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

Editorial Board

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The Journal of Northeast Asian History (ISSN 1976-3735), sponsored by the Northeast Asian History Foundation, is published semiannually, in June and December, by the Institute of International Affairs at the Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University, 1 Kwanak-ro, Kwanak-gu, Seoul, 08826, Korea. A one-year susbscription each issue is US$25 plus shipping for individuals, including students. Please send your subscription order and payment directly to the publisher.

A word from the chief editors

The Journal of Northeast Asian History will be published under new managment from this issue. In particular, the publication of the Journal is now entrusted to the Institute of International Affairs at the Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University. Professors Tae Gyun Park, Erik Mobrand, JeongHun Han, and Jaewoo Choo are working together as chief editors of the Journal.

The Journal has published academic articles dealing with a diverse array of vibrant debates and controversies covering topics and issues related to Northeast Asian History. Such works have spanned the ancient to the modern period and covered myriad topics, encompassing the controversies over the perception or interpretation of history and territorial disputes. The Journal has thus facilitated academic discussion regarding various Northeast Asian historical issues.

Therein, the Northeast Asian History Foundation has played a critical role. The foundation has endeavored to raise awareness of Northeast Asian historical and territorial issues in publishing a scholarly journal in English. As a consequence, readers outside the Northeast Asian region have come to be interested in those topics important in Northeast Asia. Readers inside the region have improved their understanding of those issues.

Along with the foundation, we the co-editors in chief are committed to continuing and enhancing such efforts. If such an endeavor can be said to have been in its initial stages up until now, then the time has come to elevate the discussion of such issues and topics to a higher level. Moving beyond the task of merely fostering interest in topics and issues related to Northeast Asian history, we aim at invigorating relevant scholarly debate.

With this task in mind and sponsored by the Northeast Asian History Foundation, we commit to renewing publication of the Journal. Accordingly, in addition to increasing the ample supply of scholarly articles and book reviews, we intend to seek out the greater participation of those who are specialists in their fields. This means including not only more articles and book reviews, but also introducing the newest documents, unfolding debates and most recent currents in academia. Furthermore, we plan to expand the scope of research comparing issues in Northeast Asia with those of other regions. We shall also strive to convey the latest information in this regard, introducing, attending and organizing various academic conferences and events in other regions.

While the journal's revitalization begins with this issue, having been planned, edited and completed on a tight schedule, it does not completely reflect the changes described thus far. We pledge to the readers that the following issue will demonstrate a format and content commensurate with the aforementioned objectives. Finally, we sincerely hope that readers continue to view the Journal of Northeast Asian History with interest and anticipation.

Tae Gyun Park, Erik Mobrand, JeongHun Han, and Jaewoo Choo
chief editors, The Journal of Northeast Asian History

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ABOUT THE JOURNAL OF NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY
The Journal of Northeast Asian History (JNAH) is a peer-reviewed biannual journal published by the Institute of International Affairs at the Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University. JNAH seeks challenging research focusing on regional and trans-national issues within the context of historical Northeast Asia. The Journal concentrates on interdisciplinary, comparative, and cross-cultural approaches to issues such as borders, identity, international relations, history issues, history education, historiography, and other relevant themes within the humanities and the social sciences. In addition to this thematic diversity, the Journal's geographical scope extends to other areas of Asia and beyond, thus inviting scholarly engagement in rethinking globalism and localism in world history. For detailed information about the submission of manuscripts, please contact the Journal at journal.jnah@snu.ac.kr.

Articles

How History Created its own Dramas: A Study of John Dewey's Experiences in his 1919 Visits in Japan and China

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How History Created its own Dramas: A Study of John Dewey's Experiences in his 1919 Visits in Japan and China

American philosopher and educationist John Dewey was invited to Japan and China in 1919. He gave lectures, visited schools and met celebrities in both countries. Comparatively speaking, Dewey showed more affection to China, where he extended his stay up to two years. His correspondence during that time shows that his involvement in the May Fourth Movement, which marked the climax of the democratic movement in China, impressed him very much, suggesting the possibility of putting his theory of democracy into practice. He changed his ideas about China through such a process. On the other hand, the centralization of authority under the Imperial System in Japan worried him, becoming the obstacle to the acceptance of his theory in Japan during that time. History is influenced by complicated factors, both internal and external.

Keywords: John Dewey, Letters from China and Japan, Democracy, China, Japan

How History Created its own Dramas: A Study of John Dewey's Experiences in his 1919 Visits in Japan and China

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I. Introduction

As a famous philosopher and educationist, John Dewey's (1859-1952) influence extends across many fields and countries. Numerous monographs and journal papers have been written about him from different perspectives. Therein, his trip to East Asia is a heated topic. Accompanied by his wife, Alice Dewey, John Dewey visited Japan and China in 1919. He delivered lectures, visited schools, met celebrities and stayed for long periods in both countries. Japanese scholar Akihiro Mori (森章博) held the view that Dewey's visit was closely connected with the Taisho New Education Movement of Japan during that time.[1] Hu Shih (胡適), a leading intellectual in China and the translator of most of Dewey's lectures, claimed, "Ever since the contact of China and the Western world, no one has influenced our Chinese intellectuals as greatly

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[1] Akihiro Mori, *Nihon niokeru john dewey dhiso denkyuu no seiri* [An Overview of the Studies on John Dewey in Japan] (Tokyo: Syuuousha, 1992), 12-15.

as Dewey did."[2]

In 1969, as a commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of Dewey's visit, a collection entitled *Studies on Dewey* was published in Japan. Scholars like Yoshio Nagano (永野芳夫) and Norio Miura (三浦典郎) wrote of their memories of Dewey's travel in Japan. In the first chapter of his book, *Nihon Niokeru John Dewey Shiso Kenkyuu No Seir*i (An Overview of the Studies on John Dewey in Japan), Akihiro Mori described how Japanese scholars translated and introduced Dewey's works before and after his stay in Japan. Regarding studies of Dewey's visit to China, monographs such as *Du Wei Yu Zhongguo* (John Dewey and China), and *John Dewey in China* might be most representative.[3] In brief, most of the historical facts and a comprehensive itinerary of Dewey's trip have been clarified in previous studies. The problem is that Dewey's trips have always been treated in terms of one-way instruction, that is, he taught people in these two countries with a developed theory. However, what Dewey himself experienced and thought remains unclear. This is particularly interesting considering that, as is well known, Dewey knew little about Japan and China before he embarked on his journey. How he constructed his understanding of these two unfamiliar countries in his travels is an interesting issue deserving further analysis.

To analyze this issue, attention should be paid to a long-ignored set of historical documents, Dewey's Letters from China and Japan. John and Alice Dewey wrote letters to their children in America almost every day during their travels informing them of what they had experienced and thought in these distant and unfamiliar countries. These letters were edited and published as a book by their daughter Evelyn Dewey in 1920. It is absolutely first-hand information allowing one to relive their

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[2] Hu Shih, *Hu shi quan ji* [The Collected works of Hu Shih], vol.1 (Hefei: Anhui Educational Press, 2007), 360.

[3] Yuan Qing, *Du wei yu zhongguo* [John Dewey and China] (Beijing: Renmin Press, 2001); Jessica Ching-Sze Wang, *John Dewey in China* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007).

experiences in East Asia nearly one hundred years ago. Due to issues of style, these letters were not included in the *Collected Works of John Dewey*, which has become the canonical text when referring to Dewey. This might be one of the reasons why this material has received much less attention than warranted.[4]

The current study, based upon his correspondences and contemporaneous records, tries to offer a clearer portrait of Dewey's visits in these two countries and his experiences, feelings, and thoughts therein.

II. Days in Japan

The following passage sums up the commencement of Dewey's trip to Japan:

> In the fall of 1918, Dewey was on a sabbatical leave from Columbia University and was teaching at the University of California at Berkeley. Because Dewey and his wife, Alice, were geographically nearer to Asia than they would otherwise have been, they thought they might as well take this opportunity and travel to Japan in the spring. Dewey also agreed to this plan because this trip might help cure Alice's longtime depression over the death of their son on a trip to Italy. When two of Dewey's Japanese acquaintances learned that he was planning a trip to Japan, they arranged for him to deliver a series of lectures at Tokyo Imperial University.[5]

The lectures served to turn their trip into an official one. Eiichi

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[4] This historical material was translated into Chinese by Liu Xing and published by Beijing Normal University Press in 2016. Neither Chinese nor Japanese translation was available before. This might be another reason why this material was ignored.

[5] Wang, *John Dewey in China*, 3.

Shibusawa (渋沢栄一), "the father of Japanese capitalism," agreed to be their sponsor during their stays.

Boarding the ocean liner Shinyo Maru (春洋丸), they left San Francisco on January twenty-third, 1919 and reached the port of Yokohama on February ninth. The next day, reports about their arrival appeared in newspapers like *Osaka Asahi Shimbun* (大阪朝日新聞) and *Yorozu Choho* (萬朝報), complemented by a picture of them taken in Yokohama. In the first letter to their children, Alice wrote with surprise that a man came out of a curio shop and asked: "Exguse me, madame, is this not Mrs. Daway? I knew you because I saw your picture in the paper."[6] This scene testifies to the development of mass communication in Japan at that time.

The Dewey's were fascinated by everything. In the second letter home, Dewey said that he was "having so many interesting experiences and impressions" that it was "already difficult to catch up in writing them down."[7] Clogs, tea ceremonies, a festival of dolls, lacquer and porcelain—all manner of Japanese traditional things caught their eye. They were also impressed by the modernization brought about by the Meiji Restoration. Dewey's letters give us a vivid portrayal of a developed Asian country with wonderful service, clear districts and politeness everywhere. Dewey claimed that it was "about as easy shopping in this store, the big department store, as it is at home—much easier as respects attention and comfort. They give us little wrappers or feet gloves to put over our shoes. Think of what an improvement that would be in muddy weather in Chicago."[8] Regarding Japanese restaurants, an 'ordinary one,' in Dewey's view, "was cleaner than any

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[6] John Dewey and Alice Dewey, *Letters from China and Japan* (New York: E.P. Dutton & Company, 1920), 3. Spellings like "Exguse" and "Daway" are not mistakes, but rather attempts transcribe the pidgin English.

[7] Ibid., 7.

[8] Ibid., 11.

American one, even the best."[9] He also joked with his children that "politeness is so universal here that when we get back we shall either be so civil that you won't know us, or else we shall be so irritated that nobody is sufficiently civil that you won't know us either."[10] The combination of traditional and modern characteristics in Japan led Dewey to judge that, in Japan, "Old world and new world are not mere relatives; they are as near absolutes as anything."[11]

When Hu Shih and other former students of Dewey at Columbia University learned of Dewey's visit to Japan, they tried to contact him and invited him to visit China. P. W. Guo (郭秉文), another student of Dewey, called on Dewey with this specific purpose in mind when passing through Tokyo on March fourteenth. Dewey "entertained the idea of visiting China in the summer before returning to the United States."[12] And in a letter on March twenty-seventh, he wrote "We can't give an exact date for everything we are going to do till we go to China."[13] In other words, at least until that time, the date of departure to China had not yet been decided.

After "the storm of sociability and hospitality" came the most important issue for Dewey in Japan, his lectures at Tokyo Imperial University.[14] From February twenty-fifth to March twenty-first, Dewey gave lectures every Tuesday and Friday under the title, "The Position of Philosophy at the Present: Problems of Philosophic Reconstruction."[15] Some previous studies seem to exaggerate the influence of these lectures. Meanwhile, historical records show that that they attracted more than one

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[9] Ibid., 34.

[10] Ibid., 31.

[11] Ibid., 19.

[12] Wang, *John Dewey in China*, 3.

[13] Dewey, *Letters from China and Japan*, 74.

[14] Ibid., 11.

[15] Akihiro Mori, *Nihon niokeru john dewey shiso kenkyuu no seiri*, 5.

thousand listeners. But after three lectures, in a letter on March fifth, Dewey wrote, "They [the Japanese] are a patient race; there is still a good-sized audience, probably five hundred."[16] His use of the word "patient" is interesting, suggesting that some in the audience did not exit probably out of simple politeness. It is said that just thirty or forty people attended the final lecture. In any case, it seems that Dewey's lectures were much less influential than commonly imagined. The reason for this will be discussed below.

Apart from giving lectures, Dewey also visited several kindergartens and schools. On February twenty-second, he and his wife went to Houmei (豊明) Kindergarten and School, itself an affiliate of Japan Women's University. The weekly university newspaper reported, "Doctor Dewey and his wife's visit started from nine o'clock a.m. After a lunch, they continued their inspection. They showed great interest in Japanese ancient etiquette, the Samurai's sword, flower arrangement, and the Koto."[17] Viewing articles such as these, Dewey seemed to be seeking cross-cultural novelty. But only his letter home can reveal his actual focus:

> The forenoon we spent in the elementary classes and kindergarten, which are their practice school. Those very bright kimonos for children you see are real—all the children wear them, as bright as can be, generally reds, and then some. So the rooms where the little children were are like gardens of flowers with bright birds in them—gay as can be. The work was all interesting, but the colored crayon drawings particularly. They have a great deal of freedom there, and instead of the children imitating and showing no individuality—which seems to be the

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16 Dewey, *Letters from China and Japan*, 52.

17 Norio Miura, *Isenkyuhyakujyukyunen toji no nihon niokeru dewey no kiroku* [Records about Dewey in Japan in 1919], in *Dewey kenkyu* [Studies on Dewey], ed. Dewey Society of Japan (Tokyo: Tamagawa University Press, 1969), 91-92.

> proper thing to say—I never saw so much variety and so little similarity in drawings and other hand work, to say nothing of its quality being much better than the average of ours. The children were under no visible discipline, but were good as well as happy.[18]

Obviously, Dewey cared much more about the mental condition of those children. As he stated in *The School and Society* (1900), "All children like to express themselves through the medium of form and color."[19] Indeed, one of the main themes in his theory concerns how to allow children to enjoy their freedom and arouse their creativity. It was for this reason that a Japanese classroom, rather than any superficial exotica, attracted Dewey's attention.

Besides Tokyo, the Dewey's traveled to Kamakura, Osaka and Kyoto, which they called "the Florence of Japan," possessing "every natural beauty."[20] Invited to a Geisha party given by the Tokyo mayor, Dewey was again prompted to praise the politeness of the Japanese: "[They] do one thing that we should do well to imitate. They teach the children in school a very nice lesson about the beauty and the responsibility of being polite and kind to the foreigner, like being so to the guests of your own house. This adds to the national dignity."[21]

But Dewey's feelings regarding Japan were not characterized by admiration alone. It has been pointed out that those who celebrated Dewey's coming, including Eiichi Shibusawa, Inazo Nitobe (新渡戸稲造) and Jinzo Naruse (成瀬仁蔵), belonged to an elite circle of liberals, and were thus unrepresentative of the mainstream at that time.[22] Most of

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[18] Dewey. *Letters from China and Japan*, 27-28.

[19] John Dewey, *The School and Society and The Child and the Curriculum* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990), 40.

[20] Dewey, *Letters from China and Japan*, 82, 119.

[21] Ibid., 81.

[22] Kouiti Kasamatsu, *Nihon no minsyushiso gajJitugenshita j. dewey no tokyo teikoku daigaku*

Dewey's acquaintances in Japan had experiences learning in America. At a dinner party, one such acquaintance remarked to Dewey, "When Japanese met for sociable purposes they were reserved and stiff—at least till the wine went round—as long as they spoke Japanese, but speaking English brought back the habits they got in America and thawed them out."[23] Thus, their politeness was also complemented by some manner of estrangement.

Dewey realized that to know the "real Japan" he could not restrict himself to such an elite circle. Newspapers as well as meetings with the common people became the windows through which he might have a better understanding of current affairs. In a letter on March tenth, Dewey reported "a rumor that the ex-Emperor of Korea didn't die a natural death, but committed suicide, with the hope of putting off or preventing the marriage of his oldest son to a Japanese princess—they were to have been married very soon."[24] Dewey had thus already noticed the international tension caused by Japanese colonial policy in Korea, which was "under military rather than civil control."[25]

Regarding domestic affairs, he heard that "no more progress has been made in constitutionalism" due to the growing fanaticism of the Imperial System.[26] "It is very unfortunate for them that they have become a first-class power so rapidly and with so little preparation in many ways," Dewey remarked, "It is a terrible task for them to live up to their position and reputation and they may crack under the strain."[27] The

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kouen [The Achievement of Japanese Democracy: J. Dewey's lectures at Tokyo Imperial University], *The Journal of Nihon University College of Economics* 75 (2014): 42.

[23] Dewey, *Letters from China and Japan*, 37.

[24] Ibid., 55. The "ex-Emperor" referred to here is Gojong of Korea, who died suddenly on January twenty-first, 1919 at Deoksu Palace at the age of sixty-seven.

[25] Ibid., 55.

[26] Ibid., 78.

[27] Ibid., 80.

Emperor, a "symbol of united and modern Japan," might have been the only choice for them to overcome this strain.[28] But Alice expressed her concern for a lady who had been jailed for political activities since it was "against the law for a women to take any part in politics here."[29] And with regard to education, Dewey also came to realize the children would eventually come to be instructed in discipline and obedience when they grew up. Upon encountering a group of young girls, Dewey asked Alice somewhat worriedly "when these girls would undergo the clammifying process and have all their life taken out of them."[30]

As time passed and Dewey came to gain a clearer understanding of Japan, his two-month stay came to an end. On April twenty-eighth, after a final lecture in Kobe, the couple left for Shanghai.

III. Dewey in China and the May Fourth Movement

After two days' travel, the Dewey's arrived Shanghai on April thirtieth. Starting with a speech entitled "Education for Common People," John Dewey began his lectures and visits in China. In brief, Dewey stayed in China for more than two years, visiting eleven provinces. It is recorded that he performed more than two hundred lectures and contributed to the widespread acceptance of pragmatism in China. His influence was profound and extensive, both in the intellectual field and with regard to educational institutions. In this respect, Jessica Ching-Sze Wang's monograph, *John Dewey in Chin*a, has already provided a detailed account. Since this book is easily available, there is no need to repeat any more.

However, perhaps the starting point of Dewey's visit was not so

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[28] Ibid., 149.

[29] Ibid., 129.

[30] Ibid., 50-51.

wonderful as Wang describes. It is worth noting that China in 1919 was much poorer than Japan and several parts of the country were actually occupied by domestic warlords and foreign powers. Dewey describes what he saw in Nanjing:

> "They [Chinese children] just seem like dirty, poor miserable people anywhere. They are cheerful but not playful. I should like to give a few millions for playgrounds and toys and play leaders. I can't but think that a great deal of the lack of initiative and the let-George-do-it, which is the curse of China, is connected with the fact that the children are grown up so soon. There are less than a hundred schools for children in this city of a third of a million, and the schools only have a few hundred—two or three at most. The children on the street are always just looking and watching, wise, human looking, and reasonably cheerful, but old and serious beyond bearing."[31]

As an educationist, Dewey was grieved to the extreme.

To make matters worse, the common people were rather numb to the possibility of change. Dewey sharply criticized, "Status quo is China's middle name, mostly status and a little quo. I have one more national motto to add to 'You Never Can Tell' and 'Let George Do It.' It is, 'That is very bad.' Instead of concealing things, they expose all their weak and bad points very freely, and after setting them forth most calmly and objectively, say 'That is very bad.'"[32]

It is hard to say Dewey's first impression of China was a good one, especially compared with that regarding Japan. What is interesting, however, is that history always creates its own dramas. A great event occurred during Dewey's visit to China that changed his attitude. Had it

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[31] Ibid.,184.

[32] Ibid., 206.

not occurred, in fact, Dewey probably would have had a fleeting visit to China before returning to America as scheduled. This event was the May Fourth Movement.

On May fourth, 1919, the date by which the May Fourth Movement took its name, more than three thousand students in Beijing held a mass demonstration against the decision of the Versailles Peace Conference to transfer German concessions in Shantung to Japan. With their dream of world peace shattered by this unjust treaty, the students were mortified and outraged. To protest against Japanese imperialism and government corruption, they took to the streets and even burned the house of one corrupt pro-Japanese official. The students' expression of patriotism and zeal for reform triggered similar demonstrations throughout China over the next few weeks. In big cities, people went on general strikes to support the students and promoted boycotts against Japanese goods.[33]

The May Fourth Movement was much more than a demonstration that happened on May fourth, 1919. The same can be said for Dewey's involvement in this movement. Dewey was in Shanghai on May fourth. The first time he mentioned this movement was in a letter on May twelfth, writing, "The Peking tempest seems to have subsided for the present."[34] It was true that armies had been sent by the government to the university and Ts'ai Yuan-pei (蔡元培), the Chancellor of Peking University, was forced to resign to protect his students. Dewey noted, "This Chancellor was more the intellectual leader of the liberals than I had realized, and the government had become really afraid of him."[35] He also had the feeling that perhaps the students would "go on strike all over China."[36]

His feeling was right: "The resignation of Ts'ai Yuan-pei under

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[33] Wang, *John Dewey in China*, 4-5.

[34] Dewey, *Letters from China and Japan*, 161.

[35] Ibid., 164.

[36] Ibid., 165.

government pressure was viewed by the new intellectuals, both students and teachers, as a public assault by the government upon them."[37] This aroused a new round of strikes, as Dewey describes in a letter on May thirteenth: "The students' committees met yesterday and voted to inform the government by telegraph that they would strike next Monday if their four famous demands were not granted—or else five—including of course refusal to sign the peace treaty, punishment of traitors who made the secret treaties with Japan because they were bribed, etc."[38] Compared with the enthusiasm of the students, the feelings of the common people were more complex. In a letter home, Dewey observed, "I don't know whether I told you about the clerk in the tailor shop in Shanghai; after taking the usual fatalistic attitude that nothing could be done with the present situation, he said the boycott was a good thing but 'Chinaman he got weak mind; pretty soon he forget.'"[39]

But the youth ultimately did manage to bring about change. The movement went into its climax in June. The Dewey's saw thousands of students take to the streets, giving speeches calling for freedom, unity, and courage with respect to the police. They also put their knowledge to use: "In these departments the students had set about seeing what things of Japanese importation could be replaced by hand labor without waiting for capital. After they worked it out in the school they went out to the shops and taught the people how to make them, and then peddled them about, making speeches at the same time."[40] In a letter on June first, Dewey wrote with admiration, "We are witnessing the birth of a nation, and birth always comes hard."[41]

It really was as hard as Dewey described: "The resumption of stern

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[37] Tse-tsung Chow, *The May Fourth Movement* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), 136.

[38] Dewey, *Letters from China and Japan*, 177.

[39] Ibid., 186.

[40] Ibid., 226.

[41] Ibid., 209.

policy was marked, the afternoon of the next day, i.e. June 2, by the arrest of seven students who were selling Chinese goods in the Tung-an Market in Peking."[42] Police patrols in the city had multiplied in size several times and "by the end of June 4, the government had about 1150 student prisoners on its hands."[43] The buildings of Peking University were turned into a temporary prison. As Dewey wrote in a letter on June fifth, "This is Thursday morning, and last night we heard that about one thousand students were arrested the day before."[44]

In spite of the arrests, the students did not give up, intensifying their lecturing ventures: "The Peking authorities could not make any more arrests, but dispersed the audiences, who were considerably touched by the boys."[45] Dewey was an acute observer, writing, "On the whole, the checkmate of the police seems surely impending. They will soon have the buildings full, as the students are getting more and more in earnest, and the most incredible part of it is that the police are surprised. They really thought the arrests would frighten the others from going on. So everybody is getting an education."[46]

The acting Minister of Education, Yuan His-tao (袁希涛), who faced dual pressures from the military group as well as from the students and other social groups had no way out of the dilemma except to offer his resignation. Another vice-minister, Fu Yo-fen (傅岳棻), succeeded him and requested "the military and police authorities to withdraw the garrison of police and troops stationed around the school buildings."[47] But "the students inside held a meeting and passed a resolution asking the government whether they were guaranteed freedom of speech,

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[42] Chow, *The May Fourth Movement*, 148.

[43] Ibid., 150.

[44] Dewey, *Letters from China and Japa*n, 219.

[45] Chow, *The May Fourth Movement*, 150.

[46] Dewey, *Letters from China and Japan*, 220.

[47] Chow, *The May Fourth Movement*, 159.

because if they were not, they would not leave the building merely to be arrested again, as they planned to go on speaking. So they embarrassed the government by remaining in 'jail' all night."[48] Dewey judged that "the government's ignominious surrender was partly due to the fact that the places of detention were getting full and about twice as many students spoke yesterday as the day before, when they arrested a thousand, and the government for the first time realized that they couldn't bulldoze the students; it was also partly due to the fact that the merchants in Shanghai struck the day before yesterday, and there is talk that the Peking merchants are organizing for the same purpose."[49]

In a letter on June seventh, Dewey reported that "the government sent an apology to the students," and "the students were speaking and parading with banners and cheers and the police standing near them like guardian angels, no one being arrested or molested."[50] Three days later, orders for the dismissal of three traitors were published. With pleasure as well as prudence, Dewey wrote that the students had merely "won the game at the present."[51] As apparent in the following passage, however, he later reevaluated this claim:

> I didn't do the students justice when I compared their first demonstration here to a college boys' roughhouse; the whole thing was planned carefully, it seems, and was even pulled off earlier than would otherwise have been the case, because one of the political parties was going to demonstrate soon… To think of kids in our country from fourteen on, taking the lead in starting a big cleanup reform politics movement and shaming merchants and professional men into joining them. This is sure

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[48] Dewey, *Letters from China and Japan*, 227.

[49] Ibid., 228.

[50] Ibid.,231.

[51] Ibid., 235.

some country.[52]

But wiping out traitors was only one aim of the movement. As Dewey wrote, "After June 11, the issue between the students and the government centered principally on the problem of whether China should sign the Peace Treaty [at Versailles]."[53] Despite the students' entreaties, on June twenty-fourth, the government instructed the delegation to sign the Peace Treaty. Thus, "Numerous groups including merchants, industrialists, and workers denounced the government's action. The student Union of Peking urged the President of China to change his instruction."[54] On June twenty-eighth, the date of the signing, Chinese students, workers and overseas Chinese in Paris surrounded the headquarters of the delegation at the hotel to prevent their departure to sign the treaty. Of this, Dewey remarked, "Only when French guns announced to the world that the Versailles Treaty was signed did the Chinese students and workers leave their self-assigned posts."[55] This marked the successful conclusion of the mass protest that had begun with the May Fourth Movement.

In a letter home on July second, Dewey wrote with great excitement, "To-day the report is that the Chinese delegates refused to sign the Paris treaty; the news seems too good to be true."[56] Two days later, immersed in the same atmosphere, Dewey told his children, "You can't imagine what it means here for China not to have signed. The entire government has been for it—the President up to ten days before the signing said it was necessary. It was a victory for public opinion, and all set going by these little schoolboys and girls. Certainly the United States

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[52] Ibid., 246-47.

[53] Chow, *The May Fourth Movement*, 164-65.

[54] Ibid., 165.

[55] Ibid., 166.

[56] Dewey, *Letters from China and Japan*, 258-59.

ought to be ashamed when China can do a thing of this sort."[57]

Obviously, Dewey always cared about the students and stood closely by them. But his affection for China in general also grew deeper and deeper. He joked in a later letter, "Since China didn't sign the peace treaty things have quite settled down here, however, and the lack of excitement after living on aerated news for a couple of months is quite a letdown. However, we live in hopes of revolution or a coup d'état or some other little incident to liven up the dog days."[58]

IV. Dewey's Ideas of Democracy

No one can deny that to experience a historical turning point brings strong excitement. Dewey, a famous philosopher, often pondered about this. In his most famous work, *Democracy and Education*, published in 1916, Dewey tried to offer a new kind of understanding about democracy. Arguing that "a democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience," Dewey believed that "the free and equitable intercourse which springs from a variety of shared interest" would be a necessary mode of human association.[59]

This is the essential reason why he emphasized in his Tokyo Imperial University lectures that "democracy has many meanings, but if it has a moral meaning, it is found in resolving that the supreme test of all political institutions and industrial arrangements shall be the contribution they make to the all-around growth of every member of society."[60] In a letter home, as well, Dewey mentioned how he also

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[57] Ibid., 266.

[58] Ibid., 288.

[59] John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York: The Free Press, 1966), 87, 84-85.

[60] John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (New York: Henry Holt And Company, 1920), 186.

"spoke on the moral meaning of democracy" at a private party in Japan.[61]

But his theory was obviously alien to Japan at that time. Although Japan had rapidly developed since the Meiji Restoration, it had established a centralized state under the Imperial System. The "Imperial Rescript on Education," promulgated in 1890, indicated such an ideology. This rescript stated, "The Emperor is the descended Son of heaven receiving the divine oracle, and possessed of all virtue and compassion for his subjects," as well as, "The subjects do not demand basic human rights from the Emperor as sovereign, but are expected to daily endeavor to reflect on their position, and when going to the Imperial Palace, apologize for not adequately fulfilling that expectation."[62] In the "Standard Outlines of the Regulations concerning Elementary Schools Courses," drawn up in 1891, it was reaffirmed that children should be taught in accordance with the educational purpose delineated in the "Imperial Ordinance relating to Elementary School" and the "Imperial Rescript on Education," each emphasizing cultivation of the "Reverence for Emperor and Love of the Country." Accordingly, "A photograph of the Emperor and the Imperial Rescript on Education were placed in a designated location," named Houanden (奉安殿), a space reserved for a course on Ethics.[63]

Dewey recollected how he had been told that, in Japanese schools, "More than one has been burned or allowed the children to be burned while he rescued the portrait of the Emperor when there was a fire."[64] This was simply unthinkable to him. He argued, "There the very great public spirit is nationalistic rather than public spirit as we understand

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[61] Dewey, *Letters from China and Japan*, 69.

[62] Katsutoshi Mizuhara, *History of National Curriculum Standards Reform in Japan* (Sendai: Tohoku University Press, 2010), 53-54.

[63] Ibid., 59.

[64] Dewey, *Letters from China and Japan*, 149.

it."[65] Thus, the situation in Japan was opposite to Dewey's idea of democracy.

Aside from its imperialistic tendencies, Japan had learned a lot from Germany over the course of modernization. This was especially apparent with respect to the intellectuals. Imperial Universities made German philosophy a central part of the curriculum. On the other hand, Japanese scholars tended to regard the pragmatism developed in America as an 'aberration' or 'vulgarization' of philosophy.[66] This is another reason why Dewey had a difficult time finding an audience for his theory in Japan.

In contrast, the situation in China seemed quite different, suggesting to Dewey the possibility of putting his theory of democracy into practice. The Qing Dynasty, the last feudal dynasty in China, ended in 1912, replaced by the Republic of China. However, as Dewey argued, a democracy is more than a form of government, and this replacement occurred in form only. Dewey realized that what China really needed was "another revolution, or rather a revolution."[67]

The May Fourth Movement, which came about rather incidentally, was no doubt a real revolution. The young students stayed united until the final day, fearless of the pressure from police and government. The utilization of what they learned in school ensured their efficient and effective organization. Thus, education proved to be something that could improve society. Meanwhile, the common people were also aroused to participate in this movement. Support from merchants, industrialists and workers showed that the "numbness" of the Chinese had receded—the Chinese people had formed bonds of "association" in such a movement. Only in this respect can we understand why Dewey

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[65] Ibid., 162.

[66] Akihiro Mori, *Nihon niokeru john dewey dhiso kenkyuu no deiri*, 30.

[67] Dewey, *Letters from China and Japan*, 206.

stated in a letter, "We are witnessing the birth of a nation."

In the preface of *Letters from China and Japan*, Evelyn Dewey, editor and first reader of these letters, described how the Dewey's became absorbed in the political developments unfolding in China:

> The fascination of the struggle going on in China for a unified and independent democracy caused them to alter their plan to return to the United States in the summer of 1919. Professor Dewey applied to Columbia University for a year's leave of absence, which was granted, and with Mrs. Dewey, is still in China. Both are lecturing and conferring, endeavoring to take some of the story of a Western Democracy to an Ancient Empire, and in turn are enjoying an experience, which, as the letters indicate, they value as a great enrichment of their own lives."[68]

This passage, written in 1920, would be the best explanation for such a turning point in Dewey's travel plans in China.

V. Conclusion

History creates its own dramas. If Dewey did not come to Japan, or if the May Fourth Movement happened at another time, there would probably be little preoccupation with Dewey in the modern history of China. But the facts show that Dewey's theory did meet the needs of Chinese educational, or in a broader sense, social transformation rightly during that time. No wonder he met with warm reception and was viewed as "Mr. Science" and "Mr. Democracy" by the Chinese people. History is constituted by the complicated involvement of many factors.

Nearly one hundred hundred years have passed since Dewey

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[68] Ibid., vi.

departed from San Francisco to visit East Asia, but his theory is still alive in China. Some problems that existed one hundred years ago, like how to ensure children's freedom in education and how to achieve democracy in society, yet remain. This may be the reason why Dewey's works still draw so much attention among Chinese scholars. In Japan, after World War II, studies of Dewey also greatly developed, accompanying the introduction of democratic theory by the United States. That, however, is another story.

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New Perspective of Research on the Northeast Region of China: "Old Industrial City"

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New Perspective of Research on the Northeast Region of China: "Old Industrial City"

This paper offers a critical review of approaches to understanding problems associated with the new Northeast phenomenon. These include the marketist (market fundamentalism), resource-based city, old industrial base, and typical danwei system approaches. Such perspectives fail to move beyond the Northeast phenomenon itself and understand the underlying problems in historical context. Building on the typical danwei system approach, this paper proposes the old industrial city approach, which focuses on problems at the urban level. This approach addresses the enterprise-centric typical danwei system approach's failure to grasp the importance of increasingly autonomous regional governments. It also recognizes crucial urban political forces including the market and social organizations. Altogether, it is better equipped to capture the complex sociopolitical terrain and cultural politics of the Northeast in the reform era, which is characterized by the coexistence of legacies of Northeastern socialism and popular culture imagery.

Keywords: marketism (market fundamentalism), resource-based city, old industrial base, typical danwei system, old industrial city

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I. Beyond the Northeast 'Phenomenon'

The Northeast region of China has been grappling with the 'new Northeast phenomenon' (*xindongbei xianxiang*) for the last several years. This phenomenon is characterized by falling rates of economic growth and a decreasing population under the New Normal of slowing economic growth in China.[1] The Northeast phenomenon (*dongbei xianxiang*), its predecessor, occurred in the mid-to-late 1990s, consisting of widespread business failures, unpaid wages, layoffs, and strikes resulting as mid-to-large-size state-owned enterprises, mainly in heavy industry, failed to adjust to the gathering momentum of urban market reforms. In Shenyang's Tiexi district, a representative urban center in the region, the average debt-to-asset ratio for over 1,100 state-owned enterprises reached more than ninety percent, resulting in the dismissal of some 30,000 employees therein. The state of the economy and society in the

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[1] "Shiguanquanju de jueshengzhizhan: Xinchangtaixia xindongbei xianxiang diao cha [The Decisive Battle on all Fronts: An Investigation of the New Northeast Phenomenon under the New Normal]," *Xinhuashe*, February 5th, 2015.

region seemed so hopeless, in fact, that Shenyang came to be referred to as the city of unemployment (*xiagangzhicheng*). Socioeconomic conditions improved somewhat as the central government began reform of state-owned enterprises in the region in 2003, corresponding with the Northeast promotion (*dongbei zhenxing*) policy, but the new Northeast phenomenon followed soon after.

There are several approaches to analyzing the causes of the Northeast and new Northeast phenomena. First, the marketist (market fundamentalism) approach emphasizes the halfway measures characterizing efforts to reform state-owned enterprises, which were central to the Northeast promotion policy. Second, the resource-based (*ziyuanxing*) city approach indicates problems in industrial structure. Third, subtly distinguishable from the former, the old-industrial base (*laogongye jidi*) approach insists upon the irrationality of the industrial structure. Finally, the typical danwei system (*dianxing danweizhi*) approach examines the particular characteristics of society and enterprises in the region.[2]

In sum, the Northeast phenomenon of the 1990s and the new Northeast phenomenon of the 2010s are distinguishable with respect to internal or external frames of reference. In relation to internal conditions, they respectively occurred in the market reform and New Normal eras. In relation to external conditions, they respectively occurred prior and subsequent to China's full-fledged integration into the global capitalist economy. But there is also clear continuity in terms of socioeconomic stagnation, characterized by the likes of slowing economic growth, failed enterprises, unpaid wages, population decreases, and worker layoffs and strikes. Marketist, resource-based city, old industrial base, and typical danwei system approaches provide ways of understanding these

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[2] "Danwei," the fundamental unit composing Chinese urban society established during the socialist era, connotes a place of employment, whether state institution, enterprise, hospital, school, research center, cultural organization, etc.

phenomena.

Each of these approaches offers particular insights into understanding the Northeast and new Northeast phenomena. But they also exhibit limitations as far as articulating fundamental socioeconomic problems, modes of operation of mid-to-large- size heavy industrial companies, which have existed in the region for more than one hundred years, and the dynamics of the relations between these enterprises and the state and workers. Furthermore, any approach analyzing merely the phenomenon itself, thus overlooking its genesis in far-reaching historical changes, amounts to but a symptomatic diagnosis; a more basic, in-depth understanding requires a comprehensive and historical approach. Considering Chinese socialism's traditionally decentralized nature, characterized by the multi-layered relational structure between central and local governments, such an approach focuses analysis on local governments, seeking to establish a historically grounded understanding of the society and economy of the Northeast region of China hinging on the relations between the state (local governments), business, and labor.[3]

The goal of this paper is to critically analyze approaches to understanding the society and economy of Northeast China and to explore new possibilities for research in this area vis--vis the concept of the old industrial city. While this concept is not uncommon among Chinese scholars, it bears a marked association with barriers to economic development, often used simply to refer to cities that are old and dilapidated or have failed to adjust to a market economy. Consequently, research on the old industrial city in China is generally limited to such themes as industrial structure, spatial structure, urban renovation,

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[3] Regarding the decentralized and multilayered character of Chinese socialism, see Barry J. Naughton, *Growing out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform 1978-1993* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 38-46; Barry J. Naughton, *The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth* [Jungguk gyeongje: sijangeuroui ihaenggwa seongjang], trans. Yi Jeong-gu and Jeon Yong-bok (Korea: Seoul gyeongje gyeongyeong, 2007), 81-2.

government functions, industrial legacies, etc. This paper eludes the confines of functionalist approaches treating the old industrial city as a mere subject for remodeling and innovation. Instead, it regards the old industrial city as a socialist legacy. Moving beyond the phenomenon itself, moreover, it endeavors to establish the old industrial city approach as a methodology for recognizing and analyzing the fundamental causes underlying various social and economic problems in the Northeast region of China. The next section introduces domestic and international media and research pertaining to the new Northeast phenomenon, elucidating the meaning and limitations of the concepts mobilized therein.

II. Marketism, Resource-based City, Old Industrial Base, and Typical Danwei System

The new Northeast phenomenon refers to falling rates of economic growth and a decreasing population. More specifically, it signifies the fact that the Gross Regional Domestic Products of Shenyang, Changchun, and Harbin, representative cities in the region, are the lowest in China. The highest average regional growth rates in public revenue have failed to match the national rate of 6.5 percent and are sometimes even negative.[4] Media commentary regarding the problem is limited, mostly amounting to calls for the admittance of Korean companies or criticism of bureaucratism and the planned economy. It is difficult to find

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[4] In 2015, the real growth rate of total production in the Jilin, Heilongjiang, and Liaoning provinces were ranked, respectively, twenty-eighth, twenty-ninth and thirty-first on a list including all thirty-one of China's provinces, directly controlled municipalities, and autonomous regions. http://www.guancha.cn/economy /2016_02_17_351270.shtml, accessed July 29th, 2016. Accordingly, the decline in public revenue in these provinces has become much more pronounced. http://finance.qq.com/a/20150511/063754.htm, accessed July 29th, 2016. Population decreases accompanying economic stagnation, furthermore, were already a serious problem. According to the 6th National Population Census conducted in 2016, annual population decrease rates have reached two million. Thus, the Northeast region has become a territory characterized by population outflows. http://news.qingdaonews.com/zhongguo/2015-07/10/content_11148814.htm, accessed July 29th, 2016.

any in-depth analysis or understanding of the basic problems afflicting the economy and society.[5] One professor of economics at Jilin University, in a translated account published in Korea, argues for the distinction between the Northeast and new Northeast phenomena. Unlike the Northeast phenomenon, he says, the new Northeast phenomenon is but a growing pain accompanying the sophistication of the Chinese economy. He also stresses the plans in motion for the revitalization of the Northeast regional economy in the age of the New Normal. More specifically, he asserts that a great deal of the problems characterizing the phenomenon, such as the business failures and worker layoffs, will be resolved by the economic growth resulting from the Northeast Promotion Policy. Thus, in this account, the new Northeast phenomenon is only a minor problem accompanying industrial structural adjustment, distinct from the Northeast phenomenon of the past.[6]

However, as indicated in the March 2016 strikes by workers in the Shuangyashan mines, owned by largest mining company in the Northeast region Longmei Group, it is difficult to draw a distinct line between the Northeast phenomenon (business failures, unpaid wages, worker layoffs and strikes) and the new Northeast phenomenon (decreasing economic growth and population)one must rather say that they are occurring simultaneously.[7] According to the *China Labour Bulletin*, based in Hong

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[5] "Jungguk gweonyeokbyeol hyeonjang lipoteu 8 Dongbuk jiyeokLyaoning jirin heirungjiangseong sindongbukjinheunge yeongnyang jibjung. Daeryuksik goripdoen seom, hangukgwa hyeomnyeogi dolpagu [8th Field Report from China: Northeastern China Focus on the Capabilities of New Northeast Promotion in the Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang provinces. Remote Island in a Continent, Breakthrough in Cooperation with Korea]," *Naeil sinmun*, May 9th, 2016; "Special Correspondence: Why are Chinese Leaving Three Northeastern Provinces?," *Ajugyeongje*, August 11th, 2015.

[6] Li Zheng, "Jungguk dongbuk jiyeok, saeroun baljeonui gihoe maja [The Northeast Region of China Encounters New Opportunities for Development]," http://csf.kiep.go.kr/expertColr/M004000000/view.do?articleId=14470, accessed July 27th, 2016.

[7] For more on the mining strike in Shuangyashan, see http://www.wyzxwk.com/Article/shidai/2016/03/360420.html, accessed July 27th, 2016.

Kong, protests and strikes by Chinese workers have increased since last year in the aftermath of the global recession.[8] Ultimately, a more accurate diagnosis of the situation in the Northeast region would acknowledge the coexistence of the Northeast and new Northeast phenomenon rather than asserting a clear end to the former and beginning to the latter.

Meanwhile, some such as Michael Pettis, a professor at Beijing University, argue that the new Northeast phenomenon is an outgrowth of inadequate reform to state-owned enterprises since the implementation of the Northeast promotion policy in 2003. The core problem with the Chinese economy, Pettis argues, is that the government monopolizes far too much wealth. Instead, wealth should be transferred from the government to the household sector through the privatization of state-owned enterprises. This is a typical marketist perspective, asserting that the essential objective of state-owned-enterprise reform should not be mere profit increases through enhanced business effectiveness and technology, but doing away with government monopolies. However, even while privatization of state-owned enterprises may admittedly help bring an end to the bureaucratism deriving from government monopolies, there is no guarantee that the wealth transferred to the private sector will not come to be dominated by a few specific privileged households. If this wealth does indeed come under the control of foreign or domestic capital, the monopoly will merely have passed from the government to the private sector, and thus privatization seems unlikely to function as a prescription for the new Northeast phenomenon.

In sum, interpretations of the new Northeast phenomenon are either excessively superficial such as officially sanctioned perspectives regarding past problems as resolved and current problems as but minoror excessively marketist. These approaches tend to reduce the problems of

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[8] http://www.clb.org.hk/content/workers%E2%80%99-struggle-continues-china%E2%80%99s-economic-growth-slows-67-percent, accessed July 29th, 2016.

the Northeast region to economic origins, and are thus grounded in the view that if only the relevant economic issues are resolved so too will be the business failures, unpaid wages, layoffs, labor strikes, slowing economic growth, decreasing population, and so on. Such approaches, moreover, are preoccupied with the new Northeast phenomenon itself, and thus uniformly overlook its historical origins.

By comparison, the resource-based city approach lends greater weight to the Northeast region's intrinsic characteristics in explaining its prevailing problems. The resource-based city is a particular kind of city taking as its industrial basis the gathering and processing of natural resources such as minerals and forests in the surrounding area. In such a city, urban formation is closely related to resource development, which is crucial for economic production and development. Cities such as Anshan, Daqing, Jinchang, and Panzhihua are typical examples of this. Daqing, a resource-based city representative of the Northeast region founded in 1959 for the purpose of oil and gas procurement, has now grown into the largest oil-related industrial city in China. Since oil deposits have become depleted and the yield has been gradually decreasing, however, the very existence of the city has come into question. The resource-based city approach, then, focuses on cities that come into crisis as their key resourcessuch as coal, oil, or steelbecome depleted, putting forth industrial structural conversion as the relevant solution. Being the largest heavy industrial region in China since even before the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, Northeast China contains many such cities. The resource-based city approach locates the cause of the regional economic crisis unfolding amid the reform era in an industrial structure perpetuating excessive dependence on natural resources, formulating solutions accordingly. Such an approach is limited, however, not only because it understands the region purely in economic terms but also because it fails to discern the historical, socioeconomic origins of the problems of the reform era.

The old industrial base approach shares the notion of irrational

industrial structure with the resource-based city approach, but it can be differentiated from the latter in the following ways.[9] If the resource-based city may be defined as a planned city established for the exploitation of natural resources such as coal, oil, steel, nickel, and copper, as described above, then the old industrial base transcends the individual city to incorporate the larger territory in which it is embedded. The old industrial base of Northeast China, for example, refers to an industrial hub endowed with a unitary heavy industrial production system based around core cities such as Shenyang, Changchun, and Harbin. By comparison, Daqing, a resource-based city revolving around industries related to the procurement of natural resources such as oil, occupies a relatively smaller space. Furthermore, if the industrial structure of a resource-based city can be said to primarily consist of the exploitation and export of natural resources in the surrounding region, then the industrial structure of the old industrial base consists of the use of these resources in the final stages of production and manufacturing.

Considering these attributes, in comparison with the urges for privatization prevalent in the marketism of international and domestic media and as well as scholarly research pertaining to China, the old industrial base approach actually takes into greater consideration the social and economic history inherent to the Northeast region. The essential viewpoint of this approach, however, regards the old industrial base as emblematic of bureaucratism, ineffectiveness, rigidity, and the planned economy, and thus treats it as a subject for remodeling and transformation. In fact, the core content of the Northeast promotion policy initiated in 2003 has been the remodeling of the Northeast old industrial base. In this respect, adopting a position advocating for marketizing reform with respect to the ineffectiveness and obsolescence

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[9] Hu Limei, "Zhuanxingzhong de ziyuanxingchengshi yu laogongye jidi de bijiao [Comparison of the Resource-Based City in Transition and the Old Industrial Base]," *Ziyuan yu chanye* 10, no. 1 (February 2008).

of the economy and society of the Northeast region, the old industrial base approach is almost identical to that of the old industrial city.

Relative to each of the perspectives described thus far, the typical danwei system approach adopts a decidedly more in-depth understanding of the regional economy and society. The typical danwei system refers to the unique danwei regime (*danwei tizhi*) established in Northeast China around the time of the founding of the PRC. The extreme typicality of its constitutional elements, this approach argues, ensured the danwei regime's social and economic dominance not only in the socialist era but into the reform era as well; even as the *shequ* (community) began to systematically replace the danwei in the mid-1990s, the latter maintained an influence in the Northeast region as strong as ever. According to Tian Yipeng, a professor of sociology at Jilin University and a proponent of the typical danwei system approach, the characteristics of the approach are as follow.[10] First, in terms of material space, typical danwei system enterprises generally occupy large plots of land in city outskirts wherein factories and employee housing are densely arranged. These enterprises were either founded in the Manchukuo period, prior to the establishment of the PRC, or in the early years of the PRC as part of the "156 key construction projects" (*zhongdian jianshe xiangmu*), a large-scale development project of the first five-year plan (*diyige wunian jihua*) undertaken with capital, technical, and professional assistance from the Soviet Union. With respect to heavy chemical industry in Northeast China, then, the important characteristics of the typical danwei system were vast plots of land located in city outskirts in which factories and employee housing were densely distributed. Second, in terms of social space, typical danwei system enterprises were converted from spaces of

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[10] Tian Yipeng and Qi Si, *Danwei shehui de zhongjie: Dongbei laogongyejidi dianxing danweizhi beijingxia de shequ jianshe* [The End of Danwei Society: The Construction of Shequ against the Backdrop of the Typical Danwei System in Northeast Old Industrial Bases] (China: Shehuikexue wenxian chubanshe, 2005), 52-62.

imperialism and bourgeois hedonism into spaces for worker production and socialism in the early years of the PRC to accord with the communist party's city-takeover (*chengshi jieguan*) ideology, wherein cooperative housing, known as workers' villages (*gongren xincun*), was built en masse in order to provide the socioeconomic security necessary for workers' livelihoods.[11] The workers' villages were characterized by marked isolation and exclusivity, and since socioeconomic security was guaranteed on the basis of workers affiliation with specific enterprises, social bonds formed along these lines. Third, in addition to the characteristics of material and social spaces, typical danwei system enterprises functioned as a single administrative district (*xingzheng quyu*). As central enterprises (*zhongyang qiye*) under the direct jurisdiction of relevant departments within the central government, a considerable number of Northeastern mid-to-large-size state-owned enterprises in the heavy industrial sector bypassed local governments in the chain of command. Furthermore, as mentioned above, since these enterprises occupied large plots of land in urban outskirts endowed with all manner of amenities including schools, markets, hospitals, and cultural facilities, they functioned in practice as unitary administrative districts. Thus, the relationship between these enterprises and local governments was characterized by horizontal cooperation, not vertical hierarchy. Furthermore, being under the jurisdiction of the central government and sometimes having tens of thousands of workers at their respective commands, these enterprises were not weaklings in terms of mobilizing socioeconomic support with respect to the local governments.

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[11] "City-takeovers" refer to the process of commencing administration in newly captured cities. Cities composed an unfamiliar territory to the communist party, which had successfully conducted the revolution based on its experience in the countryside. Thus, it began the process of learning urban management while conducting city-takeovers in the Northeast region following the defeat of Japan in the Pacific War in 1945. Seizing control of the various social organizations and institutions composing the basis of urban society, including enterprises, it learned from their methods of operation.

The structure of relations between local governments and enterprises in the Northeast region during the socialist period, then, can be described in terms of a weak state (local governments) vs. strong society (enterprises).

Unlike the marketist, resource-based city, and old industrial base approaches described above, the typical danwei system approach allows one to analyze the specific structural character of the Northeast region in terms of the state-enterprise-worker relations formed amid the socialist period. It thus complements the lack of historicity and sociality in the other approaches, the significance of which is particularly apparent in understanding the new Northeast phenomenon of the reform era. Unlike the marketist approach merely noting halfway reforms of state-owned enterprises or the resource-based city approach urging reform of the irrational industrial structure, it combines economic and social factors to analyze the state-enterprise-worker relations of the Northeast region on a comprehensive historical basis.

Nonetheless, there are clear limitations to this approach as well. Since the typical danwei system approach essentially emphasizes the formation of the Northeast region's socioeconomic character on the basis of enterprises during the socialist era, a configuration that has survived into the reform era, it tends to focus analysis on the relationships between workers and executive management within enterprises, relationships within and without enterprises, and relationships between enterprises and local governments. To be sure, the legacy of the enterprise-centered typical danwei system, which sufficed as the framework for social administration in the past, yet holds powerful influence even in the reform era. But with its replacement by the residence-centered *shequ* (community) system, the formation of a *shequ* model reflecting the region's particular characteristics has now become a topic of wide discussion. Furthermore, with respect to the emergence of the market as well as various social organizations and associations in Chinese society outside of enterprises, the reform era is decidedly different from its socialist counterpart, the era where enterprises

effectuate society (*qiye banshehui*). The enterprise-centered typical danwei system and the typical danwei system society, the social space into which it developed, are highly useful concepts for elucidating the characteristics of the Northeast economy and society in the socialist era, the era of urban marketization reforms (1990s), as well as the era of globalization (2000s), in which China concluded legal and institutional incorporation into the global capitalist system with accession to the World Trade Organization, and domestically, replaced the danwei with the *shequ* and initiated the Northeast promotion policy. However, the typical danwei system approach encounters limitations in grasping the economy and society of this region from the mid 2000s onward, a period characterized by a far more complex sociopolitical topography.

Based on the critical analyses of approaches to understanding the new Northeast phenomenon and its underlying socioeconomic causes presented thus far, the following section delineates the old industrial city approach. This particular framework endeavors to comprehend the dynamics of state-enterprise-worker relations as they traversed the socialist and reform eras, encountering the dissolution of the typical danwei system and the implementation of the shequ.

III. Old Industrial City and New Research on the Northeast Region

Among the approaches examined in the preceding section, the typical danwei system approach was best equipped to understand the social and economic problems of the new Northeast phenomenon in a historical context. However, as stated above, it is not so well equipped to comprehend the variegated sociopolitical topography of the reform era. The old industrial city approach, on the other hand, offers a comparatively more useful framework for analyzing urban composition in terms of the dynamics and relationships between social, political, and economic factors in a historical context. Its characteristics are as follow.

First, the old industrial city approach encompasses the perspective of the typical danwei system approach, acknowledging the historical influence of the social, political and economic characteristics of mid-to-large size state-owned enterprises in the heavy industrial sector that have persisted in the reform era. Thus, it signifies the possibility of transcending the enterprise-centered focus of the typical danwei system approach, comprehending the political and cultural problems of the cities within which such enterprises are embedded. In reality, however, the majority of studies in China adopting this approach tend to focus on the durable historical legacy of declining heavy industrial state-owned enterprises or particular cultures formed among workers affiliated with specific enterprises. Consequently, even while moving beyond individual enterprises, the city is significant only insofar as the subject for remodeling and transformation is elevated to the urban level.

Second, there is a need to vigorously redefine the old industrial city approach as a framework possessing the potential to transcend the enterprise-centered typical danwei system approach by examining the economy and society of the Northeast region at the level of urban governance. The term urban governance refers to the structure of and manner in which power is performed and distributed among the constitutive elements of a city, as in the relations between the state (local governments), capital, citizens, social organizations, etc. Furthermore, connoting a historical approach in the term "old," one may assert that the old industrial city approach accurately reflects the realities of the various mid-to-large-size enterprises that have subsisted in the Northeast region through the founding of the PRC, the socialist and reform eras, and the 2000s.

Third, an important characteristic of the reform era was urban entrepreneurialism. Initiated as a result of the expanding autonomy of local governments beginning in the mid-1990s, this was a substantial enough change in the character of the local governments to become the subject of much debate. As a consequence, moreover, the precise

composition of the relationship between the central enterprises and the local governments in the Northeast region, characterized by a weak state (local governments) vs. strong society (enterprises), became relatively diluted. In other words, central enterprises existed much as they always had in the reform era except that they were now more affected by the economic policies of the local governments, which maintained a much higher level of hegemony over economic policy than in the past. The typical danwei system approach, therefore, having been formulated amid the socialist era in which the core principles of enterprise management reflected not the market but centralized government planning, could no longer suffice alone to encapsulate the dynamics of government-enterprise relations in the reform era. In this respect, the old industrial city approach is useful insofar as it positions the city as the unit of analysis, endeavoring to comprehend the dynamics of and relations between the state, enterprises, society, and social organizations participating in urban governance within the context of the historical legacy of the typical danwei system.

Fourth, the old industrial city approach is also useful for articulating the culture of the Northeast region in the post-socialist era. As is well known, the industrial cities of the Northeast region were generally established in two phases. First, heavy industrial and military enterprises were established en masse in the Northeast region for the production of supplies necessary to the Japanese invasion of China during the Manchukuo period. Second, fifty-six (thirty-five percent) of the "156 key construction projects," mentioned above, were established in cities in the Northeast region in the 1950s.[12] Norheastern cities, constituted on the basis of mid-to-large-size heavy industrial enterprises and their affiliated advanced workers, existed as icons representative of

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[12] He Yimin and Zhou Mingchang, "156 xiang gongcheng yu zhongguo gongyechengshi fazhan [156 Factories and Chinese Industrial Urban Development]," *Dangdai zhongguoshi yanjiu* 14, no. 2 (2007).

socialist China, referred to as the "eldest sons of the republic," "equipment treasury of the republic," and "Ruhr of the East," and workers therein enjoyed high levels of socioeconomic security. Since the mid-1990s, however, as reform of state-owned enterprises commenced in earnest with the dissolution of the typical danwei system and the initiation of industrial structural adjustment and private property reforms as part of the Northeast promotion policy in 2003, these cities have transformed from the eldest sons of the republic into cities of unemployment.[13]

The image of pride in socialist China once characterizing the cities in Northeast China has been supplanted by images of comedy and organized crime. In various mediums of popular culture, Northeastern China is portrayed as the homeland of various comedians and a base of organized crime. In 2004, the song "Northeasterners Aren't Gangsters" (*Dongbeiren bushi heshehui*) became an Internet sensation coinciding with the initiation of the remodeling policy as a component of the Northeast promotion policy. In 2008, *Once Upon a Time in Northeast China (Dongbei wangshi)*, an Internet novel depicting Northeastern gangsters, became so popular that it was later made into a television drama series in 2012. Images symbolizing Northeastern organized crime have thus taken the Internet by storm. Meanwhile, caricatures of the image of the Northeast in the reform era by Northeastern comedians like Zhao Benshan and Xiao Shenyang have become standard. Getting their start as traditional *Er ren zhuan* entertainers in Northeast China, these comedians gained nationwide stardom through television in programs like "Country Love" (*Xiangcun aiqing*) and *Madashuai*, where they cultivated an image of Northeastern rural areas and their inhabitants. In this manner, an image of the Northeast associated with organized crime

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[13] *Tiexi District*, a documentary by Wang Bing, presents a serene depiction of this era while portraying the workers of Shenyang's Tiexi district. These were former factory owners suddenly laid off or reduced to contract status by reforms to state-owned enterprises.

and comedy, (re)produced in the popular culture of the reform era, has become a part of Northeastern urban culture in the post-socialist era. The old industrial city approach is particularly useful for analyzing this Northeastern cultural milieu, characterized by the curious coexistence of unemployment, comedians, organized crime, and the historical legacy of mid-to-large-size industrial enterprises from the socialist era.[14]

In sum, one may thoroughly redefine the old industrial city approach in terms of its capacity to encompass the historicity of the typical danwei system approach, the dynamism of the diversity and mutual relations of urban political actors amid the reform era, and the mingling between socialist and post-socialist era cultures. In that case, what kind of research might be possible based on this particular approach? Shenyang provides a useful avenue to explore this question. First, there may be research chronologically examining historical shifts in corporate governance in the Northeast region at the urban level. Targeting Shenyang's Tiexi district, such a study would historically analyze changes in enterprise management structure in heavy industries across the Manchukuo, Kuomintang, socialist, and reform eras. In this manner, one would be able to investigate how variations in the structure of enterprise management affected local governments, enterprises, and social organizations at the urban level. Shenyang First Machine Tool Works (*Shenyang diyi jichuangchang*), for example, a heavy industrial enterprise vital to Shenyang's Tiexi district, was founded by the Japanese zaibatsu Mitsubishi under the name of Manchuria Machinery Company (*Manzhou jiqi gufen youxian gongsi*) in November 1935, as the Japanese invasion of Manchuria progressed in earnest. The company was soon renamed Mitsubishi Machinery Corporation (*Mitsubishi kiki*

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[14] Liu Yan, "Dongbei bushi heishehui: Dazhong wenhua de chengshijianghu xiangxiang yu shehuizhuyi xiudaide qingganjiegou [The Northeast is not a Haven for Organized Crime: The Milieu of Urban Imagery in Popular Culture and the Emotional Structure of the Socialist Rustbelt]," *Wenhua yanjiu* 22 (2015).

kabushikikaisha). Then after the Kuomintang took Manchuria in 1946, it became the Shenyang Fourth Equipment Manufacturing Works (*Shenyang disi jiqi zhizhaochang*). In 1949, it became Shenyang First Machinery Works (*Shenyang diyi jiqichang*), a state-run enterprise. Finally, it was given its current name of Shenyang First Machine Tool Works in 1953. In 1993, amid the reform era, it was amalgamated into the Shenyang Machinery Equipment Company (*Shenyang jichuang gufen youxian gongsi*), once again becoming a joint-stock company as it had been sixty years prior.

This manner of analysis allows for studies on the changing dynamics of relations between local governments, enterprises, and social organizations vis-à-vis the structure of enterprise management by historical period. In order to conduct such research, one may examine documents at the Shenyang Machinery Group Archives (*Shenyang jichuang jituan danganshi*) and the party archives in Shenyang and the Tiexi and make use of the Shenyang First Machinery Tool Works Compilation Committee (*Shenyang diyi jichuang bianzuan weiyuanhui*) and the Journal of Shenyang First Machinery Tool Works (*Shenyang diyi jichuang changzhi*).

Second, there may be sociological historical studies pertaining to state-enterprise-worker relations in Shenyang's Tiexi district. Therein, the "state" should naturally denote both the central and local governments, while analysis should essentially examine state-enterprise-worker relations in Shenyang within a mid-to-long-term historical context. Japanese companies built factories and carried out production in Shenyang from the late nineteenth to early twentieth century. As the penetration of Japanese companies accelerated following Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese war and the Manchukuo puppet state was established in 1932, the region became synonymous with heavy industrial enterprises and workers in China. Shenyang was liberated by the communist party in 1948, following a brief occupation by Soviet troops in 1945 and the subsequent civil war between nationalists and

communists. With the founding of the PRC, state-enterprise (-worker) relations dominated by the typical danwei system were established. Thus, state-enterprise-worker relations assumed a particular configuration in the Manchukuo era, traversing a particular path through the socialist era and eventually giving way to the typical danwei system, before undergoing transformation amid reform of state-owned enterprises in the reform era. The old industrial city approach allows one to analyze the dynamics of this process.

Methodologically, Michael Buroway's concepts of the "factory regime" and the "politics of production" may be used to analyze the various ways in which certain influential forces have intervened in the operation of enterprises (and workers) in the name of production. Such an approach analyzes the assorted means by which the state, enterprises, social organizations, and citizens intervene in factory operations within the historical contexts of specific cities. As suggested above, diverse political forces and regimes have prevailed in the Northeast Region over the last 100 years. Research focusing on state-enterprise-worker relations may investigate the intervention of various political forces in the factory regimes and politics of production of specific cities within this particular historical context.[15]

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[15] Burawoy focuses on the labor process in terms of the political ideological implications of reproducing specific social relations and the political ideological production arrangements stipulating the relations of production therein. He conceptualizes this framework with the term "factory regime." Briefly stated, the factory regime consists of the political ideology within the factory dominating the labor process as well as the political ideology projected from without onto the entire production process. If the former is the ideology of capital directly regulating the labor process, then the latter is the ideology of diverse social actors, including the state, that exist outside the factory. Based on ethnographic fieldwork, Burawoy analyzes the politics of production in capitalist and socialist enterprises via the concept of the factory regime. Michael Burawoy, *The Politics of Production* [Saengsanui jeongchi], trans. Jeong Beom-jin (Korea: Bakjongcheol chulpansa, 1999).

IV. In Lieu of a Conclusion: The Legacy of Northeast Socialism and the Significance of the Old Industrial City Approach

This paper critically examined varied approaches to understanding the myriad problems of the Northeast region of China, exposing the need to move beyond the new Northeast phenomenon and acknowledge the fundamental problems underlying it. The old industrial city approach provides an effective means of doing so. Building on the typical danwei system approach, it approaches the social and economic problems of the Northeast region on a historical basis at the urban level. Using this approach, two avenues for research were suggested with respect to enterprise management structure and factory regimes.

As much as there is a need for historically grounded approaches to understanding the reform era, there is also a need to conceptualize socialism in terms of the substance and institutions that exist at regional levels rather than as an abstract, nationalized ideal.[16] That is to say, considering the enormity of China's territory and the regional diversity therein, research should descend to the level of substance and institutions rather than conceptualizing socialism as a nationwide abstraction. Socialism dominated the thoughts and customs of the Northeast region as a substantial entity and an institution through the chemistry with its people and culture. This is a legacy that yet prevails, as manifest in the typical danwei system. The legacy of Northeast socialism has lapsed from substance and institution into culture, blending with the novel iconography (comedians, organized crime) arising in the post-socialist era.

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[16] This is a point first raised in Park Chul-hyun, "Sahoejuuiui sigi junngguk dongbuk jiyeogui gukgawa gieop: Daeryeongichacharyangchangui jeonhyeondanwijereul jungsimeuro [The State and Enterprises in the Northeast Region of China during the Socialist Era: With focus on the Typical Danwei System of the Dalian Locomotive and Rolling Stock Company]," *Manju yeongu* 20 (2015).

The old industrial city approachencompassing the typical danwei system approachappears particularly well suited to encapsulate the cultural politics of the urban space, in which a legacy receding into culture and the imagery of reform era popular culture coalesce. This is because the reform era city does not constitute a space in which only the state and enterprises exist, as in the past, but one in which the diverse social actors begot by the market intermingle and the complex cultural politics taking form therein unfold in everyday life.

Having argued for an understanding of the reform era as the post-socialist era, wherein socialism is conceptualized in terms of substance and institutions, what might be the methodological significance of the old industrial city approach for facilitating such an understanding? First, in historical terms, the communist party's principal encounter with urban social, political and economic problems occurred amid its city-takeovers in the Northeast region, right around the founding of the PRC. The party established a number of major policies stipulating the basic character of Chinese socialism in the process of resolving such problems. The danwei-centered urban society, enterprise-centered worker welfare system, and capacity for political mobilization engendered by the establishment of party organizations within enterprises, for instance, were each initiated in the spring of 1948 in Northeastern cities. The experiences of the Northeast region thus became an important point of reference as city-takeovers advanced into Northern, Eastern, Southern, and Southwestern China.[17] The Northeastern city, in other words, constituted the archetype of the city-takeover. Second, in comparative sociological terms, Chinese socialism was markedly more decentralized relative to the Soviet Union. While China initially implemented a planned economy, by the mid-1970s, products under direct jurisdiction of the central government had become relatively few and the

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[17] Ibid., 148-51.

implementation of central government plans were remarkably ineffective at the local government level. Meanwhile, not only did China feature more diverse forms of enterprises, with urban and rural collective enterprises existing alongside state-owned enterprises, but the scale of its enterprises was also different, with small-to-large-size enterprises being far more numerous. Due to the lack of a mechanism mediating inter-regional investment resulting from the decentralized economic system, moreover, state-led economic sectors and unfinished construction projects were twice as numerous in China than in the Soviet Union by the late 1970s.[18] The important fact is that decentralization affected not only local governments but locally situated central enterprises as well, as well reflected in the central enterprises of Northeastern cities. Even while such enterprises lay under the jurisdiction of relevant bureaus in the central government, their locality ensured autonomy from the overarching organization that was the central government.[19] This dual autonomy of central enterprises intelligible in Northeastern cities is thus a reflection of the decentralized character of Chinese socialism.

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[18] Naughton, *Growing out of the Plan*, 26-56.

[19] The weak state (local governments) vs. strong society (enterprises) structure represented in the old industrial cities of the Northeast region must be understood not only in terms of the autonomy of central enterprises with respect to local governments but also with respect to the central government.

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Asian Diplomacy: The "Fulcrum" Role of Two Major Powers in East Asia?

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Asian Diplomacy: The "Fulcrum" Role of Two Major Powers in East Asia?

The paper explores the extent to which the relationship between China and Indonesia can contribute to region-building. It points to the ways in which the interests of each country will inevitably overlap in the coming years. China's desire for greater global influence motivates its economic outreaches to Indonesia. This courtship of Indonesia is taking place in an international environment that Beijing conceptualizes as "multipolar." It accords with Indonesia's ambition to strategically position itself at the center of maritime Southeast Asia and the ASEAN Economic Community and become a "global maritime fulcrum" based on enhanced logistics and transportation infrastructures. Since Indonesia and China are both firmly embedded in the ASEAN-led regional order, which is open, loose and welcoming of non-East Asian states' participation, they have no intention of challenging US Pacific power.

Keywords: China, Indonesia, ASEAN, maritime, fulcrum

Asian Diplomacy: The "Fulcrum" Role of Two Major Powers in East Asia?

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I. Introduction and Historical Background

This paper explores the extent to which the relationship between China and Indonesia can contribute to region-building. It points to the ways in which each country's interests cannot but overlap in the coming years. However, possible obstacles to this outcome include Indonesian reluctance to participate in the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) getting in the way of expanded Sino-Indonesian ties. Composing the background for reinvigorated bilateral exchanges are China's emergence as the world's second biggest economy and its desire for greater global influence motivating its economic outreaches to Indonesia. This courtship of Indonesia is set against an international environment that Beijing conceptualizes as "multipolar." It accords with Indonesia's ambition to strategically position itself at the center of the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) and the development of an integrated regional ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) to become a "global maritime fulcrum" through enhanced logistics and transportation infrastructures.

The thesis of the paper is that both Indonesia and China have no

intention of challenging United States (US) Pacific power because they are firmly embedded within ASEAN-led regionalism, which is open, loose and welcoming of non-East Asian states' participation. These potential participants include the US, European Union (EU), Russia, Australia, etc. Due to this "open and loose" regionalism, business-like relations subject to market forces eclipse strategic considerations. Mutual commercial benefits, in other words, are emphasized rather than overriding political strategic concerns. To ensure that Beijing's assistance is not undermined by shifting winds in the domestic politics of aid recipients, Beijing needs to evaluate all capacity-building and developmental project funding according to market compatibility, sustainability and ethical rules. This logic applies to Indonesia if it applies for funding from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Funding must also avoid entanglement in sensitive geopolitical issues, otherwise its acceptability for Indonesia will be diminished.

Interestingly, bilateral relations between China and Indonesia (the two largest states in East Asia) have not unfolded naturally, instinctively or logically in the postwar era. In the age of decolonization, Mao's China and Sukarno's Indonesia, along with Nehru's India, enjoyed some form of fraternity as newly independent countries in the developing world characterized by resurgent nationalism. They each also had a cordial relationship with Stalin's postwar Soviet Union. But outside such political commonalities and ideological experiments with the non-aligned movement, a significant gap existed in economic linkages between China and Indonesia due to the emergence of the Cold War. Belonging to the socialist world, China experimented with self-sufficiency and ideological cultural revolutions while Indonesia continued trading with the capitalist world and remained integrated with and open to ideas from the West. China promoted self-reliance, massive top-down market-irrational heavy industrialization and socialist ideological orthodoxy. Indonesia remained open to trade and commerce even as it nationalized colonial-era state firms (the Sukarno years) in the

name of newfound nationalism in the decolonization era. China isolated itself from the globalized US-led capitalist system while Indonesia remained integrated, eventually receiving Japan's overseas developmental assistance for economic development.

In the Cold War, both China and Indonesia's political affiliations were ambiguous since they belonged to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM); neither wanted to be too close to the Soviet Union or the US-led free world. In fact, The NAM was declared in the Indonesian city of Bandung. Thus, the NAM powers set out to strike a middle path between the two superpowers. Over the course of the Cold War era, China went from staunch Stalinist Soviet ally to bitter enemy with Khrushchev's Soviet Union after the Sino-Soviet split. Shunned by both superpowers, it subsequently reformed its socialist economy to become a capitalist market economy in 1979 after rapprochement with Nixon's US and then Japan. In the meantime, Indonesia went from the Sukarno-era country friendly to both the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China (PRC) to anti-Communist non-aligned power in Southeast Asia and founding member of ASEAN, an anti-Communist regional organization in the early Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) years. (SEATO was formed to arrest the threat of Vietnamese communism spreading to Southeast Asia according to the logic of domino theory). Both countries had different economic trajectories but shared the desire to become non-aligned middle powers. It is likely this instinctual preference for non-aligned status as well as the self-awareness of past greatness currently pulling these two states together again.

Before the emergence of China among the leading global economic powers, its communist legacy ensured it would be less economically important to Indonesia compared to other large powers and major economies (especially Japan) in the free world. These countries proceeded to set up production networks with Indonesia, firmly rooting it in the world capitalist system. Japan set up facilities in Indonesia for commodity acquisitions (to feed Japan's manufacturing sector) and also

invested in the Indonesian manufacturing sector to jump-start its industrialization. In fact, before China's economic reforms, Indonesia was the largest recipient of Japanese Overseas Development Aid (ODA). It has remained, along with China, one of the two major recipients of Japanese loans, aids and financial help. Even today, Indonesia is working with Japan to build its Jakarta subway system and the largest coal-fired electricity generation plant in the region. In addition to tapping into Indonesia's rich resources, Japan's aiding of Indonesian industrialization and developing its economy reflects the interest in creating a large consumer market for Japanese products.

Fifteen years after Japan's economic bubble burst and rapid growth came to an end, China may be entering Indonesia for the same reasons as Japan. China's economic rise to become the world's second largest economy (by purchasing power parity) is motivating its economic outreaches to Indonesia in an international context it defines as "multipolar." In the Chinese worldview, this multipolar world system is conceptually ambiguous. It is neither a Chinese vassal state tributary international system (a Ming dynasty-era international system in which a contemporary regional power like Indonesia would never fit), nor a Cold War-style bipolar international world system (since neither China nor Indonesia are building up alliances and they are still incapable of challenging US supremacy). It is also not a balance of power system (since China openly declares it does not favor alliances and Indonesia is firmly embedded in ASEAN network that cannot accept any Northeast Asian member states but engages them through the ASEAN Plus Three [APT] mechanism). Given the non-synchronized nature of these outreaches, the current state of affairs can best be described with the term "economic diplomacy." There is no geopolitical alliance threatening to disturb or displace the current world system in a manner beneficial to both countries nor is there a hierarchical tributary relationship harking back to the Ming imperial dynasty, represented by Admiral Zheng He's voyages to Southeast Asia. This is a form of economic diplomacy based

on the growing interdependence between the two countries and the need to accommodate two important G-20 players with trillion-dollar economies and the increasing capability with respect to autonomous and independent decision-making in world affairs.

Although the economic relationship between China and Indonesia could originally be characterized as organic and laissez faire, embedded within multilateral, regional and bilateral frameworks, it is now being shaped and crafted by China's OBOR proposal, offering funding mechanisms like AIIB, the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) Bank and Silk Road Fund. The AIIB and OBOR have each become alternatives to funding options for loans and aid from the Asian Development Bank (ADB, where Tokyo traditionally exerts strong leadership), the World Bank (WB, where Washington has strong voting rights) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF, where Europeans and Washington are dominant). AIIB and OBOR are both dominated by China, although the Beijing-based AIIB has effectively become multilateralized after US allies like the United Kingdom (UK), Australia, South Korea and other Western European nations joined the organization. These institutions have ushered in a new age where Jakarta (and presumably most of the developing world) is able to choose between Western-led institutions, Japanese funding agencies and facilities, and now Beijing-backed banks and funding organizations to establish economic partnerships according to its national interests. This is an ideal situation for developing countries, assuming that OBOR and AIIB are successfully institutionalized in the coming years and decades. Economic diplomacy, in other words, has become pluralistic in nature, with multiple options bringing both opportunities and complications for funders as well as recipients. Given that AIIB is still new (signed into effect on June 30, 2015), Jakarta continues to rely on traditional partners like ADB, WB and IMF. But for certain projects like coal-fired electricity generation plants, Indonesia may seek funding from AIIB, which has less strictly prescribed environmental standards and conditions for issuing

loans.

There are three major schools of thought when it comes to Sino-Indonesian interests in the OBOR. The first school of thought is Sino-centric conceptually, looking at OBOR as an economic tool for China to export its overcapacity overseas as its domestic economy and domestic consumption slow down. For the Chinese, this export potential is strong and set to grow larger in the near future. This will consume excess goods manufactured in a slowing Chinese economy with weakening domestic demand as it readjusts its production structure to higher value-added industries. China's less developed western regions can also benefit from exporting excess production capacity westward to Central Asia and other new markets in the overland Silk Road region. The second major school of thought is based on the concept of connectivity. Indonesia is keen to connect its far-flung islands and AIIB offers the funds to do so. This connectivity can help the Indonesian islands to capitalize on growing intra-regional trade and move Indonesian manufactured goods faster for export to other countries. The third major school, related to each of the first two, centers on Indonesia's aspiration to become a "global maritime fulcrum." By improving its logistics and transportation infrastructures, Indonesia is trying to strategically position itself at the center of the MSR and the developing integrated ASEAN AEC region.

In all the above schools of thought, it is important to highlight the fact that neither China nor Indonesia is trying to displace the US. The de facto US-centered maritime trade route in place since the start of the postwar period has benefitted both countries, bringing them prosperity as export-led economies. Sea-lanes in East Asia were protected and kept open and free to merchant traffic by the US Pacific 7th Fleet and other military and security assets. As beneficiaries of these free sea-lanes and peace and stability under the US Pacific watch, China and Indonesia have much to gain from supporting the continuity of the MSR and maintaining freedom of navigation. Both countries are more concerned about their own national interests. For Indonesians, infrastructure

development is considered the main priority. This will make its national economy more competitive and requires tapping into different sources of funding such as the World Bank, IMF, ADB and now AIIB and other OBOR opportunities. For the Chinese, the MSR provides opportunities to deplete excess capacity while shoring up its rising influence overseas.

Both countries have no aspirations to compete with Washington directly. Consumed with their own developmental problems, moreover, they do not possess the capabilities of doing so. At the height of international media chatter about their competitive instincts and especially after the UK and other Western European countries and US allies decided to join the AIIB, the US expressed the possibility of working with AIIB through the WB, while China mentioned the possibility of joining the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP, a US-led regional trade pact) if conditions were right. In other words, the possibility exists to enmesh all these countries even further in an economically interdependent world made smaller by globalization. The economic diplomacy of China, particularly if Indonesia cooperates with these initiatives, does not have to produce a zero-sum game of economic competition for regional powers and for China and the US.

II. Methodology

To conduct research for this paper, I looked at primary documents such as the transcript of Chinese President Xi Jinping's speech to the Indonesian Parliament in Oct 2013. I also examined secondary resources like media reports. I analyzed these materials and examined their use of historical references to reveal contemporary narratives regarding the issue of Asian diplomacy. I paid especial attention to coverage of OBOR in *The Jakarta Post* (a popular Indonesian daily) to discern the mood among Indonesian intellectuals and elites, with a view to revealing Indonesian receptiveness to the initiative. I also examined articles in China's state-owned media to analyze official pronouncements and

narratives regarding the OBOR initiative related to Indonesia.

Analyzing elite leaders' speeches is a useful tool for uncovering broad intentions with respect to a global context. In the case of China, President Xi has continually centralized presidential authority. He has expressed the intention to add his own publications, ideas and initiatives to the official annals of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) around the time of the 6th Party Plenum (taking place at the time of this writing). Therefore, at this initial stage of the OBOR initiative, the broad outline Xi provides in his speeches maps out China's global intentions, enabling researchers to infer Indonesia's possible role in this global worldview. The outline also helps one to understand the process through which narratives found in Chinese worldviews are formulated and how international relations are managed in Beijing. In terms of the printed word, just as the Chinese state-owned press and propaganda materials provide valuable clues related to Chinese official thinking and ideas about state intentions, Indonesian publications like *Jakarta Post* read by the country's elites, including journalists, intellectuals, politicians and government officials, provide a survey of elite opinions. In this paper, I focus on the period around 2013 because President Xi's major foreign policy initiative, OBOR, was announced in that year. Xi declared that this would be his administration's only foreign policy initiative while he is in power. In October 2014, the current Indonesian President Joko Widodo came into power and announced major ambitions for Indonesia to become an international economic power and a reputable naval power in the Southeast Asian region. These two developments converge somewhat with the bilateral and regional developments examined in the paper.

I make no claim that the paper is comprehensive but endeavor to provide an analytical update on the state of Sino-Indonesian relations centered on the OBOR initiative. The paper is neither a history of pre-modern Southeast Asian history in the age of commerce but rather includes historical narratives as a means of investigating economic

diplomacy. In parts of the paper, I utilize world history as a theoretical framework to contextualize the discussions. I ask questions that transcend area studies and are applicable universally to all historical narratives and contexts. I try to frame historical narratives and questions within the contemporary context and compare them with the pre-modern world system. I ask the questions of what has changed over time and how this change impacts contemporary international relations. I also ask questions regarding how a state-based international system necessitates a critical analysis of synchronic ideas and whether narratives about bilateral exchanges are timeless and unchanging.

III. Selected Literature Review

For this paper, I examined some of the existing literature on Sino-Indonesian ties. In selecting the studies, I focused on those that restricted their analyses to the bilateral relationship, selecting mostly those from the last five years for the sake of contemporary relevance. For example, Anne Booth highlights how China rose from economic non-engagement with Southeast Asia in the early days of the Cold War to competing with ASEAN countries' export products in the lead-up to its entry into the WTO, before finally becoming a massive market for the exported commodities of Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia.[1] By 2010, Southeast Asian countries, including Indonesia, were under pressure from Chinese agricultural products and manufactured goods inundating Southeast Asian markets while their natural resources continued to feed Chinese production needs.[2] According to Booth, the following opinions are widely held in Indonesia:

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[1] Anne Booth, "China's Economic Relations with Indonesia: Threats and Opportunities," *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs* 30, no. 2 (2011): 141-160.

[2] Ibid., 153.

> Many Indonesians see it as leading to "cutthroat competition that will have negative impacts on the development of Indonesian economic capabilities in the long term" (Jakarta Post 2010). Others view Chinese policies as essentially neo-colonial; in its hunger for raw materials, China is in effect seeking to re-impose colonial patterns of trade on Southeast Asia. It is too early to tell if these fears are justified or not, but they appear to reflect widely held beliefs in Indonesian business, media and political circles.[3]

Booth is careful to note that these are but perceptions on the ground; it is still too early to tell if the fears of Indonesian entrepreneurs and other stakeholders in the Indonesian economy are legitimate. The charge of "neo-colonialism" is serious but may be exaggerated. Even perceptions may be carefully managed to prevent subjective opinions and interpretations from influencing policy decisions.

Since Booth's article, written in 2011, China experienced a dramatic economic slowdown engendered by a brief meltdown in the Shanghai stock market in 2015 where three trillion US dollars were wiped out in a matter of weeks. This, however, has only been one part of the slowing growth since the Hu-Wen era, when the administration tried to dampen a red-hot speculative economy through deliberate policy designs (to prevent a speculative bubble from forming). By the time Xi ascended to power, the slowdown had accentuated, affecting domestic demand in the process. The question then became whether the slowdown in demand would trigger more Chinese exporters to shift their excess capacity and overproduction overseas to locations like Indonesia. Or perhaps the slowdown in China will conform to the scenario painted in *The Jakarta Post* (the same daily that Booth quoted in 2011) in 2015:

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[3] Ibid., 153-154.

> True, as China has now become the largest supplier of our non-oil imports, many local companies have complained about the fierce competition posed by cheap Chinese products that have been flooding our markets. However, we should not be preoccupied with the negative side of booming China-Indonesia trade relations. Indonesia can now benefit more from the Chinese economy. Also true is that China's economy is slowing down, with its growth falling to about 7 percent from an annual average of 10 percent, but this slump will not last forever. As China's economy continues to expand, so will its middle-income earners, resulting in a huge pool of purchasing power. China will not only need various consumer goods from Indonesia but also will become a big supplier of millions of tourists as well. Indonesia can also benefit from China's position as a huge global production or assembly center within its complex, modularized global production systems.[4]

The commentary at this time is almost diametrically opposed to Booth's narrative. It acknowledges Booth's report on the fears on the ground in 2011 but rather emphasizes the benefits that outweigh such detriments. Indonesia, according to this view, is likely to benefit from the growing consumption of the Chinese middle class, Chinese tourists, and embeddedness in Chinese production networks. There are three caveats in navigating between the two diametrically opposite narratives. First, there is the unpredictability of economic development and, as a logical implication of this, economic diplomacy. Within a space of four years, the imagery presented by Booth of a resurgent China challenging the price-competitiveness of ASEAN goods was reduced to a slowing Chinese economy that still carries the prospects of voluminous consumption through two identifiably important groups of Chinese

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[4] "Editorial: $3 billion boost from China," *The Jakarta Post*, September 18, 2015, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/09/18/editorial-3-billion-boost-china.html#sthash.PLLu5qfI.dpuf, accessed September 19, 2015.

middle-class consumers and tourists. Ultimately, the two narratives may not be mutually exclusive. It may be possible for Chinese competition and longer-term consumption to co-exist in the future. In other words, China and its economy may not be either an unmitigated threat or benefit to Indonesia. Reality reflects a complex mixture of friendly competition and close partnership that needs to be constantly managed.

Second, both narratives indicate that Sino-Indonesia economic ties must be grounded in pragmatic business-like assessment of benefits and detriments rather than idealistic strategic closeness and partnership. Economic incentives and environmental factors are volatile and continually evolve. Interpretations of economic factors are diachronic, not synchronic. Any talk of absolutism, either in the form of alliances of economic "fulcrums" (central nodes and positions within a regional trading network) or head-on rivalry is premature. Beijing and Jakarta are firmly embedded in ASEAN-led regionalism, which is open, loose and welcoming of participation by non-East Asian states' such as the US, EU, Russia, Australia, etc. Third, in both cases, the descriptions are superlative due to the size of the Chinese economy and the speed of its development in world historical terms. There is therefore a tendency for exaggerated perceptions, especially in the perceived areas of Chinese resource "hunger" (also known as "neo-colonialism"), its "huge" purchasing power, and the almost "infinite" millions of tourists and consumers.

Such perceptions also color popular ideas, images and impressions of the OBOR and MSR. Like all major economies, there are natural cyclical features of economic growth. While China's rise is widely acknowledged, it is also slowing down dramatically as it enters into unchartered waters. Economic slowdown will continually test the resilience of its social system, society's capacity for absorbing shocks, and an authoritarian political system that faces a vocal rising middle class. While China's economy is slowing down, however, it is also true that, even at six to seven percent of annual growth, it is still performing

better than most developed economies this growth rate is equivalent to growing at the size of a major economy's GDP every few years. Many of these features are unprecedented in world history and the unexpectedness of China's rise also presents uncharted opportunities for bilateral interactions between regional powers like China and Indonesia.

To navigate through unchartered territories, China must skillfully deploy its economic and diplomatic resources. To understand the features of contemporary Chinese economic diplomacy, I reviewed policy papers in this area. Economic diplomacy is covered in Zha Daojiong's paper on China. He argues that the fifth generation of Chinese leaders is keen to expand multilateral trade with other countries while liberalizing its domestic economy to ensure the sustainability of growth and state-led investments overseas.[5] He also claims that China also wants to draw Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).[6] To expand its economic presence overseas, moreover, China "must win the trust and support of the international community of state."[7] Relations between China and Indonesia can therefore be understood with respect to China's economic charm offensive to win over important pivotal regional economies for the smooth implementation of OBOR. One way to win trust in the East Asian context is to reach back into history and construct a narrative legitimizing an important and time-tested bilateral relationship.

In a co-authored article, John Wong and I describe China's turn to economic diplomacy prompted by the failure of "peaceful rise" discourse, a form of cultural diplomacy, to generate soft power.[8] We note that economic diplomacy appeared more appropriate given China's large

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[5] Daojiong Zha, "Chinese Economic Diplomacy: New Initiatives," *Policy Report* (March 2011), 11.

[6] Ibid., 3

[7] Ibid., 11

[8] John Wong and Lim Tai Wei, "The Economic Card in China's Pro-active Diplomacy," *National University of Singapore (NUS) East Asian Institute (EAI) Background Brief* No. 1021 (2015), i.

reserves, surpluses and need to acquire raw materials.[9] Due to past lessons with regard to less successful bilateral funding initiatives, China is conducting economic diplomacy through multilateral institutions like AIIB and promoting cooperation in the developing world because it is now fully aware that economic diplomacy, or "buying states off," can be obstructed when national interests change (recent experiences with Sri Lanka and Burma come to mind).[10] China learned that the national interests of recipients of aids/loans/ODA may change but their desire to have the funding does not. Therefore, to ensure that its help is not subjected to the shifting winds of domestic politics, Beijing needs to evaluate all capacity-building and developmental project funding according to market compatibility, sustainability and ethical rules. This logic will also hold for Indonesia if it applies for AIIB funding.

IV. Significance of OBOR and AIIB to Contemporary Sino-Indonesian Bilateral Ties

Symbolically, Chinese President Xi Jinping chose Indonesia as the site to publicly announce the initiation of the new MSR on October third, 2013. It is important to carefully analyze President Xi's speech to the Indonesian Parliament in October 2013 in detail to understand the vision that his administration has in store for Indonesia in the MSR and how China intends to shape the region with respect to its worldview. President Xi's speech reveals much about the Sino-Indonesian friendship from a Sinocentric point of view. It considers Indonesia to have a "traditional friendship" with China and, despite the wide expanse of the South China Sea, Xi claims that China and Indonesia "face each other across the

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[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid., ii.

sea."[11] In addition to such constructed geographical proximity, historical narratives were also deployed in President Xi's speech:

> As early as the Han Dynasty in China about 2,000 years ago, the people of the two countries opened the door to each other despite the sea between them. In the early fifteenth century, Zheng He, the famous Chinese navigator of the Ming Dynasty, made seven voyages to the Western Seas. He stopped over the Indonesian archipelago in each of his voyages and toured Java, Sumatra and Kalimantan. His visits left nice stories of friendly exchanges between the Chinese and Indonesian peoples, many of which are still widely told today.[12]

Three points stand out in this narrative. First, the invocation of the Chinese Han dynasty is extremely important. The Han dynasty was one of the golden eras of Chinese civilization as well as one characterized by a strongly unified China. Its significance to OBOR lies in the fact that the Han Chinese Empire successfully traded with the Roman Empire through numerous intermediaries in the Middle East and Central Asia. But what was emphasized here was really the maritime exchanges, which are objectively more relevant and more extensively recorded parts of Admiral Zheng He's seven voyages to places around Southeast Asia, including Indonesia (where he is more commonly known as "Cheng Ho," as in most of Southeast Asia). This is a strategic reference since Zheng He's voyages are far better known in Indonesia than Han dynasty-era Chinese history. The past is revived in a re-packaged narrative for the present. Unlike Admiral Zheng He's brief seven voyages, Beijing's

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[11] Jinping Xi (edited by Xu Rui), "Speech by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Indonesian Parliament," ASEAN-China Centre, October 3, 2013, http://www.asean-china-center.org/english/2013-10/03/c_133062675.htm. accessed October 4, 2013. The speech was made on 2 October 2013 in Jakarta, Indonesia.

[12] Ibid.

intentions in maritime Southeast Asia are likely to be permanent and long lasting. Thus, substantive discontinuities are interwoven with constructed worldviews and visions of economic diplomacy.

How do Indonesian public intellectuals and scholars view the history of Chinese presence in Indonesia (including views from the culturally hybrid Peranakan community that descended from intermarriages between Chinese and indigenous Malays)? In terms of historical evidence, Chinese migration to Indonesia may have started as early as the fourth century (traceable using material artifacts), while Hokkien (Fujianese) traders may have arrived sometime around 800-900 AD. As well, evidence of early settlers in early Dutch-era Indonesia date back to 1619 AD in the port city of Makassar.[13] Compared with this Indonesian interpretation, exchanges during the Han dynasty cited by Xi are dated two hundred years earlier. It also appears that the Indonesian perception associates sizable Chinese migration waves with the early Dutch presence at the end of the Ming period. It may be possible that Chinese migration occurred between 800 and 1644 AD (end of Ming). Meanwhile, Xi directly highlights the Zheng He voyages (1405-1433) that took place during the Ming dynasty (1368 to 1643).

Second, in the Sinocentric worldview, Zheng He's voyages often appear as peaceful voyages, in sharp contrast with narratives of Western imperialist and colonial ventures. These narratives portray the voyages as peaceful and diplomatic, with what little violence that did occur consisting of slight brushes with bandits and pirates. In other words, given the precedence of peaceful contact constructed through this narrative, Beijing is trying to convince Jakarta that contemporary exchanges are likely to yield the same level of mutual understanding and benefits. What is missing from this depiction, however, are Indonesian

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[13] Hermanto Lim, David Mead, and SIL International, "Chinese in Indonesia: A Background Study," *SIL Electronic Survey Report 2011-028* (2011).

ideas about the Chinese tributary relationship with its vassal states during the Ming period. More studies need to be done on Bahasa Indonesian literature on this early contact and how the locals received the Chinese.

Finally, the speech indicates how stories of Zheng He have circulated widely in Indonesia, becoming integrated into local myths and folklore. In fact, some Peranakan communities in Indonesia and even in the neighboring Malay Peninsula believe they are descendants of Zheng He's entourage left behind by the ships who proceeded to indigenize through intermarriage, eventually producing a hybridized culture in the region. Due to the cross-pollination of the two cultures, Peranakans are neither completely Chinese nor Malay and therefore ethnically unique. The hybridized cultures and people, along with artifacts left behind by Zheng He's voyages, have become cultural relics and archeological evidence that physicalize the narrative of the peaceful southward Ming voyages. They may serve as useful and effective bridges to construct stories and narratives for bilateral Sino-Indonesian ties. Stakeholders can use these stories to legitimize bilateral exchanges for popular consumption. For sustainability in economic exchanges, however, national interests will ultimately trump mythical folklore and historical anecdotes. Therefore, maximization of national interests remains paramount in any economic exchanges and initiatives.

All three points establish the fact that bilateral contacts are not new and thus have the potential to further develop upon the peaceful ties from past encounters. The narrative is synchronic in nature, occurring across time and space with little regard for changing contexts, world historical trends and national priorities. When Zheng He first arrived in Southeast Asia, he came into contact with disparate kingdoms with economies far less interdependent with one another. But President Xi is currently endeavoring to build Sino-Indonesian relations in a state-based international system where states with well-defined land and maritime territories are economically dependent on one another. National interests are therefore also more clearly defined and states themselves operate

under normative rules in a de facto international system existing since 1945. China also no longer has the same preponderance of power vis-à-vis Indonesia as it did in the Han and Tang dynasties. Modernity thus dictates Indonesian questions as to what constitutes its interest in OBOR.

The constructed nature of the Silk Road is a clear fact. It did not really exist but was conceptualized by a German geographer in the 1870s. He described the original overland as an organically developed caravan trading route that expanded over time, operated by myriad intermediaries and traders. In other words, the overland component of the OBOR is based on the concept of a European explorer that was later reinforced through official slogans by the Chinese government. The overland Silk Road declined with the rise of the Ottoman Empire that boycotted trade with the West and the isolationist late Ming dynasty China. The regions and kingdoms in the historical overland trading route known as the Silk Road was later supplanted by the maritime Silk Road when technologies allowed ships and other maritime vessels to carry more cargo. Logistics was further improved by the emergence of steamships that did not need to rely on wind power. A Japanese scholar who studied the maritime ceramics trade in the 1970s coined the term maritime Silk Road, or MSR. Therefore, in essence, both overland and maritime Silk Road were modern and contemporary constructs. Beijing's version of OBOR is a conscious state-constructed route. In this sense, it directly touches upon issues of national interest, sovereignty and geopolitical rivalries. China's official narrative regarding MSR, as outlined in a document jointly released by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and Ministry of Commerce (MOC), highlights the following route:

> The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road attempts to link China's southeast coastal region—Fuzhou and Quanzhou in Fujian province, Guangzhou and Zhanjiang in Guangdong, Beihai in Guangxi and Haikou in

> Hainan—to Europe through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean in one route, and the South Pacific in another. From Hanoi, Vietnam, the Road heads to the South China Sea and then the Strait of Malacca to reach Kuala Lumpur. It then joins Jakarta, Indonesia, before crossing the ocean to Colombo, Sri Lanka, and Kolkata, India. The path then swings west to Nairobi, Kenya, and continues north into the Red Sea and Mediterranean Sea to reach Athens, Greece, before joining the Belt finally in Venice.[14]

This MSR route resonates with the ancient Silk Road adhered to by Zheng, with the exception that the Ming-era route did not reach Europe; the Suez Canal did not exist then and Zheng probably did not sail round the horn of Africa to travel to Europe. Based on current available evidence, Zheng He probably reached the eastern coast of Africa (although Gavin Menzies' highly-controversial work extends Zheng's voyages beyond that). Given that modern technologies no longer depend on the monsoon winds that guided Zheng He's ships and others during the Ming period, the OBOR version of MSR is far more extensive and purposeful insofar as it is designed specifically to facilitate the transport of large amounts of cargo for trade and commerce. The overland and maritime routes including China and other economies found in the OBOR region encompass a total trade volume higher than 1.1 trillion US dollars, twenty-five percent of China's total trade volume by value.[15] These routes have great potential to grow in the future from Hungary to Indonesia, and Chinese policy-makers estimate the OBOR will add an additional 2.5 trillion US dollars to China's trade volume over the period of 2015 to 2025, an amount greater than the total value of its exports in

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[14] Xin Yi Tho, "Silk Road Economic Belt - a journey without end," *The Jakarta Post*, April 10, 2015, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/04/10/silk-road-economic-belt-a-journey-without-end.html, accessed April 11, 2015.

[15] Ibid.

2013 as the globe's number one ranking exporter.[16]

China is not necessarily reviving a tributary version of economic diplomacy. One future shape of China's envisioned MSR is deep integration between Indonesia's maritime infrastructure facilities with China's production networking routes:

> AIIB's share may mean that Indonesia's maritime highways and ports may become integral parts of China's MSR as well. Indonesia's sea lanes of communications will then be complemented by west-east connectivity, through the Java Sea to Makassar and Sorong in Papua and back, in further boosting Indonesia's maritime economic development. Indonesia's maritime highway concept may develop into the MSR super maritime highway.[17]

According to this interpretation of the MSR, there is complementarity between the MSR and Indonesia's own plans for economic development by connecting its far-flung archipelagic islands from East to West. Indonesia's port cities desire to be dynamic nodes of import-export trade as ASEAN and East Asia integrate economically with each other.

While trade integration through the OBOR and MSR can be characterized as development without detriment, in terms of geopolitics, this maritime region is a minefield of security risks. China's recent movement in the South China Sea resembles more closely modern-era naval gunboat supremacy and policing than a vassal state-based tributary system. Realizing the geopolitical risks of Chinese dominance in the OBOR region, Indonesia has taken several countermeasures. Luhulima,

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16 Brenda Goh and Koh Gui Qing, "China's 'One Belt, One Road' looks to take construction binge offshore," *Reuters*, September 6, 2015, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/09/06/uk-china-economy-silkroad-idUKKCN0R60X820150906. accessed September 7, 2015.

17 C.P.F. Luhulima, "Superimposition of China's 'silk road' and Indonesia's maritime fulcrum," *Jakarta Post*, December 13, 2014, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/09/27/mutants-creating-superhumans-curing-incurable.html, accessed April 1, 2015.

C.P.F., a senior researcher at the Center for Political Studies at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) based in Jakarta, suggests that Indonesia adopt the following countermeasures for balancing against China's strength in OBOR: lobbying for a few executive positions in AIIB to uphold Indonesian national interests in MSR; enhancing naval weapons and military systems to guard the sea-lanes under Indonesian jurisdiction; and monitoring naval movements in Indonesian maritime territories.[18] Meanwhile, in a forum on OBOR in Nusa Dua, Bali, attended by officials and community representatives from China and ASEAN, Bantarto Bandoro of Indonesian Defense University asserted, "Indonesia should not allow itself to be used by China to persuade other ASEAN members to cooperate."[19]

My own contributions to the existing literature regarding this subject can be classified into three areas. First, much of the updated literature on Sino-Indonesian relations concerns the pre-OBOR historical period; in other words, it pertains to the era before the emergence of a Chinese-driven multilateral framework. Therefore, it focuses mainly on the issues of individual cases of resource extraction, Chinese investments, and bilateral developmental challenges. I argue that these aspects continue to be important objects of analyses but that the emergence of the OBOR initiative provides researchers with an overarching framework to situate Indonesia in a global map of Chinese economic outreach. In this respect, Indonesia systematically becomes part of a Chinese global strategy to manage its economic policy.

Second, strategic interests such as the current overwhelming focus on maritime disputes in contemporary media outlets and academic forums are not the only ways to discuss relations between the largest

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[18] Ibid.

[19] "In Indonesia, Caution Urged With China's New 'Silk Road' Plans," *Jakarta Globe*, http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/indonesia-caution-urged-chinas-new-silk-road-plans/. accessed September 28, 2015.

states in Northeast and Southeast Asia, respectively. Focusing on economic mutualism may serve as a useful bilateral platform of analysis when it comes to assessing the national interests of various big powers active in the region and how emerging powers like Indonesia aggregate these interests. It also reflects the policy dilemma that Southeast Asian countries face, or the need to engage with China economically while maintaining security arrangements with the US and its network of allies that have a track record of guarding the sea-lanes and maintaining peace and stability in the region in the postwar years. Third, many publications tend to view economic closeness between Beijing and Jakarta in zero-sum terms, arguing that it shall result in the decline of Western (particularly US) influence in the region. I claim that this is not necessarily the case as bilateral exchanges based on mutual benefits, open and loose economic cooperation, and economic imperatives tend to be more accommodating of other large powers' interests and participation.

V. The ASEAN Framework

In the infrastructure sector, Indonesia's relationship with the OBOR can be contextualized in terms of overall ASEAN connectivity. Transportation infrastructure built and funded by the Chinese government can help to facilitate the already large numbers of people travelling between the two locations. As the *Jakarta Post* points out, eighteen million people travel annually between the two locations while students engaging in exchanges between China and ASEAN countries number more than 180,000.[20] Besides these interflows of people, investments also circulate between the two regions with ease. As with

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[20] Bu Xu, "Maritime Silk Road can bridge China-ASEAN cooperation," *The Jakarta Post*, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/08/05/maritime-silk-road-can-bridge-china-asean-cooperation.html. accessed August 6, 2015.

most of the countries in ASEAN, China has now become the single largest investor for Indonesia as well. And since Indonesia is the largest country within ASEAN, its policies, decisions, and actions have repercussions for other ASEAN members. For example, the competition between Japan and China to offer high-speed railway technologies was seen as a precedent for other railway projects in Southeast Asian countries. Ultimately, the project was cancelled in favor of a medium-speed railway. On September thirtieth, 2015, the Indonesian government announced China the winner in the bidding war to build the medium-speed railway. Jakarta hopes Indonesia can be more competitive when the Chinese-funded infrastructure project is completed. More specifically, it is hoped the project will aid logistics in the manufacturing sector and integrate industrial parks into Chinese production networks, just as was the case for Japanese production networking in the past.

In the service sector, like the rest of ASEAN, Indonesia also hopes for increases in Chinese tourists visiting the country. Mutual trade volume between China and ASEAN surpassed 480 billion US dollars in 2014.[21] Like other ASEAN and Asia Pacific countries, Indonesia views the growing number of Chinese middle-class consumers as a potential market for Indonesian products. This imagery of a large number of middle-income consumers has captured the imagination of the Indonesian manufacturing sector. But for this dream to become reality, China must continue to grow and avoid the political instability causing implosions in its cyclical dynastic history. The CCP is already more than eighty years old and is searching for ways to shore up its political legitimacy at home, particularly if economic growth slows down in China. The OBOR is a crucial vehicle for China to export its surplus manufacturing capacity to other consumer markets. According to Hong Kong-based (sometimes critical) China watcher Willy Lam, a former

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[21] Ibid.

journalist turned academic, the main beneficiaries of OBOR are China's state-owned construction firms, including the following State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs): China State Construction Engineering Corporation Limited (CSCEC), a civil-engineering group that finished almost six thousand projects in 116 countries in the last thirty years; China Communications Construction Company Limited (CCCCL) constructing bridges, highways and ports in four continents; China CAMC Engineering Co. Ltd (CAMCE) engineering and construction firm; and the privately-owned SANY firm, among others.[22]

VI. Domestic Interpretations by Indonesia-based China Experts

The historical narrative remains strong even in contemporary Sinologists' opinions in Indonesia. For example, prominent Indonesian Sinologist Agustinus Wibowo argues, "China is trying to emphasize its role in the global economy, as it used to be during the years of the Silk Road when China was the main hub and generator for the world's trade business."[23] The concept of revivalism is strong in such narratives, implying that the OBOR initiative is not entirely new; it has precedent in the historical overland Silk Road that used to connect the Han dynasty to the Roman Empire via intermediaries benefitting from trade. Confirming this historical narrative revivalism, Wibowo opines, "This [OBOR] is an initiative to connect China to its neighboring countries and civilizations, and at the same time to relive [sic] the ancient trade routes to the current

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[22] Willy Lam, "'One Belt, One Road' Enhances Xi Jinping's Control Over the Economy," *China Brief* 15, no. 10, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43914&cHash=859e508bc4e133a688b4ca5bd57bf1c2#.VgksE7GwqUk. accessed September 28, 2015. Willy Lam's original references are from For CSCEC - Finance Sector Net [Beijing], May 4 and the CSCEC website.

[23] Fan Ruan, "Indonesian Sinologist on China's 'One Belt, One Road' initiative," *China Daily*, http://m.chinadaily.com.cn/en/2015-07/13/content_21267230.htm. accessed September 27, 2015.

global setting."[24] Such narratives indicate the presence of a group of scholars and intellectuals familiar with world historical views that use them to actively support Silk Road revivalism.

The historical narrative may be understood by Indonesian scholars who are well-acquainted with China but what about the opinions of Indonesian hawks, conservatives and liberals who may not share the same understanding as their Sinologist counterparts? Like any other major initiatives, AIIB and OBOR loans as well as other funding coming from China do encounter challenges. Indonesian businesses have complained about the highly price-competitive Chinese-made products flooding their markets. Others express worries about the geopolitical dominance of China, coming at a time when Indonesia is trying to assert itself as a naval power in the region. Even among moderates, there are anxieties about economic domination by China through the OBOR. Due to the simultaneous presence of Indonesian Sinologists, pro-China Indonesian elites, China hawks, moderates, Indonesian Chinese communities and various political factions, Indonesia has self-balancing mechanisms structurally built in to manage different ideas, viewpoints, perspectives and narratives about China. Such balancing mechanisms, when reflected in the collective outlook of Indonesian strategic thinking, result in a worldview that tends toward the separation of economics and politics. This is a phenomenon practiced by many states in the East Asian region when it comes to balancing the national interests of various big powers active in the region. It also reflects the policy dilemma that Southeast Asian countries face: the need to engage with China economically while maintaining security arrangements with the US and its network of allies, which have a track record of guarding the sea-lanes and maintaining peace and stability in the region since the postwar era.

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[24] Ibid.

VII. Separation of Economics and Politics?

Sino-Indonesian economic relations are generally positive, smooth-going and growing. In the domain of security, like most other Southeast Asian states, Indonesia remains rational and neutral, in favor of ASEAN-led ("ASEAN in the driver's seat") regionalism within the status quo geopolitical order that has served the region well in the postwar decades. Maintaining this neutral position, Indonesia is likely to watch very carefully the development of OBOR and MSR in consideration of its own national interests. At times when Indonesian interests are violated, e.g. when Chinese, Vietnamese and other fishing trawlers are caught wandering into its waters, the fishermen are detained and their boats are dynamited. The MSR initiative also arrives at a time when Indonesia aspires to become a maritime power. President Jokowi's administration declared Indonesia a "global maritime fulcrum." It thus welcomes Chinese investments that boost the connectivity of its many islands, but rejects military dominance by China. Indonesia has skillfully pursued this balance in the past even at the height of the Cold War, procuring weapons from the Soviet Union, engaging politically and economically with Washington, projecting a non-aligned image as an important leading member in ASEAN, and accepting developmental assistance from Japan. Indonesia assumed these multiple identities simultaneously. In that sense, it acted as a big power fulcrum balancing the interests of even larger and/or more powerful states. There is no reason to argue against Indonesia's continued success in this regard into the near future, even in the face of China's rise and the OBOR/AIIB initiatives.

Indonesia also has newfound confidence as a trillion dollar economy within the increasingly influential G-20. This is in addition to its traditional role as a "big brother" within the ASEAN family. Indonesia may thus continue to highlight its autonomous role in the international community along with other large rapidly developing economies. Ultimately, nations in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia's pre-modern

historical empires and kingdoms, have been skillful and experienced in managing big power relations. These nations are located in a region that has seen the arrivals of Indic empire builders, Arab traders and missionaries, European colonial empires, American naval supremacy, Japanese Empire, and now the rise of China. Drawing on its historical experience and accumulated cultural capital, Indonesia is likely to develop and evolve a system suitable to contemporary conditions in order to counterbalance Chinese dominance and influence in the region. This role is especially important considering the suspicion of some observers regarding the underlying geopolitical intentions of OBOR:

> Although Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has stated that One Belt, One Road is "not a tool of geopolitics," China will likely attempt to turn economic cooperation into political influence. Doing so will require Beijing to overcome a number of difficult obstacles, primarily, managing great power competition with India, Russia, and the United States within Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East.[25]

That region which this Foreign Affairs article does not mention is Southeast Asia, where Indonesia is a major actor. If OBOR becomes predominantly geopolitical in its application in Southeast Asia, Indonesia is likely to display its competitive instincts to resist or reject OBOR advances.

Meanwhile, as ASEAN members ponder optimal ways to benefit from AIIB and OBOR while maintaining their respective national interests and priorities, China appears to be enthusiastically forging ahead with the overland Silk Road route. It is working with Pakistan (where it allocated forty billion US dollars for development) and other

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[25] Jacob Stokes, "China's Road Rules Beijing Looks West Toward Eurasian Integration" *Foreign Affairs*, April 19, 2015, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2015-04-19/chinas-road-rules, accessed September 29, 2015.

countries in Central Asia. This is a region friendlier to China compared with Southeast Asia, which has traditionally worked more with Western countries through close cooperation in the postwar and Cold War periods. There is also a degree of familiarity due to inherited institutions as former European colonies (Thailand is the only country in Southeast Asia that was not colonized). China is a relatively new player in Southeast Asia. It withdrew from meddling in Southeast Asian, and especially Indonesian, internal affairs after anti-Chinese riots in the 1960s that resulted in China denying ethnic overseas Chinese in the region citizenship eligibility in the PRC. Ethnic Chinese in Indonesia were offered a choice either to return to China (some did and ended up in places like Hainan Island) or stay in Indonesia to become citizens and give up their rights to PRC citizenship. China also stopped propaganda broadcasts to Southeast Asia when it opened up economically in its transition to a market economy in the reform era. Furthermore, compared to the MSR traversed by Zheng He over seven voyages, the overland route is historically more familiar to Chinese historians. Ultimately, as Indonesia considers its national interests with regard to becoming a maritime fulcrum in the region through an economic and trade relationship with China, the latter is also carefully calibrating its funding priorities and apportioning its attention and resources between the overland and the maritime components of the OBOR.

In conclusion, I argue that economic mutualism is a better lens to understand national interests. As Indonesia transitions to become a maritime fulcrum in the region, China is examining its priorities with respect to the overland and maritime components of OBOR. Meanwhile, Indonesia is fully aware of the long-term geopolitical impact if the OBOR turns economic into geopolitical power. OBOR must maintain its economic development focus and avoid the use of political tools to dominate Southeast Asian countries. National interests are the overriding determinants of bilateral complementarity and compatibility and they can assert themselves easily when challenged.

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Nuclear Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Implications from EURATOM

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Nuclear Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Implications from EURATOM

Northeast Asia is currently facing several nuclear issues, such as the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula and a potential arms race between the countries in the region. These issues have led to the discussion of an institutionalized regional framework that could help in finding a solution to common problems in the region. Regional nuclear cooperation might be difficult to be realized with the high tension and distrust among the countries, but as was proven in Europe, such cooperation could contribute to confidence- and trust-building. This paper explores the history of EURATOM and identifies learning points that could be used for similar cooperation in Northeast Asia. Research and development, activities related to nuclear safety and regional safeguard measures are areas that could be applied based on the EURATOM experience. The U.S. would play a large role, as was proven in Europe and is predicted to be in Northeast Asia, making it a challenge for the realization of the cooperation. However, regional nuclear cooperation in Northeast Asia is not impossible through small steps that would build up trust and confidence.

Keywords: EURATOM, nuclear energy, regional cooperation, proliferation, confidence-building measures

Nuclear Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Implications from EURATOM

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I. Introduction

Many observers remain concerned about the unsolved North Korean nuclear issue, which could inevitably create dangerous uncertainty for the Korean Peninsula and the entire region. The Six Party Talks have proven unsuccessful, with no results in the denuclearization of North Korea, and it seems there are currently obstacles to resuming the talks. Furthermore, the North Korean nuclear program has been developed further since the Six Party Talks were stalled in 2009. Thus, it seems that North Korea's nuclear program is an issue that is out of international control.

In addition to the issue of North Korea's nuclear program, the future concerns and worries of Northeast Asia extend to the issues of nuclear proliferation, nuclear safety and nuclear arms races. Indeed, there have been a growing number of opinions that the only option for South Korea and Japan to deal with the threat of a nuclear North Korea is to develop their own nuclear weapons. Therefore, unless the North Korean nuclear crisis is solved soon, one must consider the worst-case scenario for Northeast Asia: a nuclear arms race between the countries.

Furthermore, the expansion of nuclear energy use in the region raises the central issue regarding the safety of nuclear material. Measures to solve nuclear issues in Northeast Asia should be focused beyond the details of the current crisis on the Korean Peninsula and try to shed some light on the question of whether a regional approach could be applied in Northeast Asia to resolve the common problems each country is facing. Nevertheless, an institutionalized regional framework to solve nuclear issues in Northeast Asia is still lacking.

Although both Europe and Northeast Asia display a history of war and nuclear competition among regional powers, the recent experiences of the two regions stand in sharp contrast to each other. This may stimulate academic discussion and investigation into how European cooperation on nuclear issues—particularly with regard to the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM)—occurred and whether there are lessons for Northeast Asia and, more generally, for security after World War II.

The purpose of the paper is to examine how the experience of EURATOM might benefit either the peaceful uses of nuclear energy or regional security in Northeast Asia, as well as what aspects of EURATOM could be applied to the a Northeast Asian context. This paper firstly argues that nuclear energy sector cooperation may provide the soundest and most politically acceptable solution to the problem now occurring in Northeast Asia. This regional cooperation would be more sensitive to the special concerns or conditions of the region when compared to central or universal treaties. In light of this, the paper examines Northeast Asian regional nuclear energy cooperation by historically reviewing Europe's experience of nuclear energy cooperation, particularly with regard to EURATOM. The paper also examines nuclear energy sector cooperation projects plausibly implementable as solutions to the North Korean nuclear issue and Northeast Asia's security crises. Finally, the paper argues that the European experience can and should serve as an inspiring example, albeit

with important limitations, that other regions, such as Northeast Asia, could at least draw lessons from, if not emulate.

In order to do so, the study evaluates the EURATOM experience in terms of confidence-building, nuclear safety, safeguard systems and U.S. influence, each of which are needed for future nuclear energy cooperation in Northeast Asia. Based on these topics, the study will attempt to design a future road map for Northeast Asian nuclear energy cooperation.

II. Nuclear Security and Distrust in Northeast Asia

1. Nuclear Crisis in Korea

In 2010, North Korea revealed two thousand centrifuges that, together with an additional eight hundred centrifuges, could produce forty kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) annually.[1] This in turn could be used to produce twenty to one hundred nuclear bombs by 2020.[2] The issue of denuclearization, however, would appear to be deadlocked, with there being little prospect of the Six Party Talks being resumed in the near future amidst a marked lack of trust and political will.

To quell the North Korean nuclear threat, the international community has used a stick and carrot approach to push the regime to denuclearize. There have, however, been no positive changes in North Korea's position as a result of international aid or sanctions. In the past, its actions and changes in position could be interpreted as maneuvering in the run up to further rounds of negotiations in order to test the other

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[1] Olli Heinonen, "North Korea's Nuclear Enrichment: Capabilities and Consequences," *38 North*, June 22, 2011, http://38north.org/2011/06/heinonen062211/.

[2] Shannon Tiezzi, "Report: North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Could Grow Tenfold by 2020," *The Diplomat,* February 25, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/report-north-koreas-nuclear-weapons-stockpile-could-grow-tenfold-by-2020/.

parties' intentions. The key was that there is no end if North Korea itself does not have an intention to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. Despite this reality, the international community still relies on the use of external influences to change North Korea's behavior. For instance, the U.S. has imposed additional economic sanctions since 2016, while many still believe that North Korea would be willing to dismantle its nuclear weapons in exchange for economic compensation.[3]

If nuclear weapons are not a bargaining chip for North Korea to extract economic concessions, its strategic plan for the possession of nuclear weapons will be unchangeable unless all military threats postured by the U.S. are removed on the Korean peninsula.[4] For North Korea's part, the imbalance of military power between the two Koreas since the 1980s has pushed Pyongyang's pursuit of nuclear weapons. In the recent years, Pyongyang has seen the acquiring of nuclear weapons as the only way to secure it from what it views as a "hostile policy" pursued by the U.S., as evidenced by the US-ROK joint military exercises and the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" that the North Korea perceived as targeting them. Accordingly, North Korea's ultimate goal is to become a nuclear state—it is trying to achieve for itself greater security by means of nuclear deterrence.

The continuation of North Korea's economic woes diminished the resources needed for keeping up with the South in terms of conventional weapons, even puttting it at a disadvantage. To make matters worse, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. clarified that it desired regime

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[3] For further discussion on the effectiveness of aid and sanctions towards North Korea, see Sangsoo Lee, "Breaking the Deadlock: Security Building on the Korean Peninsula," *Institute for Security and Development Policy*, April 1, 2015, http://isdp.eu/content/uploads/publications/2015-lee-breaking-the-deadlock-security-building-on-the-korean-peninsula.pdf; Dursun Peksen, "Why Economic Sanctions Have Failed Against North Korea," *The Diplomat,* July 8, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/why-economic-sanctions-have-failed-against-north-korea/.

[4] "US troop pullout key to ensuring peace and security," *Pyongyang Times,* November 15, 2016, http://www.naenara.com.kp/en/order/pytimes/?page=World&no=23179.

change in North Korea.[5]

It has been difficult to establish a sense of mutual trust within the multilateral framework as different member countries often have different views and goals when trying to gain benefits from the negotiation process, which cannot be perceived as based on "trust" between member countries. The only way to overcome this stumbling block of mistrust is through steps to build confidence in a bilateral setting that leads to multilateral talks for North Korea's denuclearization.

China has focused on maintaining its leadership and maximizing its leverage as host and de-facto mediator of the Six Party Talks. In fact, for its own security reasons, China is more concerned about instability in North Korea than its nuclear weapons. Indeed, the Six Party Talks have not proven successful, with no results on denuclearization in North Korea, and it seems there are still obstacles to resuming the talks. The U.S. and South Korea believe that even if North Korea returns to the Six Party Talks, it does not mean that North Korea will dismantle its nuclear weapons. Both countries remain firm that North Korea has to prove its sincere intention to denuclearize before re-starting negotiations. While the goal of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula is a long-term process, in addition to the issue of North Korea's nuclear program, the future concerns and worries of Northeast Asia will be extended to the issues of nuclear proliferation and safety.

2. Nuclear Proliferation in Northeast Asia

One of the largest threats related to the nuclear issue in Northeast Asia is the proliferation of nuclear weapons material or technology to a terrorist group or a terrorist-sponsoring country by North Korea.[6] However, not

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[5] Ingolf Kiesow and Sangsoo Lee, *No Confidence in Korea: A Regional Problem in a Global Context* (Singapore: Institute for Security & Development Policy, 2010).

[6] Robert L. Gallucci, "MacArthur President Robert Gallucci Addresses ASAN Nuclear Forum,"

only should the risk posed by North Korea be addressed, but also the proliferation potential of Japan and South Korea. North Korea is only one state that affects the strategic environment in Northeast Asia, nuclear or otherwise, and it is a relatively small one at that, a characteristic that applies to its nuclear weapons program as well. A sound strategic environment should be created that shapes North Korea's choices in constructive ways, but also serves the interests of all states in the region, many of which may be affected more by considerations pertaining to each other than by those related to North Korea, irrespective of the North's nuclear capacities.

Indeed, even as North Korea's nuclear threats increase, a growing number of South Koreans support the creation of a nuclear weapon development program, which is seen as the only option to deal with North Korea. Therefore, unless North Korea's nuclear crisis is resolved any time soon, it could lead to a nuclear arms race between Japan and China—as well as between North and South Korea, the worst-case scenario for Northeast Asia.

South Korean firms have emerged as major participants in the global nuclear energy industry. They now operate twenty-five nuclear plants that generate about one-third of the country's electricity, and they began exporting nuclear plants in 2010.[7] South Korea has shown responsibility in its nuclear power development, being in full compliance with the NPT, but North Korea's violations of its nuclear commitments have started to shift the South's position.

In 1992, Pyongyang and Seoul agreed not to pursue enrichment and preprocessing through the Joint Denuclearization Agreement. This pledge, however, was broken by North Korea as it continues to pursue a

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MacArthur Foundation, February 19, 2013, https://www.macfound.org/press/speeches/macarthur-president-robert-gallucci-addresses-asan-nuclear-forum/.

[7] "Nuclear Power in South Korea," *World Nuclear Association*, last updated October 2016, http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-o-s/south-korea.aspx.

uranium-enrichment program for military purposes. Seoul argues that the obligations Pyongyang has violated should thus not apply to them either, and that North Korea's actions should not restrict the South's development as a nuclear power producer. South Korea has followed up this rhetoric by increasing its fuel enrichment and preprocessing capabilities, and this has become a concern for the U.S., which fears that this might send the wrong signals to North Korea.

Further complication arises from the sensitivity of the South Korean public with regard to the fact that the U.S. has granted Japan advanced consent for U.S.-origin fuel enrichment and reprocessing that it is denying to South Korea. South Korea currently wants such advanced consent to enrich and reprocess U.S.-origin nuclear fuel, and it has become Seoul's objective to be held to the same nuclear cooperation standards as other states with advanced civilian nuclear energy sectors. This dispute led to a deadlock in talks on a new bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement, as the U.S. administration refused to provide advanced consent unless South Korea satisfactorily shows that its preprocessing will be proliferation resistant and commercially viable. In order to improve South Korea's nuclear processing and spent fuel management, a U.S.-ROK joint study was launched in 2011. This has led to a new US-ROK Nuclear Cooperation Agreement signed on June 15, 2015, also known as the "123 Agreement."[8] The new agreement did not provide consent for pyroprocessing and enrichment to South Korea, but it created a possibility for future U.S. decision to grant such consent.

The U.S.-Japan nuclear cooperation agreement is due to be renewed in 2018, and the negotiations for this renewal could be the standard for cooperation between the U.S. and countries with advanced nuclear industries. The negotiations should also consider that the provisions of

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[8] "U.S.-Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation," U.S. Department of State, June 16, 2015, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/2015/243872.htm.

the agreement will also apply to South Korea if it succeeds in addressing the proliferation and safeguards issues through the U.S.-ROK joint study. In this manner, the U.S. would gain additional leverage to strengthen non-proliferation safeguards with Japan while demonstrating its sensitivity towards South Korea's concerns about receiving equal treatment.

3. Nuclear Safety in Northeast Asia

North Korea poses the world's greatest risks among ns with nuclear material. The 2016 Nuclear Material Security Index, published by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), ranks twenty-four countries according to their level of nuclear material safety. North Korea is ranked twenty-fourth, and represents the country with the most unsafe nuclear material security.[9] The result implies that North Korea poses a significant security threat as a result of such low levels of nuclear material safety and security. In this sense, the future concerns and worries of the international community will be extended to the issues of safety and security of North Korea's nuclear material. Some questions naturally follow: What is a long-term approach for dealing with North Korea's nuclear material, and how can the international community help secure North Korea's nuclear material in an effort to prevent unexpected nuclear-related incidents?

Nevertheless, not only is there the risk of North Korea's nuclear safety but Northeast Asia is also exposed to unexpected nuclear incidents as the region is heavily dependent on nuclear power. China already has thirty-three nuclear power reactors and twenty-two are under construction in the eastern coastal areas.[10] The plan is to increase nuclear

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[9] "2016 NTI Nuclear Security Index Report," *NTI*, January 14, 2016, http://www.nti.org/analysis/reports/2016-nti-nuclear-security-index-report/.

[10] "China: Country Statistics," *IAEA*, 2015, https://www.iaea.org/PRIS/CountryStatistics/

capacity to at least fifty-eight GWe by 2020-21, and 150 GWe by 2030.[11] Nuclear dependence in Japan will also increase in coming decades to meet targets for carbon emissions reductions. Japan has forty-three main reactors with another two reactors planned to be built in the future.[12] With thrity-six nuclear reactors online in 2030, nuclear capacity would increase to 28.2 percent of the total, up from 22.4 percent in 2014.

Given this concentration of reactors in areas where earthquakes and other natural disasters have happened fairly frequently, ensuring nuclear safety should be a prerequisite for the development of nuclear energy and the principle of "safety first" should be upheld in each country of Northeast Asia. Furthermore, it is insufficient to approach the issue of nuclear safety management at a national level as radioactive materials spread across national frontiers.

Still, a cooperative regional framework to solve the nuclear safety issue in Northeast Asia is lacking. For example, Japan was reluctant to cooperate with its neighbors concerning the monitoring of the nuclear crisis during the Fukushima disaster. The Japanese government's reluctance to share information on the radiation leak from the nuclear power plant and its unilateral decision to discharge contaminated water into the ocean led to great concerns and criticisms among the public in South Korea and China. As the countries are geographically close to Japan, they risked becoming victims if the radiation leaks spread. Japan's refusal to receive South Korean nuclear experts also created a feeling of distrust towards Japan's management of the crisis as a whole.

CountryDetails.aspx?current=CN.

11 "Nuclear Power in China," *World Nuclear Association*, last updated November 5, 2016, http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/china-nuclear-power.aspx.

12 "Japan: Country Statistics," *IAEA*, 2015, https://www.iaea.org/PRIS/CountryStatistics/CountryDetails.aspx?current=JP.

III. EURATOM: Lessons from the European Experience

1. Historical Overview

The first step in European integration was the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952.[13] The Community essentially placed the member countries' coal and steel industries, which at that time were the main component for any war industry, under one supranational organization. The original six signatory countries were Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. These countries later tried to deepen the integration process through the establishment of the European Defense Community (EDC; 1950-54), but this initiative soon proved to be too ambitious and fell to the resistance of the French National Assembly.[14]

The idea of EURATOM, together with the European Economic Community (EEC), was developed from 1955 on. Notable characters behind the project were Jean Monet, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, Paul-Henri Spaak and Guy Mollet. As the historical overview showed, these figures pressed for the establishment of EURATOM in a time when restoring confidence in the success of European integration was crucial. As European integration and community building halted after the EDC, EURATOM was valued even just for its role in resuming and bringing success in trust and confidence building. The development of EURATOM, together with the ECSC, ECC, and the failed attempt of EDC, can be seen as both a step in the interstate learning process, evidenced by the sixty-year history of the European Union, and as a final

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[13] "Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, ECSC Treaty," *EUR-LEX*, last updated October 15, 2010, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Axy0022.

[14] Arnold Kanter, "The European Defense Community in the French National Assembly: A Roll Call Analysis," *Comparative Politics* 2 (1970): 203-228.

product of shared international learning. During the EURATOM process, Western European countries derived the same lesson from the historical circumstances: In order for Europe to remain a serious factor in international politics, they had to pool together resources, share competences and accept interdependence. In the 1950s, there were nuclear programs underway in many European countries but individually they all paled in comparison to their U.S. or Soviet counterparts. Prior to the establishment of EURATOM, the European national nuclear programs were based on bilateral agreements with the U.S.

Another incentive for establishing civil nuclear industry in Europe came in the form of the 1956 Suez crisis.[15] Following Egyptian President Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal, Europe was forced to face its energy dependence on traditional fossil fuels arriving from the Middle East. In the wake of a growing middle class and its increasing demand for energy, unity seemed the most approachable way to ensure stability and growth. In that year, the six ECSC member states were thrust into collective action when their general energy supply was abruptly impeded during the Suez crisis, during which the preconditions for the transportation of fuels to Europe from the Arabian Peninsula were altered. The management of the canal itself was kept in operation as ensured by the Egyptian president, but the nationalization of the territory demonstrated a shifting power balance, where the European countries realized their dependence on the relatively unstable regimes of the Middle East. Together, the six imported nearly a quarter of their total energy supply and it was estimated that the imports would double in ten years and treble in twenty.[16] Meanwhile, European coal exports fell utterly short of meeting the increasing global demand.

There are arguments whether EURATOM was a glorious enterprise

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[15] For summary of the Suez crisis, see "An affair to remember," *The Economist,* July 27, 2006, http://www.economist.com/node/7218678.

[16] Louis Armand, Franz Etzel and Francesco Giordani, *A Target for Euratom*, (s.l., 1957).

for pooling together resources and technology in order to create a supranational organization that could effectively support European energy independence or if it was an elaborate foreign policy tool the U.S. State Department used to exercise control over ECSC member countries obtaining nuclear materials and technology.[17] However, both positions often omit to consider one thing EURATOM undoubtedly succeeded in: building trust and confidence between former European enemies, France and Germany. In the EURATOM process and throughout the history of European integration, the original six states used costly signals, including giving up some of their sovereignty, to show their intention of engaging in a trusting relationship with each other. Past experience of continuous interdependence, exchange of reliable information, and living up to agreements contributed to the gradual growth of trust between member states. These lessons are important because they show that states repetitively engaging in cooperation and sharing common experience and ideas about these experiences eventually "learn together," that is, they derive some sort of meaning from their shared experience. If these meanings are similar to each other across states then they can lead to more favorable cooperation in the future.

2. The EURATOM Treaty and Framework

The EURATOM Treaty, which was signed on March twenty-fifth, 1957, forms the basis of the EURATOM legislation.[18] It is expressed in Article 1 of the treaty that the role of the Community is "to contribute to the raising of the standard of living in the Member States and to the

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[17] Gregoire Mallard, "Can the Euratom Treaty Inspire the Middle East: The Political Promises of Regional Nuclear Communities, *Non Proliferation Review* 15, no. 3 (November 2008): 459-77; John Krige, "The Peaceful Atom as Political Weapon: Euratom and American Foreign Policy in the Late 1950s," *Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences* 38, no. 1 (2008): 5-44.

[18] "Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (2012/C 327/01)," *European Union*, October 26, 2012.

development of relations with the other countries by creating the conditions necessary for the speedy establishment and growth of nuclear industries." Its mandate includes a common market to insure free movement of nuclear commerce, nuclear safety standards, safeguards beyond those of the IAEA, ownership of fissile materials, nonproliferation policy, research, and negotiations with other countries on the import and export of nuclear materials.

As nuclear energy was still in its early stage of development in that time, it was important to ensure that every member has similar level of knowledge and holds the same standard of safety protocols. There was a strong emphasis on developing nuclear skills and competence, which undermines the research and development framework. The research and training activities by the Community was aimed to improve nuclear safety, waste management, security and radiation protection. The fields covered are listed in Annex I of the treaty and include areas such as the processing of radioactive material, study of the harmful effects of radiation on living organisms, and the economic aspects of energy production. Common control over dual-use research and development was also encouraged, as it could further increase the level of trust between member states. Research cooperation between members was strengthened through the establishment of a Joint Research Center (JRC) in nuclear fields, and the findings of the research would be made available to the member states, making it possible to access a wide range of information.

Many of the successful features of EURATOM are ones that the U.S. offered as "preferential treatment." Though the regional safeguard systems employed in EURATOM followed a pattern originally developed by the U.S. and introduced through bilateral agreements between the U.S. and individual countries, they were designed and implemented to EURATOM specifically in order to build trust with the U.S. and avoid intrusive U.S. inspection rights. Instead of American or other international inspectors, EURATOM would recruit its own

inspectors from member countries. The regional safeguard system, the inspection procedures and the property ownership arrangements all reflected this dominance.

Although EURATOM recruits its own inspectors from member countries, EURATOM inspectors also cooperate with their counterparts from the IAEA in order to avoid unnecessary duplications of activities. The tight safeguard provisions of EURATOM, which at the same time excluded non-EURATOM inspectors and offered limited inspection rights to the IAEA, served as trust-building measures between EURATOM countries as well as the United States.

In essence, EURATOM made its regional safeguards system as close as to the original U.S. proposals envisioning strong international authority over nuclear materials and activities. In return, the regional safeguard system provides a useful mechanism for Europe in order to limit U.S. intrusions into Europe's nuclear affairs. U.S. rights of intervention ended at the Community's external frontier, so long as the security commitments were honored.

Property ownership was considered the second outstandingly successful achievement of the EURATOM framework. Article 86 says that special fissile materials (SFM) shall be the property of the Community, and this extends to all SFM produced or imported by a member state.

The historical circumstances surrounding the creation of EURATOM influenced the institutional framework a great deal. At that time, the United States' dominance in both possession of uranium and plutonium, which are considered scarce resources, and its technical advantage were unsurpassed. Therefore, the United States had considerable bargaining power that left its mark on EURATOM.

After realizing that the European countries could not be deterred from pushing on with their own nuclear programs, the U.S. State Department decided to adopt a policy that would steer European nations to cooperate in a supranational organization, effectively controlling each

other under the EURATOM framework. The U.S. would offer benefits to conduct material and technological transfers through the EURATOM, instead of through bilateral arrangements with separate countries. This preferential treatment would be given to countries in exchange for giving up part of their sovereignty by joining EURATOM.[19] The EURATOM treaty also bestowed Right of option (Article 52) for acquisition and ownership on other nuclear materials on the community. It was especially important in the early years when U.S. nuclear market dominance was still prevalent as it protected individual countries from U.S. exporters' abuse of market power.

3. What did not work?

Despite the strong emphasis on safety, the main task of EURATOM is still the promotion of nuclear energy, in particular through policy and funding. Nevertheless, some aspects of the institutional framework cannot be considered that successful. On the large scale, EURATOM was not very successful in establishing a vibrant civil nuclear industry in Europe. The decreasing prices for conventional fuels after the Suez crisis lessened the incentive for nuclear power in Europe.

The treaty framework for research and development, especially for dual-use activities (uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing), was not very successful either. Two separate enrichment capacities were developed instead of cooperation: URENCO (Federal Republic of Germany) and EURODIF (France).

Furthermore, it is stated in Article 81 of the treaty that EURATOM inspectors "shall at all time have access to all places and data and all persons who, by reason of their occupation, deal with materials or equipment or installations subject to the safeguards." Nevertheless, a

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[19] John Krige, "The Peaceful Atom as Political Weapon."

"Defense clause" was maintained in Article 84 of the Treaty, which excluded materials for military use from the safeguards. In other words, EURATOM safeguards do not prohibit the military use of nuclear materials.

Problems over the uncertainty of funding and the mixing of Nuclear Weapon States and Non-Nuclear Weapon States further undermined the trust-building capacities of the community. These problems should be addressed in other regional nuclear energy cooperation. Despite its fallacies, the concept of EURATOM did, however, not lack intention; it simply experienced an all too wide gap between its expectations and what the member states ultimately had capacity to accomplish. Despite its discernable limitations, the EURATOM's success should perhaps be measured according to what has been accomplished and not what it initially set out to accomplish.

IV. Lessons for Northeast Asia

1. Trust-building Measures for State Actors

The most significant lesson to be drawn from the EURATOM experience is that the process was done through confidence- and trust-building measures. Therefore, the EURATOM framework can be used as a model for the region. In Northeast Asia, one of the main push factors for a joint venture on nuclear energy is the ongoing discussion on nuclear safety in the region and the issue of denuclearization in North Korea, which continues to pose a threat to the region's stability. The EURATOM Treaty, however, neither set out to, nor achieved, disarmament of any of its member states. It did however contribute to the building of mutual confidence through the agreement of not continuing or commencing any new nuclear programs for anything but peaceful purposes. In addition to its results in achieving non-proliferation, the EURATOM Community also furthered the European political and economic integration, albeit

through an issue which is today highly sensitive and contested.

The concept of trust building is essential for appreciating the value of the EURATOM project in creating a supranational institution in Europe. EURATOM is the product of a series of confidence-building measures between the six Founding States as well as towards external actors like the U.S., Soviet Union and the IAEA. However, EURATOM is also a confidence-building measure in itself, if viewed in the larger context of the European integration process which signals the trustworthy, security seeking nature of European countries.

Due to the lack of trust among the Northeast Asian countries, there are still obstacles to resume any official dialogue to discuss the dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear program any time soon, including the Six Party Talks. The expansion of the region's nuclear industries raises central issues regarding regional nuclear safety, environmental protection, and peaceful use of nuclear energy. Trust among Northeast Asian neighbors can be created by initiating negotiations dealing with these areas that are less sensitive and of common interest. Cooperation should be a gradual approach from modest collaboration, to promoting the safe use of nuclear energy, to more ambitious regional nuclear security issues, such as the safeguards system. A future institutional breakthrough could significantly enhance regional security as well as facilitate the safe use of nuclear energy in Northeast Asia.

2. Regional Nuclear Safety Cooperation

As was proven by the EURATOM experience, continuous interdependence, exchange of reliable information, and living up to agreements contributed to the gradual growth of trust between member states. These lessons are important because it shows that repetitive engagement in cooperation and sharing common experiences and ideas would lead to mutual learning that can lead to further cooperation in the future.

There is a wide spectrum of options for regional nuclear safety cooperation in Northeast Asia, including areas of safety regulations, emergency preparedness, emergency response measures and other safety related issues. The cooperation could start first on a low level through a research and development framework that emphasizes the knowledge, skills and competence needed to ensure nuclear safety. In particular, information sharing and exchange, establishing an early notification framework in case of emergency and exchanging experts are vital for building and maintaining confidence in the safe operations of nuclear facilities and dealing with nuclear accidents. These recommendations would forestall a potential disruption over nuclear cooperation and buy time for a less politically volatile approach by establishing a common standard for regional cooperation. A Joint Research Center, similar to the one established by EURATOM, could be a platform for research cooperation and exchange of information through meetings, sharing of documents, finding solutions to common issues and exchanging experience.

3. Regional Safeguard System

The EURATOM safeguard system is a unique example of a comprehensive system for supervision and control of all civil nuclear material implemented in nuclear and nonnuclear weapon states. All components of the nuclear fuel cycle are present in the EU territory starting from mining and conversion, through enrichment and fuel fabrication to the use of nuclear fuel in power reactors. Furthermore, it is stated in the treaty that EURATOM inspectors shall at all time have access to all places and data and all persons who deal with materials or equipment or installation. Nevertheless, a "Defense clause" in the EURATOM Treaty does foresee the rights of France and the UK, which are nuclear states, to possess and manage a non-safeguarded fuel cycle for national defense purposes. It causes inequalities among member states that undermine the

community-building aspect of EURATOM. However, this example can also be adopted for Northeast Asia, in which inspectors only limit access to some of the facilities in the U.S., China and Russia, the three nuclear weapon states in the region.

There are outstanding concerns about the possibility that North Korea will not completely abolish all of the nuclear materials and weapons that have been produced, largely due to the fact that it is difficult specifically to find North Korea's already produced HEU nuclear materials. Under the framework of the Six Party Talks, the IAEA was in charge of the safeguard and verification systems requiring North Korea to provide a complete declaration of all nuclear programs and disablement of all existing nuclear facilities. However, IAEA inspectors at the Yongbyon nuclear facilities removed safeguards equipment and left the country on April sixteenth, 2009, following North Korea's decision to cease all cooperation with the IAEA. In reality, it is hard to deny that some weaknesses still remain in its ability to implement the dismantlement of all North Korean nuclear programs. For example, during the past process of negotiation North Korea only addressed the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. Therefore, serious disputes erupted over the lists given to the IAEA detailing its nuclear program because it was suspected that the country hid some produced HEU.

In this regard, the future system for denuclearization should take a number of steps to strengthen its safeguards system. More specifically, an effective verification regime must also focus on possible undeclared material and activities in North Korea. While some of these measures could be applied on a routine basis within the framework of existing comprehensive safeguards agreements, others required their own regional safeguard system in Northeast Asia.

The treaty may want to invite parties to adopt stricter inspection arrangements as technology evolves. For example, parties to the cooperation could create a regional nuclear forensics network and database to control non-state actor nuclear proliferation. In addition, the

inspection of U.S. facilities in South Korea and Japan could be demanded. Plutonium-based fuel cycles as in Japan and under discussion in South Korea may require more transparency in real-time than current safeguards systems allow to preserve a meaningful diversion-detection to response-time ratio. The parties would need to create a regional inspectorate, as has occurred in the EURATOM.

4. Key Challenges

One of the challenges for having nuclear regional cooperation in Northeast Asia is North Korea. In addressing this issue, it is imperative that a channel for engagement with Pyongyang is continuously open in order to facilitate the international watchdog function for the management of the North's nuclear material. From a long-term perspective, there is a strong case to be made for encouraging and assisting North Korea in building up its capacities for nuclear material safety and non-nuclear energy production.

The issue of energy support for North Korea is also a key factor in dismantling its nuclear program. Establishing a nuclear reactor would be one possible option for the international community. One way to establish the confidence to build a nuclear reactor is to have multinational cooperation. Common control over the reactor could help build trust among the members. However, the situation regarding nuclear energy has changed greatly following the nuclear disaster in Japan. Therefore, nuclear energy cooperation with North Korea could also include the areas of nuclear waste management and safety. On the other hand, transferring technology on renewable energy would be an option as a part of energy aid to North Korea in exchange for dismantling its nuclear program. This could help resolve North Korea's energy crisis and address safety issues, especially at a time when global concern about nuclear radiation in Japan still remains. From a long-term perspective, the establishment of the oil and gas pipeline from Russia to the Korean

Peninsula is also a possible option, although there is a political risk at the moment.

The U.S. factor could be a long-term or permanent one affecting regional cooperation in Northeast Asia. There are various views on the participation of the U.S. in regard to nuclear cooperation in the region. The U.S. may hinder regional cooperation as an outgrowth of its own Northeast Asian strategy, or the U.S. may actually try to establish a multilateral system in the region. It can be said that the main factor for the establishment of nuclear energy cooperation in Northeast Asia will be the U.S. approach to the region as a whole. In other words, any future Northeast Asian regionalism may prove extremely difficult to generate unless the U.S. takes a central role in untangling the imperfect sovereignty relationships among the countries in the region. If the U.S. and the direction of Northeast Asian regionalism run into conflicts of interest with each other, nuclear energy cooperation in Northeast Asia is unlikely to occur.

The success of EURATOM also largely depended on the U.S. After realizing that the European countries could not be deterred from pushing on with their own nuclear programs, the U.S. State Department decided to adopt a policy that would steer European nations to cooperate in a supranational organization, effectively controlling each other under the EURATOM framework. The State Department's willingness to transfer technology and materials to European allies should be attributed as much to its realization that the political and economic reconstruction of European countries was invaluable to containing the USSR, as to their common identity shaped by the learning process shared by the democracies on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition, U.S. commercial interest was an also important factor. By reaching the agreement with EURATOM, the U.S. was able to secure the majority of the Western European market for both reactors as well as enrichment services through which the U.S. can exercise political control over recipient countries. Therefore, ultimately, the U.S. made some concessions to get the

EURATOM scheme going for both security and commercial interests. When it comes to setting the road map for Northeast Asian nuclear energy cooperation, it is important to remember U.S. interests and motivations in the early days of EURATOM.

V. Conclusion

The EURATOM experience provides lessons that could be applied to regional nuclear cooperation in Northeast Asia. Even though the current situation makes it difficult for nuclear cooperation to develop, it does not mean that it is impossible. As proven in Europe where there was a high level of tension and distrust after World War II, regional nuclear cooperation could still be established and even contributed to confidence- and trust-building in the region.

The important step in achieving regional nuclear cooperation in Northeast Asia is that a channel for discussion should always be made available. The main target in future talks should be considered a common goal for regional security in Northeast Asia based on mutual trust, benefits and responsibility. Therefore, they should focus broadly on North Korea's nuclear weapons program and be aimed more at achieving peace and security in Northeast Asia. As a new approach, future negotiations could include a wider range of regional nuclear security matters and a low level of regional cooperation on nuclear security as areas of common interest for all countries in Northeast Asia since the North Korean nuclear program is not the only issue of nuclear security in the region. Little by little, through small steps in confidence and trust building, regional nuclear cooperation would be possible and contribute to the improvement of the situation in Northeast Asia.

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Does China have Structural Power? Rethinking Chinese Power and its Consequences for the International Order

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Does China have Structural Power? Rethinking Chinese Power and its Consequences for the International Order

International relations (IR) theory has produced two main assessments of the effects of the rise of China. Realists have argued that it will generate a structural tension that will inevitably lead to increasing competition between China and the United States. Liberals have highlighted how China has been socialized to the contemporary rule-based international order. The paper argues that these two assessments of the Chinese rise either downplay the role of Chinese power, in the case of liberalism, or build their theorizations on an anachronistic and oversimplified conceptualization of Chinese power, as with structural realism. The article looks at Chinese structural power analyzing cases such as the progressive internationalization of the *renminbi* and China's recent attempts to build regional institutions in the economic and financial realm centred on its leadership. The article describes how Beijing is increasingly capable of dictating terms of political and economic interaction to its partners.

Keywords: rise of China, structural power, power transition, *renminbi*, international order

Does China have Structural Power? Rethinking Chinese Power and its Consequences for the International Order

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I. Introduction

International relations theory has produced two main accounts of the rise of China. On the one hand, focusing on military power, relative advantages and security dilemmas, realism has argued that China and the United States are likely to be embroiled in a Thucydides trap, which will lead them to hegemonic competition and possibly to direct military confrontation. The second and most optimistic account, promoted by liberal theorists, sees China as a responsible power, increasingly integrated and socialized to the rules and norms of the liberal international order.

I will argue that both these narratives, while capturing part of the reality of the Chinese ascent, fail to consider key political and economic developments that have a fundamental impact on the definition of the current and future international order. I will argue that this is a consequence of a fundamental theoretical pitfall: an oversimplified conceptualization of power, based on the idea of power as resources.

An assessment based on a less parsimonious but more realistic idea of what political power is and how it can be theorized helps to

reconceptualize the Chinese rise and the extent of its consequences. In order to do so I will present the weakness of the "power as resources" concept as employed by the literature on the Chinese rise. Moreover, I will highlight how the concept of structural power helps theorize the consequences of Beijing's rise for Asia and globally.

The first section highlights how mainstream scholarly accounts have used a very narrow and limited concept of power in order to describe the nature and the consequences of the Chinese rise. The second part reviews the scholarly literature relative to the critique of the concept of power as resources and explores the main theoretical alternatives. Among those alternatives, the concept of structural power seems to be the better equipped to provide valuable explanations of the consequences of the Chinese rise in Asia and globally.

In the third section, I will suggest that China has structural power. The main elements underpinning it are the process of internationalization of the *renminbi* and the construction of several international institutions centered on Chinese leadership, such as the Asia Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Chang Mai Initiative.

These developments suggest that China is neither the revisionist power envisioned by structural realism and power transition theory, nor the order taker depicted by liberal accounts.

II. Realism, Liberalism and Chinese Power

The vast debate on the rise of China has produced two main theoretical accounts. Realists and power transition theorists have argued that the Chinese rise will generate a structural tension that will inevitably lead to increasing competition and conflict between China and the United States. Liberal analyses have highlighted how China has grown more responsible and has been socialized to the contemporary rule-based international order. These two assessments of the Chinese rise either downplay the role of Chinese power, in the case of liberalism, or build

their theorizations on an oversimplified conceptualization of Chinese power, purely based on military capabilities, as in the case of realism.

Realist scholars have offered a pessimistic picture of Chinese ascendency. Power transition theory and structural realism assume that the Chinese rise will necessarily bring instability and conflict in the longer term. As Aaron Friedberg famously stated in 1993, East Asia in the aftermath of the Cold War was already "ripe for rivalry."[1] Structural realists explicitly compare the Chinese rise to the rise of Wilhelmine Germany or Imperial Japan. From this perspective, today's China can be considered as a potential regional hegemon that will, voluntarily or not, threaten its neighbors' security and destabilize the present international order. As John Mearsheimer stated, "A wealthy China would not be a status quo power but an aggressive state determined to achieve regional hegemony."[2] This would lead to conflict both with the United States and its Asian allies such as Japan and South Korea.[3]

Similarly, power transition theory foresees increasing levels of conflict between a rising China and the United States and its allies. The rising power, approaching parity in economic and military terms, will increasingly be dissatisfied with the status quo and increasingly keen to use coercion to reshape the rules of the order in its favor.[4] Realist and power transition theorists see in the proliferation of territorial disputes a

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[1] Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," *International Security* 18, no. 3 (1993-1994): 5-33.

[2] John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001); John J. Mearsheimer, "China's Unpeaceful Rise," *Current History* 105 (2006): 162.

[3] Avery Goldstein, "Power Transitions, Institutions, and China's Rise in East Asia: Theoretical Expectations and Evidence," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 30, no. 4 (2007): 639-82; Aaron L. Friedberg, *A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2011).

[4] Ronald L. Tammen and Jacek Kugler, "Power Transition and China-US Conflicts," *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 1, no. 1 (2006): 35-55; Steven Chan, *China, the US and the Power-transition Theory: A Critique* (London: Routledge, 2007).

clear sign of Beijing's dissatisfaction towards the status quo.[5]

Both power transition theory and structural realism assume as an independent variable of their frameworks the share of military capabilities owned by a rising power, and possibly in addition to that, population, technology and economic might. They employ a notion of power defined as "resources," which assumes that a nation's power is the by-product of a clearly measurable amount of resources owned by the state.

As Jack Levy clearly stated, "PTT [power transition theory] posits that national power is a function of population, economic resources, military capabilities and the political capacity to transform them into national power."[6] Levy also emphasizes that scholars need to be very cautious in basing their analysis and predictions of the Chinese rise on this theory. First, it tends to oversimplify complex relations between the current hegemon and the rising power. Second, the theory focuses only on a very narrow, even if very relevant, aspect of the Chinese rise, namely economic and military resources. The rise of Chinese GDP and an increasing military budget are surely relevant elements to be considered. However, they are hardly the only relevant factors in theorizing and analyzing the rise of China. Finally, PTT tends to assume that once a rising power reaches parity in terms of GDP, it will try to translate its economic might into military power, necessarily generating a process of hegemonic transition leading to war.

Analyses inspired by neo-classical realism assume a partially different position listing a number of intervening variables such as nuclear weapons or a Chinese status-quo orientation that can make a

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[5] Taylor M. Fravel, "Power Shifts and Escalation: Explaining China's Growing use of Force in Territorial Disputes," *International Security* 32, no. 3 (2007-08): 44-83.

[6] Jack S. Levy, "Power Transition Theory and the Rise of China," in *China's Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics*, ed. Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 14.

direct military clash between the two superpowers unlikely.[7] Nonetheless, they maintained that a conflict between the challenger and the challenged remains the most likely outcome of the process of transition.[8] Ultimately, theoretical analyses based on structural realist premises have considered only military capabilities and "latent power," namely, other resources that might help in increasing the military budget.[9] This is surely a narrow understanding of Beijing's rise.

Liberals, on the contrary, see China as a state that has been socialized to the rules and norms of the contemporary international order. Alastair Iain Johnston explained how China was progressively socialized with respect to international norms and regimes during the period of reform and opening.[10] China, having internalized the norms of the current international order is described as a status quo power, or a "responsible stakeholder," uninterested in pursuing its interests outside the rules of the global order or in reshaping it according to its interests.[11] As John Ikenberry stated, "The existing international order is highly developed, expansive, integrated, institutionalized, and deeply rooted in the societies and economies of advanced capitalist states and parts of the developing world – China will become influential and successful to the extent it works within and through existing rules and institutions."[12]

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[7] Scott D. Sagan, "Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb," *International Security* 21, no. 3 (2006): 54-86; Camilla T. Sørensen, "Is China Becoming more Aggressive? A Neoclassical Realist Analysis," *Asian Perspective* 37, no. 3 (2013): 363-85; Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, *Neoclassical Realism, The State, and Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

[8] Chan, *China, the US and the Power-transition Theory*.

[9] Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 55-56.

[10] Iain Alistair Johnston, *Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

[11] Robert Zoellick, "Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?" *NBR Analysis* 16, no. 4 (2005): 5-15.

[12] G. John Ikenberry, "America's Challenge: The Rise of China and the Future of Liberal International Order," *New American Foundation* (2011), 6.

These analyses assume that China is surely a status quo power interested in growing inside the order. The Chinese leadership since the beginning of the era of reform and opening has understood that the contemporary rule-based order is "easier to join and harder to overturn."[13]

If structural realism oversimplifies the nature of Chinese power, liberal analyses tend to underestimate the impact and the consequences of it on the present and future international order. China is considered as an order taker and a status quo power.[14] Liberals highlight how China has been progressing in all the key dimensions the liberal tradition considers as necessary to build peaceful and stable relations with other countries, with the notable exclusion of democracy.[15] The relations between contemporary China and the rest of the world are in fact characterized by increasing levels of transnational contacts and economic interdependence. Moreover, China has been included within a great number of international institutions and regimes.[16]

Arguing that China joined the contemporary Western-led rule-based international order surely captures a fundamental reality of the Chinese rise. As Foot and Walter verified, China is increasingly adhering to fundamental global norms regarding a number of crucial issues, from economic governance to climate change, to the use of dispute settlement.[17]

This, nevertheless, is only a part of the picture. These analyses tend

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13 Ibid., 2.

14 Iain Alastair Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?" *International Security* 27, no. 4 (2003): 5-56.

15 Bruce Russett and John Oneal, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).

16 David Shambaugh, *China Goes Global: The Partial Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

17 Rosemary Foot and Andrew Walter, *China, the United States, and Global Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); David C. Kang, *East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

to underestimate the consequences of the Chinese rise on the international order. Liberal accounts often do not ask whether China is willing to change those norms or promote an alternative order. This question goes beyond the simple dichotomy between compliance and non-compliance to global or Western norms. China should be considered not just as an order taker. It should be also considered also as an order maker, namely a power that attempts to build institutions and promote norms reflecting its role, interests and identity. As Pu stated, socialization should be considered a two-way street, not simply a process through which non-Western powers can reach a certain "standard of civilization."[18]

This does not necessarily mean that China is a revisionist power, or that China wants to pursue global hegemony, trying to substitute the United States. Nor does it mean that the future of Asia will be defined by an updated version of the pre-Western tribute system.[19] It means more simply that it is necessary to find a way to theorize a middle ground between the gloomy and simplistic perspective inspired by realism and power transition theory, and the idea that China is merely a subject to a process of socialization in which it will grow more responsible and more educated to global norms.

This middle ground should be built on a more accurate understanding of what Chinese power means for the current international order. The Chinese ascendency will probably contribute to changing the face of Asia. However, it is not likely to generate a hegemonic war as predicted by PTT. Nevertheless, in order to appreciate the defining features of Chinese power and to estimate its likely consequences, we should critically analyze what concept of power underlies our theoretical stance. In the next section I will address one of the main theoretical

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[18] Pu Xiaoyu, "Socialisation as a Two-way Process: Emerging Powers and the Diffusion of International Norms," *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 5, no. 4 (2012): 341-67.

[19] John K. Fairbank and Tatuan Chen, *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968); Kang, *East Asia Before the West*.

problems related to the limits I just highlighted, namely the concept of "power as resources" in IR theory.

III. Power in International Relations Theory

Power is the central concept for realism. As we anticipated, however, structural realists generally employ an oversimplified concept of power that in turn shaped the debate on the Chinese rise.

Structural realists and power transition theorists have never considered a formulation of power different from power as resources because every alternative, rooted in a multi-dimensional conceptualization, would entail a number of problems, such as the problems of measurement, domain specificity and fungibility[20] that would undermine the theoretical premises both of balance of power theory and power transition theory.

As a consequence, all the analyses rooted in structural realism remain firmly embedded in the idea of "power as resources." Military force is considered the real and only measure of power and war-winning capabilities are considered to be what matters most in international politics. The neorealist idea of what power is and how it works has been primarily influenced by Kenneth Waltz. In his *Theory of International Politics*, he assumed the distribution of capabilities as a defining characteristic of the structure of the international system. Therefore, the power of a great power is defined by the share of that power's military capabilities in the system.[21] A similar degree of generality is evident in Robert Gilpin's definition of power. He stated that "power refers simply

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[20] Regarding fungibility, Baldwin refers to the idea of movable goods that can by freely placed and replaced by others of the same class. It connotes universal applicability or convertibility in contrast with context specificity or domain specificity.

[21] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1979).

to the military, economic, and technological capabilities of states."[22] John Mearsheimer was even more explicit in equating power with military resources. He posited that in international politics, "A state's effective power is ultimately a function of its military forces. I define power largely in military terms because offensive realism emphasizes that force is the ultima ratio of international politics."[23] This sort of conceptualization has led scholars to focus almost exclusively on military power and military force.

The Waltzian concept of structure defined by a fixed ordering principle, anarchy, and by distribution of material capabilities has also been the subject of a number of criticisms, mainly by constructivist scholars. Alexander Wendt, for instance, promoted the idea of structure defined both by material elements and the distribution of ideas. This implies the possibility to overcome the Hobbesian concept of anarchy embedded in the neorealist theory.[24]

Despite the criticisms, the neo-realist understanding of power and international structure has deeply influenced the field. As David Baldwin stated, "The field of international relations has paid a price for its preoccupation with military force. The importance of military force has been exaggerated, the role of non military power has been underestimated and the field of IR has been impoverished by its insulation from studies of power in other realms."[25] The neorealist conceptualization of power suffers from three basic limits: power is considered inherently non-specific, mono-dimensional and perfectly

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[22] Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 13.

[23] Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 55-56.

[24] Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics." *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992): 391-425; Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

[25] David A. Baldwin, "Power and International Relations," in *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Beth A. Simmons, Walter Carlsnaes and Thomas Risse (London: Sage, 2002), 179.

fungible.[26] On the contrary, moving away from a mono-dimensional concept, we should consider power as domain specific, multi-dimensional and not perfectly fungible.

The first fundamental theoretical step is admitting that political power is not perfectly fungible.[27] For neo-realists, perfect fungibility of power derives from the implicit metaphor of money, employed by Waltz, as the foundation of their theory.[28] Waltz derived the equivalence between money and power from structuralism in sociology since the metaphor of money was already present in the works of Talcott Parsons and Karl Deutsch.[29] Considering power as the political equivalent of money leads to the assumption that every additional unit of military capability would entail an additional unit of power that in turn would provide an additional unit of political influence. In this way, military resources and military power become a conceptual *passé par tout* to analyze every form of interaction between states, including the military, political and economic realms.[30]

Several scholars contested and rejected the "power as resources" approach, proposing an alternative conceptualization that can be labeled "power as relations." This approach borrows from the theoretical tradition that stems from the work of scholars such as Lasswell, Kaplan

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[26] Robert J. Art, "Force and Fungibility Reconsidered," *Security Studies* 8, no. 4 (1999): 183-89.

[27] David A. Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies," *World Politics* 31, no. 2 (1979): 161-94; Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, "Power in International Politics," *International Organization* 59, no. 1 (2005): 39-75.

[28] Raymond Aron, "Qu'est-ce qu'une théorie des relations internationales?" *Revue francaise de science politique* 17, no. 5 (1967): 837-61.

[29] Talcott Parsons, "On the Concept of Influence," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 27, no. 1 (1963): 37-62; Karl Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963).

[30] David A. Baldwin, "Money and Power," *The Journal of Politics* 33, no. 3 (1971): 577-614; Stefano Guzzini, "Structural Power: The Limits of Neorealist Power Analysis," *International Organization* 47, no. 3 (1993): 443-78; Felix Berenkoetter, "Thinking About Power," in *Power in World Politics*, ed. Felix Berenkoetter and Michael J. Williams (London: Routledge, 2007).

and Dahl, who looked at the relational nature of power. Notably, Robert Dahl considered power as "the capacity of an individual, or group of individuals, to modify the conduct of other individuals or groups in the manner which he desires."[31] Every actor tries to obtain conformity to its will. This attempt to establish control is eminently an exercise of power. "A" will try to obtain conformity and oblige "B" to follow its preferred course of action. If power is assumed not to be perfectly fungible, the exercise of power is not directly and proportionally related to the share of military capability in the system.

Conceiving power as relational allows admitting that power is inherently domain specific. A state may exercise power in the economic domain or in the security domain in different ways. Different tools of political power (such as diplomacy and symbolic power) can be effective even if not backed by military resources.

Theoretical research on power criticized Dahl's position stating the existence of two other faces of power. Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz highlight another important aspect to be considered: "non decisions." They argued that an important source of power is deciding which issues should be addressed and which should be ignored. Who is able to shape the agenda for decision making owns a relevant and very specific power.[32] This approach also involves the structure of institutions both at the domestic and international level. Institutions, setting the rules of the game, tend to define what kind of issues should be addressed or ignored and contribute to setting the agenda.

Other studies highlighted how even this conceptualization should be considered limited and introduced the idea of a possible "third face of power." Authors such as Lukes and Cox argued that a more subtle and pervasive nature of power consists in shaping normality and reducing

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[31] Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," *Behavioral Science* 2, no. 3 (1957): 204.

[32] Peter Bachrach and Morton S Baratz, "Decisions and Non Decisions: An Analytical Framework," The *American Political Science Review* 57, no. 3 (1966): 632-42.

conflict. As Lukes argued, "The most effective and insidious use of power is to prevent such conflict from arising in the first place."[33]

This idea is related to the Gramscian concept of hegemony. Gramsci argued that a hegemonic power is able to persuade the subject of a power relationship that inequality of power is not only acceptable but also legitimate. As a consequence, hegemony is not just a form of political power exercised through coercion and violence but through political leadership and ideology. Borrowing from Gramsci, Robert Cox defined hegemony as "a structure of values and understandings about the nature of order that permeates a whole system of states which appear to most actors as the natural order."[34] As Cox himself posited, when it comes to hegemony and hegemonic power, "Ideas and material conditions are always bound together, mutually influencing one another, and not reducible one to the other."[35]

An important concept that encompasses both the second and the third faces of power is the concept of structural power developed by Susan Strange. Strange defined structural power as:

> The power to shape and determine the structures of the global political economy within which other states, their political institutions, their economic enterprises and (not least) their scientists and other professional people have to operate. This structural power... means rather more than the power to set the agenda of discussion or to design the international regimes of rules and customs that are supposed to govern international economic relations. That is one aspect of structural power, but not all of it […] Structural power, in short, confers the power

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[33] Steven M. Power Lukes, *A Radical View* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005).

[34] Robert W. Cox, *Approaches to World Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 151.

[35] Ibid., 151.

> to decide how things shall be done, the power to shape frameworks within which states relate to each other, relate to people, or relate to corporate enterprises.[36]

This definition clarifies how the concept of structural power regards both the capacity to shape formal institutions and also the legitimacy, knowledge and forms of production, echoing the concerns of scholars who proposed a three faced conceptualization of political power in IR.

According to Strange, structural power is defined by four different structures: security, finance, production and knowledge. Contrary to Marxism, realist and liberal approaches do not assign epistemological or ontological priority to any of those. The production structure is "what creates wealth in a political economy."[37] Consequently, at the international level the production structure is determined by international specialization in the realm of economic production. The financial structure that already in the late 1980s Strange considered increasingly relevant pertains to credit and finance. In *States and Markets*, she defined how the possibility to gain confidence as a credit provider is a key asset for structural power. Credit is a key mechanism of political authority since "whoever can gain the confidence of others in their ability to create credit will control the economy."[38] Moreover, at the international level, confidence as a creditor entails the capacity to manage the currency in which credit is denominated. This affects the exchange rate with respect to credit denominated in other currencies. Consequently, the monetary system is a key component for Strange's idea of financial structure, together with the social relations between creditor and debtor.

The last dimension is what she calls knowledge structure. In her

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[36] Susan Strange, *States and Markets: An Introduction to International Political Economy* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 1988), 24-25.

[37] Ibid., 27.

[38] Ibid., 30.

writings, the definition of knowledge structure includes both ideological elements and elements related to technology and science. On the one hand, her formulation is influenced both by the neo-Gramscian idea of hegemony and by Lukes' idea of the third face of power. On the other, the knowledge structure is assimilated by the amount of know-how and technology a nation owns. As a consequence, the mastery of advanced technologies in the system can contribute to the structural power of a nation.

The concept of structural power is surely less parsimonious than the notion of "power as resources." Moreover, it eschews statistical and "objective" measurements. However, it can be considered very useful in assessing the consequences of the Chinese rise, since it serves to shed light on fundamental issues such as China's growing capacity to structure relations with other fundamental regional and global players on its own terms, particularly when it comes to financial and economic governance. The People's Republic of China is indeed increasingly behaving as an order maker and as a public goods provider, evidencing how both the image of a system breaker proposed by realism and a socialized and disciplined power advanced by liberals can hardly describe the current realities.

IV. The Chinese Rise and Structural Power

The notion of structural power is a valid instrument to assess the consequences of the Chinese rise on the contemporary international order providing a theoretically driven analysis that does not fall either into the trap of power as resources or into an ad hoc analysis tailored on any form of Chinese exceptionalism. As a consequence, we should try to evaluate whether China, together with a mighty army and fast growing economy, has developed any structural power. In order to do so I will consider two main aspects that are central for a structural power analysis: the attempt to internationalize the Chinese currency, the *renminbi*, and the attempt to

promote international institutions built upon Chinese centrality.

1. The Internationalization of the *Renminbi*

Even if the *renminbi* is not likely to substitute the US dollar as the leading reserve currency of the international monetary system in the short term, the Chinese leadership is committed to promoting its internationalization and as an alternative reserve currency and currency for international trade in the Asia Pacific region and occasionally even beyond.

As Barry Eichengreen reminded us, the "exorbitant privilege" of providing the key currency for the international system is a central factor determining a power transition. The United States surpassed the United Kingdom in terms of GDP in the late nineteenth century. At the time, Washington did not act as a public goods provider since the international trade and national reserves were largely denominated in pound sterling. The situation changed dramatically after this and in the 1920s when the dollar surpassed sterling as the leading international and reserve currency.[39]

This precedent has several implications. First, even if the role of the dollar is still an essential part of American primacy and a fundamental part of American structural power, this does not exclude the possibility in the future of the presence of several internationalized currencies. Second, as the rise of the dollar did not require the demise of the pound sterling, a potential rise of the *renminbi* would not require the demise of the dollar.[40]

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[39] Barry Eichengreen, *The Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar and the Future of the International Monetary System* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

[40] Barry Eichengreen, "The Renminbi as an International Currency," *Journal of Policy Modeling* 33, no. 5 (2011): 723-30; Jeffrey A. Frankel, "Internationalization of the RMB and Historical Precedents," *Journal of Economic Integration* 27, no. 3 (2012): 329-65.

Finally and most importantly, today the *renminbi* faces many of the difficulties the US dollar faced a century ago. London had everything Washington and New York have today: specialised investment banks with a global network of overseas branches, a large and liquid bond market and an open stock exchange. Great Britain enjoyed the trust of credit that Strange considered a key asset of structural power. The London stock market and the British bond markets were by far the most liquid in the world. The United States before the Federal Reserve Act in 1913 did not even have a functioning central bank. Moreover, US banks could not open branches abroad. All these obstacles notwithstanding, by 1924, a larger share of global foreign exchange reserves was held in dollars rather than in pound sterling.[41] Since 1945, the dollar's international role has provided the United States with a series of benefits, including balance of payments flexibility, policy autonomy, and exchange-rate gains.[42] The use of the dollar as the only completely internationalized currency has helped to loosen constraints on its hegemonic power and has originated structural commercial, financial, and political gains.[43]

In order for Beijing to pursue the internationalization of the *renminbi*, it is following the example of the United States between the two world wars and is enacting a number of reforms. First, it has been encouraging its use for international trade. Second, it is stimulating its use for private financial transactions. Third, it has been creating incentives to central and private banks for its use as a reserve currency.

The effort to internationalize the Chinese currency started in 2006

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[41] Eichengreen, *The Exorbitant Privilege*.

[42] Benjamin J. Cohen, *Organizing the World's Money: The Political Economy of International Monetary Relations* (New York: Basic Books, 1978).

[43] Susan Strange, "The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony," *International Organization* 41, no. 4 (1987): 551-74; Carla Norrlof, *America Global Advantage: US Hegemony and International Cooperation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Carla Norrlof, "The Profitability of Primacy," *International Security* 38, no. 4 (2014): 188-205.

with the publication of a report on "The Timing, Path, and Strategies of RMB Internationalization" by a study group set up by the People's Bank of China (PBOC), China's central bank.[44] Since then, China has adopted a complex strategy aimed at the internationalization of the *renminbi*. It promoted the use of its currency in financial markets in Asia and made an effort to promote its use in international trade and direct investment settlement. Since 2007, China launched the so-called Dim Sum bond market to allow the purchase of *renminbi*-denominated bonds internationally. Moreover, it allowed border states to trade *renminbi*. Since then, Laos, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, and Vietnam have started to use *renminbi* as the main currency for foreign trade. Today, China also uses its own currency for payments of energy and raw materials purchased from Brazil, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and South Africa.[45]

Since 2010, China has abandoned the dollar as currency for bilateral trade with Japan and Russia. Since 2012, the Chinese government allowed all Chinese exporters to trade and invoice using the *renminbi*. During the same year, China and Japan started to direct currency trading on the foreign exchange market. Moreover, China started to divert part of its reserves from US dollars to Japanese yen.

Another important policy inaugurated in 2008 was the negotiation of bilateral currency swap agreements (BSAs) between the People's Central Bank and other central banks in the region and globally.[46] In this manner, China can promote a wider use of the *renminbi* without completely liberalizing currency controls. As Liao and McDowell

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[44] Peoples Bank of China Study Group, "The Timing, Path, and Strategies of RMB Internationalization" (Beijing, 2006).

[45] Hung G. Fung and Jot Yau, "The Dim Sum Bond Market and its Role in the Internationalization of the Renminbi," *European Financial Review* (2013, March 1st): 64-67.

[46] A currency swap is a foreign-exchange agreement between two institutions to exchange aspects of a loan in one currency for equivalent aspects of an equal in net present value loan in another currency.

explained, there is a strong correlation between BSAs and the creation of FTAs (free trade agreements). This means Beijing is trying to build a network of trade agreements centered on itself, backed by a strategy which makes the *renminbi* a feasible monetary public good.[47]

All these steps are starting to reveal significant consequences. For instance, economic analysts noted that the value of Asian currencies is increasingly moving together with the value of the RMB.[48] These steps are progressively creating the premise for a fundamental change in Chinese monetary policy. The People's Bank of China is progressively abandoning its former policy of pegging the *renminbi* to the value of the dollar and removing the restrictions on capital account convertibility.[49]

The fact that the PBOC is increasingly allowing the *renminbi* to float against the dollar is likely to determine fundamental changes for China's macro-economic policies. A completely independent monetary policy and further policies directed toward the liberalization of the *renminbi* should require deep reforms of the banking system, still largely based on the four public giants and influenced by the visible hands of the state and the financial system. In order to develop a stable, deep and liquid financial market that is able to underpin the internationalization of the *renminbi*, China should improve the supervision and regulation of financial institutions, and markets will have to be reinforced before it is safe to move to capital account convertibility. Moreover, the state should detach state-owned enterprises from the easy and politically driven credit

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[47] Steven Liao and Daniel McDowell, "Redback Rising: China's Bilateral Swap Agreements and RMB Internationalization," *International Studies Quarterly* 59, no. 3 (2015): 401-22.

[48] Masahiro Kawai and Victor Pontines, "The Renminbi and Exchange Rate Regimes in East Asia," ADB Working Paper 484 (2014).

[49] Wensheng Peng and Shu Chang, ed., *Currency Internationalization: Global Experiences and Implications for the Renminbi* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Eswar Presad and Lei Ye, *The Renminbi's Role in the Global Monetary System* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2012); Benjamin J. Cohen, "The Yuan Tomorrow? Evaluating China's Currency Internationalization Strategy," *New Political Economy* 17, no. 3 (2012): 361-71.

they have been accessing until the present day. Ultimately, the PBOC would cease to be able to pursue competitive devaluations in order to boost exports.[50]

The most recent step was undertaken in 2014 with the Shanghai Free Trade Zone (SFTZ). In this new kind of special economic zone, the Chinese government has been experimenting with new localized reforms. Among those reforms, there is a complete liberalization and convertibility of the *renminbi*.

Both of these steps already signal the commitment of the Chinese authorities to the progressive expansion of the *renminbi*'s international role. However, further reforms are needed to achieve the internationalization of the Chinese currency. Several of them, in particular the complete convertibility and removal of restrictions on the movement of capital, appear to be politically costly. These reforms would not simply imply substantial macro-economic adjustments. They would rather signal the necessity for the party to rethink the current economic model based on export-led growth and high savings. Most importantly, they would force the Chinese Communist Party to reconsider its role in controlling and often micromanaging the economic system, in particular when it comes to credit and finance. The Chinese elite is divided on these prospects. Reformists such as the governor of the People's Bank of China, Zhou Xiaochuan, push for an acceleration of reforms needed to internationalize the *renminbi*. Conservatives, especially in the SASAC and in the Ministry of Finance, tend to be more cautious, since those reforms could seriously diminish the competitiveness of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs).[51]

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[50] Barry Eichengreen, "ADB Distinguished Lecture Renminbi Internationalization: Tempest in a Teapot?" *Asian Development Review* 30, no. 1 (2013): 148-64; Hyoung-ky Chey, "Can the Renminbi Rise as a Global Currency? The Political Economy of Currency Internationalization," *Asian Survey* 53, no. 2 (2013): 348-68.

[51] Yang Jiang, "The Limits of China's Monetary Diplomacy," In *The Great Wall of Money: Power and Politics in China's International Monetary Relations*, ed. Eric Helleiner and Jonathan

However, an internationalized currency would result in a number of advantages for Beijing, as it does today for Washington, such as a reduction of transaction costs, macro-economic flexibility, and political and economic leverage over partners. It would also create incentives for Chinese authorities to start to rebalance the economy from investment to consumption, and from exports to domestic absorption. The process of internationalization of the *renminbi* appears to follow a familiar path for observers of Chinese economic reforms. As has already happened with the SEZs (special economic zones) and agricultural reforms, gradual, retractable and localized experiments generally precede far-reaching reforms.

Politically, the process of internationalization has relevant consequences in terms of recognition and prestige. The use of Chinese currency in international transactions represents one of the most evident symbols of the renewed centrality of the PRC in the region and of the benign nature of Beijing's rise. Second, it highlights how the Chinese ascendency leads to a partial redefinition of the order, regionally and, to a minor extent, globally. The "rise of the redback" signals the possibility for China to act as an order maker and public goods provider in Asia.

2. Building International Institutions.

Another example of the rising Chinese structural power is the attempt to promote institutions in the realm of international economic governance centered around Chinese leadership or at the very least edifying regional institutions excluding American presence.[52] First, China has been

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Kirshner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014); Christopher A. McNally, "Sino-capitalism: China's Reemergence and the International Political Economy," *World Politics* 64, no. 4 (2012): 741-76.

[52] Christopher Dent, "Paths Ahead for East Asia and Asia-Pacific Regionalism," *International Affairs* 89, no. 4 (2013): 963-85; Ralph Emmers and John Ravenhill, "The Asian and Global Financial Crises: Consequences for East Asian Regionalism," *Contemporary Politics* 17, no. 2

promoting a wide network of FTAs. Since 2001, when it was admitted to the WTO, Beijing has signed and implemented twelve FTAs.[53] More recently, Chinese economic diplomacy has also promoted multilateral initiatives, the China-ASEAN FTA and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).[54] The latter would favor a much deeper level of economic integration compared with pre-existing bilateral FTAs, which mainly deal with trade in goods. The RCEP would cover other relevant sectors such as investments and services.[55]

Together with the promotion of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, China has been promoting a process of economic regionalization that aims at underpinning its role as regional leader. The process of economic regionalization in East Asia started in the late 1980s and was largely guided by Japan. In 1997, Japan proposed the creation of an Asia Monetary Fund (AMF) that would have been able to provide liquidity and assistance to countries hit by economic crises. In the Japanese proposal the credit received by the AMF would not be characterized by the same conditionality normally imposed by the IMF and the World Bank. The proposal was rejected due to the strong opposition of the United States who considered it a dangerous attempt to decouple the regional financial institutions from the global financial governance centered on the IMF and the World Bank. At the time, China chose not to support the Japanese initiative, worrying that the AMF could enhance Japanese leadership in the region.[56]

(2013): 133-49.

[53] Guoyouand Song and Wen Jin Yuan, "China's Free Trade Agreement Strategies," *The Washington Quarterly* 35, no. 4 (2012): 107-19.

[54] The proposed RCEP agreement includes ASEAN members, Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand.

[55] Jeffrey Wilson, "Mega-Regional Trade Deals in the Asia-Pacific: Choosing Between the TPP and RCEP?" *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 45, no. 2 (2015): 345-53.

[56] Philip Y. Lipscy, "Japan's Asian Monetary Fund Proposal," *Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs* 3, no. 1 (2003): 93-104; Eric Altbach, "The Asian Monetary Fund proposal: A Case Study

The idea of providing a mechanism for greater financial cooperation and self-help during a financial crisis resumed a few years later. This time China promoted the idea of creating an institutionalized mechanism detached from the Bretton Woods institutions and capable of providing liquidity and assistance to countries hit by liquidity problems and speculative attacks.

As a consequence, in 2000, during an ASEAN PLUS Three (APT) meeting, the creation of the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) was approved. The CMI was based on two different mechanisms, a system of economic surveillance and a system of bilateral currency swap that would provide liquidity in case of crisis. The CMI mechanisms however were not utilized in 2008 and 2009 in the aftermath of the crisis. The APT decided to reform the CMI, approving the "Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization" (CMIM) in 2009. China and Japan lead the initiative, each contributing thirty-two per cent of the reserves.[57] These agreements, together with the BSA (Bilateral Swap Arrangements) promoted since 2008, represent an important, if not decisive, change in the financial governance in Asia Pacific. As Evelyn Goh argued, "The politics of the CMI shed light on the shifting dynamic of resistance, deference, and contestation between Japan, China and the United States during the broader process of re-negotiating the regional order."[58] The cooperation in the APT framework demonstrated how Japan and China, together with Korea and other ASEAN members, would be able to build an alternative mechanism of financial governance, based on rules and norms different from those provided by American-led institutions such as the IMF.

The CMI created the institutional premises for a credible challenge

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of Japanese Regional Leadership," *Japan Economic Institute Report* 47 (1997).

[57] Randall C. Henning, "Future of the Chiang Mai Initiative: An Asian Monetary Fund?" *Peterson Institute for International Economics Policy Brief*, no. 9 (2009).

[58] Evelyn Goh, *The Struggle for Order: Hegemony, Hierarchy, and Transition in Post-Cold War East Asia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 234.

to IMF conditionality in a future financial crisis. This would potentially enable East Asian countries to insulate themselves from the global regulatory regime centered on the IMF and American leadership. In that case, China would become the first provider of economic and financial assistance and would be able to determine the nature and the forms of conditionality to be attached to the provision of a fundamental public good such as lending of last resort in a time of crisis.[59]

At the moment, the revolutionary potential of the CMIM is limited by the Sino-Japanese rivalry.[60] Japan wants to maintain an institutional link between the CMIM and the IMF, while China would prefer the CMIM to be an alternative and completely detached from the IMF. However, the CMIM would represent an extremely relevant institutional resource if in the future Beijing and Tokyo overcome current political and security problems.

The AIIB, a development bank inaugurated in December 2015, represents another source of structural power for China. The AIIB was promoted by Beijing together with other twenty-two Asian partners in December 2016. The establishment of the AIIB helps in understanding the current Chinese approach to the region. On the one hand, China is increasingly socialized to the rules of the global order. On the other hand, it has been promoting new institutions centered on its own interests and its own centrality. The AIIB joins the already existent Asia Development Bank (ADB) in financing projects aimed at building infrastructure and promoting economic growth in Asia. The AIIB, however, has a relevant political and strategic value for Beijing. The ADB is substantially led by Japan, which is the larger lender, and includes the United States among

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[59] William W. Grimes, "The Asian Monetary Fund Reborn?: Implications of Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization," *Asia Policy* 11, no. 3 (2011): 79-104; John D. Ciorciari, "Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization: International Politics and Institution-building in Asia." *Asian Survey* 51, no. 5 (2011): 926-52.

[60] Richard C. Bush, *The Perils of Proximity: China-Japan Security Relations* (New York: Brookings Institution Press, 2013).

its members. On the contrary, China will be the main lender and most powerful member of the new bank. China has twenty-six percent of the voting rights in the bank and thirty percent of the stakes, more than the other five major investors combined. The AIIB has an initial capital of one hundred billion USD, half of which are contributed by China.

This attempt is politically important for two different reasons. First, Beijing is enhancing its structural power, creating an institution based on its own centrality and norms and rules favoring its own interests. This new institution is not related to the Bretton Woods system and its governance mechanisms, in contrast with the ADB as well as the CMI. The success of the initiative testifies to the widespread dissatisfaction towards the role of global financial institutions. On the one hand, several Asian states lament the incapacity of the Bretton Woods institutions to adapt their internal structures and voting rights to the development of Asian economies. On the other hand, many states favour the creation of forms of governance that forgive hard political and economic conditionality.

The success of the bank indicates that China is able to promote forms of governance alternative to current global institutions both in terms of membership and in terms of rules. Moreover, the AIIB is likely to contribute to the process of internationalization of the *renminbi*. Ultimately, through the AIIB China aims at enhancing what Susan Strange called "trust of credit."

The strategic relevance of the AIIB emerges when considering American opposition. The Obama administration considered the creation of such an institution a problem for the Bretton Woods system, since it is likely to limit the conditionality of the main global financial institutions. As a consequence, the United States has encouraged its closer allies not to participate in the AIIB.[61] Notably, Japan is the only significant US

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[61] Zachary Keck, "Why the US Is Trying to Squash China's New Development Bank," *The*

partner in the region that refused to join the AIIB.

These developments are meaningful in a number of ways. They demonstrate that even if China is not trying to squarely challenge the institutional structure underpinning the contemporary economic order, it is promoting forms of institutional cooperation that are potentially alternative to the institutions built upon American leadership. China demonstrates a certain degree of structural power when it promotes initiatives that enable it to provide public goods, such as an internationalized currency and lending of last resort.

The creation of an indigenous Asian system of economic governance reflects the desire to isolate the region from the instability and costs associated with American political and economic hegemony.[62] Institutions such as the CMIM, AIIB, and RCEP reflect the desire to build forms of international cooperation based on rules and norms originating in Asia and tailored to local interests and identities.

Ultimately this analysis allows one to put forward several relevant hypotheses. First, international competition between great powers does not necessarily entail less order. On the contrary the rise of China's structural power has led to the promotion of alternative forms of institutionalized cooperation, aimed at addressing fundamental problems of economic coordination, such as provision of credit in time of crisis.

Second, the future economic order, both regionally and globally, is likely to be characterized by an increasing degree of normative heterogeneity. Rules and norms advanced by Beijing are likely to be different from those that have underpinned the current global economic order. Beijing tends to promote forms of cooperation that entail a larger role of the state in the economy, especially when it comes to the role of

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Diplomat, October 10, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/why-the-us-is-trying-to-squash-chinas-new-development-bank/.

62 Mark Beeson and André Broome, "Hegemonic Instability and East Asia: Contradictions, Crises and US Power," *Globalizations* 7, no. 4 (2005): 507-23.

state-owned banks and state-owned enterprises. Third, the rise of China's structural power and the emergence of an increasingly plural economic order is likely to fundamentally undermine the capacity of the Bretton Woods institutions to impose forms of conditionality similar to those imposed on South East Asian states after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1998.

Fourth, this analysis also points to the fact that structural power is not a mere consequence of the increase of China's material capabilities. In order to fully develop its structural power, especially when it comes to financial power and "trust of credit," Beijing has to continue to develop both its international role as a leader of multilateral forums and accelerate domestic reforms. Beijing needs to deepen a number of reforms necessary for the next steps toward regional financial and economic leadership. Among those, the most important are probably the liberalization of capital flows and a more independent monetary policy.

Finally, it is important that any analysis based on the concept of structural power is necessarily associated with the capacity to promote cooperation with other great and middle powers and to be perceived as a reliable leader, able to promote stability. On the one hand, at least since the Asian Financial Crisis, China's most important partners in the economic and financial realm, namely Japan, South Korea, and the ASEAN states, have, even if to different degrees, shared the interest to promote forms of closed and "intra-Asian" economic cooperation. This interest represented a reaction to the way the US handled the Asian Financial Crisis, and more generally to the approach to economic conditionality promoted by the IMF and other global financial institutions. Cooperation with China generally appears to be politically less costly, since Beijing attaches great importance to non interference and respect for sovereignty, as opposed to the high degree of conditionality embedded in the Bretton Woods institutions. Nevertheless, the image of a promoter of stability and reliable power could be undermined by China itself in a number of ways. Beijing could choose to

escalate one of the many territorial and maritime disputes with one of its neighbors; it could abandon the principle of non interference, increasing the cost of participating in the new forms of institutional cooperation; and it could reverse the process of economic and financial reforms.

Ultimately, Beijing has already developed significant forms of structural power, and it is already able to promote significant elements of its own vision of the international order. Consequently the future of the global order is likely to be more plural, both in terms of leadership, ideas, and values as well as institutional structures. Nevertheless, it is important to point to the fact that this is not a historical or theoretical necessity. The rise of China's structural power might be reversed if China itself abandons its role as stabilizer or gets engulfed in military confrontations with its neighbors and particularly with key partners in the region such as South Korea and Japan.

IV. Conclusion

The theoretical and empirical debate regarding such an important issue as the rise of China has been fundamentally biased by an oversimplified conceptualization of power stemming from the idea of "power as resources." This paper suggested that employing a more nuanced, even if necessarily less parsimonious, conceptualization of power helps to highlight other relevant aspects of the challenge posed by China to the contemporary international order and to the present American primacy.

This article also highlighted how the idea of structural power is very useful in order to understand the Chinese rise and its consequences. The idea of looking at the four structures listed by Susan Strange as key components of structural power and in particular to the finance structure helps to illuminate several crucial dynamics that are not captured by realist and liberal theories.

Structural power has two main implications. It means that an actor is able to shape the surrounding environment inducing others to

participate in interactions modeled on its interests and ideas. Overall, focusing on structural power means mainly theorizing and analyzing the complexity of the challenge posed by Beijing's ascent. Accepting a discourse based either on the power transition or the idea of a one-way socialization of the Chinese state undercuts the possibility of analyzing the processes, contestation, hybridization and redefinition that mark the contemporary international order.

The Chinese attempts to act as a public goods provider, through institutions such as the CMI and the AIIB or through the internationalization of the *renminbi*, show how the Chinese rise does not necessarily mean a disruption of the order or the origin of a large-scale security dilemma. The rise of Chinese structural power rather means that Beijing is going to be more active in contesting and reshaping the rule of the economic and political order in Asia and globally.

Structural power also means the capacity for an actor to isolate itself from the interests, will and attempts at coercion of other powerful actors. In this case, it means that China will be increasingly able to resist US pressures and promote institutionalized channels that are relatively independent from American interests, ideas and norms. The creation of institutions such as AIIB and RCEP are the evident signal that China aims at exercising a leadership role and promoting its own norms, while isolating the region from the normative influence of the United States and the global financial institutions.

This analysis also points out the potential obstacles China needs to overcome to achieve a regional leadership and to aspire to a role of global order maker. Predictability and capacity to obtain consent of partners and neighbors have been a crucial element of America's structural power and of the US-led global order. China's drive to leadership might be undermined both by its own foreign policy and by the incapacity to adapt the domestic system to the role of "order maker." The recurrent escalations of maritime and territorial disputes provide examples of how Beijing might undermine its role of public good

provider in Asia. On the domestic front, the possible failure to increase the reliability and the predictability of Chinese institutions might also undermine the Chinese potential to compete with the United States in terms of economic and political influence.

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Book Reviews

Stepping Stone for Contemplation and Exploration in East Asian History: Review of *Shared Readings of Modern East Asian History* (Revised Edition)*

by YU Yong-tae, PARK Jin-u, and PARK Tae Gyun
Korea: Changbi, 2016

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I. The Fruits of Contemplation

When first introduced in the 1990s along with "East Asian discourse (*dongasiaron*)," the field of East Asian History was largely dismissed as unrealistic. Soon China's rapid rise and the changing political dynamics in the region, however, ensured the subject would begin to attract widespread attention. In Korea, the ever-expanding scope of research on East Asian history prompted the teaching of "East Asian History" as a distinct high school subject beginning in 2012.

The introduction, conclusion, and ten chapters included in this 2016 revised edition of the book were also each originally in the first edition released in 2010, which underwent seven printings. The book's objective is to present a regional history of East Asia that addresses the conceptual problems and limitations of past attempts to do so.

With the emergence of East Asian discourse in Korea, criticism of ethnocentric and nation-centric conceptions of history began to appear in

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* *Hamkke ingneun dongasiageunhyeondaesa* (gaejeong pan).

earnest in the fields of history and historical education. As post-nationalist conceptions of history gradually gained in prominence, the very idea of a "national history" came to be dismissed. Along with nationalistic and ethnocentric historical perspectives, orientalist historical perspectives rooted in the ideas of "civilizational enlightenment (*munmyeonggaehwa*)" and social Darwinism were also subjected to fierce criticism. Behind such critical thinking lay the tacit recognition that conceptions of global history were essentially Eurocentric.

This was a contradictory reality, characterized by the excessive emphasis on national and ethnic identity intrinsic to nationalistic and ethnocentric historical discourse, on the one hand, and the lack of self-respecting historical perspectives emanating from orientalist historical perceptions on the other. Regional histories have accordingly attracted a great deal of attention as a way beyond this impasse in research and education related to East Asian history. Thus, in order to understand the lineage of the Korean people in a more contextual manner, Korean historians shifted their focus away from far away lands to examine the more immediate experiences shared with adjacent neighbors, overcoming the barriers of nationalistic, ethnocentric identity without losing a sense of identity altogether.

East Asian history has garnered widespread interest because, as a regional history, it offers opportunities to move beyond existing historical perceptions. This newfound interest in East Asia, moreover, is quite different from that which originated in imperial Japan. As stated in the book, the goal of a regional history of East Asia is to facilitate 'an understanding of world history grounded in the history and reality of a single nation, Korea, while engaging in the careful introspection to ensure such an understanding does not become a mere extension of a single national history.' In order to realize this objective, the book relates and compares imperialistic and nationalistic views of history.

The ultimate goal of this book, by way of such contemplation, is 'to confront the dichotomous historical narrative of invasion and

exploitation versus cooperation and interdependence and establish a historical framework in pursuit of peace and prosperity in East Asia.' In other words, to the question, 'Why is an East Asian history necessary?' the book replies, 'For the contribution to the peace and prosperity of East Asia.' Dialogues between China, Korea, and Japan in the 2000s around the subject of East Asian history have greatly attracted the attention of scholars and educators. Thus, East Asian history has moved beyond mere discourse to attain substantive power. These dialogues recognized the possibility of the politicization of historical conflicts to threaten peace in East Asia. They have produced concrete results in the forms of books and reports.

History Leading to the Future (Miraereul yeoneun yeoksa), a work jointly composed by China, Korea, and Japan, is one such result directly referenced in the book:

> 'Discernable attempts have been made to create a shared history between the three nations with respect to Japan's war of aggression. The reduction of modern East Asian history to Japan's war of aggression, however, is excessively one-sided. Meanwhile, the subjective roles of other Asian territories resisting Japan are lacking. Korean and Chinese resistance to Japanese aggression, on the other hand, appears passive and inevitable, arising as a reaction to the actions of Japan. Furthermore, the depiction of the subjectivity of Korea and China purely in terms of resistance against Japan may serve but to strengthen the tendency toward nationalistic historiography.'

This passage is a reflection of the concern that the dialogues, although carried out in the name of peace and prosperity for the East Asian community, might rather produce a result opposite to the one intended.

Accordingly, the book moves beyond the limitations of existing historical perceptions while resolving issues related to the efforts thus far to compose an East Asian history. To this end, it concentrates on

‘understanding the dependence, relationships, confrontations, and conflicts between the state and civil society in the East Asian region, while drawing into relief the efforts to pursue liberty and equality through solidarity and cooperation.’

Structurally, while exploring the overall flow of modern and contemporary East Asian history, the book is divided by topic. The ten subjects addressed mostly pertain to politics and economy but there are also those related to society and culture. This approach is reminiscent of the revised 2007 educational curriculum on East Asian history, which divided the subject into twenty-six topics in order to present a comprehensive overview.

The book seeks to address each topic at the regional, state, and civic levels. In turn, the book thus covers the interrelated content at the regional level transcending the scope of the state; content at the state level, where comparisons are possible but interrelationships are difficult to discern; and content at the level of the people, external to state leadership, who were unsuccessful in state formation or deprived of the state altogether. Approaches to East Asian history at regional, state, and civic levels have been greatly explored in the historical dialogues between Korea, Japan and China. This is reflected in the high school textbooks that are the fruits of such dialogues. The distinct character of the book lies in the manner in which it eludes agonizing over what particular image of East Asia is appropriate at each level; like a smelting furnace, it melds each of the images into one. Altogether, the book’s objective, structure and narrative style are the fruits of careful contemplation, that which has been produced in regional historical dialogues as well as research and education pertaining to East Asian history.

II. Reimagining East Asian History

The book is composed of three different parts. A Chinese historian

narrates the history of the nineteenth century, a Japanese historian the first half of the twentieth century, and a Korean historian the latter half of the twentieth century. The authors divide the topics in terms of which country is most important with respect to each individual topic. In this manner, they strive to avoid the shortcomings of existing studies on East Asian history composed of parallel national histories. There are, nonetheless, parts in the book where such an integrated perspective fails to materialize.

To begin, the first three chapters are entitled, "State and Society in the Period of Seclusion," "Expansion of the Global Market and the Transformation in Regional Order," and "Nation-state Oriented Reform." Roughly spanning the seventeenth to late-nineteenth century, the discussions therein cover the prosperity and stability achieved in each country by the eighteenth century, internal collapses that began to take form in the early nineteenth century, demise of the Sino-centric tributary system and the transition to the treaty system brought on by, among other things, the inroads of Western powers, and nation-building efforts. Each of these matters is dealt with from a structural point of view. Establishing the relationship between the regional, national, and civic histories in each nation, they illuminate these historical epochs from an East Asian perspective. Although the terminology and logical development are quite technical, the chapters yield important implications.

Dealing with the first half of the twentieth century, the fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters are entitled, "Imperial invasion and Anti-imperial Nationalist Movements," "Socialism and the People's Movement," and "The Shock of Total War and the Systemization of Public Mobilization." With respect to the first edition, these chapters were criticized for their careless treatment of Chinese history relative to the treatment of the rise and fall of the Japanese Empire. Taking this assessment into account, in the revised edition these sections feature a supplemented account of Chinese history. However, as the authors acknowledge, this has only led to additional content pertaining to Chinese history. The manner in which

the chapters are divided into subsections, which was also an object of criticism, remains unchanged. Altogether, the aspects of Japan's dominance and wrongdoing are palpable in the Korean and Chinese sections revolving around the Japanese historical account. Finally, the aspects of resistance are discernible in the descriptions of Korea and China, but there is not enough content pertaining to the true suffering of the people.

A shortcoming of this section that has not been addressed in the revised edition is the persistent inadequacy of an international relations historical perspective. The stunningly rapid transformation of China's international status, for instance, is given insufficient treatment—China occupied a seat among top leaders at the Cairo Conference seemingly but a brief moment after lapsing into a pseudo-colony. The chapter topics being what they are, as listed above, it is possible to carelessly handle aspects of international relations history. Overall, one can evaluate this section of the book as an attempt to apply a topic-based approach to the first half of the twentieth century. This is different from existing studies, which commonly adopt an international relations historical perspective reproducing an image of the lives and peoples of each nation with respect to one another.

From chapter seven onward, covering the years since 1945, an international relations historical perspective becomes ubiquitous. The seventh chapter, which is also greatly concerned with the actions of the United States, is entitled, "The Formation of the Cold War System and the Postponement of Decolonization." In this manner, post-war East Asian history is dealt with in terms of the East Asia policy of the United States. The eighth and ninth chapters are entitled, "The Industrialization and Democratization of the Capitalist Bloc" and "The Experiments and Course Corrections of the Socialist Bloc." These concern Cold War East Asian history in both the capitalist and socialist blocs. The tenth chapter, entitled, "Conflicts and Civic Movements of the Post-Cold War Era," deals with post-Cold War East Asian history. The eighth to tenth chapters

provide consistent comparative discussions of contemporary East Asian history from the perspective of democracy. A notable change in the revised version is the addition of a section in chapter eight devoted to women's issues in the capitalist bloc during the Cold War. This allows for comparison with the existing section on women's issues in the socialist bloc in chapter nine.

Overall, the viewpoints and methodologies of the discussions of the nineteenth and early and late twentieth centuries are incongruent. But the intention of the book, 'to focus on a number of discrete events, how they were interrelated, and how they influenced and were influenced by each nation,' is undoubtedly buttressed by a number of revisions in the new edition. Nonetheless, it appears the fundamental objectives of the book—to overcome the limitations of parallel national histories, to reorganize historical facts and periods by topic, and to create a new image of East Asian history—have yet to be ultimately fulfilled.

East Asian history is a field demanding constant cooperation. Reflecting the prevailing nation-centric climate, Korean, Japanese, and Chinese histories each occupy their own particular domain in the discipline of history. Accordingly, research and education pertaining to East Asian history are also concerned with the reconfiguration of this topography. To reimagining East Asian history, one must embark on a journey involving two tasks: daring exploration and harmonious cooperation. Evoking these two tasks in its pages, the book thus becomes a stepping-stone for beginning such a journey.

III. The Korean Guide to Reading and Writing East Asian History

The Korean, Chinese and Japanese history textbooks created through joint Korean-Chinese writings on East Asian history feature comparisons of how to describe the port openings in each country. These descriptions are basically consistent with prevailing historical views based on a

Eurocentric conception of history beginning with the "Western great powers." Thus, although the joint history textbooks pursued the creation of shared perceptions of East Asian history by "writing East Asian history together," this only brought into fresh relief the fact that the project could not overcome the inertia of existing historical scholarship. Meanwhile, China's *East Asian History (Dongasa)* explains the opening of ports in East Asia via the dissolution of the tributary system and the establishment of the treaty system in terms of the transformation of the Sino-centric order. Consequently, the rise of Japan within the treaty system is explained but there is no reference to Korea. *East Asian History (Dongasiasa)*, a textbook used in Korea, focuses on the relations and processes of port openings in East Asia on a "mutual" basis. This is because only when the issue is approached in terms of international relations history can the status and role of Korea be exposed.

In Korea, an issue ever of concern in researching East Asian history is how to narrate East Asian history as a Korean. Should one approach East Asian history with a Korean identity or does East Asian history need to be explored in terms of post-nationalist, post-ethnic identity? This book acknowledges these concerns, but the task of formulating a consistent historical theory for analyzing history from an East Asian point of view is no easy one. Therefore, even while it adopts a future-oriented attitude to thoroughly investigate a historical theory discerning an East Asian history, the reality is that this must be preceded by a compromise regarding how to reimagine East Asian history as a Korean.

In this manner, the book reveals the reality of research on East Asian history. Though it avoids parallel national histories to pursue a comprehensive point of view, a harsh reality is reflected in the fragmented image of East Asian history not easily overcome. Nonetheless, progressing via persistent contemplation and exploration, it is clear the book provides a stepping stone toward exposing the task confronted by researchers on East Asian history in the "here and now." One cannot but express respect for the authors who, even while knowing the task is not

an easy one, endeavor to reveal a way forward for research on East Asian history.

*The Vietnam War and Korean Society: Forgotten War, Distant Present**

by YUN Chung-ro
Seoul: Pureun yeoksa, 2015

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This book attempts to reconstruct Korea's experience of the Vietnam War through the lens of individual actors. It is a vibrant narrative of what life was like in Vietnam for the soldiers and civilian contractors, whose first-hand encounters of the battlefront have remained largely neglected over the years. This "bottom-up" account of individual experiences sheds light on how memories of the Vietnam War are highly varied. Similarly, the meaning of the Vietnam War for Korea is also multi-faceted.

In the first chapter, the author provides a brief overview of existing studies on the Vietnam War, contending that these narratives tend to interpret the Vietnam War as either a Korean modernization program or a mechanism to strengthen the Korean authoritarian regime. The shortcoming of these approaches is that they rely heavily on the government's point of view and overlook the fact that private individuals were also important actors in the war. Thus, a "micro" approach is necessary, whereby a range of different experiences – and the kinds of memories generated by those experiences – that have hitherto gone

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* *Beteunam jeonjaeng-ui hangguk sahoesa: ichin jeonjaeng, oraedoen hyeonjae.*

unnoticed can be ascertained.

This does not mean that the author is indifferent to "macro-level" questions. In fact, in chapter two, he seeks to understand why there was no large-scale opposition to the Vietnam War in Korea. His answer is four-fold. To begin with, the general public's attention at the time was focused on the Korea-Japan normalization issue. Consequently, the Vietnam War did not sufficiently develop into a major issue to arouse mass reaction. Secondly, because the US was financing the Vietnam War, the Korean government was relatively free from monetary burden and taxpayer discontent.[1] Third, with the opposition party rather ineffective, there was no one big group strong enough to resist the government's Vietnam War effort. Finally, the bulk of the population framed the Vietnam War as an opportunity to escape unemployment and poverty, and thus was rather enthusiastic about the war.

Meanwhile, in chapter three, the author tries to formulate a general argument about the collective memory of the Korean participants as a whole. He recognizes that there clearly was an ideological element, as Korean combatants and civilian employees defined communism an evil that had to be defeated. However, there was a strong racial element as well. The Koreans made a clear distinction between themselves and the Vietnamese, the latter being "backward and needing guidance" while the former was "advanced and a model."[2] Meanwhile, there were economic dimensions as well; Vietnam was the land of opportunity, where people could earn money, which in turn could contribute to the development of Korea.

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[1] The author also acknowledges that the Vietnam War served as the first time South Korea gained a stronger bargaining position vis-à-vis the US; the "more flags" policy led the US to seek help from the Korean government.

[2] This point provides an interesting contrast with the US, which was careful not to make the Vietnam War appear as if it were a war between white people (former colonizing race) and Asians (former colonized). In fact, the US thought that having another group of Asians (Koreans) fighting the war would be helpful in this regard.

The following chapters focus on individual actors. Chapter four recounts the experiences of the combatants and demonstrates that people's attitudes toward the war and Vietnam were varied depending on the context and time, with economic impetus and sense of masculinity often dictating their actions.[3] The general public was initially loath to go to war, and elites would evade the draft through money and networks. Later, however, Vietnam became associated with all kinds of coveted material gains, and the number of applicants wishing to be assigned to Vietnam soared. Once in Vietnam, many combatants recollected how they simply wanted to quit and go home. Yet, as history attests, together as a group, they displayed both valor and cruelty. They had to fight, lest they be attacked and killed. They had to kill the Viet Cong as revenge for their fallen comrades. Meanwhile, the racial hierarchy – admiring the American wealth and might while looking down on Vietnam – was very much alive among Korean combatants.

Chapter five traces the mobilization of both human and material resources in Korea for the war. In the name of "crisis," "opportunity" and "honor," a task force was activated by the government to oversee the regular flow of letters and care packages to the Korean soldiers in Vietnam. College students made field visits to Vietnam to encourage their compatriots. At the same time, while soldiers were doing the fighting, people in Korea were tasked with developing the country with the remittances gained from the war. In turn, this "total mobilization," in which Koreans abroad and back home were intricately linked, had the effect of weakening mass opposition to the Vietnam War.

Chapter six examines the experiences of civilian employees, who have so far been missing in the scholarly discourse. These civilian employees were ideologically united as anti-communists and were

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[3] The limit of this chapter, as the author confesses, is that it treats all combatants as one uniform unit. Hence, it does not necessarily show how enlisted men's experiences might have been different from those of officers or high-level decision-makers in the military.

economically motivated to escape poverty. At the same time, similar to their combatant counterparts, there was a strict racial hierarchy, with Americans on top, followed by Koreans and Vietnamese. Meanwhile, their experiences also varied. Many were mobilized as semi-combatants at times. Many were sent by the Korean government and constantly wrestled with long working hours, unfair treatment and fear that their contracts might be annulled at any time. Many were recruited in Vietnam by Americans after retiring from the Korean military, and were relatively free from the concerns of contract annulment and being sent back to Korea; instead, they reminisced about how "life was good" with a considerable salary, welfare and leisure opportunities. Some civilian contractors recruited in Vietnam by Vinnell, which had no professional links in Korea, later chose to continue working for American military contractors in the Middle East. Each and every individual had one's own unique story to tell.

In chapter seven, the author examines the experience of Hanjin employees, a scenario in which Vietnam was not exactly the land of opportunity perceived by many others. Hanjin employees were also motivated economically, going to Vietnam in search of a better life. What they confronted in Vietnam were extremely long working hours, a less competitive salary than other civilian contractors in Vietnam (especially, those working for the American companies), unfair contracts and quasi-military duties. Some had experienced unjust contract annulment by Hanjin. Unsurprisingly, employees were unhappy. As frustration escalated, some workers later set fire to the Hanjin headquarters in Seoul. However, the government backed Hanjin, and the workers' discontent was silenced. Consequently, the story of the Hanjin employees remained in oblivion for many years.

Chapter eight deals with how the Vietnam War is generally remembered in Korea. The author points out that there is no widespread recognition that the Vietnam War was a mistake. There is hardly any sense of remorse or contriteness regarding what had happened in

Vietnam. Instead, the government, along with conservatives and war veterans, argue that the war was a just cause. Of course, there is a gap between how the government and individual veterans remember the war. Soldiers were united in the sense of manly camaraderie and a desire to escape poverty; the idea that Korea was engaged in a crusade against communism, as advocated by the government, was often far from their immediate concerns. Yet, this fragment of history has been disregarded.[4] What is left is the government wanting to believe that they made the right choice to enter the war to fend off communism and develop the country with the blood money gained in Vietnam. The veterans, meanwhile, believe they were faithfully answering the nation's call and fighting the war that they themselves had not decided on.

Chapter nine examines three different monuments that were built to commemorate the Vietnam War, all of which either exhibit noticeable public indifference to the past or sharply conflicting memories. Han-Viet Peace Park was constructed by civic organizations with generous donations from ordinary people, who learned about civilian atrocities in Vietnam through the newspaper three decades after the war. While this is a significant achievement with symbolic value, both the Korean and Vietnamese governments were rather silent about this project. What is more unfortunate is that less and less people are paying attention every year, which has led to poor maintenance of the park. The Ha My Memorial was erected by the Korean veterans to pay respect to those who lost their lives during the war. There was a noticeable gulf between how Korean veterans and victims (and families of those victims) wished to remember the past. When the stone monument was being built, the locals wanted to stipulate the mass killings by Korean soldiers; the Korean veterans were not very fond of this idea. Third, the Korean

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[4] At the same time, as was the case with Hanjin employees, veterans' concerns went unheard. For years, they received no proper compensation for the physical and psychological damages caused by the war.

government constructed a special commemorative site in Hwacheon to honor Vietnam War veterans. The government intended to develop this into a popular tourist spot accessible to the mass public. The problem is that the general public is not showing much interest; at the same time, this monument is ideologically charged, portraying the Vietnam War as a justified action against communist aggression.

The author concludes the book by raising a number of questions. To begin with, taking into account the fact that the Vietnam War was an international event, what were the roles of other participating countries, such as Australia and Taiwan? Are there other voices that have been silenced and ignored? What would the Vietnamese say about their encounters with the Koreans during the war? What can be done to rectify past transgressions, including unfair treatment of the Hanjin laborers, civilian massacres committed by Korean units and blithe disregard for veterans when they returned home?

The book's value is in its humanity, recounting the lives and experiences of real people. At the same time, it combines and seeks to balance between traditional archival research and oral history – however limited the resources – through which the author unveils those aspects of the past that had been largely forgotten. In this regard, it complements another book on the Vietnam War that came out the same year, which gave relatively more weight to rigorous archival analysis.[5] What is perhaps most notable about this book is the fact that it calls for greater social awareness of the past. By uncovering some very sensitive aspects of the Vietnam War, the author demands more effort to investigate what really happened back then to offer justice to all those who have been wrong done.

Of course, there are also some questions the book was not able to

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[5] Park Tae Gyun, *Beteunam jeonjaeng: icheojin jeonjaeng, banjjogui gioek* [The Vietnam War: Forgotten war, Untold Stories] (Seoul: Hangyeolle chulpan, 2015).

address. For example, could there have been any instances in which Koreans and Vietnamese could relate to one another, instead of Koreans constantly looking down on the Vietnamese? Also, did the Koreans only interact with the Americans and Vietnamese, or did they encounter anybody else? Regardless, it would be fair to acknowledge this book as a starting point for further intellectual undertakings and academic enrichment regarding the Vietnam War. Possibly, it might even lead to better policy-making and reconciliation.

Can China Research be Free of Official Chinese Historical Interpretations?
Review of *China in the Deng Xiaoping Era* (vols. 1, 2, and 3)*

by CHO Young Nam
Korea: Mineumsa, 2016

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Viewing China's current international status, one cannot but confer great historical significance upon the reforms that made such development possible. The representative figure behind this historical change is none other than Deng Xiaoping. In official Chinese appraisals, Deng is known as the "grand architect of opening and reform." But such appraisals propagate misunderstandings of the processes involved in opening and reform. Is it indeed the case that reform and opening were pursued in a manner perfectly consistent with Deng's designs? As manifest in the Tiananmen incident of 1989, implementation of opening and reform was not without complications. In the initial stages of this process, rural residents implemented agrarian reforms voluntarily with the firm support of provincial leaders. Subsequent reforms proceeded, but were subject to repeated interruption and resumption as they were fiercely debated within the central government.

The term "bamboo curtain" was often used to describe China in the past. This was because, on the outside, information regarding China was

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* *Deongshaoping sidaeui jungguk.*

so difficult to attain. But even now, when much information is made public and the Chinese media has become much more approachable, it remains difficult as ever to gain access to important information and the movements of high-level officials. It is thus quite common within China research to depend on official Chinese statements or analyses for primary sources. The majority of official analyses, however, possess political objectives. The most representative instance is the "Resolution regarding various Historical Issues since the Founding of the PRC" composed in June 1981. In this document, the party reevaluated its past policies and actions as well as Mao Zedong and Maoist ideology, invalidating Hua Guofeng's "Two Whatevers" (the party must acknowledge and uphold whatever Mao decided and instructed). Thus, this resolution allowed the Deng Xiaoping leadership to end the confusion surrounding communist party ideology and theories since the Cultural Revolution. The issue is whether such official analysis and evaluation completely convey the facts of history. Researchers must strip away the political veil of official statements and analysis and view the facts with a critical eye. Such is the approach adopted by Cho in his book, which refutes official Chinese interpretations of the Deng Xiaoping era.

The Deng era is typically synonymous with the reform era, with the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (hereafter Third Plenary Session), by which Deng took a decisive hold on power, officially recognized as the starting point of opening and reform. This event is thus interchangeably referred to as "The Zunyi Conference of a New Era," "The Second Revolution," or "The Great Transition." In the author's view, however, it was the Eleventh Party Congress in 1977 that marked the actual initiation of opening and reform in China, pointing to Hua Guofeng as the genuine advocate of reform. As well, regarding the issue of Deng's reinstatement, the author is critical of existing studies portraying Hua as opposed to Deng's reinstatement. With respect to economic matters, there was little disagreement between the two. If such was the case, then what was the

source of conflict between Deng and Hua? It was historical reappraisals, reinvestigations of regrettable incidents, and the "Two Whatevers" engendering their mutual antagonism. The author argues, then, that the prevailing emphasis on the Third Plenary Session is meant to portray Deng Xiaoping as the grand architect of opening and reform.

Opening and reform in China did not unfold over a specifically designated period, nor was it the purposeful project of the central government or a few central leaders therein. Rather, it emerged accumulatively out of the myriad experiments and experiences implemented voluntarily across various regions. Opening and reform then gained in strength through Deng's ratification and support of such experiments and experiences, ultimately becoming the basis of the party and the state. The author thus argues that the Third Plenary Session was significant insofar as it marked the commencement of Deng's leadership rather than opening and reform.

Accordingly, mobilizing and comparing vast amounts of material, the author deviates from official Chinese interpretations to elucidate the Deng Xiaoping era. Such an endeavor is not without precedent in Korean scholarship pertaining to China. As with Ahn Chi-young's *The Birth of the Deng Xiaoping Era (Deongsiaoping sidaeui tansaeng* [Changbi, 2013]), some have already explored the starting point of the Deng regime. Ahn's work, however, does not encompass the entire Deng era.

The most illuminating aspect of the author's work is his treatment of the Tiananmen incident. There exist a plethora of valuable materials pertaining to this incident, including the leaked "Tiananmen Papers" featuring secret conversations among the top leadership in China and various testimonies of the many who directly participated in the occupation of Tiananmen Square. But since testimonies can contradict one another and memory is not always accurate, it is extremely difficult to present such evidence as factual. The author, on the other hand, compares and contrasts countless materials in order to uncover the truth.

The book is not a mere account of historical facts. It also reflects

the effort to understand the Deng regime on a theoretical basis. That which is most representative of this endeavor is the exposition of the Deng regime's political character. The author is critical of past characterizations of the structure of power under the Deng regime that represent it with the concepts of a "three-horse carriage" or "twin peaks." He instead presents the concept of a dual political structure composed of the politics that take place in the official sphere and those that take place among elderly statesmen. According to this view, one can more easily understand how Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, who each occupied the highest official position within the communist party, underwent such rapid downfalls at the hands of veteran statesmen.

Regarding Deng era factions, typically represented in terms of reformist and conservatives, the author offers a discussion meticulously categorized by period and subject. Following the Third Plenary Session, a tacit agreement was reached that Deng would oversee political issues wile Chen Yun would exercise authority over economic issues. By 1981, however, as economic reforms began to progress in earnest, the consensus between the two proceeded to dissolve with respect to economic policy. Chen Yun was a proponent of balanced growth while Deng advocated unbalanced growth. Therefore, the conflict between Chen Yun and Hu Yaobang, who supported Deng's policies, was inevitable. But unlike the conflict characterizing economic matters, Deng and Chen were all but identical in the realm of politics; they each supported the conservatism represented in the Four Cardinal Principles. Thus, conflict arose in the political realm with Deng Xiaoping on one side and Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang on the other, but was resolved with Hu and Zhao's respective dismissals from the position of General Secretary.

With China's rise, the craving for knowledge of China grows ever stronger. Unfortunately, not only are these volumes immense in length but also somewhat inaccessible to the general reader. It is thus difficult to foresee this book having any mass appeal. Nonetheless, as a work neither

written by a Western scholar nor reflective of official Chinese interpretations, it is a welcome addition to Korean scholarly research on China. One can only hope that Korean scholars studying China will continue to produce such fruitful research into the future.

Can Japan Break Free of the Base-State?
Review of *The Birth of the Base State: Japan's Korean War**

by NAM Gi-jeong
Korea: Seoul National University Press, 2016

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I. Is Japan Truly a "Pacifist" State?

With a victorious vote in the upper house of the Japanese Diet in July 2016, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) fulfilled the conditions for revising the constitution. Already having a two-thirds majority in the lower house, the matter of coordinating the timing of the amendment but remained. While persistent resistance by the opposition party and civil society ensured the amendment could not be passed by force, as had been the case in Korea in 1969 when President Park sought a third term, the Abe government's drive toward the amendment was a *fait accompli*.

Why did the Abe regime advocate such an amendment? Had Japan forgotten its culpability in the tragedies of World War II? Was Japan abandoning its status as a pacifist state? Gi-jeong Nam traces the historical roots of these questions to the Korean War. Compared with the efforts of other scholars, such as Weon-deok Lee, associating Japan's struggle to become a normal state with US Asia Pacific policy or US

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* *Gijigukgaui tansaeng: ilboni chireun hangukjeonjaeng* (Seouldaehakgyo chulpanmun-hwaweon).

demands regarding the right to collective self-defense originating in the San Francisco Treaty,[1] this is certainly a novel approach.

Adopting this more fundamental approach, the author asks, 'Can a state sustained by military bases be a pacifist one?' He thus seeks to discover why, despite the fact that the term "base-state" is much more useful for understanding post-war and contemporary Japan, there is such a preoccupation with the term "pacifist state." This view signifies Japan's pursuit of national security conforming to American foreign policy as well as the reality that the pacifist state has been made possible by the base-state. In fact, considering Japan's debates over constitutional revision, the complex unfolding dynamics of China-Japan relations, and the significance of the implementation of THAAD in East Asia not only for Korea but also for Japan, the author's critical perspective is all the more meaningful.[2]

Of course in this respect one might also rationalize the Abe government's dream of a normal state in terms of the true realization of the pacifist state via the dissolution of the base-state. Just as the author

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[1] Bruce Cumings, "The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy: Industrial Sectors, Product Cycles, and Political Consequences," *International Organization* 38, no. 1 (Winter 1984); Weon-deok Lee, *Hanilgwageosa cheoriui weonjeom* [The First Step in Resolving Korea-Japan Historical Issues] (Korea: Seouldae chulpanbu, 1996); Hyeong-seok Yu, "Jipdanjeok jawigweonui seongnip baegyeonge gwanhan sogo [Tracing the Origins of the Establishment of the Right to Collective Self-Defense]," *Beophakyeongu* 22 (2006); Yeong-jun Park, "Ilbon abe jeongbuui botonggunsagukgahwa pyeongga: gukgaanbojeollyakseo, jipdanjeok jawigweon, miilgaideurain, anbobeopjee daehan jonghapjeok ihae [Evaluating the Abe Government's Efforts to Become a Normal Military State: Comprehensive Understanding of the State Security Strategy Paper, Right to Collective Self-Defense, US-Japanese Guidelines, and Security Legislation]," *Aseayeongu* 58, no. 4 (2015).

[2] The LDP's Hatoyama Cabinet established in 2009 was an important political experiment for Japan, bringing an end to fifty-four years of the 1955 system. However, Kan soon ascended to the prime ministership over the Futenma Base relocation issue. This is the latest case revealing the importance of the base-state for the US-Japan alliance. Jin-pil Su, "Hatoyama naegage isseo hutenma giji banhwan munjewa miiranbochejeui jaeinsik [The Hatoyama Cabinet, Futenma Base Relocation Issue, and Redefinition of the US-Japan Security Regime]," *Sahoewa yeoksa* 92 (2011). Perhaps the Hatoyama Cabinet was the first in the postwar period to approach US-Japan relations from the position of a pacifist state, not a base-state.

points out, skepticism regarding the "pacifist state" even within the pacifist camp, a staunch supporter of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, can be understood in the same context. Although Japan has never directly dispatched any of its own military troops under the pacifist constitution, has not Okinawa served as the base for dispatching countless American troops to Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq for the last seventy years? As Morris-Suzuki argues, Japan has done more than enough to fulfill its role as a base-state of the United States.

Article 9 nonetheless maintains an important symbolic meaning. The author's argument is that, in order to understand its limitations, it is necessary to view post-war Japan as a "base-state." Unlike past treaties with the United Kingdom or the Philippines, which loaned out land for American bases, the US opted to 'render the entire sovereign territory of Japan an outpost for potential military operations.' This configuration differs little from that outlined in the US-Korea Mutual Defense Treaty, except that Korea possesses its own military forces while Japan does not.

II. A Base-State Shaped by Shared Internal and External Interests

The focus of the author with respect to the Korean War is not Korea but Japan. As scholars commonly describe, even before the Chinese communist victory in 1949, America had initiated the "reverse course" rendering Japan the most important territory in the Cold War in East Asia. Both the United States and Soviet Union expressed an interest in Japan following its defeat in the Pacific War, but the Soviet Union lacked any pretext to begin a war in Japan, and thus war ultimately came to the Korean Peninsula instead.

Although the war was located in Korea, it was Japan most transformed by it. With the outbreak of the war, Japan was transformed into a base-state as US troops stationed therein were dispatched to the Korean peninsula. On the evening of June twenty-sixth, 1950, President

Truman ordered General MacArthur to dispatch the American Air Force and Navy to Korea. Out of the eight armies stationed in Japan, MacArthur mobilized the 24th Infantry Division in Kokura. By June twenty-eighth, bombing by the Far Eastern Air Force had begun on the peninsula. Over the course of the war, the fifteen airports in Japan were converted into bases for these operations. Task Force Smith, which would fall into disarray after a series of defeats by North Korean troops, was dispatched to the front line on July first from Kyushu.

By January thirty-first, 1953, as the war wound down to its final stages, the number of American bases in Japan had reached 733. In spatial terms, these bases occupied about 0.378 percent of Japanese territory, amounting to roughly half of the space formerly occupied by Japanese troops. The size of naval training areas at sea, furthermore, rivaled the size of Kyushu. Therein, it was Okinawa that was undoubtedly the greatest subject of transformation.[3] Over the course of the war, Japanese territory provided the launching point for over 720,000 US Air Force and 160,000 US Navy sorties. Deployment of Napalm and other incendiaries amounted to 476,000 tons by the air force and 22,000 tons by the Marine Corps and Naval aircraft. If such statistics alone are not convincing, one may observe the fact that the United States refrained from deploying nuclear weapons in Japan based on the fear of Soviet

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[3] Since Okinawa was not returned to Japan it until 1971, there is in fact room for doubt as to its direct relationship with the formation of the base-state. At the Cairo Conference in late 1943, the United States went as far as to sound out whether the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had any intentions of directly controlling Okinawa. See Byeong-jun Jeong, "Kairohoedamui hanguk munje nonuiwa kairoseoneon hangukjohangui jakseong gwajeong [Discussion of the Korean Problem at the Cairo Conference and the Drawing Up of Clauses Pertaining to the Korean Problem in the Cairo Declaration]," *Yeoksabipyeong* 107 (2014). Had the United States not experienced a financial and economic crisis in the late 1960s, it is possible it would have continued to exercise authority over Okinawa long past 1971. This conjecture suggests the utmost importance of Okinawa to American military strategy. Even while it was closely connected with bases within sovereign Japanese territory, then, there is room for doubt with respect to the direct relationship between Okinawa and the formation of the base-state.

retaliation against Japan.[4]

It is here the book's most important contribution is brought into relief. The formation of the base-state in Japan cannot be understood in relation to American policy alone. Japanese politicians and intellectuals were not complacent with respect to the Korean War, but endeavored to harness it for the achievement of their own interests. In other words, Japanese society was not an idle observer of the Korean War; it sought ways to use it to its advantage. Broadly speaking, this process dovetailed with US policy toward Asia. Narrowly speaking, it was in tune with US policy toward Japan. Overall, it was the most important impetus in the formation of the Japanese base-state.

Prime Minister Yoshida dispatched a special envoy to the United States recommending the establishment of American bases in Japan even before the outbreak of the Korean War. Regardless of the intention of the United States to use Japan as a base for military operations, then, without voices in Japan advocating a "Meiji without military" through the establishment of American military bases, the formation of the base-state would have been impossible. Furthermore, civilian politicians believed that the dissolution of the military would serve to 'cut out the political cancer that was the military.' Shall we say perhaps that American military presence was the answer to a "daring, unutterable prayer"?

Recalling this period, US ambassador to Japan Robert D. Murphy recorded in his memoirs, 'The Japanese have turned four of their islands into a single, great supply depot with a startling speed,' and, 'America would not have been able to conduct the war in Korea if not for Japan.' 'The Japanese,' he further noted, 'received neither demand nor approval to assist the war effort. But Japanese shipbuilding and railroad experts went to Korea along with their entourages and worked under the command of the Americans and the United Nations.'

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[4] http://www.pressian.com/news/article.html?no=63337, accessed August 14th, 2016.

The Korean War was also an important turning point for Japanese companies responsible for war crimes during the Pacific War. The "Big Five" and "Big Nine," including companies like Nippon Tire, Fuji Motors, and Nippon Steel Tubing, were important contributors of supplies to the American war effort, and following the war, played a major role in the revival of the Japanese economy. Of particular note was the resurrection of the Japanese military industry with resumption of weapons production. Ishii Mitsujirō, who was banned from public office from 1947 to 1950, recorded the following in his diary:

> This is divine redemption. Stock prices have risen. Shipments of coal to Joseon have been set at ten thousand tons per month. Remaining stockpiles have been put in order. The United States anticipates it will spend the greater part of its personnel budget, 300 million US dollars, in Japan. The unemployment issue has been solved. And the crackdown on the communist party and reinforcement of police strength was carried out without us even having to ask.

Meanwhile, special procurement generated other benefits for businessman on the frontline, acting as the "fair wind" subduing worker unrest and ensuring their fidelity to business activities. It is said that the enterprise unions celebrated for several days upon receiving their year-end bonuses.

III. The Origin of the Drive to Become a Normal State

Alignment around the idea of becoming a normal state in Japan following the outbreak of the Korean War played a decisive role in reviving right-wing and military forces involved in past war crimes, who advocated for militarization as a reaction against the formation of a base-state in Japan. Playing an important role for the United States, which required Japan as a base of operations in the war against communism, the

opportunity for the rightists/militarists previously barred from politics to reemerge throughout Japanese society came to fruition under American occupation and amid democratization.

The United States required the counsel of those who had operated behind the scenes in Korea during the colonial period. Meanwhile, these forces also had a useful role to play in stemming the mounting cries of left-wing communists in post-war Japan. Also in terms of American interests, the assistance of the old rightists/militarists was required to suppress Korean residents in Japan (*zainichi*), who were identified as a specific latent threat to Japanese society. Relatedly, the rightists played a core role in implementing the so-called "red purge." They particularly lent a hand in manipulating the discovery that the Soviet Union was directing the Japanese communist party through documents pertaining to the establishment of revolutionary organs and the operation of a revolutionary movement. This incident provided an important pretext for the suppression of the communists.

Less than four months into the war, more than ten thousand deportees were repatriated to Japan. By 1951, among more than 210,000 deportees from the public sector, 201,508 were repatriated. As a result, organizations revolving around the old rightist/militarist forces became ubiquitous around this time, justified by the "urgent demand for true patriots in political leadership in the name of defending against the communist plot." This logic was no different from the one that saw collaborators restored to positions of power in Korea following liberation from Japan.

Among these forces were also extremist, anti-American nationalists as well as advocates of pan-Asianism. Meanwhile, there were those appealing for rearmament among the socialists as well. While such groups were prevented from moving into the mainstream by realists on the right portraying cooperation with the United States as inevitable and opponents of rearmament on the left, they have nonetheless been able to consistently voice their own particular brands of reasoning during times

of crisis. More recently, with the rise of China becoming a pressing issue, they have asserted their views once again. Thus, these perceptions constitute one of the axes around which the current debates over normalization pivot.

The movements and arguments of left-wing communists around the time of the Korean War are also worthy of note. While this group was largely suppressed by the red purge, they were able to gather support in Japan after the war as the mood in Japanese society became partial to peace. Therein, the author's historical analysis of the role of Korean residents in Japan as a vanguard in the left-wing movement is also particularly striking. The author describes how cooperation between the Japanese communist party and Korean residents in opposing the Korean War led to the founding of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan as well as the attempted communist resistance movement.

A more important attempt, however, is the one by the author to elucidate the origins of the pacifist discourse in Japanese civil society currently opposed to normalization. If those supporting normalization are on one side, then pacifist discourse can be said to be on the other. Proponents of this discourse were an instrumental force behind the three principles of peace—comprehensive peace, non-aligned neutrality, and opposition to the base-state—delineated during the Korean War. This line of argument has formed an important basis for social discourse since the advent of the 1955 regime, compelling even the conservative government to uphold Article 9 of the Constitution as a national ideology and adhere to such principles behind the prohibition weapons exports, anti-nuclearism, maintaining levels of military spending at below one percent of GNP, and maintaining an exclusively defensive security policy.

Naturally, this argument also contained decisive limitations. Japan had begun to engage in war in Korea. It had resumed weapons production in provisioning the US military. Finally, the American base-state had already taken root. In this reality, positions such as 'US-alliance neutrality' and 'opposition to the formation of a military base-state'

amounted to little more than idealistic slogans. Indeed, perhaps they even served to veil the eyes of the Japanese people. To borrow the words of the author, proponents of the pacifist discourse 'turned a blind eye to one aspect of a complicated reality.'

With the old rightists/militarists revived on the one hand and proponents of pacifist discourse idealistically masking reality on the other, perhaps the citizens of Japan fulfilled the conditions favorable to the establishment of the "base-state," a topic discussed in the book's eighth chapter. In reality, while a sense of crisis due to the outbreak of the Korean War might have compelled a nationwide consensus with respect to the formation of a base-state, the social solidarity underlying this consensus rested on the basis of the opposing political factions that would become the two most important social and political forces in Japan. As a result, the movements of the extreme right and extreme left endeavoring to dismantle the base-state were unable to attain societal support. Even while public discourse regarding constitutional reform has gathered momentum in post-Cold War Japan, the fact that public support for maintaining US-Japan security and the Self-Defense Force remains as strong as ever aptly demonstrates this point.

IV. Whither Japan?

As the discussion thus far has shown, in *The Birth of the Base-State*, by elucidating the "uniqueness" of the Japanese state emerging in and around the time of the Korean War, Gi-jeong Nam demonstrates how to understand not only the past but also the future of Japan. Thus, the last sub-sections of the book are entitled "From Base-State to Normal State" and "Japanese Normalization as an East Asian Problem." In these sections, the author evaluates the armistice system formed in the wake of the Korean War. Not limited to the Korean peninsula, he argues, this is more an "East Asian ceasefire system," which Japan is also subject to as a base-state.[5]

The author also proposes a way to resolve this system, stating, "Normalization under the current ceasefire agreement system cannot resolve the contradictions of the base-state. It can only make them more pronounced." In fact, by opting to become a base-state rather than reemerge as a military power, Japan ensured the 'institutionalization of the ceasefire agreement system,' which, according to Nam, constituted a 'veiled check against the relapse into war.' Here, the author also provides discerning historical insight into the 'long Sino-Japanese War.' He warns that, 'coinciding with the clamorous cries of proactive pacifism,' the Abe government's drive toward becoming a normal military state 'may ultimately exacerbate the possibility of war.'

In this respect, the book is decidedly unique compared with existing studies of Japan since the San Francisco Treaty, which neglect to consider the greater East Asian context. The author explores Japan's postwar past, it's present, and future not only in terms of US-Japan relations but also in terms of China-Japan and Korea-Japan relations. Accordingly, the author notes in the introduction that the drive for normalization within Japan began with the 'resurrection of the conflictive structure of China-Japan relations,' but progressed in earnest with the emergence of the North Korean nuclear issue.[6]

Additionally, while the author does not seriously deal with this subject in the body of the text, there were internal elements constituting the basic drive behind drastic changes in Japanese society. In order to

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[5] Rather than "ceasefire," the reviewer considers "armistice" to be the more accurate term. Tae Gyun Park, "Jeongjeonhyeopjeonginga, hyujeonjeopjeonginga [Armistice or Ceasefire?]," *Yeoksabipyeong* 73 (2005); Bo-yeong Kim, "Jeongjeonhyeopjeonggwa pyeonghwahyeopjeong, yeoksajeok maengnakgwa uimi [The Historical Context and Meaning of the Armistice and the Peace Treaty]," *Naeireul yeoneun yeoksa* 61 (2015).

[6] The author illustrates the interplay between North Korean representative Yeong-su's Park's "sea of fire remark" at the North-South working level talks in March 1994, American plans to attack the Yeongbyeon nuclear facilities during the first North Korean nuclear crisis, and the proposal and advancement of the argument that Japan become a normal state aroused by the publication of Ozawa Ichiro's report, "Ilbongaejogyehoek [Plan for Remodeling Japan]" in 1993.

understand current and future conditions in Japan, the author writes in the book's opening pages, one must examine changes and threat perception within Japanese society:

> The year 1995, marking fifty years since the end of the war, began with the shock of the Great Hanshin Earthquake. Soon after, the Tokyo subway sarin gas attack perpetrated by members of Aum Shinrikyo in March engendered harsh criticism of the Japanese state and leadership vis-à-vis its ability to prevent disasters and maintain public order. Those critical of this perspective found fault with the limitations of a pacifist state. This was but the first half of 1995. In September, the rape of a young girl by American soldiers in Okinawa sent the entire island into a furor. American bases concentrated in Okinawa exposed the reality of Japan's continued peace, and the residents of Okinawa began to proclaim the hypocrisy of the 'pacifist state.' Thus, the limitations and hypocrisy of the pacifist state were simultaneously revealed in 1995. Confronting this reality, on the one hand, some referred to the failure of the pacifist state, and on the other, some demanded its true realization.[7]

This understanding of Japanese society suggests that the base-state was not merely imposed upon Japan from without but was the product of the links between external policy and internal interests. Moreover, it discloses two distinct discourses taking form as a result, which have continued to function as the basis of social discourse in Japan ever since. Thus, the author demonstrates why a comprehensive approach, rather than a specialized disciplinary one, is more effective for analyzing the

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[7] This sense of crisis seems only to have sharpened as of late. Any attempt by the reviewer, admittedly not a Japan specialist, will likely be inadequate, but it appears that recent economic stagnation, or the "lost twenty years," and the surging sense of crisis caused by the Tōhoku earthquake in Tsunami occurring in 2011 also need to be taken into account in order to analyze the current state of Japanese society. Only in this manner might one understand both the ruptures and continuities of the past seventy years.

formation of the Japanese base-state. Even though the book appears a study of international politics, it also encompasses elements of conceptual and intellectual history, while applying an empirical methodology.

This book is useful insofar as it allows a more thorough understanding of Japan. It seems somewhat regrettable, however, that analysis of Korean issues is not more fully developed. Attention is given to threat perceptions in China and North Korea regarding Korea-Japan relations and the role of Korean residents in Japan in the formation of postwar social discourse, but there is a need for more concrete analysis of the relationship between the armistice system on the Korean peninsula and Japan than that presented in the conclusion. Considering in particular that the author puts forward this issue in the conclusion, explaining the entanglement between Japan, Korea—another a base state—and the armistice system operative on the Korean peninsula for the past sixty-three years would help to clarify his argument.

Furthermore, an investigation of how Japanese perceptions of China-Japan relations have changed in the post-war era might also provide a meaningful avenue for understanding its social discourse and consensus. After all, while threat perception regarding China has admittedly existed in Japan since the medieval era, there have been a considerable number of other perceptions as well. Knowledge of these differing perceptions and how they vary by era can also be useful for understanding the dynamics of the East Asian international order, long characterized by the conflictive structure of the Sino-Japanese War.

This book is necessary to understand contemporary Japanese society. This is especially true with regard to Korea, where civil society often fails to see beyond its own parochial point of view. From a Korean perspective, there are times when it is difficult to understand the pacifists as much as there are times when it is difficult to understand the old right/militarists. Occasionally, the position of the rightists actually accords well with Korean interests. Meanwhile, the so-called progressive pacifist

position sometimes feels little different from that of the old right/militarists. Nam's book sets the stage for understanding exactly why this is the case. That is the book's virtue.

*Japan's Foreign Wars: Legitimization of War in 16th – 19th Century Japanese Literature**

by KIM Si-deok
Korea: Yeollin chaekdeul, 2016

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Jae-kyung LEE
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This book is a Korean translation of a Japanese publication,[1] itself a version of the author's original doctoral dissertation (also written in Japanese). It is also the fruit of the author's extensive analyses of classical Japanese literature, building on prior studies of literature and historical documents related to the Japanese invasion of Korea in 1592 (hereafter Imjin War).[2] In these works, the author has produced important

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* *Ilbonui daeoe jeonjaeng: 16~19 segi ilbon munheone natanan jeonjaeng jeongdanghwa nolli.*

1 Kim Si-deok, *Ikoku seibatsu senki no sekai: kanhanto-ryukyu retto-ezochi* [Annals of Foreign Conquest: The Korean Peninsula, Ryukyu Islands, and Ezo] (Kasama shoin, 2010).

2 These include Choe Gwan and Kim Si-deok, *Imjinwaeran gwallyeon ilbon munheon haeje: geunsepyeon* [Explication of Japanese Literature Pertaining to the Imjin War: Pre-modern Period] (Mun, 2010); Yasushi and Kim Si-deok, *Hideyoshi no taigai senso: henyo suru katari to ime-ji* [Hideyoshi's Foreign Conquests: Changing Narratives and Imagery] (Kasama shoin, 2011); Kim Si-deok, Geudeuri bon imjinwaeran: geunse ilbonui beseuteuselleowa jeonjaengui gieok [The Japanese Perspective of the Imjin War: Bestsellers and Memories of War in Early Modern Japan] (Hakgoje, 2012); Ryu Seong-ryong, *Gyogam-haeseol jingbirok: hangugui gojeoneseo dongasiaui gojeoneuro* [Translation and Commentary, Book of Corrections: From a Korean Classic to an East Asian Classic], translated and annotated by Kim Si-deok (Akanet, 2013); and Kim Si-deok, *Geurimi doen imjinwaeran: geunse ilbon gomunheonui saphwaro boneun 7 nyeon jeonjaeng* [Imagery of the Imjin War: Looking at the Seven-years War through Illustrations in Early Modern Japanese Literature] (Hakgoje, 2014).

research pertaining to Japanese pre-modern literature concerned with Japan's foreign wars. Altogether, the book provides a comprehensive overview of the author's own particular critical approach as well as a starting point for further research in this regard.

There are two major themes in the book. First, it offers an overview of literature produced in early modern (sixteenth-to-nineteenth century) Japan related to the Imjin War and its influence on other Japanese literature pertaining to Japan's foreign conquests. Second, the author analyzes the concept of the "just war (*seibatsu, bellum iustum*)" manifest in war annals pertaining to Japanese foreign wars in the pre-modern period. This analysis is extrapolated from Imjin War literature. A concept widely used within the East Asian Confucian cultural sphere, the "just war" was originally a "putative measure" adopted by the Chinese emperor to deal with "outsiders," "barbarians," and "others" disturbing the social order. Thus, a "just war" consists of two clearly opposing sides, one virtuous and superior and the other deserving of punishment.

In the first chapter, the author divides the development of Japanese Imjin War literature into five stages, with each having particular characteristics. The second through fourth chapters deal with literature pertaining to the Ryukyu and Ezo wars and the Conquest of the Three Koreas, elucidating the influence of Imjin War literature as well as the concept of the "just war" manifest therein. Following its initial stages of development, Japanese Imjin War literature was influenced by the introduction of Chinese literature in the first half of the seventeenth century (the first shock) and later by the introduction of Korean literature, including such works as the *Book of Corrections (Jingbirok)*, in the latter half of the seventeenth century (the second shock). Thus, Imjin War literature came to embrace information regarding all three states in East Asia. By the nineteenth century, it was widely disseminated in the form of *Yomihon* literature, which took the common people as its subject. Meanwhile, it has been confirmed that Imjin War literature had a direct influence on the development and composition of eighteenth-

century literature concerning the Ryukyu War and the Conquest of the Three Koreas.

According to the author, the concept of the "just war" is composed of two logics, namely, that of the attacker, which claims some sort of justifiable grounds for such action, and that of the defender, which emphasizes the need to protect against invasion. Thus, there is the "logic of attack" and the "logic of defense." The author shows how these logics shift and strengthen over time in Imjin War literature. In particular, he describes how this literature became imbued with nationalistic characteristics in response to the incursion of Russia and other Western powers beginning in the latter part of the eighteenth century. The author thus presents concrete cases demonstrating how this particular flow also emerged in literature pertaining to the Ryukyu and Ezo wars and the Conquest of the Three Koreas.

The book's significance stems from its capacity to convey to Koreans what the Imjin War, with which they are already familiar, meant in pre-modern Japan and how these perceptions have carried over into modernity. The Korean audience will also likely experience its first encounter with the development of literature concerning Japan's foreign wars, such as that pertaining to the Ryukyu and Ezo wars and the Conquest of the Three Koreas. Meanwhile, they will come to better understand the concept of the "just war" and how it was used by the Japanese in the early modern period.

The Japanese invasions of the 1590s are commonly referred to in Korea with the terms "*Imjin waeran* (literally Imjin 'chaos')" and "*Jeongyu jaeran* (literally *Jeongyu* 're-chaos')." "*Imjin*" and "*jeongyu*" refer to the years within the sexagenarian calendar when each of the invasions occurred (1592 and 1597, respectively). "*Ran*" refers to the "chaos" incited by the "*wae*," the term then used by Koreans to refer to the Japanese. In Japan, the invasions are now respectively referred to as *Bunroku no eki* and *Keichō no eki*. Here, *Bunroku* and *Keichō* each refer to years and *eki* to "campaign." Thus, Japan has also come to the wars

with respect to the years in which they occurred. It was common up until 1945, however, to use the term, "Toyotomi Hideyoshi's Conquest of Joseon (*Hō taikō no chōsenseibatsu*)." This rather had the effect of portraying Joseon as the object of a "just war." In China, the war was once variously referred to as the "*Wanli dongzheng*" or the "*Wanli chaoxian zhi yi*." Currently, it is also referred to as "*Kang wo yuan chao*." Thus, China refers to the war as the "the just war in the East during the reign of Emperor Wanli," "the war in Joseon during the reign of Emperor Wanli," or "the matter of resisting Japan and aiding Joseon." Lately, to avoid the subjective perceptions signified by such terminology, some have argued for the more neutral term of "Imjin War." More important than the issue of nomenclature itself, however, is the task to stipulate exactly how such differing terminologies have developed and precisely what is signified by the differing perceptions therein.

Reflecting this critical awareness, Korean scholarship in the fields of history and literature has recently begun to illuminate problems of memory pertaining to the Imjin War. In the Korean public consciousness, however, perceptions of the Imjin War have diverged little from the narrative structure presented in the *Book of Corrections*. Consequently, there is inadequate understanding of the Chinese and Japanese sides of the story. Just as the author delineates in the book, pre-modern Japanese perceptions of the Imjin War were never all that straightforward owing to the powerful influence of diverse factors such as the reception of Chinese and Korean literature, differences between intellectuals and the common people, disparities over time, and the advent of mass publishing. Furthermore, with the onset of modernity, an intimate relationship was forged between the development of pre-modern Japanese Imjin War literature and Japanese "perceptions of the other." Accordingly, there is a need for Koreans to transcend unmitigated criticism of Japanese perceptions, to endeavor to objectively observe the point of contact between the pre-modern process of development and the modern era, and to compare this process with the development their own perceptions of

the Imjin War. It is precisely in this respect that the publication of the book in Korean is so significant. One may hope it will have a substantial influence on future relevant research.

The analysis of the legitimization of war, or the concept of "just war," within sixteenth-to-nineteenth-century Japanese literature in the book also has important implications for Korean historical and literary research. The concept of a "just war" allowed Japan to legitimize its invasion of Joseon on the basis of the arrogance, tyranny, and "obliviousness to war" of its ruling class. Coming to empathize with the Korean point of view, however, contemporary Japanese researchers now naturally consider the term "Just War in Joseon" to be an objectionable one. Nevertheless, the tendency for a nation to believe itself on the side of righteousness and its war on the side of justice is a universal one, wherein Korea is no exception. Korea has also used the term "just war" to refer to its military encounters with surrounding peoples, such as those on Tsushima Island (Daemado) and in Jurchen in the fifteenth century.[3] In terms of the legitimization of armed conflict or deference to a "great power" according to the "logic of defense" described in the book, the actions of Korea share common ground with the reasoning manifest in pre-modern Japanese literature pertaining to wars with foreign powers. Meanwhile, the "Russian Conquest (*Naseon jeongbeol*)" of the seventeenth century was a coercive military action by the Qing, but it has been reappraised as a proud historical event in relation to King Hyojong's (r. 1649-1659) "Northern Conquest" in the eighteenth

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[3] Jeong Da-ham, "Joseon chogiui "jeongbeol": cheonmyeong, sigye, dallyeok, geurigo hwayangmugi [The "Just War" in the Early Joseon Dynasty Era: The Will of Heaven, the Clock, the Calendar, and the Gun]," *Yeoksawa munhwa* 21 (2011): 45-80; Jeong Da-ham, "Jeongbeoliraneun jeonjaeng/jeongbeoliraneun jesa: sejongdae gihaenyeon "dongjeong"gwa pajeogang "yainjeongbeor"eul jungsimeuro [War as "Just War" / War as Ancestral Rite: The Gihae "Conquest of the East" during the Reign of King Sejong and the Pajeo River "Barbarian Conquest"]," *Hanguksa hakbo* 52 (2013): 271-306.

century.[4] In contemporary Korea, these wars are referred to the same as they always have been, as the "Daemado Conquest," "Jurchen Conquest," and the "Russian Conquest." Thus, the rationalization of military conquests according to the logic of the "just war" has not been absent from Korean history either. In this manner, the author's emphasis on the concept of the "just war" may act as a mirror reflecting the "victimhood nationalism" inherent in Korean perceptions of their nation.[5]

The book is thus a useful work inducing contemplation in the Korean studies scholar and general Korean reader alike. There are, nonetheless, some issues with the book as well. First, because it is a compilation of studies pertaining to separate literary works, there are places within the text where the overall critical perspective of the book is not readily apparent. In the second section of chapter two, for example, the analysis of *Crescent Moon: The Adventures of Tametomo (Chinsetsu Yumiharizuki)*, related to the Ryukyu Conquest, is necessary to discuss the development of Ryukyu Conquest literature, but any consideration of the relationship between this work and other Imjin War literature or the concept of the "just war" manifest therein does not emerge until very much later. While it is true that this problem is inevitable, due to the fact that the book surveys each piece of literature separately, it can be somewhat exasperating for the reader. Furthermore, as mentioned above, the book's critical approach consists in philologically arranging the developmental process of Imjin War literature and its influence on Japanese literature pertaining to wars with foreign powers, analyzing the logic of the "just war" manifest therein. But it is difficult to claim that each of these objectives receive balanced treatment. Despite being well

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[4] Kye Seung-beom, *Joseonsidae haeoepabyeonggwa hanjunggwangye: joseon jibaegyecheungui jungguk insik* [Foreign Dispatches and Korea-China Relations during the Joseon Dynasty Era: Perceptions of China Among the Joseon Ruling Class] (Pureun yeoksa, 2009), 259-275.

[5] Jie-hyun Lim, "Victimhood Nationalism and History Reconciliation in East Asia," *History Compass* 8, no. 1 (2010): 1.

presented in the conclusion, the author's critical framework is perhaps not so well formulated within the main body of the text.

The book also demonstrates the inevitable limitations associated with any specialized scholarly work. It is primarily a work directed at scholars of Japanese literature, composed of highly technical and empirical content. The average reader, and especially the average Korean reader—despite the fact that this edition is published in Korean—will thus likely encounter great difficulty in grasping the content of the book. This is simply due to the fact that, in order to do so, one should have prior knowledge of such difficult subjects as pre-modern Japanese literature, political and social development in Edo period Japan, or historical change in the realm of publishing. The author has surely endeavored to address this issue by making some simplifications in the translated version; he has removed esoteric content from the main text and footnotes, shifted some footnote content into the main text, added footnotes explaining unfamiliar content, and even incorporated illustrations. Unfortunately, it remains clear the book is not one "friendly" to the average reader.

Furthermore, while the author minutely traces the manner in which the logic of the "just war" manifests in Japanese literature pertaining to wars with foreign powers, a precise theoretical analysis is lacking. There are brief and intermittent discussions in the body and conclusion regarding which rationales for "just war" manifest in early modern Japanese literature pertaining to war with foreign powers originate in the ancient and medieval eras, which are the result of Confucian influence, and which are the product of popular culture in pre-modern Japan. Nevertheless, the book would have benefitted from a discussion of how Japan's concept of the "just war" is similar to or different from that in China and Korea by comparing these rationales with the concept of the "just war" prevalent in pre-modern Japanese literature related to wars *within* Japan.

One might anticipate that such issues will be resolved in the

author's upcoming work, *The Philology of War (Jeonjaengui munhak)*. Readers wishing to better understand the author's critical approach and the development of Imjin War literature, moreover, may refer to *The Japanese Perspective of the Japanese Invasion of 1592: Bestsellers and Memories of War in Pre-modern Japan*, targeted at the general reader.[6]

To conclude, it is perhaps worth mentioning a few points of personal interest to the reviewer in the book. First, despite the fact that pre-modern Japanese Imjin War literature intricately encapsulated literature from all three nations in East Asia, rather than submitting any critical perspective regarding Japan's wars, it merely supplemented and strengthened the already existing perceptions therein. Second, under the influence of unabashed nineteenth-century nationalism, the Japanese logic of the foreign "just war" developed into a sense of superiority and imperial expansionism, completely bereft of the capacity to present the slightest justification for war (*casus belli*). While it is unfortunate that the scope of this review does not allow for a description of the various other aspects of the book, suffice it to say that it is worth a read not only for readers interested in the Imjin War but also the literature, ideas, and society of early modern Japan.

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[6] See note 3.

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