


The History of Imperial Japan's Seizure of Dokdo



The History of Imperial Japan's Seizure of Dokdo

Kim Byungryull

| Preface |

Japan continues to provoke conflict by laying claim to Dokdo, ignoring the fact that historically and legally the island is an integral part of Korean territory.

History clearly shows that the Japanese imperialists illegally seized Dokdo for strategic and military purposes during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). But Japanese politicians today tend to ignore the historical reality and teach the young generation faulty, misleading knowledge.

As an effort to shed a light on history, our Foundation is publishing the book, which shows the process by which the Japanese militarists seized Dokdo.

We have many publications concerning Dokdo. Regretfully, however, there have been few papers on the unlawful seizure of the island by Japanese militarists in the context of the Russo-Japanese War.

I hope that the book will be of great help in understanding the issues surrounding of Dokdo, and that it will become a reference work not just for researchers but for policy makers too.

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to those who have been engaged in the translation and publication of this book.

Kim Yongdeok

President
Northeast Asian History Foundation

| Foreword |

If Dokdo belonged to Japan from the beginning as the Japanese insist, what led the Daijokan (Meiji Japan's Council of State) to say that "It should be kept in mind that Takeshima (Ulleungdo) and Matsushima (Dokdo) has nothing to do with Japan" in 1877

Did Japan occupy a group of islets that had remained unoccupied ahead of anyone else? In December 1869, the Japanese government dispatched Moriyama Shigeru, a Foreign Ministry official, to Joseon (Korea) to find out how Takeshima (Ulleungdo) and Matsushima (Dokdo) had become Korean possessions. This shows that the Japanese government knew that Dokdo belonged to Korea at that time. But Japan changed its attitude and took steps to incorporate them into its territory in 1905, insisting that they remained unoccupied. The first step it should have taken before incorporating them into its territory was to check whether Korea had renounced its sovereignty over the islets. If Japan had incorporated the islets without knowing that they belonged to Korea, then it would have been appropriate for Japan to set the record straight upon learning that they belonged to Korea.

There is one thing that was overlooked by Koreans in this controversy. They did not check carefully whether or not Japan took steps to incorporate Dokdo into its territory in 1905 in full knowledge of the fact that they belonged to Korea. Korean simply assured that Japan acted as it did because it did not know the islets belonged to Korea.

If Japan took such a step out of need, e.g. for a military purpose, then there was no reason for it to verify whether the islets belonged to Korea.

The Japanese claim that they took steps to incorporate the islets into their territory in response to a petition submitted by a fisherman named Nakai Yosaburo. If that is true, they would have contacted the Korea government to verify whether the islets belonged to Korea or not. If the islets had then been confirmed as belonging to Korea, all the Japanese government would have had to do was to reject the fisherman's petition or ask the Joseon government to allow the fisherman to fish in that area. In fact, the Japanese government did not have to ask such a favor of the Joseon government. At that time, Japanese fishermen were free to fish in the sea near the Korea coast under the Joseon (Korea) - Japan Trade Regulations signed in 1883 and the Joseon (Korea) - Japan Fishing Regulations signed in 1889. All these circumstances make it possible to guess that Japan took such a step for military reasons, without taking the trouble to check whether the islets belonged to Korea.

At that time, Russia was one of the most powerful countries in the world. In making preparations for a war against such a powerful country, Japan must have known the strategic value of Dokdo in the East Sea. Thus, it would be meaningful to check the process by which Japan incorporated the islets into its territory from such a perspective.

Kim Byungryull

(June 2006)

| Contents |

Preface ... 4

Foreword ... 5

chapter 1. The Rise of Militarism in Japan

1. The Adoption of a Western Military System and the Centralization of Power... 13
2. The Adoption of Military Conscription ... 16
3. The Meiji Regime and the Military ... 18

chapter 2. Japan's Conspiracy to Conquer Joseon

1. The *Seikanron* (“Debate over Joseon Expedition”) and the Campaign to Force the Opening of Joseon ... 27
2. The Sino-Japanese War and the Isolation of Joseon ... 48

chapter 3. The Russo-Japanese War and Japanese Encroachment on the Korean Peninsula

1. Military Operation Plan in the Russo-Japanese War ... 65
2. The Outbreak of War and the Escalating Encroachment on the Korean Peninsula ... 69

chapter 4. The Incapacitation of Joseon (Empire of Great Han)’s Armed Forces and the Imposition of the Japanese Military System on Joseon

1. The Incapacitation of Joseon’s Armed Forces ... 81
2. Joseon Falls under Japanese Military Control as a Supply Base for the Russo-Japanese War ... 84

chapter 5. The Japanese Navy's Seizing of Dokdo

1. The Expulsion of the Russians from Ulleungdo ... 101
2. The Japanese Navy Grasps the Strategic Value of Dokdo ... 104
3. Seizing of Dokdo ... 114
4. The Japanese Government insists that “Uninhabited” Islands were Legitimately Incorporated ... 127

chapter 6. Japan Usurps Korea's Diplomatic Sovereignty and Incorporates Dokdo into Japanese Territory

1. Usurpation of Korea's Diplomatic Sovereignty ... 141
2. Japan's Notice of the Incorporation of Dokdo into its Territory and its Notification to Korea ... 152
3. Protests from Korea ... 157

chapter 7. Management of Dokdo after the Russo-Japanese War

1. The End of the Russo-Japanese War and the Removal of the Watchhouses ... 165
2. The Management of Dokdo in the Post Russo-Japanese War ... 168

chapter 8. Japan's Annexation of Korea and Dokdo

1. Japan's Annexation of Korea ... 177
2. The Management of Dokdo after Annexation ... 181

Conclusion ... 190

List of Figures and Tables ... 192

Index ... 196

| Notes on Romanization and Usage |

- The Joseon Dynasty changed its name to Daehan Jeguk (Great Han Empire) in 1897. In this book, “Korea” has been used instead of the “Great Han Empire” to avoid confusion.
- The same principle is applied to the quoted materials, such as the text of a treaty.
- The transcription of Korean names and places in Korea follows the rule announced by the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism on July 7, 2000 (Public Notice No. 2000-8).
- The transcription of Japanese names people and places follows the Hepburn-style Romanization. The corresponding Chinese characters for such names are provided in the index for easier identification by those who are interested.
- The transcription of the names of major historical events is accompanied by the description generally used in the relevant country (e.g. the “Korea-Japan Protectorate Treaty” is accompanied by “Eulsa Joyak,” as used in Korea).
- The transcription of “Dokdo” in quoted materials is accompanied by its other name, “Liancourt Rocks,” etc..

THE HISTORY OF IMPERIAL JAPAN'S SEIZURE OF DOKDO



Chapter 1

The Rise of Militarism in Japan

The Western powers imposed unequal treaties on Japan. Japan blamed the Western powers, but transformed itself into a militaristic nation and imposed similar treaties on its neighbors.

1. The Adoption of a Western Military System and the Centralization of Power

In September 1870, Yamagata Aritomo was appointed as Japan's Junior Vice Minister of War.¹⁾ Between July 1869 and September 1870 he sojourned in Europe (namely France, Britain, Germany, Russia, Belgium and the Netherlands) and the U.S. to study military science, and was strongly impressed by Prussian militarism and patriotism. He learned that Prussian youths were made to acquire a militaristic bearing and interest in national defense through a universal military conscription system.²⁾ Upon returning home, he had the opportunity to report the results of his visit to Europe directly to the Emperor. (an exceptional privilege for a lowly warrior like him) A few months later, he was appointed as the head of working-level military affairs. The appointment came with an order to build a strong military and push ahead with a series of innovations in the Ministry of War.

Upon Yamagata's appointment as Junior Vice Minister of War, Senior Vice Minister of War Maebara Issei resigned feigning illness. In early August 1871, Prince Arisugawa Taruhito resigned as Military Minister, and the position remained vacant. In late August, Yamagata was appointed as the Senior Vice Minister of War and took the role of de-facto Military Minister.

When appointed Junior Vice Minister, of War Yamagata unified the nation's military systems, modeling the Army on the British system and the Navy on the French system. In April 1872, the Ministry of War was divided

1) The Ministry of War comprised a Minister, Senior Vice Minister, Junior Vice Minister, (two) Director Generals, etc..

2) David B. Ralston, *Importing the European Army: the Introduction of European Military Techniques and Institutions into the extra-European world, 1600-1914* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990), p. 161.

into the Ministries of War (now restricted to the army) and Navy. In March of the following year, he was sworn in as a war Minister.

At that time, Japan believed that the Prussian military system was superior to that of France due to Prussia's recent victory in the Franco-Prussian War. However, no one in Japan was fluent in German, so the French system was adopted, only to be replaced by the Prussian system within a short period of time.

Yamagata reinforced the Royal Palace Guard Unit³⁾ in an effort to enhance the central government's authority. To reinforce the Royal Palace Guard Unit, he, along with Iwakura Tomomi and Okubo Toshimichi, two influential statesmen, paid a visit to Saigo Takamori in Kagoshima. Saigo Takamori was an influential figure in the military. Yamagata reorganized the Royal Palace Guards with men selected from among the troops of the Satsuma, Choshu and Tosa domains. This laid the basis for the foundation of the Japanese Army. With the troops organized under the central government, the Meiji government pushed ahead with the process of centralizing power more confidently, announcing the *Haihanchiken* - the abolition of the old domains and the establishment of prefectures - in August 1871. Men from the four domains of Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa and Hizen assumed the positions of Councillors.⁴⁾

In the Navy's case, the *Haihanchiken* order transferred all warships belonging to the old domains to the central government.⁵⁾ In 1873, Navy Minister Katsu Kaishu proposed the 18-Year Plan,⁶⁾ though the plan was

3) It was renamed as the Royal Palace Guard in 1872.

4) Saigo Takamori from Satsuma, Kido Takayoshi from Choshu, Itagaki Taisuke from Tosa and Okuma Shigenobu from Hizen.

5) All told, the number of ships whose total tonnage reached 12,350 tons came to 14 in 1871. Bak Yeongjun, *The Formation of the Japanese Military and its Expansion in the Meiji Era*. [in Korean] (Seoul: Institute for National Defense Military, 1987), p. 238.

ultimately shelved due to financial limitations. Still, many naval officers were sent abroad (i.e. Togo Heihachiro was one of those sent to Britain and Yokoi Heijitaro was one of those sent to the U.S.) to acquire advanced military skills and knowledge. Efforts were also made to lay the groundwork for a modern Navy by inviting foreign military instructors to train Japanese seamen and build naval ships.⁷⁾




Fig. 1-1. Japanese Royal Palace Guards

-
- 6) It was an ambitious plan to build a total of 104 ships, i.e. 26 iron-clad ones, 14 large-sized ones, 32 mid-sized ones, 16 small ones and 16 transportation ships.
- 7) In 1872, the number of foreigners employed by the Meiji government came to 213, of whom 119 were British and 49 were French. The British were mostly engaged in assignments at the Ministry of Public Works, the Navy and communications, while half (i.e. 24) of the French worked at shipyards. Hirakawa Sukehiro, "Japan's turn to the West," Marius B. Jansen, ed., *The Cambridge History of Japan*, Vol.5: *The Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 468~469.

2. The Adoption of Military Conscription

During the Tokugawa era (1603-1867), the samurai monopolized the Japanese military. Farmers or merchants could not carry swords. Towards the end of the Tokugawa Bakufu, a new military recruiting system was adopted to select some troops from the common people to fill the shortage, while continuing to depend on samurai selected from the provincial domains to meet most of its needs. However, even after the Meiji Restoration, a universal system of military service was not immediately adopted. Several attempts were made to implement such a system in the early Meiji era, but failed due to stiff opposition from the samurai.

When appointed as Junior Vice Minister of War in 1870, Yamagata decided to push ahead with universal military service as previously proposed by Ōmura Masujirō.⁸⁾ In 1872, he advanced the opinion that military preparedness should be focused not only on dealing with internal strife, but also on the country's relations with other countries.

At present our military strength, aside from the Imperial Bodyguard established merely to protect the Palace and Emperor, includes only the troops of the four garrisons numbering twenty battalions. These are assigned to maintain internal security not external defense…… But with the significant changes resulting from the dissolution of the han armies and the collection of weapons, circumstances are appropriate for determining a policy for external defense.⁹⁾

- 8) When he became Senior Vice Minister of War, Ōmura Masujirō made several attempts to modernize the military system, seeking to abolish the clans, end the privileges granted to samurais, and adopt universal military service. He was assassinated by those opposed to him.
- 9) Roger F. Hackett, "The Meiji Leaders and Modernization: The Case of Yamagata Aritomo," *Changing Japanese Attitudes toward Modernization*, Marius B. Jansen, ed. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 254.



Fig. 1-2. Japanese youths undergo a physical checkup for military conscription

His views, submitted in a letter (called Yamagata Ikensho), pointed out the need to adopt a system of universal military service modeled on European systems to counter Russia's southward advance. His proposal for the adoption of universal military service faced stiff resistance from conservatives who insisted on maintaining samurai traditions.

Still Yamagata pressed ahead with his idea saying, "Most of the European countries have adopted a universal military service system. Even small countries, such as Belgium or the Netherlands, have a regular army of 45,000 men, as well as reserve forces. Youths finish their secondary school education at the age of 19. If they are made to join the military after finishing secondary school education, it will be a huge military college for ordinary people." Finally on January 10, 1872, the Universal Military Conscription Act was implemented.

3. The Meiji Regime and the Military

1) The Power Structure of the Meiji Regime

In the pre-Meiji Restoration period, politics were not separate from the military in Japan. The leader of a group who obtained victory in an armed struggle could gain absolute power. During the Bakufu Period, the Emperor and the Shogun shared authority and power, but politics and the military were two functions exercised by those in power, namely the samurai.

Japanese emperors were the source of traditional authority, but exercised only symbolic power and bestowed legitimacy on the Shoguns, who were both political and military strongmen. Throughout the period of political turmoil during the Meiji Restoration, those who newly rose to power from Satsuma and Choshu needed the Emperor's imperial authority to win the war against the Bakufu. After the establishment of the new Meiji government, samurai had to allow the imperial Court, which was ruled by the Emperor, to retain the role of the symbol of authority in their effort to put down the samurai rebellion and unite the people. They used the Emperor to split those who opposed to them spiritually and claim their own legitimacy.

After the Meiji Restoration, politics and the military continued hand in hand as in the Bakufu era. In Japan, the corps of career military officers was not formed as in European countries. The group that led the Meiji Restoration consisted of lower samurai from Satsuma, Chosu, Tosa and Hizen. They assumed the positions of politicians, bureaucrats and uniformed soldiers of the new Meiji government. Thus, the distinction between civilians and uniformed soldiers was meaningless. For example, Yamagata Aritomo and Yamamoto Konnohyoei were soldiers, but they were also politicians in the time-honored samurai tradition. Samurai were national leaders who put politics and the military under their control.

With the adoption of European systems it looked as if politics could be separated from the military. In reality, the military established its own realm and blocked the government's interference. The government was unable to gain a strong foothold, and the military remained the main influence behind the imperial plan to reinforce the military and enrich the nation.

The Japanese military launched a universal military service system and re-organized itself into a modern, centralized institution. The Imperial Instruction to Soldiers announced in 1882 carried greater significance than the law and constituted the supreme norm governing the military. The Emperor announced, "I am your Commander-in-Chief." This laid the ideological basis for the supreme command's independent prerogative and was intended to secure the military's own realm free from governmental control.¹⁰⁾

The Imperial or Meiji Constitution promulgated in 1889 reflected the Imperial Instruction to Soldiers as follows:

Article 11: The Emperor shall have full control over the Army and the Navy.

Article 12: The Emperor shall have the right to make decisions on the systems of the Army and the Navy and the military budget.

Article 11 took the Army and Navy from the Cabinet minister's control, although the Minister's prerogative was stipulated in the Cabinet System Regulation of Japan, Article 55. Article 12 also put matters concerning

10) Ōe Shinobu, *Prerogative of Supreme Command* [in Japanese] (Tokyo: Nippon-Hyoronsha), p. 32.

military organization and budget beyond governmental control. That is to say, the Army and the Navy were allowed under the Constitution to report directly to the Emperor, completely bypassing the civilian government. When the government ratified the Washington Naval Treaty in 1922 and the London Naval Treaty in 1930, the military accused the government of violating the Emperor's prerogative of supreme command. The General Staff Office Ordinance, Article 6 stipulates that "military orders shall be carried out by having them delivered to the War Minister immediately after the Emperor's approval." This meant that the Ministry of War was forced to follow the General Staff Office's instructions concerning military orders. Due to the supreme command's independent prerogative, the cabinet including the Ministry of War could not interfere in the General Staff Office's handling of affairs related to military orders.

The political practice of the supreme command's independent prerogative secured its legitimacy through an amendment to the Japanese Cabinet System Regulations in December 1889. The Cabinet System Regulation, Article 7 stipulated that "when there is a proposal made concerning a military secret or order, the Army and Navy Minister shall report to the Prime Minister pursuant to the intention of the Emperor, without going through the Cabinet." As such, whenever there was a need for the Emperor to decide a matter involving the supreme command's prerogative, the Army or Navy General Staff Office could make a recommendation directly to the Emperor and receive his instructions without going through the Cabinet.

In this way, the military set up a legal and institutional system in which it was free from government control, but allowed to intervene in governmental affairs. With a few exceptions in the early Meiji era, the positions of the War and Navy Ministers were occupied by military generals or flag officers. Even in the extraordinary event of the entire Cabinet's

resignation, the War and Navy Ministers could remain politically neutral. Furthermore, the War and Navy Ministers could ask for the entire Cabinet's resignation by resigning in advance.¹¹⁾

As those from the samurai clans were losing power at the end of the Russo-Japan War and political parties were coming to the political forefront, there was a movement to include civilians as candidates for posts as War or Navy Ministers. The law Stipulating that the post War and Navy Minister was to be filled by an active duly general was abolished in 1913 by the Cabinet headed by Yamamoto Gonnohyoe, who gained power in the Taisho Political Crisis.¹²⁾ In 1936, the system was amended to restore the original practice amid the military's political dominance.

2) The Military's leading Role in the Nation's Policy towards Asia

Since its earliest days, the Meiji government had set its sights on the Asian continent. A proposal was made to the Imperial Court to start a war of conquest of Joseon (Korea) in 1868¹³⁾ to keep victorious troops occupied as they returned home after the Boshin War.¹⁴⁾ Although the proposal was rejected, advance into the Asian Continent remained a primary goal for the Japanese government.

Japan's invasion of Taiwan in 1874 was the first step towards realizing

11) Lee Hyeongcheol, *The Japanese Military's Political Dominance* [in Korean] (Seoul: Bobmunsa, 1991), p. 32.

12) *Ibid.*, p. 32.

13) Fujiwara Akira, "Translated by Eom Suhyeon," *The History of Japanese Military Affairs* [in Korean] (Seoul: Sisa Japanese Language Promotion Center, 1994), p. 67.

14) A civil war in Japan (1868-1869) was fought to put down the rebellion headed by Enomoto Takeaki, the Navy Minister during the Bakufu era, who wanted to restore the Bakufu.

its dream of occupying all of Asia. The Taiwan invasion's primary purpose, conducted on a pretext of retaliation against Taiwanese aborigines for killing Ryukyu fishermen, was to placate samurai dissatisfied with the government's refusal of their proposal to invade Joseon.¹⁵⁾



Fig. 1-3. A depiction of a battle between Taiwanese and Japanese troops on the Penghu Islands

Japan's policy for advance into the Asian continent was originally the Foreign Ministry's responsibility. The military was supposed to be no more than a support organization assigned to clear away policy obstacles. In reality however, the military played a leading role in implementing the policy, primarily due to the following reasons:

First, the Japanese military had emerged victorious in the wars against China and Russia. Consequently, it held the advantageous position of possessing more useful intelligence than any other government organization. Second, after the wars against China and Russia, the Japanese Army stationed troops in Korea, the Liaodong Peninsula, lands

¹⁵⁾ Fujiwara Akira, *Ibid.*, p. 67.

owned by the South Manchuria Railroad Company and northern China. The numbers of dispatched intelligence officers and Japanese military advisers to Chinese military factions outnumbered those dispatched by the Foreign Ministry. Third, the military had a clear sense of mission believing it was at the forefront of the long-held vision to advance into the Asian Continent.¹⁶⁾

Yamagata Ikensho strongly supported the Japanese military's plan to advance into the Asian Continent. In 1890 he proposed that Japan should expand itself territorially to gain a firmer footing on the Asian continent, using the Korean Peninsula as a bridge to link Japan with other parts of Asia.¹⁷⁾

16) Lee Hyeongcheol, *Ibid.*, p. 39.

17) Iokibe Makoto, *The History of Japan's Politics and Diplomacy* [in Japanese] (Tokyo: Nihon Hoso Shuppan Kyokai), pp. 58~61.

THE HISTORY OF IMPERIAL JAPAN'S SEIZURE OF DOKDO



Chapter 2

Japan's Conspiracy to Conquer Joseon

Japan reorganized itself into a modern military nation, laid plans to conquer Joseon and advance into the Asian Continent, following in the footsteps of Western imperialist countries.

1. The *Seikanron* (“Debate over Joseon Expedition”) and the Campaign to Force the Opening of Joseon

1) *Seikanron*

The arrival of the American naval fleet led by Commodore Matthew Perry in July 1853 forced Japan to open its doors to the outside world in 1854. Later it modernized its military and weaponry, and laid plans to conquer Joseon and advance into the Asian continent following in the footsteps of Western imperialist countries.

Satō Nobuhiro,¹⁾ a scientist and an early advocate of Japan’s westernization said the following in his war scenario entitled *Kondohisaku*:

Troops from Matsue and Hagi will attack villages in Hamgyeong, Gangwon and Gyeongsang Provinces in the east of Joseon, with many warships laden with firearms and carriages. Those from Hakata will land on the southern coast of Joseon and march to Chungcheong Province. We will conquer several castles in that country to make them ours. We will also display our military strength in the Bohai Bay of China with our warships from time to time.²⁾

In a letter sent from his prison cell in 1855, Yoshida Shōin³⁾ said the

1) Satō Nobuhiro wrote many books on farm management, mining, naval defense and military science. He advocated a centralized government directly controlled by the Emperor.

2) Quoted from Lim Jongguk, *The History of the Japanese Invasion of Joseon* [in Korean] (Seoul: Ilwolsoegak Publishing, 1988), p. 23.

3) A thinker and educator at the end of the Bakufu period, Yoshida Shōin belonged to a

following revealing the influence of Satō Nobuhiro's proposal to invade Joseon:

We made treaties with Russia and America. We should not be regarded by these barbarians as unfaithful people by failing to comply with them. We should behave strictly according to established principles, show a faithful attitude and build our national strength so that we may conquer easy targets, such as Joseon, Manchuria and China, and make up for what we lose in commerce with Russia and America.⁴⁾

He believed that Japan had to overcome its disadvantageous position as a result of the unequal treaties with Western powers, but that there was no way to cancel the treaties. Thus, he declared that Japan should make up for its loss by annexing the territories of nearby Joseon and Manchuria, which were easy targets. Hashimoto Sanai⁵⁾ had similar thoughts:

The future world will be dominated by Britain and Russia. Japan cannot resist their dominance alone. It will be wise to maintain friendly relations with Russia and form an alliance with America to block the British

group of people advocating reverence for the Emperor and the expulsion of “barbarians (i.e. foreigners).” In 1858, when the Bakufu signed the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Amity and Commerce, he attempted to assassinate the senior councilor in charge and was later hanged.

- 4) Inoue Kiyoshi, *Formation of Japanese Imperialism* [in Japanese] (Tokyo: Iwanam;shoten, 1968), pp. 10~11.
- 5) A political thinker and a medical doctor at the end of the Bakufu period, Hashimoto Sanai belonged to a group of people advocating reverence for the Emperor and the expulsion of “barbarians (i.e. foreigners).”

advance. We need to accept the demand made by Townsend Harris (American Consul General and Minister to Japan) for a trade treaty and the presence of an American Minister in Japan in this regard. It is essential for us to regard America as a fief in the east, the Western countries as belonging to us, maintain close relations with Russia, and advance into neighboring countries.⁶⁾

The proposal made by Yoshida and Hashimoto was not readily adopted by the Bakufu. In the period from 1855-1857 following the opening of its doors to America in 1854, Japan was asked to do the same by other Western powers.




Fig. 2-1. Yoshida Shōin



Fig. 2-2. Hashimoto Sanai

6) Inoue Kiyoshi, *Ibid.*, pp. 10~11.

With the establishment of the new Meiji government, Yoshida's followers, including Kido Takayoshi, raised the need for advance into other countries, and particularly the invasion of Joseon. Realistically, Kido's insistence on the Korean expedition was a response to Joseon's rejection of Japan's proposal to establish formal relations. At that time, Japan ordered the leader of Tsushima's domain, So Yoshiakira, to propose the establishment of formal relations. The Korean side refused to receive Japan's envoy and official letter, pointing to the inclusion of certain expressions in the letter which could be interpreted as regarding Korea as a tributary of Japan.

Korea's rejection enraged the Japanese leaders, including Kido Takayoshi, who initiated discussion of the need to invade Korea. Kido Takayoshi wrote the following in his journal:

At the moment, there are two important things we should do. One is to set the world in the right direction and the other is to dispatch an envoy to Joseon and ask for its apology for its rudeness towards us. If Joseon does not comply with our request, we should attack it to display our strength.⁷⁾

Kido clearly expressed his thoughts that the invasion of Korea would greatly contribute to Japan's interests. In 1869, he wrote the following letter to Omura Masujiro, who was responsible for the military policies of the new Meiji government:

It is my wish to compel Busan in Joseon to open its doors by force. There will be no material benefit in it for us. We may incur some loss. Even so,

7) Ibid., p. 3.

there are no other good ways to achieve a grand vision for our people, develop technologies and help the nation prosper for ever. Our plan concerning Joseon will establish the national identity of Japan. I think that this will be the starting point for our glory to shine on the East Sea. As regards to starting a war, we should not hurry. We should set up a budget for each year, occupy several areas first, and then draw up a new plan. Then, in two or three years, the whole situation will be changed in our favor and the foundations for a strong Imperial Japan will be laid.⁸⁾

Kido meant that Japan's invasion of Joseon would bring no immediate economic benefits, but in the long-term it would help Japan to build its economy and technology, in addition to enhancing its status in the international community. Furthermore, he even stated in detail how to carry out a war against Joseon, specifying that Japan's level of preparedness should be augmented. Because the domains posed a potential threat to the newly established Meiji government, it appears that Kido may have raised the need to invade Joseon to divert the local domains attention to matters outside the country, using the prevailing anger towards Joseon for rejecting Japan's proposal to establish of formal relations.⁹⁾

In April 1871, Etō Shinpei submitted a recommendation to State Minister Iwakura Tomomi to the effect that Japan should prepare 500,000 to 600,000 well-trained troops led by 20,000 officers, including a commanding general, and about 30 warships under a five-year plan designed to advance into the Asian Continent.

8) Ibid., pp. 3~4.

9) Bak Yeongjun, *The Formation of Japanese Military and its Expansion in the Meiji Era* [in Korean] (Seoul: Institute for National Defense Military, 1987), p. 247.

We should build up the capability of the Army and Navy, and send spies to monitor the local situations, including the detailed geography of Korea and China in order to formulate our strategy. When China turns against us, we should set the matter right once and for all either by joining forces with Russia or by going it alone and asking Russia to stay neutral. If we succeed in dominating all of Asia after conquering China and winning the minds of the people through benevolent policies, appointing the right people to the right positions and selecting talented people, we will be able to compete with America, Russia and Germany in a bid to conquer the world.¹⁰⁾

What Etō proposed was similar to the idea proposed by Yoshida Shōin and Kido Takayoshi: to exact compensation for what Japan had lost to the Western powers by invading its neighboring countries. Upon hearing the news that Joseon had refused to receive Japan's diplomatic document proposing the restoration of the imperial system and the establishment of formal relations, Etō, sensing a good excuse to justify the invasion said the following to Tokuhisa Tsunenori.¹¹⁾

It is urgent that we should expand the Empire's sphere of influence to the Asian Continent and look for ways of developing the Japanese nation in an effort to harvest the second fruit of the Meiji Restoration. Joseon is behaving rudely towards us. We should use this as an opportunity to use our force to expand the Empire's sphere of influence. We should occupy

10) Matsushita Yoshio, *On the Military System of the Meiji Government* [in Japanese] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1956), p. 444

11) Governor of Toyama Prefecture.

Joseon in an alliance with Russia. We should also split China into two, giving the northern half to Russia and controlling the remaining half ourselves. We will set up a ten-year plan to install a network of railroads in the area occupied by us and then look for an opportunity to drive the Russians out and establish Beijing as our permanent capital.¹²⁾

The *Seikanron* (“Debate over the Korean expedition”) gradually took shape on the basis of Etō’s proposal. In November 1871, the Japanese delegation headed by State Minister Iwakura Tomomi embarked on a two-year tour of America and Europe. Those remaining in Japan, including State Councilor Sanjō Sanetomi and other statesmen such as Saigō Takamori, Gotō Shōjirō, Itagaki Taisuke, Soejima Taneomi, Etō Shimpei and Ōkuma Shigenobu, initiated the *Seikanron* debate.



Fig. 2-3. Members of the Iwakura Mission (Japanese Center for Asian Historical Records (JACAR), www.jacar.go.jp)

12) Matsushita Yoshio, *Ibid.*, pp. 444~445.

Kirino Toshiaki, an adviser to Saigō Takamori, said the following on the matter:

Looking at the current world situation, certain countries are at loggerheads with each other. Large and strong countries are trying to annex smaller and weaker countries. If we want to become a power to be reckoned with, we should expand our sphere of influence and stand face to face with the Western powers. At present, Britain, France, Germany and Russia are intent on holding each other in check. We should seize this opportunity and invade Korea, Manchuria and China, and thereby lay the groundwork for our advance into Europe and America.

In 1871, Saigō Takamori drew up a detailed plan to invade Joseon, because he envisaged a clash between Joseon and an American fleet asking Joseon to open its doors. He sent a number of his followers (Lieutenant Colonel Kitamura Shigeyori and Major Beppu Shinsuke) to Joseon and others (Ikegami Shiro, Takechi Kumagichi and Sakaki Chuhei) to Manchuria to collect intelligence. He thought that Japan's invasion of Joseon would inevitably lead to a war against Russia and that, faced with such an eventuality, the national security of Japan should be secured by occupying part of Russia's territories.¹³⁾

Soejima Taneomi, who assumed the position of State Minister during Iwakura's visit to Europe and America, explained the policy of the Japanese government thus after meeting with American Minister to Japan Charles E. De Long and American Consul to Japan Le Gendre in October 1872.

13) Oka Yoshitake, *The History of Modern Japanese Politics*, Translated into Korean by Chang Insong (Seoul: Sohwa, 1996), pp. 28~29.

In Japan, the most important matter now is how to maintain the military. The new government has taken measures to modernize the Army and Navy. It appears that the troops wish to show their force in action, having undergone repeated training. Under such circumstances, the government has reached the conclusion that it would be wise to start a war against China or Joseon or engage in a show of force against Taiwan, as there may be internal strife between those from different domains in the military.

Joseon has continued to show an insulting attitude toward our government over the past two or three years. Thus, our government has decided to punish it. In this regard, we will see to it that Russia does not meddle in our war against Joseon by settling the problem concerning Sakhalin amicably with her.¹⁴⁾

Soejima said that Japan's plan to invade Joseon and Manchuria was drawn up to test its military preparedness and avoid potential conflicts between troops from different domains.

Japanese leaders, including Katsu Kaishu, Ōkuma Shigenobu and Ōki Takatō, were opposed to the *Seikanron*. After much heated debate, the proponents of the *Seikanron* prevailed.

When the Iwakura Delegation returned home to Japan in September 1873, those saying that domestic politics should be improved first and that Japan's strength should be increased, gained the upper hand. Ōkubo Toshimichi, a member of the Iwakura Delegation, expressed his opposition to the *Seikanron* on the following grounds:

14) Ishii Takashi, *Japan in the Early Meiji Period and East Asia* [in Japanese] (Tokyo: Yurindo, 1982), pp. 9~11.

1) war might lead to civil disturbances, in view of widespread popular resentment against the recent reforms entailing the loss of property and privilege for many; 2) war might cause fiscal bankruptcy; 3) war would force the abandonment of domestic programs for educational, industrial, and military modernization; 4) war would increase Japan's trade deficit and cause general impoverishment of the nation; 5) war would make Korea and Japan easy prey for Russia, which was waiting for an opportunity to fish in troubled waters in East Asia; 6) war would reduce Japan's ability to service its foreign debts and thereby invite interference in its internal affairs by Britain, its chief creditor; 7) war might hamper Japan's efforts toward treaty revision with the Western powers.¹⁵⁾

Kido Takayoshi changed his previous position and objected to Saigō's *Seikanron*, declaring that a war against Joseon would delay domestic innovations. When the invasion was finally selected as the national policy after a heated debate on October 14 and 15, 1873, those opposed to the *Seikanron*, including Ōkubo, Kido, Ōkuma and Ōki, resigned. On October 17 the *Seikanron* proponents met and decided to prevent national disunity by postponing discussions on how to invade Korea to a later date.

State Councilor Sanjō Sanetomi became ill while wavering over which side to support. Iwakura Tomomi replaced him when he resigned. The *Seikanron* opponents persuaded him to make a recommendation against the *Seikanron* to the Emperor on October 23. In the petition he submitted to the Emperor, he said that the invasion of Korea should be postponed until the country settled the territorial issue with Russia.

15) Kim Keyhiuk, *The Last Phase of the East Asian World Order: Joseon, Japan, and the Chinese Empire, 1860-1882* (LA, 1980), p. 184; Bak Yeongjun, *Ibid.*, Requoted from p. 259.

On the following day, the Emperor accepted Iwakura's petition. Many *Seikanron* proponents resigned in protest. On October 26 hundreds of followers including Kirino Toshiaki and Shinohara Kunimoto accompanied Saigō Takamori on his return home to Kagoshima after resigning from his post. Colonel Tani Shigeki and Lt. Colonel Yamaji Kenji from Tosa also resigned. Officers at the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department also showed their agitation.

Sensing the agitation among military troops and police officers, the Emperor issued an Imperial Rescript to the Royal Palace Guards on two occasions to the effect that, "You should fulfill your duty and accept my wishes as loyal subjects."¹⁶⁾

Political leaders, including Saigō Takamori, thought that it was necessary to invade Japan's neighboring countries to placate the more than 400,000 samurai threatening the social order over the loss of their positions due to the Haihanchiken (the abolition of old domains and the establishment of prefectures) and the universal military service order.

Even *Seikanron* opponents were not actually opposed to the idea of invasion itself, they simply thought that priority should be given to more urgent matters at that time. Kido Takayoshi, a *Seikanron* opponent, was among those who thought it necessary to invade Japan's neighboring countries.

Moreover, the samurai who had lost their positions were causing difficulties for the Meiji Government. Saigō and Kirino saw the seriousness of the problem. In the end *Seikanron* was shelved for the time being. In February 1874, Japanese leaders such as Sanjō Sanetomi, Iwakura Tomomi and Ōkubo Toshimichi agreed as follows with regard to Japan's policy

16) Matsushita Yoshio, *On the History of Military System in Meiji Period* [in Japanese] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1956), pp. 390~392.

toward Joseon:

First of all, we should dispatch an official to Russia to settle the Sakhalin problem. If the problem is settled well, we will then dispatch a delegation to Joseon. However, we need to dispatch secret military personnel to that country to check out the current situation there first. We also need to see what cunning plan those in Tsushima have in mind. We should display our military strength by dispatching a few warships along with the delegation. Military provocation will not be necessary in the initial stages. We need to act as if we wish to restore traditionally friendly relations. Even if they continue to act rudely, making it necessary to start a war, we should not readily engage in a war, although we should find measures to cope with such a situation. The Navy should finish its preparations before the dispatch of the delegation to Joseon. ¹⁷⁾

In February 1874, Etō Shinpei staged a rebellion leading a group of disaffected samurai in his hometown Saga. They blamed the ministers for blocking the Emperor's view with their flaccid and complacent attitudes and insisted on punishing Joseon's rudeness.¹⁸⁾ The rebellion failed, ending with the arrest of Etō Shimpei in Kochi Prefecture the following month. However, the Japanese government judged that it should find a way to allay samurai discontent and pushed ahead with the invasion of Taiwan (which appeared weaker than Joseon) in an effort to engage in a small war.

17) Ishii Takashi, *Ibid.*, p. 287.

18) *Ibid.*, p. 439.

2) Joseon is forced to open its Doors

On May 1, 1874, just three months after finalizing the policy concerning Joseon, Japan dispatched Moriyama Shigeru, a Foreign Ministry official to Joseon to observe the situation there. In Joseon, the Daewongun, King Gojong is father, had withdrawn from the powerful position of ruling the country on behalf of his young son, and the entire nation was concerned about what they had heard through China about Japan's intention to invade Joseon. On August 16, the Joseon government had Nam Hyowon, an officer stationed in Dongnae, Busan meet Moriyama Shigeru, who was staying at the Japanese Mission in Chorang, Busan. Moriyama told Nam that if Joseon agreed to Japan's use of such expressions as "imperial" concerning its Emperor, Japan would do likewise for Joseon. On August 28, Moriyama told a group of three Royal Messengers of Joseon that Japan was ready to establish formal relations with Joseon, referring to the 1871 Treaty it had made with Qing (China). He drew their attention to the need for the formation of a joint front against Russia's southward expansion and the fact that Qing was losing strength. He also said that Japan was ready to help Joseon, if it was interested in modernizing its outdated arms and machinery.

Finally, Joseon accepted Moriyama's proposal. Moriyama came back to Joseon with the Japanese Foreign Minister's official letter proposing the establishment of formal relations on February 25, 1875. Joseon hesitated in proceeding with the negotiations, declaring that the Japanese government's official letter was in violation of official protocol, since it had been written in Japanese, and Moriyama had taken a steamboat instead of a sailing boat to travel to Joseon and attended a feast in Western-style attire. Thereupon, Moriyama sent his deputy to the home country, making the following request to the Japanese government:

Please have one or two warships carry out the work of surveying the sea routes between Tsushima and Joseon immediately, without disclosing our real intentions, and send a letter to me asking for a prompt conclusion to the matter so that my duty may be fulfilled smoothly.¹⁹⁾

The Japanese Ministry of the Navy complied with Moriyama's request. On May 4, the Vice Navy Minister Kawamura Sumiyoshi asked State Councilor Sanjo for his approval of the plan to dispatch the warships Unyo Maru and Hinoto Maru No.2 to conduct a survey of the sea routes between Tsushima and Joseon. On May 24, the Unyo Maru arrived in Busan followed by the Hinoto Maru No.2 on June 12, where they staged a show of force. However, Joseon did not appear to be intimidated by Japan's gunboat diplomacy. On June 24, Joseon official Hyeon Seog-un said that the Japanese delegation would not be allowed to meet the Mayor of Dongnae if they insisted on wearing Western clothes and the negotiations were stopped.

Harry Parkes, British Minister to Japan, was watching the ongoing developments between Joseon and Japan. He suspected that Joseon's decision to open its doors might be delayed due to Russia's influence and made a recommendation to the home government that Britain should occupy Geomun-do.²⁰⁾

19) Ibid., p. 30.

20) Ibid., pp. 305~312.




Fig. 2-4. The Unyo Maru




Fig. 2-5. Japanese warships displaying a shows of force near Busan

With the treaty signed between Japan and Russia for the exchange of Sakhalin for the Kuril Islands, Vice Navy Minister Kawamura Sumiyoshi ordered Major Inoue Yoshika, the captain of the Unyo Maru, to survey the sea routes between Joseon's coast and Niuzhuang, Qing. The order was intended to provoke Joseon's hostile action. Prior to his ship's voyage, the captain said to those around him, "Our presence should provoke gunfire from them." The officers on board the ship also knew what their real mission was.²¹⁾

On September 20, the Unyo Maru anchored in Ganghwa Bay on the pretext of taking on board fresh supplies of potable water. Captain Inoue, along with five officers, ten marines and ten seamen, set out on a small boat up the Han River. A battery on the southern tip of Ganghwa-do fired a shot at the boat around 2:30 pm. The volley was intended as a warning shot at a strange looking ship from a battery stationed at Chojjijin. The Japanese hurriedly returned to the mother ship.

The following morning, the Unyo Maru moved up the river and dropped anchor at a point about 1,700 meters away from the 3rd Battery on the island and began firing at the battery with 40-pound guns. A few minutes later the Joseon's battery on shore returned fire. However, the Joseon's guns had a range of only 700 meters. The Japanese fired some 27 shots over a period of two hours with 110-pound and 40-pound guns, but they could not find a proper place to go ashore. The fight petered out on the same day. The following day, September 22, the Unyo Maru moved towards the 1st Battery on Yeongjong-do and started firing at it from a point about 800 meters away. A little while later 22 marines went ashore and occupied Yeongjong-do Castle, hoisted the Japanese national flag and set fire to the ramparts. On the Joseon side, 35 troops were killed and 16 were taken captive. On the

²¹⁾ Ibid., p. 215.

Japanese side only two seamen were injured.

The Unyo Maru returned home to Japan. Vice Navy Minister Kawamura Sumiyoshi hurried to dispatch the Kasuga Maru to Busan. On November 13, he decided to dispatch the Moshun Maru and the Hinoto Maru No.2 to Busan as well.

In January 1876, Army Lt. General Kuroda Kiyotaka was appointed as the head of the Japanese delegation. He forced Joseon's officials to sign the Treaty of Ganghwa (see below), also known as the Joseon-Japanese Treaty of Amity in February.²²⁾

“It is our wish to reinforce the traditional amity between Joseon and Japan, overcoming the estrangement that has developed in recent times. In this regard, the Japanese government has sent Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary/Army Lt. General/State Councilor Kuroda Kiyotaka and Vice-Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Inoue Kaoru to Ganghwa, Joseon. On its part, the Joseon government has appointed the officials Sin Heon and Yun Jaseung as its representatives. The two sides hereby agree as follows in deference to the wishes of their respective governments:

Article 1. Joseon, an independent country, has full sovereignty, as does Japan. In future, the two countries shall treat each other with the proper demeanor and on an equal footing in order to maintain good relations. The two sides shall not intrude upon each other's territories, or show feelings of hatred or contempt towards each other under any circumstances. First of all, all laws and regulations that stand in the way of the establishment of bilateral relations shall be abolished. The

22) Kim Yongku, *The History of World Diplomacy* [in Korean] (Seoul National University Press, 1989), pp. 248~268.

two sides shall launch new laws of generosity and understanding so that they may live in peace forever.

Article 2. The Joseon government shall dispatch its envoy to Tokyo, Japan fifteen months later to engage in a meeting with the Japanese Foreign Minister and discuss matters concerning our bilateral relations. This envoy may stay in Japan or return home, as the prevailing situation dictates.

Article 3. All official letters sent by Japan to Joseon in future shall be in Japanese, but translated into Chinese for the next 15 years. All official letters sent by Joseon to Japan shall be in Chinese.

Article 4. Chorayang, Busan, where the Japanese Mission is located, has been the site of bilateral trade. Innovations shall be made for previous practices and matters concerning the trade ship linking Busan and Tsushima, and the trade business shall be handled in accordance with the new Treaty. The Joseon government shall open up the two ports stated in Article 5 for trade with the Japanese. Japanese citizens shall also be allowed to lease land and build houses in the areas stated or lease houses owned by Joseon in the places where they stay.

Article 5. Three ports in Gyeonggi, Chungcheong, Jeolla, Gyeongsang and Hamgyeong judged to be good for bilateral trade will be designated at a later date. They shall be opened up for trade with Japan after the joint work of construction, which shall be completed within 20 months from February of the 9th year in the Japanese calendar (i.e. February 1876).

Article 6. In the event that a Japanese ship encounters a storm or is unable to reach its destination while sailing near Joseon, it shall be allowed to enter the nearest port in Joseon until its safe voyage has been secured, and to purchase any necessary items, including coal and repair riggings. Any expenses incurred will be paid by the ship's owner. The provincial offices and citizens shall do their best to take care of any such ship and its crew in earnest and provide the necessary supplies with generosity. In the event that a vessel of either country is washed

ashore in either country after being hit by a storm in the middle of the sea, the people in the area shall do their best to take care of the crew and the relevant provincial office shall take the necessary measures to ensure that they are taken care of by the Japanese authorities.

Article 7. There are many small islands and submerged rocks along Joseon's coastline that may cause danger to sailing ships. Thus, the Joseon authorities shall allow Japanese voyagers to conduct surveys of these waters as they please. Their locations and the depth of the waters around them will be marked upon a map, which will be distributed to the ships of the two countries for their safe voyage.

Article 8. At ports designated by the Joseon authorities at the Japanese government's request, trade missions may be established for the proper control of Japanese traders. In the event that cases requiring mutual cooperation arise, the local administrative heads of the two countries shall meet at a trade mission and reach an amicable settlement.

Article 9. In carrying out trade, the people of the two countries shall be allowed to take action freely without any intervention on the part of government officials. No limits whatsoever shall be imposed on bilateral trade. In the event of an act of deception in trade or a failure to pay debts, the officials having jurisdiction shall order the relevant party to compensate the loss incurred by any such act of deception or pay what is due. However, neither government shall be held responsible for the relevant compensation.

Article 10. In the event that a Japanese person is charged with a crime committed against a Joseon citizen while residing at a port designated by the Joseon authorities, Japanese government officials shall be allowed to take part in the investigation and the relevant proceedings. The relevant trials shall be held in a fair and unbiased way.

Article 11. The two countries shall make separate trade regulations to allow merchants and business people from the two countries to carry out their business conveniently. Those designated by both countries

shall meet in Seoul or Ganghwa within six months for further discussion and the finalization of items that could be set as separate regulations with their details duly complemented.

Article 12. The foregoing eleven articles contained in this Treaty shall be observed in good faith by the two countries from this date on and shall not be amended. The two countries hereby promise to maintain friendly relations on a permanent basis. In witness whereof, the authorized representatives of the two Parties hereto have set their seals and executed this document in two counterparts.

For the Joseon Government:

Sin Heon (Sealed)

Position: Vice Chief Supreme Command

Yun Jaseung (Sealed)

Position: Deputy Commander of Military Command

For the Japanese Government:

Kuroda Kiyotaka (Sealed)

Position: Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary/Army Lt. General/State Councilor

Inoue Kaoru (Sealed)

Position: Vice-Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Inoue Kaoru



Fig. 2-6. Sin Heon



Fig. 2-7. Kuroda Kiyotaka



Fig. 2-8. The scene of a meeting prior to the Treaty of Ganghwa

With the Treaty of Ganghwa, Japan forced Joseon to sign a treaty that was more unequal than the “unequal treaties” that Japan itself had had to sign with the Western powers. Under the terms of the treaty, Japan could open a government office anywhere it chose in Joseon and conduct surveys of Joseon’s coastal areas, while Japanese nationals charged with committing a crime in Joseon could not be punished by the Joseon’s authorities. Such terms suggest that Japan had sought to lay the groundwork for the invasion of Joseon from the outset.

2. The Sino-Japanese War and the Isolation of Joseon

From 1883-1885 Japan built or purchased 12 naval ships including three large battle cruisers, the Naniwa, Takachiho and Unebi, based on the need for a military build-up amid the ongoing confrontations with Qing, the military riot in Joseon in 1882, and the attempt by pro-Japanese reformists to stage a coup d’etat in Joseon in 1884.²³⁾

Japan was driven towards a political crisis as a result of the serious conflicts between a government led by samurai cliques and civilian parties. In March 1894, Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu sent a letter to Aoki Shūjō, the Japanese Minister to London, stating:

The domestic situation is so desperate that the government will not be able to calm it down without resorting to shock therapy. Even so, it

23) Fujiwara Akira, “Translated by Eom Suhyeon,” *The History of Japanese Military Affairs* [in Korean] (Seoul: Sisa Japanese Language Promotion Center, 1994), p. 99.

would be reckless to start a war. Amendment of the existing treaties seems to be the only option available to us to get out the situation.²⁴⁾

Aoki's words show that starting a war was regarded as a viable option, however "reckless."

At the time of the outbreak of the farmers' uprising (now referred to as the Donghak Peasant Revolution) in 1894, the Joseon government asked Qing for help. Japan saw this as a good opportunity, as it was looking for an excuse to conduct an external military operation to calm political unrest on the domestic front. However, the peasants agreed to settle their differences with the government, seeing that it was more important to prevent foreign intervention in the nation's domestic affairs. Once the situation had settled somewhat, the Joseon government asked for the withdrawal of the Chinese troops. Japan, seeking to put Joseon into its hands, exploited the situation, even at the risk of a war with Qing. Japan asked Joseon to sever its ties with Qing, trying to find an excuse to provoke Qing. The Japanese military set up an operational plan as follows:

Our mission is to dominate Qing by dispatching crack units to Bohai Bay. The success of this mission will depend on how well we do in sea battles. Our operation will be divided into the following two phases:

First, we will dispatch the 5th Division to Joseon to keep the Chinese troops in check and have the Army and Navy make preparations for a war, while defending strategically important positions within Japan. In

24) Ibid., p. 101.

the meantime, our naval fleet will gain the upper hand in the West Sea and Bohai Bay.

Second, our operation in Phase-2 will depend on the result of the sea battles in Phase-1. In the event that we succeed in gaining dominance in the sea, the main Army units will move to Bohai and engage in a decisive battle on Hebei Plain. The fleet of Qing's 4th Navy is superior to our Navy in terms of both number and tonnage. The warships of the Northern Fleet are solidly-built and better than ours. Thus, we cannot be optimistic about the outcome. If the two sides turn out to be neck and neck, wherein we fail to gain dominance in Bohai Bay and the enemy does not establish a dominant presence in our coastal waters, we will advance on Joseon and do our best to gain control in that country. If the sea battles turn out to our disadvantage and the enemy gains dominance on the sea, we should provide all possible support for the 5th Division and take measures to repel the enemy's attack on the home front.²⁵⁾




Fig. 2-9. A secret circular of the Donghak Army

25) Ibid., p. 103.




Fig. 2-10. Japan's main naval fleet (From the left : the warships Itsukushima, Yoshino Naniwa and Fuso)




Fig. 2-11. A Chinese warship sinking in Asan Bay after a Japanese attack



On June 23, 1894 the Japanese Navy made a surprise attack on Qing before a declaration of war, thus igniting the sino-Japanese War. On June 27, the Japanese expeditionary force - the Oshima Composite Brigade - started a land battle, defeating 3,000 Chinese troops in Seonghwan and Asan, Joseon. The Japanese Army General Quarters dispatched the 5th and 3rd Divisions of the Army to Joseon. Qing also sent more troops to Joseon.

Japan won landslide victories in the land battle at Pyeongyang on September 15 and in the sea battle on the West Sea on September 17. Having easily gained dominance of the sea, Japan changed its plan and Oyama Iwao's unit landed on the Liaodong Peninsula towards the end of October.

The unit took Lüshun (or Port Arthur) in one day. Part of Yamagata Aritomo's unit advanced to Haicheng and occupied Niuzhuang and Yingkou in February 1895. On the other front of the war, Oyama Iwao's unit and the Navy successfully attacked Weihaiwei on the Shandong Peninsula, occupying it in February 1895. Qing's Northern Fleet surrendered. Seeing the situation turn decidedly to its disadvantage, Qing hurried to sue for peace prior to a major battle on the Hebei Plain.

On April 17, 1895, the Sino-Japan Peace Treaty was signed on April 17, 1895. With victory in the war, Japan put an end to China's influence over Joseon and took the Liaodong Peninsula, which would serve as a forward base for its further advance into the Asian continent. However, Japan gave in to pressure from Germany, France and Russia to return the peninsula to Qing, which came to be called the Tripartite Intervention. They were afraid of Japan's abrupt emergence as a military power, and Japan was forced to give up its plan to advance further into the continent.




Fig. 2-13. Sea battle in Weihaiwei

Having rejected Japan's bid for a share of the Chinese pie, Western powers were intent on expanding their respective vested interests in China. In




Fig. 2-14. A negotiation session held before the Sino-Japan Peace Treaty




Fig. 2-15. Text of the Sino-Japanes Peace Treaty

1896, Russia obtained the right to build a railroad linking Manchuria with Vladivostok, and in 1898 she obtained a concession for Guandongzhou. In the same year, Germany and Britain obtained a concession for Jiaozhou Bay and the Kowloon Peninsula / Weihawei, respectively. In 1899 France obtained a concession for Guangzhou Bay. In 1900 Japan made another

attempt to obtain a share of the pie by sending its troops to play a major part in the allied expedition to rescue foreign nationals in Beijing during the Boxer Rebellion. Japan's move roused Russia and the two countries clashed over their respective interests in Manchuria and Joseon.

Seeing that Japan had yielded to the Tripartite Intervention and returned the Liaodong Peninsula to Qing, the Joseon government pushed ahead with its pro-Russia policy in the expectation that Russia would check Japan's coercive influence on it. As such, Russia's presence on the Korean Peninsula surged abruptly.

Japan believed that Empress Myeongseong, the wife of Emperor Gojong, was the mastermind behind Joseon's pro-Russian policy. At daybreak on October 8, 1895 a group of Japanese samurai and police officers commanded by Miura Gorō, the Japanese Minister to Joseon, entered Gyeongbok Palace, assassinated the empress and burned her body. Emperor Gojong escaped to the Russian Legation in Seoul. Contrary to Japan's expectations, the Japanese assassination of the Empress drove Joseon even closer to Russia, which then exploited the situation for its own southward expansion, extending its presence in Manchuria and Joseon.

After this, in 1902, Prime Minister Katsura Tarō and Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō of Japan played a leading role in Japan's alliance with Great Britain. Japan then entered into negotiations with Russia, offering to grant Russia a vested interest in Manchuria in return for Russian recognition of Japan's dominance in Joseon. Russia, however, could not agree to Japan's use of the Korean Peninsula to further its militaristic ambition after its alliance with Britain, but Japan would not give up its interests in Joseon.




Fig. 2-16. Treaty for Japan's Return of the Liaodong Peninsula to China

Amid such maneuverings, the Yongampo Incident took place in 1903. Japan expressed stiff opposition to Russia's request to the Korean government for the lease of Yongampo, south of Shinuiju, ostensibly for lumbering purposes in a forest near the Amnok (Yalu) River. Japan, for its part, asked the Korean government to open up Yongampo for trade with it, to which Russia in turn strongly objected. When Russia built a rampart and a gun battery in an area near to the controversial site in September 1903, leading Japanese newspapers claimed that their country should even consider an armed clash with Russia. Public opinion in favor of war against Russia spread nation wide. Finally, the Japanese government and the military decided to start a war against Russia in Korean and Manchuria in December 1903 (See the following).

The Korean Peninsula is extremely important for the defense of our country. We can never allow any other country's dominance in Korea. If a war against Russia is our only choice, we should occupy Korea completely to consolidate our position. We should take all possible measures in this regard. It is important that we dispatch an Army unit to Seoul to lay the basis for a preemptive attack, regardless of the outcome of the sea battles……

Our military campaign against Russia will be divided into two phases as follows:

Phase 1 for operations to the south of the Amnok [Yalu] aimed at the complete occupation Korea.

Phase 2 for operations to the north of the Amnok [Yalu] aimed at Manchuria.²⁶⁾

The Japanese Army and Navy war plans were as follows:

1. The 1st and 2nd Fleets will attack Lüshun to destroy the Russian fleet.
2. The 3rd Fleet will occupy Jinhae Bay in order to secure the safety of the Tsushima Strait.
3. An Army expeditionary force will be dispatched to Korea to make preparations for a preemptive attack, regardless of the outcome of the sea battles.
4. We will decide on the timing for starting a war as soon as the two warships ordered from Argentina arrive in Japan.

26) Ibid., p. 103.



Fig. 2-17. A warship similar in type to those Japan ordered from Argentina

On February 5, 1904 Japanese leaders made a final decision on the severance of diplomatic relations with Russia and the launch of a war against it at a meeting held in the Emperor's presence.

The Imperial Order for the declaration of war against Russia issued on February 10 (See the following) made it clear that the objective of the war against Russia was to secure Japan's dominant presence in Manchuria and the Korean Peninsula.

I, the Japanese Emperor, as part of the imperial family that has maintained the succession to the throne under the divine protection of Amaterasu Omikami, hereby announce to my faithful and brave subjects that we will now start a war against Russia. The Army and Navy shall do their utmost in battle, and all government officials shall strive to help the nation accomplish its ultimate purpose in accordance with their own assignments. We shall take all measures available to be fully prepared

within the limits recognized by International Law.

I have thought that it is the most important objective of the nation's diplomacy to establish a desirable state that can guarantee the security of the Japanese Empire, while striving to maintain the security of all of Asia and not to cause harm to Asian countries' sovereign rights and interests, by pursuing civilization by peaceful means and consolidating friendly relations with other countries, and I have made efforts not to deviate from such a belief. You, my faithful subjects and military officers, have also carried out duties in deference to such a wish of mine. In the course of such efforts, we have successfully established friendly relations with other countries. However, it is a matter of the deepest regret that we should now start a war against Russia, which runs counter to my sincere wishes.

The Japanese Empire has attached great importance to the preservation of Korea from long ago. The status of Korea is directly linked to the security of the Japanese Empire. Russia maintains its troops in Manchuria despite the agreement with Qing for the withdrawal of its troops and the promise it made to that effect to other countries. Not only that, it plans to reinforce its position in Manchuria in order to occupy it. If Manchuria is occupied by Russia, there will be no way to preserve Korea, and the fragile peace in the Far East will be put in jeopardy. I have ordered the Cabinet to propose a measure of compromise to Russia out of the desire to maintain peace in the region under such circumstances.

However, Russia refused to accept our proposal despite our repeated attempts for compromise over the past half year. On the contrary, it tried to intimidate us by reinforcing the strength of its Army and Navy, while deliberately dragging its feet in negotiations designed to settle the situation. Thus, it is judged that Russia has not been interested in maintaining peace in the region since the beginning. It has refused to accept our proposal, the security of Korea is now in jeopardy, and our national interest is being threatened.

The situation has reached an impasse. The Japanese Empire now has no

choice but to change its position and maintain its security by means of war, although we wished to settle the situation through peaceful negotiation. I trust in my subjects' loyalty and bravery and expect them to do their best to maintain the Japanese Empire's glory and to recover peace in the region.²⁷⁾




Fig. 2-18. Text of the Imperial Rescript Declaring War against Russia

27) “Imperial Rescript Declaring War against Russia, Emperor Meiji and His Era,” *Seiron*, Special Monthly Issue, December 2002, pp. 319~321.

THE HISTORY OF IMPERIAL JAPAN'S SEIZURE OF DOKDO



Chapter 3

The Russo-Japanese War and Japanese Encroachment on the Korean Peninsula

Seeing that Japan had given in to the Tripartite Intervention and returned the Liaodong Peninsula to China, the Joseon government pushed ahead with a pro-Russia policy in the expectation that Russia would check Japan's coercive influence upon Joseon. Thus, Russia's presence on the Korean Peninsula surged abruptly, and Japan came to regard a war with Russia inevitable.

1. Military Operation Plan in the Russo-Japanese War

On May 5, 1895 as a result of the Russian, German and French Tripartite Intervention, Japan returned the Liaodong Peninsula ceded to it by China at the end of the Sino-Japanese War. As the Japanese felt it necessary to build up national strength, the Japanese government imposed conditions of frugality upon its people to cover the expenses for a military buildup. Japan made great strides in terms of its military strength in the ten-year period between the start of the war against China and the end of the war against Russia (i.e. 1894-1905).

In 1900, Japan dispatched its crack military unit to Beijing in response to Britain's request to rescue foreign nationals during the Boxer Rebellion in China. In effect, this meant that Japan played the role of suppressing a Chinese national movement against Western imperialists as their puppet in the Far East. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance Treaty made in 1902 meant that




Fig. 3-1. Text of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance Treaty

Japan, in consideration of its geographical advantage and military strength, was formally recognized as Britain's agent against Russia's southward expansion in the region.

Upon observing that Russia had increased the number of its troops in Manchuria following the lease of Lüshun and Dalian in the aftermath of the Tripartite Intervention, the Japanese General Staff Headquarters began studying ways to defeat Russia militarily. In April 1903, Russia did not keep its promise to withdraw its troops from Manchuria and reinforced its military activities near the Amnok [Yalu] River. On June 22, the Japanese Chief of General Staff, Ōyama Iwao, submitted the following letter to the Cabinet:

The use of the Korean Peninsula as a forward base for the defense of Imperial Japan has consistently been our national policy. It will remain so in the future. From long ago, our country has been called the Heavenly Country, as the islands are located in the middle of the endless sea. Today, with the ongoing development of transportation, even the widest sea has become another ordinary transportation route. The entire national territory looks similar to a creeping snake. Its topography has numerous vulnerable points which require solid defense. One good feature of our national defensive capability is the existence of the Korean Strait, which enables us to observe ships sailing near to our land effectively. As long as Korea remains friendly to us, the strait will serve as a reliable gateway to the East Sea. However, if Korea is occupied by a powerful country, it will become a fatal threat to us, as the voyage across the strait takes only a few hours. We should consider any unfavorable factors posed by the geographical location of Korea to our national defenses.

Since long ago, we have suffered various hardships in persuading Joseon to distance itself from Qing. As Qing treated Joseon as one of its tributary states, we were engaged in the war¹⁾ against it in the 27th and 28th years of the Meiji era (1894-1895), causing tens of thousands of casualties and

spending enormous sums, and were able to keep Korea as a forward base for our national defense.

As a result of the war with us, Qing's vulnerability has been exposed to the world. Thus, Russia occupied Jinzhou and obtained the right to build a railroad linking Manchuria with Vladivostok, expanding its influence in the region at an amazing speed. If the Japanese Empire leaves Russia to do as it pleases, it will occupy Korea within three to four years, which means that we will lose an important forward base for our national defense. The security of the nation and its people will then be in great jeopardy.

Under such circumstances, we should settle the problem of Korea by negotiating with Russia within the shortest period of time. There is a possibility that we may resolve the matter without resorting to force. Even if we should become engaged in a war, Russia is not sufficiently prepared militarily to wage a war against us. This appears to be an opportune time to take action to settle the Joseon problem as part of the long-term plan for the future of our country.

If we let slip this good opportunity, Russia will make up for its deficiency and build up its positions more solidly in the coming three to four years, and then we will be unable to confront her. Then, there will no longer be any hope of diplomatic negotiations with Russia. If the situation reaches that point, we will have to yield to it with humility.²⁾

1) Reference to the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895).

2) Fujiwara Akira, "Translated by Eom Suhyeon," *The History of Japanese Military Affairs* [in Korean] (Seoul: Sisa Japanese Language Promotion Center, 1994), pp. 123~125



Fig. 3-2. Arrival of Japanese troops in Incheon

In December 1903, the Japanese General Staff Headquarters drew up a plan of attack against Russia, dividing it into two phases: Phase 1 would involve operations to the south of the Amnok [Yalu] - aimed at the complete occupation of Korea. Phase 2 would involve operations to the north of the Amnok [Yalu] - aimed at Manchuria.

First of all, the Navy will gain dominance of the sea, destroying Russia's Pacific Fleet. In Phase 1, the Army will dispatch a first expeditionary force composed of three divisions to Korea and have them advance north to the Amnok [Yalu]. A second expeditionary force composed of three divisions will land on the Liaodong Peninsula in China and advance to Liaoyang in collaboration with the first expeditionary force. An attack on Lushun Fortress will be decided upon at a later date, depending on the situation. One division will take charge of a campaign to hold the enemy's movements in check in the Ussuri Basin area.³⁾

2. The Outbreak of War and the Escalating Encroachment on the Korean Peninsula

On February 5, 1904, a telegram containing information on Japan's severance of diplomatic relations with Russia and the order to commence the attack against it was dispatched. General Kuroki Tamemoto, the Commander of the Japanese First Army, ordered Major General Kigoshi Yasutsuna, the Commander of the 23rd Brigade, to land the contingent force in Incheon, advance rapidly to Seoul, and seize control of the Joseon Royal Court and government.

3) Ibid., p. 126.



Fig. 3-3. Japanese troops of Kigoshi's Brigade marching through the streets




Fig. 3-4. Troops of Japanese 12th Division marching through the streets

At 4:20 pm on February 8, six cruisers and eight torpedo boats of the Japanese Navy led by Major General Uriū Sotokichi entered Incheon Port, dominated the Russian cruisers and gunboats anchored there with no difficulty, and sent 2,200 troops of the 23rd Brigade ashore. After the troops had come ashore, the Japanese ordered the Russian fleet to weigh anchor and then sank them in the waters just outside the port. The 23rd Brigade started marching to Seoul, leaving behind two battalions to guard Incheon Port. At 1:00 pm on February 9, they arrived at Gyeongbok Palace in Seoul and immediately surrounded it. At 3:30 pm, Japanese Minister to Korea Hayashi Gonsuke had an audience with King Gojong and asked for Korea's cooperation in Japan's war against Russia.

On February 18, the two battalions that were left behind in Incheon joined their main unit in Seoul. On the following day, the main forces of the 12th Division entered Seoul. With Japanese troops surrounding the Royal Palace, the division commander Inoue and his staff had an audience with King Gojong on February 23. Amidst such a threatening atmosphere, the Korea-Japan Protocol (See the following) was signed at 3:00 pm.

Article 1. The two countries shall do their best to maintain friendly relations with each other and establish peace in Asia. In this respect, the Imperial Government of Korea shall trust the Imperial Government of Japan and accept its advice on the need for improvement as regards the general status of affairs in Korea.

Article 2. The Imperial Government of Japan shall protect the Royal Court of Korea with goodwill.

Article 3. In the event that there is a danger concerning the safety of the Royal Court of Joseon or the preservation of the nation's territory due to a third country's invasion or the outbreak of internal strife, the Imperial Government of Japan may take prompt measures to cope with

such a situation. Under such conditions, the Imperial Government of Korea shall provide the necessary support to assist the Imperial Government of Japan in taking the proper measures. The Imperial Government of Japan may use strategically important areas whenever necessary to accomplish the objectives stated in the foregoing.

Article 5. Neither government of the two countries shall at any time in the future establish an agreement with a third country that violates the terms stated in this Treaty.

Article 6. Details not stipulated in this Treaty shall be settled through negotiations between the Foreign Minister of the Imperial Government of Korea and the representative of the Imperial Government of Japan.

For the Imperial Government of Korea:

Yi Jiyong (Sealed)

Position: Acting Foreign Minister

Chief of Army General Staff

February 23, the 8th year of the Gwangmu Period (1904)

For the Imperial Government of Japan:

Hayashi Gonsuke (Sealed)

Position: Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

February 23, the 37th year of the Meiji Period (1904)

Article 4 of this Treaty grants Japan the right to station and move its troops and to use strategically important areas in Korea.




Fig. 3-5. The Japanese Army marching through Seoul

The 12th Division of the Japanese Army moved northward to Pyeongyang between February 19 and March 18 and joined forces with two other divisions that had landed on Jinnampo. They moved further north to Sinuiju, Jiuliancheng and Fenghuangcheng, where they engaged in battles with Russian troops.

The Japanese Forces Stationed in Korea (“JFSK”) were organized by March 20, 1904 and arrived in Seoul on April 3, where they were to maintain social order and carry out military duties. Headquartered in Seoul, they placed units in Incheon, Busan and Wonsan to supervise the supply of materials for the war against Russia and repress those Koreans engaged in anti-Japanese movements. The 2nd Division, and the 13th and 15th Divisions were incorporated into the JFSK on September 1, 1905 and October 16 respectively, and then divided into three garrison units: the Eastern Garrison Unit controlling Hamgyeong Province; the Northern Garrison Unit controlling Hwanghae and Pyeongan Provinces; and the Southern Garrison Unit controlling Gyeonggi, Haeju, Gimhwa, Chuncheon, Cheongju, Daegu,

Busan and Jeonju. The Japanese Military Police Units, which had been stationed in Korea since 1896, came under the control of the commander of the JFSK. From July 20, 1905, JFSK Commander Lt. General Haraguchi Kensei placed Hamgyeong Province under military administration and implemented a security police system in Seoul and its vicinities.⁴⁾



Fig. 3-6. Map of the Liaodong Peninsula

Japan started purchasing land in Jinhae, going so far as to forge the necessary documents, in a bid to weaken Russian influence in the naval port.

4) Lim Jongguk, *The History of the Japanese Invasion of Joseon* [in Korean] (Seoul: Ilwolsoegak Publishing, 1998), p.127.



Fig. 3-7. Japanese military headquarters in Malli-dong, Seoul

In August 1904, Japan dispatched a group of engineers to Jinhae to build a gun battery in connection with its plan to make Jinhae Bay a forward base for its Navy. In April 1905, it launched the Jinhae Bay Fortress Command.

On February 9, 1904, the 23rd Brigade of the Japanese Army established its headquarters in the Japanese Clubhouse building near Namsan, Seoul. Many troops were accommodated in private Japanese houses, bars or military quarters, while a government-run warehouse in Yongsan and a glassware factory were used to accommodate the troops of the 12th Division that arrived in Seoul on February 18.

With the signing of the Korea-Japan Protocol on February 23, 1904, Japan asked the Joseon government to allow its troops to use land covering 3 million pyeong (2,430 acres) in Yongsan, 3.93 million pyeong (3,180 acres) in Pyeongyang and 2.82 million pyeong (2,284 acres) in Baengma near Uiju, paying a mere 200,000 won for the privilege. It was arranged that private land could be purchased by the Joseon government with a loan made by the

Japanese government for use by Japanese troops, while land owned by the Joseon government could be transferred to Japanese troops free of charge. Thus, the land designated as sites for the Masan-Samnangjin and Seoul-Wonsan railroads, stations, and rolling stock warehouses was expropriated at the price of 2 Jeon per pyeong,⁵⁾ which brought forth a stream of complaints from the landowners concerned. The Japanese ended up returning 5.78 million pyeong (4,680 acres) of land to the original landowners.

Table 3-1 | Japanese Military's Expropriation of Land in Korea

	Original area of land expropriated	Portion returned	Details of returned land	Portion expropriated	Portion paid for	Land earmarked for military use
Yongsan	300	185	• Returned: 134 • Railroad site: 51	115	29,800	117.98
Pyeong-yang	393	197	• Returned: 159 • Railroad site: 38	196	15,008	197.5
Baengma	282	196	• Returned: 183 • Railroad site: 13	86	—	86
Total	975	578	• Returned: 476 • Railroad site: 102	397	44,808	401.48

※ Source: Lim, History of the Japanese Invasion of Joseon, p. 169.

※ Unit: 10,000 pyeong

5) At that time, a newspaper was sold for 7 Jeon at newsstands.



Fig. 3-8. The building used as the Headquarters of the Japanese Forces Stationed in Korea

THE HISTORY OF IMPERIAL JAPAN'S SEIZURE OF DOKDO



Chapter 4

The Incapacitation of Joseon (Empire of Great Han)'s Armed Forces and the Imposition of the Japanese Military System on Joseon

The Japanese imperialists incapacitated the Joseon Forces in order to prevent them from hindering the progress of the war against Russia, and brought Korea under military control.

1. The Incapacitation of Joseon's Armed Forces

Needless to say, the occupation of a country requires the incapacitation of its military forces. Officially, the Joseon Forces are known to have been disbanded by September 3, 1907.¹⁾ In reality, the Japanese Forces Stationed in Korea (“JFSK”) had started taking all possible measures to incapacitate the Joseon Forces much earlier.

Japan attempted to reorganize the Joseon Forces under those friendly to Japan or to place pro-Japan groups in the organization. In 1881, 2nd Lieutenant Horimoto Reijo formed and trained a special unit of 80 Joseon soldiers. Between September 1904 and February 1905, the Joseon military system was reorganized, with Japanese advisers assigned to each unit. In June, Lt. Colonel Saito Rikisaburo, Staff officer of the JFSK, made a recommendation entitled the Guideline to Military Management in Joseon to the home government. Item 3 (Implementation of the Military System) of the recommendation reads as follows:

We shall disband most of the Joseon Forces on the pretext of reforming the military system, leaving only those that would normally guard the Royal Palace and keep the Emperor at his ease, thus making it inevitable for Joseon to rely on our military strength completely²⁾

- 1) Yu Hancheol, *The Disbanding of Korean Forces at the End of Imperial Korea 65 Important Scenes in the History of the Japanese Invasion of Korea* [in Korean] (Seoul: Garam, 2005), p. 107.
- 2) Quoted from Lim Jongguk, *The History of the Japanese Invasion of Joseon* [in Korean] (Seoul: Ilwolsaegak Publishing, 1998), p. 206.

Japan announced the adoption of a new military system on September 24, in accordance with this recommendation, replacing the Supreme Command System adopted on March 20, 1900. Lt. Colonel Nozu Shizutake was sworn in as the military adviser to the Joseon government. Under the Supreme Command system, the Military Minister controlled only those affairs concerning weapons, ammunitions, construction works and accounting.³⁾ All rights concerning military control and the issuance of orders were exercised by the Supreme Command, which was composed of the Emperor (Supreme Commander), the Crown Prince (Commander), four generals reporting to the Crown Prince, four other high-ranking officers, and fifteen aides.

All substantial rights concerning the military were seized by the Supreme Command. Thus, there was nothing Nozu could do as the military adviser. He thought that the abolition of the Supreme Command was the only way to extricate himself from the situation and start exercising his influence on the Joseon military.⁴⁾

Any mention of the intention to abolish the Supreme Command System will meet with stiff opposition, let alone the Emperor's consent; so you had better propose a "Grand Reform" rather than the abolition of the existing system. At present, the Emperor is intent on building up the military and he will agree to the reform. Then, you had better establish a new system that includes the abolition of the existing system, stating that it is necessary to reorganize the military system as a precondition to the military build-up. Research is under way concerning the new military system. You should form an institution that will deliberate the results of the research.⁵⁾

3) Amendment to the Military System, Imperial Rescript, Article 17, dated July 6, 1904.

4) Ichikawa Maski, *Major General Eo Dam's Memoir* (魚潭小將回顧錄), p.81; Lim, *History of the Japanese Invasion*, p. 204 Re-quoted.

5) *Ibid.*, p. 204.

Ultimately, the first “reform of the military system” was carried out just as Nozu Shizutake had planned. Eo Dam, a pro-Japanese Korean, officer acknowledged that the reform was intended to deprive the Supreme Command of its rights, as follows:

Thus, all rights concerning military affairs were returned to the military, as Nozu had planned. None of them recognized that the first Grand Reform was no more than an attempt to deprive the Supreme Command of its rights.⁶⁾

The fact that all rights concerning military affairs were returned from the Supreme Command to the military meant that Nozu, the military adviser to the Military Minister, had in effect seized them.

Exploiting this situation, the Commander of the JFSK pressured Military Minister Yi Yunyong, who was no more than a puppet, to disband the 2nd Battalion of the 5th Regiment in Bukcheong and the 3rd Battalion in Jongseong, and to impose a strict punishment on all the troops for their collaboration with the Russian Military. The Joseon Military relieved 2nd Battalion Commander Sim Hoengtaek and 3rd Battalion Commander Kim Myeonghwan of their respective duties on December 1 and disbanded the two battalions on December 7.

6) Ibid., p. 205.

2. Joseon Falls under Japanese Military Control as a Supply Base for the Russo-Japanese War

In June 1904, Korean demonstrators gathered in Jongno, Seoul to hold a large-scale protest rally following the spread of a rumor that Nagamori Tokichirō, a Japanese entrepreneur, had been given the right to cultivate wastelands throughout Joseon. The Commander of the JFSK decided to impose military policing, particularly in Seoul, and on July 20 instructed the local military police chief as follows:

1. We intend to impose a system of military policing in Seoul and its vicinities in consideration of the current situation in Joseon in an effort to maintain law and order and help the Japanese Military to carry out its operations smoothly.
2. You are hereby instructed to watch movements both in and out of Seoul and carry out each of the following to the letter. Instructions will be separately issued for the following Item 4.
 - 1) Those who draw up or distribute documents designed to disturb public order shall be punished, and any such documents seized.
 - 2) Public gatherings or the publication of newspapers judged to disturb public order shall be stopped and those concerned shall be punished. Newspapers shall be compulsorily submitted for inspection by the Military Command prior to publication.
 - 3) Those in possession of articles that could pose a danger to public order, such as firearms, ammunitions, weapons, etc, shall be checked, and punished, with the said articles to be seized if necessary.
 - 4) All mail and telegrams shall be subject to inspection, if necessary. Pedestrians shall be stopped and questioned if suspected.

Following the commencement of the Russo-Japanese War, a series of incidents including the blocking of the passage of a train and the theft of a military communication cable were reported. On July 2, 1904, the Commander of the JFSK issued the following notice:

1. Any person who inflicts damage on the railroad system or military communication cables shall be sentenced to capital punishment.
2. Any person found guilty of hiding a person who has engaged in the acts stated in the foregoing 1 shall also be sentenced to capital punishment.
3. Any person who turns over a person who has engaged in the acts stated in the foregoing 1 or 2 to the authorities will be paid 20 won.
4. Any person who reports a person who has engaged in the acts stated in the foregoing 1 or 2 to the authorities will be paid 10 won.
5. The protection of the portion of a railroad or military communication cable laid through a village shall be the responsibility of the village. Each village shall operate a committee headed by the village leader for the protection of the said portion of railroad or military communication cable laid through the village.
6. In the event that damage is inflicted on the portion of railroad or military communication cable laid through a village, with no suspect arrested, the member of the protection committee on duty on that particular day shall be lashed or detained.
7. In the event of repeated damage, the fact will be notified to the Joseon government for its strict punishment.
8. In the event that damage is inflicted on a military communication cable by error, as by a sailing boat, the perpetrator shall be detained and lashed. The relevant boat may be seized, depending on the severity of the damage. We will ask the Joseon government authorities to impose a strict punishment, depending on the seriousness of the situation as judged by the Logistics Commander. Any expenses incurred for

lodgings and meals during the period of detention shall be borne by the detainee.

Frederick Arthur McKenzie, a Canadian war correspondent during the Russo-Japanese War, wrote the following in his book, based on what he heard an aide say to Itō Hirobumi:

“It is necessary for us to show these men something of the strong hand of Japan.”

“The people of the eastern mountain districts have seen few or no Japanese soldiers, and they have no idea of our strength. We must convince them how strong we are.”⁷⁾

In his book (See the following), McKenzie vividly describes the Japanese punishment imposed on a village where military communication cable poles had been cut down.

As I stood on a mountain-pass, looking down on the valley leading to I-Chhon, I recalled these words of my friend. The “strong hand of Japan” was certainly being shown here. I beheld in front of me village after village reduced to ashes.

I rode down to the nearest heap of ruins. The place had been quite a large village, with probably seventy or eighty houses. Destruction, thorough and complete, had fallen upon it. Not a single house was left, and not a single wall of a house. Every pot with the winter stores was broken. The

7) F.A. McKenzie, Translated by Shin Bongryong, *The Tragedy of Korea* (Korea: Jipmoondang, 1999), p. 171.

very earthen fire places were wrecked.⁸⁾

Such was the Japanese punishment for the crime of failing to prevent the destruction of military communication cable poles.

Look around and you can see the ruins of all. They spoke many harsh words to us. ‘The Eui-pyung broke down the telegraph poles and you did not stop them,’ they said. ‘Therefore you are all the same as Eui-pyung. Why have you eyes if you do not watch, why have you strength if you do not prevent the Eui-pyung from doing mischief? The Eui-pyung came to your houses and you fed them. They have gone, but we will punish you.’

“And they went from house to house, taking what they wanted and setting all alight. One old man - he had lived in his house since he was a baby suckled by his mother - saw a soldier lighting up his house. He fell on his knees and caught the foot of the soldier. ‘Excuse me, excuse me,’ he said, with many tears. ‘Please do not burn my house. Leave it for me that I may die there. I am an old man, and near my end.’

“The soldier tried to shake him off, but the old man prayed the more. ‘Excuse me, excuse me,’ he moaned. Then the soldier lifted his gun and shot the old man, and we buried him.⁹⁾

The Japanese military control first imposed in parts of Hamgyeong Province in July 1904 in connection with its war against Russia was extended to the entire province. On August 8 of that year, 300 Russian cavalry men disturbed the Japanese front line in Wonsan. The following day, a company of Russian

8) Ibid., p. 171.

9) Ibid., p. 172.

cavalry equipped with artillery pieces attacked a Japanese unit in the south of Yangil-ri. Local Korean residents secretly obstructed Japanese movement in collaboration with the 5th Regiment of the Joseon government forces in Bukcheong and Jongseong.

On October 8, 1904, the Japanese arbitrarily brought Hamheung and Wonsan under military control to cope with the situation.



Fig. 4-1. A Korean village laid to waste by the Japanese Military



Fig. 4-2. A Deserted House



Fig. 4-3. Korean houses destroyed by the Japanese Military

The following guidelines were included in the instructions on military control.

5. Local government officials who have caused harm to the Japanese Military or are judged to be unqualified to carry out their duties shall be relieved of their positions. The relevant reports shall be made in advance, if possible.
6. The vacant positions of local government officials shall be filled by selecting a suitable candidate from among the residents in the area.
7. Local government officials newly appointed by the Joseon government shall be barred from being sworn in or carrying out their duties if they do not have a letter of approval issued by the Japanese Military Commander.
8. Efforts shall be made to monitor local government officials or those acting on their behalf to prevent them from engaging in irregular or illegal acts in contradiction of orders issued by the Japanese Military (for the confiscation or provision of quarters or employment to workers, etc) to local residents in the area under military control.
9. Any Koreans found to have engaged in acts intended to obstruct Japanese Military operations (such as inflicting damage on roads, bridges, railroads or military communication cables or inflicting damage on or stealing weapons, ammunition, horse feed, military supplies, mail, structures, ships or vehicles) in the area under military control shall be punished under the military rules. The handling of Japanese or non-Koreans found to have engaged in such acts shall be carried out in accordance with the instructions of the Japanese Military Commander.
10. In the event that it becomes necessary to use Joseon forces in an area under military control, the relevant request shall be made to the commander of such forces or the Japanese Military may issue an order directly as necessary.
11. The military police shall have the power to stop and question people in the street to maintain public order in the area under military

control.

12. Strict compliance with the following provisions shall be observed in areas under military control:

- 1) Any public gatherings, newspapers, magazines or advertising judged to disturb public order shall be stopped, and the relevant people shall be detained.
- 2) Any articles owned by private citizens that could be of service to the Japanese Military shall be checked and confiscated as necessary.
- 3) Any weapons, ammunitions or other dangerous articles owned by private citizens that could be of service to the Japanese Military shall be checked and confiscated as necessary.
- 4) All inhabitants of an area under military control judged capable of jeopardizing military secrets shall be ordered to move elsewhere.
- 5) All telegrams handled at Joseon institutions shall be checked, their transmission shall be stopped, and those with suspicious contents shall be seized as necessary.
- 6) Local residents shall be made to assume full responsibility for the protection of the railroads, military communication cables, roads and bridges in their areas.
- 7) Local administrative units shall be made to pay for the repair of roads and bridges required for military operations.¹⁰⁾

On October 12, Hamheung and Wonsan were brought under military control as announced. Those traveling from Wonsan to areas occupied by the Russians or Ussuri had to obtain the permission of the Japanese Military Commander. Ships sailing from Wonsan Port could only obtain a sailing permit by reporting the details of their port calls, destination, and the type and quantity of their cargoes.

10) JFSK order, No. 268.

On January 14, 1905, the Japanese issued an expropriation order for Yeongheung Bay and nearby areas in connection with their plan to establish a military base there. On February 15, Hamnam Governor was relieved of his position on the pretext of his lack of ability, uncooperative attitude and old age. Local government officials had to obtain a letter of approval from the Japanese Military Commander, pledging allegiance to him. They could carry out their duties only within the limits set by the commander of the local Japanese military unit. Many Koreans were killed for their suspected involvement in acts viewed as harmful to the Japanese Military. Such a system remained in place until the orders and instructions for governing the area under Japanese military control were abolished following the Portsmouth Peace Treaty.

It was enough for any man in the north to be suspected of holding intercourse with the Russians, for his death to follow, and follow quickly. The Japanese, themselves past - masters in the art of espionage, were the most rigid suppressors of attempts to spy upon their own doings. There is little doubt that many people were unjustly put to death in this way. A man who had Russian money on him was at once dealt with as a spy.¹¹⁾

Observing the confrontation between the Iljinhoe, a pro-Japan Korean organization, and the Gongjinhoe, a pro-Russia organization, the commander of the JFSK decided to use it as an excuse to spread the system of military policing. On January 3, 1905, he notified the Joseon government that the Japanese Military would henceforth be in charge of maintaining public order in Seoul and its vicinity, and ordered the local military police chief to

11) F.A. McKenzie, *Ibid.*, p.111.

implement the system in accordance with the following guidelines, thereby depriving the Joseon government of police authority outright.

1. Military police activities shall be carried out in such a way as not to interfere with those of the ordinary police force, if a case that is brought to its attention has nothing to do with the maintenance of public order.
2. Do not allow the Joseon authorities to use its forces or exercise police authority concerning any matter related to the maintenance of public order.
3. When a person is found to have drawn up or distributed a document designed to disturb public order, such a document shall be seized and its author/distributor shall be detained.
4. All public gatherings or assemblies in the area under military control shall obtain the Japanese Military's approval in advance. All those gatherings judged to have the potential to disturb public order shall be prohibited.
5. Each of the following restrictions may be imposed in the area under military control, provided that restrictions concerning non-Koreans or a deportation order stated at articles 1) and 3) below shall follow the order of the Japanese Military Commander.
 - 1) The circulation of newspapers, magazines or ads judged to disturb public order shall be stopped.
 - 2) Those in possession of dangerous accoutrements such as firearms ammunitions, etc. shall be checked and punished, and the objects in question shall be seized if necessary.
 - 3) All those in the area under military control judged to pose a threat to military secrets shall be ordered to move elsewhere or be detained.

Under the Detailed Enforcement Regulations concerning the Military Police promulgated on January 6, 1905, criminals, their accomplices and those

caught for an attempted crime or involvement in a conspiracy concerning the following 19 acts were subject to capital punishment, imprisonment, expulsion, fines or lashing:

1. Espionage.
2. An act that benefits the enemy.
3. Taking an article from a POW by force and helping one to escape.
4. Collective resistance against the Japanese Military.
5. Obstruction of military operations.
6. Causing harm to the Military.
7. Destruction and theft, or obstruction of the operation of military communication cables, telephones, railroads, vehicles or ships.
8. Destruction of military installations, roads or bridges.
9. Destruction or theft of weapons, ammunition, military supplies, including rations, horse feed or uniforms, and military mail.
10. Obstruction of military communication and transportation other than what is stated in the aforementioned #2.
11. Distribution of unfavorable rumors or reports.
12. The posting of an unfavorable public notice.
13. Obstruction of or non-compliance with an order for the confiscation/provision of lodging or workers.
14. Obstruction of work carried out by Japanese soldiers or civilians working for the Military.
15. Any attempt to disturb public order through gatherings, assemblies or the publication of newspapers, magazines or advertising.
16. Non-compliance with an order prohibiting access to a designated place.
17. Non-compliance with an order issued by the Japanese Military Commander.
18. An act of hiding a criminal, taking an article from a criminal by force, or helping him to escape.
19. Destroying the evidence or proof of a crime.

Major Takayama Itsumei, the Military Police Chief of the JFSK, issued the following notice concerning public gathering or assemblies of Koreans on January 8, 1905:

1. Political assemblies shall obtain prior approval by submitting an application stating the name, rules, location and the list of members at least 3 days in advance.
2. Political gatherings shall obtain prior permission by submitting an application stating the place, hour/date and purpose at least one day in advance.
3. For other public/private gatherings or assemblies, the aforementioned 1 and 2 shall apply as necessary.
4. Outdoor gatherings and public campaigns are prohibited with the exception of ceremonial occasions.
5. The proceedings of a gathering shall comply with the order given by the military police personnel who are present.
6. The publication or dispatch of a document concerning a gathering or assembly shall be inspected by the Japanese authorities in advance.
7. Anyone acting in violation of this notice shall be punished in accordance with the corresponding military regulations.



Fig. 4-4. Koreans executed by the Japanese on charges of damaging railroads

In April 1905, a system of military policing was also imposed in Jeongju, following an attack on the Iljinhoe, a pro-Japanese organization, by a group of angry Koreans. Those in violation of the aforementioned notice were executed or imprisoned. McKenzie described what he saw in such a prison as follows:

“The barbarities of the Korean courts and prisons still remain unchecked. My attention was called to the state of the prisons, and I visited two of them. In the first, at Ping - yang, I found eighteen men and one woman confined in one cell. Several of the men were fastened to the ground by wooden stocks. The prisoners were emaciated, and their bodies showed plain signs of horrible disease. Their clothing was of the poorest, the cell was indescribably filthy, and the prisoners were confined in it, without exercise and without employment, year after year. One man had been in the cell for six years.

“The second prison, Sun - chon, was much worse. In the inner room there - so dark that for some moments I could see nothing - I found three men fastened flat on the ground, their heads and feet in stocks and their hands tied together. The room had no light or ventilation, save from a small hole in the wall. The men’s backs were fearfully scarred with cuts from beatings. Their arms were cut to the bone in many places by the ropes that had been tightly bound around them, and the wounds thus made were suppurating freely. The upper parts of the limbs were swollen; great weals and blisters could be seen on their flesh. One man’s eyes were closed, and the sight gone, heavy suppuration oozing from the closed lids. Presumably the eyes had been knocked in by blows. The men had lain thus confined without moving for days. I had them brought out into the sunshine. It was difficult work; one of them had already largely lost the use of his limbs, owing to their contraction. They were all starved and so broken that they had not even spirit to plead. The place was the nearest approach to hell I have ever seen.¹²⁾

12) F.A. McKenzie, *Ibid.*, p. 118.



Fig. 4-5. Ammunition carried by Japanese artillery units

Thereafter, the Japanese imperialists began seizing coastal areas and islands in Korea in connection with naval requirements.



Fig. 4-6. A Korean forced to carry military supplies for the Japanese military

THE HISTORY OF IMPERIAL JAPAN'S SEIZURE OF DOKDO



Chapter 5

The Japanese Navy's Seizing of Dokdo

It is quite ludicrous to suggest that Dokdo was put under Japanese control simply in response to a request from a Japanese fisherman named Nakai Yosaburo, who submitted his "Request for the Territorial Incorporation of Liancourt Island (Dokdo) and its Lease" to the Japanese government to maintain his livelihood.

1. The Expulsion of the Russians from Ulleungdo

Following the commencement of war against Russia, Japan forced the Korea government to end all matters associated with Russia on the Korean Peninsula. On March 23, 1904, about a month after Japan's declaration of war against Russia, Japanese Minister to Korea Hayashi Gonsuke sent a telegram summarized as follows to the Japanese Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō:




Fig. 5-1. Rescript for Japan's Severance of Diplomatic Relations with Russia



Fig. 5-2. Hayashi Gonsuke

.....It is necessary for us to control the right to cut timber in the forests near the Amnok [Yalu] in connection with our forces' advance on the

area. It is thought that we need to end Russia's existing right to exploit the area, as it will conflict with ours, as a matter of formality. Please consider this and issue your command.¹⁾

On the following day Komura replied saying, "We have also thought about it. We will give you your orders at the opportune time."²⁾ On May 9, Komura sent the following telegram to Hayashi:

.....Special rights to cut timber in the forests near the Duman [Tümen] and the Yalu were originally granted by the Korea government to individuals, but they have been controlled by the Russian government, which means that the conditions for the rights have not been in compliance. Thus, the special rights are hereby cancelled. However, any special rights granted to Russian nationals or businesses will remain valid, as long as they do not hamper the Korean government's sovereignty.³⁾



Fig. 5-3. Komura Jutarō

- 1) Japanese Foreign Ministry Documents, 37-1, No.435, pp. 382~383.
- 2) Japanese Foreign Ministry Documents, 37-1, No.435, p. 383.
- 3) Japanese Foreign Ministry Documents, 37-1, No.435, p. 386.

On May 12, 1904, Hayashi met Korea Foreign Minister Yi Hae-yong and forced him to agree to his proposal that the rights that the Korean government had granted to the Russian government to log forests should be cancelled straight away. On May 18, Hayashi reported to Komura that the logging contract made between Korea and Russia would be cancelled.⁴⁾

But the failure to include the rights granted to Russia to cut timber on Ulleungdo in their discussion reveals a specific gap in their preparations for naval warfare.

The following announcement made by the Korea government on May 18 included the scrapping of the right to cut timber even in Ulleungdo, which was not discussed either in Hayashi's report or in Komura's instruction:

.....Special rights to cut timber in the forests near the Tumen, the Yalu and Ulleungdo were originally granted by the Korea government to individuals, but they have been controlled by the Russian government. Not only that, but the Russian government has been engaged in acts of aggression in violation of the agreements for such special rights. Thus, the special rights are hereby cancelled. However, special rights granted to Russian nationals or businesses will remain valid, as long as they do not hamper the Korean government's sovereignty.⁵⁾

The abrupt change in the Korean government's rescript was attributed to the Japanese Navy's disastrous losses around May 15, 1904, after its successful domination in the initial stages of the war. The Vladivostok Fleet led by Admiral Essen threatened the Japanese Navy in the East Sea. Japan's ultra-

4) Japanese Foreign Ministry Documents, 37-1, No. 435, p. 388.

5) Japanese Foreign Ministry Documents, 37-1, No. 450-451, pp. 389~391.

modern warships, the Hatsuse and Yajima, had been sunk by mines laid by the Russian Navy. Seven hours before that incident the Yoshino and Kasuga had collided in dense fog and sank, and the gunboats Oshima and Akashiro were also involved in an accident. This series of disasters dealt a near fatal blow to the Japanese Navy.

Judging it had lost a third of its capabilities, the Japanese Ministry of Navy needed to construct a hasty naval base in Ulleungdo to make up for the losses. To this end, it was thought necessary to expel the Russian loggers on the island to prevent them from spying on Japanese facilities.

2. The Japanese Navy Grasps the Strategic Value of Dokdo

In the initial stage of the war, the Japanese Navy seemed to be in a dominant position against Russia, sinking the Petropavlovsk on April 13, 1904 and killing Admiral Makarov in action. However, the situation abruptly turned against Japan just a month later as mentioned above.⁶⁾ On June 16, the Hitachi Maru, a freight ship sailing for Lüshun Port laden with weapons and the Izumi Maru were sunk by the Kromboy of the Vladivostok Fleet of Russia in the Tsushima Strait, while the Sado Maru was sunk by the Russian ship.⁷⁾

6) Denis and Peggy Warner, *The Tide at Sunrise: A History of the Russo-Japanese War*, Translated by Imouto Osataro and Mitani Tsuneo, pp. 320~321.

7) *Ibid.*, pp. 323~324.




Fig. 5-4. The Mutsu Maru, a freight ship



Fig. 5-5. A destroyed gun barrel on the Izumi Maru (Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, www.jacar.go.jp)

With the sinking of these ships, 1,095 Japanese troops lost their lives. Their commander committed suicide after burning the regimental flag. The Japanese taking of Lüshun was delayed by two months. Vice Admiral Kamimura Hikonojō, who was charged with besieging the Vladivostok Fleet

of Russia was ridiculed with nicknames such as “national enemy” or “Russian spy.” However, it was not possible to pull the battleships from the attack on Lüshun to protect Japan’s sea lanes in the East Sea.

Following the loss of its naval supremacy, Japan was concerned about the possibility of its troops in Manchuria becoming isolated. The Japanese military needed a means for the early detection of Russian naval ships sailing southward to the East Sea to regain naval supremacy around the Korean Strait.

At its Cabinet council, Japan had already decided that “Korea must be brought under our control under threat of force,”⁸⁾ and laid the legal basis for the use of Korean land as it pleased under the Korea-Japan Protocol which was forcefully signed on February 23, 1904, immediately after the commencement of the Russo-Japanese War.

To meet its urgent needs following the sinking of several naval ships, the Japanese Navy built watchhouses in strategically important points in Korea, including Jukbyeon, Ulsan, Geomundo and Jejudo, linking them with undersea cable between June 27 and July 22. On July 5, Japan decided to build another watchtower on Ulleungdo linked with Jukbyeon by undersea cable. Thus, a total of 20 watchtowers were built⁹⁾ on sites that had been forcefully taken.

More naval ships including the Takashima Maru were sunk. Between July 20 and 30, a Russian naval ship appeared in the Tsugaru Strait twice threatening Tokyo Bay. Feeling the utmost urgency, Japan pulled out four of

8) Japanese Foreign Ministry, *Japanese diplomatic chronology and important documents* (Nihongaikō ncnpyō narabiai shuyō bunsho, 日本外交年表並主要文書), (1956), pp. 217~219, pp. 223~224.

9) The Japanese Navy General Headquarters, *Naval War History in the 37th and 38th years of the Meiji Reign Top Secret Part 4*, Vol. 4, 1-27 (Tokyo: Government Print Office, 1934), pp. 218~276.

the six mid-sized cruisers engaged in the attack on Lüshun to guard the Korean Strait.

The Japanese Navy decided to make up for its deficient naval strength by detecting enemy ships early from the watchtowers erected on shore. The two watchtowers built in Ulleungdo began operations on September 2. The work for laying the undersea cable started on September 8 and was completed on the 25th under threat from Russia's Vladivostok Fleet.¹⁰⁾ Once completed, Russian naval movements observed from the Ulleungdo watchhouses could be directly reported to the Japanese naval unit in Sasebo, Japan via Jukbyeon, Korea. Had Ulleungdo been uninhabited, Japan would have attempted to use the entire area as a naval base.

| Table 5-1 | Japanese Military Watchhouses in Korea during the Russo-Japanese War

Name of watchhouse	Location	Means of communication with base station	Means of communication with naval ships	Work started in	Work completed in	Operation started in	Number of personnel deployed
Palmipo	Palgupo	Phone	Light signal / wireless	2/15/1904	3/28/1904	9/20/1904	14
Baekdo	Baengnyeongdo	Phone	Wireless	3/17/1904	4/3/1904	4/11/1904	19
Jukbin	Jukbyeon	Telegraph	Wireless	6/27/1904	7/22/1904	8/10/1904	13
Wonsan	Wonsan	Phone	Light signal	7/5/1904	8/3/1904	8/3/1904	5
Yeongdo	Busan	Telegraph	All means	7/17/1904	8/20/1904	8/2/1904	9
Hongdo	Hongdo	Telegraph	All means	7/17/1904	8/2/1904	10/7/1904	8
Songdo East	Ulleungdo	Telegraph	All means	8/3/1904	9/1/1904	2/9/1904	7

10) Ibid., pp. 48~57.

Name of watchhouse	Location	Means of communication with base station	Means of communication with naval ships	Work started in	Work completed in	Operation started in	Number of personnel deployed
Songdo West	Ulleungdo	Phone	All means	8/3/1904	9/1/1904	2/9/1904	7
Ulgi	Ulsan	Telegraph	All means	8/27/1904	9/20/1904	9/21/1904	7
Mundo	Geomundo	Telegraph	All means	8/27/1904	9/20/1904	9/30/1904	11
Udo	Jejudo	Telegraph	All means	8/27/1904	9/20/1904	10/10/1904	7
Jedo	Jejudo	Telegraph	All means	8/27/1904	9/20/1904	9/30/1904	12
Uldo	Uldo	Phone	All means	8/27/1904	9/20/1904	10/15/1904	19
Dadae	Geojedo	Phone	All means	9/5/1904	10/18/1904	11/19/1904	8
Suwon	Suwondan	Telegraph	All means	3/7/1905	4/21/1905	5/3/1905	7
Hodo	Yeongheung	Phone	All means	3/28/1905	4/24/1905	5/26/1905	11
Mugi	Musudan	Telegraph	All means	6/7/1905	6/7/1905	7/20/1905	12
Songdo North	Ulleungdo	Telegraph	All means	7/14/1905	7/16/1905	8/16/1905	11
Dongi	Dongoe Point	-	All means	7/14/1905	8/15/1905	8/21/1905	8
Jukdo	Dokdo	Phone	All means	7/25/1905	8/19/1905	8/19/1905	6

※ Source: The Japanese Navy General Headquarters, *Naval War History*, Vol.4

In the meantime, Japanese troops led by General Nogi Maresuke attacked Lüshun on August 10, the naval battles in the West Sea turned in Japan's favor, and the Japanese Navy overwhelmingly defeated Admiral Essen's Vladivostok Fleet in a battle near Ulsan. Russia's Czar, Nicholas I, decided to dispatch the Baltic Fleet to the East Sea at a meeting on August 30. On September 13, the first fleet set sail from Kronstadt. There was intelligence that the Vladivostok Fleet had repaired ships damaged in the battle near Ulsan. It was even rumored that the fleet had seen action on September 22.¹¹⁾

The situation put the Japanese Navy on the alert. For Japan, the possibility of the Vladivostok Fleet blocking up the Korean Strait was more urgent than the imminent presence of the Baltic Fleet. Thus, the Japanese Navy devised a plan to build a watchhouse on Dokdo. This demonstrated that the Japanese recognized the strategic importance of the islands and took action to use them before a Japanese fisherman named Nakai Yosaburo submitted his “Request for the Territorial Incorporation of Liancourt Island (Dokdo) and Its Lease” to the Japanese government.

On September 24, the Niitaka Maru set sail from Ulleungdo to inspect the Dokdo, checking first-hand what the crew installing a telegraph cable linking Jukbyeon with Ulleungdo had reported about the islands.¹²⁾ This occurred five days before the Japanese fisherman submitted his request. The daily activities report of the Niitaka Maru dated September 25, 1904 read as follows:

Intelligence gathered by those who actually saw Liancourt Rocks from Matsushima (Ulleungdo)

Koreans call them Dokdo, while our fishermen call them Liancourt Rocks. (The name ‘Liancourt Rocks’ comes from the French whaling ship Liancourt which charted the islands in 1849.) As shown on the map, they are composed of two rocky islands. The western island is about 160 meters high. It is composed of a steep slope, making it difficult to climb.

-
- 11) Choe Munhyeong, *The Russo-Japanese War and Japan’s Annexation of Korea Viewed from the Context of International Relations* [in Korean] (Seoul: Jisiksanup, 2004), p. 300.
- 12) *The Daily Report on the Activities of the Naval Ship Niitaka Maru*, dated September 24, 1904 (The Defense Agency of Japan).

The eastern island is lower, and wild grass grows on it. There is a small flat space on its top that is wide enough to build two or three houses.

There is a small spring on an indented part of the eastern island. There is another spring in a place near the sea marked “B” on the map, in the southern section of the island. The water flows down westward and the spring never dries up all year round. At a place marked “C” on the map, in the western part of the western island, there is also a source for fresh water.

Most of the small rocks scattered around the islands are flat-topped. Combined, they form spaces wide enough for dozens of people to lie down upon. They are the preferred places of rest for sea lions. The space between the two islands is wide enough to dock a boat. It is advisable to place a boat on shore if it is a small one. On many days of the year, the wind blows strong. On such days, it is advisable to wait in Matsushima (Ulleungdo) until the wind calms down.

Those hunting sea lions near the islands use Japanese boats and sleep in temporarily built houses on one of the islands, spending about ten days in all on one hunting trip. They seem to make pretty good money. The number of fishermen comes to 40 or 50 at a time. A lack of potable water has not been reported. This year alone, they made hunting trips there several times. They say that they saw three Russian naval ships sailing in a northwesterly direction after staying near the island for some time.¹³⁾

The foregoing report contains some exaggerations, such as “The spring never dries up all year round,” apparently intended to emphasize that the islands constituted a suitable site on which to build a watchhouse. It appears the Japanese Navy’s plan to build a watchhouse was based on the islands’

13) Ibid., dated September 25, 1904.

location in the middle of the East Sea, and that the plan was influenced further by the reported sighting of Russian naval ships.

The Japanese Navy General Headquarters thought the information insufficient to justify the installation of an island watchhouse. On November 13, it ordered the captain of the Tsushima Maru, carrying out duties near the Korean Strait, to check whether “Liancourt Rocks are a suitable site on which to build a wired telegraphic transmission base.”

We duly received secret message No.276, a command issued to the captain of the Sendo Takehide (from the flagship Kasagi in Takeshiki on November 13, the 37th year of the Meiji Period).

1. You are instructed to take the following personnel and supplies to the places indicated and then carry out the following duties after departing. The schedule for their return to your ship after finishing the assignment should be fixed in consultation with the relevant personnel. Report your fixed schedule to us.
2. Carry out a communication test with the wireless telegraphic transmission base on Takasaki Mountain and transport the personnel involved in the test.
3. Check to see whether Liancourt Rocks are a suitable site on which to build a wired telegraphic transmission base (not a wireless one).
4. Transport the personnel and supplies for the watchtowers in Matsushima (Ulleungdo), Jukbyeon and Ulgi.
5. The personnel and supplies for each watchtower stated above (c) will be on the Seiryu Maru, which will arrive tomorrow (the 14th) morning. The test personnel for Takasaki Mountain will arrive on the morning of the day after tomorrow (the 15th).¹⁴⁾

14) *The Wartime Daily Report on the Activities of the Naval Ship Tsushima*, dated November 13, 1904 (The Defense Agency of Japan).

Due to inclement weather the personnel from Sasebo arrived three days behind schedule. Thus, the Tsushima Maru set sail for Jukbyeon on November 18.¹⁵⁾ At 8:40 am on November 19, the Tsushima Maru arrived at the entrance to Jukbyeon Bay. It unloaded the supplies for the watchhouse there and set sail for Ulleungdo one hour later. It arrived at Dodong, Ulleungdo at 4:20 pm on the same day and unloaded the supplies for the watchtower at a place near the watchtower.¹⁶⁾ The ship arrived at Dokdo at 7:20 on November 20, 1904 and Major Yamanaka Shibakichi, the vice-captain of the ship, and military surgeon Imai Gebitaro went ashore.

After checking the islands for three hours, they made a report to the effect that a lower part in the eastern area of the western island and a flat space at the southern tip of the eastern island appeared to be suitable sites for watchtowers. The lack of potable water would be the most serious problem for the personnel who would stay there, which meant that potable water would have to be supplied from elsewhere if a watchtower was to be maintained there. The ship returned home to Beppu Bay at 7:03 pm the same day. The captain of the ship made the following written report on what he had seen of the Dokdo to the Ministry of Navy on January 5, 1905.

Summarized explanation of Liancourt Rocks submitted by Commander Sendo Takeo, the captain of the Tsushima Maru, to the Japanese Navy's Hydrographic Director on January 5, the 38th year of the Meiji Period (1905).

15) *The Wartime Daily Report on the Activities of the Naval Ship Tsushima*, dated November 18, 1904 (The Defense Agency of Japan).

16) *The Wartime Daily Report on the Activities of the Naval Ship Tsushima*, dated November 19, 1904 (The Defense Agency of Japan).

.....Liancourt Rocks are only a small island group consisting of two main islands facing each other and surrounded by small rocks. These small rocks are mostly flat, and their tops are slightly above the surface of the water. Around the two main islands are a number of small caves inhabited by groups of sea lions. The main islands consist of bare rocks without any trees; a lot of wild grass grows on the southern side, like moss. The sea winds blow all the time. Climbing is impossible from anywhere all around because of the islands' precipitous cliffs and soft layers. There is no level ground, and both sides of the water passage between the two main islands are extremely narrow. There are a couple of flat stone areas but none of them are safe from the waves. On the eastern island stands a little hut, which is used by fishermen to catch sea lions in the summer. Now, only ruins remain after its sudden destruction. Judging by what is left of it, one can only imagine how powerful the winds and waves must have been when the damage was done. As regards construction sites that can be protected from the wind and waves, only the two areas outlined below are feasible.

- (a) On the eastern side of the western island stands a peak whose sides are so steep that the upper part cannot be climbed upright, while the lower part is gradual enough to enable one to make one's way up to the middle of it. Geologically, it is made up of strong stone there, and a level area of about 3 pyeong (10 square meters) could be made of it. If some work is done on it can be blocked from every direction except the east.
- (b) At first glance the top of the eastern island seems to have a number of flat areas, and thus seems to be suitable for the construction of structures. However, a survey of the island has revealed that an enormous amount of construction would be required to build a path just to access a certain area. Although it is inevitable that the island is exposed to and thus affected by bad weather, at its southern end there is a flat area of about 3~4 pyeong; and one side of the northwest appears to be isolated.....¹⁷⁾

The foregoing report is followed by a report made by the military surgeon pointing out the lack of spring water and the fact that the fishermen had to bring potable water from elsewhere, although there was a small freshwater spring in a place near the sea that they could use when the sea was calm.

The Japanese Navy judged that a watchtower could be maintained on the island on the strength of the report. However, they waited until the next spring to take any action.

3. Seizing of Dokdo

In winter it was difficult for a boat to dock at the Dokdo wharf due to the strong winds. It was also difficult to build a facility there due to the lack of freshwater. While the plan to build a watchhouse on Dokdo was shelved, the Japanese Navy engaged in a series of large and small sea battles against the Vladivostok Fleet of Russia, and finally succeeded in taking Lüshun on January 1, 1905 after great hardship. Taking Lüshun did not mean that the odds were now decidedly in Japan's favor. Towards the end of January, Russia launched a large-scale offensive involving 100,000 troops against the Japanese in Heigou. In March the two sides (240,000 Japanese troops and 320,000 Russians) engaged in the largest battle of the Russo-Japanese War in Shenyang, causing 70,000 casualties on the Japanese side alone. Japan won the battle but was left with an insufficient number of troops, and the war reached a stalemate.

After a series of defeats in Manchuria, Russia sent the Baltic Fleet to

17) Referential document No.67, p. 367 to *The Wartime Daily Report on the Activities of the Naval Ship Tsushima* (The Defense Agency of Japan).

join the Vladivostok Fleet in an attempt to gain a dominant position at sea and support its army. Russia planned to use Ulleungdo as a base for naval operations in the East Sea between Vladivostok and Masan. Japan attempted to block the Russian advance in the East Sea, using Dokdo as a base for its naval operations in the sea between Okishima and Ulleungdo. Ulleungdo and Dokdo became strategically important for both sides if Russia would succeed in joining the Baltic Fleet and the Vladivostok Fleet; in that core sea battles would be fought in the East Sea.¹⁸⁾

The Second Pacific Fleet of Russia under the command of Admiral Rodjestvensky left Libau, the Baltic Fleet's home port, on October 14, 1904 with Czar Nicholas II's blessing. At the Gibraltar Strait, it was decided that the main fleet led by Admiral Rodjestvensky should take the route around the Cape of Good Hope, while a unit led by Admiral Falkersham passed through the Suez Canal. The main fleet arrived at Nosibe Port in Madagascar on December 29 after a difficult voyage. Departure was delayed due to the German reluctance to supply coal for the ships' engines. It remained there until March 17 at the orders of the home government to join the Third Pacific Fleet before departing for the battle theater. The three-month wait on steel decks under a tropical sun left the Russian seamen utterly exhausted and afforded the Japanese Navy the opportunity to recover from the great losses it had suffered in the battle with the Vladivostok Fleet.

To make matters worse, Russia gave up Lüshun on January 1, 1905. On January 22, the first revolution, known as "Bloody Sunday," broke out in Russia and the news left the seamen under Admiral Rodjestvensky's command utterly dejected.

Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō of the Japanese Navy stayed in Tokyo for

¹⁸⁾ Choe Munhyeong, *Ibid.*, p. 299.

five weeks from December 30, 1904, to discuss how to carry out naval battles under the direction of Ito Yuki, the Chief of the Japanese Naval Operations. In the meantime, the Russian fleet led by Admiral Folkersam passed through the Suez Canal and joined the main fleet of Admiral Rodjestvensky on January 9, 1905, forming a fleet of 38 ships. On January 10, 1905, Japanese Interior Minister Yoshikawa Akimasa sent a confidential letter entitled the “Matter concerning the Uninhabited Islets” (See the following) to Prime Minister Katsura Taro, asking for a Cabinet meeting.




Fig. 5-6. The Russian fleet led by Admiral Folkersam (Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, www.jacar.go.jp)




Fig. 5-7. The Baltic Fleet of Russia at Nosibe Port in Madagascar
(Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, www.jacar.go.jp)

To: Prime Minister Count Katsura Taro

The Matter concerning the Uninhabited Islets

The uninhabited islands, located 160 km from Okishima at latitude 37° 9' 30" N, longitude 131° 55' E, show no signs to the effect that they are the territory of another country. In the 36th year of the Meiji Period, a Japanese fisherman named Nakai Yosaburo started hunting sea lions near the islands, building a hut on one of them, and submitted a petition asking for their incorporation into Japanese territory and that they be leased to him. We hereby intend to name them Takeshima and have them incorporated as part of Okishima, Shimane Prefecture. Please hold a Cabinet session to discuss this.

January 10, the 38th year of the Meiji Period

Interior Minister Viscount Yoshikawa Akimasa




Fig. 5-8. The confidential letter asking for the Japanese Cabinet's decision on the incorporation of Dokdo into Japanese territory

Upon receipt of the confidential letter, Katsura insisted that Dokdo was not the territory of another country and decided to incorporate them into Japanese territory at a Cabinet meeting on January 28, 1905. No member of the Cabinet raised any objection to the decision. At that time, the Cabinet was under the virtual control of the military.

The decision made at the Japanese Cabinet meeting held on January 28, the 38th year of the Meiji Period.

As stated in the Matter concerning the Uninhabited Islets, located at latitude 37° 9' 30" N, longitude 131° 55' E, some 160 km from Okishima, they show no signs of belonging to the territory of another country. In the 36th year of the Meiji Period, a Japanese fisherman named Nakai Yosaburo started hunting sea lions near the islands, building a hut on one of them, and submitted a petition asking for their incorporation into Japanese territory and that they be leased to him. The Interior Minister

expressed his intention to name them Takeshima and to have them incorporated as part of Okishima, Shimane Prefecture. As we have checked the matter, the fact that the fisherman resided on one of the islands and engaged in fishing in that area has been proven by a document. We hereby announce the Cabinet's decision to adopt the resolution to incorporate the islands as part of Okishima, Shimane Prefecture, as it has been occupied by a Japanese national under International Law.



Fig. 5-9. The Text of the Japanese Cabinet's decision for Dokdo incorporation into its territory

The foregoing decision was made only a week after Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō issued an order that “all naval ships not assigned to special duties assemble at the Korean Strait by January 21, 1905 after finishing the necessary repairs.”¹⁹⁾ Tōgō’s order signified that Japan had selected the

19) The Japanese Navy General Headquarters, *Ibid.*, p. 137.

Korean Strait as the site for a decisive battle with Russia. Tōgō also drew up a plan to destroy the Russian fleet if it fled in the direction of Vladivostok via Ulleungdo and Dokdo in expectation that the Japanese Navy would win the battle. The decision made on May 18, 1904 to expel the Russians cutting timber in Ulleungdo was in line with the plan. However, the inclement spring weather prevented the Japanese from building a watchtower on Dokdo.

On January 21, 1905 the Japanese fleet gathered at the Korean Strait, where they carried out a 7-stage exercise under the command of Tōgō. The maneuvers comprised; 1) the launch of a surprise attack on the Russians, using all their destroyers and torpedo boats; 2) the launch of an all-out attack during the daytime; 3) the launch of a second surprise attack after sunset, using all the remaining destroyers and torpedo boats; 4) the pursuit of fleeing enemy ships up to the area around Ulleungdo; 5) the fighting of a battle near Ulleungdo and a surprise attack at night; 6) the pursuit of the fleeing enemy ships up to Vladivostok; 7) the enclosure of enemy ships in Vladivostok Harbor and the mining of the entire area to incapacitate the enemy fleet.




Fig. 5-10. Core ships of the Japanese naval fleet

On May 26, the Second Pacific Fleet of Russia finally appeared in the foggy Korean Strait dimming their lights to evade detection by Japanese cruisers.

However, a hospital ship tailing the fleet kept its lights bright in compliance with relevant international convention. At around 2:30 am on May 27, the Japanese cruiser Shinano Maru detected the lights on the hospital ship through the dense fog and identified the Russian fleet. At 4:45 am in the morning, the Shinano Maru reported its findings by telegraph.

Upon receipt of the report, the Japanese flagship Mikasa, captained by Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō, set sail from Jinhae towards the Korean Strait.

At 2:10 pm the combined Japanese Naval Fleet opened fire. One hour later, the Russian battleship Osylabya and the Russian flagship Suvoroff with Admiral Rodjestvensky on board were enveloped in flames.

In the ensuing five-hour battle, the Russian fleet lost four capital ships. Admiral Nebogatov took over the command of the Russian fleet from Admiral Rodjestvensky, who was wounded. The Russian fleet led by




Fig. 5-11. Telegraph containing a message from the Shinano maru (Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, www.jacar.go.jp)



Fig. 5-12. The Baltic Fleet of Russia at Nosi-Be Port in Madagascar (Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, www.jacar.go.jp)

Nebogatov tried to flee in the direction of Vladivostok. The Japanese fleet, composed of about 40 destroyers and torpedo boats, surrounded the Russian fleet and waited until dark. At 8:00 pm, the Japanese launched their attack, sinking two of Russia's battleships and two cruisers. The other vessels of the Russian fleet scattered. At daybreak of May 28, the remaining ships of the Russian fleet, namely the flagship Nikolai II, with Admiral Nobogatov aboard, and the cruisers Oryol, Aprixin, Seniavin and Izumrud were sailing in the direction of Dokdo, trying to avoid detection by the Japanese. However, the Japanese found them and attacked until 11:00 am. Finally, Admiral Nobogatov surrendered at a point 18 miles southeast of Dokdo. At 2:00 pm, the Russian destroyer Biedovy with the wounded, unconscious Admiral Rodjestvensky on board also surrendered at a point 38 miles to the southwest of Ulleungdo.




Fig. 5-13. The Mikasa, flagship of the Japanese Fleet



Fig. 5-14. Commanders on the battleship Mikasa

At that time, Admiral Domecq Garcia of the Argentine Navy was on one of the Japanese ships watching the battle. A sketch he made of the battle situation clearly shows that Japanese ships blocked the path of the fleeing Russians near Dokdo, confirming why the Japanese had taken such a strong interest in the islets.

In this battle, the Japanese won a major victory, though Russia still remained strong. The Japanese Navy recognized the strategic value of Ulleungdo and Dokdo again, and recommended (See the following) building a watchhouse on Dokdo on May 30, 1905.

It is requested that the following facilities be built, as their usefulness has been recognized for future operations:

1. A telegraphic transmission base, which should be made suitable for long-distance transmission, using high-voltage power.

2. A temporary watchtower at Donggoe Point in Yeongil Bay.
3. Undersea cable should be laid in order to link Matsushima (Ulleungdo) with Liancourt Rocks, and Liancourt Rocks with Takasaki Mountain on Okishima.
4. A watchtower and a flagpole should be erected on Liancourt Rocks (the structure should not be detectable to ships passing by).²⁰⁾




Fig. 5-15. The Suborov, flagship of the Russian Fleet

At 2:00 pm on June 13, 1905, the Japanese warship Hashitate Maru arrived at Dokdo and surveyed it for about 40 minutes.²¹⁾ The captain of the warship reported that a watchtower could be built on the highest point of the eastern

²⁰⁾ The Japanese Navy General Headquarters, *Ibid.*, pp. 20~21.

²¹⁾ *The Wartime Daily Report on the Activities of the Naval Ship Hashitate*, dated June 13, 1905 (the Defense Agency of Japan).

island and that potable water should be supplied once or twice a month.²²⁾ On the basis of that report, the Commander of the Japanese Navy Third Fleet finally decided that the eastern island was a suitable site for a watchtower and submitted a report to that effect with a map showing the prospective site attached, on June 14.




Fig. 5-16. The Russian Fleet surrendering to Japan

On June 24, 1905, the Japanese Minister of Navy established the Plan for Relevant Facilities in the Sea of Japan, including another watchhouse and a telegraphic transmission base in the northern section of Ulleungdo and a watchhouse on the eastern island of Dokdo, linking these watchhouses and the one in Oki Japan with an undersea cable. The plan did not mention the border between Korea and Japan or the Korean territories, however.

Work on the new watchtower in Ulleungdo started on July 14 and finished on August 16.²³⁾ The work for the one on Dokdo started on July 25 and finished on August 19.²⁴⁾ The war ended in September somewhat earlier

22) *The Wartime Daily Report on the Activities of the Naval Ship Hashitate*, dated June 13, 1905 (the Defense Agency of Japan).

23) *The Japanese Navy General Headquarters*, Ibid., p. 227.

24) Ibid., p. 276.

than expected, and a small change was made to the plan. An undersea cable was laid between Dokdo and Matsue, Japan instead of Oki. Cable laying started at the end of October and finished on November 9.²⁵⁾




Fig. 5-17. A sketch made by Admiral Domecq Garcia of the Argentine Navy of the sea battle between Japan and Russia while on board one of the Japanese ships

The Japanese government saw Dokdo only as an object for military use and had no particular interest in what the fisherman, Nakai Yosaburo, did there for his living.

²⁵⁾ Ibid., pp. 20~21 and pp. 93~95.

4. The Japanese Government insists that the “Uninhabited” Islands were Legitimately Incorporated




Fig. 5-18. Hashitate maru (Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, www.jacar.go.jp)

The Japanese government has insisted that it legally incorporated the uninhabited islands into its territory. Kawakami Kenjō, who played an important role in drawing up the Japanese government’s diplomatic documents as a Foreign Ministry official at the time of Korea and Japanese sovereignty disputes over the islands in the 1950s, said the following:

Nakai Yosaburo and Ishibashi Shōtarō, both residents of Oki Island, were engaged in hunting sea lions, starting in the 36th year of the Meiji Period (1903). In the following year, Iguchi Ryuta and Kato Chujo from Oki and Iwazaki from Yamaguchi Prefecture joined them in sea lion hunting. The number of sea lions caught by these people in that area came to 2,760, a number which raised some concern about the disappearance of those

animals from that area. When the sea lion hunting season was over in the 37th year of the Meiji Period, Nakai Yosaburo made a request to the Internal, Foreign and Agricultural/Commercial Ministers that the Japanese Government incorporate Liancourt Rocks into the Japanese territory and lease it to him. It was a historic event through which Takeshima was incorporated into Shimane Prefecture.²⁶⁾



Fig. 5-19. The watchtower site built by the Japanese in the northern part of Ulleungdo (Courtesy of Hong Songgun)

26) Kawakami Kenjo, *The Geographical and historical research of Takeshima* [in Japanese] (Tokyo: Kokinshoin, 1966), pp. 208~209.



Fig. 5-20. The site of the quarters for the Japanese troops guarding the watchtower in the northern part of Ulleungdo (Courtesy of the Dokdo Guards)

Nakai Yosaburo was an educated fisherman who had attended a private higher educational institution in Tokyo after finishing his secondary school education in his hometown. In 1890, he started fishing in the territorial waters of foreign countries, using an aqualung, which was an ultra-modern equipment item at that time. In 1891 and 1892, he collected sea slugs in the sea off Vladivostok. In 1893, he caught sea lions and abalones in the sea off Gyeongsang and Jeolla Provinces, Korea. In 1903, he found the hunting sea lions to be highly profitable. In an attempt to monopolize the right to catch sea lions near Dokdo, he paid visits to high-ranking officials in Tokyo in the fall of 1904 and submitted the following petition to the Interior, Foreign, Agricultural and Commercial Ministries:

To: Interior Minister Viscount Yoshikawa Akimasa
Foreign Minister Baron Komura Jutarō
Agricultural/Commercial Minister Baron Kiyoura Keigo

Subject: Petition for the Incorporation of Liancourt Rocks into Japanese Territory and Lease of the Same

There are some uninhabited islands called Liancourt Rocks at a point about 90 km southeast from Ulleungdo and about 160 km from the Okishima. The rocks are composed of two islands facing each other. Dozens of rocks are scattered around them. The western sides of the two islands are perpendicular cliffs. On the top of the islands, weeds are growing. There are no trees on the islands. There is a small sandy beach in an indented part of the seashore on one of them. There is only one small place to build a structure on one of them. From a place on one of them, spring water containing a little salt flow down the rocks. One can moor a boat alongside the shore when the winds calm down.

The islands are located between Okishima and Ulleungdo on the sea route to the Gangwon and Hamgyeong provinces of Korea. If people reside on them and provide fuel, potable water or foods, they will be of great help to any boats sailing nearby. It is thought that these islands will be very important for Japanese fishing and ongoing trade with Gangwon and Hamgyeong Provinces.

They have remained uninhabited as a group of rocks on a distant sea. Seeing countless sea lions on these islands, I thought that they should not be left as they are. In the 36th year of the Meiji Period, I spent some money to build a temporary house on one of the islands for workers who would help me catch sea lions. People made fun of me, as they thought that I was doing something foolish. Due to various unfavorable conditions, my project turned out to be unprofitable. However, this year, I came up with a new idea for catching sea lions effectively and succeeded in exploring the related markets. The salt-preserved skin of sea lions has become popular, as it can serve as a substitute for cowhide. The oil

collected from their fresh fat is as good as that of whales. Its residues can be used as a raw material for adhesives. Their bones and meat can also be used as good fertilizers. Thus, the hunting of sea lions is expected to become a profitable business. There is no usable land on the islands. As for the possibility of catching other marine products, I am not in a position to make a comment on it, as no relevant survey has been made. However, it is expected that more promising business could be found in future. In short, the future prospects are bright, if someone continues to engage in the business of hunting sea lions using a facility properly built on the island.

At present, it is not clear whose territory the islands are. I find it a risky action to invest in them, as I am not sure whether my rights can be protected. The season for hunting is between April or May (when the sea lions gather for mating) and July or August. Hunting them should be properly controlled to prevent their extinction. If no control is made many people, including me, will enter into fierce competition with each other once they see that it is a profitable business. No one will obtain any benefit from such a situation.

I have concluded that it is profitable to hunt sea lions near the islands after making various efforts and plans, such as how to control the hunting of them, including the protection of young ones and pregnant ones, and how to kill their natural enemies, such as dolphins and sharks, using exquisite devices to catch them. I have also tested whether it is possible to catch other kinds of fish there. However, at present I am not sure whether to continue making such efforts due to the aforesaid problem.

The current situation appears disadvantageous to the entire nation. Thus, I request that the government incorporate these islands into the nation's territory and lease them to me for ten years. A map of the area is hereby attached for your reference.

September 29, the 39th year of the Meiji Period (1906)

Nakai Yosaburo

Oaza Nishi-machi, Saigo-cho, Suki-gun, Shimane Prefecture

It can be said that what the Japanese fisherman observed while hunting sea lions near Dokdo was accurate and carried some significance. Concerning Dokdo (called “Takeshima” in Japan), the *Shimane Prefecture Bulletin* compiled in 1923 by the Office of Education of the prefecture records, “In the 37th year of the Meiji Period, indiscriminate hunting was fierce and caused many problems. Thus, inagining two islands belonged to, Nakai came to Tokyo in order to ask that government to lease them to him, by persuading the Minisrry of Agriculture and Commerce.” It is clear that he meant the Korean government by “that government.” In the 1950s, when a controversy concerning the islands arose between the two countries, the Japanese government said that that part stemmed from the misunderstanding of the compiler.²⁷⁾

Nakai Yosaburo left two statements concerning Dokdo: 1) His resume submitted to the Office of the Okishima, 2) his verbal statements made to Okuhara Fukuichi on March 25, 1906. The attachment to the resume he submitted to the Office of Okishima states as follows:

All fishermen hunting near Ulleungdo know well that there are many sea lions on and near Takeshima. However, reckless attempts to catch them will cause them to disappear. It will also lead to the problem of a supply glut. I came to realize that it could be a profitable business. But, recently, many hunters have been catching an excessive number of sea lions in this area. Thus, I am concerned about the possibility of their imminent extinction. I have thought over how the situation surrounding the islands can be properly settled and the profitability of the business sustained.

27) “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,” *The Monthly Survey Report*, The November 1954 issue, p. 68.

I wondered if the islands were part of Ulleungdo and Korea territory. I came to Tokyo to ask the authority. At that time, as the Director General of Marine Affairs, Maki Bokushin, said that it was not necessarily Korea territory. I hurried in investigated. I understood finally from the clear comment by Kimotsuki, the Director of Waterways that this island belonged to no country. Thus, I submitted a petition to the Interior Foreign and Agricultural/Commercial Ministers, asking the government to lease them to me. In response, an Interior Ministry official said that the fisherman's petition would be rejected no matter what his reasoning was, saying, "If we incorporate worthless pieces of rocks suspected of being a sovereign Korean territory on an occasion like this, many foreign countries with their eyes on Japan will become greatly convinced that we intend to take Korea. This time, I paid a visit to Yamaza Enjiro, Director General for Political Affairs. He said that it was important and urgent that Japan should incorporate the islands into its territory and that it would be of great help to the Japanese Navy to build a watchhouse there and link it with others by wireless means or undersea cable. He encouraged me to resubmit the petition to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as his ministry's opinion was different from that of the Interior Ministry. Thus the islands were incorporated into the Japanese territory.²⁸⁾

Concerning what Nakai Yosaburo said about how the islands were incorporated into Japanese territory, Okuhara Fukuichi stated the following in his book *Takeshima and Ulleungdo*:

Believing the Liancourt Islands Korean territory, at the end of fishing season of the 37th year of the Meiji Period, Nakai Yosaburo came to Tokyo where he had an opportunity to talk to the Director General of

28) It refers to the Russo-Japanese war.

Marine Affairs, Maki Bokushin, through an official named Fujita Kantarō at the Ministry of Agricultural/Commercial Affairs, deciding to ask the Japanese government to convey his desire to the Korean government to lease the Liancourt Rocks to him. Having the matter checked by Director General Kimotsuki at the Ministry of Navy, Nakai understood that from the point of Kimotsuki's official post it was not clear whose territory the islands were. It was a little closer to the Japanese mainland in terms of the distance between each country and the island. As Japanese fishermen did fishing there, it was judged to be proper to have them incorporated into Japanese territory. Thus, Nakai submitted a petition to the Interior, Foreign and Agricultural/Commercial Ministers asking that the Liancourt Rocks be incorporated into the Japanese territory and that they be leased to him. Some time later, Nakai explained the situation to an official named Inoue at the Ministry of the Interior. Dr. Kuwada paid keen attention to the matter and asked for the opinion of the Office of Shimane Prefecture, which in turn asked for the opinion of the Office of the Okishima. Thus, the Japanese government decided to have the islands incorporated into its territory, naming them Takeshima.²⁹⁾

The above clearly shows that the Japanese government believed that Dokdo was Korea territory. The Japanese government cannot insist this was only a misunderstanding on the part of the official who compiled *The Shimane Prefecture Bulletin*. The following conclusions are based on the two aforementioned items and the islands' incorporation process into Shimane Prefecture:

First, some Japanese government officials opposed incorporation of

29) Okuhara Fukuichi, *Takeshima and Ulleungdo* (Shimane Prefecture), pp. 27~32 or Concerning Brief History of Takeshima, *History and Geography*, vol. 8 (1906).

Dokdo into Japanese territory. In 1876, when the Japanese Ministry of the Interior instructed the prefectural offices to submit their charts and land registration maps to update a map of the entire Japanese nation, Shimane Prefecture asked the Ministry whether to include Ulleungdo and Dokdo as part of its territory. After a five-month document check, including those from the Tokugawa Bakufu, the Ministry concluded that the Dokdo islands did not belong to Japan. In 1877, Iwakura Tomomi, a Council of State member or Dajokan, confirmed the Ministry's conclusion. *The (Amended) Abridged Japanese Geographical Description* published by Otsuki Shuji says, "In the sea to the northwest of Oki, there are an island called Matsushima (Ulleungdo) and a group of islands called Takeshima (Dokdo). The distance between the two comes to about 90 km. It is our understanding that the two have recently been incorporated into Korean territory. *The History of Joseon's Enlightening*, compiled by Tsuneya Seifuku, says, "There are six islands in the area." The most outstanding of these are Usando (called "Matsushima" by the Japanese) and Takeshima." Inoue, a Ministry of the Interior official, opposed the incorporation of Dokdo into Japanese territory, as he was aware of the contents of *The (Amended) Abridged Japanese Geographical Description* and *The History of Joseon's Enlightening*.

Second, it appears that the Interior Minister sent a confidential official letter to the Prime Minister in fear of causing a controversy. He knew of his ministry's determination and of Iwakura Tomomi's confirmation opposing Dokdo's incorporation in accordance with *The (Amended) Abridged Japanese Geographical Description*.

Third, at least two of three Japanese government advocates (Maki Bokushin, Kimotsuki Kaneyuki and Yamaza Enjirō) for the incorporation of the islands into Japanese territory knew that they belonged to Korea despite Inoue's opposition at the Interior Ministry. Maki Bokushin, Director General for Marine Affairs at the Agricultural/Commercial Ministry, wrote the

foreword for *The Guideline on Fishing in Korea's Territorial Waters* published in 1903. The book states that the Liancourt Rocks belonged to Gangwon Province, Korea. Kimotsuki Kaneyuki served for the Department of Waterways the Japanese Navy. The 1883, 1886, 1894 and 1899 editions of the waterway journals that he compiled refer to Ulleungdo and Dokdo as Korean territory. Nevertheless, Kimotsuki Kaneyuki in response to the information sent to him by the Japanese naval ship Niitaka Maru on Dokdo, contradicted himself saying, "There is no evidence to lead us to believe that they belong to Korea."

Yamaza Enjiro served at the Japanese Consulate and Legion in Korea for a long time before becoming the Director General for Political Affairs at the Japanese Foreign Ministry. He wrote the foreword for the *Most Recent Guidelines for Korean Businesses*, and said that he had read the booklet meticulously. On page 294 of the booklet, there is a clear statement to the effect that Dokdo ("Liancourt Rocks") belonged to Korea. He and Komura Jutarō advocated hard-line policies towards other nations and Japan's invasion into Asia. Naturally Yamaza Enjirō chose to disregard Korea's sovereignty.

Fourth, the Japanese government maintains that it concluded that the islands belonged to no country in response to Nakai Yosaburo's claim that he had fished in the area from 1903. At least two of the three previously mentioned Japanese officials clearly knew that the islands were part of Korea's territory, and it is probable that even Yamaza Enjirō, the third official, also did. Japan intentionally avoided the process of verifying whether they really did belong to no particular country.

Simply stated, Japan occupied the islands as a matter of military expedience, knowing full well that they belonged to Korea. It is nonsensical to say that the Japanese government incorporated the so-called "unclaimed land" into its territory to help a fisherman with his livelihood. Had the

incorporation truly served such a purpose, there would have been no reason to send a confidential letter asking for deliberation of the matter at a Cabinet meeting. Moreover, Japanese officials would have chosen to verify the matter with Korea in advance had they been responding to a fisherman's request. At that time, Japanese were allowed to catch fish freely in the territorial waters of Korea under the Korea-Japan Trade Rules of 1883 and the Korea-Japan Fishing Rules of 1889. Nakai could hunt in the waters around Dokdo under the terms of such an arrangement. Knowing that such an attempt to incorporate the islands would most likely have led to a serious conflict with Korea, we can see that Japan's true intention was to use the islands for military purposes. The explanation that the Japanese government incorporated the islands to grant a fisherman the monopoly on hunting sea lions in the area also makes no sense. At that time, Japan could intervene in any administrative issue in Korea settle it in favor of Japan, and there was no need for the Japanese government to go through this kind of bureaucratic trouble to grant this right to one fisherman.




Fig. 5-21. Maki Bokushin's Foreword in *The Guideline on Fishing in Korea's Territorial Waters*

THE HISTORY OF IMPERIAL JAPAN'S SEIZURE OF DOKDO



Chapter 6

Japan Usurps Korea's Diplomatic Sovereignty and Incorporates Dokdo into Japanese Territory

Japan has pointed out that Korea should have protested the incorporation of Dokdo in 1905 if it was part of Korean territory. In reality, the Korean government could not even know what happened about it due to Japan's secrecy about a measure taken secretly by the government of another country. Furthermore, the Korean government was in no position to protest when it did learn of the measure a year later, because by then Korea had been deprived of its diplomatic rights since it had become a Japanese protectorate.

1. Usurpation of Korea's Diplomatic Sovereignty

Japan forced the Korean government to sign the Korea-Japan Protocol in 1904. Under the terms of the protocol, Japan was allowed to use any land in Korea it chose for military purposes. Japan went so far as to put a large area in Hamheung Province under military control. Under the terms of the First Korea-Japan Protocol signed on August 22 (see below), 1904, D.W. Stevens and Megata Tanetaro were appointed as Senior Diplomatic Adviser and Senior Financial Adviser, effectively stripping the country of its diplomatic and financial sovereignty even before the Eulsa Treaty (also called the Korea-Japan Protectorate Treaty) in 1905.




Fig. 6-1. The First Korea-Japan Protocol Treaty

1. The Korean government shall appoint a Japanese national recommended by the Japanese government as its Senior Financial

Adviser and follow his opinion on all financial matters.

2. The Korean government shall appoint a foreign national recommended by the Japanese government as its Senior Diplomatic Adviser and follow his opinion on all diplomatic affairs.
3. The Korean government shall consult with the Japanese government in advance concerning treaties made with foreign countries and important diplomatic matters, including any privileges, concessions and contracts granted to, or made with, foreigners.

August 22, the 8th year of the Gwangmu Period (1904)

Acting Foreign Minister of Korea Yun Chiho (Sealed)

August 22, the 37th year of the Meiji Period (1904)

Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Hayashi Gonsuke (Sealed)

In this way, Japan deprived Korea of its diplomatic sovereignty to eliminate an obstacle to its war with Russia. Additionally, incorporating Dokdo into its territory on February 22, 1905 served naval warfare purposes in the East Sea. Japan's final victory in the war with Russia was achieved by destroying the Russian fleet as it entered the Korean Strait on May 27, after embarking on October 14 of the preceding year for the long voyage around the Cape of Good Hope. On July 29, Japan concluded the confidential Katsura-Taft Treaty (below) with America, which recognized America's interests in the Philippines and guaranteed Japan's interests in the Korean Peninsula.

Article 3. Concerning Korea, Katsura said that Korea was one of the causes of the Russo-Japanese War and thus it is very important for Japan to find an ultimate solution to the issue concerning Korea as a corollary of the war. If it is allowed to take future courses of action as

it pleases after the end of the war, Korea will make agreements or treaties with other countries, and there is a fear that this may cause further international conflicts as in the pre-war period. Thus, Japan thinks that it should take a decisive measure that will prevent Japan from being involved in another war.

On September 5, Russia and Japan signed the Treaty of Portsmouth with America acting as mediator. The treaty guaranteed Japan the right to regard Korea as one of its protectorates, occupy a southern part of Sakhalin, and also lay a railroad in Southern Manchuria. On October 27, a Japanese Cabinet session made the following decision concerning the “establishment of the right for the protection of Korea.”

This appears to be the best time to put into practice our plan to establish the right to protect Korea, as previously decided by the Royal Court. Both Britain and America have consented to our decision. Other countries also appear to have accepted the fact that Korea should inevitably be a protectorate of Japan in view of the recently concluded Anglo-Japanese Alliance and Russo-Japanese Peace Treaty, the special relationship between Japan and Korea, and the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War.....Accordingly, we should achieve our wish by carrying out our plan in accordance with the following methods and order:

1. We should place the entire diplomatic affairs of that country in our hands by signing a treaty with the Korean government based on the attachment.
2. After signing the contract with Korea, we should secretly inform the governments of Great Britain, America, Germany and France of its content even before making any public announcement. When making the public announcement, we should explain the factors that led us to establish the right for the protection of Korea and make it clear that

existing treaties between Korea and other countries will be maintained and that their commercial or industrial interests in Korea will not be jeopardized.

3. The timing for the implementation should be early November.
4. All matters concerning the signing of the treaty should be entrusted to Japanese Minister to Korea Hayashi Gonsuke.
5. The signed letter [of the Japanese Emperor] should be presented to the Korean Emperor by Japanese Imperial Envoy.
6. Commander Hasegawa Yoshimichi of the Japanese Forces Stationed in Korea should be ordered to provide the necessary assistance to Hayashi so that the matter may be concluded successfully.
7. Japanese troops currently on the move for stationing in Seoul should arrive in Seoul before the commencement of the matter, if possible.
8. In the event that there is no hope of obtaining the Korean government's consent to the treaty, we should, as a last resort, unilaterally inform it of our decision to put it under our protection, explaining to Britain what led us to take such a step and announcing that any existing treaties between Korea and other countries will be maintained and that their commercial or industrial interests in Korea will not be jeopardized.¹⁾

On November 9, 1905, Itō Hirobumi arrived in Seoul. On the following day, he submitted the Japanese Emperor's signed letter to Emperor Gojong of Korea, asking him "to listen to his opinion in consideration of the prevalent world situation and the need to protect the Korean people's interest." On November 15, he presented the draft contents of the treaty for signature by the two countries with the following threats:

1) Kim Samung, *The Ulsa Treaty in 1905, The Unfinished Period of 100 Years* [in Korean] (Seoul: Shidaewi Chang, 2005), pp. 27~28.

This draft has been made in consideration of all the relevant factors, which means that there is no room for changes. As stated in the first clause of the Peace Treaty made earlier, and as even details concerning the control of military facilities along the border of your country and the status of the Russians in your country were included in the treaty, there can be no room for any changes to this draft. The only thing left now is Your Majesty's decision based on what has been finalized by our government. You are free to accept or reject it. Please think about the implications of rejecting it, however, as you will be in a more disadvantageous position.²⁾

Itō threatened the Korean Emperor in an arrogant and impolite manner for three and half hours from 3:30 pm. He flatly rejected the Korea Emperor's request that Japan concede Korea even perfunctory diplomatic rights. He threatened the Emperor saying that the Korean government would face a more difficult situation if he rejected Japan's offer.

At 4:00 pm on November 16, Itō had the Korean ministers come to him and forced them to agree to the Japanese draft treaty, repeating the threats he had made against Emperor Gojong as follows:³⁾

2) Ibid., p.39.

3) Quoted from Special Envoy Itō Hirobumi's report on his mission, *Japanese Diplomatic Documents*, Vol. 38, *Japan's Occupation of Korea*, compiled by Lee Taejin (Seoul: Kachi), Requoted.

Korea used to be a tributary of Qing (China). Japan helped it to become an independent country with a series of actions, such as the (pro-Japanese) reformists' attempt at a coup d'état in 1884 and the Sino-Japanese War. Japan also helped Korea to maintain its territory by blocking Russia's ambitions through its victory in the Russo-Japanese War.

Japan should be entrusted with Korea's diplomacy to maintain peace in Asia. The contents of the draft made by Japan for a new treaty cannot be changed, although the two sides may agree to change certain phrases or expressions. It must be remembered that the Emperor and his ministers should not shed the responsibility for this important matter on one another. Ministers representing a country and running state affairs on behalf of a king should not be swayed by public opinion where matters of national interest are concerned. When the Emperor said that he would check the people's opinion on the matter, as it was an important one, I warned him that we would regard it as an attempt to incite them to oppose our offer. In doing the right thing, you should pay no attention to public opinion. You should understand how strong a country Japan has become. Your country should form an alliance with Japan, as it lacks the strength to remain independent. Japan will never fail to accomplish its objectives once they are set, even if objections are raised by other countries. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Russo-Japan Peace Treaty have shown that they regard Japan as a force to be reckoned with.⁴⁾

Itō had heavily armed Japanese troops surround Gyeongbok Palace, where a meeting was held in the presence of the Emperor Gojong. A coercive atmosphere was created by placing armed soldiers, including units of the

4) Kim Samung, *Ibid.*, p.51.

military police at each entrance to Seoul and in other important points. Hayashi Gonsuke's memoirs (below) vividly depict the prevailing atmosphere on that day.

.....intend to start these negotiations from early in the morning, having ministers of the Korean government gather at the Japanese Legation. I may want Mr. Itō to appear at the session when the time is ripe.

The negotiations may not be concluded by noon. I think that in such a case I will have to go to the King of Korea and ask for his decision during the lunch hour. The presence of Mr. Itō may be required, depending on how the negotiations go. I will make an arrangement to inform Mr. Itō in such an eventuality.

Another arrangement I will make is to ask General Hasegawa to watch over the negotiations. The Korea ministers will gather where I ask. This is an important matter for Korea and its ministers will not accept the matter easily. When moving from the Legation to the Royal Palace, there may well be some attempts to escape. The military police should be placed along the way on the pretext of escorting them so that no one can run away.

Another thing to which attention must be paid is the Seal of State. I will have someone to watch over it from early in the morning.

There is another thing that General Hasegawa should do. If the treaty is made, one or two ministers may attempt to commit suicide. I will set up a plan to prevent such a thing, although any such incident would not be our responsibility.

I asked the Korea ministers to come to the Japanese Legation, having arranged everything in consultation with Mr. Itō. At the meeting, which was started from early in the morning, no decision could be made, as expected. They were all upset. It was now the lunch break.

As the ministers could make no decision on the important matter, I decided to go to the Korean King to listen to his opinion.

Despite such a coercive atmosphere, the first Cabinet meeting held in the Emperor's presence went against the Japanese plan. After being informed of the result of the meeting by Prime Minister Han Gyuseol, Hayashi Gonsuke said, "If you men behave like this, we on the Japanese side have no choice but to ask the Emperor to make the decision himself." He then dismissed the meeting and reported the fact to Itō Hirobumi.

Hayashi's memoirs went as follows:

I placed someone inside the Korea Royal Court to see what was being discussed between the King and his ministers at that moment. He informed me that the King had given instructions to send a messenger to Mr. Itō. It seems that the King wishes to ask Mr. Itō to give him and his ministers two or three more days to discuss the matter among themselves. I judged that this was the time and sent a message to Mr. Itō, telling him to push ahead with what we had prepared. Thus, Mr. Itō appeared at the meeting held in the Korean Royal Palace.⁵⁾

Upon receiving Hayashi's message, Itō Hirobumi came to the Korean Imperial Palace accompanied by General Hasegawa and the military police commander. Japanese troops had surrounded the palace tightly and stood guard at important places in Seoul, including the Japanese Legation. Japanese troops armed with artillery and machine guns guarded the entrances to Seoul. Troops marched through the streets of Seoul with rifles and fixed bayonets. Many armed Japanese military police and police troops were in the Imperial Palace and at Jungmyeong Hall, where the meeting was held.

5) Kim Samung, *Ibid.*, p. 68.



Fig. 6-2. Japanese artillery reinforces the coercive atmosphere at Namsan Mountain, Seoul

The Korean ministers were about to leave for the day when Itō, guarded by troops, arrived at the site of the meeting a little before 8:00 pm and asked them to reopen. Five of the ministers finally yielded to Itō's threats by 12:30 am. At 2:00 am on November 18 (the recorded official date was one day before November 17), the Eulsa Treaty, or Korea-Japan Protectorate Treaty, was signed between Foreign Minister Bak Jesun of Imperial Korea and Japanese Minister to Korea Hayashi Gonsuke. The contents are below.

The government of Imperial Korea and that of Japan hereby agree upon the cause of sharing interests as follows for their joint interest, and this shall remain in effect until Korea becomes a rich and strong country.

Article 1. From now on, the Japanese government (i.e. its Foreign Ministry) shall control the foreign affairs of Imperial Korea on its

behalf, and the Japanese representatives in charge of foreign affairs, including consuls, shall protect the subjects of Imperial Korea and their interests in foreign countries.

Article 2. The Japanese government shall fully respect the existing treaties between Imperial Korea and other countries, and the government of Imperial Korea shall make no further treaties or promises with other countries without the consent of the Japanese government.

Article 3. The Japanese government shall place a Residency-General under the Emperor of Imperial Korea. The Residency General shall be stationed in Seoul, take care of the country's foreign affairs and have the right to have an audience with Emperor. The Japanese government shall place resident directors the control of the Residency General anywhere in Korea.

Article 6. The Japanese government guarantees that the dignity and well-being of the Royal family of Imperial Korea shall be protected. In witness whereof, the undersigned duly authorized by their respective governments have set their hands and seals on this treaty.

November 17, the 9th year of the Gwangmu Period (1905)

Foreign Minister of Imperial Korea Bak Jesun (Sealed)

November 17, the 38th year of the Meiji Period (1905)

Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Hayashi Gonsuke (Sealed)

Later, all foreign embassies in Korea were asked to leave the country. On January 17, 1906, the Foreign Ministry was abolished and only a foreign affairs department remained to maintain existing documents related to foreign affairs.

On February 1, 1906, the Residency-General's Office was established to bring even internal affairs under Japan's control. Thus, Korea practically lost its status as an independent country.




Fig. 6-3. The text of the Eulsa Treaty

2. Japan's Notice of the Incorporation of Dokdo into its Territory and its Notification to Korea

The Interior Minister of Japan issued the following order concerning public notification of the incorporation of Dokdo into Japan's territory within Shimane Prefecture.

Interior Minister's Instruction (dated February 15, 1905)
No. 87

To: Shimane Prefecture Governor Matsunaga Takeyoshi

The islands, located 160 km from Okishima at latitude 37° 9' 30" N, longitude 131° 55' E, shall be named Takeshima and henceforth belong to Okishima. This fact shall be publicly declared within your areas of jurisdiction.

February 15, the 38th year of the Meiji Period

Interior Minister Yoshikawa Akimasa

In compliance, the Shimane Prefecture Governor put up the following public notice:

Shimane Prefecture Public Notice No. 40

Effective today, the islands located 160 km from Okishima at a point of latitude 37° 9' 30" N, longitude 131° 55' E shall be named Takeshima and belong to Okishima.

February 22, the 38th year of the Meiji Period

Shimane Prefecture Governor Matsunaga Takeyoshi




Fig. 6-4. The Circulatory Notice of Shimane Prefecture Office notifying the incorporation of Dokdo into those territories belonging to Okishima

It was an established Japanese practice to have the relevant local government issue the incorporation notification of an island. However, Japanese negotiations with Britain and America when incorporating Ogasawara Islands in 1876 informed 12 Western countries of its incorporation decision. As such, what caused Japan to neither inquire about nor notify Korea of its intent to incorporate the Dokdo, given that Korea was under Japan's control?

It is clear that Japan did not inquire about or notify Korea of the matter because it knew that the islands belonged to Korea. An inquiry would have clearly invited protest from Korea. Japan must have been worried that if it informed Korea of the incorporation, many foreign countries watching Japanese actions would have been greatly convinced of its intention to annex Korea to prosecute the Russo-Japanese War successfully. If the incorporation was merely intended to help Nakai Yosaburo, the fisherman who had asked the Japanese government to incorporate the islands and lease them to him to allow him to hunt sea lions more freely, the Japanese government did not have to go so far as to take such a drastic measure as incorporation.




Fig. 6-5. Official gazette of the Shimane Prefecture Office announcing the incorporation of Dokdo into Okishima territories (dated May 29, 1905)




Fig. 6-6. Official gazette of the Shimane Prefecture Office notifying the incorporation of Dokdo into those territories belonging to Okishima (dated June 5, 1905)

As late as March 28, 1906, one year after it had deprived Korea of diplomatic sovereignty, Japan informed the Governor of Ulleungdo, Shim Heungtaek, of its incorporation of Dokdo.

Not only the Korean government but even the leading mass media of Japan and the Japanese ministry in charge of the publication of official gazettes did not know the facts concerning the incorporation of the islands. It was only referred to in various letters circulating in local government corridors. The following examples serve to support this fact: a special edition of the *Osaka Asahi Shimbun* dated May 29, 1905 carried an article saying, “The Combined Fleet of the Japanese Navy attacked the enemy fleet, including the warship the Nikolai-I, near the Liancourt Rocks on May 28”



Fig. 6-7. The Denbo shimbun (Kept at Dokdo Museum)

while a special edition of the same daily dated May 29, 1905 published an article saying, “Further to yesterday’s special edition, the Combined Fleet of the Japanese Navy attacked the leading warships of the fleeing enemy fleet near the Liancourt Rocks, and they finally surrendered on May 28……”

The edition of the *Denbo Shimbun* dated May 31 also carried an article saying, “On the 28th of May, our Navy attacked the enemy’s Third Fleet in a battle in the Sea of Japan, and the enemy surrendered near the Liancourt Rocks, located at a point 180 nautical miles from Hamada, Sekishu and 240 nautical miles from Tsushima’s capital city” Various other official gazettes of Japan dated May 29 and 30 also mentioned the Liancourt Rocks. Then, the *Denbo Shimbun* must have realized belatedly that it had made certain mistakes. In its official gazette dated June 5, it said that the reference to “Liancourt Rocks” in its official gazettes in May should have read “Takeshima.” *Japan’s official gazette No. 6667*, dated September 18, 1905, carried an article under the

subject *The Status of Ulleungdo, Korea* and quoted a report made by Japanese Consul Ariyoshi Akira in Busan as follows: “Sea lions live on or near the Liancourt Rocks about 90 km to the southeast of Ulleungdo. People in Ulleungdo started to hunt them from last year. They are caught for about six months of the year, between April and September” revealing that even a Japanese diplomat was in the dark about the incorporation of the Dokdo into Japanese territory.

3. Protests from Korea

Alarmed by the Japanese notice of the incorporation of Dokdo, Ulleungdo’s governor, Shim Heungtaek, immediately reported the following to the central government:

A group of Japanese officials, including Okishima Governor Azuma Bunsuke, visited me today. They said that they had come to inspect Dokdo, which they said had been incorporated into Japan’s territory. They asked how many households there were on the islands, along with other questions about its population and agricultural products and how the island was guarded. Please consider the appropriate measures.

5 of the third month (in the lunar calendar), the 10th year of the Gwangmu Period

The report was immediately submitted to Gangwon Province Acting Governor Yi Myeongnae, who in turn also reported it to the central government.




Fig. 6-8. The report made by Lee Myeongnae, Acting Governor of Gangwon Province

Upon receiving the report, the Interior Minister of the Joseon government sent an order to the following effect:

It is understandable to record the number of households in an area of another country while touring. It is unreasonable to say that Dokdo is Japan's territory. We are extremely upset at the report.

The Prime Minister issued the following instruction:

It is clearly unreasonable for the Japanese to say that Dokdo belongs to them. Report the current status of the islands and verify what the Japanese are doing there again.

At that time, Korea had already been deprived of its foreign affairs sovereignty, and could not properly protest. During that time Koreans had already allowed the Japanese military to use huge areas of land for military purposes. Korea was in no position to protest Japan's incorporation of the uninhabited rocky islands into its territory. However, on hearing the news about Japan's incorporation, *the Daehan Maeil Shinbo* and *the Hwangseong Shinmun* carried the following article in protest:

A regrettable thing has occurred. It is claimed that the Governor of Ulleungdo has reported to the central government that a group of Japanese officials came to visit Ulleungdo, saying that Dokdo is now part of Japan's territory, and inquired about its size, the number of households on the islands, and whether there was any arable land. It is reported that upon hearing this, the Minister of the Interior of our country responded, saying, "It is clearly unreasonable to check the number of households in an area of another country. It is ridiculous to say that the Dokdo are Japan's territory. We are just upset at the report."⁶⁾

According to Ulleungdo Governor Shim Heungtaek's report to the Interior Ministry, a group of Japanese officials, including Okishima Governor Azuma Bunsuke, came to visit Ulleungdo on the 4th of this month, saying that Dokdo, located about 40 km from Ulleungdo, is now part of Japan's territory, and asking questions about how many households there are on the islands, about its population and agricultural products, and about how the island is guarded.⁷⁾

6) *The Daehan Maeil Shinbo*, dated May 1, 1906.

7) *The Hwangseong Shinmun*, dated May 9, 1906.

Hwang Hyeon, a Joseon Dynasty scholar, wrote the following in diary, *Ohagimun*:

It is said that a group of Japanese have checked various details about Dokdo, located about 40 km from Ulleungdo, which they said has become part of Japanese territory.⁸⁾

The Korean scholar stated a similar fact in *Maecheonyarok*, on the period 1864-1910.⁹⁾

Concerning Japan's occupation of Dokdo, Professor Emeritus Naito Seichu of Shimane provincial University likened it to "an act of taking valuables from an empty house,"¹⁰⁾ while Professor Hori Kazuo of Kyoto University said, "Korea was obsessed with the deprivation of its sovereignty and was not in a position to pay proper attention to the sovereignty of small rocky islands."¹¹⁾

8) A page dated April (lunar calendar), 1906.

9) A page concerning 1906.

10) Naito Seichu, *Is Takeshima Japan's territory?* [in Japanese] (*The World*, June 2005), p. 56.

11) Hori Kazuo, *Ibid.*, p. 120.

THE HISTORY OF IMPERIAL JAPAN'S SEIZURE OF DOKDO



Chapter 7

Management of Dokdo after the Russo-Japanese War

If Japan's incorporation of Dokdo into its territory in 1905 was intended merely to protect Japanese fisherman Nakai Yosaburo's hunting of sea lions in that area, as has long been insisted, the islands should have been properly managed after the end of the Russo-Japanese War. However, the Japanese virtually forgot about the islands' existence after the end of the war.

1. The End of the Russo-Japanese War and the Removal of the Watchhouse

On August 10, 1905, the first meeting of the Russo-Japan Peace Commission was held at the American naval port of Portsmouth, 50 miles north of Boston, with President Roosevelt acting as a mediator. Komura Jutarō and Takahira Kogoro were present as the Japanese representatives, and their Russian counterparts were Sergei Y. Wilte and R. Rosen. Russia's position was that it would not pay any compensation whatsoever for the war, as there had been neither victor nor loser in the war. Japan persistently asked for pecuniary compensation from Russia and the cession of some territory.




Fig. 7-1. A negotiation session held before the Treaty of Portsmouth

In fact, neither side was in a position to continue the war. Russia was in a state of extreme turmoil due to the Revolt of 1905, and Japan was unable to continue the war both financially and militarily. Under such circumstances,

both countries welcomed America's role as a mediator for peace. On September 5, they finally signed the Treaty of Portsmouth agreeing to the following contents:

1. Russia shall not raise any objection to Japan's right to regard Joseon as one of protectorates.
2. Both countries shall pull out of Manchuria.
3. Russia shall hand over to Japan the leased territories of the Changchun-Lüshun Railroad and Liaodong peninsula.
4. Russia shall cede the southern part of Sakhalin below 50° latitude N. to Japan.
5. Russia shall grant to Japan the right to fish in the waters off the Maritime Province of Siberia.




Fig. 7-2. The Treaty of Portsmouth ended the Russo-Japanese War

With the war over, the Japanese Navy no longer needed watchtowers in Ulleungdo and Dokdo. The Japanese thought that their presence on Dokdo would lead other countries to suspect that Japan's incorporation of it into its territory was associated with a desire for war. On October 19, 1905, the Japanese Navy Headquarters ordered the removal of those on Ulleungdo.¹⁾

On October 24, just nine days after the official end of the war, a similar order was given regarding Dokdo watchtower.²⁾ The prompt steps taken to remove the watchtower on Dokdo was an attempt to conceal the fact that they had been incorporated into the Japanese territory for military purposes. If the incorporation had been intended purely as a means of helping Nakai Yosaburo hunt sea lions there, the watchtower could have been ceded to him to use it for his fishing. Indeed, the undersea cable installed between Jukbyeon, Ulleungdo and Dokdo in Korea and Matsue in Japan was not removed for future use in connection with Japan's later colonial rule over Korea.



Fig. 7-3. Remains of the Japanese quarters used by troops to man the Dokdo watchtower

1) The Japanese Navy General Headquarters, *Naval War History in the 37th and 38th years of the Meiji Reign Top Secret Part 4*, Vol. 4, 1-27 (Tokyo: Government Print Office, 1934), p. 244.

2) *Ibid.*, p. 276.

2. The Management of Dokdo in the Post Russo-Japanese War

After the end of the war, Dokdo gradually slipped the attention of the Japanese. It was not even included in *The Japanese Sea Directory* compiled by the Japanese Navy until the Japanese government took the step to annex them into its territory. *The Japanese Sea Directory*, Vol. 4 (First Revised Edition), published in June 1907 mentions it using the name Liancourt Rocks, as follows:

The islands are located at latitude 37° 9' 30" N, about 160 km northwest of Okishima. They comprise two rocky and barren islands, most of whose areas are composed of perpendicular slopes and small flat-topped rocks, and the entire area has a circumference of about 5 km. The two islands are about 150-200 m apart, with the water channel between them being about 500 m long.

The Western island consists of a single 150 m-high peak. The Eastern island is much lower than its cousin in the west and has a flat top. They are located close to the sea route for vessels going in the direction of Hakodate and thus may present a danger to vessels in the night. Japanese fishermen gather in the area in June and July to hunt sea lions. They were incorporated into Shimane Prefecture in the 38th year of the Meiji Period.




Fig. 7-4. *The Japanese Sea Directory* (1907)

The Korean Sea Directory compiled by the Japanese Navy in March of the same year (1907) contains more detailed information on Dokdo (see below).

Liancourt Rocks

They have been called Liancourt Rocks since they were spotted by the French ship Liancourt in 1849. In 1854, the British ship HMS Hornet spotted them and called them the Hornet Islets. The Koreans call them Dokdo, while Japanese fishermen call them Liancourt Rocks.

They are small islands in the Sea of Japan, about 160 km from Okishima and 100 km from Ulleungdo. The two islands face each other with a 500 m-long water channel separating them. The area comprises the two islands and groups of small rocks that look like “go” stones. The western island consists of a single 150 m-high peak. The eastern island is

lower and has a flat top. The small flat-topped rocks in the area are barely above sea level.

They are both barren and rocky islands. Being exposed to strong winds all year round, they have no trees, although the eastern island has a small expanse where grass grows. Most of their areas are composed of perpendicular slopes and there are many bizarre-looking caves. There is no way to climb these slopes. The area is a natural habitat for sea lions.

The waters surrounding the islands are deep. They are located close to the sea route for vessels sailing in the Sea of Japan and thus they are said to present a danger to sailing vessels in the night.

There are a couple of flat strips of land along the shore, but they are exposed to the waves. The flat top of the eastern island is not easily accessible. The only place where people can avoid the fierce northwesterly winds is a small tract of land on the southern tip of the eastern island. On the western island, people can climb up to the mid-slope, as the slope is gentle. It may be possible to form a flat area for a shelter on the mid-slope. On neither island is there sufficient space to build a house on, as stated earlier. When the naval ship *Tsushima* visited to check the islands' general status in November of the 37th year of the Meiji Period, there was a hut built by a fisherman on the eastern island, but it had been heavily damaged by strong winds.



Fig. 7-5. *The Korean Sea Directory* (1907)

Note that this record of 1907, supplementing by *The Korean Sea Directory* (Second Edition), published in 1899, provides more information about the islands than *The Japanese Sea Directory*.

The contents of *The Korean Sea Directory* (Second Edition), published in 1899, are as follows:

Liancourt Rocks

The islands were named after the French ship Liancourt, which spotted them in 1849. They were also named “Menalai and Olivutsa Rocks” by the Russian frigate Pallas in 1854, and “The Hornet Islands” by HMS Hornet in 1855. The captain of the British ship reported that the barren and rocky islands were located at latitude 37 14’ N, longitude 131 55’ E, and that bird droppings covered them, giving them a white appearance.

Their entire length comes to 2 km, with the distance between the two islands being about 500 m. The western one is about 120 m high and looks like a lump of sugar; the eastern one is much lower and has a flat top. The waters around them look deep. They are located close to the sea route for vessels sailing in the direction of Hakodate and thus present a grave danger to vessels.




Fig. 7-6. *The Korean Sea Directory* (1899)

The New Geography of Korea, compiled by Tabuchi Tomohiko in 1908, states that “the uninhabited islands are about 60 km to the southwest of their main island. They are together known as Liancourt Island and are located between Ulleungdo and Okishima of Japan.” In Chapter 5 on Ulleungdo, Gangwon Province, it clearly shows that Dokdo belongs to Ulleungdo, Korea, confirming that Japan’s incorporation of them into its territory in 1905 was undertaken in relation to its needs during the war with Russia.

In conclusion, it would have made more sense if Dokdo had been included only in *The Japanese Sea Directory* and not *The Korean Sea Directory*, as the Japanese claimed that they had been incorporated into the Japanese territory in 1905. However, *The Korean Sea Directory* of 1907 (the version supplemented by the 1899 edition) makes more detailed mention of the islands than its Japanese cousin. This shows that the compilers of both the Sea Directories consistently recognized Dokdo as Korean territory. Furthermore, Japanese scholars also had no doubt that the islands belonged to Ulleungdo, Korea based on such records.





Fig. 7-7. *The New Geography of Korea*

THE HISTORY OF IMPERIAL JAPAN'S SEIZURE OF DOKDO



Chapter 8

Japan's Annexation of Korea and Dokdo

Japan consistently regarded Dokdo as a group of islands belonging to the Korean Peninsula throughout its colonial rule over Korea, which shows that Japan incorporated them into its territory for military purposes during its war with Russia.

1. Japan's Annexation of Korea

After the Eulsa Treaty was signed under threat of force in 1905, Emperor Gojong of Joseon issued an article in *the Daehan Maeil Shinbo* asking other countries to come to his aid with regard to the treaty, which had been forcefully signed without his approval. In June 1907, he dispatched three envoys, namely Yi Sangseol, Yi Jun and Yi Wijong, to the Hague Conference (also called “the Second Peace Conference”), to show the world the unfair situation facing his nation. However, the Conference Chairman refused to grant the right of presence to them, saying that Korea as one of Japan’s protectorates had no sovereignty over its diplomatic rights. Thereupon, Japan forced Emperor Gojong to step down and cede the throne to his son on July 20 of that year. When the throne’s cession was announced, many Korean people exploded with rage and staged furious street demonstrations day after day, destroying the building of *the Gungmin Shinbo*, a pro-Japanese newspaper, and attacking Japanese people in many places.

Japan cracked down on the protests and forced the Korean government to sign a new Korea-Japan Treaty giving the Japanese Resident-General the right to intervene in the country’s internal affairs. Under the new arrangement, the Joseon government had to comply with the Resident-General’s instructions to improve the general state affairs, and obtain his prior consent for the following: the enactment of laws, orders and administrative measures; the appointment or dismissal of high-ranking officials; the invitation of foreign dignitaries. Not only that, but the Joseon government had to appoint Japanese officials recommended by the Resident-General as its own governmental officials. Japan appointed many Japanese as Korea government officials from vice ministerial posts and below.

On July 31, 1905, just after the forced signing of the new treaty, Japan disbanded Korea’s Armed Forces of which only a small number of troops

remained: two regiments (3,600) of infantry and 400 cavalry, artillery and logistics units in Seoul, and eight regiments (4,800) of infantry troops outside Seoul.

The Newspaper Act (July 24, 1907), the Security Act (July 27, 1907) and the Publication Act (September 23, 1909) were enacted. On June 24, 1910, a memorandum was exchanged between the governments of Korea and Japan allowing the latter to control all law enforcement rights. Thus, Japan completed all the procedures required for the annexation of Korea. In May 1910, Japanese Minister of Army Terauchi Masatake was sworn in as the new Resident-General. He stopped the publication of Korean-language dailies, such as the *Hwangseong Shinmun*, *Daehan Minbo* and *Daehan Maeil Shinbo*, in an attempt to prevent the general public from knowing what was happening in affairs of state. Japan forced the Korean government to sign the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty (below) on August 22, 1910 with the cooperation of Korean Prime Minister Yi Wanyong.

Wishing to secure permanent peace in Asia through the enhancement of mutual happiness based on the special and close relationship that exists between the two countries, the Emperors of Joseon and Japan have decided to sign the Annexation Treaty, as it is judged that Korea will be in a better state under Japan's protection. Thus, the Emperors of Japan and Joseon have appointed Resident-General Viscount Terauchi Masatake and Joseon Prime Minister Yi Wanyong as their respective plenipotentiaries. The plenipotentiaries thus appointed hereby agree to the following:

Article 1. The Emperor of Joseon cedes all sovereign rights concerning Korea to the Emperor of Japan permanently.

Article 2. The Emperor of Japan accepts the cession stated in the foregoing article and approves the complete annexation of Korea to Japan.

Article 3. The Emperor of Japan promises to allow the Emperor of Joseon, the ex-Emperor, and their wives and dependents to maintain their existing titles and proper level of dignity and honor and to pay proper salaries to them.

Article 4. The Emperor of Japan promises to allow the Royal family of Joseon other than those stated in the foregoing article to maintain their existing titles and proper level of dignity and honor and to pay proper salaries to them.

Article 5. The Emperor of Japan will grant positions of peerage and pecuniary compensation to Koreans who are engaged in meritorious service for Japan.

Article 6. The Government of Japan will take complete charge of the State affairs of Korea following the signing of this treaty for annexation, provide full protection for all Koreans, along with their property, who comply with the laws and regulations, and take measures to enhance their welfare.

Article 7. The Government of Japan will do everything in its power to appoint qualified Koreans who faithfully comply with the new system as government officials of Japan in Korea.

Article 8. This treaty, duly authorized by the Emperors of Joseon and Japan, will be implemented from the day of its promulgation.

In witness hereof, the under-named plenipotentiaries hereby set their hands and seals.

August 22, the 4th year of the Yunghui Period

Prime Minister Yi Wanyong (Sealed)

August 22, the 43rd year of the Meiji Period

Resident-General Viscount Terauchi Masatake (Sealed)




Fig. 8-1. The text of the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty signed in 1910

Under the treaty, Korea became a colony of Japan. The Japanese Resident-General's Office was replaced by the Governor-General's Office. The Governor-General, who was selected from among the full-generals of the Japanese Army or Navy, was handed control of the legislative, administrative, judiciary and military affairs of Korea. Terauchi, the first Governor-General, exercised a thoroughly coercive control of the nation. He used the military police and the police to enforce the law. The position of Chief Police Superintendent was assumed by the Japanese Military Police Commander, while the positions of local police superintendents were assumed by the heads of the local Japanese military police units. There were 640 military police units with 2,019 troops and 480 police units with 5,693 officers stationed in Korea, and their number increased year after year.¹⁾

1) Lee Gibaek, *A New View of Korean History* [in Korean] (Seoul: Iljogak, 1996), p. 401.

2. The Management of Dokdo after Annexation

Dokdo was not marked as Japanese territory on the maps compiled by the Japanese government during the Meiji Period. Likewise, they were consistently marked as Korean territory on the maps compiled by the Japanese government during its colonial rule over Korea.

Looking at *The Complete Map of Shimane Prefecture* published in February 1917 Dokdo is not depicted, although Okishima is. The same is true of those published in April, 1935 and January, 1940. A map published in 1930 by the Japanese Army Photography Unit of the Land Survey Department (Rikuchi Sokuryobu) also neglected to mark Dokdo, while another published in February, 1949 by *the Yomiuri Shimbun* also did not include it.




Fig. 8-2. *The Complete Map of Shimane Prefecture, Japan (1917)*

The Korean Topography-Newest Edition, published in 1912 by the Nikkan Shobo of Japan, introduces Ulleungdo in Chapter 10 (Islands) of the Natural Geography Section, stating, “Liancourt Rocks, which are near Ulleungdo, came to be widely known following the naval warfare in the Sea of Japan.” A map attached to *The Results of the Depth-Fathoming of the Waters off Joseon*, published in 1937 by the Marine Observatory of the Governor-General’s Office, includes Dokdo in the list of those in the Sea of Japan, revealing that the Japanese recognized the islands as being part of the Korean Peninsula.

Like Japan’s maps and topographies, the Sea Directories classified Dokdo as being part of the Korean Peninsula. *The Japanese Sea Directory*, Vol.6 (published in 1911) says, “This directory contains information on the sea routes passing through all the waters off Korea. As the country was annexed to our country in 1910, it was renamed as the “Japanese Sea Directory” in the foreword. It explains about “Liancourt Rocks” in detail. The same is true of *The Japanese Sea Directory*, Vol.10, published in 1920 (see below).




Fig. 8-3. A map of Korea compiled by the Japanese Army Photography Unit, Land Survey Department (Rikuchi Sokuryobu, 1930)



Fig. 8-4. A map published by the Yomiuri Shimbun (1949)




Fig. 8-5. The Korean Topography Newest Edition (1912)




Fig.8-6. *The Results of the Depth-Fathoming of the Waters off Joseon (1937)*

Liancourt Rocks

Europeans have referred to them as Liancourt Rocks since the French vessel Liancourt spotted them in 1849. They were also named “Menalai and Olivutsa Rocks” by the Russian frigate Pallas in 1854, and “The Hornet Islands” by the British sloop HMS Hornet in 1855. The Koreans and Japanese call them the Dokdo and Liancourt Rocks, respectively.

They are two small islands encircled by many rocks at a point in the Sea of Japan about 160 km from Okishima, Shimane Prefecture and 100 km to the southeast of Ulleungdo. The two islands face each other, separated only by a 150 m-wide channel. The island in the west is about

150 m high. The one in the east is lower than its cousin in the west and has a flat top. The rocks surrounding them are flat shaped and barely above sea level. Some of them are large enough to lay dozens of Tatami-mats down.

The two islands are barren and rocky. Exposed to strong sea winds all year round, they have no trees, although some grass grows on the one in the east. The edges of the island are cliffs formed of soft rocks and caves. No one could climb to the top. The area is a natural habitat of sea lions.

The waters in the area are deep. According to a survey conducted by the Japanese warship *Tsushima*, a point a little way off the southern tip of the eastern island was about 90 m deep. They are located close to the sea route for vessels sailing in the Sea of Japan and thus present a danger to sailing vessels in the night.

There are no flat space on the island. There are only a couple of flat strips at the edges of the eastern island, but they are exposed to the waves. The flat top on the eastern island is not easily accessible. The only place to avoid the northwesterly winds is a tiny tract of land on the southern tip of the eastern island.

The east side of the western island is composed of cliffs. One can climb mid way up it via the gentle slope formed there. It may be possible to form a flat space by chipping away the rocks mid way up the slope. Both islands are devoid of sufficient space to build a house as stated earlier. When the naval ship *Tsushima* came here to check the general status of the islands in November of the 37th year of the Meiji Period, there had been a hut built by a fisherman on the eastern island, but it was heavily damaged by strong winds.

Every summer, dozens of people come over from Ulleungdo to hunt for sea lions. It is said that they stay here for about ten days, sleeping in a temporarily built hut.

Fresh water. There is a cave at the south tip of the western island. A fairly large amount of freshwater drips from the rocky ceiling of the cave, but it is difficult to collect it in a container. There are several natural

springs, but they are polluted by sea lion waste and cannot be used as potable water. Sea lion hunters bring potable water from outside and use spring water for cooking.

Location. The island's southern tip of the eastern land is located at a point of latitude 37 degrees, 14 minutes and 18 seconds north and longitude 131 degrees, 52 minutes and 33 seconds, according to a survey conducted in the 41st year of the Meiji Period.

It is also noteworthy that Vol.10, *The Japanese Sea Directory*, published in April 1920 by the Japanese Navy, was renamed “*the Joseon Engan Suirosi (Korean Coastal Straits Sea Directory)*” in 1930, disclosing that the Korean part of the directory published in 1920 was nothing different from the *Joseon Engan Suirosi*, although its name was *The Japanese Sea Directory*. On the part of Korean east sea-shores in the *Joseon Engan (Korean Sea-coasts)*, a simplified version of *The Korean Coastal Straits Sea Directory* mentions Dokdo, calling it Takeshima. The foreword of the directory also states that its contents were excerpts from *The Joseon Engan Suirosi (Korean Coastal Straits Sea Directory)* published in January 1933.

Even a textbook for elementary school children published by the Governor-General's Office marked Dokdo, along with Ulleungdo, as belonging to the Korean Peninsula.




Fig. 8-7. The Japanese Sea Directory (1911)

The fact that Dokdo was marked as belonging to the Korean Peninsula in Japanese maps, sea directories and school textbooks clearly shows that the Japanese government's decision to incorporate it into its territory in 1905 was connected with its overall military designs during the Russo-Japanese war rather than with any attempt to help the Japanese fisherman Nakai Yosaburo hunt sea lions there.




Fig. 8-8. The Chōsen (Korea) Engan Suirosi (Korean Coastal Straits Sea Directory, 1933)



Fig. 8-9. A textbook for elementary school children published by the Governor-General's Office during Japan's colonial rule over Korea (1933)

| Conclusion |

The Japanese government had recognized that Dokdo was part of Korea's territory when it incorporated it into her territory. This is confirmed by an instruction of the Dajokan (State Council of Meiji Japan) and *The Korean Sea Directory* as well as the publications made by Tsuneya Seifuku and Kuzuu Shusuke. The inquiry asked by the Interior Ministry of Japan and the answer given by the Dajokan (Council of State) are held in the official files of both offices.

It is absolutely implausible to suppose that the decision to incorporate Dokdo into Japanese territory was made by the Japanese official who had no previous knowledge of Dokdo, unless Japanese government officials were in the habit of making policy decisions without checking past records.




Fig. 9-1. *Dajjo Ruiten* (Cover)




Fig. 9-2. Contents of *Dajjo Ruiten*

The only cogent supposition is that the officers-in-charge knew Dokdo belonged to Korea. Inoue, then an Interior Ministry official, expressed disapproval concerning the proposal to incorporate Dokdo, mentioning it as an “island suspected to be Korean territory.”

If the Japanese government had only considered Nakai Yosaburo’s request to incorporate Dokdo and lease it to him purely from the viewpoint of helping a Japanese fisherman to hunt sea lions, the decision should have been rejected. Japan was surely not reckless enough to get involved in an international territorial dispute simply to help a fisherman eke out a living.

For military purposes, Japan was prepared to use all possible means. At that time, the Ministers of War and Navy were active duty generals and all the members of the Cabinet were ex-samurai. They had no reason or motivation to object the military’s request for the incorporation of Dokdo. The incorporation for military purposes is even clearer when one considers that it ordered construction of watchtowers on Ulleungdo and Dokdo and then removed them right after the end of the war with Russia.

Recently, Japan has frequently engaged in provocative acts concerning the sovereignty of Dokdo. There must be many Koreans who, in the face of such provocations, are reminded of the situation surrounding the Russo-Japanese War.

| List of Figures and Tables |

■ Figures

No	Title	Page
Fig. 1-1	Japanese Royal Palace Guards	15
Fig. 1-2	Japanese youths undergo a physical checkup for military conscription	17
Fig. 1-3	A depiction of a battle between Taiwanese and Japanese troops on the Penghu Islands	22
Fig. 2-1	Yoshida Shōin	29
Fig. 2-2	Hashimoto Sanai	29
Fig. 2-3	Members of the Iwakura Mission(Japanese Center for Asian Historical Records(JACAR), www.jacar.go.jp)	33
Fig. 2-4	The Unyo Maru	41
Fig. 2-5	Japanese warship displaying a show of force near Busan	41
Fig. 2-6	Sin Heon	47
Fig. 2-7	Kuroda Kiyotaka	47
Fig. 2-8	The scene of a meeting prior to the Treaty of Ganghwa	47
Fig. 2-9	A secret circular of the Donghak Army	50
Fig. 2-10	Japan's main naval fleet (From the left : the warship Itsukushima, Yoshino Naniwa and Fuso)	51
Fig. 2-11	A Chinese warship sinking in Asan Bay after a Japanese attack	51
Fig. 2-12	Map showing Weihaiwei	52
Fig. 2-13	Sea battle in Weihaiwei	53
Fig. 2-14	A negotiation session held before the Sino-Japan Peace Treaty	54
Fig. 2-15	Text of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty	54
Fig. 2-16	Treaty for Japan's Return of the Liaodong Peninsula to China	56
Fig. 2-17	A warship similar in type to those Japan ordered from Argentina	58
Fig. 2-18	Text of the Imperial Rescript Declaring War against Russia	60
Fig. 3-1	Text of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance Treaty	65

No	Title	Page
Fig. 3-2	Arrival of Japanese troops in Incheon	68
Fig. 3-3	Japanese troops of Kigoshi's Brigade marching through the streets	70
Fig. 3-4	Troops of Japanese 12 th Division marching through the streets	70
Fig. 3-5	The Japanese Army marching through Seoul	73
Fig. 3-6	Map of the Liaodong Peninsula	74
Fig. 3-7	Japanese military headquarters in Malli-dong, Seoul	75
Fig. 3-8	The building used as the Headquarters of the Japanese Forces Stationed in Korea	77
Fig. 4-1	A Korean village laid to waste by the Japanese Military	88
Fig. 4-2	A Deserted House	89
Fig. 4-3	Korean houses destroyed by the Japanese Military	89
Fig. 4-4	Koreans executed by the Japanese on charges of damaging railroads	95
Fig. 4-5	Ammunition carried by Japanese artillery units	97
Fig. 4-6	A Korean forced to carry military supplies for the Japanese military	97
Fig. 5-1	Rescript for Japan's Severance of Diplomatic Relations with Russia	101
Fig. 5-2	Hayashi Gonsuke	101
Fig. 5-3	Komura Jutarō	102
Fig. 5-4	The Mutsu Maru, a freight ship	105
Fig. 5-5	A destroyed gun barrel on the Izumi Maru (Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, www.jacar.go.jp)	105
Fig. 5-6	The Russian fleet led by Admiral Folkersam (Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, www.jacar.go.jp)	116
Fig. 5-7	The Baltic Fleet of Russia at Nosi-Be Port in Madagascar (Japan Center for Asia Historical Records, www.jacar.go.jp)	117
Fig. 5-8	The confidential letter asking for the Japanese Cabinet's decision on the incorporation of Dokdo into Japanese territory	118
Fig. 5-9	The Text of the Japanese Cabinet's decision for Dokdo incorporation into its territory	119
Fig. 5-10	Core Ships of the Japanese naval fleet	120
Fig. 5-11	Telegraph containing a message from the Shinano maru (Japan Center for Asian Historical Reocords, www.jacar.go.jp)	121
Fig. 5-12	The Baltic Fleet of Russia at Nosi-Be Port in Madagascar (Japan Center for Asian Historical Reocords, www.jacar.go.jp)	121

No	Title	Page
Fig. 5-13	The Mikasa, flagship of the Japanese Fleet	122
Fig. 5-14	Commanders on the battleship Mikasa	123
Fig. 5-15	The Suborov, flagship of the Russian Fleet	124
Fig. 5-16	The Russian Fleet surrendering to Japan	125
Fig. 5-17	A sketch made by Admiral Domecq Garcia of the Argentine Navy of the sea battle between Japan and Russia while on board one of the Japanese ships	126
Fig. 5-18	Hashitate Maru (Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, www.jacar.go.jp)	127
Fig. 5-19	The watchtower site built by the Japanese in the northern part of Ulleungdo (Courtesy of Hong Songgun)	128
Fig. 5-20	The site of the quarters for the Japanese troops guarding the watchtower in the northern part of Ulleungdo (Courtesy of the Dokdo Guards)	129
Fig. 5-21	Maki Bokushin's Foreword in <i>The Guideline on Fishing in Korea's Territorial Waters</i>	137
Fig. 6-1	The First Korea-Japan Protocol Treaty	141
Fig. 6-2	Japanese artillery reinforces the coercive atmosphere at Namsan Mountain, Seoul	149
Fig. 6-3	The text of the Eulsa Treaty	151
Fig. 6-4	The Circulatory Notice of Shimane Prefecture Office notifying the incorporation of Dokdo into those territories belonging to Okishima	153
Fig. 6-5	Official gazette of the Shimane Prefecture Office announcing the incorporation of Dokdo into Okishima territories (dated May 29, 1905)	154
Fig. 6-6	Official gazette of the Shimane Prefecture Office notifying the incorporation of Dokdo into those territories belonging to Okishima (dated June 5, 1905)	155
Fig. 6-7	<i>The Denbo shimbun</i> (Kept at Dokdo Museum)	156
Fig. 6-8	The report made by Lee Myeongnae, Acting Governor of Gangwon Province	158
Fig. 7-1	A negotiation session held before the Treaty of Portsmouth	165
Fig. 7-2	The Treaty of Portsmouth ended the Russo-Japanese War	166
Fig. 7-3	Remains of the Japanese quarters used by troops to man the Dokdo watchtower	167
Fig. 7-4	<i>The Japanese Sea Directory</i> (1907)	169
Fig. 7-5	<i>The Korean Sea Directory</i> (1907)	171
Fig. 7-6	<i>The Korean Sea Directory</i> (1899)	172
Fig. 7-7	<i>The New Geography of Korea</i>	173

No	Title	Page
Fig. 8-1	The text of the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty signed in 1910	180
Fig. 8-2	<i>The Complete Map of Shimane Prefecture</i> , Japan (1917)	181
Fig. 8-3	A map of Korea compiled by the Japanese Army Photography Unit, Land Survey Department (Rikuchi Sokuryobu, 1930)	183
Fig. 8-4	A map published by the Yomiuri Shimbun (1949)	184
Fig. 8-5	<i>The Korean Topography</i> Newest Edition (1912)	184
Fig. 8-6	<i>The Results of the Depth-Fathoming of the Waters off Joseon</i> (1937)	185
Fig. 8-7	<i>The Japanese Sea Directory</i> (1911)	188
Fig. 8-8	<i>The Chōsen (Korea) Engan Suiroshi</i> (Korean Coastal Straits Sea Directory, 1933)	188
Fig. 8-9	A textbook for elementary school children published by the Governor-General's Office during Japan's colonial rule over Korea (1933)	189
Fig. 9-1	<i>Daijo Ruiten</i> (Cover)	190
Fig. 9-2	Contents of <i>Daijo Ruiten</i>	190

■ Tables

No	Title	Page
Table 3-1	Japanese Military's Expropriation of Land in Korea	76
Table 5-1	Japanese Military Watchtowers in Korea during the Russo-Japanese War	107

| Index |

A

(Amended) Abridged Japanese
Geographical Description(改正日本
地誌要略) 135

B

Baltic Fleet 108

C

Council of State(Dajokan, 太政官)
190
Complete Map of Shimane
Prefecture(島根縣全圖) 181

D

Denbo Shimbun(電報新聞) 156
Daehan Maeil Shinbo 159, 177, 178
Debate over Joseon Expedition(Seikan
ron, 征韓論) 27, 37

E

Etō Shinpei(江藤新平) 31, 38
Empress Myeongseong 55
Emperor Gojong 55

F

Famers' uprising(Donghak Peasant
Revolution) in 1894 49
Frederick Arthur McKenzie 86

G

Guideline on Fishing in Joseon's
Territorial Waters(韓海統漁指針)
136
Guideline to Military Management in
Joseon 81
Gungmin Shinbo 177

H

Haihanchiken(廢藩置縣) 37
Hashimoto Sanai(橋本左內) 28
Hayashi Gonsuke(林權助) 71, 72, 101
Hinoto Maru No.2(第二丁卯丸) 40, 43
History of Joseon's Enlightenment(朝鮮
開化史) 135
Hwangseong Shinmun 159, 178

I

Inoue(井上光) 71

J

- Japanese Forces Stationed in
Korea(JFSK, 朝鮮駐筈軍) 73, 81,
84
Japan's official gazette No. 667 (Sept.,
18, 1905) 156
Joseon-Japanese Treaty of Amity in
February, 1876(Treaty of Ganghwa)
43

K

- Kasuga Maru(春日丸) 43
Kido Takayoshi(木戸孝允) 30, 36,
37
Korea-Japan Protocol 71, 75, 106, 141
Korea-Japan Trade Rules of 1883 137
Korea-Japan Fishing Rules of 1889
137
Korea-Japan Protectorate Treaty(Eulsa
Joyak) 141, 149
Korea Sea Directory, 1899, 1907 171
Korean Coastal Straits Sea
Directory(Chōsen Engan Suiroshi, 朝
鮮沿岸水路誌), 1930, 1933 187
Korean Topography-Newest Edition,
(最新朝鮮地誌) 182

L

- Liancourt Rocks (Dokdo) 109, 111,
113

M

- Matter concerning the Uninhabited
Islets(無人島所屬に関する件) 116
Map attached to The Results of the
Depth-Fathoming of the Eastern
Waters off Joseon(朝鮮東近海測深
成績付圖) 182
Military riot in Joseon in
1882(Imogunna) 48
Moshun Maru(孟春丸) 43
Most Recent Guidelines for Korean
Businesses(最新韓海實業指針)
136

N

- Nakai Yosaburo(中井養三郎) 109,
129
Nitaka Maru's(新高丸) 109
New Geography of Korea(韓國新地理)
172

O

- Official Files of the Council of
State(Dajoruiten)(太政類典) 190
Official Files of the Government
(Kobunroku)(公文錄) 190
Osaka Asahi Shimbun(大阪朝日新聞)
155

P

Plan for Relevant Facilities in the Sea of
Japan(日本海同水域総合施設計劃)
125

R

Request for the Territorial Incorporation
of Liancourt Island(Dokdo) and Its
Lease(竹島編入并貸下願) 109
Russia's Pacific Fleet 60

S

Saigo Takamori(西郷隆盛) 14
Sato Nobuhiro's war
scenario(Kondohisaku, 混同秘策)
27
Shim Heungtaek 155
Shimane Prefecture Bulletin(島根縣誌)
132, 134
Sino-Japanese War 52, 65
Sino-Japan Peace Treaty 53
Sino-Japanese(Cheong-il) War 52, 65
Soejima Taneomi(副島種臣) 34

T

Tripartite Intervention 53, 55, 65
Tsushima Maru(對馬丸) 111, 112

U

Unyo Maru(雲揚丸) 40, 42, 43
Uriū Sotokichi(瓜生外吉) 71

W

Waterway Journal of 1883, 1886(漢瀛
水路誌) 136
Waterway Journal of 1894, 1899(朝鮮
水路誌) 136

Y

Yamagata Aritomo(山縣有朋) 13
Yamagata Ikensho(山縣意見書) 17,
23
Yomiuri Shimbun(讀賣新聞) 181
Yosida Shoin(吉田松陰) 17, 19

The History of Imperial Japan's Seizure of Dokdo

Published on November 28, 2008

Published by the Northeast Asian History Foundation

Written by Kim Byungryull

Translate by the Northeast Asian History Foundation

Imkwang Bldg., 77 Uijuro, Seodaemungu, Seoul 120-705, Korea

Tel : (82-2) 2012-6065

Fax : (82-2) 2012-6175

E-mail : book@historyfoundation.or.kr

Copyright © 2008 by the Northeast Asian History Foundation

All Rights Reserved. No portion of the contents may be reproduced in any form without written permission of the Northeast Asian History Foundation.

ISBN 978-89-6187-066-5-93910

NOT FOR SALE