morality , art, industry and like, and this civilisation is acknowledged by her. She had been governed at first by civil statesmen,but gradually militarists came to power, and the so-called" shogunate" predominated for more than one thousand years. Thus the Japanese had lived under the militarism till Meiji restored the sovereignty about fifty years ago. Then what kind of national spirit they have! They accustomed only to despotism,militarism, bureaucratism and imperialism. Thus liberty , righteousness and humanity are foreign to them,and the noble idea of the League of Nations can not be fully realised. Notwithstanding that they have a constitutional government they firmly believe in the Divine rights of King. Yet they claim to be one of the most civilized and advanced peoples of world.Before the Russo-Japanese war broken out, the true condition of Japan had not been known to the world. They are not merely lovers of flower and beauty, but they are the Spartans of Asia.

What is their aim and desire ? What can we expect from such a people? They declare themselves as ruler of Asia and intend to fly their flag in the centre of China. Manchuria has been already placed at her disposal and Mongolia is under her influence . They are applying the Monroe-doctrine to Asia in the wrong way.That was the aim of the twenty one demands to China and the American Japanese declaration lately made by Ishii,utilising the time when the powers were busily engaged in the great war. It was nothing but to obtain the superior position in China.They are pledging and advocating the open door and equalm chance policy,yet they are not to be trusted. This can be easily proven by the annexation of Korea. There they are expanding their power, they admit no competition . This is so in Korea and formose. In a word,it is their plan to exclude any other's influence from ASIA .

They have in mind not only Asia,but the archipelagoes in the South Sea , Formosa being their main footing . They consider those islands as their ancestor's native land, so they have taken oath to get them back. To carry this into effect some way or other they have expanded their naval power and not to self-defend as they declared. In this way they are dreaming to establish a world empire,for which they would fight against the United States of America or put the Anglo-Japanese treaty to naught. It was not an incident but a reality that Terauchi once spoke of the German Japanese alliance. From this we can see that their opposition to the League of Nations is not because they do not understand it fully,but because they have such an ambition.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION



2.

The Japanese are so excelled in concealing their real schemes that one is apt to be misled. Thus their national spirit and intention clearly show that they are the menace to th e peace of the world at large. The chief factor of their late expansion was the munitions possession of Korea. It was indeed a great misfortune that the world should have been mute in her annexation of Korea. Therefore she became dangerous to the peace of Asia and will remain such so long as Korea is in the grip of her hands.

Then how about Korea ? Korea is a peninsula connected to the continent of Asia and extended out to the Pacific Ocean and occupies so important a position over looking both the continent and ocean that its nomination of the Balkan peninsula was justifiable, for the possessor of it is placed in a favourable position to overcast Asia. Especially Korea is griping the throat of Japan, and so without Korea the Japanese army and navy will be rendered lame, which fact was shown in the Chino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars.

What kind of people are the Koreans? Their history began long before the christian era, namely four thousand and two hundreds years ago. They taught Japanese and have co-operated with China in developing the civilization of Asia. Their first empire was established in Manchuria with territories along the North-eastern coast of China. They had been as brave as the Romans, but cruelty was unknown to them, being taught to be peacefull by Tankun, the founder of their country. They are called the " Italian of Japan ". Like the old Greeks, they love art and peace to such an extent that they have been deprived of their freedom and they are now toiling under the brutal rule without any chance of being developed.

After the Russo-Japanese War three different treaties were formed between Korea and Japan in 1905, 1907 and 1910 which gave the way to the annexation. From the time when we, the Koreans, first came into contact with the Japanese up to the time of annexation, Japanese were ringing nothing but "Peace, Peace" and the final outcome was the destruction of our country. Their words are sweet, their hearts were bitter.

The present condition of Korea may be described in three parts;- 1. Spiritually.

Knowing that a nation depends on the spirit of its citizens the Japanese are trying in every way to stop our spiritual development. Christianity in Korea has been recognized as the national religion, from which we have learned the meaning of democracy and the value of liberty. Since the American missionaries introduced our people to the Saviour of the world, the number of christians has grown steadily and no fear that there are now more than help million of people living under the light of life. Thus christianity is playing the most important role in our spiritual development. But in Korea christianity itself is in state of persecution by the Buddhist or Shintoist ruler. For example, in 1911, about two hundred of best christians were arrested and imprisoned giving the pretext of conspiracy against Terauchi the then governor-general. To every church the Japanese send two or three spies to overhear what preachers preach and pray. On the other hand, Buddism, Confucianism and Shintoism are strongly encouraged among the Koreans. But finding that this plan, being behind time, can not succeed, they employ and send the Japanese pastors to Korea not to preach but to bend their whole effort in assimilation. They even force us to worship their king as a God to our greatest pain.

There is only one news paper in our own language in Korea, but even that is managed and published under Japanese administration. Magazines are not allowed: even though it be allowed , it can not give any benefit to Koreans, for the protocols should becarefully examined by the police before publishing.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Public meetings are absolutely forbidden in any place and at any time. Not a single university nor a library club~~s~~ exists in Korea. There are four colleges being ~~k~~ run by the government, but literature, history and politics are noy taught,but merely vocational education,and they can admit no more than eight or nine hundred students. There are only 17 three middle schools, but very low graded.more over,all the lessons are taught in Japanese. How a waste of national ability it is!Their purpose of educating us is to enhance our loyalty to their empire and not to guide us to become good citizens. It is needless to say that bible teaching is not allowed in either christian or non-christian schools,even English is prohibited last the Koreans know the affairs of the world. so the Koreans are both"blind" and"deaf" to the current movement of the world civilization. Under such conditions how can you expect the Koreans to be cultivated and uplifted?

ll. Politically,

It is safe to say that Korea is governed by police and soldiers. We have neither right nor liberty,but the duty of paying taxes. There is no safty even for private houses and letters.There is neither parliament nor municipality,so the wrongs done by the brutal Japanese policy are nowhere to be appealed and redressed, ALL the laws and affairs are made and executed by the few of the Japanese officers and no Koreans has any part in it. Thus you can imagine what kind of life the XXXXXX Koreans are living.

lll. Economically,

Co-operation is the fundamental principles of economics,but the Japanese do not allow the Koreans to co-operate themselves the minimum of capitalis placed so high for corporation by the law that an ordinary Korean can not effort to start it.And in case he can effort to do so,hamix his inexperience will turn him out a feilure. Thus we have no company or factory that can be called a corporation.The Koreans, in this way, are compelled to make their living by only cultivating the land and the land ,as you know,is capital of agriculture. But so many Japanese imigrantsare coming over every year that very soon all the land shall be occupied by them. And lack of capital being Color,no mines are allowed to be opened by the Koreans. The Japanese announce to the world that they are helping Korea financially, but it is nominal; on the contrary,they are profiting greatly by exporting our national wealths to their country and imposing heavy taxes on us. ~~K~~ Thus Korea is drained of her money and resources rapidly, and difficulty of living has therefore been the inevitable result.

understanding that they can not JAPanise the Koreans , the Japanese are trying to destroy Korea by these cruel policies,which are their own invention. What is,then,left for koreans to do? They are lost in a maze. Yet they are not despondent and indeed nothing can discourage them. They struggle with all their hearts,minds and bodies for independance, justice and peace.For this we are crying to the conscience of the world, especialy to the Americans who uphold the grand principle of President Wilson that a nation should be ruled in accordance with the governed. As long as Japan practices these cruel policies the world peace which we so much desire can never be realized.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION



4

In conclusion we declare that we are not conquered, but more only cheated and destroyed by the Japanese falsehood. This same falsehood and their Imperialism is going to ruin all Asia, not letting the admirable ideas of president Wilson of peace and democracy get a foothold in Asia. Korea must be redeemed, democracy must exist in Asia. Now, you Americans once guaranteed, in the first treaty between Korea and United States of America sore thirty years ago, the independence of Korea. therefore we appeal to you to keep us securethis same independence.

Figure 2. The Petition Lyuh Woon-hyung Sent to President Wilson (November 28, 1918)

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

caused the paper to discolor after ninety-nine years and there is a staple mark on the upper left corner. The letter conveys the terrible situation Korea is in to Crane, a high-ranking government official who is also President Wilson's personal friend and asks Crane to deliver the attached petition to President Wilson. The two most notable things about the letter are that it is dated November 29, 1918 and that it was sent in the name of Lyuh Woon-hyung as the secretary of the New Korean Young Men's Association.

While being interrogated by the Japanese authorities, Lyuh stated that right after he met Crane, he spent three days writing the petition at Jang Deok-su's place. Assuming that Lyuh met Crane on November 27, the petition as well as the letter must have been finished on the twenty-ninth. The petition was dated November 28, 1918 in the copies authored in Korean with Korean-Chinese characters and in Japanese. Based on this, writing the petition could have been finished on November 28, and the accompanying letter addressed to Crane could have been written the next day.

Sending the letter as the secretary of the New Korean Young Men's Association is related to the matter of when and how the association was established. Estimates made through previous studies about when the association became established tend to be divided between August and November of 1918.[36] Lyuh stated to the Japanese police and prosecution that he had twice held meetings with Jang Deok-su, Cho Dong-ho, and Shin Seok-woo since August 1918 and took inspiration from the Young Turks to organize the New Korean Young Men's Association. Later, however, Lyuh corrected his statement during his trial by saying that the association was established in November 1918 around the time he met and handed Crane the petition.[37] Prior to November, preparations were being made for the association's establishment. Furthermore, the Chinese language edition of the

---

[36] Shin Yong-ha argued that the association was organized in August and expanded in November 1918, whereas Kim Hee-gon argued that the association's organization occurred in November 1918. See Shin, "Sinhan cheongnyeondan eui dongnip eundong," 96; Kim, "Sinhan cheongnyeondang eui gyeolseong gwa hwaldong," 151.

[37] "Report of trial no. 1," June 2, 1930, Seoul Court of Review in Hamyang lyuhssi daejonghoe, *Mongyang Lyuh Woon-hyung jeonjib*, 626.

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

first issue of "The Young Korea," the association's official bulletin, indicates that the New Korean Young Men's Association was established on November 28, 1918.[38] Lyuh also admitted later that the association had been hastily organized in order to submit the petition.[39] Hence, it can be inferred that Lyuh Woon-hyung had been closely associated with Jang Deok-su, Cho Dong-ho, Shin Seok-woo, and Shin Guk-gwon since the summer of 1918 and as they drafted and handed the petition to Crane, the New Korean Young Men's Association became officially formed on November 28, 1918.

According to Lyuh's statement, no positions or divisions other than his as secretary were initially created within the association. After recruiting more members, the association failed to gain consensus on its initial plan to appoint Son Byeong-hui as president and ended up appointing Kim Kyu-sik as chairman of a board of four directors.[40]

V. Copies of the Petition Dated November 28, 1918

As previously mentioned, the remaining copies of the petition Lyuh Woon-hyung created include three copies in English, one copy in Korean and Korean-Chinese characters, and one copy in Japanese. Among these copies, only the content of the Japanese copy has so far been partially disclosed.[41]

---

38 "Bondang giryak [Summary of the Association's Statutes]," *Sinhan cheongnyeon* [The Young Korea], March 1, 1920.

39 Lyuh, *Mongyang Lyuh Woon-hyung*, 26.

40 "Interrogation Report no. 2," August 1, 1929, Prosecutions Bureau under the Seoul District Court in Hamyang Lyuhssi daejonghoe, *Mongyang Lyuh Woon-hyung jeonjib*, 467-70.

41 Chosen sotokufu keimu kyokucho [Head of the Japanese Government-General of Korea's Police Bureau] to Haniwara Masanao (Gaimu jikan) [Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister], "Futeidan kankei zakken-chosenjin no bu-shanhai kariseifu [On the submission of a petition for independence]," 15 January 1920, Ichigatsu nanoka Heian-hokudo chiji hokoku yoshi [Summary of the North Pyongan Province Governor's January 7 Report], Overseas information alert no. 648. A Korean translation of this report can be found in Kang Deok-sang, *Lyuh Woon-hyung pyeongjeon* [A Critical Biography of Lyuh Woon-hyung], trans. Kim Gwang-yeol Kim, vol. 1 *Jungguk ilbon eseo pyeolchin dongnip undong* [Independence Activities in China and Japan], 2 vols. (Yeoksa bipyeongsa, 2007): 168-72.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

The following offers a brief overview of each copy.

Copy II-1 in English is the original copy created by Lyuh and kept at Columbia University. This four-page copy is what this paper is based upon and appears to have been typed with the same typewriter on the same paper used to create Lyuh's letter to Crane.

Copy II-2 in English is the one Kim Kyu-sik carefully carried on his journey to Paris, Washington D.C., and Hawaii. On November 15, 1920, Kim Kyu-sik was caught trying to stow away on the U.S. Transport Thomas headed for Manila from Hawaii and was forced to leave the ship. Around that time, the leading Korean independence activists in the United States had been attempting to find ways to travel from Hawaii to China without stopping by Japan because they feared being arrested by the Japanese authorities. In 1919, Park Yong-man managed to board the U.S. Transport Thomas in Honolulu on May 17 and stopped by Manila before reaching Vladivostok. This was possible because, unlike Kim Kyu-sik, Park had maintained close ties with the American military. Upon the news that Park had succeeded in traveling as a stowaway, Kim naively slipped aboard the U.S. Transport Thomas without the military connections Park had and was discovered before the ship's tugboat could leave the port of Honolulu.[42] During the process of being caught and removed from the ship, the United States Army's Military Intelligence Division photographed the valuable documents Kim Kyu-sik had been carrying, including a copy of Lyuh's four-page petition. The content of Copy II-2 matches that of Copy II-1 in English, but considering the difference in typeface and editing style, Copy II-2 seems to be a reproduction of Lyuh's petition. Copy II-2 also exhibits traces of minor corrections compared to Copy II-1. For instance, near the very end of Copy II-1, there is a sentence that says "Now, you Americans once guaranteed, in the first treaty between Korea and the United States of America some thirty years ago, the integrity of Korea." In Copy II-2, the sentence has been slightly changed to "Now, you Americans

---

[42] For further details, refer to Bang Sun-joo, *Jaemi hanin eui dongnip eundong* [Korea-American Independence Movements] (Asian Culture Research Institute of Hallym University, 1989): 108-10.

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

once guaranteed, in the first treaty between Korea and the United States of America in 1882 the integrity of Korea."

Copy II-3 in English is included in *Democracy and the Eastern Question*, a book Thomas Millard published in New York in 1919.[43] Rather than covering the entire text, the book only presents the second half of the petition that offers an overview of Korea's spiritual, political, and economic situation under Japanese occupation.

Copy II-4 in Korean with Korean-Chinese characters can be found in the first issue of *Sinhan cheongnyeon* [The Young Korea] published on December 1, 1919.[44] Since Copy II-4 was included in the New Korean Young Men's Association's bulletin, it can be considered a faithful representation of the copy Lyuh Woon-hyung and Jang Deok-su originally created.

Copy II-5 in Japanese is kept at the Diplomatic Archive of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The governor of North Pyongan Province had managed to obtain a copy of Lyuh's petition and reported it to the Japanese Government-General of Korea on January 7, 1920. The head of the Police Bureau under the Japanese Government-General of Korea in turn reported the petition to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on January 15, 1920.[45] Copy II-5 therefore seems to be a translation of Copy II-4 in Korean with Korean-Chinese characters.

Before moving on to an analysis of the petition's content, it is necessary to consider why Lyuh Woon-hyung chose to hand the petition over to Crane and Millard. The petition was drafted to prepare against the possibility of being unable to send a Korean representative to the Paris Peace Conference. One copy was for President Wilson and the other was to be submitted to the conference. Lyuh later stated that with Crane's consent, both copies were essentially handed to Crane through "his secretary" Thomas F. Millard (1868-1942).[46] At the time, Millard was publishing the weekly

---

[43] Millard, *Democracy and the Eastern Question: The Problem of the Far East as Demonstrated by the Great War, and its Relation to the United States of America*, 38-40.

[44] Lyuh, "Sinhan cheongnyeondang daepyo chi miguk daetongnyeong wiil sonseo."

[45] "Futeidan kankei zakken-chosenjin no bu-shanhai kariseifu," 15 January 1920.

[46] "Interrogation Report no. 1 (Report of trial)," February 22, 1930, Seodaemun Prison in Hamyang

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

magazine *Millard's Review of the Far East* in Shanghai. As a journalist, he had been anti-Japanese and sympathetic toward China's situation.[47] He was therefore also sympathetic toward Korea as well.[48] In December 1918, Millard left Shanghai and headed to Europe, where he served as Crane's secretary and unofficially advised the Chinese delegation attending the Paris Peace Conference. At the conference, he antagonized the Japanese by claiming that Japan should withdraw from the Shandong peninsula so that China may regain sovereignty over it.[49]

Millard, however, is said to have lost his copy of Lyuh's petition in Yokohama. Lyuh's friend Yi Man-gyu once said that when Millard stopped by Japan with the Chinese representative Lou Tseng-tsiang (陸徵祥), Lyuh's petition was stolen along with all of Millard's luggage. The robbery was suspected to have been committed by a Japanese spy.[50] According to Kang Deok-sang's research, the robbery was reported in the newspaper *Osaka Mainichi Shimbun*. "While Lou Tseng-tsiang was in Japan last year between December 6 and 10, a Japanese spy under secret orders from the Japanese police paid a large sum to the man keeping an eye on Lou Tseng-tsiang's luggage to look the other way as the spy stole the bags carrying the most important documents. At the time, Lou Tseng-tsiang was traveling with Thomas Millard, the famous anti-Japanese American journalist from

---

Lyuhssi daejonghoe, *Mongyang Lyuh Woon-hyung jeonjib*, 560.

47 Around the time Crane became appointed as the United States Minister to China, there were rumors that a war might break out between the United States and Japan. Chu Yo-han even hinted that such rumors might be true in a commentary published by *Dongnip sinmun* on March 16, 1920, saying that "the United States Minister to China Mr. Crane is heavily anti-Japanese and is friends with Mr. Millard who publishes an anti-Japanese magazine in Shanghai."

48 Among Millard's publications that mention Korea, there is *America and the Far Eastern Question* (New York: Moffat, Yard and Company, 1909) and *Our Eastern Question: America's Contact with the Orient and the Trend of Relations with China and Japan* (New York: The Century Co., 1916).

49 Bruce A. Elleman, *Wilson and China: A Revised History of the Shandong Question* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2002): 111.

50 Yi, *Lyuh Woon-hyung seonsaeng tujaengsa*, 24. Lyuh Woon-hong was the one who declared that the theft occurred in Yokohama. See Lyuh, *Mongyang Lyuh Woon-hyung*, 27.

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Shanghai."[51] The Japanese translation of Lyuh's petition at the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Diplomatic Archives (Copy II-5) could therefore have been secretly acquired in Japan by the North Pyongan Provincial Police's secret service and handed to the province's governor.[52]

However, the suggestion that North Pyongan Provincial Police's secret service stole Lou Tseng-tsiang and Thomas Millard's luggage in Yokohama, Japan and that the governor of the North Pyongan Province reported the incident to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs seems less plausible when considering factors such as jurisdiction and the reporting order. The date that the North Pyongan Province's governor submitted a report about the petition to the Japanese Government-General of Korea was January 7, 1920. The date that the head of the Japanese Government-General of Korea's Police Bureau sent the governor's report to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was January 15, 1920. What is worth noting, though, is that prior to these developments, the petition meant to be delivered to President Wilson was published on December 1, 1919 as part of an article in the first issue of *Sinhan cheongnyeon* entitled "Sinhan cheongnyeondang daepyo chi miguk daetongnyeong wiil sonseo" [The Message from the Representative of the New Korean Young Men's Association to the United States President]. The published petition is what this paper has been referring to as Copy II-4 in Korean with Korea-Chinese characters. Therefore, considering the sequence of events, the report by the governor of North Pyongan Province and the head of the Japanese Government-General of Korea's Police Bureau is more likely to have involved the petition's Korean version published in *Sinhan cheongnyeon* than a copy of the petition se-

---

[51] This is a rearranged quote based on reports from the February 14, 1919 edition of *Millard's Review of the Far East*, the February 20, 1919 edition of the Kyoto newspaper *Hinode Shimbun*, and Kang, *Lyuh Woon-hyung pyeongjeon*, 168. Meanwhile, the article titled "Rumors of Document Theft Groundless," in the Hinode Shimbun's February 20, 1919 edition reported that "despite repeated rumors that confidential documents have been stolen as Lou Tseng-tsiang stopped by Japan on his way to Europe, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has recently declared such rumors to be groundless." The report practically claims that no documents have gone missing.

[52] Lee, *Lyuh Woon-hyung*, 158.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

cretly acquired in Yokohama. This conclusion seems even more plausible when the details in the petition's Japanese version from the report (Copy II-5) are compared with those in other copies.

First, if the Japanese Police indeed stole Millard's copy of the petition, the report to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs would have referred to Lyuh Woon-hyung as the secretary of the New Korean Young Men's Association. However, the report cites Lyuh as the association's representative. The petition originally did not contain Lyuh's name, title, or signature, or the date, because such information was included in the accompanying letter. If the Japanese had obtained an original copy of the petition, the report would have separately mentioned that there was a letter attached to the petition.

Second, the words and their sequence, and the way the sentences are arranged in the report by the North Pyongan Province's governor written in Japanese (Copy II-5) exactly correspond to those in the article written and published in Korean in *Sinhan cheongnyeon*. Comparing the composition of the petition's English, Korean, and Japanese versions makes it more obvious that the article about the petition in *Sinhan cheongnyeon* was used as the original for the petition's Japanese translation. This in turn suggests that Copy II-5 is unlikely to have been created from the petition in Thomas Millard's and Lou Tseng-tsiang's luggage that was stolen by the Japanese police.

Moreover, the book Millard published in 1919 bears no mention of the luggage theft in Yokohama. Instead, Millard does state in the book that he has a copy of the petition Lyuh Woon-hyung gave him.[53] This contradicts the well-known story about the stolen luggage and petition. The book also indicates that after meeting Crane on November 27, Lyuh drafted the letter and petition, handed them to Crane, and made another copy of the petition and letter to hand over to Millard in December. This confirms that Millard's copy had been in his possession at the time he was authoring his book in New York in 1919.

---

[53] Millard, *Democracy and the Eastern Question*, 38.

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

According to Frank Baldwin, Millard had been sympathetic toward Korea and agreed to submit the petition to the peace conference. He acknowledged that "in principle the case of Korea is as much entitled to considering as the case of Jugo-Slavia, Poland and Czech-Slavia," but added that "there was little chance of Korea being considered at the conference."[54]

Where, then, does this leave the story about Millard losing his luggage in Yokohama? Crane's memoirs hint at the circumstances behind the story's formulation. After visiting Shanghai, Crane was surveilled by the Japanese secret service as he traveled to Nagasaki, Kobe, and Tokyo. The Japanese secret service persistently followed Crane around to determine the purpose of his visit to the Far East. Crane found their approaches "most amusing" as he recalled how they constantly attempted to gather intelligence about him from his associates and friends. Around the time, Thomas Millard happened to accompany Crane and, since their relations "had always been friendly," Millard was "carefully cross-examined." "The little Japanese agent got out a notebook filled with information about me, but Mr. Millard advised him to address his questions directly to me."[55] Because the Japanese secret service had been so overt in keeping a close eye on Crane and Millard's whereabouts, allowing their luggage to be stolen would have developed into a diplomatic problem difficult to ignore. Furthermore, if Lyuh's petition had been stolen, Millard would not have been able to relay its content through the book he published in New York in 1919.

Based on the above, Millard visited Japan with Crane and the Chinese representative Lou Tseng-tsiang in 1918 between December 6 and 10. Lyuh had entrusted Millard with the petition's delivery because he was aware of the fact that Millard would accompany Crane to Paris as his secretary. Their stop in Japan caused them to be closely surveilled by the Japanese secret service. It is uncertain as to whether their luggage was stolen or

---

[54] Baldwin, "The March First Movement," 35.

[55] Crane, "Memoirs of Charles R. Crane," 355-56.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

not, but it at least seems certain that both Crane and Millard each carried their own copy of Lyuh's petition back to the United States.

Did those copies then make it into the hands of President Wilson and the Paris Peace Conference? Investigations to date have not been able to unearth any evidence that they were submitted to President Wilson or the Paris Peace Conference. The collection of Woodrow Wilson's papers at the United States Library of Congress includes countless correspondence, petitions, and documents delivered to Wilson during his presidency, but there is no trace of having received Lyuh's petition and letter from Crane.[56] There is also no trace among the papers of the American delegation to the peace conference indicating that Millard's copy of Lyuh's petition and letter was submitted. Finally, there is no mention of their delivery among the accounts of what happened between 1918 and 1919 in Crane's memoirs and Millard's book.

VI. The Petition Addressed to President Wilson

The petition's content can be arbitrarily divided into an introduction, main body, and conclusion. It begins by outlining how Japan and Korea are related to World War I in the introduction, then dedicates its main body to describing the situation of Korea under Japanese rule, and in the conclusion asks the United States to support Korea in achieving independence.

The following summarizes what is communicated through the petition's introduction.[57]

First, thanks to the United States' participation, World War I ended in a victory for justice, humanity, and freedom.

Second, because the Paris Peace Conference will consider charging the League of Nations, advocated by President Wilson, with the task of en-

---

[56] "Woodrow Wilson Papers: A Finding Aid to the Collection in the Library of Congress." Accessed on March 20, 2017, http://rs5.loc.gov/service/mss/eadxmlmss/eadpdfmss/2009/ms009194.pdf; "Index to the Woodrow Wilson papers." Accessed on March 20, 2017, https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/000030968.

[57] Expressions used in the petition's English version slightly differ from those in the Korean version.

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

suring world peace, it is worth taking note of how Korea and China are closely related to the matter of peace in the East as well as the world.

Third, the Japanese are "accustomed only to despotism, militarism, bureaucratism, and imperialism," which is why they are "the Spartans of Asia" with no understanding of liberalism, humanism, pacifism, or the League of Nations.

Fourth, Japan's expansionist policy is attempting to gain supremacy in Manchuria, Mongolia, and mainland China and is aimed at driving out all other foreign influence from the areas, as it did in Joseon and Taiwan. Japan is therefore a barrier to achieving world peace.

Fifth, Japan's expansionist policy was launched through Japan's occupation of Korea and has turned the Korean peninsula, the Balkan peninsula of Asia, into a base for the Japanese army and navy.

Sixth, although Korea has been a civilized country with a nearly four thousand and two-hundred-year history, it became annexed by Japan after the Russo-Japanese War. Japan claimed that it will forever guarantee Korea's independence and peace in the East, but it ended up destroying Korea.

The petition's main body illustrates the spiritual, political, and economic conditions of Korea under Japanese occupation. The lengthiest portion is dedicated to the spiritual condition, while the economic and political conditions are less extensively covered.

Regarding Korea's spiritual condition, Japan's suppression of Christianity is described in detail, including the 105-men Incident and the ban on bible teaching. Then, the limitation of free speech is exposed by mentioning that only one Korean-language newspaper is being published under the Japanese Government-General of Korea's supervision, while public speeches and the publication of magazines have been banned. Also mentioned is the scarcity of educational opportunities without any universities or libraries except for four colleges that focus on vocational education and three middle schools teaching in Japanese instead of the Korean language.

The brief description of Korea's political scene cites that despite paying tax, Koreans have no rights, and with no parliament or municipality, they are not allowed to take part in legislative or administrative activities.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

The section about Korea's economic condition points out how incorporation and opening mining businesses have been made impossible for Koreans, while their land continues to be taken over by Japanese immigrants. This section is likely to heavily reflect the views of Jang Deok-su since he was more familiar with Korea's economic situation than Lyuh Woon-hyung. While studying at Waseda University in Japan, Jang Deok-su joined a fraternal association of Korean students in Tokyo called the Jae ilbon donggyeong Joseon yuhaksaeng haguhoe (在日本東京朝鮮留學生學友會) and wrote numerous articles and analytical pieces on the state of affairs as he served as chief editor of the association's bulletin *Hakjigwang* (學之光). In 1916, Jang helped Kim Cheol-su organize the Sinadongmaengdang (新亞同盟黨), or the New Asian Alliance, with Chinese and Taiwanese students in Japan to launch an international solidarity movement against Japan and imperialism.[58]

The petition's conclusion states that in their struggle for independence, justice, and peace, the Koreans are "crying to the conscience of the world, especially to the Americans who uphold the grand principle of President Wilson that a nation should be ruled in accordance with the governed." The conclusion also declares that the Koreans have not been conquered, but cheated by the Japanese, and emphasizes that only when Korea regains independence can democracy be established in Asia. It ends by adding that since the Americans guaranteed the independence of Korea thirty years ago, the Koreans are appealing to them for their full support in securing that same independence. In essence, the world's conscience, Wilson's self-determination, Japan's treacherous annexation of Korea, and the 1882 treaty between United States and Korea all justified the need for Korea's independence.

In short, the petition's content conveys (1) praise and expectations to-

---

[58] Kang, *Lyuh Woon-hyung pyeongjeon*, 120-37; Ono Yasuteru, "Shin a domeito no kenkyu: Chosen Taiwan Chugoku ryugakusei no minzoku o koeru nettowaku no shoki keisei katei" [A Study on the Sinadongmaengdang: The Formation of a Trans-ethnic Network between Joseon, Taiwanese, Chinese Students], *Jisedai ajia ronshu* [Journal of Next Generation Asia Forum], no. 3 (2010): 5-13.

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

ward the United States and President Wilson for ending World War I and defending justice, humanity, and liberty; (2) a warning about Japan's practice of despotism, militarism, bureaucratism, and imperialism and its expansionist policy taking advantage of the Korean peninsula; (3) a report on the spiritual, political, economic conditions of Korea under Japanese rule; and (4) a request for the United States to support Korea's struggle for independence.

The need for Korea to gain independence was made relevant to the worldwide trend of upholding humanity, justice, and free will. Meanwhile, the brutal reality of Korea under Japanese rule and the potential for Japan's expansionist policy to give rise to conflicts in Asia gave reason to ask for the United States' sympathy and support.

The petition reflects the rationale employed by Lyuh Woon-hyung as well as other independence activists inside and outside Korea around the time the March First Independence Movement occurred. In fact, Lyuh used the same rationale and argument during his visit to Japan in 1919 at the invitation of the Japanese government. While giving a speech at the Imperial Hotel, Lyuh said that "The Koreans acknowledge that the Japanese have a right to live, just as God has allowed the nationally awakened Koreans to demand for liberty and equality. [omitted] Now the world is crying out for reformation through the emancipation of the weak, women, and laborers. It is a worldwide trend that pertains to Japan as well. What also represents that trend, not to mention God's will and a nation's awakening, is Korea's independence movement."[59] When Lyuh attended a welcoming reception hosted by Shinkinkai (新人會), or the New Men's Society, he remarked that "Joseon's independence is universal justice, not an emotional explosion. It is not solely for the free development of Joseon's people, but for world peace."[60] The use of terms such as worldwide trend, God's will, and national awakening hints at the infusion of Lyuh's Christian worldview in his rationale for Korea's independence.

---

[59] Yi, *Lyuh Woon-hyung seonsaeng tujaengsa*, 36.

[60] Ibid., 59.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Meanwhile, the petition lacks formality by failing to include the author's name, identity, address, or signature, not to mention a date, title, and recipient name. Such formal details are instead included in the attached letter addressed to Crane. What made the petition and letter appear even less formal was the fact that they were delivered in person to Crane. For these reasons, Crane could have found them tricky to present to President Wilson. Such lack of formality is likely to have resulted from rushing to produce the papers immediately after meeting Crane and from being inexperienced in authoring such papers. It was, after all, the first diplomatic attempt Lyuh Woon-hyung made among his activities for the sake of Korea's independence.

VII. The Effect of Lyuh Woon-Hyung's Petition

The widely accepted theory in academia is that selecting Korean representatives in the United States and Shanghai in 1918 to be sent to the Paris Peace Conference served as a major external impetus for the March First Independence Movement. There may be room for debate as to whether which representative carried more authority, but only the New Korean Young Men's Association in Shanghai managed to send their representative to Paris.[61] In the United States, the Korean National Association's North American branches gathered at the San Francisco headquarters on November 25, 1918 and selected Rhee Syng-man and Chong Han-gyong as the Korean representatives to be sent to the peace conference. However, the selected representatives never made it to Paris because the United States Department of State refused to issue them passports. Moreover, Chong Han-gyong took the lead in sending a petition to President Wilson asking for Korea to be temporarily guided by a mandate, which then sparked disputes over mandatory rule.[62]

---

[61] Shin Yong-ha, Yun Pyong-suk, and Ahn Byong-jick, *Samil dongnip undong balbal eui gyeongwi* [Details Behind the March First Independence Movement's Outbreak] (Jisik Saneopsa, 1977): 48-54.

[62] Bang Sun-joo, "Samil undong gwa jaemi hanin [The March First Independence Movement and

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Immediately after entrusting Charles Crane and Thomas Millard with the petition, Lyuh Woon-hyung invited Kim Kyu-sik to Shanghai and sent him to represent the New Korean Young Men's Association in Paris. That was the major outcome from drafting the petition for Crane. The rest of the developments as to how expenses were raised or how the ship ride was secured for Kim to travel to Paris are known well enough not to warrant further exposition in this paper.[63]

Kim Kyu-sik has often been described as a Korean in Tianjin who was suddenly invited to Shanghai and sent to the Paris Peace Conference by Lyuh Woon-hyung to represent his country. However, Kim was already well known by then as an independence activist in China during turbulent times marked by the Xinhai Revolution, World War I, and the Paris Peace Conference. Since going into exile in China in the spring of 1913, Kim worked closely with Shin Kyu-sik as he became involved in the activities of Dongjesa [Mutual Assistance Society] between 1913 and 1914, Sinhan hyeongmyeongdang [New Korean Revolutionary Party] in 1915, Daedongdangyeol seoneon [Declaration of Great Unity and Solidarity] in 1917, and Korea's diplomacy toward the United States leading up to the March First Independence Movement. Kim was therefore a prepared representative with experience in leading Korean independence movements in China.[64]

On his way to Paris, however, Kim Kyu-sik sent a letter from Colombo, Sri Lanka to his wife Kim Soon-ae in Qiqihar of China's Heilongjiang Province. On December 2, 1919, the British Censorship Office in Colombo reported to the British War Office about Kim's letter and the petition draft Kim was carrying to submit to the peace conference.[65] According to Ku

---

Koreans in the United States]," in *Samil undong* [The March First Independence Movement], Hanminjok dongnip eundongsa [The History of the Korean Independence Movement] 3 (National Institute of Korean History, 1988).

63 Kang, *Lyuh Woon-hyung pyeongjeon*, 166-67.

64 A review of Kim Kyu-sik's activities in China in the 1910s will be published as a separate paper.

65 Censorship Office (Colombo) to War Office, 25 February 1919, F.O. 371/3817 (52102/7293); Enclosure in Censorship Office to War Office, 25 February 1919, F.O. 371/3817 (52102/7293); Ku, *Hanguk gukjegwangyesa yeongu*, 234; Ku, *Korea Under Colonialism*, 41.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Dae-yeol's research, the petition for independence Kim Kyu-sik had been carrying was not the same draft as the one authored by Lyuh Woon-hyung. This may have been because "Kim Kyu-sik was not convinced about the petition drafted by the Korean activists in Shanghai, which took an approach considerably different from that of the Korean activists in the United States."[66] A copy of Kim Kyu-sik's petition was attached to the British Censorship Office's report from Colombo, which is on file at the British War Office. The draft exhibits a slight difference in format compared to Lyuh Woon-hyung's petition yet maintains the same basic structure in terms of content. In addition, the draft served as the prototype for the petition's final draft that Kim Kyu-sik delivered to the Paris Peace Conference's Secretary-General on May 6, 1919.[67] The petition submitted by Kim Kyu-sik as the New Korean Young Men's Association's representative therefore did eventually convey what was in Lyuh Woon-hyung's petition.

Lyuh Woon-hyung's activities were heading toward a culmination as he submitted a petition to President Wilson and the Paris Peace Conference through Charles Crane, organized the New Korean Young Men's Association, and sent Kim Kyu-sik to represent the association in Paris. To support Kim's task at the peace conference, Lyuh and the association felt it necessary to carry out in Korea and abroad demonstrations and other activities large enough in scale to draw attention to the matter of Korea's independence. They also felt the need to raise more funds to support Kim Kyu-sik's task in Paris.

Lyuh Woon-hyung headed to Primorsky, Russia and Jang Deok-su went to Japan, while Sonu Hyok, Kim Chol, Seo Byeong-ho, Kim Soon-ae, and Baek Nam-gyu went to Korea. They became immersed in publicizing Kim Kyu-sik's activities in Paris and urged for the need to carry out

---

66 Ku, *Korea Under Colonialism*, 41.

67 See "Kim Kyu-sik's Letter to the Paris Peace Conference's Secretary-General (May 6, 1919)" and "A Memorandum Presenting The Claims of the Korean People for Liberation" in National Institute of Korean History, *Seohanjip II* [Correspondences II], Daehanminguk imsijeongbu jaryojip [Collection of Materials on the Republic of Korea's Provisional Government] 43, 2011: 18, 24, 403-12, 569-82. The petition was submitted in Kim Kyu-sik's name as the representative of the New Korean Young Men's Association.

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

demonstrations and raise funds for Korea's independence. Their activities, according to Kang Deok-sang's assessment, "greatly influenced the independence declarations made on February 8 and March 1, 1919." Sonu Hyok met former Christian leaders of Sinminhoe [New People's Association], including Yi Seung-hun, Yang Jeon-baek, and Gil Seon-ju, to gain their support in carrying out a demonstration to support the Korean representative sent to the Paris Peace Conference. Jang Deok-su slipped into Japan to gather more details about the February Eighth Independence Declaration and seek ways to carry its effect over to Korea and Shanghai. Lyuh Woon-hyung traveled to Changchun, Harbin, and Vladivostok to spread the news about having sent a Korean representative to Paris, encourage independence activities to support Kim Kyu-sik at the conference, and raise funds. All these efforts added to the impetus created by the independence declaration on February 8 and evolved into another declaration on March 1.

Changes in the international situation with the end of World War I and the Paris Peace Conference, motivation from overseas through attempts to send Korean representatives to Paris, and the February Eighth Independence Declaration in Tokyo built up into an eruption in Korea called the March First Independence Declaration. These influences exchanged between activists inside and outside Korea created an echoing effect that brought independence activities outside Korea to new heights and led to the Shanghai Provisional Government's establishment, a remarkable achievement in the history of Korean independence movements.

Those who took part in the Shanghai Provisional Government and other Korean independence activities positively regarded the contribution Lyuh Woon-hyung and the New Korean Young Men's Association made to the March First Independence Movement.[68] The newspaper *Dongnip sinmun* described the petition Lyuh sent to Crane as the beginning of the Korean independence movement. On sending members of the New Korean Young Men's Association to Paris, Japan, Russia, and Korea, the *Dongnip sinmun* portrayed it as "a sign that a massive storm was about to break out

---

[68] Kang, *Lyuh Woon-hyung pyeongjeon*, 162-94.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

throughout the whole of Korea, which had remained silent (on the surface)."[69]

Lyuh Woon-hyung and the New Korean Young Men's Association's activities along with the Korean National Association's attempt to send representatives to Paris from San Francisco in 1918 served as an external origin for the March First Independence Movement. By succeeding in sending a representative to Paris, Lyuh and his associates particularly became enablers of a diplomatic path to independence that Koreans could lay their hopes on at the time. With a total of two million participants, the March First Independence Movement was a major incident that reawakened a national urge dormant for nearly ten years since the fall of the Korean Empire. Lyuh's petition served as an important catalyst for igniting that national urge toward independence.

Lyuh Woon-hyung swiftly and precisely gained a grasp of the international situation at the time, responded to an opportunity for Korea's independence, and took subsequent actions to help turn that response into a success. His fellow activists were hopeful as they strived inside and outside of Korea to publicize ongoing independence activities. Such efforts led to the declarations of Korea's independence in Tokyo and Seoul in 1919. Lyuh came across news of the March First Independence Movement when he arrived in Changchun from Vladivostok. Lyuh Woon-hyung and Kim Kyu-sik dedicated themselves to the needs of the times, not knowing that a completely unexpected future awaited them.

---

[69] "Hanguk dongnip eundongsa (1) [The History of Korea's Independence Movement (1)]," *Dongnip sinmun*, August 26, 1919.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Baldwin, Frank Prentiss. "The March First Movement: Korean Challenge and Japanese Response" Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1969.

Bang, Sun-joo. *Jaemi hanin eui dongnip eundong* [Korea-American Independence Movements]. Asian Culture Research Institute of Hallym University, 1989.

Crane, Charles Richard. *Memoirs of Charles R. Crane*, Columbia University Rare Book and Manuscript Library, n. d.

Elleman, Bruce A. *Wilson and China: A Revised History of the Shandong Question*. New York, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2002.

Fitch, George A. *My Eighty Years in China*. Taipei: Mei Ya Publications, 1967.

Hamyang lyuhssi daejonghoe. *Mongyang Lyuh Woon-hyung jeonjib* [The Collected Writings of Mongyang Lyuh Woon-hyung]. Edited by Mongyang Lyuh Woon-hyung seonsaeng jeonjib balganwiwonhoe [Publication Committee for the Collected Writings of Mongyang Lyuh Woon-hyung]. Vol. 1. 3 vols. Seoul: Hanul, 1991.

Kang, Deok-sang. *Lyuh Woon-hyung pyeongjeon* [A Critical Biography of Lyuh Woon-hyung]. Translated by Kim Gwang-yeol. Vol. 1. 2 vols. Yeoksa bipyeongsa, 2007.

Kim, Hee-gon. "Sinhan Cheongnyeondang eui gyeolseong gwa hwaldong [The New Korean Young Men's Association's Formation and Activities]." *Hanguk dongnip undongsa yeongu* 1 (1986): 141-75.

Ku, Dae-Yeol. *Hanguk gukjegwangyesa yeongu* [A History of Korea's International Relations]. Vol. 1. Seoul: Yeoksa bipyeongsa, 1995.

_____. *Korea Under Colonialism: The March First Movement and Anglo-Japanese Relations*. Seoul: Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1985.

Lee, Chong-sik. *Lyuh Woon-hyung: Sidae wa sangsang eul chowol han yunghwajueuija* [Lyuh Woon-hyung: The Korean Harmonist]. Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 2008.

Lyuh, Woon-hong. *Mongyang Lyuh Woon-hyung*. Cheonghagak, 1967.

Millard, Thomas F. *America and the Far Eastern Question*. New York, NY: Moffat, Yard and Company, 1909.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

_____. *Democracy and the Eastern Question: The Problem of the Far East as Demonstrated by the Great War, and its Relation to the United States of America*. New York, NY: The Century Co., 1919.

_____. *Our Eastern Question: America's Contact with the Orient and the Trend of Relations with China and Japan*. New York, NY: The Century Co., 1916.

Nagata, Akifumi. *Ilbon eui joseontongchi wa gukjegwangye* [The Rule of Korea by Japan and the International Relations]. Translated by Park Hwan-mu. Translation. Seoul: Ilchogak, 2008.

National Institute of Korean History. *Seohanjip II* [Correspondences II]. Daehanminguk imsijeongbu jaryojip [Collection of Materials on the Republic of Korea's Provisional Government] 43, 2011.

Ono, Yasuteru. "Shin a domeito no kenkyu: Chosen Taiwan Chugoku ryugakusei no minzoku o koeru nettowaku no shoki keisei katei" [A Study on the Sinadongmaengdang: The Formation of a Trans-ethnic Network between Joseon, Taiwanese, Chinese Students]. *Jisedai ajia ronshu*, no. 3 (2010): 5-13.

Shin, Yong-ha, Yun, Pyong-suk, and Ahn, Byong-jick. *Samil dongnip undong balbal eui gyeongwi* 3.1 [Details behind the March First Independence Movement's Outbreak]. Jisik Saneopsa, 1977.

Shin, Yong-ha. "Sinhan cheongnyeondan eui dongnip eundong" [The New Korean Young Men's Association's Independence Activities]. *Hanguk hakbo* 12 no. 3 (1986): 94-142.

Yi, Man-gyu. *Lyuh Woon-hyung seonsaeng tujaengsa* [The History of Lyuh Woon-Hyung's Struggles]. Reprint. Seoul: Minju munhwasa, 1946.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Imperial Japan's 'Civilization' Rule in the 1910s and Korean Sentiments: The Causes of the National-Scale Dissemination of the March First Movement

Tae-eok KWON
Seoul National University

The Journal of Northeast Asian History
Volume 15 Number 1 (Winter 2018), 113-142

Copyright © 2018 by the Northeast Asian History Foundation. All Rights Reserved.
No portion of the contents may be reproduced in any form without written permission of the Northeast Asian History Foundation.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Imperial Japan's 'Civilization' Rule in the 1910s and Korean Sentiments: The Causes of the National-Scale Dissemination of the March First Movement*

Tae-eok KWON
Seoul National University

I. Overview of the March First Movement

On the First of March 1919, when the Japanese Government-General of Joseon was confident that its "civilization" (*bunmei*) colonial rule had achieved considerable success, Koreans revolted nationwide against Japanese rule. The nationwide resistance set off in Seoul at 2 pm on that day eventually spread to the entire country. Starting from Gyeonggi and Pyeongan Provinces, the movement disseminated mainly through networks of railroads and roads. By mid-March, it reached rural counties and, finally, villages in mountains. It peaked from late March to early April but was ruthlessly quashed by police and troops around late April and early May. The colonial police estimated that there were 1,214 protests with approximately 1.1 million participants, but given that these figures are from colonial authorities, who are prone to minimizing the scale of natives' liberation activities, the actual numbers were likely much higher. Moreover, considering the fact that the protests sometimes took place several times on the same day at the same location and that small-scale protests in remote areas often went unreported, it is not implausible that the number of protests exceeded 2,000 incidents and the number of participants reached approxi-

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

mately two million.[1]

At the beginning, the thirty three representatives of the Korean people were the main instigators, but it has been revealed that intellectuals, including students and religious leaders, and religious organizations, such as Christianity and Cheondogyo (Religion of the Heavenly Way), made significant contributions to the dissemination of the movement. In the later stages, however, protests spread and evolved by the grassroots power of the peasant class. The phrase "a spark of fire has spread like a wildfire on a field" was not simply literary rhetoric; Koreans nationwide rose up on their own against Japanese rule, risking their lives. Although the goals and scales of the protests were different, almost every member of the Korean nation stood in opposition and fought against the Japanese colonial rule in their own way. It was an unprecedented national-scale movement against colonial power in world history.

The movement was manifested in many different ways, but most incidents were nonviolent protests, especially those led by students and religious leaders. In rural towns, protests commonly took place on market days, when a large number of locals would congregate: mobilizing the market crowd, protesters would shout together "*Daehan Dokrip Manse*! (Independence for Korea!)." Even in cases where violence was involved, weapons were clubs, sickles, and stones at best, and the violence was targeted mostly at low-level colonial agencies, such as village offices, military police outposts, and police stations. Nevertheless, violence from protestors was rare until brutal crackdowns by Japanese police and civilian bodies of veterans and firemen began and until the protestors needed to rescue arrested compatriots. The colonial government recorded the number of victims during the suppression of this Movement to be 7,645 deaths, 45,562 injuries, and 49,811 arrests.[2]

---

* This paper is a shortened revision of Kwon Tae-eok's "'Civilization' project of Japan and Korean's perception in the 1910s," *Korean Culture* 61 (March 2013).

1 Kim Jin-bong. *Samilundongsayeongu [A Study on the History of March First Movement]* (Paju: Kookhak, 2000), 198-99. cf. The population of Korea at that time was approximately 16.7 million.

2 Ibid., 296.

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

II. Nationwide Protests and the Cultural Change of the 1910s

What made this anti-colonialist movement spread nationwide when there was no leadership that orchestrated it? What are the factors that made it possible? The March First Movement was a collection of individual grassroots revolts without a control tower; therefore, it is not easy to summarize its causes into one or two factors. Imperial Japan analyzed the main causes of this massive-scale rebellion to be (1) the misinterpretation of Woodrow Wilson's Self-Determination Doctrine and (2) the spread of a rumor that King Gojong was poisoned to death.[3] The Imperial analysis implies that the Movement was a mishap occasioned by the misinterpretation and rumor, obviously identifying these two as the main factors that ignited Koreans' rebellion.

World War I itself was a significant event in world history. It brought dramatic shifts in the views of intellectuals living under colonial rule. The war revealed the true face of Western Civilization—full of contradictions and absurdities and not 'all good and beautiful'—and cast doubts on its pretending world views.[4] Hence, the demand grew for reform of the world order from one ruled by the law of the jungle to one ruled by human principles; the optimism that a new society founded on justice would eventually arrive also grew. In the same vein, a hope emerged for a new world where the proletariat and the colonized would be no longer oppressed.[5] At the

---

3 Joseon Military Office Headquarters, "Public Sentiments Before the Riots," in *Classified-Reports on 1919 Joseon Riots* (1919).

4 Kwon Bodeu-rae, "Jinhwaronuy Gaengsaeng, Inryuuy Tansaeng—Cheongubaeksipnyeondaeuy Insikronjeok Jeonhwangwa Samilundong" [Rebirth of Evolutionism, Birth of Homo Sapiens—Epistemological Shift and the March First Movement]," in *Cheongubaeksipgunyeon Samwol Ilile Mutda [Asking to the First of March 1919]*, eds. Park Hyeon-ho and Ryu Joon-pil (Seoul: Sungkyunkwan University Press, 2009), 123.

5 Heo Soo, "Jeilcha Segyedaejeon Jongjeon-hu Gaejoronuy Hwaksankwa Hanguk Jisikin" [Dissemination of Reconstructionism Aftermath of World War I and the Intellectuals of Korea]," Ibid.

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

conclusion of World War I in 1918, the US president, Woodrow Wilson, proposed fourteen provisions of principle for the new world order, which included the proclamation of the self-determination of nations. The Wilson Doctrine was interpreted as an ideological justification for weak and small nations to fight for their rights to life. The thirty three representatives who planned the March First Movement knew that the doctrine did not apply to Joseon under Japan's colonial rule, one of the winning allies in World War I, but their aim was to show the world that Korea, as a nation, had the will to gain independence. Whatever its original intention was, Wilson's self-determination doctrine turned into an ideology that provided a justification for oppressed peoples to fight for their liberation.[6] In addition to the close of World War I, the year of 1918 had witnessed Russia's Socialist Revolution, the German Revolution, and the Independence of Poland. Even Japan experienced some public disturbances and allowed the establishment of its first parliamentary cabinet. This fluctuating state of affairs in the world accelerated and set the stage for the eruption of the March First Movement.

However, what provoked the wider population of the Korean public was the rumor of the assassination of King Gojong by poison. King Gojong suddenly died on the twenty eighth of January 1919, and the rumor that he had been poisoned to death by Imperial Japan soon became rampant. Gojong was the symbol of Korean resistance against Japanese invasion,[7] and there was nothing that could provoke more anger from Koreans than his assassination. Mourning for his death quickly spread nationwide: Confucian scholars wore mourning clothes, built worshipping platforms, and paid tribute to him. As the date (March third) of the emperor's entombment approached, mourners thronged in Seoul, disseminating the news of the independence proclamation and protests on March First

---

6 Shin Yong-ha and Shin Il-cheol, "Jesambungwa Jonghaptoron – Samilundong Chilsipjunyeon Ginyeon Symposium" [Comprehensive Debates of 3 People at the Symposium for the 70th Anniversary of the March First Movement]," in *Samilundonggwa Minjoktongil [March First Movement and National Unification]* (Seoul: Donga Daily), 267-69 & 269-70.

7 Lee Tae-jin, *Gojongsidaeuy Jaejomyeong [Reexamining the Era of King Gojong]*, (Seoul: Taehaksa, 2000). ※ Refer to the book on King Gojong's resistance against the Japanese annexation of Korea and his effort to protect Korea's sovereignty.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

throughout the country.

These two events were undoubtedly critical factors for the start and spread of the March First Movement, but their effects were not potent enough to underpin its national scale. Participating in the Independence Movement itself carried great risks, because at that time, Imperial Japan ruled Korea with an iron fist, largely relying on military police and troops. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine the self-determination doctrine and Gojong's death as the sole causes of the national-scale rebellion. There must have been additional, more crucial reasons that immediately concerned the lives of the Korean people.

The field of South Korean history has accumulated a considerable amount of research on the subject of the March First Movement, but it has not clearly identified the causes of its national-scale dissemination. Aside from addressing the two events setting the background of the movement, research has not advanced further than addressing Imperial Japan's "brutal rule" as the immediate internal cause of the massive rebellion. Japan's brutal military rule in the 1910s, epitomized by military police, is inarguably the main cause, but it cannot account for all aspects of Japan's colonial rule in the 1910s. However, Mabuchi Sadatoshi has offered an interesting perspective. He noted that the most persistent and fiercest protestors among the movement were those in the peasant class and that the most relentless and fiercest revolts took place in agrarian areas. Resistance was particularly fierce in the provinces of Gyeonggi, Gyeongbuk, and Hwanghae, where peasants' indigenous development of crops and products had been frustrated by Japanese colonial power.[8] His study has identified that this dynamic factor was directly linked to the lives of the Korean peasantry. Nonetheless, the resentment of the peasantry is still insufficient to explain the national scale of the movement, because the movement encompassed Koreans from various sectors and classes, not just farmers and peasants.

In 1989, South Korea hosted a number of academic events in celebra-

---

[8] Mabuchi Sadatoshi, "Characteristics of Joseon's Agriculture in the First World War Era and the March First Movement – Agricultural Production and Colonial Landownership," *The Journal of Joseon History* 12, no. 3 (1975).

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

tion of the seventieth anniversary of the March First Movement. One of the outcomes was *Studies on March First Liberation Movement of People* (1989), a collection of works by young historians of the Korean History Society, who based their analyses on a Marxist approach. Their works reflected desire to bring about a social revolution in contemporary Korean society, seeking lessons from the achievements of the historic movement. Although their analyses included colonial Joseon's class stratification, they identified that the main force of strife in the movement came from the whole mass of people, with the exception of a small minority of pro-Japanese collaborators. This generic definition of people comes from the fact that colonial Joseon's class stratification was not fully progressed due to its limited development of capitalism. Nevertheless, their research has altered the character of the March First Movement from being a bourgeois-nationalist movement to being a nationalist-liberation movement.[9]

Criticizing the nationalist and Marxist interpretations of the Movement, Yong-jick Kim was the first among South Korean historians to argue for placing the research focus on collective identity and its foundation—namely, 'culture.' Adopting theories from the American social science field, he characterized the March First Movement as a national and social movement that arose in the nation-building process of non-western countries. He also argued that the movement was a congeries of three disparate movements with two distinct methods of mobilization—proactive mobilization by public-sphere leaders and reactive mobilization via traditional resources such as local leadership and communal identity.[10] His study has great significance for introducing concepts from world history experiences

---

[9] Bae Seong-joon, "Samil Undonguy Nongminbonggijeok Yangsang [Elements of March First Movements as Peasants' Uprising]," in *Cheongubaeksipgunyeon Samwol Ilile Mutda [Asking to the First of March 1919]*, eds. Park Hyeon-ho and Ryu Joon-pil (Seoul: Sungkyunkwan University Press, 2009), 289.

[10] Kim Yong-jick, "Formation of a Modern State and National Social Movement in Modern Korea: March First Movement (1919) in Comparative Historical Perspective," (Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1992), trans. Kim Yong-jick, "Sahoeundonguro Bon Samilundong (*March First Movement seen from Social Movement*), *Hangukjeongchihakheobo [Korean Political Science Review]*, 28-1.

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

to the analysis of the March First Movement, thus inspiring many Korean historians. However, in concentrating on establishing a theoretical framework, he failed to underpin his theory with facts; for instance, he emphasized culture as an important factor of the movement but did not provide a concrete analysis in relation to historical facts. Nevertheless, his characterization of the March First Movement as a national and social movement remains significant in the research field, and it will be an important subject of discussion in the future.

For nearly twenty years following Yong-jick Kim's work, interest on the March First Movement in general has largely declined, and the focus of the research has shifted to regional case studies, owing to the development of local governments in South Korea. This shift in research trends is related to two circumstances: one, the weakening of the will to solve real-world problems in parallel with the political and social democratization of South Korea, and two, the self-criticism of South Korean historians for having missed diverse aspects of the movement by focusing on social classes and nation, two overarching subjects of historical discourse. These self-criticisms resulted in a new book, *Asking to the First of March 1919*. As indicated by its editors in the preface, the book contains many "articles criticizing the methods of remembering and representing the March First Movement rather than directly discussing the event." This statement exhibits traits of post-colonialism, which still exerts a significant influence on the current academic field. In addition, the book anatomizes societal changes brought by the 1910s, such as the problem of mass society, the influences of mass media, and the formation of people as political agents, thus presenting many new areas of research.[11] The formation of mass society and emergence of mass media are indispensable factors when discussing the causes of the national-scale dissemination of the March First movement.

This paper may also be construed as part of the aforementioned postcolonial trend in that it looks into culture beyond the scope of nation and

---

[11] H. Park and J. Ryu, Preface to *Cheongubaeksipgunyeon Samwol Ilile Mutda [Asking to the First of March 1919]*.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

social class, but its main focus is to identify factors that caused the nation-scale dissemination of the resistance to the idiosyncrasies of Japanese colonialism in the 1910s. The Japanese Government-General in Korea conducted a massive scale of colonial restructuring under the name of civilization, upsetting the entire foundation of Korean society from the very bottom. The colonial reform denounced Korean traditions and customs, which had been formed through long historical experiences, and the dramatic changes affected and angered Koreans from all walks of life. The Japanese occupation was the first true colonial rule that Koreans had ever experienced, and the associated political, economic, and social changes—that is, the cultural changes—came as a cultural shock to all Koreans. With these circumstances in mind, the paper attempts to identify the motivations of Koreans' national-scale participation in the March First Movement by investigating the characteristics of Japanese colonial rule in the 1910s and the culture shock that Koreans experienced.

III. Characteristics of the Japanese Colonial Rule of the 1910s and the March First Movement

The military rule in the 1910s, epitomized by military police, is often mentioned as a cause of the March First Movement. Even the Japanese referred to their governor-general's policy on Joseon at that time as the tyranny of good intentions. However, a colonial government is not a charity, so it is absurd to assume that good intentions were involved from the very beginning. As Jürgen Osterhammel defined it, colonialism is essentially "any relationship between masters and servants, but one in which an entire society is robbed of its historical line of development, externally manipulated and transformed according to the needs and interests of the colonial rulers," and "modern colonialism is based on the will to make peripheral societies subservient to the 'metropolises.'"[12] Moreover, Japan practiced an extreme

---

[12] Jürgen Osterhammel, *Colonialism-A Theoretical Overview*, trans. Shelly L. Frish (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1995), 31.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

form of colonialism, executing an assimilation policy of incorporating Korea permanently into the Japanese Empire and thereby replacing Korea's traditional institutions and values with Japan's modernized ones.

Japan's primary purpose in assimilating Korea was to transform it into a supplier of food and resources and a military base for the invasion of the continent. After the Russo-Japanese War, Japan immediately began replicating its economic system in Korea. Both countries valued their currencies the same, which eliminated any functional differences, and shared a common external tariff system. The Japanese land system was also adopted to modernize property ownership in Joseon.[13] Thus, Joseon's economy ended up on the fast track toward capitalization, and along with it, traditional society rapidly disintegrated.

In addition to economic restructuring, Joseon's administrative institutions underwent dramatic reformation, and a modern and rational legal system including a judiciary was adopted. For instance, in 1914, *myeons* (town-level regional units) were merged and rearranged, and in 1917, a new system of township, wherein a *myeon* became the smallest administrative unit that governed town affairs, was implemented. Consequently, community traditions were obliterated, and the colonial government's policies could penetrate to bottom-level rural communities.[14] As the modern system of administration was shaped, Koreans came to experience an incomparably more powerful form of government than they had previously under the Joseon Dynasty, and the will of the power holder could control and interfere every part of the land and people. The centralized governmental system facilitated efficiency and rationality across Korean society and settle-

---

[13] Kim Nak-yeon, *The Korean Economy under Japanese Colonial Rule,* (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 2002), 56.

[14] Kim Ik-han, "Cheongubaeksipnyeondae Iljeuy Jibang Jibae Jeongchaek – Hangjeongguhoek Tongpyehapgwa Myeonjelul Jongsimuro [The Japanese Policy of Local Governance in the 1910s – Focusing on Merging and Rearranging Administrative Units and the Myeon System]," *Sahoewa Yeoksa* [*Society and History*] 50 (1996); Hong Sunk-won, "Iljechogiuy Myeon Unyeonggwa 'Joseon Myeonje'-uy Seongrip [The Management of Myeon in the Early Japanese Colonial Era and Establishment of Joseon's Myeon System]," *Yeoksawa Hyeonsil [History and Reality]* 23 (1997).

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

ment of the capitalist economic order which was subordinate to Imperial Japan. All these changes were stipulated by numerous new laws and ordinances, such that the new jargon 'shower of laws and ordinances (法令雨下)' was coined and circulated at that time.

Meanwhile, the Japanese colonial government meticulously built infrastructure and facilities to fit military purposes. For example, the first governor-general of Joseon, Masatake Terauchi, who was a continental expansionist in the Japanese military and a railroad expert, began the construction of the Gyeongwon and Honam railroad lines immediately after the annexation in 1910. By 1915, his government completed a total of 1,000 miles of railroad network. With the completion of the Aprok Railroad Bridge in 1911, the railroads crossing the peninsula and those running to Manchuria were made to have the same standard gauge and were connected as one route.[15] When Korean peasants were mobilized to construct the new railroads at that time, they were ordered to build them "as broad as to allow the two largest gun carriages to pass each other."[16] In short, Imperial Japan was conducting two projects simultaneously under the name of civilization: economic incorporation of Joseon into Japan and militarized transformation of the peninsula for the continental invasion.

The problem, however, was that such projects required an enormous amount of money, but Japan at that time was under financial constraints. Japan barely managed to overcome its fiscal deficit after the Russo-Japanese War with the fortune from World War I, so naturally, it did not have any financial resources to support its colonial reconstructions. As a result, its colonial projects were stagnated and did not progress as planned; hence, it needed to procure necessary resources from the colony. The purpose of its cadastral surveys included the procurement of financial resources, and they were successfully executed, increasing the land tax revenue by 1.8 times between 1910 and 1918. From these additional sources of financing,

---

15 Jung Jae-jung, *Iljechimryakgwa Hangukcheoldo [Japanese Invasion and Korean Railroads]* (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1999), 106-28 & 141-43.

16 Hayashi Shigeki, "Reviewing the Old and Learning the New," in *Memoirs of Joseon*, eds. Wada Yachio *et al*. (Tokyo: [Keijō Chikazawa Shoten], 1940), 70.

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

the colonial government was able to collect 2.7 times more taxes in 1918 than in 1910 before the cadastral surveys.[17] Despite the tax increase, the colonial government still suffered from financial difficulties and employed various ways to coerce donations. In particular, new railroad constructions in the 1910s drew many complaints about the coercion of donations. All these facts show that the colonial government propelled construction and reformation projects without sufficient financial resources, incurring resentment from natives. What were the reasons for the Japanese Government-General of Joseon to push forward those projects despite insufficient finances? In 1907, Japan had already attempted to deploy two divisions of troops in Korea, deeming Russia as a potential enemy in the Imperial Japan's National Defense Policy and enhancing its armaments. In addition, the world of the 1910s experienced a number of dramatic, history-changing events, such as the Xinhai Revolution in China in 1911, the start of World War I in 1914, and the Russian Revolution in 1917. Japan's military saw this fluctuating geopolitical state of affairs as an opportunity to extend its influence to the continent—Manchuria and China. With this ambition, Imperial Japan hurried the development of Korea in order to transform it into the departure point and military base for the invasion.[18]

Another driving force for Japan was its desire to prove that it was a *bona fide* civilized nation that could govern a colony of its own. Although it was able to join the "club of civilized nations" winning the Russo-Japanese War, Japan was still required to prove itself to be as qualified as any Western power, for civilizational criteria for its membership were those of the West. Thus, for Japan, the colonial rule of Korea was closely tied to its honor. To be acknowledged by Western powers, Japan annually published an English report of its reformation and development of Korea,[19] and such

---

17 Kim Ok-geun, *Iljeha Joseonjaejeongsa Nongo [A Study of Joseon's Financial History Under the Imperial Japanese Rule]* (Seoul: [Iljogak], 1994), 14 & 27.

18 Akira Iriye, *Ilbonuy Oykyo [Japan and the Wider World: From the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the Present]*, trans. Lee Sunghwan (Seoul: [Pureunsan], 1993), 73-81.

19 The American Council of Christian Churches–Committee of Asian Relations [ACCC], "Hangukuy Jeongse (1) – Choygeun Sageondeule Daehan Mokgyeokjadeuluy Sinbingseong

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

promotional efforts helped it earn praise for its civilization rule in Joseon. Although Japan's colonialist restructuring of Joseon's economy and militarization of its land under the guise of civilization was praised internationally, the problem were the Koreans. Because all the policies and projects were centered on the interests of the empire, it was difficult to satisfy the expectations of Koreans from the outset, no matter how much civilization they presumably achieved. Moreover, these policies placed excessive burdens on Korean people and alienated them from their long-standing traditional order. Additionally, the Government-General and Japanese assumed the role of preceptors of civilization who were enlightening uncivilized Koreans. This arrogance further provoked antagonism from Koreans.

Japan rationalized its colonial rule and exploitation under the name of civilization, and it was, in fact, successful to a certain extent. However, Japan's rationale was not very persuasive to Koreans: Japan had belonged to the same sphere of civilization as Korea, their societal developmental stages had not been much different, and Japanese superiority relied on what was borrowed from foreign civilization. Moreover, Joseon had been reputed to be more civilized in the sphere of Chinese Civilization before Western imperialists extended their influence to the East. Although it was true that Japan was a step ahead in acquiring civilization as noticed by some of the Japanese, it was not a great achievement to the minds of Korean intellectuals.[20] Furthermore, the customs[21] and behavior of low-class Japanese, who came as henchmen of pillaging Joseon, looked far from civilized in the eyes of the Koreans.[22]

Issneun Jeungeon [The Korean Situations (1) -Credible Testimonies on Recent Events by Witnesses]," in *Dokripundongsa Jaryojip [Resources of Independence Movement History]* 2, eds. (Seoul: National Institute of Korean History, 1972), 448-49.

20 Anonymous, "Sentiment of Low-Class Koreans" in *Works of the Entire Korea* 43 (1909.4), vol. 3 *[Documents of Modern-era Japanese Perceptions of Joseon]* (Tokyo: [Ryokuin Shobō], 1999), 78-79.

21 Shakuo Ikuo, "*The Enforcement of Disciplines,*" (1909), Ibid., 201-02

22 Takasaki Soji, *Sikminji Joseonuy Ilbonindeul – Gunineseo Sangin, Geurigo Geishaggaji [The Japanese in Colonial Joseon – From Soldiers, Merchants, to Geishas]*, trans. Lee Gyusu, (Seoul: [Yeoksa Bipyeongsa], 2006), 17-28.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

A Japanese psychoanalyst, Shu Kishida, suggested that the Imperial Japanese "projected their inferiority complex onto Koreans, which derived from truckling to European and American empires."[23] That is, to the Japanese of that time, Koreans represented the shameful side of their own image which they wanted to throw off in order to identify themselves as part of Western civilization. In other words, Japan's contempt of Koreans was an expression of their own inferiority complex t.[24]

In contrast, the Koreans perceived themselves as a people of distinct ethnicity with a more advanced civilization than that of the Japanese. Having been under the rule of a centralized kingdom for a long time, as mentioned by Ito Hirobumi,[25] they also displayed a higher sense of homogeneity. However, the lament that Koreans cared only for themselves and their families, neglecting their country, frequently appeared in Patriotic-Enlightenment-Era newspapers including *Dokrip Shinmun* (*Independence Newspaper*) during the final years of the Joseon Dynasty. It was a common persuasion of intellectuals of that time that Koreans must strengthen sense of nation and build a strong and wealthy nation, like Japanese had in defeating Russia. This patriotic-enlightenment movement invigorated the development of the press and civic engagement: a number of newspapers were launched, civic groups were formed, and magazines were published to educate Koreans on civilization and enlightenment. As a result, private schools were founded across the country, reaching 5,000 at one point.[26] All these activities contributed to enhancing the Koreans' sense of nation. As the crisis of Joseon's sovereignty become increasingly evident with the Japanese intrusion after the Russo-Japanese War, the Koreans' sense of na-

---

23 Kishida Shu, *Psychoanalysis of Bums* (Tokyo: [Seidosha], 1977), 17.

24 Lee Seong-shi, "Godaesaeseo Bonun Gukmingukga [Nation States in Ancient History]," in *Gahap Omphalos Teubyeolho Jeonhu Osipnyeon Symposium: Dongasiaul Gocheo Mutnunda* [*Kawaii Omphalos – Special Edition of the 50th Post-War Anniversary: Rethinking East-Asian History*], 32.

25 Sodan Meika, "Difficulties of Governing Korea," in *Joseon Achievements*, 24 (June 10, 1907), vol. 2 of *Perception of Joseon*, 190.

26 The Association for Korean Modern and Contemporary History, ed., *Hanguk Geundae Hyeondaesa Ganguy [Lectures on Modern History of Korea]* (Seoul: [Hanul], 2013), 119.

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

tion strengthened even more. The *Donga Daily* pointed out in the 1920s that Korean nationalism emerged after colonial rule began.[27] Hence, it is plausible that Korean nationalism grew even stronger after the annexation in 1910, as the Japanese colonial rule forced Koreans to conform themselves to Japanese order and culture.[28]

In the 1910s, Koreans in general could not voice their opinions or participate in society. Koreans were almost denied political rights, including the freedom of speech. In other words, they were alienated as mere objects in managing social affairs. For example, it came as a great shock to Koreans when their language, the fundamental means of communication and key to their cultural unity, was discriminated under the new social order. In Gwangsu Lee's novel *The Heartless*, there is a scene in which the main character hears a station porter shout "Heizo, Heizo" in the train and he only then realizes that he has reached Pyeongyang. This seemingly trivial scene illustrates the fact that Koreans needed to know the Japanese word "Heizo" to take the train to Pyongyang—a symbol of civilization brought by Japan. The Japanese language was imposed as the official medium of instruction at schools, and teaching Korean history was not allowed.

Korean history never experienced such a state of colonialism until the Japanese annexation. The entire nation of people experienced the fall from being the main agents of their society to being mere objects, and this must have evoked despair and feelings of helplessness, loss, and anger. The changes imposed by Imperial Japan upset their conditions of life—namely, their culture—from its very roots. Customs and beliefs familiar to them were suddenly labeled as barbarous and as things to be discarded. Worse, such reformation and transformation was forcibly and humiliatingly imposed upon them by the Japanese, with whom they had a long history of

---

27 [It was after they had lost the political key and been subjected to the rule of a different nation that the Koreans' notion of pure ethnic nation was awakened and developed]." *Donga Daily* editorial, "Mibalgyeonuy Minjung" [Undiscovered People], (Oct. 27, 1923).

28 Michael Crowder, *Senegal: A Study in French Assimilation Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), 36. ※ He argues that the French-style assimilation policy draws more of resistance from natives, inciting their desire to recover their own indigenous culture than the British-style indirect governance.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

hostility. These findings all indicate that rebellion was inevitable. The Japanese colonial government also acknowledged that its "rapid reform of all institutions and systems" was a problem in its method of governance.[29]

Therefore, the dramatic change in culture that affected the lives of Koreans must be investigated as a cause of the nationwide dissemination of the March First Movement. That is, what induced Koreans' nationwide independence movement was their anger toward the Japanese civilization rule in the 1910s, which brutally, forcibly, and humiliatingly denounced Koreans' traditional ways of living—their culture—and imposed customs and culture totally alien to them.

With this understanding, the following section examines the meeting minutes of the colonial government police and officials from immediately after the March First Movement, which include reports of public opinions of Koreans collected across the country, especially their complaints and demands.[30] By examining these documents, this paper investigates how the policies of the Japanese government affected Korean traditional culture and how this angered Koreans.[31]

---

[29] Park Gyeong-shik, *Joseon's March First Independence Movement*, (Tokyo: [Heibonsha], 1987), 249.

[30] Headquarters of the Joseon Military Police, "Reports Submitted to the Meetings of Police and Military Police Chiefs in June 1919," in Classified: Circumstances of the 1919 Joseon Incident - ※ This book of documents is a collection of reports submitted at the meetings of Japanese police and military police chiefs, which collected situations and public opinions from every province of Korea immediately after the March First Movement. Although the reports have limitations, coming from the colonial ruler, they are a reliable source to find out Koreans' public sentiments at that time, since complaints and demands of Koreans were collected secretly to prepare solutions. Henceforth in the paper, the descriptions of Koreans' complaints and demands without a source are all from these reports.

[31] The social and technological development brought by the Japanese civilization rule of the 1910s, such as networks of railroads and roads, establishment of mass society, and new metal printing technology, must have contributed to the nationwide dissemination of the March First Movement. However, this paper focuses on the factors concerning Korean sentiments—their complaints and demands.

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

IV. Causes of the National-Scale Uprising

1. Denouncing of Customs

To re-discover and re-invent traditionally unregulated social customs as objects of management is said to be an aspect of modern society.[32] The most noticeable change that Koreans felt deeply under the colonial rule was the interference and surveillance by authorities that penetrated into every part of their lives. Even worse, it was violently forced upon them by the military police's "Jocho-Gyosei (助長行政)" or promotion policy. This interference created greater discontent when it involved economic matters. In particular, when the interference directly threatened the livelihood of the peasantry—for example, denying the right of the commons after the surveys of forests and fields (Gyeongbuk Province) or banning swidden farming (Gangwon Province)—it evoked strong resistance. James Scott's study on the economy of the Southeast Asian peasantry reveals that restrictions on common access to mountains and forests were what made peasants suffer most under colonial rule.[33] The Japanese colonial government even banned tobacco cultivation and home brewery for the purpose of private consumption.

In terms of traditional customs, the public cemetery law drew constant complaints. All thirteen provinces in Korea raised discontent toward the law, demanding a return. Although the public cemetery system allowed for practical use of land and was a reasonable policy to a certain extent, it went against the Korean customs and sensitivities of the time. In fact, it is unsurprising that the public cemetery law drew such strong resistance from the Koreans 100 years ago, especially when it was imposed upon them by a for-

---

[32] Lee Cheol-wu, "Iljeo Jibaeuy Beopjeokgujo [The Legal Construction of the Japanese Colonial Rule]" & Matsuda Toshihiko, "*Jumakdamchong*-ul Tonghae Bon Cheongubaeksipnyeondae Joseonuy Sanghwanggwa Minjung" [The 1910s Joseon's Social Situations and People, *Focusing on Eavesdropping at Pubs*," 381-84, in *Iljeo Siminji Sigiuy Tongchicheje Hyeongseong [Development of the Japanese Colonial Government System]*, ed. Kim Dong-no (Seoul: [Hyean], 2006).

[33] James C. Scott, *Nongmin-uy Dodeok Gyeongje [The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia]*, trans. Kim Chundong (Seoul: [Akanes], 2004), 92-93.

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

eign colonial invader, given the fact that a propitious site for a grave (明堂) is still in the Korean discourse of the twenty-first century.

Another source of resentment was sanitation policing. In the imperial period, hygienicists equated filthiness with barbarism and cleanliness with civilization, functioning as a catalyst for colonization. Sanitation and hygiene crackdowns were used as an instrument for the colonial police to control and surveil the private living spaces of natives.[34] In fact, there were instances where police intruded on private residences and arrested vagrants on the pretext of sanitation inspection.[35]

Meanwhile, aristocrats resented that they were treated in the same way as commoners (Gyeongbuk Province). What made them particularly furious was being conscripted for road constructions alongside commoners. The conscription for construction work was one of the major sources of complaints among Koreans at that time. Anger was also often directed at Korean police assistants, many of whom bullied their compatriots and played minions to the Japanese colonial powers. How Koreans perceived of them is well illustrated by the phrase "almost a band of government-authorized thugs."[36] The primary reason for the anger toward them was certainly rooted in their abuses, but the collapse of the traditional caste system could also have contributed to it.

2. Collapse of the Traditional Economic Structure

After the opening of the ports, foreign trade dramatically transformed not only Joseon's economy but also its society. Importantly, the cadastral sur-

---

[34] Kwon Gi-ha, "Cheongubaeksipnyeondae Chongdokbuuy Wisaengsaeopgwa Sikminji 'Sinmin'-uy Hyeongseong [The 1910s Colonial Government's Sanitary Affairs and the Establishment of Officials and Subjects]," (MA Thesis, Yonsei University). ※ The colonial government conducted a big sanitation event twice a year, in spring and fall.

[35] "Uyrongkkaji Dwijinda Cheongyeolul Bingjahago" [Searching Even Wardrobes on the Pretext of Sanitation)], *[The Saehanminbo Daily]* 503 (1918.9.12.), 2.

[36] Ministry of Patriots & Veterans Affairs, *Samilundong Dokropseoneonseowa Gyeokmun: Haeoyuy Hangukdokripundongsaryo (15)- Iljepyeon 7 [Korean Declaration of Independence and Manifestos for the March First Independence Movement: Overseas Resources of Korean Independence Movement History (15) - Japan vol. 7]* (Sejong: 2002), 278.

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

veys expedited the commercialization of land and the deprivation of land from farmers, thus accelerating the disintegration of Joseon's traditional economic structure. According to research by Seong-wu Kim (2006), the agrarian society of Joseon maintained a system of moral economy governed by an 'integrated principle of reciprocity and redistribution.'[37] A moral economy pursues collective survival foremost, valuing security and equality in economic activities. It is plausible that such traditional thoughts and practices were still quite prevalent in Joseon's agrarian society around the time of the March First Movement and thus that farmers had considerable resistance to the commodity-currency economy that followed the opening of the ports.

The imposition of genetically modified crops also evoked resentment among farmers. The colonial government pushed farmers to cultivate cash crops, such as genetically modified rice, silkworms, and upland cottons, in order to target the Japanese market, but despite their high profitability, the risk was too high for Korean farmers.[38]

Taxes also drastically increased after the annexation. As a result of the cadastral surveys, the land tax nearly doubled from slightly over 6 million won in 1910 to approximately 11.78 million won in 1919, and with the introduction of tobacco and liquor taxes, the tax revenue grew by approximately 2.7 times during the same period.[39] In 1920, the population of peasantry, both tenant and partial-tenant peasants, comprised 77.2%, while 47.4% of farmers owned less than 5 *danbo* of land (approx. 4958.7 ㎡),[40] which suggests that the majority of the farming populace was poor at that time. Therefore, any new taxation would certainly have incurred anger from farmers.

---

[37] Kim Seong-wu, "Joseonsidae Nongminjeok Segyegwangwa Nongchonuy Unyeongwonri" [The Agrarian World View of the Joseon Peasants and Their Principles of Agrarian Community Management]," *Gyeongjesahak [Review of Economic History]*, 41 (2006), 278.

[38] J. Scott (2004), 36: For the farmers already in financial crisis, resilient and reliable traditional crops are more reasonable choices than profitable cash crops.

[39] Kim Ok-geun, 14 & 27.

[40] Park Gyeong-shik, *Ilbonjegukjuuyuy Joseonjibae [The Colonial Rule of Joseon by Japanese Imperialism]* (Paju: [Cheonga], 1986), 88-89.

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

3. Contempt and Discrimination

Koreans were further infuriated by the disdain of the Japanese and their discriminatory laws and institutions. The discrimination that started with the annexation can be classified into four types: ① discrimination of Japanese officials and civilians toward Korean officials and civilians, ② discrimination between Japanese and Korean public officers, ③ legal and economic discrimination of Koreans, and ④ discrimination of Koreans in education. The most common incidents of ① discrimination were disdainful and insulting words and acts of the Japanese toward Koreans.

> The Japaneses generally treat Koreans like slaves. Some of them called even a local man of eminent wealth "yobo," which is used these days instead of the non-polite Japanese word "omae (お前)." Accordingly, it cannot but be an insult. It is infuriating. (Gyeongnam Province).

The cases of ② were mostly concerning payment and promotion. Those of ③ were overt and covert discriminations that Koreans experienced through laws and policies as the following complaints illustrate: "no Korean is appointed head of a government office" (Gyeonggi Province), "no Korean is allowed to be head of a police office or a court" (Chungnam), "Koreans are not appointed principals of schools" (Chungnam), and "many things are kept secret to Korean officers" (Chungnam). In addition, the fact that the punishment of flogging was only applied to Koreans is suggestive of the discrimination and humiliation that Koreans must have felt at that time.

Regarding ④, discrimination in education, there was a report of complaints from Gyeongnam Province as follows:

> Even in education, many colleges and high schools have been founded in Japan, providing civilized education, but Joseon has only inferior primary schools. Even though there are secondary schools, they do not teach civilized education but treat students like custodians or farm workers—even make them clean feces... (Gyeongnam Province)

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

In other words, it was a complaint on the obscurantist policy of the colonial government, which, while preaching civilization and equality, hardly provided the education of civilization.

4. Surge of Anti-Japanese Sentiment

Although various and specific complaints and demands poured into the Japanese colonial government, the root of all these problems lay in the anti-Japanese sentiment prevalent among the general Korean populace. This sentiment had been formed through a long history of interaction between the two countries, especially through the vivid historical memory of *Imjinwaeran* (i.e., the Japanese invasion of Korea in 1592). The military police of Chungnam Province reported the harmful effects of the novel *Imjinrok* [*The Record of the Black Dragon Year*] and determined that the anti-Japanese sentiment originating from *Imjinwaeran* had formed part of the Koreans' ethnic identity.[41]

The anti-Japanese sentiment in the subconsciousness of Koreans surged as interactions with Japanese became more active after the opening of the ports. It was triggered by disadvantages that Koreans experienced from the exportation of rice and the intrusion of Japanese merchants and fishermen. The anti-Japanese sentiment was expressed in 1894 during the Donghak Peasant War through peasant insurgents' hostile acts toward Japanese. Moreover, the assassination of the queen (i.e., Empress Myeongseong) by hired Japanese assassins in the following year further ignited the fury of the entire nation. Apparently, even during the process of establishing the Government-General, Japanese authorities were already concerned

---

[41] Soho Tokutomi: "One of the most difficult parts in the process of annexing and governing Joseon has been their memory of the Imjin War. Most Koreans remember this war, as every province of the country has numerous steles, signboards, tombs, books, and oral legends that commemorate it. However we try, it is impossible to eradicate all of them." translated and requoted from Bongwu Ha, "Donghak Gyojo Choi Jewuuy Daeoyinsikgwa Ilbongwan [Donghak Guru Choi Jaewu's Views of the World and Japan]," in Seo Yeonho *et al*., *Hanguk Geundae Jisikinuy Minjokjeok Jaahyeongseong: Ilje Sikminji Cheheomul Neomeoseo [The Development of National Identity of Modern Korean Intellectuals: Overcoming the Japanese Colonial Rule]* (Seoul: [Sohwa], 2004), 182.

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

about the anti-Japanese sentiment among Koreans. Such sentiment escalated further with the annexation, as a large number of Japanese then moved to Korea and enjoyed various privileges while discriminating against Koreans. The long-standing belief of Koreans, which was based on their interpretation of Confucianism, was that they were a people of superior manners, honor, and principles,[42] and this belief aggravated their dormant hostility when the Japanese disregarded and insulted them.

5. Soaring Demand for Civilization and Frustration

During the early dissemination period of the March First Movement, Christianity and Cheondogyo played a major role in the north, while students and intellectuals took the lead in the middle and southern provinces.[43] They were the group of Koreans who experienced civilization first and hence had the strongest aspiration for civilization. Although the education at colonial schools was fundamentally based on the assimilation policy, it was still a gateway to civilization. In particular, students at private schools that were founded and run by missionaries were more exposed to Western civilization. Because those students had good knowledge of civilization and a strong desire to attain it, the colonial government's hypocritical civilization campaign would have particularly frustrated them. Thus, those who were more exposed to civilization naturally undertook the role of igniting the March First Movement. Additionally, most public and private schools were located in cities that were transportation hubs connected by a network of modern railroads and large new roads, and the most notable hub was Seoul, the capital city. At that time, Seoul was swarmed by a throng of people from every part of the country who came to mourn the death of King Gojong; they turned into protesters demanding independence, making Seoul the epicenter of the nationwide liberation movement. The movement naturally spread from Seoul via railroads and roads to ev-

---

[42] MPVA, *Samilundong Dokropseoneonseowa Gyeokmun: Haeoyuy Hangukdokripundongsaryo (15)- Iljepyeon* 7, 189.

[43] Mabuchi, "Characteristics of Joseon's Agriculture in the First World War Era and the March 1st Movement – Agricultural Production and Colonial Landownership" 130.

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

ery part of the country.

Cheondogyo, a native religion founded by the Donghak Movement of the peasantry in the nineteenth century, suffered a severe backlash after the failed peasant uprising in 1894. Its leader, Sohn Byeonghui, transformed himself into a strong advocate of civilization[44] and encouraged his followers to accept civilization after he had witnessed the success of the Meiji Restoration during his exile in Japan. Under Sohn's leadership, Cheondogyo extended its influence around the upper-middle regions of the Korean peninsula and published magazines to civilize its followers. The ruling body of Cheondogyo was highly centralized; hence, when the directions were sent down from its leadership as one of the representatives of the movement, the followers immediately and uniformly joined the movement.

Through the movements of Civilization Enlightenment and Patriotic Enlightenment in the last years of Joseon, the ideology of political freedom was widely spread among Korean intellectuals, alongside ideas such as fostering industry and production, strengthening economic prosperity and military might, and cultivating patriotism through education. However, the civilized colonial rule of Imperial Japan was far from what the intellectuals understood and anticipated. The class of new intellectuals, comprising students, religious leaders, and other neo-intellectuals, had extensive knowledge of civilization, had a strong thirst for it, and were keenly aware of the changing world order. Accordingly, this new class came to stand in the frontline of resistance against the colonial rule. Since they were the major agents disseminating the March First Movement at beginning, this neo-intellectual class accounted for 21% of the prisoners who were arrested because of the protests.[45]

---

[44] Kim Jeong-in, "Cheongubaeksipnyeondae *Cheondogyohoewolbo*-lul Tonghaese Bon Minjunguy Salm" [The Life of People Described in *The Cheondogy Monthly*]," *Hangukmunhwa [Korean Culture]* 30 (2002), 329.

[45] Kondo Kenichi, "*March First Uprising* (1)" (1964), 223-27, requoted in *Samil Minjokhaebangundong Yeongu* [*A Study on the March First National Liberation Movement*] (Seoul: Cheongnyeonsa, 1989), 238. ※ Although the figure is from the statistics of the late 1920s, only 2.7% of Koreans were 'educated,' including those taught in Seodang—traditional Korean

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

What they wanted most was more civilization, and their key demand was political freedom. If not independence, they at least wanted equal political rights, the right to autonomy, freedom of speech and publication, and freedom of assembly and association. The following manifesto succinctly and clearly illustrates what Koreans wanted at that time.[46]

> We demand the immediate independence of Joseon. It was within our freedom to conduct politics in the ways we see ideal. Being governed by others, even if it were by politics of civilization, is still against the historical tradition of Koreans. (Gyeongnam Province)

The commoners, mainly represented by the peasantry, were not adamantly against the civilization policy of the colonial government. A secret investigation report (酒幕談叢) in 1915 analyzed how the peasant class construed the new form of rule, in contrast with the Joseon-era rule. They appreciated the termination of *yangbans*' (the aristocracy of Joseon) tyranny through the abolition of the caste system, the secure procurement of private property through the development of financial institutions, and the development of transportation.[47] The fact that the peasant class in general were not totally hostile to civilization suggests that they also desired to attain a certain level of civilization.

Compared to the reactive demands discussed in (1) and (2), Korean intellectuals' demand for true civilization can be characterized proactive, even though their knowledge of civilization was accumulated through propaganda of the colonial rulers.

---

schools. Lee Yeo-sung and Kim Se-yong, *Sutjajoseonyeongu [Studies on Numbers of Joseon]*, *book 1*, (1931), 81.

[46] Demands from Gyeongnam Province also included the following examples: If independence is not possible, let Koreans elect their house representatives, appoint Crown Prince Lee Wang Governor-General of Korea, treat Korean and Japanese public servants equally, and provide equal education.

[47] Matsuda, "*Jumakdamchong*-ul Tonghae Bon Cheongubaeksipnyeondae Joseonuy Sanghwanggwa Minjung."

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

V. Conclusion

It would be very difficult to explain the March First Movement with only a few causes: protests dispersedly took place across the country, with the people of diverse classes participating in these protests, who made numerous demands, whether overlapping or different. Thus, to understand the nationality or the nation-wide character of the movement, it is a better way to shift the focus of research into the cultural changes and ruptures forced by the Japanese colonial rule in 1910s. Considering culture as the totality of ways of living in a historical community, cultural change is I believe, the most effective explanation for the national resistance to the Japanese colonial rule in 1910s.

Japanese at the time tried to speed up the civilizing process of their new colony, Joseon. They took pride in their achievement, exacting admiration from Koreans who had not regarded them highly. Obsessed by the aspiration to join the club of civilized countries, they hurried to demonstrate their civilizing capacity to the Western countries, without taking into consideration the sense of pride and sentiments of Koreans. Disrupting the foundation of the Koreans' ways of living, this forcible civilizing process provoked strong and wide resistance from them.

For the first time in their history, Koreans came to experience the reality of colonial rule in its true sense. Without political rights, they were degraded into mere objects of manipulation. Their dormant anti-Japanese sentiment, especially originating from the Japanese invasion in 1952, gained an increasing presence due to their frictions with Japanese after the opening of the ports. This sentiment was accumulated and intensified by their acts of oppression, discrimination, and contempt as they forced a civilizing mission on Koreans. The nationality in one voice of the March First Movement rests on this sentiment, calling for the withdrawal of the Japamese colonial government, despite the fact that the people of different classes had defferent expectations and demands.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Akira, Iriye. *Ilbonuy Oykyo* [*Japan and the Wider World: From the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the Present*], trans. Lee Sunghwan. Seoul: Pureunsan, 1993

American Council of Christian Churches – Committee of Asian Relations [ACCC]. "Hangukuy Jeongse (1) – Choygeun Sageondeule Daehan Mokgyeokjadeuluy Sinbingseong Issneun Jeungeon [The Korean Situations (1) - Credible Testimonies on Recent Events by Witnesses]." In *Dokripundongsa Jaryojip* [*Resources of Independence Movement History*], vol. 2, eds. Gusapyeonchanwiwonhoe [National Institute of Korean History]. Seoul: Gusapyeonchanwiwonhoe, 1972.

Anonymous. "Sentiment of Low-Class Koreans." In *Works of the Entire Korea* 43 (1909.4), vol. 3 of *Documents of Modern-era Japanese Perceptions of Joseon*. Tokyo: Ryokuin Shobō, 1999.

Anonymous. "Uyrongkkaji Dwijinda Cheongyeolul Bingjahago [Searching Even Wardrobes on the Pretext of Sanitation]," *The Saehanminbo* 503, September 12, 1918.

Association for Korean Modern and Contemporary History, ed. *Hanguk Geundae Hyeondaesa Ganguy* [*Lectures on Modern History of Korea*]. Seoul: Hanul, 2013.

Bae, Seong-joon. "Samil Undonguy Nongminbonggijeok Yangsang [Elements of March 1st Movements as Peasants' Uprising]." In *Cheongubaeksipgunyeon Samwol Ilile Mutda* [*Asking to the 1st of March 1919*], eds. Park Hyeon-ho and Ryu Joon-pil. Seoul: Sungkyunkwan University Press, 2009.

Crowder, Michael. *Senegal: A Study in French Assimilation Policy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962.

Editorial, "Mibalgyeonuy Minjung [Undiscovered People]." *The Donga Daily*, Oct. 27, 1923.

Ha, Bong-wu. "Donghak Gyojo Choi Jewuuy Daeoyinsikgwa Ilbongwan [Donghak Guru Choi Jaewu's Views of the World and Japan]." In Seo Yeon-ho et al., *Hanguk Geundae Jisikinuy Minjokjeok Jaahyeongseong: Ilje Sikminji Cheheomul Neomeoseo* [*The Development of National Identity of Modern Korean Intellectuals: Overcoming the Japanese Colonial Rule*]. Seoul: Sohwa, 2004.

Hayash, Shigeki. "Reviewing the Old and Learning the New." In *Memoirs of Joseon*, eds. Wada Yachio *et al.* Tokyo: Keijō Chikazawa Shoten, 1940.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Headquarters of the Joseon Military Police. “Reports Submitted to the Meetings of Police and Military Police Chiefs in June 1919.” In *Classified: Circumstances of the 1919 Joseon Incident*, 1919.

Heo, Soo. “Jeilcha Segyedaejeon Jongjeon-hu Gaejoronuy Hwaksankwa Hanguk Jisikin [Dissemination of Reconstructionism Aftermath of World War I and the Intellectuals of Korea.” In *Cheongubaeksipgunyeon Samwol Ilile Mutda* [*Asking to the 1st of March 1919*], eds. Park Hyeon-ho and Ryu Joon-pil. Seoul: Sungkyunkwan University Press, 2009.

Hong, Sun-kwon. “Iljechogiuy Myeon Unyeonggwa ‘Joseon Myeonje’-uy Seongrip [The Management of Myeon in the Early Japanese Colonial Era and Establishment of Joseon’s Myeon System].” *Yeoksawa Hyeonsil* [*History and Reality*] 23 (1997).

Joseon Military Office Headquarters. “Public Sentiments before the Riots.” In *Classified: Reports on 1919 Joseon Riots*, 1919.

Jung, Jae-jung. *Iljechimryakgwa Hangukcheoldo* [*Japanese Invasion and Korean Railroads*]. Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1999.

Kim, Ik-han. “Cheongubaeksipnyeondae Iljeuy Jibang Jibae Jeongchaek – Hangjeongguhoek Tongpyehapgwa Myeonjelul Jongsimuro [The Japanese Policy of Local Governance in the 1910s – Focusing on Merging and Rearranging Administrative Units and the Myeon System].” *Sahoewa Yeoksa* [*Society and History*] 50 (1996).

Kim, Jeong-in. “Cheongubaeksipnyeondae *Cheondogyohoewolbo*-lul Tonghaese Bon Minjunguy Salm [The Life of People Described in The Cheondo Church Monthly],” *Hangukmunhwa* [*Korean Culture*] 30, 2002.

Kim, Jin-bong. *Samilundongsayeongu* [*A Study on the History of March 1st Movement*]. Paju: Kookhak, 2000.

Kim, Nak-yeon. *The Korean Economy under Japanese Colonial Rule*. Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 2002, 56.

Kim, Ok-geun. *Iljeha Joseonjaejeongsa Nongo* [*A Study of Joseon’s Financial History Under the Imperial Japanese Rule*]. Seoul: Iljogak, 1994.

Kim, Seong-wu. “Joseonsidae Nongminjeok Segyegwangwa Nongchonuy Unyeongwonri [The Agrarian World View of the Joseon Peasants and Their Principles of Agrarian Community Management].” *Gyeongjesahak* [*Review of Economic History*] 41, 2006.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Kim, Yong-jick. "Formation of a Modern State and National Social Movement in Modern Korea: March First Movement (1919) in Comparative Historical Perspective." Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1992. Trans. Kim Yong-jick, "Sahoeundonguro Bon Samilundong," *Hangukjeongchihakheobo* [*Korean Political Science Review*] 28-1.

Kishida, Shu. *Psychoanalysis of Bums*. Tokyo: Seidosha, 1977.

Kondo, Kenichi. "March 1st Uprising (1)" (1964), 223-27. Requoted from *Samil Minjokhaebangundong Yeongu* [*A Study on the March 1st National Liberation Movement*]. Seoul: Cheongnyeonsa, 1989.

Kwon, Bodeu-rae. "Jinhwaronuy Gaengsaeng, Inryuuy Tansaeng—Cheongubaeksipnyeondaeuy Insikronjeok Jeonhwangwa Samilundong [Rebirth of Evolutionism, Birth of Homo Sapiens – Epistemological Shift and the March 1st Movement]." In *Cheongubaeksipgunyeon Samwol Ilile Mutda* [*Asking to the 1st of March 1919*], eds. Park Hyeon-ho and Ryu Joon-pil. Seoul: Sungkyunkwan University Press, 2009.

Kwon, Gi-ha. "Cheongubaeksipnyeondae Chongdokbuuy Wisaengsaeopgwa Sikminji 'Sinmin'-uy Hyeongseong [The 1910s Colonial Government's Sanitary Affairs and the Establishment of Officials and Subjects]." Master's thesis, Seoul: Yonsei University.

Lee, Cheol-wu. "Iljeo Jibaeuy Beopjeokgujo [The Legal Construction of the Japanese Colonial Rule]." In *Iljeo Siminji Sigiuy Tongchicheje Hyeongseong* [*The Development of the Japanese Colonial Government System*], ed. Kim Dong-no. Seoul: Hyean, 2006.

Lee, Seong-shi. "Godaesaeseo Bonun Gukmingukga [Nation States in Ancient History]," *Gahap Omphalos Teubyeolho Jeonhu Osipnyeon Symposium: Dongasiaul Gocheo Mutnunda* [*Kawaii Omphalos – Special Edition of the 50th Post-War Anniversary: Rethinking East-Asian History*], 32.

Lee, Tae-jin. *Gojongsidaeuy Jaejomyeong* [*Reexamining the Era of King Gojong*]. Seoul: Taehaksa, 2000.

Lee, Yeo-sung and Se-yong Kim. *Sutjajoseonyeongu* [*Studies on Numbers of Joseon*] Book 1. 1931.

Matsuda, Toshihiko. "*Jumakdamchong*-ul Tonghae Bon Cheongubaeksipnyeondae Joseonuy Sanghwanggwa Minjung [The 1910s Joseon's Social Situations and People, Focusing on *Eavesdropping at Pubs*.]" In *Iljeo Siminji Sigiuy Tongchicheje Hyeongseong* [*The Development of the Japanese Colonial*

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Government System], ed. Kim Dong-no. Seoul: Hyean, 2006.

Mabuchi, Sadatoshi. "Characteristics of Joseon's Agriculture in the First World War Era and the March 1st Movement – Agricultural Production and Colonial Landownership." *The Journal of Joseon History* 12.3 (1975).

Ministry of Patriots & Veterans Affairs. *Samilundong Dokropseoneonseowa Gyeokmun: Haeoyuy Hangukdokripundongsaryo (15)- Iljepyeon 7* [*Korean Declaration of Independence and Manifestos for the March 1st Independence Movement: Overseas Resources of Korean Independence Movement History (15) - Japan, vol. 7*]. Sejong: Ministry of Patriots & Veterans Affaris, 2002: 278.

Park, Gyeong-shik. *Ilbonjegukjuuyuy Joseonjibae* [*The Colonial Rule of Joseon by Japanese* Imperialism]. Paju: Cheonga Chulpansa, 1986.

_____. *Joseon's March 1st Independence Movement*. Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1987.

Park, Hyeon-ho and J. Ryu, eds. Preface to *Cheongubaeksipgunyeon Samwol Ilile Mutda* [*Asking to the 1st of March 1919*]. Seoul: Sungkyunkwan University Press, 2009.

Osterhammel, Jürgen. *Colonialism-A Theoretical Overview*, trans. Shelly L. Frisch. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1995.

Scott, James C. *Nongmin-uy Dodeok Gyeongje* [*The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia*]. Trans. Kim Chundong. Seoul: Akanes, 2004.

Shakuo, Ikuo. "The Enforcement of Disciplines," (1909), In *Works of the Entire Korea* 43 (1909.4), vol. 3 of *Documents of Modern-era Japanese Perceptions of Joseon*. Tokyo: Ryokuin Shobō, 1999.

Shin, Yong-ha and Il-cheol Shin. "Jesambungwa Jonghaptoron – Samilundong Chil-sipjunyeon Ginyeon Symposium [Comprehensive Debates of 3 People at the Symposium for the 70th Anniversary of the March 1st Movement]," In *Samilundonggwa Minjoktongil* [*March 1st Movement and National Unification*]. Seoul: Donga Daily.

Sodan, Meika. "Difficulties of Governing Korea." In *Joseon Achievements* 24 (June 10, 1907), vol. 2 of *Perception of Joseon*: 190.

Takasaki, Soji. *Sikminji Joseonuy Ilbonindeul – Gunineseo Sangin, Geurigo Geishaggaji, The Japanese in Colonial Joseon – From Soldiers, Merchants, to Geishas*. Trans. Lee Gyusu. Seoul: Yeoksa Bipyeongsa, 2006.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Discussion

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Special Discussion on the March First Movement's Centennial

‹The March First Movement in East Asian History›

The year 2019 marks the one-hundredth year since the March First Movement occurred. The movement involved a nationwide demonstration in Korea to resist Japanese colonial rule. It was the first large-scale independence movement to occur in a victor nation's colony since World War I. The March First Movement brought about various changes in the course of East Asian history, such as the establishment of the Korean Provisional Government, Japan's cultural assimilation efforts, and other independence movements in weak nations nearby. Hence, the Northeast Asian History Foundation arranged a special discussion to celebrate the movement's centennial. Through a review of the movement's background, meaning, impact, and remaining research challenges, the discussants sought to determine which messages from the March First Movement are still valid for those studying East Asian history and politics today both inside and outside Korea.

- **Discussants:** Sang-gyu Kang (Professor, Korea National Open University), Chan-seung Park (Professor, Hanyang University), Kyoung-han Bae (Research Professor, Busan National University)
- **Moderator:** Hyun-chul Kim (Research Fellow, Northeast Asian History Foundation)

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

1. In a few months, Korea will be celebrating the March First Movement's centennial. Many Koreans mention the movement, but often without a detailed understanding of its nature or significance. To learn more about the movement's historical significance, we now turn to experts, such as yourselves, with extensive experience in studying the histories of Korea, China, and Japan as well as international politics.

Kyoung-han Bae: In the histories of Korea and China, not to mention Europe, the year 1919 is understood as the starting point of contemporary history. This is because social, cultural, and global change substantial enough to be referred to as a "civilizational transformation" took place around 1919. That year was when the March First Movement and May Fourth Movement occurred in Korea and China, respectively. Overall, the March First Movement was an anti-imperialist movement to resist Japanese rule and aggression and is sometimes described as the "people's emergence to the forefront" since it was the people who took initiative. It can also be considered an occasion through which ideas of democracy and republicanism, initially raised in the Xinhai Revolution, picked up stream in Korea. Thus, anti-imperialism and democracy would be two key words to repre-

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

sent the March First Movement.

Sang-gyu Kang: The March First Movement's significance may seem almost too profound to summarize. The extent of the movement's significance may be made more apparent if we consider what might have happened to history from the twentieth century onward if the movement had not occurred. In that sense, the movement could be described as "the Milky Way that flowed through a pitch-dark night sky." The March First Movement was a major milestone in Korean history that demonstrated how very much alive the Korean nation and spirit remained under Japan's imperialist rule. It played a particularly pivotal role in twentieth century Korean history by serving as a domestic and international reminder that Koreans continued to hold on to their national identity and desire to regain independence.

Chan-seung Park: The March First Movement is the only incident in twentieth century Korean history that managed to bring Koreans together as one. As a result, it served as an occasion for Korea to become reborn as a modern nation. During the Joseon dynasty, the rigid social hierarchy that distinguished nobility from commoners made it difficult for Koreans to act as one, which is what makes the movement special for having overcome such a divide. The hierarchy had already been legally abolished through the 1894 Gabo Reforms, but it was the March First Movement that actually helped people become considerably less conscious of class. For instance, in one village I surveyed, noblemen were the ones who planned how the villagers would participate in the movement, but the ones who actually stood in front and struck the gong to lead the protest were commoners. Therefore, when those commoners returned after being arrested and serving time in prison, no nobleman in the village was able look down on them ever again. That experience of leading demonstrations for independence was what later allowed commoners to step forward and take charge as agents of history.

Furthermore, the March First Movement served as a source of inspiration for other independence movements and social movements that ensued. The movement put in motion the establishment of the Korean Provi-

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

sional Government, armed struggles against Japan in Manchuria, and diplomatic efforts for independence. It also indirectly affected socialist, peasant, and feminist movements in Korea. The March First Movement is therefore meaningful as the starting point and source of inspiration for national social movements that took place in Korea under Japanese rule.

2. Why did such a significant, nationwide movement occur in 1919, ten years after Japan's forced annexation of Korea? This might be a question that requires an explanation about how international circumstances changed around the time the movement took place.

Sang-gyu Kang: The first thing that comes to mind about the 1910s would be World War I. The war that took place from July 28, 1914 to November 11, 1918 completely changed the grammar of war and engendered reflections on the modern Western order and Western civilization. World War I launched an overall review of discussions on the so-called "rule of civilization" or building a "civilization-centered world." Considering the context of the period in which it occurred, the March First Movement is therefore deeply significant for having occurred at a time when Japan was also compelled to reconsider imitating Western ways and to discuss new imperialist modes of operation. Socialist arguments for revolution and President Wilson's idea of national self-determination criticized the violence and lack of morality in international politics, and following that trend, Koreans must have detected an opportunity to carry out an independence movement.

Kyoung-han Bae: After World War I, a catastrophe brought on by competition between European powers came to an end, the Paris Peace Conference was held, the United States replaced Europe in playing a central role in the international order and Japan gained hegemony in Asia. The Paris Peace Conference imbued Korean independence activists and Chinese reformers with optimistic views that relied on international morality and justice. Some in China even believed that a common good could overpower force. They most likely fantasized about the statement President Wilson had made on national self-determination in January 1918. However, the March

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

<Kyoung-han Bae, Busan National University>

First Movement revealed that such views had been based on false pretenses. China also experienced betrayal from the United States when German rights in Shandong Province were awarded to Japan instead of being returned to China, which gave rise to the May Fourth Movement. The socialist revolutionaries' argument for national self-determination raised prior to the Russian Revolution is also known to have contributed to the outbreak of both the March First Movement and the May Fourth Movement. Thus, the March First Movement can ultimately be regarded as resistance fueled by the idea of national self-determination to break free from imperialist rule by a country that had gained hegemony in Asia.

Chan-seung Park: In the 1910s, Korean independence activists were sensitive to developments in international affairs. Once World War I broke out in 1914, the Shanghai-based Sinhan hyeongmyeongdang [New Korean Revolutionary Party], in which activist Yi Sang-seol (李相卨) played a central role, appointed the Korean Emperor Gojong as the party's leader. The move seems to have taken into consideration the fact that there was an emperor in Germany, a country that appeared to be on its way to winning the war. When the United States' participation in the war in July 1917 changed the situation, Shin Kyu-sik (申圭植) and his fellow independence activists drafted the Daedongdangyeol seoneon [Declaration of Great Unity and Solidarity], which practically leaned toward American republicanism. Once Germany lost the war in November 1918, Korean youths in Shanghai organized the Sinhan cheongnyeondang [New Korean Young Men's Association] to prepare Korea for the upcoming Paris Peace Conference, and

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

new organizations were subsequently formed according to developments in international affairs.

The March First Movement's connection to the Paris Peace Conference is a matter that needs to be more carefully examined. Through the conference in January 1919, several countries previously ruled by Germany, Russia, Austria, and the Ottoman Empire were granted independence. This made Korean activists feel the urge to take advantage of the situation by carrying out independence activities, which resulted in the March First Movement. After the movement, Son Byeong-hui (孫秉熙), one of the thirty-three representatives who signed the Korean Declaration of Independence, testified during a preliminary hearing at Seoul District Court that "there were expectations that the Paris Peace Conference might discuss the matter of Joseon if Joseon made its desire for independence known." Jang Gi-wuk (張基郁), a fourth grade student from Jungang High School who distributed leaflets for the independence movement, also once stated that "the people of Joseon believed declaring their independence and publicly cheering for it in unison would win the League of Nations' endorsement for Korea's independence." Such statements indicate that Koreans must have acknowledged the Paris Peace Conference as a fairly significant opportunity to gain independence.

3. What were the circumstances in Korea that led to the March First Movement? At the time, what specific acts of resistance did the Koreans domestically engage in against Japanese rule?

Chan-seung Park: People from all walks of life took part in the March First Movement because they shared the understanding that they could no longer live under Japanese rule. The very first line of the Korean Declaration of Independence—"We hereby declare the independence of Korea and that Koreans are a self-governing people"—resonated greatly with Koreans who found Japan's forced annexation of Korea in 1910 utterly unacceptable.

Frustration about the Japanese Government General of Korea's arbitrary rule also played a huge role in prompting Koreans to join the inde-

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

<Chan-seung Park, Hanyang University>

pendence movement. For example, the nobility resented the regulation on burial grounds, which forced them to bury their deceased family members at the public cemetery instead of at private family gravesites. Farmers were frustrated about being banned from cutting trees on mountains for firewood, being mobilized for road construction during the farming season, and being forced to grow mulberry trees to support silkworm breeding. Students were embittered about being forced to study in the Japanese language and within an education system that was deficient compared to that for Japanese students. Additionally, capitalists were stymied by financial institutions, such as banks that made it difficult to take out loans. What Koreans found particularly mortifying and unbearable under Japanese rule were things such as being sentenced to flogging or getting fined by the military police without trial according to a law about the immediate conviction of criminal offenses or being addressed in derogatory terms such as "yobo" by the Japanese in Korea.

Sang-gyu Kang: Like Professor Park said, Koreans must have been acutely aware from experience that Japanese colonial rule under the pretext of achieving "civilized rule" and "Oriental peace" was extremely mortifying. Such a realization and pent-up indignation led Koreans to identify themselves as a community of pain, which gave birth to a democracy that resisted being ruled by a foreign civilization, and that is what must have inspired Koreans to take part in a nationwide movement for independence.

Kyoung-han Bae: In addition to the two domestic circumstances that were just mentioned, I would like to point out the fact that Koreans were also influenced by witnessing exactly how various independence movements

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

since 1895, especially armed struggles, ended up being fruitless. They continued to witness failure after failure up until 1919. Of course, suppression, discrimination, and mortification must have caused many Koreans to rise, but commoners would have also been affected by a sense of resistance that was triggered as their nation's independence grew distant over time. Therefore, vivid memories of the Japanese military brutally suppressing righteous Korean soldiers could have also contributed to making the March First Movement possible.

4. At the time, what were the characteristics of and problems with Japan's imperialist colonial rule? Compared to colonies ruled by other imperial powers, what was different about Korea?

Sang-gyu Kang: Imperialism at the time inevitably led to some form of exploitation, and as with any other colony, force was used to exploit Korea. However, whereas countries in the Christian cultural sphere of Europe used force to subdue countries in non-Christian spheres, Japan did the same to neighboring countries in the same cultural sphere. This caused the subdued countries to experience a greater sense of betrayal and indignation that left them traumatized for a long time.

The pain Korea went through is aptly described in the preface of Hanguk tongsa [The Painful History of Korea] Park Eun-sik (朴殷植) published in 1915: "Korea is a civilized country, a land of noble men that gave birth to the Japanese civilization. After Korea had served as its teacher, Japan is now trying to turn Korea into its slave." Korea ended up falling prey to imperialism in its vicinity, which severely damaged its pride. That was what set its



<Sang-gyu Kang, Korea National Open University>

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

experience apart from other countries that suffered due to Western imperialism.

Kyoung-han Bae: Considering changes in the East Asian international order, Japan's invasion of East Asia was different from that of Western powers. For instance, since the Meiji Restoration, an argument for Japan's conquest of Korea, called Seikanron (征韓論), emerged. At the base of the argument was the intent to invade mainland China, an idea Japan had been harboring since the traditional era. Therefore, Japan had had the desire to advance into continental Asia since the late nineteenth century. Between the outbreak of the First Sino-Japanese War in 1894 and the end of the Pacific War in 1945, Japan's invasion of East Asia was carried out swiftly and intensively over a relatively short period of time. This is probably why Japanese imperialism exhibited a greater degree of oppressive exploitation.

Japan's colonial rule of Taiwan is often compared with its colonial rule of Korea. Taiwan's resistance against Japan was weaker than Korea's even though Taiwan was colonized fifteen years ahead of Korea. The reason for that had to do with Taiwan's historical identity. Taiwan only became incorporated as Chinese territory in the seventeenth century and was afterwards invaded and ruled by a number of European powers, such as the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal. Then, Japan took over. Therefore, Taiwan's situation was very different from Korea, which is why it is inappropriate to make a direct comparison between the two. Moreover, Japan's colonial rule of Taiwan was strategically successful in many ways. Its colonial rule of Korea was more atrocious because it regarded Korea as a military base for its advance into continental Asia. This, I believe, is what caused full-blown resistance in Korea.

Chan-seung Park: In the case of Taiwan that Professor Bae mentioned, Japan's colonial rule was practically aimed at demonstrating to Western imperial powers its capability of running a colony of its own. This is why Japan invested considerably in building railroads or schools in Taiwan.

What stands out the most about Japan's rule of Korea is that Japan sought to transform Korea, not into a colony, but into an extension of Japa-

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

nese territory. Japan ultimately intended to turn Korea into a place no different from Japan, which is where the assimilation policy comes in. To put it simply, Japan's assimilation policy was to transform the customs and mindset of Koreans so that they resembled those of the Japanese. However, the chance of such a policy succeeding was low because Korea had a larger population and a longer history as an independent nation and was culturally sophisticated. Nevertheless, Japan was determined to realize its dream of advancing into continental Asia, which is why it sought to turn Korea into an extension of Japan.

What I mentioned earlier about the regulations on burial grounds or teaching Koreans the Japanese language and history all resulted from Japan's assimilation policy. However, Koreans became greatly frustrated because policies that purported to be about assimilation were, in fact, closer to being about discrimination. The mass migration of the Japanese to Korea and the appointment of Japanese candidates to major positions in charge of controlling Koreans were other policies that likely triggered resistance.

Sang-gyu Kang: When discussing the differences between Taiwan and Korea in terms of their experience as former Japanese colonies and how they respectively remember the experience, I believe we should be careful not to approach them based on today's perspective without an understanding of the context of the time when each country experienced colonial rule. Back then, Taiwan and Korea had historical experiences and levels of national pride that were entirely different from one another. Unlike the civilized country of Korea, which had a strong, unique sense of national pride and identity, Taiwan had not formed an independent national identity, nor had it firmly established a unique culture of its own. Moreover, China to which Taiwan belonged, was struggling with an internal division of its own. That is why we should bear in mind that the Taiwanese had reason to have relatively positive memories about Japan's showy colonial rule.

5. Would there be any historical incidents or figures related to the March First Movement worth shedding new light on? If so, please briefly introduce them.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Chan-seung Park: It is hard to introduce just one, since it was a nationwide movement, but I would have to go with student participation, which I found most impressive. Students at vocational schools or middle schools in Korea were influenced by the February Eighth Declaration of Independence made in Tokyo and began preparing a demonstration of their own in mid-February. Yonhi College student Kim Won-byeok, Bosung College student Gang Gi-deok, and Gyeongseong Medical College student Han Wi-geon had originally planned to launch a demonstration on March 5 but decided to act in tandem with the thirty-three Korean representatives at the request of one named Yi Gap-seong.

That is how, among the people gathered at Pagoda Park on March 1, there were hundreds of students who were associated with the Young Men's Christian Association or a student group called the Seobuk haksaeng chinmokhoe. The crowd led the demonstration that day as well as the one on March 5 in front of Seoul Station. Most of the demonstrators were arrested. Students who were later arrested for producing and distributing newspapers underground were sentenced to anywhere from one to three years of imprisonment, which was similar to what the thirty-three representatives were sentenced to. That was an indication of how much the Japanese Government General of Korea feared and was wary of student participation in the independence movement. Nevertheless, students continued to take part in other demonstrations that occurred after March 20, and such activities had a ripple effect throughout Gyeonggi Province that eventually spread all over the country. Examining the March First Movement's overall process makes it obvious that the movement was orchestrated by the thirty-three representatives and Catholic and Protestant organizations, but the students seem to have made an equally important contribution.

Sang-gyu Kang: I would like to focus on what the slogan "Daehan dongnip manse" [Long Live Korean Independence] symbolized. The slogan, along with the Korean flag (Taegeukgi), turned into major symbols of Korea because the experience of shouting the slogan and waving the flag especially awakened the frustration and patriotism in people's hearts at the time. While modern states were formed and started to become integrated into a

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

modern international order, Korea had been deprived of its right to join the newly evolving trend. Therefore, shouting the slogan and waving the flag turned out to be a prime chance for people to express the sorrow of having lost their national sovereignty.

One more thing to point out is the rumor that spread after the Korean Emperor Gojong's death on January 21, 1919. The rumor that the emperor had been poisoned after continuing to resist Japan's pillaging of Korea's national sovereignty played quite a critical role in triggering a nationwide uprising two days ahead of the emperor's funeral on March 3. Such circumstances seem to affirm that a modern civilized mindset does not become introduced instantly but instead progressively in a zigzag-like pattern as it meshes with previously established traditions and ideas. I think the movement is a specific instance proving that the meeting of the traditional and the foreign does not involve discarding all things from the past and replacing them with newly accepted things but rather has to do with creating room among things from the past so that new possibilities may unfold.

Kyoung-han Bae: I've been considering two points in relation to the thirty-three Korean representatives who actually played a fairly limited role in the movement. There are still many issues to look into regarding their whereabouts and acts of betrayal after the movement. Nevertheless, I think it was deeply meaningful that among those representatives were religious leaders from Cheondoism, Protestantism, and Buddhism. In particular, once Cheondosim and Protestantism joined forces, religious circles surged to the forefront of the March First Movement. This seems worth exploring in terms of the role religion has played in modern Korean society. It would also be worth positively reviewing the process through which harmony was created among different religions at the time. There should be new aspects to study when we think about the interreligious conflicts and the insufficient role religion is playing in Korean society today.

6. Now that we have touched upon multiple aspects of the March First Movement, perhaps it is time to discuss the impact the movement had upon neighboring countries. How did Japan and China view the movement?

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Kyoung-han Bae: In Korea, the May Fourth Movement that took place in China is often pointed out as an overseas reaction to the March First Movement, but scholars in Korea and China have different opinions about such an interpretation. The Peking University students who led the May Fourth Movement did, in fact, express admiration for the March First Movement, so the movement in Korea does seem to have had a direct impact upon the movement in China. However, a closer look at the May Fourth Movement's eruption shows that discouragement from the Paris Peace Conference and the sense of betrayal the Chinese felt toward the United States were what directly led to China's refusal to sign the Treaty of Versailles and to demonstrations demanding that several Chinese officials resign for allegedly collaborating with the Japanese. The May Fourth Movement was therefore along the line of the March First Movement, but it would be misleading to claim that the movement in China was a direct result of the movement in Korea. Meanwhile, regarding the two movements as incidents that occurred around the same period does rationally help to explain the international solidarity activities against imperialism that ensued.

What is more worth taking note of is the way the March First Movement changed how the Chinese viewed Korea. Renowned liberal scholars in China, such as Chen Duxiu (陳獨秀), used to disregard Korea as an "incompetent, impolite nation incapable of acting in solidarity." Only after the March First Movement did their attitude toward and understanding of Korea turn positive, enough for some to even claim that China should learn from Korea.

Sang-gyu Kang: As Professor Bae described, Chinese people such as Kang Youwei (康有爲) and Chen Duxiu regarded Joseon as an instance of a failed, ruined country prior to the March First Movement. Therefore, the movement should be considered an occasion that made the international solidarity of resistance possible in Asia. In other words, it is necessary to examine the movement as an occasion that formed Asian solidarity in resisting imperialism, which should be distinguished from the Japanese argument that "Asia is one."

Looking into how Japan viewed and reported the March First Move-

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

ment at the time reveals that the Japanese were not seriously or fundamentally concerned about the movement's ramifications. Yoshino Sakuzo (吉野作造), a famous political scientist who taught at the University of Tokyo during the Taisho Democracy period, argued that "the people of Joseon regard themselves as having become civilized earlier than the Japanese, which makes it inappropriate to adopt an assimilation policy toward them" and suggested that "the people of Joseon should be awarded some sort of right." However, except from a few intellectuals, such a suggestion failed to gain much sympathy in Japan.

7. Having been established as a result of the March First Movement, how did the Republic of Korea's provisional government manage to uphold the movement's spirit and what was the historical and political significance of the government's establishment?

Chan-seung Park: The March 3 and 5 editions of the newspaper *Joseon Dongnip Sinmun*, published and distributed by followers of Cheondoism, reported that "a national convention will soon be held in Seoul to establish a temporary government." The temporary government mentioned in those editions was referring to a provisional government. This hints that followers of Cheondoism had been made aware of plans for the provisional government's establishment while preparing for the March First Movement. In fact, a leaflet handed out on April 9 under the title "The Republic of Joseon's Provisional Government" included a list of cabinet members that included the name of Cheondoism's leader, Son Byeong-hui.

Meanwhile, Protestants consulted followers of Cheondoism and Confucianism to separately organize a cabinet. The establishment of a provisional government, known as the Hansung Government, was subsequently proclaimed at a national convention held on April 23. Throughout that process, members of the Seobukpa [Northwestern Faction] managed to secure a list of the Hansung Government's cabinet members and made corrections to the list before passing it on to Shanghai—a move that is now referred to as the proposal for the Sinhanminguk Government. However, Koreans in Shanghai dropped the administrative system headed by a consul governor

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

from the proposal and recommended Rhee Syngman as prime minister of the Shanghai Provisional Government. In any case, moves to form a provisional government were continuously made during the March First Movement, and once such news reached Shanghai, a provisional government was established there between April 10 and 11. Therefore, I personally think there is enough reason to collectively refer to the March First Movement and the establishment of provisional governments as the "Gimi-year Revolution" (己未革命).

Sang-gyu Kang: If the March First Movement signifies the birth of Korean democracy, provisional governments signify the birth of a political space for direct tasks for Korea's independence—a pivot for Korean independence activities.

However, there is one thing that cannot be left out when discussing the connection between the March First Movement and provisional governments. That would be the Korean Empire's connection to the Shanghai Provisional Government. Article 1 of Daehakguk gukje, the constitution King Gojong promulgated after establishing the Korean Empire, stated that "Korea is recognized all over the world as an independent empire." The article thereby proclaimed that the Korean Empire was an independent country, a sovereign state according to international law. Another thing we should note is what Shin Seok-wu (申錫雨) said as a member of the provisional assembly when the assembly was considering a new name for Korea in September 1919. "We are now trying to establish a new country based on cries for independence that began in front of Gyeongungung Palace's Daehanmun Gate…. Since the country we are now trying to establish will be a republic to succeed the Korean Empire, it should be named the Republic of Korea." Shin Seok-wu's suggestion gained support from the absolute majority and led the provisional government to choose the name Republic of Korea.

In other words, the Shanghai Provisional Government decided to succeed the Korean Empire, as it dreamt of moving into new territory as a democratic republic. Therefore, in a way, the March First Movement and the Shanghai Provisional Government served as a bridge for an indepen-

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

dent, constitutional monarchy called the Korean Empire to transition into a democratic republic called the Republic of Korea.

Kyoung-han Bae: Considering the aforementioned notions of anti-imperialism and democracy within the broader context of East Asia might make it easier to recognize where the Korean Provisional Government stands. After the Xinhai Revolution, Asia's first republican revolution, democracy spread to areas surrounding China, such as Korea, Vietnam, and Mongolia, as they embraced republicanism. In Korea's case, the early independence activists who came to China immediately after the Xinhai Revolution responded enthusiastically toward the terms "gonghwa" (共和) and "minguk" (民國). At the time, the term gonghwaguk (共和國), meaning a republic, was commonly translated into Korean-Chinese characters as *minguk*, which allowed for *minguk* to be recognized as a synonym for republic. Therefore, Daehan (Korea) was taken from the name Daehan jeguk (Korean Empire) to be combined with minguk to form Daehan minguk (大韓民國), the Republic of Korea. Therefore, the Korean Provisional Government's choice to advocate a democratic republic represents the process through which the republicanism introduced by the Xinhai Revolution spread and settled down all over East Asia.

In terms of anti-imperialism, the March First Movement changed the Chinese view of Koreans and prompted the need to build international solidarity. As Comintern came to play a central role in supporting democratic movements in colonized areas, widespread anti-imperialist solidarity emerged after 1920. Therefore, the Korean Provisional Government's establishment was a starting point for embracing democratic republicanism that formed a pivot for anti-imperialist solidarity in East Asia.

8. As we celebrate the March First Movement's centennial, what aspects of the movement should we focus on and learn from? Please point out any relevant challenges that may be lying ahead.

Chan-seung Park: I believe the very first line of the Korean Declaration of Independence wholly embodies the March First Movement's spirit: "We

동북아역사재단 NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

hereby declare the independence of Korea and that Koreans are a self-governing people." After Japan deprived them of their position as citizens of an independent country in 1910, Koreans came to acutely realize the importance of that position. When President Wilson advocated the idea of national self-determination, they recognized the opportunity to regain their national sovereignty and carried out the March First Movement. In addition, twenty-first century Korea is still in need of that same spirit of independence, particularly as a guide for establishing peaceful relations between the two Koreas on their way to achieving unification in the future.

Other terms to carefully take note of in the Korean Declaration of Independence are justice and humanitarianism. The word justice was mentioned several times in President Wilson's Fourteen Points speech, where he emphasized that "It is the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak." Humanitarianism is also something President Wilson repeatedly highlighted in speeches he made prior to the United States' participation in the war. An editorial published in the November 10, 1918 edition of the Korean newspaper *Maeil sinbo* described President Wilson as a personification of justice and humanitarianism and expected the United States and Britain to abide by such principles in taking the lead in reforming the world. Therefore, mentioning justice and humanitarianism suggests that the Korean Declaration of Independence must have been heavily influenced by the mood at the time both inside and outside Korea. The terms represented the spirit of the times back then, and I believe they are still values commonly embraced by humanity today.

Kyoung-han Bae: Independence from imperialism or positive expectations for an international order based on justice, humanitarianism, and peace can appear somewhat unrealistic, but they can also be effective in the long run. Since anti-imperialism and democracy were previously suggested as key words representing the March First Movement's significance, I would like to add the "argument for building a peaceful international order" as a key phrase. Although such an argument was no more than an expression of

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

<Hyun-chul Kim, Northeast Asian History Foundation>

wishful thinking around the time the movement occurred, it later turned into and still remains an earnest goal for East Asia. National independence, autonomy, democracy, and building an international framework of peace are still valid topics in matters involving unification on the Korean peninsula or complex international conflicts between powerful countries. Therefore, today, we are still facing the message the March First Movement tried to communicate a hundred years ago.

Sang-gyu Kang: In the end, the March First Movement should be regarded as the occasion that allowed Korea to break away from a Sino-centric order and establish itself as a principal agent upon a new stage. The fact that universal values of nonviolence, mutual growth, and peace were employed to explain that Korea was an independent country signifies that the March First Movement is linked to the trend in world history of severely criticizing the twentieth century as an age of extremes that strived only for national prosperity and military power.

Considering what the March First Movement means to Koreans, we need to comprehensively analyze and reflect on the Korean peninsula's geopolitical position and the experiences it went through during times of transition. The Korean peninsula is still surrounded by world powers. After experiencing war during the nineteenth century Western occupation of the East and the twentieth century Cold War era, the Korean peninsula has remained under the threat of war in the twenty-first century post-Cold War era due to North Korean nuclear issues. Under such circumstances, the March First Movement offers vivid implications for how Korea can concentrate its efforts while trying to harmonize but not homogenize. In that

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

sense, the movement is a valuable historical source we can draw upon time and again in regard to discussing the present state of Korea.

9. Finally, we would appreciate it if you could each introduce notable findings made so far in researching the March First Movement or any relevant topics that require further research in the future.

Kyoung-han Bae: I think it is a pity that the March First Movement and Korean provisional governments are only being studied as part of a history of independence activities. The Chinese also tend to approach the May Fourth Movement as an act of patriotism, but that only produces outcome-based interpretations that fail to view history comprehensively. Therefore, I believe it is necessary to study the March First Movement or the May Fourth Movement from more diverse angles.

For example, focusing on the actual lives of Koreans around the time that the March First Movement occurred might broaden the spectrum of research. Instead of simply pitting Japan against Korean independence activities, I would like to see more studies about people who lived on middle ground back then. In the Manchurian areas, there were Koreans devoted to independence activities and Koreans who cooperated or even collaborated with the Japanese. Featuring the period as if only activities for independence took place would make it difficult to gain a truly comprehensive overview of Korean history. In terms of the situation in Korea at the time, we need to delve more deeply into the negative aspects of what happened after the March First Movement, such as the reality of Japan's cultural rule or what became of independence activists as the Japanese Government General and army headquarters tried to placate such activists and convince them to cross over to the other side of the conflict.

I recently heard talk of building a memorial hall to celebrate the March First Movement's centennial. In addition to exhibitions that can effectively pass on the movement's spirit, I sincerely hope that a proper space and database for conducting basic research on the movement can be established there as well.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Sang-gyu Kang: I agree with Professor Bae about breaking away from fixed frames in research and diversifying perspectives to view history because it is an important aspect of modern historical reflection. What I have been interested in lately is how the wars Japan caused over the course of half of a century impacted Asia. Japan intermittently caused wars between the First Sino-Japanese War in 1894 and the end of the Pacific War in 1945, warranting a more macroscopic—yet detailed—approach to be able to properly research the impact of such wars. Additionally, it is such a shame that we have not yet seen any superb publications focused on covering with the Pacific War or the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal.

Finally, I would like to point out two things related to the significance of the March First Movement. One is how paradoxical history can be. The movement and the establishment of provisional governments prompted Koreans to come together to resist Japanese imperialist aggression, but they also turned out to be deeply tragic, frustrating experiences. Nevertheless, such tribulations served as opportunities for Korea to make the transition from constitutional monarchy to republicanism and confirmed that the Korean spirit was alive. Japan, on the other hand, managed to successfully move forward after the Meiji Restoration until the country lost the war while still under imperial rule by a bloodline that had yet to be broken.

Another point of interest is that, considering the paradox of history within the present context, the judgements and choices we make now will be the making of our history over time. East Asian countries each took a very different track in the twentieth century. However, from a macroscopic viewpoint, we cannot ignore the fact that they share the same experiences and *Zeitgeist* in terms of striving to catch up to modernity and the West. We must also pay attention to the fact that negative aspects of modern grammar from the past are connected to the insecurities and crises East Asia is currently experiencing. Therefore, we in Korea need to clearly acknowledge that the choices we make now will be entirely passed on as history to our future generations.

Chan-seung Park: Frankly, Korean historical research on the March First Movement has not made much progress, and there have been very few doc-

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

toral dissertations covering the topic. It would have helped a lot if enough testimonies had been collected from survivors after Korea's liberation, but the failure to do so has made it difficult to conduct research today. Moreover, Korea's division into north and south has made research even more challenging. For instance, there is no way to confirm whether records still exist on the trials held in North Korean regions in relation to the March First Movement. Therefore, compared to how much the movement's significance has been highlighted, not enough research has been done to support discussions about such significance. Additionally, scarce research has been conducted on the history of the Japanese Government General of Korea's governing policies. With a majority of researchers focusing on the history of independence movements, there has not been enough energy left to spend on comparing the policies Japan adopted to govern Korea with those other countries adopted to govern their own colonies.

What I find more of a shame is that there is a serious lack of research on the March First Movement's relation to other international developments. The movement is sometimes described as if only domestic factors in Korea caused it to occur, to the point that the thirty-three Korean representatives are even criticized for having misunderstood the idea of national self-determination as well as the Paris Peace Conference's agenda. This is evidence that not enough research has been done on how the Korean understanding of international developments was tied to the motivation behind carrying out a nationwide demonstration in Korea.

The last thing I would like to mention is that when we consider the March First Movement, we should think highly of the fact that Koreans attempted to actively take advantage of changes in international developments. From an objective viewpoint, the principle of national self-determination could not be applied to Korea back then. Even leading Korean independence activists, including the thirty-three representatives, must have had some doubts as to the possibility of Korea achieving independence according to the principle of self-determination. Nevertheless, taking advantage of the principle as an opportunity to overthrow reality was a proactive attitude that deserves to be highly regarded. I believe that Koreans are in need of such an attitude today. Compared to rumors of war from a year

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

ago, an international event such as the Winter Olympics has served as a turning point for forming a mood of peace lately between the two Koreas. The fact that Korea took advantage of a situation to create opportunities for itself reminds me of how Korea responded to circumstances around the time of the March First Movement. Countries such as the United States, China, and Russia are still putting their own interests first in regard to issues involving the Korean peninsula, so Korea needs to maintain a proactive attitude to overcome the reality it now faces. This is the very spirit of the March First Movement that Koreans need to uphold at they welcome the movement's centennial.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Notes for Contributors

The Journal of Northeast Asian History [JNAH] is a peer-reviewed biannual journal published by the Northeast Asian History Foundation. JNAH seeks challenging research focusing on regional and trans-national issues within the context of historical Northeast Asia. The Journal concentrates on interdisciplinary, comparative, and cross-cultural approaches to issues such as borders, identity, international relations, history issues, history education, historiography, and other relevant themes within the humanities and the social sciences. In addition to this thematic diversity, the Journal's geographical scope extends to other areas of Asia and beyond, thus inviting scholarly engagement in rethinking globalism and localism in world history. For detailed information about the submission of manuscripts, please contact the Journal at jnah@nahf.or.kr or jnah.nahf@gmail.com.

JNAH is published semiannually, in June and December. There is no set deadline for the submission of manuscripts. However, the manuscript must reach the editorial office by March 15 to be considered for publication in the June issue and by September 15 for the December issue. All submissions will be refereed by specialists in relevant fields. Authors will be notified of the decision of the Editorial Board as promptly as possible, usually within three to four months of submission, as to whether their papers have been accepted for publication. Manuscripts may be edited according to the guidelines of the Editorial Board. The Editors are the final arbiters.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Preparation of Manuscripts

General Guidelines

1. *The Journal of Northeast Asian History* (ISBN 1976-3735) follows *Chicago Manual of Style*, 16th edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010).
2. Submitted manuscripts, including footnotes and illustrations, should be approximately thirty pages in length. The manuscript should be double-spaced in 12-point type.
3. The first page of the manuscript should provide the article title, and the names(s) and affiliations(s) of the author(s).
4. The second page should provide an abstract of no more than 150 words and at least five keywords that are placed following the abstract.
5. Romanization systems for East Asian languages are as follows: Revised Romanization, by the Republic of Korea government, for Korean, Pinyin for Chinese, and Hepburn for Japanese. For Inner Asian languages, Manchu, and Mongolian, please follow the systems used in the *Cambridge History of China*, volume 6. Exceptions to these are proper names internationally authorized, such as Koguryo.
6. Diacritics in East Asian language romanization systems (e.g., macrons in Japanese) must be included consistently.
7. East Asian (Korean, Chinese, and Japanese) scripts should appear wherever necessary in the body of the text or in the footnotes, following the appropriate romanization. Korean scripts should be in standard PC or Macintosh encoding, Chinese characters in standard Big5 encoding (please use traditional form, or *fantizi* 繁體字), and Japanese kanji and kana in Shift-JIS.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Illustrations and Proofs

Authors are encouraged to include good quality illustrations (maps, photographs, etc.) in their manuscripts. Changes at the page proofs stage and later will be accepted only upon the Editor's approval. Final proofs are sent to both authors and book reviewers, and corrections are to be limited to printing errors only.

Copyright

Authors are to obtain permission to reproduce any copyright material. In assigning copyright, authors may use their own materials in other publications if *The Journal of Northeast Asian History* is acknowledged as the original place of publication and the Northeast Asian History Foundation is notified in writing in advance. Authors also agree to assign copyright of their manuscript to the Northeast Asian History Foundation to ensure that the materials in the journal can be distributed as widely as possible.

Submission Address

All manuscripts and communication should be directed to:
Editorial Office
The Journal of Northeast Asian History
Northeast Asian History Foundation
Imgwang Bldg.,
81 Tongil-ro, Seodaemun-gu
Seoul 03739, Republic of Korea
Email: jnah@nahf.or.kr
jnah.nahf@gmail.com.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Publication Ethics

The stipulations below are the public pronouncement of *The Journal of Northeast Asian History* for academic integrity and originality.

1. Articles and book reviews in *The Journal of Northeast Asian History* do not represent the views of the Northeast Asian History Foundation or the journal's editors.
2. No part of a manuscript submitted to the journal should be under review for publication elsewhere nor have been published in another publication without the permission of *The Journal of Northeast Asian History*.
3. Three specialists, including editorial board members, if appropriate, will be appointed peer reviewers to evaluate the suitability of the manuscript. The Editor is responsible for the final acceptance or rejection of the manuscript.
4. Any form of scholarly misconduct, including plagiarism, forgery, or falsification, in the process of research or writing the manuscript is not permitted. If misconduct is reported, the editorial board will form a committee to consider the withdrawal of the manuscript. If misconduct is proved, the manuscript under investigation will be immediately withdrawn and the author will not be permitted to submit further manuscripts to *The Journal of Northeast Asian History*.
5. Quotation of or references to sources in the manuscript must be clear. Authors are fully responsible for all the factual and numerical contents published in their manuscript.
6. In the case of co-authored manuscripts, the order of authors should reflect the extent to which they contributed to the completion of the manuscript.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

The Journal of Northeast Asian History
Volume 15 Number 1 Winter 2018

Published in Winter 2018
Compiled by Northeast Asian History Foundation
Published by Northeast Asian History Foundation
Imgwang Bldg., Tongil-ro 81, Seodaemun-gu, Seoul 03739, Republic of Korea
Tel: +82-2-2012-6000 Fax: +82-2-2012-6154

ISSN 1976-3735

Copyright © 2018 by the Northeast Asian History Foundation. All Rights Reserved.
No portion of the contents may be reproduced in any form without
written permission of the Northeast Asian History Foundation.

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION