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

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# Articles

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# The Museum Exhibited: Shaping China's 21st Century National Museum

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## The Museum Exhibited: Shaping China's 21st Century National Museum

In March 2011, the National Museum of China, which is a union of the former Museum of Chinese History and the Museum of Chinese Revolution, opened to the public at Tiananmen Square, the heart of the Chinese Nation. Its transition to a modern museum was fast and ambitious. Expanding on a gigantic scale from 65,000 square meters to almost 192,000 square meters, it constituted the largest museum in the world. This article presents the transformation of this major cultural institution of the People's Republic of China. It casts light on the project development and on the decisions for the exterior and interior architecture, and examines the museum's current interpretation of the role as a representative of the Chinese nation.

**Keywords:** People's Republic of China, museum studies, architecture, national identity, Tiananmen Square

# The Museum Exhibited: Shaping China's 21st Century National Museum

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## Introduction

In March 2011, the National Museum of China, a union of the former Museum of Chinese History and the Museum of Chinese Revolution, opened to the public at Tiananmen Square, the heart of the Chinese Nation.[1] The transition to a modern museum complex was fast, ambitious, and, to a certain extent, drastic: Only 20% of the original building was kept and 80% is new structure. Thus the museum expanded on a gigantic scale from 65,000 square meters to 191,900 square meters, currently constituting the largest museum in the world. Furthermore, with its construction costs of 2.5 billion Yuan (approximately US$ 380 million)[2] the project can be considered to be one of the most important museum projects undertaken within the last decade.

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1 Parts of this paper are extracted from the author's PhD thesis, "The National Museum of China: Building Memory, Shaping History, Presenting Identity" (University of Heidelberg, 2013). I would like to thank Francesca dal Lago and John Finlay for reviewing the manuscript of this article.

2 Gmp 2011, National Museum of China, Beijing, brochure from the architects von Gerkan, Marg and Partners (gmp), Public Relations and Communication, Hamburg 2011, "Facts and figures" n.p.

It all began with the National Museum of China launching an international bidding process for the new design of the museum in 2004. The intentions were as follows:

> The museum building has not developed in parallel to the public's daily increasing demand for culture. Moreover, the Olympics of 2008 further stimulate the requirements of the National Museum. Therefore, it was decided to re-build the former museum, extending it to the east and building over the courtyards. The museum as 'world state-of-the-art' National Museum should correspond with the dynamic development of China and the increasing cultural demand of the people.[3]

The main task formulated by the National Development and Reform Commission in charge of the project was to enlarge the building on the east side, reinforcing the historical structure while keeping the structure of 1959 effectively intact.[4] The architects were requested to build a museum "which would serve as a display window of the 5,000 year long history of China, one that would accommodate one million objects and 20,000 visitors at the same time," and, furthermore, "the building should be cautiously and respectfully altered."[5]

From February until September 2004, an international public bidding for the new design of the National Museum of China took place. An expert committee selected eleven outstanding national and international architects out of the thirty-six candidates and invited them to submit their proposals.[6] The National Museum of China and its board of

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3 "Wettbewerbsaufgabe" [Specifications of the competition], in *Gmp wettbewerb aktuell* 12/2004. Gmp Public Relations and Communication (Hamburg, gmp: 2004), 29. Here translated by the author.

4 Susanne Beyer, Martin Doerry, and Nora Reinhardt, "Weltfremd und unglaubwürdig" [Unworldly and implausible], interview with Meinhard von Gerkan, *Spiegel*, April 11, 2011.

5 Ibid.

6 Organized by the Beijing Gaojin Consultant Co. in cooperation with the Beijing Project

directors were directly in charge of the project. Furthermore, the museum was subordinate to the Ministry of Culture and the Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Major decisions in the project development were made by the National Development and Reform Commission; the final go-ahead of the project, however, was given by Li Changchun, a member of the nine-man Standing Committee of the Politburo and the chief of propaganda of the CCP.[7] Although the winning design by the German architectural firm von Gerkan, Marg and Partners (gmp) working with the China Academy of Building Research (CABR) was selected in 2004, serious alterations in the design were made in the following years until the final reopening in 2011.[8]

The project and its development, however, have prompted critical questions concerning the current significance of the building, its cultural role, and the form of representation which was chosen for its expression. What was being pursued besides size and grandeur? Do continuities or changes dominate the new design of the museum? Do these two aspects give clues about the self-image, which was aspired by the National Museum of China, and about the official presentation of its history, memory, and identity? With an analysis of the reconstruction project, the development of the outer appearance, and the inner structure of the museum, this article seeks to provide some answers to the questions raised above. The analysis will examine how the project evolved and how the final form was found. First, the National Museum of China, its

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Consultants Company; cf. Interview, Stephan Schütz, architectural designer, gmp, Berlin, January 19, 2006.

7 Ian Johnson, "At China's New Museum, History Toes Party Line," *The New York Times*, April 2011, 1.

8 As required by Chinese regulations, foreign architects must team up with Chinese partners. However, only a few very large and influential institutions possess an official license, therefore constituting possible partners for foreign companies. Cf. Eduard Kögel, "Zur Lage junger Architekten in China" [On the situation of young architects in China], *Archplus* 168, no. 2 (2004: 2), 71.

institutional role, and its development as a national museum are presented. Then, the setting of the museum in the center of the Chinese capital is analyzed, examining the decision for the location of the museum building of 1959. In order to define the changes the museum has experienced and what these changes mean in terms of self-identification and museum presentation, the comparison of the façade and the interior design implemented in 2011, with the original building of 1959 and the 2004 winning proposal, forms the core of this essay.

## The Museum as National Institution

The National Museum of China is one of the most important museums of the People's Republic of China, whose current presentation is the result of historical developments. Its origins can be traced to two different roots, the foundation of the Preparatory Office of the National History Museum set up in 1912 by the government of the newly established Republic of China, and the Preparatory Office of the National Museum of Revolution established in 1950 after the founding of the People's Republic of China. These roots still constitute the institutional basis of the museum today.

From its early beginnings, the museum had been a venue of identification and legitimization. Since the nineteenth century, the concept of modern museums has been introduced to China from the West. On the one hand, foreigners living in China established their own culture and opened the first museums in cities such as Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chengdu.[9] On the other hand, Chinese delegations interested in learning about Western culture and technology traveled to Europe, the United States, and Japan,[10] where they visited and learned about the institution of

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9 Wang Hongjun 王宏钧, *Zhongguo bowuguanxue jichu* 中国博物馆学基础 [The Basis of Chinese Museology] (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe 上海古籍出版社, 1990), 100.

10 Although there were ambivalent feelings about Westernization and an increasing Japanese influence in China, from the mid-nineteenth century on, Japan nevertheless served as an

the museum, at times bringing back innovative ideas. It is claimed that the first modern museum founded by a Chinese was established in Nantong, Jiangsu Province in 1905, going back to the private initiative of the industrialist Zhang Jian (1853-1926).[11] However, the late Qing Dynasty made the establishment of museums a governmental task, mainly under control of the Department of Education.[12]

With the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1911 and its particular worldview, the concept of the nation-state gained recognition.[13] During the first years of the Republican Era (1912-1945), several public museums were established throughout China, most importantly in the capitals of Beijing and Nanjing.[14] As in the west, these museums played an important role in the process of nation building in China. One major task of the Ministry of Culture of the newly established Republic of China was safeguarding the national treasures, thereby continuing the dynastic tradition of legitimizing the empire by means of the imperial collection. During the first years of the Republic, parts of the Imperial Palace were made accessible to the public for the first time in history. Its content was regarded as public property and the essence of the cultural tradition, the roots of the newly established nation-state.[15] The subsequent opening of

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instrumental shortcut to Westernization.

11 The history of Nantong Museum and its founder Zhang Jian are well documented in Qin Shao, "Exhibiting the Modern: The Creation of the First Chinese Museum, 1905-1930," *The China Quarterly* 179, no. 9 (September 2004), 684-702.

12 Wang Hongjun, *Zhongguo bowuguanxue jichu*, 84.

13 C. X. George Wei and Liu Xiaoyuan, eds., *Exploring Nationalism of China: Themes and Conflicts* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002), 121. Modern nationalism stemming from Western thought had already been adopted in China during the late nineteenth century, mainly among the intelligentsia, and became a forceful weapon in politics.

14 Joanna Capon, *Guide to Museums in China* (Hong Kong: Orientations Magazine, 2002), 8.

15 Shih Shou-Chien, "Die kaiserliche chinesische Sammlung und das Nationale Palastmuseum" [The Chinese imperial collection and the National Palace Museum], in Schätze der Himmelssöhne. Die Kaiserliche Sammlung aus dem Nationalen Palastmuseum, Taipeh. *Die Großen Sammlungen. Kunst- und Ausstellungshalle der BRD* (Bonn: Hatje Cantz, 2003), 17.

the Palace Museum starting in 1925 focused on the enduring traditions of the country. In addition, it was deemed necessary to create another modus to enable the population to identify with the new nation-state. With the founding of the Preparatory Office of the National History Museum in 1912, the new Republican government established its own museum project, after a proposal made by Cai Yuanpei (1868-1940), then Minister of Education. At that time, the Palace Museum housed the best collection of Chinese artifacts in the world, while the Museum of Chinese History, with its universal approach, obtained its collection from nationwide archaeological excavation. Despite the humble beginnings of the collection in 1912, the Museum of Chinese History became one of the first and most influential museums and, most importantly, a symbol of the new Republic of China.

Besides the Museum of Chinese History, the Preparatory Office of the National Museum of Revolution represented the second foundation of the National Museum of China. Set up in March 1950, this office immediately moved to the premises of the Hall of Military Glory (Ch. *Wuyingdian*) in the Forbidden City.[16] For the establishment of the People's Republic of China, once again, the founding of new museums, especially the Museum of Chinese Revolution, was of vital importance. As early as May 1949, the Committee to Control Cultural Affairs issued an announcement through the Museum of Chinese History to collect revolutionary documents and artifacts, emphasizing two areas: the Communist Party and Communist martyrs. In February 1950, a nationwide collection campaign commenced as announced by the Bureau of Cultural Relicts, focusing on relicts starting with the Opium War of 1839-1842, but accentuating the time after May Fourth when the CCP

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16 Kirk A. Denton, "Visual Memory and the Construction of a Revolutionary Past: Paintings from the Museum of the Chinese Revolution," *Modern Chinese Literature and Culture* 12, no. 2 (Fall 2000), 208.

progressively ascended to a position of leadership.[17] In order to establish the Museum of Chinese Revolution, the Soviet museum model was consulted, supported by Russian advisors, the translation of Russian museum accounts and field trips to Moscow's museums. In the autumn of 1950, a Chinese delegation led by Wang Yeqiu (1909-1987) traveled to Moscow to visit several museums dedicated to the new regime. The delegation was especially impressed by the Central Lenin Museum, the Red Army Museum, and the rich collection of the National Museum of the Revolution on Gorki Street, which displayed the glorious path of the Bolshevik Revolution and highlighted the central role of Lenin and Stalin in the establishment of Soviet Russia.[18] If the task of the first Western museums emerging in the eighteenth century during the time of the Enlightenment was to educate free citizens, the Soviet museums were established to educate the public in the Socialist ideology.[19]

In the newly established People's Republic of China, a new master narrative, which was based on Soviet Russian models, the Marxist-Leninism doctrines,[20] and Mao Zedong's thought, dominated the interpretation of modern Chinese history and was implemented in the

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17 Hung Chang-tai, "The Red Line: Creating a Museum of the Chinese Revolution," *The China Quarterly* 184 (December 2005), 920.

18 Wang Yeqiu 王冶秋, "Sulian guoli geming bowuguan" 苏联国立革命博物馆 [The Soviet National Museum of the Revolution], *Wenwu cankao ziliao* 文物参考资料 10 (1950:10), 66-77.

19 Boris Groys, "The Struggle Against the Museums; or, The Display of Art in Totalitarian Space," in Daniel J. Sherman and Irit Rogoff, eds., *Museum Culture*, *History Discourse*, *Spectacles* (London: Routledge, 1994), 144.

20 In 1924, Marxism-Leninism, a combination of Marxist historical materialism and a practical guideline for establishing Communism and Socialism, was made the official state doctrine of the Soviet Union. Cf. Ma Xueping. "Observations on the Life of Marxist History in East and West," *Chinese Studies in History* 38 (Spring/Summer 2005), 53. In Soviet Russia Marxism-Leninism was most powerful and served for the legitimation of the newly established dictatorship. It was the basis for further social historiography; cf. Georg G. Iggers, *Geschichtswissenschaft im 20. Jahrhundert: ein kritischer Überblick im internationalen Zusammenhang* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007), 31.

public museums.[21] Following the materialist interpretation of Marxism that defines all history as a class struggle, in which different groups of society strive for the means of production,[22] "the dynastic history of China was reinterpreted as a conflict between feudal power, the emperor, and the imperial bureaucracy on one side, and the anti-feudal forces, the peasant rebels, on the other."[23] Furthermore, the new historical approach defined the CCP as the guiding force of the sequence of revolutionary events, leading to the foundation of New China. Like Stalin before him, Mao Zedong (1893-1976) recognized both the importance of an ideological historical concept and the legitimizing power of its interpretation as being urgently needed for the newly established nation, and in order to stabilize his own position.[24] The new Museum of Chinese Revolution provided a platform for the display of the Chinese Communist master narrative, forging and controlling collective memory and monopolizing the writing of history.[25] The CCP continued to exercise tight control over the museum display, especially via its Propaganda Department. Therefore, the Museum of the Chinese Revolution was not only a cultural space, but also a political institution to serve the interests of the party[26] and to display history as a means of legitimizing party leadership and contributing to the self-image that was to be created.

In 2003, the Museum of Chinese History and the Museum of Chinese

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21 Cf. Jin Qiu, "History and State: Searching for the Past in the Light of the Present in the People's Republic of China," *Historiography East & West* 2, no. 1 (2004), 13; John E. Schrecker, *The Chinese Revolution in Historical Perspective* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), 213.

22 William H. Shaw and Charles Saumarez Smith, "Marxism," in Jane Turner, ed., *The Dictionary of Art*, vol. 20 (New York: Grove, 1996), 525.

23 Jin Qiu, "History and State," 28.

24 Matthias Middell, "Marxisitische Geschichtsschreibung" [Marxist historiography], in Joachim Eibach and Günther Lottes, eds., *Kompass der Geschichtswissenschaft: Ein Handbuch* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2002), 70.

25 Hung Chang-tai, "Revolutionary History in Stone: The Making of a Chinese National Monument," *The China Quarterly* 166 (June 2001), 914.

26 Ibid.

Revolution were unified into the National Museum of China. To combine the major collections of early and recent Chinese history, which had already shared one building since 1959, seemed only reasonable.[27] Furthermore, the newly established and unified National Museum of China appeared much more capable to fulfilling the double function of a storage place for national monuments and of a memorial of the nation-state. Its primary task remained one of representing the People's Republic of China, its legacy and recent development on a national and international scale. Following the 2003 unification, the National Museum of China became the largest comprehensive history museum in the country, holding some of its most significant historical objects.[28] It is under the direct guidance of the Ministry of Culture and is operated under dual leadership of a director-general, and a deputy director who is a representative of the Communist Party.[29] In the course of the unification process, major parts of the administration were combined. However, separate curatorial departments and storage facilities from the former museums remained, mirroring the original structure of the two institutions.[30] When the National Museum of China closed for renovation in 2007, it defined the following future goals:

> When the revamping project is completed, the National Museum of China will be the supreme hall of culture and art for the Chinese nation in the 21st century. As a window showcasing the long history and brilliant culture and art of the Chinese nation, it will be a comprehensive museum that will feature a more forward-looking vision, a concept better in line with the development of the era, the latest theory of

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27 The idea of unification, however, was not new. Between 1969 and 1983 the two institutions were already unified and only separated again thereafter. Hung Chang-tai, "Revolutionary History in Stone," 931.

28 Li Xianyao and Luo Zhewen, *China's Museums*, trans. Martha Avery (Beijing: China Intercontinental Press, 2010), 68.

29 Correspondence, staff member A, exhibition department, NMC, September 12, 2009.

30 Ibid.

> museology, the latest cultural relics collection, preservation and research means, the most advanced display mode and the most reliable cultural relics security and safeguarding measures…. By the 100th anniversary of its establishment in 2012, the NMC is expected to become the best museum in China and one of the best in the world.[31]

With its unification and the reconstruction project, the National Museum of China has set itself the task of being a “global player”; it has also exposed itself to being measured by the standards and criterion of the international museum environment. As a state institution it corresponds to the official view of the nation and its presentation serves to shape the perception of history, memory and identity. The following analysis will seek to identify how the new National Museum of China pursued the above stated self-imposed goals by comparison of the successive architectural designs of the museum and its development over time.

## The Setting

At the inception of modern museums, private and public collections were housed in rededicated buildings such as palatial structures of princely proprietor or in cabinets of wealthy private owners (for example, British Museum 1753, Hermitage 1764, Louvre 1793, and The Palace Museum 1925). These rededicated buildings were seldom modest but generally monumental in nature and mainly occupied a central position in the city. As interim solutions, however glamorous, they were rarely best fit for the purpose of a museum, and the development of genuine building type seemed logical. The purposefully erected museum buildings of the nineteenth century continued to occupy a central position in the city and often served

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31 National Museum of China, “News.” http://www.nationalmuseum.cn/en/news/news_id_364.jsp (accessed April 18, 2007).

important structuring functions. Especially in cities which were designed from the outset as capitals, for example, Washington, D.C., Canberra, or Brasilia, museums assumed a key role as part of the overall city outline.[32] There, governmental museums provide a dual function of presenting national memories and national or even world history in correspondence to the official story line and serving as a key part of the official self-representation of the nation-state.

The National Museum of China also followed this general development pattern. Before the museum building adjacent to Tiananmen Square was erected, the Preparatory Office of the National History Museum was housed in various interim locations, all of which were of political and historical importance, and monumental in appearance. However, through the change of the political system, these buildings had lost their function and were open to new use. The museum's collection was initially housed at the site of the former Imperial College of the Qing Dynasty. In 1917, however, due to the remote location and to insufficient space, the museum moved to the Meridian Gate of the Imperial Palace.[33] For the establishment of a new museum building in 1959 and also for the reconstruction of the museum in 2011, the decision for and the handling of the central position in the city was of vital importance.

## 1959 – Determining the Location

The newly established Museum of the Chinese Revolution required an adequate building to serve as a memorial and a place of recollection for the Chinese people. Together with the Museum of Chinese History, the

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32 Andrew W. Daum and Christof Mauch, eds., *Berlin, Washington, 1800-2000: Capital Cities, Cultural Representation, and National Identities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3 ff.

33 The Gate tower was used as exhibition venue, while the continuously growing collection was stored in the buildings situated between the Meridian Gate and the Duan Gate. Cf. *Zhongguo Lishi bowuguan 90 nian* (Beijing: Zhongguo lishi bowuguan, 2002), 140.

Museum of the Chinese Revolution was integrated in the overall building program of the capital known as the "Ten Great Buildings." This program was implemented by the Chinese government in preparation for the tenth anniversary celebrations of the People's Republic of China in 1959. It focused on the erection of ten representative landmarks along with a massive reshaping of the capital. Besides the two museums, which were unified into one building compound, the scheme included the Great Hall of the People, the Chinese People's Revolutionary Military Museum, the National Agricultural Exhibition Hall, the Nationalities Cultural Palace, the Beijing Railway Station, the Worker's Stadium, the Nationality's Hotel, and the Overseas Chinese Hotel.[34]

However, during the 1950s, the idea of erecting museum buildings at Tiananmen Square [Figure 1] was contentiously discussed along with the expansion of the square. On the one hand, several experts argued for the erection of a new political center to the west of the city; on the other hand, some argued to continue using the traditional political center, adjusting it for the new needs of the nation.[35] A proposal of the influential architects Liang Sicheng (1901-1972) and Chen Zhanxiang (1916-2001) was for the new governmental center to be established in the west of the city, whereas the Soviet advisors suggested the city center, stating technical reasons.[36] The Chinese leadership decided for the central solution: Tiananmen, the Gate of Heavenly Peace, remained the core while being enhanced and transformed to an important symbol of New China[37] and its leadership. The plan in favor of the central location was

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34 Julia F. Andrews, *Painters and Politics in the People's Republic of China, 1949-1979* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994), 228.

35 Wu Hung, "Tiananmen Square: A Political History of Monuments," *Representations* 35 (Summer 1991), 96 ff.

36 K. Shizheng Fan, "A Classicist Architecture for Utopia: The Soviet Contacts," in Jeffrey W. Cody, Nancy S. Steinhardt, and Tony Atkin, eds., *Chinese Architecture and the Beaux-Arts* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2011), 102.

37 The term "New China" defines the People's Republic of China since its foundation in 1949 and is

Figure 1. Photomontage of the new design of the National Museum of China situated at the northeast corner (right) of Tiananmen Square, rendering, courtesy of gmp 2006

finally approved by the Capital Planning Committee,[38] and in 1958, the mayor of Beijing, Peng Zhen (1902-1997), recognized the Great Hall of the People as well as the Museum of Chinese Revolution and the Museum of Chinese History to be the most important buildings at Tiananmen Square,[39] shifting the significance from the old political order (Imperial Palace, Tiananmen Gate) to the Communist rulership (Great Hall of the People, Monument to the People's Heroes, and Museum of Revolutionary History and Chinese History).

To understand the impact of the decision to build the museum at Tiananmen Square and its significance for the contemporary reconstruction, it is necessary to closely examine its historical importance as a symbol of national identity.[40] For centuries, the Tiananmen Gate

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frequently applied by the CCP and writers outside China.

38 Hung Chang-tai, "The Red Line," 920; Wang Zhengming 王争鸣, ed., *Qiji shi zenyang chuangzao de—renmin dahuitang jianshe shihua* 奇迹是怎样创造的–人民大会堂建设史话 [How a miracle was created—history of the construction of Great Hall of the People] (Beijing: Zhongguo shudian 中国书店, 2001), 16-17.

39 Wang Zhengming, ed., *Qiji shi zenyang chuangzao de—renmin dahuitang jianshe shihua*, 16-17.

40 Rubie Watson, "Palaces, Museums, and Squares: Chinese National Spaces," *Museum Anthropology* 19, no. 2 (September 1995), 8.

served as the primary and exclusive entrance to the Imperial Palace[41] as part of the sacred central axis that runs through Beijing, where the imperial throne in the Hall of Supreme Harmony is located.[42] During the Qing Dynasty, high court was held twice a year in front of Tiananmen Gate and imperial announcements were read to the subjects.[43] It continued to be a site for official political announcements of the ruler,[44] but later also became a platform for expression of political will for the subjects as well. By the end of Imperial China in 1911, the space in front of Tiananmen Gate had developed into an anti-government protest site. Its political significance continued during the Republican era, when the May Fourth Movement (1919), the Patriotic March (1926), and the Anti-Japanese Demonstrations (1935) were held in front of Tiananmen Gate. The significance of the square as a place for political expression and collective memory was also apparent to foreign powers. In 1900, for example, allied troops marched there victoriously, establishing diplomatic quarters at the southeast corner of the Square.[45] In 1937, Imperial Japan proclaimed its "New East Asian Order" at Tiananmen Square.[46]

The Communist government chose not to break with the established political tradition but rather to further develop the existing powerful

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[41] This entrance was restricted to the imperial ministers, officials, and staff, as well as the imperial family only.

[42] Watson, "Palaces, Museums, and Squares," 12.

[43] Wu Hung, "Tiananmen Square," 93.

[44] Lothar Ledderose, "Die Gedenkhalle für Mao Zedong. Ein Beispiel von Gedächtnisarchitektur" [The Chairman Mao Memorial Hall: An Example of Memorial Architecture], in Jan Assmann and Tonio Hölscher, eds., *Kultur und Gedächtnis* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988), 311-339; Jeffrey F. Meyer, *The Dragons of Tiananmen: Beijing as a Sacred City* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), 47.

[45] Today these buildings are protected as a cultural heritage site by the government of the People's Republic of China. Interview, gmp, Matthias Wiegelmann, project lead Beijing, gmp, April 10, 2009.

[46] The political significance of the square continued during the time of the Cultural Revolution, its annulment in 1976, during the protests of the Democratic Movement in 1989, and up until today. Cf. Wu Hung, "Tiananmen Square," 84-85.

image of imperial rulership and the revolutionary traditions of the square to serve their own legitimacy and claim to power: On October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong proclaimed the foundation of the People's Republic of China from Tiananmen Gate, establishing it as memorial site and birthplace of New China. Thus, the Gate also became a symbol of the newly established state and a universal architectural emblem found on official documents, stamps, and banknotes.[47] Over the years of Communist rule, Tiananmen continued to be carefully employed as a Communist icon.[48] In order to adapt and recreate this powerful symbol for the purpose of the new rule, it was necessary to change and redesign the surroundings to express one coherent ideology.[49]

After 1949, the systematic extension of the square to forge a cultural and political center began. Many buildings were torn down to create an open area in the center of the capital. This genuinely Western concept[50] of an open square in the center of the city blended perfectly with the People's Republic of China propaganda. The open area in front of Tiananmen Gate was to become the central square for the Chinese nation just as every small town establishes its own center for gatherings and events.[51] As was to be expected with many architectural decisions in Beijing, the upcoming 10th anniversary of the People's Republic of China became crucial for the design of the square. By 1958, Chairman Mao finally ordered the square to be enlarged, and, after the redesign in 1959, it could accommodate

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47 Wu Hung, "Tiananmen Square," 88.

48 Watson, "Palaces, Museums, and Squares," 12.

49 Rudolf Wagner, "Reading the Chairman Mao Memorial Hall in Peking: The Tribulations of the Imperial Pilgrim," in Susan Naquin and Chun-fang Yu, eds., *Pilgrim and Sacred Sites in China* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992), 378-423; Wu Hung, *Remaking Beijing: Tiananmen Square and the Creation of a Political Space* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).

50 Ledderose, "Die Gedenkhalle für Mao Zedong. Ein Beispiel von Gedächtnisarchitektur," 325.

51 Wu Hung, "Tiananmen Square," 90.

400,000 people.[52] The original physical center of power shifted from the Imperial Palace to the newly erected buildings:[53] The Monument to the People's Heroes (1958) at the center, the Great Hall of the People (1959) to the west, the Museum of Chinese History and the Museum of Chinese Revolution (1959) to the east, and finally the Mao Mausoleum (1977) on the southern part of the square. Considering the concentration of important governmental buildings, it seemed suitable for the Museum of Chinese History and the newly established Museum of Chinese Revolution, which served to display the official interpretation of history of the new government, to be erected at the municipal city center. The museum building was constructed on the northeast side of Tiananmen Square, symmetrically located opposite the Great Hall of the People.

## The Twenty-first Century: The Impact of the Location

Tiananmen Square has remained the cultural and political heart of China, a place of political expression for the ruling elite as well as the public, a site of pilgrimage and a strong symbol for the nation. Since unification in 2003, the National Museum of China has continued to play a vital part in the symbolic ensemble of the Chinese nation. Furthermore, since the opening-up policy, the reforms under Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997) and the introduction of a socialist market economy have caused fundamental changes in Chinese society. The role of the National Museum of China as an entity preserving and creating identity seemed to have attracted further notice, which has become particularly evident by the governmental decision for its reconstruction in 2004. Due to the importance and

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52 Until Republican times the space between Tiananmen in the north and Zhengyangmen in the south was just a narrow strip, which could only accommodate about 70,000 people; cf. Ledderose, "Die Gedenkhalle für Mao Zedong. Ein Beispiel von Gedächtnisarchitektur," 325.

53 For further discussion of the monuments of Tiananmen Square, see Wu Hung, "Tiananmen Square," and Denton, "Visual Memory and the Construction of a Revolutionary Past."

prominence of the location, however, a high level of sensitivity had to be applied in redesigning the museum. This concern became extremely apparent after the establishment of the National Grand Theater (Paul Andreu, 2007) at the rear of the Great Hall of the People, in close vicinity to the square, which caused nationwide public debate. Some praised the approach, by which "for the first time Beijing introduced modern ideas of urban redevelopment and broke with Chinese neo-classicism."[54] Many intellectuals and architects, however, criticized the design of the huge, round, translucent glass bubble, located just behind the Great Hall of the People. It was viewed as an unsuitable contrast to the rectangular, stone-clad neighboring buildings of the ensemble at Tiananmen Square.[55] Moreover, Beijing citizens no longer approved of the new architecture that changed their cityscape without recognition of the historical context. They perceived that foreign architects would use their city as a playground for fanciful ideas. Subsequently, the impact of the public debate challenged the practice of allowing foreign avant-garde and star architects to build national landmarks.[56] The government itself became sensitive and extremely alert to these concerns.[57] As a direct consequence of this controversy, the winning design of 2004 for the National Museum of China did not escape criticism, and was finally discarded. In October 2005, a change in leadership of the museum took place and by the end of the year, the original intention of making a visible distinction between the old and new architecture, a counterpoint design, was abandoned. The new

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54 Zheng Shiling, "Chinese City and Architecture in Transformation between Yesterday and Tomorrow," in *Luchao—Aus einem Tropfen geboren*, Architecture for China von Gerkan, Marg und Partner. Museum für Kunst und Gewerbe, ed. (Hamburg: Museum für Kunst und Gewerbe, 2003), 16.

55 Charlie Q.L. Xue, *Building a Revolution: Chinese Architecture Since 1980* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press 2006), 41-42.

56 Interview, Stephan Schütz, architectural design, gmp, Berlin, June 2, 2006.

57 John Finlay pointed out that this debate was, in addition, sparked by the collapse of Terminal 2E at Charles de Gaulle Airport in Paris, designed by Andreu in 2004.

director-general, Lü Zhangshen, an architect by training, became actively involved in the change of design and placed even greater weight on preserving and enhancing adaptation of the museum to the general architectural environment of Tiananmen Square. The architects of gmp were urged to synchronize the museum's exterior impression with the surrounding architecture of Tiananmen Square and to integrate the new building harmoniously into the existing context.

In summary, in 1959 as well as in 2011 the urban setting exerted an important influence on the placement and the reconstruction of the museum. In 1959, the building developed as an integral part of the design of Tiananmen Square, applying the instituted forms of the newly established People's Republic of China. In 2011, the design of the museum directly responded to the setting in the sense that the design had to adjust and dialogue closely with the traditional elements of Tiananmen Square. To a great extent, the setting was a determining element in the development of the museum's external design. The shape the museum actually took will be addressed below.

## The Façade

The first and most sustaining impression that an observer receives from a building is that generated by the façade. This outer shell serves as the figurehead of the museum. In the case of the National Museum of China, it was of major importance for the museum building in 1959, in the 2004 winning design, as well as for the executed redesign of 2011. In this section, the outer designs will be analyzed in order to understand the development in form, as well as help to trace the client's search for the most suitable design. A special focus is laid upon the application of international, national, and local forms, which can be described as follows: approaches to international design use museums worldwide as models, independent of local forms. Chinese features, on the other hand, define building characteristics, materials, and forms, which are taken from


Figure 2. The original West Façade (1959), from *Beijing shida jianzhu sheji*, 2002, 166

Chinese traditional architecture. Local features help to align the form of the original building within the context of Tiananmen Square.

## 1959 – Establishing a New Face

The museum complex of 1959 was built as a massive, rectangular structure in the monumental Soviet neoclassic style, ornamented with Chinese features. The building is located parallel to the central north-south axis of Beijing, which runs through Tiananmen Square and the Forbidden City. The museum's façade extended 313 meters from north to south fronting the square and 149 meters west to east along Chang'an East Road, altogether covering a floor space of almost 65,152 meters squared.[58] The main façade facing the square consisted of two symmetrical wings with corner projections, which were divided by a grand portico in the center [Figure 2]. Horizontally, three symmetrically arranged rows of windows structured the façade, with the windows in the

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58 *Beijing shida jianzhu sheji* 北京师大建筑设计 [Beijing Ten Prominent Buildings] (Tianjin: Beijingshi guihua weiyuanhui 北京市规划委员会, 2002), 166.

basement being noticeably smaller. Monumental grooved pilasters gave vertical order. A central staircase led up to the main portico, which was characterized by twenty-four square pillars arranged in two rows, connected by an entablature. This main entrance was framed by two immense pillars protruding over the roofline with an overall height of thirty-three meters. The emblem of a five-pointed star encircled by stalks of grain and flanked by eight red flags on each side was set above the entrance serving as a symbol of the Communist Revolution.[59] The eaves were ornamented with an overhanging, yellow and green tile cladding.[60] Their structuring in zones, the application of various tiles imitating a coffered ceiling and the use of wooden bracket-supports implied the traditional *dougong* wood architecture.[61] The other three façades mirror the main façade, albeit, with slight variations.

The 1959 museum was built in the monumental forms of neoclassicism, which predominantly features rectangular building structures, a façade design with over-long columns, grid-like arranged windows, flat roofs, and an entrance emphasized by central projections.[62] Classicist vocabulary stemming from the Western tradition was internationally and universally applied across political boundaries in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and served various governments in their expression of political ideology, requiring different codes of interpretation.[63] Some countries associated democratic traditions with this particular building style (for example, the Capitol in

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59 Hung Chang-tai, "The Red Line," 921.

60 *Beijing shida jianzhu sheji*, 166.

61 The Chinese *dougong* 斗拱 architecture describes a unique building technique of interlocking wooden brackets, which join pillars to the frame of the roof. It is one of the most important elements in Chinese traditional architecture.

62 Gabriele Fahr-Becker, ed., *Ostasiatische Kunst* (Köln: Könemann, 2006), 244.

63 Dietmar Schirmer, "State, Volk, and Monumental Architecture in Nazi-Era Berlin," in *Berlin, Washington, 1800-2000: Capital Cities, Cultural Representation, and National Identities*, eds., Andrew W. Daum and Christof Mauch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 129.

Washington, D.C.).[64] In any case, neoclassicism suited many governments as an expression of enduring tradition, power, grandeur, and state authority.

In 1932, Soviet Russia turned to neoclassicism and developed the so-called "Socialist Realism" as their dominant form of artistic expression in literature, film, arts, music, and architecture.[65] For the Socialist government, the architectural style politically associated with the Greek democratic tradition was favorably employed for a dictatorship of the proletariat.[66] This style had the advantage of continuing traditional construction methods, without need for modern technology and material.[67] After World War II, steel-reinforced concrete allowed architects the continued use of neoclassical forms on high rise buildings by means of curtain-wall architecture. The new building standards were exported to Soviet satellite states and influenced the architecture of the People's Republic of China. Soviet neoclassicism as encountered in the museum building as well as in the Great Hall of the People was, in fact, introduced to China by Soviet advisors, supporting local architects from 1950 until the end of the political alliance at the beginning of the 1960s.[68] However, even after Nikita Khrushchev's proclamation of the end of Socialist Realism in architecture in 1955, and

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64 Winfried Nerdinger, *Geschichte der Rekonstruktion, Konstruktion der Geschichte* (München: Prestel, 2010), 254.

65 Announced by the Central Committee of the Communist Party on April 23, 1932; Werner Huber, *Moskau-Metropole im Wandel: Ein architektonischer Stadtführer* (Köln: Böhlau, 2007), 55.

66 The guidelines of Socialist Realism prevailed in Soviet architecture until 1955, when Khrushchev announced a reorientation to modern building style. At the 22nd Party Congress in 1961, the Soviet Union officially announced the revival of modern form. In the 1990s, Russia experienced a revival of Socialist Realism building style alongside Postmodernism. Cf. Alexej Tarchanow and Sergej Kawtaradse, *Stalinistische Architektur: Aus dem Englischen von Ursula Bischoff* (München: Klinkhardt und Biermann, 1992), 9.

67 Anders Aman, *Architecture and Ideology in Eastern Europe during the Stalin Era: An Aspect of Cold War History* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 52-54.

68 Fan K. Shizheng, "A Classicist Architecture for Utopia: The Soviet Contacts," in *Chinese Architecture and the Beaux-Arts*, eds. W. Cody, Nancy S. Steinhardt, and Tony Atkin (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2011), 92; Hung Chang-tai, "Revolutionary History in Stone: The Making of a Chinese National Monument," *The China Quarterly* 166 (June 2001), 469.

the break between Mao and the Soviet Union, this building style remained influential for the governmental building practice of the People's Republic of China.[69] The introduction of neoclassicism helped to remodel Tiananmen Square with a completely new look as a symbol of the newly established People's Republic of China.

Although the first impression of the museum reveals the strong influence of the Soviet style, showing only few Chinese characteristics at first glance, the building, however, possesses several distinctly Chinese features. Including national and local forms corresponding to the cityscape was a well-established practice in Socialist building contexts and in the tradition of Socialist Realism itself.[70] This approach was followed not only in Russia but in many Soviet satellite states. For instance, it is to be found in the application of Polish building traditions and ornamentation at the Palace of Culture and Science (1952-1955) in Warsaw.[71] In China, the Museum of Chinese History and the Museum of Chinese Revolution were part of the previously mentioned Ten Great Buildings, a group of ten landmarks, which were scattered throughout Beijing. Each of these buildings incorporated a different style, reaching from neoclassicism even to modernist form, for the most part, however, including traditional Chinese features. The building program itself was modeled after the so-called "Seven Sisters" in Moscow, a program of originally eight buildings which changed the outline of the Russian capital dramatically during the Stalin Era.[72] In contrast to this program, which stressed the vertical line as an expression of the rising Soviet state, the

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69 Fahr-Becker, *Ostasiatische Kunst*, 244.

70 Aman, *Architecture and Ideology in Eastern Europe during the Stalin Era*, 4.

71 This building was a gift of Soviet Russia, executed with the help of Russian advisors and construction workers, and designed as a signpost of Soviet influence for many decades. Cf. Aman, *Architecture and Ideology in Eastern Europe during the Stalin Era*, 90.

72 The scheme originally encompassed eight high-rise buildings, marking the eight centuries of the city's history. cf. Peter Noever, ed., *Tyrannei des Schönen: Architektur der Stalin-Zeit* (Wien: Prestel, 1994), 151.

Figure 3. National Museum of China, details of the old and new roofline, courtesy of Ben McMillan, 2011

majority of the Ten Great Buildings including the museum building are horizontal in orientation. Therefore, the museum is not only in harmony with the Chinese architectural tradition of low-rise buildings, but blends especially well into the context of Tiananmen Square and its surroundings, particularly considering its proximity to the Imperial Palace. In addition, the monumental size of the museum, which was evocative of Socialist large-scale building practice, also recalled the dimensions of the Imperial Palaces in the vicinity of Tiananmen Square.

One prevailing feature of the façade is the use of yellow and green tiles articulating the eaves,[73] which readopt the yellow glazed roof tiles of the Forbidden City. These were applied not only for the museum architecture, but also as a unifying band joining the museum with the Great Hall of the People, and later, even the Chairman Mao Memorial Hall. The use of yellow glazed tiles is among the most prominent architectural

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73 *Beijing shida jianzhu sheji*, 166.

features of Tiananmen Square. The structuring of yellow and green tile cladding in zones, the application of various tiles imitating a coffered ceiling, and the use of wooden bracket-supports recalled the traditional *dougong* architecture [Figure 3].[74] Further examples of the union of Soviet style with Chinese design and local features are visible in numerous decorative details, such as the yellow tiles themselves, some of which were further enhanced with Socialist ornaments of bundles of grain and stars.[75]

The 1959 museum compound directly faces the Great Hall of the People, which was erected on the west side of Tiananmen Square with dimensions of 336 meters by 174 meters[76] and an overall floor space of 171,800 square meters encompassing a much larger scale than the museum. This discrepancy in size was historically rooted and politically intended: in October 1958, a draft version for the museum building was presented to Premier Zhou Enlai (1898-1976), who ordered that museum building could symmetrically mirror the Great Hall but should be smaller.[77] This statement ranks the museum second in importance after the Great Hall of the People. In summary, the museum building of 1959 was erected as part of an ensemble on Tiananmen Square, only secondary in importance, with the explicit goal of implementing the new Socialist design, which intentionally included some national forms as well as local building traditions.

## 2004 – Changing Faces

In the 2004 winning design by the architectural firm von Gerkan, Marg and Partners (gmp), the main façade was kept as required by the National

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[74] Ibid.

[75] Hung Chang-tai, “The Red Line,” 921.

[76] *Beijing shida jianzhu sheji*, 162.

[77] Wang Zhengming 王争鸣, ed., *Qiji shi zenyang chuangzao de—renmin dahuitang jianshe shihua*, 22.

Figure 4. West Façade, rendering of the winning design of 2004, courtesy of gmp 2004

Museum of China in the bidding. A new roof design represented the core feature of the exterior look [Figure 4]. This bronze-colored roof was now to span the entire building. From the outside, the old and the new structures were only to be connected by a translucent glass front, giving a light impression of a freely hovering roof. Inside, the ceiling was to be supported by twelve monumental pillars. The color scheme of gold glimmering bronze panels for the free floating roof and monumental pillars from natural red stone[78] was purposefully chosen in reminiscence of Chinese building traditions and to enhance the local form. Although this selection seems to continue the former structure, with the design of the 1959 façade being kept, the 2004 blueprint can nevertheless be described as an addition, purposefully contrasting with the former style. This impression is well grounded on the dominance of the applied color scheme, the use of modern building material, and the introduction of glass and steel architecture. Therefore, the 2004 design presents a combination of reinforced traditions and modernity and can be labeled as a "counterpoint design"[79] to the surrounding architecture.

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78 "Peking / Die Hamburger Architekten von Gerkan, Marg und Partner bauen Chinas neues Nationalmuseum" [Beijing / The Hamburg based architects von Gerkan, Marg und Partners built China's new National Museum]. Rheinischer Merkur, Nr. 45 (November 4, 2004); www.merkur.de/archiv/neu/rm_0445/ku/ku_044501-html (accessed November 30, 2004).

79 Marc Treib, "Adding on," in *A Modernist Museum in Perspective: The East Building, National*

Although the design was already chosen, a reevaluation of the project from the governmental side, including a change in the museum leadership, led to the refusal of the design in 2005. One of the major reasons given for the rejection of the approved design was the client's concern that the new roof structure would devalue the 1959 façade.[80] It was exchanged for a more harmonious solution, a design which retreats in favor of the existing situation, a somewhat "silent approach."[81]

## 2011 – More than a Facelift?

In the 2011 executed design, the museum is divided into two main blocks: a reinforced U-shaped structure from 1959 facing Tiananmen Square and embracing a new, rectangular block on three sides. It is only to the east that the façade of the new core is visible, protruding beyond the northern and southern façades of the U-shaped building. The so-called "existing envelope"[82] underwent considerable restoration and reinforcement procedures; however, the façade remained unchanged. The extended building runs 330 meters from north to south, fronting the Square, and 204 meters west to east along Chang'an East Road. The façade of the new building repeats the original structure with a simple, unornamented design. A newly implemented, staggered roof design crowns the building ascending from 26.5 meters at the eave along the front façade to forty-two meters at the center of the new structure [Figure 5]. The new roof design gives structure to the fairly massive, more or less solid building block, at

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*Gallery of Art*, ed. Anthony Alofsin (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), 152.

80 Interview, Stephan Schütz, architectural design, gmp, Berlin, June, 2, 2006. For further reference regarding the criticism of the proposal and the preservation of the original façade, see Lü Zhangshen 吕章申, *Zhongguo bowuguan jianzhu sheji fang'an tu ji* 中国国家博物馆建筑设计方案图集 [Collection of Architectural Design of the National Museum of China] (Beijing: Zhongguo jianzhu gongye chubanshe 中国建筑工业出版社, 2012).

81 Treib, "Adding on," 152.

82 Interview, Stephan Schütz, architectural design, gmp, Berlin, January 12, 2010.

Figure 5. The restored west façade with the staggered roof of the new building, courtesy of Christian Gahl 2011

the same time lending it a somewhat lighter appearance. The yellow and green tiles on the eaves of the original façade were retained. On added roof lines, slightly curved bronze-colored metal plates clad the overhanging eaves, carried by an abstracted, minimized Chinese *dougong* system in white.

The increased elevation of the roof line to forty-two meters changed the outline of the museum to a considerable extent and with it the impression of the square. It helped to balance out the shortcomings of the former design, in that the discrepancy between the height of the Great Hall of the People (forty-six meters) and the museum was harmonized. The remaining four-meter difference preserves the original intention of a "perspective of importance" implemented in the 1959 design of the buildings. Furthermore, the elevated roof line obscures the roof of the Ministry of State Security at the rear of the National Museum, which had disturbed the view from Tiananmen Square for decades. In 2004, the architects had already considered the necessity of raising the height of the museum in order to compensate for the imbalance of the various buildings at the Square. In reviewing the 2004 design, the architect of the former Museum of Chinese History and of the Museum of Chinese Revolution of 1959, Zhang Kaiji (1912-2006), admitted that the adjustment in size would create a more harmonious look with the ensemble of the Great Hall of the People.[83]

The staggered roofline including several interconnected roofs is one of the most prominent features of the new façade. By breaking up the flat, austere single-roof structure and introducing a multifaceted roof landscape, a softer contour was created, echoing traditional forms of Chinese roof shapes. From afar, the ornamentation of the old and the new roof lines seem quite similar. However, instead of yellow glazed tiles, which were originally requested by the client,[84] the new architectural forms were enhanced with bronze-colored metal plates. The addition of roof lines not only creates an important visual feature for the museum itself, but it also lays strong ties with the surrounding buildings at Tiananmen Square, all of which use the yellow tile design for their eaves. Again, the repetition of former style elements, originally implemented to enhance the Chinese characteristics as well as the local form, can be found throughout the entire façade of the new building construct. The combination of pillars, entablature, and yellow glazed tiles of the main gate was intended, in 1959 as well as in 2011, to recall traditional Chinese palace architecture [see Figure 3, above].

The contemporary style of 2011 lent the impression of a sober, unornamented, universal look. From the far side of Tiananmen Square, the new design is almost indistinguishable, fitting in with the former structure. Only as one approaches the museum can the unornamented new style be clearly differentiated from the previous architecture of 1959, and it even seems to dominate the original form—an effect both intended and considered necessary by the architects. The changes can be viewed as an

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83 CCTV Interview, September 13, 2004. Xinhuanet.com: zhongyang dianshitai xinwenhui keting 9 yue 13 ri bochule guojiabowuguo jiekai shenmi miansha 中央电视台新闻会客厅9月13日播出了国家博物馆揭开神秘面纱 [CCTV news room aired on September 13, the National Museum unveiled]. Interview with Gao Congli, director of the National Museum of China; Meinhard von Gerkan, gmp; Xiu Long, director of the China Academy of Building Research. Translated by the author.

84 Interview, Stephan Schütz, architectural design, gmp, Berlin, June 2, 2006.

**Figure 6.** National Museum of China, north façade, statue of Confucius, February 2011

improvement and as maintaining continuity in form, solving the shortcomings of the former design, creating a more monumental, but nevertheless restrained appearance. In this respect, the new façade was more than a facelift; it was also a subtle adaptation to contemporary times.

The short-lived erection of a 7.9 meter tall sculpture of Confucius in front of the north entrance of the museum in January 2011 was, as stated by director Lü Zhangshen, aimed to fill a void in the outer appearance of the museum following a Western tradition of placing sculptures in front of the museum entrance [Figure 6]. With its monumental form, static posture, and rough finish imitating the texture of carved wood or stone, the bronze sculpture suits the design of the façade, as intended by the sculptor Wu Weishan (b. 1962). The choice for Confucius, however, has to be seen as a bold move in the revival of China's most famous philosopher, who in the past was dismissed and criticized by Mao Zedong. Its unexpected overnight removal, only three months later, must be interpreted as a sign of the enduring controversy in the CCP-leadership regarding the approach to the heritage of Confucius.[85]

In summary, in all three façades of 1959, 2004, and 2011 the adaptation to international, Chinese, and local forms played an important role for the choices in design and for the understanding of the architecture as identity creating measure, however with different implementations. Although being an integrated part of the newly shaped Tiananmen Square and planned in accordance to it, the 1959 design introduced a new style mix creating a symbol for the recently established People's Republic of China. In the 2004 counterpoint approach, a statement for change was also included, making a clear distinction between the old and new façade without neglecting the former architecture. Due to the reevaluation of the project from the governmental side, this somewhat courageous approached was reversed. The executed 2011 design continues the original form most harmoniously and is in tune with the local setting. The façade was carefully amended to the local situation of Tiananmen Square, in 1959 as well as in 2011. In both cases, it was the client's aim to shape the first impression of the observer. The inner design of the building, however, called for a different approach.

## The Interior Design

The interior design of the building could develop more independently from its symbolic surroundings. On the one hand, a considerable amount of freedom was claimed in the search for an appropriate form; on the other hand, functional necessities such as the guidance of visitor streams, display facilities, and safety and security measures played an important role in structuring the building. I will provide a short overview of the inner structure of the 1959 original museum, of the 2004 planned design

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[85] For further reference, see Anne Hennings, "The National Museum of China: Building Memory, Shaping History, and Presenting Identity" (Doctoral dissertation, University of Heidelberg, 2013), 95-96.

and the executed architecture of 2011. Thereafter, the museum's gallery space and the main entrance hall, which provides the primary access to the museum and which serves a significant structuring function, are described.

## 1959 – Welcoming the New Nation

In the 1959 building, the Museum of Chinese History was located in the south wing and the Museum of Chinese Revolution in the north wing, each encircling a separate rectangular courtyard. The building had the capacity to accommodate 10,000 people within 65,152 square meters.[86] The gallery space of 23,472 square meters was equally distributed among the museums on the north and south wings, occupying the first and second floors.[87] In addition to the two wings, the structure included a main access building, a reception hall with a total floor space of 1,390 square meters, and a meeting hall with the capacity to accommodate 700 people in the center of the compound. Both museums were accessed via the main entrance gate by crossing the main courtyard, ascending an external staircase, and entering the lobby of the shared entrance at the center of the compound.

Although the clients could have chosen an interior design unrelated to the exterior, the 2011 design creates a sophisticated response to the original appearance of the building. In the 1959 design, in addition to a coffered ceiling, red marble pillars structured the relatively undersized hall in square sections [Figure 7]. This design shows similarities not only to Chinese interior divisions, but also to the stairwell of the Russian State Library (former Lenin Library, completed 1941) in Moscow, as well as to

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86 *Beijing shida jianzhu*, 166.

87 For the numbering of the floors, the author adopted the system of "ground level," "first level," and "second level," which was deployed by the National Museum of China for the publication of their floor plans. Cf. Lü Zhangshen, *Zhongguo bowuguan jianzhu sheji fang an tu ji*, 16-17.

Figure 7. Entrance hall of the original building of 1959, courtesy of Wang Yi 2007

the Great Hall of the People and the Military Museum, which were both erected in 1959 as part of the "Ten Great Buildings" program. The extensive use of white, and the sequencing of square shapes, marble floors, and pillars, which can be encountered in the main entrance hall as well as throughout the museum, resembled key characteristics of the Soviet building tradition. The galleries were distinguished by the alternation of pillars and monumental, floor-to-ceiling windows, also common to Soviet architectural style. These windows, however, proved unsuitable for displaying works of art. On the one hand, they allowed only limited wall space for the installation of artifacts such as paintings, illustrations, and three-dimensional objects. On the other hand, the exposure to too much light also constituted a real danger for the preservation of the majority of exhibits. The regulation of light quantity, which is necessary for reasons of conservation, becomes extremely difficult when relying on natural sources. In addition, varying natural light can hinder the visitor's view of the objects. As a result, curtains were installed on many galleries and would remain permanently drawn. Furthermore, specially built display panels were installed in front of the lower portions of some galleries.

The structuring units of the coffered ceiling in connection with the marble pillars in the entrance hall can also be read as reminiscent of traditional Chinese palaces architecture. The introduction of red pillars to the entrance hall is an especially clear reflection of traditional palace architecture. In addition, the illusion of an open wood structured ceiling is continued into the galleries. As with the exterior design, Chinese building traditions were also integrated into the interior. Yet, this particular use is limited to only a few significant features.

The construction of the 1959 building included a comprehensive program, which encompassed the commissioning of history painting and sculptures to be displayed in the History and Revolutionary Museum as well as in the Military Museum and the Great Hall of People.[88] These artworks would illustrate important events and specific turning points of Chinese history, such as uprisings, combat, conventions, and decision making events, and would help to establish a specific historical outlook legitimizing the party's access to power. To implement this program, the Ministry of Culture held a conference in 1958 consulting artists and architects regarding how to depict the ancient traditions and culture and how to establish an artistic program that could reflect the current situation of the people.[89] The model for this approach was again provided by Soviet Russia. Material, themes, and schemes of the oil paintings originated in the nineteenth century French tradition of history painting in the revolutionary and heroic style, for example, that of Jacques-Louis David, and were primarily transmitted via the artistic practice of Soviet Russia.[90]

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88 Andrews, "Painters and Politics in the People's Republic of China, 1949-1979," 227.

89 Ibid.

90 Denton, "Visual Memory and the Construction of a Revolutionary Past," 206; Andrews, "Painters and Politics in the People's Republic of China, 1949-1979," 236 ff.

A copy of "Lenin Proclaiming the Founding of the Soviet Government" of 1947 by Vladimir Serov (1910-1968), included in the display of the Museum of Chinese Revolution in 1961, portrayed the establishment of Communism in Russia. Style, material, and content of this work were prefiguration models for Chinese history paintings. The first series of oil paintings of this program was predominantly executed by Chinese artists who were influenced by or even trained in Russia.[91] Nevertheless, these images incorporated many elements of traditional Chinese painting, for example, to be encountered in Dong Xiwen's "Founding Ceremony of the Nation" of 1953. Here the artist applied a scheme of pure colors and introduced Chinese patterns in reminiscence of traditional Chinese New Year's paintings.[92] This picture, featuring Mao Zedong's proclamation of the People's Republic of China, formed a climax of the display of the Museum of Chinese Revolution. Just like the other paintings and sculptures of the program, this painting was incorporated in the chronological display enhancing the exhibition galleries and adding to a story line which emphasized the historic success of the People's Republic of China.

The incorporated design program makes it clear, even with the limited planning time, how sophisticated and detailed the interior design program was staged, serving as an expression of New China. Just like the exterior design, the 1959 interior design incorporated international, local, and Chinese forms, amending the form to reflect the will to display the legacy of the People's Republic of China.

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91 Andrews, "Painters and Politics in the People's Republic of China, 1949-1979," 238.

92 Feng Linggang, Description of the painting "The Founding Ceremony," The National Museum of China, http://www.chnmuseum.cn/english/tabid/549/Default.aspx?AntiqueLanguageID=2421 (accessed October 20, 2012).

## 2004 – Planning “A Public Square”

The substantial addition of gallery space as well as the enlargement of the entrance building constituted the major tasks in the redesigning of the museum in 2004. The necessary alterations of the main building part were described as follows:

> The current building offers generosity and dignity by the building’s high colonnades but at the same time it lacks openness and transparency inside, because it is blocked by the central entrance building.[93]

The German architects criticized the pristine entrance hall as separating the two U-shaped museum sections from one another. The replacement of this former core in order to gain the necessary floor space and correct an “unsuitable” solution for the National Museum of China was a crucial element in the decision of architects, institutional managers, and political leaders. More than one-half of the eleven bidding participants to this project, including the three finalists, took the same step towards changing the former core design by incorporating a light glass and steel architecture in the new central building. In their winning design [Figure 8], the architects from von Gerkan, Marg and Partners (gmp) focused on the replacement of the inner building, as well. The main concept was to integrate a central hall covering the entire core of the former building, which would have been even larger than the hall which was finally implemented in 2011. Twelve monumental red pillars would have carried the roof which was designed to give a free-floating impression. Light was to be channeled through the newly designed glass walls and floor

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93 Gmp 2004. “The National Museum of China: design proposal 2004,” Gmp Public Relations and Communication, Hamburg 2004; Gmp 2011, National Museum of China, Beijing, brochure from the architects von Gerkan, Marg and Partners (gmp), Public Relations and Communication. Hamburg, n. p.



**Figure 8.** Grand Forum, winning design of 2004, rendering, courtesy of gmp 2004

openings from the second story to the central hall.

The plan of the architects with their "human-orientated concept of the museum" was to create a forum which would function as a "public square," not only enabling access to the exhibition galleries but also inviting people from all walks of life to stay, even after museum opening hours.[94] Similar to the entrance hall in the Centre Pompidou in Paris (by Renzo Piano and Richard Rogers, 1977), which was at that time praised for its sense of welcoming openness,[95] the entrance hall was to serve as a central meeting point, offering a cafeteria, neighboring gardens, ticket counters, and information counters. Furthermore, it was to allow visitors a first glance into the galleries on the upper levels. The visitor could then reach the exhibition galleries via steep, airy, free-spanning escalators and elevators integrated into the supporting pillars.

The 2004 blueprint made an obvious argument for contemporary design and the use of Chinese building characteristics: The application of twelve red, monumental pillars carrying a cantilevered roof, the abundant

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94 CCTV Interview, September 13, 2004.

95 Victoria Newhouse, "Pei, Painting and Sculpture: The Perception of Art in the East Building," in *A Modernist Museum in Perspective: The East Building, National Gallery of Art*, ed. Anthony Alofsin (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009), 65-79.

use of a traditional Chinese red color scheme, and a bronze-colored roof were adopted as references to Chinese palatial architecture.[96] At the same time, the light glass and steel structure, the giant ceiling hovering above, the free-swinging escalators, and even the application of abstracted Chinese features in large scale such as pillars and roof design gave the building a contemporary look. Even more, the ground-breaking idea of the open public square, first implemented at the Centre Pompidou, should be considered as an equalizing, non-hierarchical approach in international museum design.

In 2004, an extension of the exhibition space from ca. 24,000 square meters to 58,000 square meters was targeted. The museum demanded that the new gallery space should be equally distributed between the exhibitions of the former Museum of Chinese History and the Museum of Chinese Revolution.[97] The architects considered a primarily administrative function for the former galleries of the original building, in order to avoid the difficult transformation of the facilities to contemporary exhibition space, which had to fulfill modern requirements and museum standards. In the restored historical wings, only temporary exhibitions including international loan exhibitions and Chinese painting galleries were envisaged. The majority of the exhibition halls were to be situated in the new core building, in the basement and above the major access hall in the west, the so-called Grand Forum.[98]

A preliminary exhibition plan foresaw theme exhibitions featuring groups of archeological objects such as jade, bronze, and earthenware in the basement. They would be displayed in a cave-like setting which was artificially illuminated to allow visitors' eyes to focus on the artifacts. To

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96 CCTV Interview, September 13, 2004.

97 Interview, Stephan Schütz, architectural design, gmp, Berlin, June 2, 2006.

98 The term "Grand Forum" for the main access hall was created by the German architects during the planning process. Officially, it acquired the name West Hall (Xi Da Ting) by the National Museum of China.

achieve the allusion of archaeological excavation sites, the German architects had the idea of presenting some exhibits in display cases buried in the floor.[99] On the level above the Grand Forum, an exhibition entitled "A Path through Chinese History" was planned, integrating the original sites of Tiananmen Square and the Forbidden City via an observation terrace within the exhibition tour.[100] Just as the Great Hall of the People dedicates one hall to each Chinese province, in an early stage curators also suggested establishing thirty-three exhibition halls to represent the Chinese provinces and their artifacts as well as a permanent gallery for The Palace Museum.

However, the approved design of 2004 with the intention to create a "museum for the nation" rather than a "museum of the nation" was never implemented. Despite the positive feedback from the jury, which had selected the design, praising the plausibility of the overall design concept, other experts in the field of architecture expressed criticism. Due to the changing atmosphere, namely the rising criticism on the practice of international architects in Beijing which had emerged in the controversy related to the building of the National Grand Theater, just a few steps away from the National Museum, the government withdrew its approval to gmp design. The scheduled rotational change in museum leadership in 2005 further increased its influence on the actual design plans. The government intentionally chose Lü Zhangshen, an architect by training, as the new director. Under his leadership, the large public hall was regarded unsuitable, possibly jeopardizing the representative character and dignity of the National Museum of China; concomitantly, an open hall for unrestricted public access was no longer desired.[101]

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99 "Peking: Die Hamburger Architekten von Gerkan, Marg und Partner bauen Chinas neues Nationalmuseum." *Rheinischer Merkur*, Nr. 45 (November 4, 2004), www.merkur.de/archiv/neu/rm_0445/ku/ku_044501-html (accessed November 30, 2011).

100 Gmp, "The National Museum of China: design proposal 2004." n. p.

101 Interview, Stephan Schütz, architectural design, gmp, Berlin, January 19, 2006.

## 2011 – A New Level of Grandeur

The 2011 design saw a further extension of the total floor space to 191,900 square meters. To allow for the tripling of museum space, the internal building structure was changed entirely. The new museum currently extends over two underground and five aboveground levels. From the main gate, a front courtyard leads to the central hall in the east and courtyards to the north and south [Figure 9]. The central hall, the so-called Grand Forum [Figure 10], represents the new core of the interior, creating shared access to the different areas of the museum. The historical north wing houses the permanent exhibition of the former Museum of Chinese Revolution now entitled “Road of Rejuvenation” which occupies over 6,000 square meters on two levels, as well as administration units on the first floor and in the basement. The south wing accommodates administration, logistics and technical units, a canteen, and a library on five floors. To the east, the new extension contains the



**Figure 9.** Floor plan (entrance level) of the reconstructed building of 2011, courtesy of gmp 2011

Figure 10. Grand Forum, courtesy of Christian Gahl 2011

majority of the exhibition space, including the permanent exhibitions of the former Museum of Chinese History, named Ancient China, displayed over 9,450 square meters, as well as making room for a theater, a cinema, and a broadcasting hall in the basement, a central reception hall surrounded by four VIP-rooms in Chinese style on the ground floor, and a banquet hall and a roof terrace on the top level. The two courtyards of the former building remain, even if scaled-down to one-third of their original size giving the building a denser, statelier character.

The Grand Forum forms the centerpiece of the new architecture, appearing in a somewhat classical, articulated design. One of the main features is its size stretching 260 meters by 34 meters from north to south and covering a total floor space of 8,840 square meters. Thereby the hall surpasses the size of the Tate Modern Turbine Hall by more than 50 per cent. From the center of the hall, two monumental staircases ascend evenly in opposing directions, leading to a spacious open gallery on the second floor. Four monumental pillars in each corner of the central entrance area of the Grand Forum accommodate elevators that allow access to the top floor. The main building materials used throughout the new museum are Chinese granite, cherry wood, glass, and iron-colored steel. The western wall of the Grand Forum consists of a slender pillar structure with monumental window panes in steel frames. The decorative grille-work of the light-vent, incorporated into the heavy cast-bronze door, resembles traditional window shutters and casts ornamental shadows onto the floor.[102] A white, coffered ceiling 27 meters high with square *oculi* seals the central hall. Local hand-sorted light-colored granite is used for the floor, the staircase, the gallery, walls, and pillars. The walls on the second floor are covered with panels made of cherry wood.

In the central hall, the segmentation of building units, the application of a coffered ceiling, as well as the use of pillars are reminiscent of traditional Chinese wood architecture, already visible in the original design. The famous architect Liang Sicheng, in his accounts on Chinese architectural history, identifies a three-part building outline with podium, main body, and pitched roof as being typical of Chinese building practices for exterior design. In 2011, a three-part Chinese building structure with a stone base, wooden center, and coffered ceiling was also introduced by the architects for the inner design of the Grand Forum.[103] Furthermore, the coffered ceiling, with its enormous dimensions, evolved as the dominant feature of the Grand Forum. The application of black cherry wood paneling recalls the use of traditional building materials. In general, the 2011 design of the Grand Forum refers to Chinese building traditions in subtle ways. However, the references seem more sophisticated than in either the 2004 design or even than in the original building.

Although the interior design could have evolved without taking the surroundings into account, the 2011 design nevertheless responds

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102 Gmp, "National Museum of China, Beijing," n. p.

103 Ibid.

**Figure 11.** Central relief and bronze cast doors, courtesy of Cheng Qin 2011

sensitively to the original appearance of the building. It incorporates the original form into the new look by using a similar materiality, retaining the monumental windows and pillars as well as the color white, and by introducing the coffered ceiling as a main feature, all seeming integral to the design. The western wall of the Grand Forum with its window front and slender pillars recalls the main gate of 1959. Numerous features including the use of materials, the aforementioned design of the western wall, and even its monumental size seem to better correlate with the outer appearance of the museum than they did in the former entrance hall of 1959.

On the central axis immediately facing the main entrance, a giant relief 36 meters wide remains the only illustration in the hall [Figure 11]. It depicts the story of Yu Gong and his sons, who legendarily worked together to remove mountains from their doorstep. This relief was modeled after the famous painting “The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains” of 1940 by the French-trained artist Xu Beihong (1895-1943), originally painted as a metaphor of China’s apparently impossible struggle during the war against Japan.[104] In his concluding speech of the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in June 1945, Mao Zedong also referred to this story, identifying the two mountains blocking the path as feudalism and capitalism, which needed to be removed by the Chinese people.[105]

The director-general of the museum, Lü Zhangshen, chose the motif of the relief,[106] which remains the only pictorial decoration in the hall, replacing earlier depictions of leading socialist figures, namely Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao, which were previously placed in the entrance hall.[107] This illustration conveys a message on the timeless value of the Chinese people's sense of perseverance and cooperation, enabling the achievement of the impossible.

For a Chinese governmental institution, the reception of official guests represents an important aspect of its responsibilities. Consequently, the provision of reception halls of sufficient size and quantity had already been of major importance for the original design of the museum, but became especially so for its redesign. In 2011, the National Museum of China provided various venues for receiving guests, predominantly incorporating the same style implemented in the design of the Grand Forum. In addition, a small number of VIP-venues are designed in richly ornamented Chinese style, one of them even referring specifically to the museum collection by applying the bronze inscription of the "Da Yu Ding" bronze vessel to the wall. This inscription of 291 characters records

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104 The painting is currently located in the central hall together with other famous paintings of New China. Cf. Sonia Kolesnikov-Jessop, (accessed October 30, 2012); Andrews, "Painters and Politics in the People's Republic of China, 1949-1979," 32.

105 Mao Zedong, Concluding Speech of the 17th National Congress of the CCP, June 11, 1945, http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-3/mswv3_26.htm (accessed October 30, 2012).

106 Interview, Stephan Schütz, architectural design, gmp, Berlin, October 26, 2009.

107 Hung Chang-tai, "The Red Line," 921.

the enfeoffment deed of minister Yu by King Kang of Zhou[108] and represents an important legacy of the Chinese calligraphic tradition. From this inscription of nineteen lines only eleven lines were partially quoted on the wall installation, thus stressing the importance of the calligraphy over the actual contents of the inscription.[109] The very same inscription is also applied as a recurrent cover design of all museum catalogues, creating a corporate identity by using the masterpieces of the collection. The idea of designing rooms in a Chinese national style brings to mind the concept of the Great Hall of the People, where for every province a hall was decorated in its own distinguished style, serving as a means of cultural identification. With the introduction of the additional VIP venues, the reception of guests, which is grounded deeply in the Chinese society and culture, can take place in a Chinese setting within the modern National Museum of China. The application of traditional artistic forms for the interior decoration of the VIP-venues parallels the adoption of traditional architectural form for the façade of the building.

The new museum accommodates forty-nine exhibition galleries with an overall exhibition space of approximately 65,000 square meters.[110] The design as carried through in 2011 afforded for a more flexible, universal design of the exhibition space as that originally planned in 2004. The exhibition "The Road of Rejuvenation" returned to its original venue in the historical north wing and the Ancient China exhibition was installed in the basement, allowing for adjustable use of the other exhibition halls for theme exhibitions (jade, bronze, painting galleries), temporary exhibitions (Chinese painting galleries) and international loan exhibitions. In the

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108 *Exhibition of Chinese History*, National Museum of Chinese History, comp. (Beijing: National Museum of Chinese History, 1998), 46.

109 Traditionally bronze inscriptions are linked to the legitimization of the ruler, and in this particular case it is documenting the emperor rewarding his minister Yu for his loyal services. Thanks to John Finlay, who made the suggestion that the application of an inscription in the VIP-room might therefore fulfil some admonition function to all VIPs to faithfully serve the state.

110 Gmp, "National Museum of China, Beijing," n. p.

**Figure 12.** Road of Rejuvenation, Tiananmen Gate installation with uncovered window and a copy of Dong Xiwen's famous "Founding Ceremony of the Nation"

galleries of the restored building, as before, the problematic monumental windows are closed and covered by the exhibition architecture of the Road of Rejuvenation display. Only one window, which faces Tiananmen Square to the west, remains uncovered. It serves to incorporate the view of the square into the exhibition itself, providing an authentic backdrop for the display illustrating the founding of New China and its proclamation from the height of Tiananmen Gate on October 1, 1949. As in previous displays, this event forms the climax of the exhibition, depicting a copy of Dong Xiwen's "Founding Ceremony of the Nation," and the original microphone on which Mao Zedong announced the Foundation of Communist China, all embedded in a replica of the original Tiananmen Gate [Figure 12]. The connection of authentic artifacts contained within a remodeled set juxtaposed against the view of the original site provides a new level of awareness within the visitor, or even individual identification, with the display of recent history of the People's

Republic of China.

In the new display of the exhibition "The Road of Rejuvenation," the original set of sculptures and history paintings which had enhanced this display for more than fifty years, was restructured. In contrast, the Ancient China exhibition refrains from the original program, only including a sculpture of the Beijing Man but no history paintings in its display. The majority of the artworks originally commissioned for the founding of the museum in 1959 were integrated in the Masterpiece Exhibition at the Central Hall in 2011, as they have become the most recognized paintings of modern China and the icons of Chinese history. Here they are displayed as "works of art" in a gallery setting following the classic academic tradition. This clearly indicates a change of focus from the narrative and documentary function they served in the previous exhibitions in order to emphasize the iconic value of the object. This development demonstrates the new museum policy to now serve as both a history *and* an art museum.

When indispensable to the history display of the Road of Rejuvenation, reproductions of these classical paintings are presented such as Dong Xiwen's "Founding Ceremony of the Nation" (1953), which is prominently displayed in the installation of Tiananmen Square, as discussed above. In addition, new sculptures and paintings were commissioned to illustrate recent events for the current Road of Rejuvenation exhibition thus pursuing the former policy of the museum. These artworks continued to be executed in an overly dramatic manner and with a narrative content, which in some cases are hardly distinguishable from the works of the former program.[111] The painting "Capitulation of Japan to China in Nanjing on September 9, 1945" (2003) by Chen Jian (b. 1951), for example, is executed with a photo-realistic style, but the composition follows the former history painting tradition.

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111 Andrews, "Painters and Politics in the People's Republic of China, 1949-1979," 238.

**Figure 13.** "Flesh and Blood Great Wall" by Ye Yushan at the Road of Rejuvenation exhibition

The majority of the sculptures were designed for the first reopening of the exhibition in 2009,[112] the most impressive being "Flesh and Blood Great Wall" (2009) by Ye Yushan (b. 1935) [Figure 13]. This bronze sculpture is an interpretation of the sculpture with the same title by Hou Yimin (b. 1930) executed for the so-called Modern China exhibition in 1989, and now displayed in the south courtyard of the museum. Compared to the 1989 classical relief style, the 2009 interpretation saw a return to the exaggerated and dramatic forms applied in sculpture as demonstrated by the statues in front of the Chairman Mao Memorial Hall, which were established in a mutual effort by over 100 sculptors in 1976 and depict the revolutionary history of the Chinese people.

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112 In October 2009, the reinforced north wing of the museum briefly opened to the public with the exhibition entitled "Road of Rejuvenation." Only a few weeks later it was closed again for necessary amendments. From then on, parts of the museum were always kept open, until March 1, 2011, when the entire museum building opened to the public.

In summary, the interior design of 1959 incorporated local, Chinese, and international forms, which can also be found in the selected design of 2004 as well as in the implemented design of 2011. The grandeur of the museum was expressed in the design of the Grand Forum. Although the Grand Forum evolved more independently from the original form of 1959, the blueprint nevertheless developed from a "counterpoint approach" in 2004, stressing the idea of a public square within the museum, leading to a much more restrained yet monumental outcome in 2011. The exhibition halls were designed according to the latest international technical standards, while with the VIP venues in Chinese style special requirements for the National Museum of China were met. Although the original sculpture and oil painting program was continued, it was only to be implemented for the Road of Rejuvenation exhibition.[113]

## Conclusion

The National Museum of China is a showcase of Chinese culture and identity. Its building, located at the heart of China and its capital, on the east side of Tiananmen Square, represents an object of display in its own right. With the construction of the Museum of Chinese History and the Museum of Chinese Revolution in 1959, the newly erected building took up a vital position to officially represent the new political order, emerging as part of the newly established political center on the square. With the comprehensive reconstruction project launched at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the National Museum of China has evolved into a new entity. The architectural solutions of 1959, as well as those of 2011, were developed in accordance with the specific conventions of their time, displaying characteristics that spanned international, Chinese, and local

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113 Due to the scope of the article, the new exhibition design cannot be discussed in detail. For further reference, see Hennings, "The National Museum of China: Building Memory, Shaping History, and Presenting Identity."

forms. In this paper, I have compared the form of the original 1959 building with the intermediate and unrealized 2004 design and the implemented 2011 structure, considering the decisions underlying these choices and their consequences. The external design was examined on the basis of the analysis of the façade, while the interior design was considered on the basis of the distribution of gallery space and the design of the Grand Forum.

It has been made clear that the location of the museum, which the Chinese government decided in 1959 to be Tiananmen Square, was of vital importance for the development of the museum design. In 2011, the same setting played an essential role for the redesigning of the museum, which became evident in the failed implementation of the "counterpoint design" of 2004 and in the alteration of this design towards an approach more in harmony with the form of the original museum.

For the exterior design of 1959, the setting and the application of the local, Chinese, and international forms played a major role in integrating the building in the newly designed political center of Tiananmen Square which shifted the cultural and political center of the nation from the Imperial Palace. The 2004 design was more attuned to international styles while at the same time satisfying the requirements of keeping the design of the original façade largely untouched. The final design implementation of 2011 maintained the references to local, Chinese, and international features, and even further enhanced the Chinese and local style. The result was a more sophisticated look, to which the unornamented modernist forms of the new building parts became subordinate. All this served to develop an outer façade still in tune with the original 1959 design and with the local setting, but resolving the shortcomings of the former structure, such as an inadequate building height in relation to the other structures on Tiananmen Square. Even the enormous size of the museum, designed to be the largest museum in the world, remains obscured by the harmonious blending of the exterior design into Tiananmen Square.

Although this continuity of form also prevails in the interior, more freedom was applied in the employment of modern elements and in the design of a state-of-the-art, functional museum building. The exhibition halls fulfill international museum standards and are designed as exceptionally flexible, neutral containers. Reception halls, by contrast, designed in Chinese style, pay tribute to Chinese culture and represent an important addition to the national museum. In the Grand Forum, the imposing size of the museum becomes immediately visible to the visitor. This museum developed from an independent glass and steel design of 2004 to a more conservative and monumental approach, which is in tune with the original design of 1959. The 2004 idea of an openly accessible public square within the museum had to make way for a much more restrained and dignified design in 2011. However, the idea of a lively square returned in the assignment of the Grand Forum as temporary exhibition space. The initial 2004 idea of an openly accessible public square within the museum, considered too mundane, had to make way for a much more restrained and "dignified" design in 2011. However, the mundane idea of a lively square returned in the occasional use of the Grand Forum as temporary exhibition space.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the National Museum of China had undergone great changes. In order to correspond with the "dynamic development of China,"[114] the museum tripled in size, presenting itself as the largest museum building in the world. The process of finding the right design, however, was a long and ongoing effort negotiated between architectural and political needs. The choices polarized between a traditional and a contemporary approach, and between the interior revision and exterior presentation of the institution. It finally evolved from a counterpoint design to a design conceived to be more harmonious and responding to the representational needs of stately

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114 "Wettbewerbsaufgabe" [Specifications of the competition], in *Gmp wettbewerb aktuell* 12/2004. Gmp Public Relations and Communication (Hamburg, gmp: 2004), 29.

power embodied by its symbolic location. In the implemented design the interior and the exterior of the building express a clear statement favoring the continuity of the original form; yet they do not repudiate modern architecture elements. The message this redesigned memorial of the People's Republic of China conveys is of continuity and stability, and of the selection of a modernization process which nevertheless does not present any clear break with former interpretations of the Chinese past. The removal of the Confucius statue from the north gate of the museum is a graphic example of the return to this conservative approach. However, the statue's initial placement shows that an intense debate regarding the interpretation of the past has taken place.

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Duan Gate 端门

Hall of Military Glory Wuyingdian 武英殿

Hou Yimin 侯一民 (b. 1930)

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Liang Sicheng 梁思成 (1901-1972)

Mao Zedong 毛泽东 (1893-1976)

Meridian Gate 午门

Ministry of Culture of the People's Republic of China 中华人民共和国文化部

National Development and Reform Commission 中华人民共和国国家发展和改革委员会

National Museum of China 中国国家博物馆

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# Asianism after Asianism: Rōyama Masamichi and the Making of a Postwar Asian Order

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## Asianism after Asianism: Rōyama Masamichi and the Making of a Postwar Asian Order

During the tumultuous early years of the Cold War, Japanese intellectuals and bureaucrats produced various Asianist thinking and discourses. Many of these intellectuals were social scientists who had advocated the East Asian Community (J. *Tōa kyōdōtai*, 東亜協同体) during the wartime period of 1931 to 1945. Rōyama Masamichi was one of the leading social scientists who developed postwar Asian regional discourses in the 1950s, and much of his Cold War Asianist thinking came from economic development-oriented wartime Pan-Asianism. He called for the Japanese government to actively intervene in government-led economic development plans in Southeast Asian countries, most of which were Japan's former colonies. At the same time, Rōyama and like-minded social scientists aimed to promote Japan's position in a United States-led Cold War Asian order. Their involvement in the making of a Japan-led colonial empire during the wartime period continued to influence Japan's postwar encounter with Asia.

Keywords: The East Asian Community, Rōyama Masamichi, democratic socialism, Asian economic development, Cold War, nationalism in developing countries

# Asianism after Asianism: Rōyama Masamichi and the Making of a Postwar Asian Order

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Scholars of Japanese studies tend to argue that memory of the imperial past prevented Japanese intellectuals from developing Asian discourses in postwar Japan. This line of thinking is often linked to another observation, that in the 1950s and 1960s an Asianist perspective only received the attention of progressive Japanese intellectuals who aimed to promote pacifism and non-Western solidarity in the rapidly changing Cold War order. On the other hand, it is widely accepted that conservative Japanese bureaucrats and intellectuals faithfully accepted the American security system and did not develop any Asian discourses of their own. This binary approach, however, needs to be reexamined since a wide range of Japanese intellectuals—progressive, liberal, and conservative—continued to produce their own versions of Asian regionalist ideas as early as the 1950s.

Based on these observations, this article explores how Asian regionalist discourses continued to influence Japanese academia as well as Japan's encounter with a decolonized Asia. In doing so, this study pays special attention to how wartime Asian discourses by Imperial Japan continued and were discontinued in the making of postwar Asian discourses by Japanese intellectuals. Here, it is important to emphasize that the imperialist and colonial approaches by imperial Japan during the wartime period were not monolithic. The slogan of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere is often considered the epitome of Japan's wartime Asian discourses. In fact, a rival set of knowledge and practice existed, and not all advocates of a Japan-led East Asian empire prioritized spiritual and intrinsic commonness as the basis of an Asian community.

For instance, a group of Japanese intellectuals, social scientists in particular, presented a competing interpretation of the East Asian Community. They were acutely aware of the urgency to convince Chinese and colonial subjects of the "rationality" of a Japan-led Asian community. To create an optimized empire-colony structure for wartime mobilization, they called for imperial Japan to develop colonial economies. By reducing the economic, political, and cultural gaps between metropole and colony, they believed that Chinese and colonial subjects would spontaneously participate in constructing an Asian empire.

Interestingly, it was these "developmentalist" wartime Japanese intellectuals who continued to address the necessity of a Japan-oriented Asianist approach in postwar Japan during the tumultuous period of the 1950s. Since most of these intellectuals were not trained in Marxism or radical social theories, their encounter with Asia differed from that of the so-called progressive intellectuals in postwar Japan who were critical of American-led Asian Cold War policies to create an anti-communist bloc in Asia. On the other hand, they were equally critical of the conservative tendency in Japan to conform to the American system. However, the promotion of the American Cold War policy in non-communized Asian countries was not accompanied by sophisticated drafts regarding the question of how the American system would convert the domestic structure of these newly decolonized Asian states and make them America's partners. It was not until the early 1960s that American policy makers began to seriously consider the possibility of modifying American modernization theory to Asian contexts. This absence of actual Asian discourses in the United States in the 1950s ironically enabled postwar Japanese intellectuals, many of whom were deeply involved in highly imperialized Asian discourses during the wartime period, to present another set of "Japanized" Asian regionalist thinking in the 1950s.

This article aims to shed new light on the decade of the 1950s by critically examining the resurgence of Asian regionalism in postwar Japan. To this end, this study focuses on the writings of Rōyama Masamichi (1895-1980) in the late 1940s and the 1950s. Rōyama was arguably the icon of the East Asian Community group during the wartime period. Trained in political science at Tokyo Imperial University, he was appointed Assistant Professor in the College of Law in 1922. Heavily influenced by the boom of liberal social science during the Taisho period, he is often considered the pioneer of international politics in prewar Japanese social science. With the publication of *Kokusai seiji to kokusai gyōsei* (国際政治と国際行政, *International Politics and International Administration*) in 1928, Rōyama emerged as a leading political scientist who grappled with the question of restructuring the Japanese domestic political system in the rapidly changing international situation. Beginning in the early 1930s, he became deeply involved in the *Shōwa kenkyūkai* (昭和研究会, Shōwa Research Association) and produced a wide range of writings on wartime Pan-Asianism, emerging as one of the most influential wartime social scientists. For this reason, Rōyama's wartime writings have been the primary topic of research on Japanese Pan-Asianist discourses during the wartime period.[1] However, his postwar Asian discourse has received little attention in spite of his prolific writings on the Cold War Asian order in the 1950s. After a short period of academic silence at the end of the Asia-Pacific War, he soon regained his scholarly influence as a

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1 Miles Fletcher, *The Search for a New Order: Intellectuals and Fascism in Prewar Japan* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1982); J. Victor Koschmann, "Constructing Destiny: Rōyama Masamichi and Asian Regionalism in Wartime Japan," in Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann, eds., *Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders* (London: Routledge, 2006); Jung Sun Han, "Rationalizing the Orient: The "East Asia Cooperative Community" in Prewar Japan," *Monumenta Nipponica* 60, no. 4 (Winter 2005), 481-513.

renowned political scientist and became deeply engaged in guiding the direction of Japan's Cold War order through his logic of Japan's involvement in economic development in Asia, in particular, Southeast Asia. Based on these observations, this paper aims to critically explore Rōyama's postwar writings on Asianism by focusing on the continuity between his wartime imperialist approach to China and Japan's colonies and his encounter with postwar Asia under American hegemony.

The main arguments of this article are twofold. First, Rōyama and like-minded Japanese social scientists attempted to promote Japan's position in Asia in the 1950s by actively engaging with economic development plans in developing countries, Southeast Asia in particular, at a time when the United States had not presented sophisticated plans for economic development in the Asia-Pacific region. The political scientist Sakai Tetsuya has argued that Rōyama's wartime developmentalist approach continued to influence the shaping of postwar Asian discourses in Japan, a line of thinking that exemplifies Japanese intellectuals' "subjective concern" (J. *shutai-teki kanshin*, 主体的関心) with a postwar Asian order in the Japanese context.[2] However, this paper will show that Rōyama's seemingly spontaneous approaches to 1950s Asia clearly reveal how much wartime colonialist and imperialist Asianist ideas continued to influence the mentality of postwar Japanese intellectuals.

In this respect, this study also pays special attention to the nature of Rōyama's developmentalist logic of a postwar Asian order, one which was widely shared by a number of Japanese social scientists in the 1950s. Since Rōyama endorsed the necessity of an American-led Cold War order characterized by the construction of an anti-communist bloc in Asia, he never challenged American militaristic hegemony in Asia, including Japan. However, Rōyama's concern was to promote Japan's postwar status in the

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[2] Sakai Tetsuya, *Kindai Nihon no kokusai chitsujoron* [The Political Discourse of International Order in Modern Japan] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2007), 150.

international order whereas the United States did not have any vision of tangible economic development plans in 1950s East Asia and Southeast Asia since the political leaders of those countries were more concerned with colonialism and economic reconstruction after the war. Under these circumstances, Rōyama and like-minded Japanese social scientists revisited their wartime developmentalist Asian discourses that actually had served Japan's total war efforts. In that respect, their Asian discourses were not so much an alternative approach to the bipolarized Cold War international order as a highly politicized approach to rehabilitate Japan's position.

## Rōyama Masamichi and the "East Asian Community" in Wartime Japan

Rōyama revealed his notion of a new Asian order in the mid-1930s, but the most concrete version of his Pan-Asianism appeared shortly after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. Together with a group of social scientists that included Shinmei Masamichi, Kada Tetsuji, and Takata Yasuma, Rōyama presented the notion of the "East Asian Community." As is well known, this notion was proposed by wartime Japanese intellectuals to rationalize Japan's invasion of China and the construction of a Japan-led East Asian community. Developing his interest in international politics, Rōyama based his theory of the East Asian Community on the observation that the nation-state framework would no longer work since the Euro-centric international order did not have the capacity to control each country's territorial and economic ambitions.[3] For this reason, advocates of the East Asian Community stressed that Japan must be the leader of Asia in order to safeguard Asia's common interests and provide security from Western imperialism.

Although Rōyama's wartime writings should be discussed in the broad

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[3] Koschmann, "Constructing Destiny," 189-192.

history of Japanese intellectuals' commitment to the Japanese empire, often called *tenkō* (転向), his encounter with Pan-Asianism needs to be more carefully investigated in order to criticize the basis of his writings. Keeping their distance from spiritual and ultra-nationalistic Pan-Asianists who were advocating the Imperial Way or intrinsic Asian commonness, Rōyama and like-minded Japanese social scientists set forth the logic of development-oriented Asian regionalism. Stressing that the economic gap between Japan and the rest of Asia must be reduced, they contended that Japan would draw support from Asian subjects for its empire-building project by developing both Japan and the colonies.[4] They also believed that developing colonial economies would be the key to creating an optimized structure for Japan's total war. For this reason, these wartime social scientists' Pan-Asian discourses were closely related to the notion of modernization and development, although they envisioned a non-Western regional community in Asia.

## Rōyama's Encounter with Postwar Japan

Rōyama's wartime discourses on developmentalism lead us to raise several important questions about the continuity and discontinuity of Asian regionalist thinking in postwar Japan. As discussed earlier, Japan-led Pan-Asianism lost ground in postwar Japan as the notion of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was stigmatized as the locus of wartime Japanese totalitarianism. While wartime ultra-nationalists, mostly advocates of spiritual and imperial-way Pan-Asianism, temporarily disappeared from the political and intellectual arenas, newly emerging liberal and progressive social scientists endeavored to erase the legacy of the fascistic era. The 33-year-old political scientist Maruyama Masao was one of them. In his

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[4] Kada Tetsuji, *Tōa kyōdōtai ron* [On The East Asian Community] (Tokyo: Nihon seinen gaikō kyōkai shuppanbu, 1939).

epoch-making 1947 essay "Political Science as Science" (J. *Kagaku to shite seijigaku*, 科学として政治学), Maruyama asserted, "[T]here has undoubtedly been a brilliant revival in other social sciences, but political science in this country, to put it bluntly, really has no tradition worth reviving. *For Japanese political science everything depends on what it happens in the future*." [emphasis added][5] In this respect, Maruyama fired against those wartime social scientists who served the wartime Japanese government.

Due to his close engagement with wartime institutions and policy-making, Rōyama's name was included among the subjects of a 1947 purge (J. *kōshoku tsuihō*, 公職追放) by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP). However, the purge of Rōyama was lifted in 1948, and he reemerged as an individual political scientist. Rōyama then became remained, actively involved in various debates over political theories and practical issues, including the question of evaluating wartime Japanese political science.[6] In 1949, Rōyama published a monograph entitled *Nihon ni okeru kindai seijigaku no hattatsu* (日本における近代政治学の発達, *The Development of Modern Political Science in Japan*). In this book, one can easily notice that Maruyama's 1947 essay greatly influenced Rōyama. Rōyama also basically agreed with Maruyama's point that the Emperor system had greatly deterred the development of modern democracy in Japan and therefore critiques of Japanese fascism must begin with problematizing the Emperor system.[7] However, while paying homage to Maruyama's analysis, Rōyama did not endorse Maruyama's condemnation of wartime

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5 Maruyama Masao, trans., Arthur Tiedemann, "Politics as a Science in Japan: Retrospect and Prospects," in Maruyama Masao, trans., Ivan Morris, *Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1969), 226.

6 For Rōyama's career and activities in postwar Japan, see Imamura Tsunao, *Gabanansu no tankyū: Rōyama asamichi o yomu* [Portraits of Governance: Reading Rōyama Masamichi] (Tokyo: Keisō shobō, 2009), 54-112.

7 Rōyama Masamichi, *Nihon ni okeru seiji ishiki no shoyōsō* [Various Aspects of Political Consciousness] (Tokyo: Keisō shobō, 1949), 46-66.

Japanese political science and suggested that a new direction for postwar Japanese political science could only be sought by thoroughly reviewing political thought in traditional and early twentieth century Japan.[8]

Why did Rōyama call for a more thorough investigation of political ideas in early twentieth century Japan, instead of accepting Maruyama's assessment? The easiest answer may be that Rōyama himself was deeply involved in producing imperial and colonial knowledge and policies during the wartime period. In a monumental study of conversion led by Tsurumi Shunsuke, one of the leading progressive intellectuals in postwar Japan, Matsuzawa Hiroaki strongly argued that Rōyama was voluntarily involved in changing the domestic political structure for the purpose of imperial war in his belief that the international political power structure at that time necessitated it.[9] Notably, Matsuzawa based his critiques on Rōyama's understanding of international politics in the 1930s and 1940s. On a macroscopic level, Rōyama's notion of a new international order referred to imperial Japan's attempt to bipolarize the world order, that is, the Western order versus a Japan-led imperial community in Asia.

Ironically, Matsuzawa's acute analysis of Rōyama's wartime collaboration with the Japanese empire provides a clue to understanding why Rōyama's historiography of modern Japanese political science differed from that of Maruyama. Rōyama's evaluation of Japanese political scientists was structured on the observation that they had responded to "given situations." When pluralist approaches to the state prevailed in the 1920s, they problematized the dominance of the state over all other social sectors and theorized "society" as an alternative force.[10] Rōyama, however, contended

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8 Rōyama Masamichi, *Nihon ni okeru kindai seijigaku no hattatsu* [The Development of Modern Political Science in Japan] (Tokyo: Jitsugyō no nihonsha, 1949), 226-228.

9 Matsuzawa Hiroaki, "Minshu shakaishugi no hitobito—Rōyama Masamichi hoka" [Democratic Socialists: Rōyama Masamichi and others], in Tsurumi Shunsuke ed., *Kyōdō kenkyū—tenkō* [A Collective Study: Conversion], vol. 2 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1960), 262.

10 Rōyama, *Nihon ni okeru kindai seijigaku no hattatsu*, 151-179.

that the advent of international society fundamentally changed the structure of domestic politics in late 1920s Japan. The First World War was, he observed, a clash of the uncontrolled interests of each nation-state. In other words, it was inevitable that each nation aimed to expand its economic and political interests beyond its national border in modern society, and this gave rise to imperialism and colonialism.[11]

As this paper will discuss in detail how Rōyama's concept of international politics shaped his thinking about the postwar Asian regional order, it is important to link his understanding of wartime international politics to the formation of the postwar international order. As Sakai Tetsuya and J. Victor Koschmann have argued, Rōyama was primarily concerned with the question of how to restructure the Euro-centric world order, and was therefore greatly influenced by political scientists and political philosophers such as Carl Schmitt and W.Y. Elliot, who produced new interpretations of state-individual relations and regional orders.[12] After Japan's defeat, Rōyama's academic interests moved to the reshaping of a postwar international order. He first showed keen interest in American political scientists' discussions of power politics. Referring to *International Politics*, published in 1933 by Frederick Shuman, Rōyama defined power politics as a modern tendency for each country to safeguard its own interests based on military and economic power in the international order.[13] Rōyama observed that international conflicts in the twentieth century occurred when totalitarian forces dominated national sovereignty and became uncontrolled. However, Rōyama cast a skeptical eye on each nation-state's capability to control its own national power. The advent of modern nation-states, Rōyama observed,

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11 Rōyama Masamichi, "Kokusai shakai ni okeru kokka shuken" [State Sovereignty in International Society], in Nakamura Akira ed., *Kindai kokkaron* [On Modern Nation States], vol. 1 (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1950), 3-66.

12 Koschmann, "Constructing Destiny," 187-189; Sakai, *Kindai Nihon no kokusai chitsujoron*, 131-141.

13 Rōyama Masamichi, "Kokusai shakai to pawa poriteikkusu" [International Society and Power Politics], *Sekai* (1950:3), in Rōyama Masamichi, *Kokusai seiji to Nihon gaikō* [International Politics and Japanese Diplomacy] (Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 1959), 70.

replaced the medieval order based on religious and feudal systems with economic and militaristic development and expansion. Therefore, he argued that modern nation-states would inevitably pursue worldly desires beyond the national level and thus be vulnerable to international conflicts.[14]

Under these circumstances, early perceptions of power politics evolved to a considerable extent and gave rise to a certain school of international politics. Scholars in this school carried the power politics-driven aspect of modern nation states a step further and established the realist theory of international politics. Hans Morgenthau was the icon of postwar realist theory in American political science. He reconfirmed that the essence of international politics is power politics, that is, each nation seeks to expand its power in the international order. Power politics, he stressed, takes different forms, depending upon the interests of each nation. According to him, the Second World War was a conflict between nations in favor of the status-quo (England and France) and nations attempting to destroy this status quo (Germany and Italy).[15]

Mogenthau's realist theory provided Rōyama with logical ground for Japan's involvement in the Second World War. Since Morgenthau's notion of power politics was based upon an affirmation of the egoistic nature of human beings, his political ideas from the outset intended to separate international politics from the realm of ethics and morality.[16] Therefore, colonialism and imperialism were conceptualized by Morgenthau as "general" conflicts in the world of power politics. Given that both France and England, namely, the status-quo maintenance alliance, were also colonial empires, Morgenthau's realist theory, in spite of its impact on anti-Soviet policies in Cold War America, fundamentally endorsed the world order dominated by "the haves" and blocked any ethical and moralistic judgment of the violence of these

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14 Rōyama, "Kokusai shakai to pawa poriteikkusu," 67-68.

15 Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Knopf, 1948, c1960), 38-43.

16 Ibid., 233-259.

advanced powers. Rōyama also shared similar views on diachronic changes in modern world history. He wrote:

> Civilization itself is basically the concept of a social sphere that goes beyond nation or national borders. In particular, modern civilization has been transnational in its scientific and technological nature. The development of capitalism as the economic system of modern society, in association with achievements by modern civilization, necessitated *colonies* through the development of markets beyond national borders and gave rise to the international expansion of economic society.[17] [emphasis added]

Rōyama argued that the configuration of power politics did not substantially change after the end of World War II. For him, the American-Soviet conflict was another chapter of the power-politics-driven international order. What actually changed was Japan's status in the international order. Rōyama's writings in 1948-1950 reflected his grave concerns about how Japan would survive in the acute Cold War international order and possibly promote its position. Not surprisingly, Rōyama centered his inquiry on how the balance of power could be explicated in East Asia. Now, referring to Arnold Toynbee,[18] one of the most renowned English historians of the twentieth century, Rōyama proposed four conditions for maintaining the balance of power: (1) the participation of multiple countries would increase power balances, (2) polarization such as the American-Soviet division would destroy the conditions for power balances, (3) if the two powers maintained physical distance, a sort of balance would be imagined, and (4) a mediator could prevent a direct clash between polarized powers.[19]

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17 Rōyama, "Kokusai shakai to pawa poriteikkusu," 61-62.

18 Arnold Toynbee was one of the most frequently read historians in postwar Japan. While more than ten of Toynbee's books were translated into Japanese in the 1950s and the early 1960s, Rōyama was the co-translator of Toynbee's seminal work, *A Study of History*.

19 Rōyama, "Kokusai shakai ni okeru kokka shuken," 39-40.

It appears that Rōyama did not take seriously the spiritual potential of Toynbee's concept of world history. As is well known, Toynbee argued that civilization, alternative civilization in particular, emerges as one country or society encounters and responds to extreme difficulty, and he also showed keen interest in the spiritual aspect of civilization, a perspective that gained currency in 1950s Japan.[20] However, Toynbee's notion of the postwar world order was for Rōyama another confirmation that bipolarization would continue in international politics and, therefore, there would be strong demands for collective security in East Asia.

Unquestionably, Rōyama's first and foremost concern was to assure Japan's national security. This explains why he even showed an affinity with advocates of permanent neutrality in Japan between 1948 and 1950.[21] A group of Japanese intellectuals and politicians, mostly liberal and progressive, proposed the notion of disarmament and neutrality in the late 1940s. If permanent neutrality was an idealistic approach to Japan's postwar security question, the realistic meaning of "peace" in Japan, as John Dower has pointedly argued, was contingent upon changing American attitudes toward Japan and Asia.[22] As is well known, the United States intended to drive postwar Japan to a strong anti-communist zone in Asia in the wake of growing communist forces in Northeast Asia, which culminated in the emergence of the People's Republic of China in 1949. Rōyama, however, observed that Japan's road would not be as simple as siding with the United States in the making of the collective security system in Asia. This line of thinking came from his peculiar analysis of nationalism and communism in Asia.

Along with his writings on postwar international politics, Rōyama

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20 Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History* (London: Oxford University Press, 1934).

21 Rōyama, "Kokusai shakai ni okeru kokka shuken," 41-54.

22 John Dower, "Peace and Democracy in Two Systems: External Policy and Internal Conflict," in Andrew Gordon, ed., *Postwar Japan As History* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), 3-33.

published several articles on communism and socialism between 1948 and 1950. Not surprisingly, he showed strong disagreement with the communist notion of the state, that is, the nation-state as dominated by the interests of the bourgeoisie would disappear if the proletariat achieved their monopolization of the means of production.[23] However, Rōyama's endorsement of realist international political theory was not directly linked to his total denouncement of Marxist political theory. Rather, he paid attention to the shadow of European Marxism. In other words, he observed that the incompatibility of Marx's radical theory with advanced European countries paradoxically demonstrated its power in explaining revolution in underdeveloped countries such as early twentieth century Russia.[24] However, his analysis of communism around 1949 and early 1950 was not yet sophisticated enough to explain how the status of underdevelopment would be appropriated by radical leaders in these countries to forge their political power in association with nationalism. Nonetheless, Rōyama seemed to be clearly aware that a mere application of American-born political theories to Japan and Asia would not provide a resolution to the conundrum of collective security in Asia. In these yet-to-be explored Asian political spaces, he first reconfirmed his conviction that a new discourse on postwar Asian regionalism must be developed and that Japan should be actively engaged in this process. At stake was the question of what kinds of roles political scientists in Japan should play under these circumstances.

## Asianist Thinking in Early Cold War Japan

As discussed above, Rōyama introduced the most up-to-date Western

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23 Rōyama Masamichi, "Marukusushugi seijigaku hihan" [Critiques of Marxist Political Science], in Rōyama Masamichi, *Minshu skakaishugi e no michi* [The Way for Democratic Socialism] (Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 1960), 77-84.

24 Rōyama Masamichi, "Kyōsantō sengen hihan" [Critiques of the Communist Manifesto], in Rōyama, *Minshu skakaishugi e no michi*, 21.

political theories to Japanese academia and showed an in-depth understanding of the complexity of international politics. He was also aware that these Western political theories had clear limits in explaining the political situations of non-Western countries in the postwar context. The gap between Western political theories and Japanese politics was conceptualized by Rōyama in two major areas. From the perspective of macroscopic democratic development, the Japanese road to Western democracy came to an impasse as Japan was dominated by ultra-nationalists during the wartime period.

Second, Rōyama observed that Japan was undergoing a confusion of value systems. While the American occupational forces attempted to promote American democratic routes to Japan, various social and political theories had already arrived in Japan and were having an influence. For instance, the concept of "democracy," Rōyama wrote, was theorized by both conservatives and progressives as "people's democracy" and "western democracy," respectively.[25] Here, people's democracy referred to political ideologies presented by the Soviet Union and Mao Zedong. However, Rōyama was skeptical about these "alternative" democratic systems. He accused them of being a democracy without the legitimacy of elections, that is, the communist party determines its own power and responsibility without election.[26] He found that the coexistence of such antipodal democratic ideas was due to the problem of the "Japanese people who do not have the capability to make autonomous judgments based on their own experience and knowledge of democracy."[27] In this way, Rōyama and like-minded Japanese social scientists in the 1950s did not accept the American value system as such and sought autonomous political development. However, this

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25 Rōyama Masamichi, "Kyōsanshugisha no minshushugikan— <Futatsu no minshushugi> no hihan" [Communists' Perceptions of Democracy: Critiques of the Development of Democracy], in Rōyama, *Minshu skakaishugi e no michi*, 58-72.

26 Ibid., 66-68.

27 Ibid., 59.

does not mean that they problematized, as some progressive Japanese intellectuals did, America's highly polarized and militarized approach to Asian security.

While the lack of democratic experience pertains to the historical side of political "backwardness" in Japan, the absence of sovereignty, Rōyama thought, would leave the Japanese unable to take Asian affairs as part of their own concerns. In this respect, the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 had a profound impact on Rōyama's writings on international politics in the 1950s. First of all, the Korean War was an international war that reconfirmed that boundaries of security should not be confined to the single nation-state framework. Therefore, Rōyama observed in September 1950, just three months after the outbreak of the Korean War, that the upcoming peace treaty talks between the United States and Japan would be closely related to the Korean War.[28] However, Rōyama was not simply concerned about the physical security of Japan that would be politically independent. Here, Rōyama artfully linked the Korean War to the power and responsibility of Japan in the changing postwar Asian order.

He first asserted that North Korea's invasion of South Korea should not be justified in any way since South Korea was legitimized by the United Nations.[29] For this reason, Rōyama concluded that the Japanese must make clear moral judgments about the Korean War. Rōyama's emphasis on an ethical standpoint on the Korean War discloses his political intention very well. As Oku Takenori has argued, leftist and even liberal intellectuals were hesitant to make value judgments on the interventionist policies of the Soviet Union and Mao's China in 1950s and 1960s Japan.[30] There were only a few

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28 Rōyama Masamichi, "Reisen no shosan to shite no Nihon no heiwa joyaku" [The Japanese Peace Treaty as the Outcome of the Cold War], *Fujin kōron* (1950:9), in Rōyama, *Kokusai seiji to Nihon gaikō*, 194.

29 Ibid., 206.

30 Oku Takenori, *Nondan no jeonhusa* [The Postwar History of the Japanese Journalistic World], trans. Song Seok Won (Seoul: Sohwa, 2007), 118-121.

intellectuals who were critical of China's and the Soviet Union's support of Kim Il Sung's North Korea. In this way, Rōyama utilized the Korean War to detach the Japanese from an "illusionary" narrative of communism as bearing peace and liberation. Referring to Ruth Benedict's *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, in which she wrote that "the Japanese concept of morality is situational," Rōyama urged the Japanese to make a "universal" ethical judgment on the Korean War, which indicated that Rōyama fully endorsed the advent of the San Francisco System in 1951.[31]

Just as Rōyama, a realist political scientist, considered it urgent for Japan to join the San Francisco System, similar logic was found among like-minded Japanese social scientists. For instance, Kada Tetsuji, one of the core advocates of the East Asian Community during the wartime period, criticized the idealist aspect of postwar Japanese political science. He particularly problematized the writings of Nanbara Shigeru, a renowned political scientist who had served as the president of the University of Tokyo between 1945 and 1951.[32] Kada insisted that Nanbara's notion of non-armament and non-nuclear oriented peace was a highly romanticized approach to security that lacked a realist sensibility.[33] Notably, a number of liberal and progressive intellectuals were still adhering to the ideal of Japan as the icon of non-armament and anti-war policies in the mid-1950s. Kada was also skeptical about the "permanent neutrality" group since it would eventually entrust Japan's militaristic and diplomatic sovereignty to the hands of foreign powers, the United States in particular.[34] For him, it was urgent for the Japanese to be armed with a new perspective that would "drive issues in Japan-favored directions" in the international order.

Once Japan's joining of the America-led collective security system was

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31 Rōyama, "Reisen no shosan to shite no Nihon no heiwa joyaku," 207-208.

32 In September 1947, Tokyo Imperial University was renamed as University of Tokyo.

33 Kada Tetsuji, *Sengō jūnen: Nihonjin no seikatsu to iken ni kansuru essei* [Ten Years after the War: Essays on the Life and Perceptions of the Japanese] (Tokyo: Raifūsha, 1955), 180-181.

34 Ibid., 189.

justified from a realist perspective, what kind of new role for Japan did these social scientists present? Rōyama was not satisfied with Japan's simply playing a potential anti-communist "buffering" role as designated by the United States. As discussed above, he induced from the Korean War his own logical grounds for the necessity of Japan's autonomous role in the making of a postwar Asian order. Here, he made the point that Japan should bear responsibility for the outbreak of the Korean War. However, this seemingly retrospective standpoint is by no means related to Rōyama's recognition of the "ethical" responsibility for Japanese colonialism, which is strikingly different from his accusation of the Soviet Union and China as unethical. Instead, he argued that Japan's failure during the Asia Pacific War resulted in the expansion of communist powers in northeast Asia. He also added that America's misjudgment of the Soviet menace and the rise of Mao's China in the mid-1940s created conditions for the inevitable crisis of world peace.[35]

In 1953, Rōyama published an article with the interesting title, "Japan in the World." Given that most Japanese intellectuals were still preoccupied with domestic political issues with the advent of the San Francisco System in 1951, Rōyama once again brought an "internationalist" perspective with a view to having an impact on Japan's yet-to-be determined road under the American security system. In this article, he quickly captured the new wave of thinking that ideological and political conflicts in the Asian region would be predominantly influenced by economic development in the name of reconstruction.[36] In other words, massive anti-colonial political forces in the late 1940s were transformed into forces for economic modernization. Rōyama was of course aware that the term "development" did not exclusively belong to the "free world." It was he who actually articulated a Japanese version of development during the wartime period. As will be discussed in detail below, the relationship between growing nationalist forces

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35 Ibid., 205.

36 Rōyama Masamichi, "Sekai ni okeru Nihon" [Japan in the World], in Rōyama, *Gendaishi kōza* [Lectures on Modern History] in *Kokusai seiji to Nihon gaikō*.

in Asia and economic development was one of the primary concerns in Rōyama's writing in the early 1950s.

While the United Nations took the initiative in injecting economic development into the Third World, Rōyama found it useful for Japan to be involved in Asian affairs as well. Here, he summoned the Meiji period as a "success story" that showed newly liberated Asian countries a way to turn foreign impacts into domestic power. Referring to the 1949 book by British diplomat and historian of premodern Japan George B. Sansom, *The Western World and Japan*, Rōyama argued that Meiji Japan's experience would provide useful lessons for these Asian countries.[37] It is of course impossible to find any speculations from Rōyama that it was during the Meiji era that Japan laid the foundation for its becoming an imperial power. Neglecting Japan's colonial encounter with its Asian neighbors in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Rōyama extracted the exterior of economic development from Meiji Japan and intended to apply it to newly decolonized Asian states.

## Asian Nationalism and the Question of Ideology

Rōyama was aware that America's collective security system in Asia succeeded in enticing only Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, leaving most South Asian and Southeast Asian countries as "weak points." At stake was the question of the incompatibility of American foreign policies with these areas. In fact, the United States did not present any detailed blueprint for economic and political changes in India and Southeast Asia. Notably, it was in the late 1950s and early 1960s that a direct foreign investment-oriented economic development plan was first proposed by American policymakers. In that respect, Rōyama understood early on the gravity of the problem of Asian nationalism and its impact on Japan's status in the international order.

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37 Ibid., 8-10.

Rōyama admitted that the notion of western style nationalism never occurred to these countries. Referring to Hans Kohn, the author of the pioneering work *The Idea of Nationalism*, he observed that modern nationalism concurrently emerged in areas where the foundations of democracy and industrialization were firmly laid.[38] The lack of industrialization and democracy, he continued, was often attributed to Western imperialism, and for this reason Asian nationalist forces tended to be anti-Western and anti-imperial.[39] Interestingly, he never insisted that nationalist forces in Asia should be controlled. Instead, he called for them to develop in a "healthy" way.[40]

It appeared that Rōyama endorsed Asian nationalism as a *fait accompli* in its fight against colonialism and imperialism, while the United States was still showing its antipathy to nationalist movements in Southeast Asia and supporting European colonial powers in the early 1950s.[41] However, nationalism for Rōyama was not so much a liberating ideology as a sort of political invariable one needed to take seriously in mapping out a regional order. Here, it is important to note that he never denounced nationalism as he envisioned an Asian regional community during the wartime period. If nationalism was a historical reality in early twentieth century Asia, Rōyama's wartime concept of nationalism was always premised upon its coexistence with a grand Asian identity. His theory of the East Asian Community was his answer to the question of how each national community should serve the greater interest of a Japan-led East Asian empire. His writings on Asian nationalism in the early 1950s reflected his continuing observation of the relations between nationalism and regionalism. In sum, his realistic approach

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38 Rōyama Masamichi, "Futatsu no sekai to Ajia" [Two Worlds and Asia], in Rōyama, *Kokusai seiji to Nihon gaikō*, 147.

39 Ibid., 144.

40 Ibid., 148.

41 Robert McMahon, *The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia since World War II* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 43-68.

to nationalism traceable to the 1930s enabled him to regard postwar Asian nationalism as a "given" condition, while intellectuals and policymakers in the United States were not prepared to respond to these massive political movements in Asia.

How, then, did Rōyama link growing nationalist forces in Asia to the Japanese experience? Here, Rōyama once again attempted to show his reflective standpoint on Japan's war. He argued that democratic and industrial development in early twentieth century Japan faced serious challenges as religious and chauvinistic nationalists dominated the political power structure. Its outcome, he acknowledged, was colonization of Japan's Asian neighbors and challenge to the Euro-centric world order.[42] This seemingly retrospective interpretation of wartime ultra-nationalism in Japan was an intended attempt for Rōyama to critically engage with Asian nationalist movements in the 1950s. Just as wartime Japanese nationalism was overwhelmed by irrational and religious forces, he asserted that similar tendencies were occurring in China and Southeast Asia. Once nationalist forces were manipulated by indoctrinated groups, Rōyama stressed, this process would give rise to distortions in the power structure and nationalism would often become violent and xenophobic.[43] He warned that the final destination of such distorted nationalism would be communism since communist ideology claims to be anti-foreign and anti-imperial.[44] For this reason, the problem of nationalism in Asia was irrevocably related to Japan's security. This line of thinking in Rōyama's writings tells us why he paid special attention to Chinese nationalism led by Mao Zedong.

Rōyama did not hesitate to label Mao's New Democracy (Ch. *xin min zhu zhu yi*, 新民主主義) a "varietal form of Marxism."[45] He observed that

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42 Rōyama Masamichi, "Ajia nashonarizumu to Nihon" [Asian Nationalism and Japan], in Rōyama, *Kokusai seiji to Nihon gaikō*, 160.

43 Ibid., 166.

44 Ibid., 170.

45 Ibid., 167.

China's concentrated power structure led by the Chinese Communist Party would emphasize the specialized mission of the Chinese people based on exalted patriotic sentiments and a growing demand for strong national sovereignty, which would take place along with the promotion of racial consciousness and xenophobia.[46] Rōyama's critiques of Mao's China seemed to target pro-Chinese intellectuals within Japan. As Oguma Eiji has pointed out, Japanese communists and liberals tended to sympathize with anti-American and anti-Western nationalist movements in their opposition to the American-led San Francisco Treaty.[47] Rōyama felt an urgency to shape a new Asian regional discourse before it was absorbed by anti-American or anti-Western rhetoric.

While being critical of Japanese advocates of radical socialism, Rōyama and like-minded intellectuals did not believe that a Western-style or an American-style democracy could be easily transplanted into Japan and the newly liberated Asian countries. They believed that a mediating political ideology should constitute an integral part of new Asian regional discourses. It was under these circumstances that a group of Japanese social scientists, including Rōyama, showed keen interest in democratic socialism (J. *Minshu shakaishugi*, 民主社会主義) in the 1950s. In 1951, the Federation for Democratic Socialism (J. *Minshu shakaishugi renmei*, 民主社会主義連盟) was organized in Japan. Interestingly, many of the participating intellectuals had never been involved in socialist organizations or movements. In that respect, the democratic socialism espoused by Japanese advocates was ideologically different from social democracy, often called a revisionist and constitutionalist notion of socialism. In addition, several participants in the democratic socialist movement were specialists in non-Japanese fields. Moreover, the doctrine manifested by the Federation for Democratic

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46 Ibid.

47 Oguma Eiji, "The Postwar Intellectuals' View of Asia," in Sven Saaler and J. Victor Koschmann eds., *Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders* (London: Routledge, 2006), 204-205.

Socialism clearly shows that this organization looked beyond domestic affairs to consider Japan's role in the international arena. Rōyama wrote,

> In order to lay the foundation for democracy in our country, we should not base it upon capitalists' disorderly *laissez-faire* activities. If protecting people's lives is not achieved and a basic structure for the national economy is not established, development of people's individuality cannot be anticipated and class violence ideologies such as communism cannot be controlled. … Precisely for this reason, the foundation of a *socialism-oriented public controlled and planned economy* is urgent in our country. [emphasis added]
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> In addition, what is urgent for Japan's present and future is its international path…. Democratic nationalism is based on international solidarity and strengthens pacifist organizations within the United Nations. It also prepares for threats against peace and contributes to the realization of democracy in the international order. At the same time, *it is an extremely important mission to overcome Asia's backwardness and pave the way for Asia's independence and self-reliance*. We believe that we must take the internationalist perspective by allying with democratic groups in Asia, instead of taking an isolationist notion such as Asia as the third power.[48] [emphasis added]

Although the non-socialist democratic socialist group in 1950s Japan disclosed a sort of messianic vision of the future of Japan and Southeast Asia, the understanding of democratic socialism was different among its members. For instance, Itagaki Yoichi, an architect of Japan's mobilization policy in Southeast Asia during the wartime period, also joined the Federation for Democratic Socialism. Never having been engaged with

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[48] Rōyama Masamichi, "Minshu shakaishugi no gutaiteki shinro" [A Detailed Route for Democratic Socialism], originally published in *Shakaishugi kyōkasho* [Textbooks on Socialism] (1957) in *Rōyama, Minshu shakai shugi e no michi*, 327.

socialist thought, Itagaki found democratic socialism as a way of creating a government-owned planned economy.[49] He was convinced that a set of state-centered top-down economic development plans must be mapped out to modernize these places in Southeast Asia where the basis for democracy and industrialization was weak. In fact, Itagaki's concept of the state was heavily influenced by Tokyo Imperial University economics professor Kawai Eijirō, who introduced the thinking of English philosopher Thomas Hill Green in the 1920s and 1930s.[50] As is well known, Green's idealist philosophy was characterized by the state's responsibility to proactively take care of social problems, inequality, and poverty.[51] Itagaki found such an interventionist role by the state compatible with the needs of Southeast Asia in the 1950s and intended to expand Japan's role in Asia.

Rōyama articulated his concept of democratic socialism in a much clearer tone. He paid attention to how the Geneva Conference of 1954 was ineffective in resolving the Korean conflicts. In spite of the spirit of peaceful coexistence in the aftermath of the Korean War, Rōyama stressed, the end of the Cold War system could not be anticipated.[52] Under these circumstances, the Soviet system was gradually penetrating the mindset of nationalist leaders in Asia and Africa. Rōyama theorized that the popularity of the Soviet system was closely related to these nationalist leaders' ambition to directly convert their "underdeveloped economy" into an industrialized one

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49 About Itagaki's relationships with the democratic socialism group, see *Karashima Masato, Teikoku Nihon no Ajia kenkyū sōryokusen taisei, keizai riarizumu, minshu shakaishugi* [Asian Studies in Imperial Japan: Total War System, Economic Realism, and Democratic Socialism] (Tokyo: Akashi shoten, 2015), 129-135.

50 Ibid., 131. Kawai's monograph on Thomas Hill Green's social philosophy was first published in 1930. Kawai Eijirō, *Tōmasu Hiru Gurīn no shisō taikei* [An Outline of Thomas Hill Green's Thought] (Tokyo: Nihon hyōronsha, 1930).

51 Maria Dimova-Cookson and William J. Mander, *T. H. Green: Ethics, Metaphysics, and Political Philosophy* (London: Oxford University Press, 2006).

52 Rōyama Masamichi, "Minshushugi to ideorogi no tairitsu" [Conflicts between Democracy and Ideology], *Sekai* (1956) in *Rōyama, Minshu shakai shugi e no michi*, 120.

like that of the Soviet Union.[53] He continued to share his highly realistic observation that the American system characterized by a "paradise for private firms" and equality between labor and capital would not be exported to these "underdeveloped" countries. For this reason, he observed that a socialist plan and management by the state had received lasting attention from nationalist leaders to deal with their economic problems.[54]

In order to prevent Asian nationalist forces from allying with communist ideology, Rōyama found it important to propose an Asia-optimized ideological direction first for Japan and eventually for decolonized Asian countries. Rōyama's affinity for democratic socialism stemmed from such geopolitical thinking, and he was envisioning a "social state" where social, economic, and political conflicts are managed by the state's intervention. Rōyama, Itagaki, and other "democratic socialists" found that the logic of an interventionist state needed to be applied to some economic sectors immediately within Japan. Agricultural reforms carried out by the American Occupation forces right after the war, they insisted, only emancipated Japanese peasants from feudalistic peasant-landlord relations. Since most of them were still small-sized and family-oriented land owners, development in productivity and an increase in income would hardly be expected.[55] To break through this impasse, Rōyama suggested, the state should consider converting individual Japanese farms into cooperative unions and implementing a national-level social security system. In doing so, Rōyama argued that a "democratic will" would spring forth from Japanese peasants.[56]

Apparently, Rōyama's logic of socialism mainly pertained to its validity as a preventive measure rather than its radical potential. By enacting some of the "socialistic" reform policies in democratic states, he believed

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53 Ibid., 131.

54 Ibid., 132.

55 Rōyama, "Minshu shakaishugi no gutaiteki shinro," 333-334.

56 Ibid., 340-341.

that the problem of unevenness and inequality within a single state might be temporarily resolved. Interestingly enough, this line of thinking bears a striking resemblance to his wartime notion of an East Asia cooperative community. During the wartime period, Rōyama and advocates of the East Asian Community shared the concern that optimizing Japanese society for total war should begin by managing symptoms of socio-economic inconsistencies, economic conflicts in particular. They urged that the economic gap between the industrialized metropole and urban areas be reduced to create a sense of national unity essential for total mobilization. Expanding this logic to Asia, they attempted to propose a "rationalizing" solution to the economic gap between empire and colony. It was for this reason that Rōyama strongly called for Imperial Japan to be involved in colonial economic development. He believed that a Japan-led economic development plan would be the key to directing anti-colonial nationalist forces in the colony to the making of a cooperative Asian community.

Here, one might wonder how Rōyama himself evaluated wartime imperial discourses produced by Japanese intellectuals. As discussed earlier, he admitted that ultra-nationalists distorted and destroyed democratic and industrial foundations that had been gradually accumulating in Japan until the 1920s. Obviously, Rōyama and the East Asian Community group came into acute conflict with ultranationalist groups as they competed to produce an idealized theory of an Asian empire. Being critical of "irrational" visions such as the Imperial Way (*kōdō*, 皇道), they argued that imperial Japan must present realistic and development-oriented regional discourses to embrace colonial subjects. This indicates that Rōyama's evaluation of Japanese wartime ideology only focused on the failure of the ultranationalists' approach to domestic and international challenges, instead of admitting the colonial nature of his own theory during the wartime period.

## Asian Regional Developmentalism and Japan

While a group of Japanese social scientists were grappling with the question of restructuring Japanese society and at the same time engaging with Asia, significant political changes occurred in Southeast Asia. In 1954, the Ho Chi Minh-led Vietnamese nationalist forces finally defeated the French colonial army. The rise of nationalist powers in Southeast Asia propelled the United States to redraft its Southeast Asian policy. Facing the growing influence of Mao's China in Southeast Asia and third world nationalist leaders' affinity for the Soviet system, the United States felt an urgent need to deter the proliferation of communist ideology in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.[57] Moreover, the Bandung Conference of 1955 reconfirmed that a free market economy and democracy, the two wheels of the Pax Americana system, would not attract third world leaders who, although in different contexts, harbored anti-colonial and anti-western sentiments.

Rōyama was aware of the subtlety of third-world alliance movements in the mid-1950s. While acknowledging the significance of revealing the imperialistic nature of white supremacy, he sent a highly realistic response to the Bandung Conference. Labeling as "abstract" the peace principles presented by China's Zhou Enlai, Rōyama warned that such a highly motivated spirit of anti-colonialism and nationalism would not last without substantial economic development in these areas.[58] Rōyama's analysis of the making of blocs in the third world ended with a strong suggestion that the United States develop forward-looking attitudes and not simply repeat its "ideology" driven anti-communist military strategies. He, at least as of 1957, seemed to be optimistic about more expanded economic aid by the United States in South Asia and Southeast Asia and attempted to draw a new rule for

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57 Hiroyuki Hoshiro, "Co-Prosperity Sphere Again? United States Foreign Policy and Japan's "First" Regionalism in the 1950s," *Pacific Affairs* 82, no. 3 (Fall 2009), 389.

58 Rōyama Masamichi, "Kokusai seiji ni okeru Ajia Afurika shokoku" [Asian and African Countries in International Politics], *Sōgō* (May, 1957), in Rōyama, *Kokusai seiji to Nihon gaikō*, 130-131.

Japan's new role under America's new economic policies.

However, the United States was still overwhelmingly focused on militaristic approaches to these regions. To be sure, witnessing the threat posed by nationalist movements in the third world, a group of intellectuals and bureaucrats in Washington called for more direct economic aid-oriented policies to attract nationalist leaders in these areas. The report by W.W. Rostow and Max Millikan issued in 1957 represented a new wave of thinking within the United States.[59] The report urged the United States government to implement more direct and sophisticated economic development plans in the third world and also to contrive a new strategy to create partnership with nationalist leaders in developing countries. Not surprisingly, Asia was one of the key strategic areas for American Cold War policy in the Rostow and Millikan report. However, the United States was less interested in creating a cooperative Asian bloc and still preferred "individual" prescriptions for political changes in each Asian country. In the meantime, the Japanese government accelerated its blueprint to extend its influence in Southeast Asia by providing economic aid. To this end, inducing America's support was utterly essential. In 1957, the Japanese Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, a former class A war criminal, visited Washington and presented his new "Asia plan," which was characterized by developing Asian economies through foreign aid.

However, Kishi's aim to promote Japan's status in Asia through American dollars was clearly rejected by President Dwight D. Eisenhower.[60] It is conceivable that America suspected Japan of intending to reemerge as a regional power, although the main reason for Washington's negative response was unrelated to its recognition of Japan's responsibility for its colonial past in Southeast Asia. However, the rejection of Japan's Asian plan

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59 W.W. Rostow and Max Millikan, *A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper & Bros, 1957).

60 Sayuri Shimizu, *Creating People of Plenty: The United States and Japan's Economic Alternatives, 1950-1960* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2001), 174-201.

was not replaced by tangible American economic policies, and this resulted, as Sayuri Shimizu has convincingly argued, in the wide opening of South Asia and Southeast Asia for Japan's self-motivated economic expansion.[61] Under these circumstances, Japanese social scientists actively appropriated this "opportunity" with more emboldened voices.

In June 1959, a group of Japanese social scientists published a provocative work entitled *Ajia keizai hatten no kiso riron* (アジア経済発展の基礎理論, *Basic Theories of Asian Economic Development*). This text of more than 850 pages was published by the Nihon Ekafe Kyōkai (Japanese Association for the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East), and it is not an exaggeration to say that it was the epitome of the social scientific scholarship that illuminated the emergence of developmentalist Asian discourses in Japan in the late 1950s. Rōyama supervised the entire publication process and wrote a foreword and an individual article for this book. In the foreword, he once again confirmed that Japan's "particular" experience in the early twentieth century would be universally meaningful for most Southeast Asian countries.[62] How, then, did Rōyama and the other authors of this book articulate Japan's role in Asia in the late 1950s?

First, it is important to note that this book placed exceptional emphasis on the term subjectivity (J. *shutaisei*, 主体性). The meaning of being "subjective" in the Asian context was well illuminated in Rōyama's own article, "*Ajia keizai hattatsu no kokusai seijigakuteki igi*" (J. アジア経済開発の国際政治学的意義, "The Meaning of Asian Economic Development from the Perspective of International Politics"). Here, Rōyama insisted that neither the Cold War bipolar system led by the United States and the Soviet Union nor the neutralist alliance characterized by the 1955 Bandung Conference would provide an optimized route for Asia's security and economic

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61 Ibid., 199.

62 Nihon Ekafe Kyōkai, ed., *Ajia keizai hatten no kiso riron* [Basic Theories of Asian Economic Development] (Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 1959), 7-8.

development.[63] According to him, both the Soviet Union and the United States had prioritized their ideological goals, the spread of people's democracy, and non-proliferation of communism, respectively, through political intervention, and this had been an obstacle to the political development of Asian nationalism.[64] He was equally critical of the neutralist trend by Third World countries such as Egypt and India. Given that Arab nationalist movements became increasingly politicized over their oil resources, Rōyama was skeptical about the possibility of a true "neutralist" alliance in Asia as well.

It is not surprising that Rōyama and like-minded Japanese social scientists responded tepidly to the neutralist movements that culminated in 1955 at the Bandung Conference. Although Japan sent its own delegates to Bandung, there was no reason for the developing countries to recognize Japan's presence in the Third World, given that Japan had been one of the major colonial powers in the early twentieth century.[65] However, these social scientists at least believed that their version of a postwar Asian regional unit would gain momentum by penetrating the "weak-point" of an ideology driven third-world bloc notion, that is, most countries were desperately searching for a path to rapid economic development and they would eventually establish economic relations with "advanced" countries to receive financial and technological aid. By carrying this idea a step further and having collective and cooperative economic relations in these individually less developed countries, these social scientists intended to rationalize Japan's joining and actually leading these late-comers.

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63 Rōyama Masamichi, "Ajia keizai kaihatsu no kokusai seijigakuteki igi" [The Meaning of Asian Economic Development from the Perspective of International Politics], in Nihon Ekafe Kyōkai, ed., *Ajia keizai hatten no kiso riron*, 674-676.

64 Ibid., 674.

65 About Japan and the Bandung Conference, see Kristine Dennehy, "Overcoming Colonialism at Bandung, 1955," in *Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders*, 213-225; Kweku Ampiah, "Japan at the Bandung Conference: The Cat Goes to the Mice's Convention," *Japan Forum* 7, no. 1 (1995), 15-24.

In order to pave the way for Japan's "rejoining" Asia, the efficacy of Japan-Southeast Asian economic cooperation had to be emphasized. To address this issue, Rōyama revisited his notion of international politics in Asia. Although the concept of collective security is essential in Cold War Asia, economic cooperation for development, Rōyama stressed, must take place among Asian countries, and not be predominantly led by Cold War superpowers.[66] However, it is misleading to assume that Rōyama and other social scientists simply denounced the central position of the United States in the Asian Cold War order. They never challenged America's strategic initiative to create an anti-communist bloc. Nor did they call for Japan to consider building an autonomous military power, as least in the late 1950s and the early 1960s. They were aware that any Asian regionalist discourses that recalled Japan's imperial past would not be accepted by most Asian countries. While endorsing America's primary role as a superpower in Northeast Asia, they intended to utilize Japan's growing economic power to construct a Japan-favored economic order in Asia. This explains why their "blueprint" for an Asian economic order excluded South Korea and Taiwan, Japan's two former major colonies and now under the direct militaristic and economic sway of the United States.

While Japan was a primary partner in America's Cold War policy in Asia, this did not discourage these social scientists from being critical of economic plans in Asia led by the United States. Rōyama, for instance, did not hide his skepticism about both the ECAFE and the Colombo Plan. He asserted that these plans were basically the outcome of Western countries' strategic interests in Asia, the United States, in particular, and did not consider the creation of self-reliant cooperative relations among Asian countries.[67] Such critiques seem to be premised upon his observation that these economic plans would automatically bring Western capital and

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66 Rōyama, "Ajia keizai kaihatsu no kokusai seijigakuteki igi," 682.

67 Ibid., 678.

technology to underdeveloped countries and eventually aimed to implant a Western-style free market economy into non-Western areas. Contrary to the expectations of "free world" leaders, a number of nationalist leaders in Asia and Africa showed keen interest in non-Western routes. For instance, India's second 5-year economic development plan between 1955 and 1960 was explicitly influenced by the Soviet model. Most developing countries had already adopted government-led multi-year economic plans in the late 1950s, and these plans were usually characterized by an intensive government-led campaign to construct basic infrastructure for economic development and rapidly increase productivity.

Interestingly, the era of state-led developmental plans was not conceived of as "foreign" by these Japanese social scientists. Rather, the idea of state-led development in Asia in the 1950s had much in common with Japan's notion of a controlled economy during the wartime period. Imperial Japan intended to control all human and material resources for its war effort, and total mobilization necessitated a strong control tower within the government and actual developmental goals based on a rapid increase in productivity. In that respect, the boom in economic plans in Asia in the 1950s was not so much an anxious reaction to the spread of the Soviet model, but rather provided favorable conditions for these Japanese social scientists who were once deeply involved in the construction of a controlled economy during the wartime period.

For instance, Hara Kakuten, one of the contributors to *Ajia keizai hatten no kiso riron* and a former member of the Research Bureau in the Manchurian Railway, a think-tank during the wartime period, clearly understood the nature of state-driven developmental plans in Asia. He asserted that these economic plans were contingent upon the flow of foreign capital, since no government in Asia was capable of securing the necessary capital for its public development projects.[68] In other words, he observed that

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[68] Hara Kakuten, "Keizai kaihatsu keikaku no hikaku keitaironteki kosatsu" [A Comparative

these developing countries were by no means economically independent. Hara's analysis was logically linked to the necessity of Japan's intervention in Asian economic development plans through providing capital. Hara was one of the main think-tank experts for Kishi Nobusuke's Asia plan in the late 1950s. As Kobayashi Hideo has succinctly pointed out, Kishi aimed to promote Japan's position in Asia by providing direct foreign capital to developing countries, and much of his thinking came from his experience as an architect of a "self-sufficient" Asian economic community in wartime Manchuria.[69]

## Conclusion

Pan-Asianist thinking and practice in early twentieth century East Asia was inseparable from Asian subjects' encounter with the West as colonizing powers. This seemingly messianic vision of a self-sufficient East Asian community reached its apex as Japan appropriated it as the rationalizing logic of its empire building during the wartime period. This indicates that Japanese wartime Pan-Asian ideologues, although different in their theoretical orientations, hardly problematized Japan's colonial violence against its Asian neighbors. Rōyama Masamichi was one of the most "evolved" Pan-Asianist social scientists during the wartime period. Instead of referring to intrinsic and biological commonalities among Asians, he, together with like-minded social scientists, grappled with the question of transforming the Chinese and colonial subjects into voluntary supporters of a Japan-led Pan-Asian empire. To this end, he paid special attention to the status of the underdeveloped economies in China and Japan's colonies and called for Japan to be actively involved in economic development as an

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Morphological Analysis of Economic Development Plans], in Nihon Ekafe Kyōkai, ed., *Ajia keizai hatten no kiso riron*, 614-615.

[69] Kobayashi Hideo, *Manshū to Jimintō* [Manchuria and the Liberal Democratic Party] (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 2005).

integral step toward a self-sufficient regional economy.

Rōyama's postwar perceptions of Asia did not show any substantial changes from his wartime writings. Admitting that the key player in reshaping an Asian order should be the United States, he still believed that the Japanese experience of wartime Pan-Asian empire building, although it failed, could provide a practical path for these newly decolonized countries in South Asia and Southeast Asia. Revisiting the idea of a state-centered planned economy for Japan's war efforts, Rōyama and a group of postwar Japanese social scientists attempted to revitalize their wartime thought, thereby rationalizing Japan's leading role in a postwar Asian order under American hegemony. Rōyama's writings and his influence in both academia and the political world first and foremost indicates that Pan-Asianist thinking, nominally stigmatized after Japan's defeat in the Second World War, never disappeared but rather shaped an important aspect of the Japanese vision of the international order during the early Cold War period.

More importantly, Rōyama's developmentalist approach to postwar Asia poses a much broader question in critically evaluating Japanese wartime ideologies. Beginning in the 1960s, the United States eventually employed the notion of state-centered planned economic development in the Third World, Southeast Asia in particular. The American realization of the necessity to deeply engage in rebuilding the economies of newly decolonized countries was part of its grand strategy to create an anti-communist buffer zone by transforming political leaders in Southeast Asia into potential supporters of American foreign policy in Asia. It is misleading to think that American policymakers simply borrowed Japan's wartime notion of economic development in Asia, led by Rōyama and advocates of the East Asian Community. However, an economic development-oriented approach to Cold War Asia by the United States certainly created political space and economic space for Japan's involvement in reshaping the Asian order. At stake is the question of revealing the link between colonial developmentalist Pan-Asian discourses in wartime Japan and America-led regional economic reconstruction and development projects in postwar Asia.

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# Hammer, Sickle, and the Shamrock: North Korea's Relations with the Workers' Party of Ireland

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## Hammer, Sickle, and the Shamrock: North Korea's Relations with the Workers' Party of Ireland

From the 1970s to the 1980s, North Korea, an anti-colonial revolutionary state, sought and established close relations with a variety of non-state actors also dedicated to anti-colonialism. The Workers' Party of Ireland (WPI) was one such group and viewed North Korea, officially known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), as a fellow divided nation with a fervently anti-imperialist worldview. Through a series of visits to North Korea in the 1980s, the WPI's leadership formed a close alliance with the Korean Workers' Party (KWP), the ruling party in the North Korean government. Although the WPI disagreed with the KWP's authoritarian grip on power in North Korea, they supported the DPRK's call for Korean reunification and sent a few members to the DPRK for military training. This article explores a facet of North Korean foreign policy that has received little attention in the historiography of the DPRK and argues that while the WPI and KWP saw similarities in the historical experiences of Korea and Ireland, WPI members ultimately viewed the DPRK's version of socialism as undesirable and unsuitable for Ireland's situation.

**Keywords:** North Korea, Workers' Party of Ireland, Kim Il Sung, Juche, Korean Workers' Party

# Hammer, Sickle, and the Shamrock: North Korea's Relations with the Workers' Party of Ireland

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## Introduction

During the 1970s and 1980s, North Korea, officially known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), interacted with a variety of non-state actors, from the Japanese Red Army to the Workers' Party of Ireland (WPI), in an attempt to strengthen its reputation abroad as a bastion of Third World socialism and non-alignment. As China began to embrace the global market system and the Soviet Union became bogged down in a war in Afghanistan, North Korea clung to its identity as a small socialist nation that did not abandon the path to Third World revolution.[1] A wide range of organizations traveled to the DPRK and became enthralled with its radical ideology of Juche (self-reliance), its commitment to Third

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[1] Charles Armstrong, *Tyranny of the Weak: North Korea and the World, 1950-1992* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013), 168-207.

World internationalism, and its fervent anti-American and anti-capitalist worldview. The ruling party in North Korea, the Korean Workers' Party (KWP), embraced these groups as partners in the global anti-imperialist movement and used them as a channel to disseminate propaganda abroad.

In this article, I will focus on the WPI and its relations with the KWP.[2] Each party had different reasons for establishing relations with the other but both shared a common ideological affinity to anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism. In addition, both parties represented a specific cause in a divided nation. Viewing capitalism rather than sectarian politics as the ultimate hurdle to a united Ireland, the WPI championed "Peace, Democracy, and Class Politics." As one of two ruling parties on the Korean peninsula, the KWP promoted the removal of American troops from South Korea and, beginning in the early 1970s, proposed the Confederal Republic of Koryo, which would represent a unified Korea at the United Nations and allow both South Korean and North Korean political structures to remain in place. Championing Korean reunification as one of its main policy goals, the KWP may have developed a special affinity to political parties from other divided nations.[3] During a September 1984 luncheon in Pyongyang with members of the WPI, North Korean and KWP leader Kim Il Sung highlighted commonalities in the

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[2] The WPI was originally known as the Official Sinn Féin and had close links to the Official Irish Republican Army. Some members of the WPI were also members of the Official IRA. The definitive work on the WPI is Brian Hanley and Scott Millar, *The Lost Revolution: The Story of the Official IRA and the Workers' Party* (Dublin: Penguin Ireland, 2009). For more on the origins of "the Troubles" and Irish paramilitary groups, see David McKittrick and David McVea, *Making Sense of the Troubles: The Story of the Conflict in Northern Ireland* (Chicago: New Amsterdam Books, 2002). In his informative article on Sinn Féin's foreign policy, political scientist Martyn Frampton explains that Sinn Féin did not want to build a new Ireland based on the North Korean model but the interactions with the North Koreans were part of "the republican perception of themselves, as belonging to a world-wide axis of opposition to the so-called 'colonial' states." See Martyn Frampton, "Squaring the Circle: The Foreign Policy of Sinn Féin, 1983-1989," *Irish Political Studies* 19, no. 2 (2004), 43-63.

[3] Rudiger Frank's recent work on North Korean-East German relations also supports this argument. See Rudiger Frank, *Nordkorea. Innenansichten eines totalen Staates* (Berlin: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2014).

historical trajectories of Korea and Ireland. Kim Il Sung said that both the Korean and Irish people “are still suffering from national division because of the policy of occupation pursued by outside forces.”[4]

The two foundational texts on North Korea’s foreign policy are Robert Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee’s *Communism in Korea* and the more recent book by Charles Armstrong, *Tyranny of the Weak*.[5] While a Cold War-era lens clouds Scalapino and Lee’s book, Armstrong offers a fresh perspective on the history of North Korea’s foreign relations. Armstrong devotes a chapter to North Korea’s interactions with the First and Third Worlds in the 1970s and argues that Kim Il Sung’s insistence on self-reliance and refusal to join the global economy ultimately conflicted with Pyongyang’s global engagement. Armstrong’s book fulfills a much-needed gap in the historiography of North Korea but does not adequately address the DPRK’s relations with non-state actors. While there has been a plethora of scholarship published on North Korea’s nuclear program and status in the international community as an isolated nation, the North Korean leadership’s support of non-state actors remains under-researched.[6] This article aims to shed light on a little known but revealing episode in North Korean history when Pyongyang crafted a niche in the international community as a state sponsor of non-state actors.[7] Although

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4 Kim Il Sung, “I Wish Your Party Success In Its Cause of Building a New Ireland,” *The Pyongyang Times,* September 29, 1984, 1.

5 Robert Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee, *Communism in Korea*, vols. 1 and 2 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972); Armstrong, *Tyranny of the Weak*.

6 The notable exceptions are Joseph Bermudez, *Terrorism: The North Korean Connection* (New York: Taylor & Francis, 1990); Terence Roehrig, “North Korea and the U.S. State Sponsor of Terrorism List,” *Pacific Focus* 24, no. 1 (April 2009), 82-106.

7 The Black Panther Party and the Japanese Red Army are two other non-state organizations that had close links to the North Korean government in the early 1970s. For scholarship on these topics, see Benjamin R. Young, “*Juche* in the United States: The Black Panther Party’s Relations with North Korea, 1969-1971,” *The Asia-Pacific Journal*, vol. 13, issue 12, no. 2 (March 30, 2015), <http://japanfocus.org/-Benjamin-Young/4303> (Accessed September 15, 2015); Patricia G. Steinhoff, “Kidnapped Japanese in North Korea: The New Left Connection,” *Journal of Japanese Studies* 30, no. 1 (Winter 2004), 123-142.

many of these organizations were seen within their own movements as too radical, Pyongyang sought ties with socialist groups, such as the Black Panther Party, Japanese Red Army, and the WPI, all of which supported class struggle, Third Worldism, and anti-imperialism.[8] Most of these organizations were also fiercely nationalistic, a characteristic which certainly attracted the ultra-nationalistic leadership in Pyongyang.[9] Through their alliances with these non-state actors, the North Korean government hoped to co-opt others into supporting their call for Korean reunification and Kim Il Sung's brand of socialism. Despite North Korea's geographic position as a small nation amongst superpowers in Northeast Asia, the state was able to project an extraordinary amount of power beyond its borders and appeal to non-state actors, such as the WPI, who shared similar viewpoints on matters of sovereignty and economics.

## Kim Il Sung and Third Worldism

North Korea's support of non-state actors began with Kim Il Sung's disenchantment with the two dominant economic orders of the world in the mid-1950s, Western liberal capitalism and the Soviet bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). As James Person has noted, Kim Il Sung feared that as a COMECON member the DPRK would be expected to merely export raw materials to the Soviet Union.[10] Not wanting to place the North Korean people in a semi-colonial position within the socialist bloc, Kim Il Sung rejected both economic structures

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8 Hugh Pearson, *The Shadow of the Panther. Huey Newton and the Price of Black Power in America* (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1994); Patricia Steinhoff, "Hijackers, Bombers, and Bank Robbers: Managerial Style in the Japanese Red Army," *Asian Studies* 48, no. 4 (November 1989), 724-740.

9 For more on North Korea's ultra-nationalist ideology, see B. R. Myers, *The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves and Why It Matters* (Brooklyn, NY: Melville House, 2011).

10 James F. Person, Introduction to "New Evidence on North Korea in 1956," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 16 (Fall 2007/Winter 2008), 447-454 <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/bulletin-no-16-fall-2007winter-2008> (Accessed April 14, 2015).

and focused on crafting alliances with other postcolonial and newly independent nations, which also sought an alternative to Soviet-style socialism or American-style capitalism.

Viewing the postcolonial nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America as the vanguard of a new international order, Kim Il Sung began to champion Third Worldism in the mid-1960s. Kim hoped to use the international body representing the Third World, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), to support the North's position in the struggle for legitimacy between Seoul and Pyongyang as the sole government representing Korea at the United Nations.[11] Thus, North Korea had two objectives, an internationally minded goal and a more localized one, when it came to Third Worldism. The first was the development of a new international order that placed anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism at the forefront of its platform. The second was the chance to use the support of Third World nations to gain an upper hand over Seoul in the battle for UN votes. So, this evokes the question: why did the North Korean leadership establish close relations with non-state actors who had no representation at the United Nations and were not from the Third World?

After the revolutions of 1968, First World radicals viewed the Third World with optimism hoping that this global project could provide an alternative to Western capitalism or Soviet communism.[12] While the People's Republic of China was most popular amongst First World radicals in the 1970s, North Korea with its independent streak and Juche ideology also attracted the gaze of First World radicals. As part of the DPRK's global publicity campaign for peaceful reunification of the

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11 Armstrong, *Tyranny of the Weak*, 180; Adrian Buzo, *The Guerilla Dynasty: Politics and Leadership in North Korea* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), 99; Bradley K. Martin, *Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader* (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2004) 137; Joon-kyu Park, "U.N. and North Korea: The Origin of the Korean Question," *East Asian Review* 1, no. 3 (Autumn 1974), 238-266.

12 Max Elbaum, *Revolution in the Air: Sixties Radicals Turn to Lenin, Mao, and Che* (London: Verso, 2002).

Korean peninsula in the 1970s and 1980s, the North Korean government sent propaganda materials to a variety of anti-imperialist organizations and funded "friendship" societies in the First World.[13] The North Koreans also set up various "peace" conferences in the First World in an attempt to promote the works of Kim Il Sung and gain international support for a reunified Korea.[14] The North Korean leadership hoped to use anti-imperialist organizations in the First World as a channel to disseminate North Korean propaganda and promote Kim Il Sung abroad as a great communist theorist. Although oblivious to the little political power these organizations actually wielded in their home countries, the North Korean government hoped that these First World radicals, who were sympathetic to Kim Il Sung's brand of socialism and call for Korean reunification, would gain high ranking political positions in the capitalist world and recognize the DPRK as the legitimate Korean government.[15] Pyongyang's isolation in the international community resulted in the Kim family regime's inability to understand how domestic politics in the West worked and often overestimated the actual power that radical social organizations, such as the Black Panthers and WPI, had in their domestic contexts. Pyongyang primarily used people-to-people diplomacy in the 1970s and 1980s as a way to spread their worldview and garner international attention for the movement to reunify the Korean peninsula under Kim Il Sung's proposed Confederal Republic of Koryo structure.

As part of North Korea's publicity campaign in the First World, the

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13 A North Korean friendship society was even established in New York City in the early 1970s. Noam Chomsky was a member of this organization. See Brandon Gauthier, "The American-Korean Friendship and Information Center and North Korean Public Diplomacy, 1971-1976," *Yonsei Journal of International Studies* 6, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 2014), 151-162.

14 Alfred Pfabigan, *Schlaflos in Pjongjang* [*Sleepless in Pyongyang*] (Vienna: Brandstatter, 1986).

15 For example, the North Koreans thought the Official IRA was a large revolutionary movement in Ireland with ample military equipment and popular support. As John Sweeney notes, "The Koreans thought that back home the Sticks [another title for the Official IRA] had a full-scale army, with tanks in the mountains, waiting for the revolution." See John Sweeney, *North Korea Undercover: Inside the World's Most Secret State* (London: Transworld Publishers, 2013), 206.

North Korean leadership established alliances with members of Western political parties. For example, German writer and leader of the German Green Party Luise Rinser visited the DPRK eleven times from 1980 to 1992 and met with Kim Il Sung forty five times during this same period.[16] Rinser became very close to Kim and spent an entire week in 1982 touring the northern provinces of the DPRK with the "Great Leader." Rinser, who was well known for her memoir detailing her experiences in a women's prison during Nazi rule, wrote a diary on her travels in North Korea.[17] This diary, which was translated from German to Korean, became popular amongst South Korean leftist dissidents during the democratization movement in the 1980s.[18] In her memoir, Rinser lauds North Korean socialism, which she sees as "socialism with a human face" and as "a model not just for the Third World."[19] Rinser also describes North Korea as a paradise for workers and peasants where child abuse, robbery, murder, and political prison camps are nonexistent.[20]

In October 1981, Rinser brought Marxist philosopher and fellow environmentalist Rudolf Bahro to the DPRK. Bahro, who was deported from East Germany to West Germany in 1979 after he wrote a book criticizing Soviet-style socialism, was impressed by North Korea's use of alternative energy sources and its lack of air pollution. After the trip, he said, "It is a lot of crap to put Hitler, Stalin, and Kim Il Sung in the same bag. I believe that he [referring to Kim Il Sung] is, in fact, a great man."[21]

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16 DPRK Embassy in Poland Bulletin No. 57, "President Kim Il Sung in Rinser's View," Date published unknown, <http://krld.pl/krld/czytelnia1> (Accessed February 23, 2015).

17 Luise Rinser, *Nordkoreanisches Reisetagebuch* [*A North Korean Diary*] (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1986).

18 The book in Korean was titled *Ruije Rinjŏ ŭi Pukhan iyagi* [*Luise Rinser's North Korea Story*] (Seoul: Hyŏngsŏngsa, 1988). See Namhee Lee, *The Making of Minjung: Democracy and Politics of Representation in South Korea* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007), 132.

19 Rinser, *Nordkoreanisches Reisetagebuch*, 144.

20 Ibid., 101-102.

21 "Alte Heimat," *Der Spiegel,* November 2, 1981, <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/

Although the German Green Party never gained much influence in German politics in the 1980s, the North Korean leadership's ability to attract Western political organizations, such as giving free trips to the "People's Korea," was a tactic used to garner support for the DPRK in the capitalist world. These government-monitored trips showed only the best parts of the "workers' paradise" in North Korea and were used to depict the DPRK as the legitimate Korean state. Interactions like this may be eschewed as mere propaganda but the WPI's search for a socialist model resulted in a brief but intense relationship with the North Korean regime that went beyond simple gestures of solidarity.

## Irish in North Korea

In 1922, the American travel writer E. Alexander Powell said, "Korea is the Ireland of the East. The more I consider the comparison, the better I like it." Powell went on to note similarities in the peasant cultures of Ireland and Korea. Powell explained, "The peasantry of both countries are ignorant, simple, patient, industrious, good-natured. Both are prone to use intoxicants to excess on occasion. Both are extremely superstitious with a terrified belief in the existence of spirits, goblins, and demons."[22] Little did Powell know that sixty years later an alliance would be formed between the workers' parties of North Korea and Ireland. During his 1984 trip to North Korea, WPI President Tomas MacGiolla said, "Though very far apart geographically, our two countries are close, very close, in our historical experiences."[23] While a shared history of domination by neighboring countries may have provided a rhetorical reasoning for the

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d-14342965.html> (Accessed April 2, 2015).

22 E. Alexander Powell, *Asia at the Crossroads: Japan, Korea, China, Philippine Islands* (New York: The Century Co., 1922), 101.

23 Tomas MacGiolla, "Let Me Assure You We Do All in Our Power to Assist You in Every Way," *The Pyongyang Times*, September 29, 1984, 1.

establishment of an alliance between the KWP and WPI, the Irish radicals were most likely attracted to DPRK's status as a Third World socialist nation with a fervently anti-imperialist ideology.

Although the Irish Republican movement had been in contact with members of the North Korean government since 1976, the relationship took off in September 1983 when two members of the WPI, General Secretary Sean Garland and Director of International Affairs Sean O'Cionnaith, visited the DPRK.[24] After arriving in Pyongyang, Garland and O'Cionnaith met Kim Yong-nam, minister of foreign affairs. They then visited various schools, health care facilities, and factories throughout the country. The two men were particularly impressed by the port of Nampho and told the theoretical magazine of the WPI, *Workers' Life*, after their trip that "the standard of living is quite high and the shops are well stocked… the people are well dressed and there were no indications of the sort of poverty that we witness daily in this country [referring to Ireland]."[25] This message must have pleased the leadership in Pyongyang and reinforced their notion that the North Korean people have "nothing to envy" in the world due to the DPRK's supposedly benevolent socialist system.[26]

In North Korea, Garland and O'Cionnaith also voiced their displeasure that the 70th conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), an international organization of parliaments from independent states designed to promote peace and democracy, was going to be held in Seoul, South Korea. These two members of the WPI issued a statement in Pyongyang on September 22 announcing that the WPI would not attend this event and "that the decision of the IPU to hold its conference in Seoul of south Korea is an insult to and mockery of all people of the world who

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24 Hanley and Millar, *The Lost Revolution*, 462.

25 *Workers' Life* (Feb. and Aug. 1984) cited in Hanley and Millar, *The Lost Revolution*, 462.

26 The "Nothing to Envy" slogan became the title of a noteworthy book on North Korean defectors from the city of Chongjin. See Barbara Demick, *Nothing to Envy: Ordinary Lives in North Korea* (New York: Spiegel & Grau, 2010).

aspire after human rights, democracy, and freedom.” The statement by the WPI stated, “The present Seoul regime is a tool of the US imperialists for the execution of their colonial subjugation policy and is little different from the Pretoria regime of South Africa.”[27] The WPI had adopted North Korea’s line that the South Korean government was a lackey of the United States.

After returning from North Korea, Garland told Paddy Woodworth, who was a freelance journalist and a WPI member from 1974-1984, that he admired the health care and education system in the DPRK but that the personality cult was too excessive and wasteful.[28] Woodworth was going to write an article for the *Workers' Life* on the odd personality cult surrounding Kim Il Sung’s regime but Garland reprimanded him. Garland said to him, “Ah come on now Paddy, I’m looking for support from these people.”[29] Garland told Brian Hamley and Scott Millar in an interview that they “weren’t under illusions” about the reality of life in the DPRK. However, they sympathized with the situation of a small, isolated country that was also divided and “were trying to do what they could themselves.” However, Garland grew frustrated with the North Korean government’s costly campaign to popularize Kim Il Sung abroad as a great communist theorist. For example, he told the North Koreans “that putting full-page ads into the *Irish Times* of Kim Il Sung’s thoughts was a waste of money because nobody f------n’ read them.”[30]

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the North Korean government placed full-page ads touting the exploits of Kim Il Sung and the success of the Juche ideology in many Western newspapers, such as the *Irish Times*, *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and *Boston Globe*.[31]

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27 “Statement of Irish Workers’ Party Delegation,” *The Pyongyang Times*, October 1, 1983, 6.

28 Author’s Skype interview with Paddy Wordworth (February 14, 2015).

29 Hamley and Millar, *The Lost Revolution*, 462-463.

30 Ibid., 462.

31 Benjamin R. Young, “How North Korean Ads in Western Newspapers Backfired,” *NK News,*

Pyongyang paid exorbitant fees for these full-page ads, which were mainly seen as outlandish by Western readers. However, the North Koreans were very deliberate with the content of their ads in the *Irish Times*. For example, a February 22, 1979 full-page ad in the *Irish Times* features a large portrait of Kim Il Sung and a report from the 30th anniversary celebration of the founding of the DPRK. The report, titled "Let us smash the two Koreas plot and peacefully reunify the country," endorses dialogue between North and South Korea and an end to the division on the Korean peninsula.[32] The placement of an ad promoting Korean reunification in an Irish newspaper is no coincidence. This was most likely an attempt by Pyongyang to sway the Irish public, who were also members of a divided nation, to support the DPRK's call for peaceful reunification. The WPI may have assisted the North Korean government with placement and payment for these ads in the *Irish Times*. However, the peak of WPI-KWP relations would not come until the mid-1980s.

The year 1984 was a busy year for WPI-KWP relations as the North Korean ambassador to Denmark, who had arranged Garland and O'Cionnaith's 1983 trip to the DPRK, visited Ireland in June and met with several Irish businessmen and representatives from semi-state enterprises.[33] In late September, WPI President Tomas MacGiolla, Vice President Seamus Lynch, and Garland were invited to North Korea. In Pyongyang, they had a luncheon with Kim Il Sung, the supreme leader of North Korea, and Hwang Jang Yop, the North Korean intellectual who designed the Juche ideology. In a speech during the luncheon, Kim highlighted that "both the Korean people and the Irish people have a bitter past when they were oppressed and maltreated under the colonial rule of the imperialists."

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September 27, 2013, <http://www.nknews.org/2013/09/how-north-koreans-ads-in-western-newspapers-backfired/> (Accessed April 12, 2015).

32 Kim Il Sung, "Let us smash the two Koreas plot and peacefully reunify the country," *Irish Times*, February 22, 1979.

33 Hamley and Millar, *The Lost Revolution*, 463.

Kim continued, "Active in these similar socio-historic conditions, our two parties have energetically struggled for the national and social emancipation of their peoples under the banner of independence, sovereignty, and socialism."[34] MacGiolla also gave a speech echoing many of the same points articulated by Kim Il Sung. MacGiolla stated, "Our enemy is the same: Imperial Capitalism. In your case it was first Japanese imperialism then the imperialism of the United States, in our case it was British imperialism which is now the puppet and client state of the U.S. imperialists just as Japan is today."[35] However, the KWP-WPI alliance was not solely based upon a recollection of similarities between Korean and Irish history. The two sides both supported revolutionary socialism and nuclear disarmament.

The luncheon speeches by Kim Il Sung and MacGiolla illuminate the ways in which each party saw the other. Both imagined the other as partners in the nuclear-free, Non-Aligned Movement. MacGiolla said, "We are convinced that the best interests of the Irish people would be served by joining the Non-Aligned Movement and working with your country in this organization to secure peace and justice for humanity."[36] Kim Il Sung and MacGiolla tried to position their respective countries as members of a new anti-imperialist international order composed of small postcolonial states united around the key concept of self-reliance. Both imagined themselves as champions of sovereignty and in conflict with liberal capitalist hegemony. During his luncheon speech, MacGiolla said, "We have in Gaelic as I'm sure you have in Korean, many phrases and sayings about people's struggles. One which comes to mind and I think very applicable to our parties and peoples, 'Ar troid, bhur troid, Bhur

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[34] Kim Il Sung, "I Wish Your Party Success In Its Cause of Building a New Ireland," *The Pyongyang Times*, September 29, 1984, 1.

[35] MacGiolla, "Let me Assure You We Do All in Our Power to Assist You in Every Way," *The Pyongyang Times*, September 29, 1984, 1.

[36] Ibid.

troid, ar troid.' Translated this means, 'Our fight is your fight, Your fight is our fight.'"[37]

MacGiolla hoped to implement a self-sufficient economic system in Ireland, like the one championed in North Korea. He lamented, "In the Irish Republic, which is independent and free from occupation, we have not achieved social, economic, or cultural freedom. We have a capitalist economy which is dominated by American monopoly capital."[38] By identifying that the Irish Republic was free from traditional colonialism but stuck in a new form of colonialism, liberal capitalism, MacGiolla is looking to North Korea for an alternative economic system based on localism rather than globalism.

Provisional Irish republican and Sinn Féin political party member Gerry MacLochlainn, who previously spent two years and eight months in a British prison for conspiracy to cause explosions, also saw admirable features in the North Korean system. While MacGiolla focused on the alternative economic system advocated by North Korea, MacLochlainn promoted the ideological output of North Korea, namely the Juche ideology and the concept of Chajusŏng (political independence). MacLochlainn gave a Spring 1985 seminar in London that connected the concepts of Juche and Chajusŏng to the situation of Ireland. MacLochlainn said that the Provisional movement of Irish republicanism had remained true to Chajusŏng since the movement upheld the dignity of the Irish nation and did not succumb to the influence of foreign powers. However, MacLochlainn said that the WPI had abandoned Chajusŏng since the party accepted a two state solution in Ireland and "were still trapped within flunkeyism." MacLochlainn questioned the party's commitment to self-reliance and national dignity. He said the WPI "stand as supporters of partition in our country, they stand clearly and unashamedly as supporters

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37 MacGiolla, "Let me Assure You We Do All in Our Power to Assist You in Every Way," *The Pyongyang Times*, September 29, 1984, 2.

38 Ibid., 1.

of imperialism in Ireland."[39] MacLochlainn's engagement with North Korean ideology shows the ways in which the Provisional movement portrayed themselves as being closely aligned with the principles of Juche: self-reliance, self-dignity, and independence.

While Sinn Féin had fewer direct ties to North Korea than the WPI, the party still sent members to North Korea and offered messages of solidarity to their Korean allies. In 1986, Sinn Féin sent a letter to the North Korean government supporting their struggle for the reunification of the Korean peninsula under the rubric of the Confederal Republic of Koryo.[40] Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams visited the North Korean ambassador in Denmark, who had seemed to develop an affinity for the Irish, during an April 1987 speaking tour in Scandinavia. Adams and the ambassador celebrated the 75th birthday of the "Great Leader" Kim Il Sung together.[41] After the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, the North Korean leadership wanted to outdo South Korea by hosting the World Festival of Youth and Students, a gathering of various international socialist movements and organizations, during the following year.[42] Sinn Féin sent a delegation of students to this event. According to a report in the Sinn Féin newspaper, *An Phoblacht/Republican News*, "While in Korea, the Sinn Féin members will have the opportunity of meeting with the youth wings of the government parties in most newly emerging countries of the

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39 Gerry MacLochlainn, *The Irish Republican and Juche Conception of National Self-Dignity are One and the Same: Paper presented to the Seminar on the Juche Idea* (London: Mosquito Press, 1985).

40 "Sinn Féin Letter to Korea," *Ireland's War* (June 1986) cited in Liam O'Ruairc, "From Havana to Pyongyang: First in a series examining Sinn Féin's international links," *The Blanket* e-magazine (Winter 2002), <http://indiamond6.ulib.iupui.edu:81/pyongyang.html> (Accessed May 2, 2015).

41 "Gerry Adams visits Scandinavia," *Ireland's War* (April 1987) cited in O'Ruairc, "From Havana to Pyongyang," *The Blanket*, <http://indiamond6.ulib.iupui.edu:81/pyongyang.html> (Accessed May 2, 2015).

42 Sergey Radchenko, "Sport and Politics on the Korean Peninsula: North Korea and the 1988 Seoul Olympics," *Wilson Center- North Korea International Documentation Project* (NKIDP) e-Dossier no. 3 (December 2011), <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/sport-and-politics-the-korean-peninsula-north-korea-and-the-1988-seoul-olympics> (Accessed April 22, 2015).

Third World, with labor and socialist parties in Western Europe, the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand."[43] Influential members of Sinn Féin such as Gerry MacLochlainn, Sheena Campbell, and John Doyle may have also attended the 1989 youth festival in Pyongyang.[44] Due to the presence of delegations from many international political organizations at this event, the North Korean leadership attempted to present itself to the world as a legitimate and powerful government that has the ability to compete with a resurgent South Korea. However, North Korea's ubiquitous and wasteful personality cult dissuaded many Irish republicans from supporting the DPRK's position as the legitimate Korean government.

## Propaganda, Nuclear Politics, and Military Training

Despite the Irish republican perception of North Korea as a fellow anti-colonial revolutionary actor, many WPI members internally criticized the DPRK government as authoritarian and North Korean propaganda as laughable. According to Woodworth, no one in the WPI actually viewed life in North Korea as admirable. The Soviet Union was in fact more widely discussed amongst WPI members.[45] Former member of the WPI's International Affairs committee Colm Breathnach said that the WPI knew the North Korean propaganda "was a load of shit. And they'd laugh at it in private. I think where the ideological thing came in was, what they really bought into was the so-called anti-imperialist element, an element of 'look, whoever is really hostile to the Yanks must be on the side of the angels.'"[46] Breathnach explained that the North Koreans had sent them

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43 "Sinn Féin delegation at World Youth Festival," *An Phoblacht/Republican News,* June 29, 1989.

44 In his brief article, O'Ruairc notes that MacLochlainn, Campbell, and Doyle attended the 1989 festival but I could not find this information in the *An Phoblacht/Republican News* article that he cited. See O'Ruairc, "From Havana to Pyongyang," *The Blanket*, <http://indiamond6.ulib.iupui.edu:81/pyongyang.html> (Accessed May 2, 2015).

45 Author Skype interview with Paddy Wordworth (February 14, 2015).

46 Colm Breathnach quoted in Tom Farrell, "Rocky Road to Pyongyang: DPRK-IRA Relations

propaganda books and "just for a laugh" Breathnach would occasionally read these North Korean publications. However, Breathnach notes that nobody else in the WPI read them and interactions with the North Koreans "were for more pragmatic reasons."[47] So what were these "pragmatic reasons?"

Woodworth notes that the WPI identified with the DPRK's opposition to nuclear weapons.[48] Today, the North Korean leadership boasts about its nuclear weapons program and ability to strike the U.S. mainland.[49] However, in the 1980s, the DPRK government's position on nuclear weapons was radically different as Pyongyang proposed a nuclear weapon free zone on the Korean peninsula. Due to the placement of American nuclear weapons in South Korea, the North Korean government held an international conference for denuclearization and peace on the Korean peninsula in 1986, which attracted delegations from over 80 non-aligned and communist nations.[50] Two members of the WPI, Sean Garland and Proinsias De Rossa, attended this conference. According to Woodworth, the WPI thought the U.S. was reckless and unpredictable with nuclear weapons and were "playing nuclear chess" in South Korea.[51] The General Secretary's Report from the 1987 WPI delegate conference explains, "The continued United States occupation and domination of South Korea is

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in the 1980s," *NK News,* May 17, 2013, <http://www.nknews.org/2013/05/the-rocky-road-to-pyongyang-dprk-ira-relations-in-the-1980s/> (Accessed January 15, 2015).

47 Breathnach quoted in Farrell, "Rocky Road to Pyongyang, <http://www.nknews.org/2013/05/the-rocky-road-to-pyongyang-dprk-ira-relations-in-the-1980s/> (Accessed January 15, 2015).

48 Author's Skype interview with Paddy Wordworth (February 14, 2015).

49 James Pearson, "North Korean Photo Reveals 'U.S. Mainland Strike Plan,'" *NK News,* March 29, 2013, <http://www.nknews.org/2013/03/breaking-north-korean-photo-reveals-u-s-mainland-strike-plan/> (Accessed April 17, 2015).

50 Rodney Katz, "Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Proposals: Strategic Implications for the United States," *A Report Prepared under an Interagency Agreement by the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress* (November 1986), 7.

51 Author's Skype interview with Paddy Wordworth (February 14, 2015).

another flashpoint for possible world war."[52] In 1988, the party conference's General Secretary Report reiterated, "The continued US domination of South Korea, the presence of over 40,000 US troops with thousands of so-called tactical nuclear weapons, makes the Korean peninsula a major flashpoint in the world."[53] Meanwhile, the WPI did not believe the Soviets would ever use nuclear weapons due to their experiences during World War II and the massive loss of Soviet lives during that conflict.[54] Behind the scenes, North Korean scientists and engineers were busy building the regime's own nuclear program in the 1980s.[55] However, the North Korean leadership's superficial commitment to nuclear disarmament earned praise from Western radicals, such as the WPI.

Despite agreeing with North Korea's stance towards nuclear disarmament, De Rossa came back from this conference unenthusiastic about life in North Korea.[56] He said it was "a completely unreal society and unreal situation, where people were basically treated as children not as adults at all."[57] However, he saw the WPI-Korean Workers' Party relationship as a necessary part of the broader friendship between the

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52 Workers' Party of Ireland, "Ard Fheis Annual Delegate Conference - 1987 : General Secretary's Report" (1987). *Materials*. Paper 24. <http://arrow.dit.ie/workerpmat/24> (Accessed February 17, 2015).

53 Workers' Party of Ireland, "General Secretary's Report to the Workers' Party Ard Fheis, Annual Delegate Conference 1988" (1988). *Materials*. Paper 14. <http://arrow.dit.ie/workerpmat/14> (Accessed February 17, 2015).

54 Author's Skype interview with Paddy Wordworth (February 14, 2015).

55 The DPRK sought assistance from the USSR in 1985 to build a nuclear power plant. See "Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry," *NKIDP* Digital Archive (March 9, 1985), <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110142> (Accessed March 25, 2015).

56 According to a report from the U.S. government, the nuclear disarmament conference in Pyongyang "concluded with the signing of a declaration which condemned the U.S. military presence in South Korea and attempted to present Pyongyang as the more peace-oriented of the two Koreas." See Katz, "Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Proposals," 7.

57 Hamley and Millar, *The Lost Revolution*, 483.

Soviet Communist Party and the WPI.[58] In 1997, De Rossa appeared in the Irish High Court suing the *Sunday Independent* newspaper for libel. The cross-examiner for the *Sunday Independent* brought up De Rossa's recent history with the WPI and noted that party had established relations with authoritarian regimes like North Korea, which "was hardly in reform mode" and had "an appalling oppressive party." De Rossa agreed that the KWP was an oppressive party but it was not beneficial to isolate entire nations.[59]

While the WPI were sympathetic with the KWP's calls for nuclear disarmament on the Korean peninsula, a more practical reason for the WPI's close relations with Kim Il Sung's regime was the training offered by the DPRK's military. In October 1988, six members of the WPI's paramilitary branch, which was cryptically referred to as "Group B" in a key WPI document, flew from Ireland to Pyongyang via Moscow. In a military training camp 30 miles north of Pyongyang, the six Group B members were taught kidnapping techniques, explosives detonation, Korean martial arts, and learned that the best way to kill a man was to "stab a man in the back of the neck, and then twist, cutting into the cerebral cortex."[60] For two months, these six Irishmen woke up at 6 a.m. every morning for fitness training. The training in North Korea ended when two of the Irishmen got in a fight. British journalist John Sweeney interviewed one of the six Group B members who trained in North Korea. According to this anonymous Group B member, "It was the worst place I ever went to. The poor bastards believe they are living in Utopia."[61]

While many WPI members later criticized the dystopian nature of

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58 Ibid.

59 Christine Newman, "Cross Examination Frustrates De Rossa," *The Irish Times*, March 1, 1997, <http://www.irishtimes.com/news/cross-examination-frustrates-de-rossa-1.47786> (Accessed February 3, 2015).

60 John Sweeney, *North Korea Undercover: Inside the World's Most Secret State* (London: Transworld Publishers, 2013), 206.

61 Sweeney, *North Korea Undercover*, 209.

North Korean society, Breathnach explains that he had "never heard anyone, including De Rossa, say anything about these things until 1989-1990 when the WPI began to unravel anyway. [Breathnach] heard people laughing at it as if, 'Oh ho ho, those f-----n North Koreans' kind of thing. But [he] never heard any kind of critique."[62] In the 1980s, most WPI members viewed North Korea as an isolated socialist nation with a dictatorial leadership that limits the freedoms of its people. On the other hand, they were also fond of North Korea's anti-imperialist platform and sympathized with its calls for nuclear disarmament. In 1990, Breathnach proposed that the WPI sever ties with this "one-family dynastic state," which he described as "Orwellian."[63] However, Garland and a few of the top officials in the party dismissed Breathnach's proposal and continued their dealings with the North Korean government.

## Conclusion

At the party conference in 1988, the WPI declared, "Our efforts to assist the Korean people in their struggle are on a number of fronts, cultural and political. As with so many areas of our activity, the need to combat the distortion and lies peddled about the Korean struggle is one of the most important."[64] However, the WPI-KWP relationship may have went beyond the cultural and political fronts as Sean Garland, the driving force behind the WPI-KWP relationship, may have been helping the North Korean government disseminate high quality counterfeit U.S. dollars, known as "supernotes," in Great Britain and Eastern Europe. At the 2005

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62 Breathnach quoted in Farrell, "Rocky Road to Pyongyang," <http://www.nknews.org/2013/05/the-rocky-road-to-pyongyang-dprk-ira-relations-in-the-1980s/> (Accessed January 15, 2015).

63 Hamley and Millar, *The Lost Revolution*, 564.

64 Workers' Party of Ireland, "General Secretary's Report to the Workers' Party Ard Fheis, Annual Delegate Conference 1988" (1988). *Materials*. Paper 14. <http://arrow.dit.ie/workerpmat/14> (Accessed February 17, 2015).

WPI conference in Belfast, Garland was arrested on charges that he had aided in the distribution of one million dollars' worth of North Korean-made supernotes, which were meant to undermine and disrupt the economy of the United States.[65] Garland was later released on bail but U.S. authorities continued to try to extradite Garland. In 2011, the Irish High Court finally dismissed the U.S. application to extradite Garland.[66]

As the Soviet system crumbled from within and the WPI reassessed their commitment to Marxism-Leninism in the early 1990s, "the Korean struggle" was no longer seen as critically important by the WPI's international affairs committee. According to former WPI member Martin Lynch, "It was clear that, at the time, knowledge of relations with North Korea was kept to a handful of people at the very top."[67] Tony Heffernan, the former press officer for the WPI, recollects that the topic of North Korea was not a priority for WPI members in the parliament.[68] North Korea clearly did not become the Marxian model for most members of the WPI. However, the North Koreans were able to get the WPI on board with their calls for Korean reunification and the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Despite its "Orwellian" society, North Korea represented certain values that attracted the WPI: self-reliance, anti-imperialism, and Third World socialism. North Korea's relations with non-state actors, such as the WPI, open a new way of viewing the Kim family state. While isolated by nations of the so-called "Free World," the North Korean

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65 "Leader of Irish Workers' Party and Official Irish Republican Army Arrested in United Kingdom on U.S. Indictment Charging Trafficking in Counterfeit United States Currency," *U.S. Department of Justice Press Release* (October 8, 2005) <https://web.archive.org/web/20051014220354/http://www.justice.gov/usao/dc/Press_Releases/2005_Archives/Oct_2005/05370.html> (Accessed March 12, 2015); "US Says North Korea Forged Dollars," *BBC News* (October 13, 2005), <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4337610.stm> (Accessed April 4, 2015).

66 "Garland 'delighted' as extradition to US denied," *Irish Independent* (December 22, 2011), <http://www.independent.ie/irish-news/courts/garland-delighted-as-extradition-to-us-denied-26804527.html> (Accessed May 16, 2015).

67 Author's communication with Martin Lynch (February 17, 2015).

68 Author's communication with Tony Heffernan (February 25, 2015).

leadership devoted a significant amount of financial resources to influencing First World radical movements, like Irish Republicanism. While the DPRK leadership's global publicity campaign ultimately failed, it contests the label of the DPRK as a "hermit kingdom." The Cold War was a competition between heavyweights, chiefly the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, but the radical ideological orientation of a small power such as North Korea allowed it to punch above its weight class in the international order and confront hegemonic powers. Although the Kim family's personality cult later left many Western supporters disenchanted with the DPRK's version of socialism, the radical politics of Pyongyang initially appealed to non-aligned political movements, such as Irish republicanism.

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# Research Trend

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# Tumultuous Times: Shifts in Mongolian Cultural Identity since 1947

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## Tumultuous Times:
## Shifts in Mongolian Cultural Identity since 1947

Following protests that erupted in May 2011, Mongols continue to protest against state development, which have been called "land grabs," throughout Inner Mongolia. Protests are modes through which Mongols resist the loss of land and the loss of a distinct cultural identity. For Mongols, pastoralism, language, and Genghis Khan are essential markers of a distinct ethnic identity and tools through which Mongols resist Hanification. To understand how these three areas of cultural identity have become sites of resistance to Hanification, it is necessary to understand the changes that have occurred in Inner Mongolia. This article will trace the historical shifts in Inner Mongolia since 1947, the year that province was established as the first of China's minority autonomous regions. I look to the work of other scholars, to cultural productions, and to my own experience of living in Inner Mongolia to analyze how historical shifts impact Mongolian cultural identity.

**Keywords:** Mongols, Inner Mongolia, history, cultural identity, ethnopolitics

# Tumultuous Times: Shifts in Mongolian Cultural Identity since 1947

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The grasslands in Northern China are a "familiar and ancestral place" where Mongols continue to grapple with the reality that the connection between place and culture is broken.[1] Historically, the grasslands have been the space where Mongols lived as nomadic pastoralists. But, pastoralism in Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, hereafter Inner Mongolia, and throughout China, is nearly extinct.[2] Caroline Humphrey and David Sneath's *The End of Nomadism?*, which was published in 1999, explores the end of nomadism throughout Inner Asia and examines how Mongols have adjusted to market oriented policies that threaten the viability of mobile pastoralism.[3] Although pastoralism has been in decline throughout Inner Asia for many years, the pastoral identity is still

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1 Akhil Gupta and James Clifford, *Culture, Power, Place* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), 38.

2 This essay uses "Mongolian" to refer to locations and institutions and uses "Mongol" to refer to people. It also uses "Inner Mongolia," instead of "IMAR" to refer to Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.

3 Caroline Humphrey and David Sneath, *The End of Nomadism? Society, State, and the Environment in Inner Asia* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999).

important in maintaining ethnic boundaries so that Mongols are distinct from other ethnic groups in China. Mongols look to the reimagined pastoral identity and other cultural markers, such as language and Genghis Khan, as tools of resistance to the Hanification of a distinct Mongolian identity.[4]

This paper is situated within the ongoing Mongol resistance to state-driven urban economic development in Inner Mongolia which continues to transform the grassland areas and interrupt Mongol cultural identity. I lived in Inner Mongolia for eight years during 2001-2012. In May 2010, I witnessed Mongolian protests that began as the result of a hit-and-run death of a Mongol shepherd. Those protests were a catalyst for my doctoral research in which I investigate what other factors have contributed to the protests that have continued since May 2011 in Inner Mongolia. In order to understand ongoing Mongol resistance, it is necessary to understand the shifts in the Mongolian culture that have resulted from state driven policies. Thus, this paper examines the historical shifts within Inner Mongolia since it was established as an autonomous region in 1947.

In 1911, when the Qing dynasty ended, the entire Chinese territory was thrust into a period of political and economic instability. This left China vulnerable to other foreign powers such as Russia and Japan, which were both vying for the loyalties of the Mongols. In November 1924, the Soviet Union dominated Outer Mongolia and helped sponsor the formation of the Mongolian People's Republic, which despite its official title, was essentially a Soviet satellite state.[5] The remainder of the Mongolian territory aligned with Japan from 1931 to 1945, when Japan invaded Manchuria and launched what would be known as the second Sino-Japanese War.[6]

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4 This essay uses the transliteration "Genghis Khan" as opposed to "Chingis Khan," "Chinggis Khan," or any other variation used throughout Western scholarship.

5 Bruce A. Ellerman, "Secret Sino-Soviet Negotiations on Outer Mongolia, 1918-1925," *Pacific Affairs* 66, no. 4 (Winter 1993), 539.

6 Uradyn Bulag, *Collaborative Nationalism* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010), 13.

After the defeat of Japan, the Chinese Communists formed an official political relationship with the leaders of the Mongolian territory as part of a strategic move to gain Mongol loyalty and support. This exclusive relationship with China led to the establishment of an autonomous region for Mongols living in the Chinese territory on May 1, 1947. The Chinese state hoped that the newly formed autonomous region would create an "expectation of belonging" in which ethnic minority groups have ownership over territory.[7] However, in reality, the autonomy inserted as part of the official name of the province was only meant to satisfy the Mongols so that they would align with Mao Zedong nd the Chinese Communists, and thereby prevent any possible allegiance to the Chinese Nationalists or foreign powers. The Chinese state never intended Inner Mongolia to be a place of true political autonomy for Mongols living there.

## Assimilation: Hanification and the End of Pastoralism

The expansion of the Chinese territory and the transition from dynastic rule to the nation-state model was not smooth. In order to establish itself as legitimate and powerful, the Chinese state needed to unite all the people living within its territory. Out of this shifting political environment, Louisa Schein suggests that two nationalisms were developed. She writes, "Han nationalism was concerned with boundaries between people within the shifting territory of the Chinese polity, specifically between Han and those designated as 'barbarians.' Chinese nationalism rose in response to foreign imperialist aggression…."[8] Han nationalism was developed out of the promotion of Han as "modern" and all others living in China as "barbaric." Chinese nationalism was created in order to build a strong political identity

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[7] Uradyn Bulag, *The Mongols at China's Edge: History and the Politics of National Unity* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), 9.

[8] Louisa Schein, *Minority Rules* (Chapel Hill, NC: Duke University Press, 2000), 108.

in light of foreign powers that threatened the rule of the Qing Dynasty. In Inner Mongolia, Han assimilation into the Mongolian territory promotes both ideologies.

Before these two nationalisms could be developed, *Han* as a distinct ethnic category had to be created. Han are the largest ethnic group in China comprising more than 90% of the national population. Even in Inner Mongolia, there are more Han than Mongols. The reason for this can be partly explained by ethnic classification projects, which were developed in order to create a strong Chinese national identity. The broad category of *Hanzu ren* (Han ethnicity) was created as a new device which could be used to unite all the different people that lived throughout the Chinese territory. By creating this new ethnic category, the state was able to construct what Benedict Anderson calls an "imagined community" by "stretching the short tight skin of the narration over the gigantic body of the empire."[9] Thus, despite any other identity that different people living throughout the Chinese territory may have had, they were categorized into one large group and labeled *Hanzu ren*. Non-Han people were termed *minzu*, which can be translated in English as "people group," "ethnic group," "nation," or even "nationality." Prior to the import of this term from Japan, there was no Mandarin word to describe the different people living in the Chinese territory. At the time of its introduction into the Chinese language, the term was used both as a way to distinguish one group of people from another and to mobilize those in the Chinese territory. *Minzu* worked with *Hanzu* as a way to get all *zu* united together to form a new Chinese nation (Ch. *Zhongua minzu*). Christopher Atwood argues that the fluidity of the term (Ch. *minzu*), having different meanings, "has proved to be one of the most important ways that the Chinese state allows members of minority nationalities to reconcile loyalty to their

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9 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin an Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991), 87.

nationality as an ethnic community with loyalty to China as a state and country."[10]

Fredrik Barth's seminal essay about ethnic groups elucidates the function of ethnic boundaries. He writes, "…ethnic groups only persist as significant units if they imply marked difference in behaviour, that is, persisting cultural differences."[11] Within the Chinese state, ethnic boundaries function in the same way. That is to say ethnic boundaries make a way for groups with distinct behavioral differences to be marked as different than others within China. But, the term *minzu* is not just a term that marks distinctions between China's ethnic minorities. The term instead functions as a way of viewing each *minzu* through their relationship with the dominant *Hanzu*. In other words *Hanzu* are the lens through which China's minority groups are viewed.

As mentioned above, there are more Han than Mongols living in Inner Mongolia. In 1947, there were four Han for every one Mongol in Inner Mongolia. But by 1960, the ratio had more than doubled.[12] The mass movement of Han to Inner Mongolia was not accidental, nor was it a new trend in Chinese politics. Early in the Qing Dynasty, the Manchu court prohibited the assimilation of Han Chinese to the Mongolian territory. This also included the protection of the Mongolian pasturelands.[13] However, the Qing were soon challenged by internal problems which included the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864) and external challenges to its stability which included the First Opium War (1839-1842) and the Second Opium

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10 Christopher P. Atwood, "National Questions and National Answers in The Chinese Revolution; or How Do You Say *Minzu* in Mongolian?," *Indiana East Asian Working Paper Series on Language and Politics in Modern China* (1994), 39.

11 Fredrik Barth, "Introduction" in Fredrik Barth, ed., *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference* (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 1969), 15.

12 David Sneath, *Changing Inner Mongolia: Pastoral Mongolian Society and the Chinese State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 88.

13 Enze Han, "The Dog That Hasn't Barked: Assimilation and Resistance in Inner Mongolia, China," *Asian Ethnicity* 12, no. 1 (February 2011), 57.

War (1856-1860).[14] These encounters with Western powers forced the Qing Dynasty to reevaluate their protection of Mongolian pasturelands. Xiaoyuan Liu asserts that the encounter with Western powers forced the Manchu court to recognize that "agricultural elements of sedentary Chinese society turned out to be the most effective forced in substantiating the Manchu court's internal and external sovereignty in the vast and largely nomadic land of Inner Asia."[15] The Qing Dynasty's quest for sovereignty and security over its territory created a self-propelled transformation into more of "nation-state" that could interact with the international community than that of an isolated body of power with limited contact with state powers outside its borders. But, before the Manchu court could westernize its empire, it needed to first "sinicize" it.[16] As such Qing policies began to focus on the "modernization" of Inner Asia through Han population transfers and the introduction of Han agricultural practices in lieu of nomadism.[17] In other words, the Qing Dynasty achieved a Manchu rule over Inner Mongolia through the sinicization of the region.

The assimilation of Han into Inner Mongolia continued during the Republican period (1912-1949). During this period, the Chinese state secured its border regions by moving Han into areas where there was a strong minority population. Owen Lattimore, who wrote about the state's prevalent assimilation (Ch. *tong hua*) policies in Northern China during the 1930s, suggests that though *tong hua* means "to assimilate," referring

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14 Han, "The Dog That Hasn't Barked," 57.

15 Xiaoyuan Liu, *Reins of Liberation* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 13.

16 For further discussion of the ethnonational identity of the Qing Dynasty see Pamela Kyle Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999); Mark C. Elliot, *The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001); Ping-ti Ho, "In Defense of Sinicization: A Rebuttal of Evelyn Rawski's 'Reenvisioning the Qing,'" *The Journal of Asian Studies* 57, no. 1 (February 1998), 123-155; Evelyn S. Rawski, "Presidential Address: Reenvisioning the Qing: The Significance of the Qing Period in Chinese History," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 55, no. 4 (November 1996), 829-850.

17 Liu, *Reins of Liberation*, 13.

to the assimilation of Han and agriculturalism to Inner Mongolia, in practice *tong hua* actually means the "extermination of the Mongols, to make room for the Chinese."[18] In his article "On the Wickedness of Being Nomads," Lattimore used other terms, such as "Chinese colonization" and "agricultural colonization" to explain, "All policies towards the Mongols, whether Chinese, Soviet or Japanese, appear to start from, a common premise: that something must be done about the nomadism of the Mongols."[19] The end of Mongol nomadism would further assimilate Mongols into the state approved Han identity. Further, moving Han to the region interrupted any potential ethno-nationalistic tendencies that Mongols may have harbored. The state's perspective that a Han identity would balance out other ethnic identities in China is representative of the political ideology that affirms that to be Han is to be Chinese, and vice versa.

After the People's Republic of China was established in 1949, it continued the strategy of balancing the Han and ethnic populations in China's border regions.[20] Dee Mack Williams' ethnographic study suggests that "Chinese rangeland policy initiatives are informed by a long history of antagonism with the grassland environment and its native inhabitants" and that this attitude was then adopted by the "Marx-Lenin-Mao line of political philosophy (which) viewed nomadic pastoralism as an evolutionary dead-end standing in opposition to national progress, scientific rationalism, and economic development."[21] As such, Mao began Han population transfers to Inner Mongolia by claiming that there was an urgent need to address population swells on China's eastern coast and to take advantage of the available open land in Inner Mongolia. Between

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18 Owen Lattimore, "On the Wickedness of Being Nomads," *T'ien Hsia Monthly* 1, no. 2 (September 1935), 423.

19 Lattimore, "On the Wickedness of Being Nomads," 415.

20 Humphrey and Sneath, *The End of Nomadism?*, 91.

21 Dee Mack Williams, *Beyond Great Walls* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), 10.

1958 and 1959, as many as one million Han settled in Inner Mongolia.[22] Han repopulation not only shifted the demographics of the region, but the rapid increase of Han in the province also influenced its economy, political environment, and culture. This was because of the difference between nomadic Mongols and Han which were sedentary agriculturists. That is not to say that some Mongols were not farmers and that some Han were not shepherds. But generally speaking there is a distinction between the two ethnic groups along the lines of occupational identities because, "The emotion that pastoralism conjures up for Mongols derives from its importance as the quintessential historical cultural marker of Mongolness."[23] In contrast to Mongol pastoralists, Han agriculturalists lived on farms with fixed boundaries and settled homes. The state preference for the Han identity to be the standard by which all other ethnic identities are viewed, combined with the influx of Han into Inner Mongolia, resulted in a preference for agriculturalism. As such, Mongols continued to find themselves marked as "backward" because they were "unable" to progress from the antiquated nomadic pastoral economy to a more modern sedentary Chinese agricultural economy.[24] This led to an emerging discourse that favored a "civilized" agricultural economy over a "primitive" pastoral economy.[25]

The transition for many Mongol pastoralists from a nomadic lifestyle to a settled one was not immediate but, rather, a gradual and subtle normalization that occurred over time. In the 1950s and the 1960s, the state developed policies aimed at building settled Mongolian communities. Families were no longer nomadic, but lived in settled

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22 Sneath, *Changing Inner Mongolia*, 88.

23 Bulag, *The Mongols at China's Edge*, 7.

24 This essay uses the term "backwards" which follows other scholars who use this term in reference to the Chinese view of ethnic minority cultural traits such as nomadism and language. See Lattimore, "On the Wickedness of Being Nomads"; Anderson, *Imagined Communities*; Williams, *Beyond Great Walls*.

25 Williams, *Beyond Great Walls*, 66.

homes with only some family members moving with the herds to various pasture sites throughout the year.[26] The justifications for such policies were rooted in the notion that education and healthcare were more accessible in urban centers than in the grasslands. Around the same time, the state also focused on expanding the agricultural industry, a move which further impacted the amount of pastureland available to herders.[27] The result of these policies was astounding. In 1949, all the families in the Xilingol league were mobile, but, by 1962, 40% of the families living in that area had become "settled with moving herding."[28]

During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) there were also a large number of Han population transfers to Inner Mongolia. Mao claimed that rural pastoral areas throughout Inner Mongolia were strongholds for ethnic nationalism, and in order to prevent any potential separatist movements, Han immigration and land reclamation was necessary. The logic behind this policy was that Han would be more loyal to the Chinese state than Mongols which is still a strong ideology within the Chinese state in which "The Party brands all challenges to Han rule, however oblique, as "splittism" punishable by a prison term or even death."[29] Examples of this ideology is evident in the state's relationship with Tibetans and Uyghurs who are still viewed, to varying degrees, as internal enemies fraught with ethnic nationalism and splittist tendencies.[30]

By the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping initiated economic reforms that focused on modernizing China by developing the agriculture industry throughout the country. The plan was meant to benefit the national

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26 Sneath, *Changing Inner Mongolia*, 87.

27 Humphrey and Sneath, *The End of Nomadism?*, 91.

28 Sneath, *Changing Inner Mongolia*, 87.

29 Gardner Bovington, "The Not-So-Silent Majority: Uyghur Resistance to Han Rule in Xinjiang," *Modern China* 28, no. 1 (January 2002), 46.

30 See Nasan Bayar, "Nation-building, Ethnicity and Natural Resources," *Inner Asia* 16 (2014), 378; Bovington, "The Not-So-Silent Majority," 46.

economy, but in Inner Mongolia, the push for an expanded agricultural economy resulted in the further demise of the Mongolian pastoral economy. Once again, the state preferred Han agricultural economy was promoted as a progressive method and as one of the keys to modernizing the country. The national focus on modernization resulted in new regional policies throughout the country as well. For example, the introduction of the household contract responsibility system meant herding communities would have to sell their livestock to private households and many pasturelands would be enclosed.[31] Mongolian spatial identity has been negatively affected by the transformation from open to enclosed pasturelands.[32]

By 1995, the increase in the rate of desertification in Inner Mongolia prompted the Chinese government to create new laws to protect the lands from over-grazing.[33] Because Mongols were no longer mobile, moving from one pastureland to another throughout the year, the land used to raise sheep was unable to naturally be replenished. Ironically, Mongol herders, who were forced to become settled citizens, were blamed for overgrazing the land. Williams captures the increased resentment about land degradation between Mongols and the state. He writes that Mongols "not only reject the Chinese national discourse that would scapegoat Mongol herders, they explicitly blame Beijing for causing (through colonialism) and perpetuating (through neglect) the land degradation that jeopardizes their livelihood."[34] Mongols resent the blame for the emerging environmental issues and the social environment in which Han continue to be promoted as "scientific" and Mongols are still viewed as "backwards." In the wake of the May 2011 protests, a rap song entitled "Song Dedicated to Mergen, Hero of the Grasslands" was written to honor

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31 Bilik, "How Do You Say China in Mongolian?," 71.

32 Williams, *Beyond Great Walls*, 67.

33 Han, "The Dog That Hasn't Barked," 59.

34 Williams, *Beyond Great Walls*, 195-196.

the memory of the shepherd who was struck and killed by a truck driver in the grasslands. The rap song was also an outlet that criticized various state policies in Inner Mongolia. In reference to the attempt by the state to blame Mongols for the above stated environmental issues, some of the lyrics read:

> Once green Mongolian plateau turned to yellow
> Beautiful grasslands turning to desert
> The government says it is the herders' fault
> Have you ever thought about it carefully?
> Whose fault is it really?
> Overgrazing is a myth and a lie
> We have grazed animals here thousands of years[35]

The song seeks to resist the legitimacy of the state's claim that the environmental issues within Inner Mongolia were due to pastoralism and instead posits this claim as a fiction created by the state.

By 2000, the state sought to repeat the economic success that Deng's economic reforms had in the eastern part of the country by launching the Western Development Program (西部大开发, Ch. *xibu dakaifa*, WDP). The highly aspirational plan focuses on narrowing the economic gap between those living on the eastern coast of China and those in the rest of the country.[36] The geographic focus of this new urban and economic reform covers more than 70% of the Chinese territory and includes Inner Mongolia. While the state's objective is that wide spread development will raise the living standards of the populations living in the western part of the country it also hopes that economic growth will quell splittist

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35 Staff, "Rap Song Dedicated to Mergen," *SMHRIC*, June 13, 2011, http://www.smhric.org/news_390.htm.

36 V. Elena Barabantseva, "Development As Localization," *Critical Asian Studies* 41, no. 2 (June 2009), 233, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14672710902809393.

tendencies that exist amongst ethnic minority groups living on the geographic and societal margins.

The WDP has also altered the infrastructure of existing cities in Inner Mongolia. In many cities, traditional courtyard homes have been replaced with high rise apartment complexes built to house the increased urban population. New airports and train stations have been added to accommodate the influx of citizens and travelers, and new shopping areas were constructed so that spending could help spur the economy.[37] I returned to live in Hohhot in late summer 2008 and found that many of the small, six-story apartment buildings that were commonplace when I left the city just three years prior, had been replaced by large apartment subdivisions. I moved into one of the new apartment neighborhoods because I knew that living in an older home carried the danger of soon being *chai'ed* (demolished).[38] Soon after I moved into the new complex, a Mongol family moved into the first floor apartment of the building in which I lived. First floor apartments had enclosed yards which were a relatively new feature in apartment homes in the region. Many others in the complex used the yard space to grow gardens, but my new neighbors used the space to keep their sheep. I later found out that the family was Mongols who had been displaced from their rural homes. Thus, it seemed to me, that the sheep they brought along with them were a reminder of their former life as pastoralists and a sign to others that they would not be displaced from that identity.[39]

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37 From the time I first visited Hohhot in March 2000 until I left the city in July 2012, I flew in and out of three different airports.

38 *Chai* means "to demolish." The Chinese ideogram, 拆, is painted on buildings marked for destruction. During the time that I lived in Inner Mongolia, the foreign community in Hohhot adopted the word into English. In fact, the summer of 2001, at the beginning of the WDP, became affectionately known as "The Summer of Chai" because of the mass destruction of buildings that took place throughout the city.

39 Personal story and observation also documented in Jamie N. Sanchez, "Cultural Colonization: The Dual-Displacement of Mongolians in Inner Mongolia," *Spectra Journal* 2, no. 2 (October 2013), http://spectrajournal.org/2013/11/18/2-2-5-cultural-colonialization-the-displacement-of-

The WDP also includes the development of coal mines and gas pipelines built to access the vast amounts of resources located throughout the Western provinces.[40] In order to gain access to the resources, the state compensates those that move into urban centers. However, the state compensation for land does not seem to satisfy many Mongols.[41] On January 20, 2015, Mongol herders protested the state's construction of the Zhurihe Military Training Base. One protestor's banner, which was written in both Mongolian and Chinese, read, "Return our home, return our land, return our compensations, we want survival" and "We displaced herders from Zhurihe Military Training Base area have paid a heavy price to the state, yet no adequate compensation has been given to us."[42] Although Mongol herders have been compensated for the land, no amount of compensation is adequate or can replace the self-autonomy and cultural identity attached to the land.[43]

The end of pastoralism also means the end of *yurts* used as traditional homes. Instead, *yurts* have been transformed into hotels for the domestic and international tourists who travel to Inner Mongolia for an "authentic" Mongolian experience.[44] Evans and Humphrey's study examines a Chinese tourist camp in Inner Mongolia that romanticizes the

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40 Barabantseva, "Development As Localization," 233.

41 The revised Law of Nationality Regional Autonomy which was passed on February 28, 2001, states in Article 65 that "When exporting natural resources out of the autonomous areas, the state should give them a certain amount of compensation." http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/china-autonomy_law.html.

42 Staff, "Mongolian herders held simultaneous protests," *SMHRIC*, January 21, 2015, http://www.smhric.org/news_555.htm.

43 Arturo Escobar, "Culture Sits in Places: Reflections on Globalism and Subaltern Strategies of Localization," *Political Geography* 20, no. 2 (February 2001), 162, http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0962629800000640.

44 C. Evans and C. Humphrey, "After-Lives of the Mongolian Yurt: The 'Archaeology' of a Chinese Tourist Camp," *Journal of Material Culture* 7, no. 2 (July 1, 2002), 190, http://mcu.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/1359183502007002639.

Mongolian culture. They write, "If the yurt-form does go on being produced in Inner Mongolia, it looks as though it will be an increasingly estranged structure, employed cynically by the Chinese and ever more alienated from the Mongols."[45] This has come to be true in Inner Mongolia. Han tourists can stay a few nights in an "authentic" Mongolian yurt and ride camels though the Gobi Desert. This "interaction" with the Mongolian culture ensures tourists that the Chinese unified multiethnic nation is intact. But, for Mongols, the commodification of the yurts in the tourist industry has created further cultural anxiety. Dru Gladney posits, in reference to Chinese films, that "the representation of minorities in this exotic and romanticized fashion is more a project of constructing a majority discourse than of depicting the minorities themselves."[46] In Inner Mongolia the romanticized tourist experience is more about satisfying the tourists than it is about depicting Mongolian culture. Further, the tourist experience simplifies the Mongolian culture and reifies the notion that Mongolian nomadic lifestyle has given way to Chinese modernization. As suggested above, natural factors have impacted the environment in Inner Mongolia, but not the same extent as human factor.

As suggested above, natural factors have impacted the environment in Inner Mongolia, but not to the same extent as human factors. One report claims that anthropogenic factors account for 94.5% of desertification in China and that "policies are the underlying forces driving other kinds of socio-economic activities (proximate causes) which directly lead to land use change, development of market economy and new enterprises, and exploitation of natural resources…"[47] In other words,

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[45] Evans and Humphrey, "After-Lives of the Mongolian Yurt," 208.

[46] Dru Gladney, "Tian Zhuangzhuang, the Fifth Generation, and Minorities Film in China," *Public Culture* 8 (1995), 167.

[47] Weicheng Wu and Eddy DePauw, "Policy Impacts on Land Degradation: Evidence Revealed by Remote Sensing in Western Ordos, China," in *Land Degradation and Desertification: Assessment, Mitigation, and Remediation*, eds. Pandi Zdruli, Marcello Pagliai, and Selim Kapur (New York: Springer, 2010), 231.

much of the human activity that has impacted the grassland areas can be linked to national policies. Tellingly, the state's response to the environmental issues further destabilizes Mongolian identity. Policies that forbid grazing or enclose grassland areas so that the land may recover continue to separate Mongols from a lived pastoral identity. Although many Mongols have now been far removed from their original pastoral identity marked by moving herds and living in a rural location, the pastoral identity in Inner Mongolia is not extinct. It remains a strong part of the Mongolian identity but it is also a part of the Chinese state imaginary that is used to maintain clear ethnic boundaries between Mongols and Han populations.

## Modernization through Mandarin, not Mongolian

Language is a powerful tool that has long been recognized by the Chinese state as an effective means to absorb the identities of those living within the Chinese territory. Anderson writes that, in imperial China, Mandarin was used to sinicize barbarians as part of a loyalty building method and that "Chinese mandarins looked with approval on barbarians who painfully learned to pain Middle Kingdom ideograms. These barbarians were already halfway to full absorption. Half-civilized was vastly better than barbarian."[48] By learning Mandarin, Mongols and Manchus could be accepted as "Sons of Heaven" and absorbed into the Chinese plan to fulfill the heavenly Mandate in an effort to achieve regional and global dominance.[49] The importance of the Mandarin language has not waned in modern China. This section of the article, examines shifts in language policies in Inner Mongolia since 1947. Despite policies that promote ethnic languages, many Mongols in China choose to learn Mandarin due

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48 Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 13.

49 Ibid.

to what Bulag calls a "language anxiety" in which Mongols are faced with the choice to learn the language of the dominant society or to learn the ethnic language.

When Inner Mongolia was established as the first autonomous region in China, the PRC intended to make Inner Mongolia a model for policy implementation for all autonomous regions. Linda Tsung states that in 1947 more than 85% of Mongols were illiterate. In order to increase Mongolian literacy, new guidelines were established to "promote Mongolian newspapers and books, to research Mongolian history and to disseminate Mongolian language textbooks in schools and develop Mongolian culture."[50] In order to achieve literacy, Mongolian language education was put in place from preschool to high school throughout Inner Mongolia in newly established Mongolian schools (蒙校, Ch. *meng xiao*) which taught in the Mongolian medium of instruction (MMI). Mongolian literacy grew at an average annual rate of 14.25% for primary schools and 21.84% for secondary schools between 1947 and 1965.[51] However, while literacy was rising, so were racial tensions between Mongols and Han people due in part to the assimilation of Han people into Mongolian territory.

In 1957, the local Inner Mongolia government created a language unification committee to work with the Mongolia People's Republic (hereafter Outer Mongolia) in an effort to build unity between the two languages. The plan was initiated so that the Mongolian language spoken in Inner Mongolia could follow the linguistic practices in Outer Mongolia. Ulanhu, a Mongol who was the chairman of Inner Mongolia, argued that language unification would allow Inner Mongolia newspapers and books to promote Maoist thoughts to Outer Mongolia.[52] This interaction between

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50 IMAR Education Department, *Neimenggu zizhiqu minzu jiaoyu wenjian huibian*, vol. 1, 1947-1957, (Hohhot: IMAR Education Press). Quoted in Tsung, *Language Power and Hierarchy*, 65.

51 Tsung, *Language Power and Hierarchy*, 65.

52 Uradyn E. Bulag, "Mongolian Ethnicity and Linguistic Anxiety in China," *American*

Ulanhu and the PRC could be read as what James C. Scott would term a "public transcript."[53] Scott writes that there is a "dialectic of disguise and surveillance that pervades relations between the weak and the strong," and that a public transcript that is "in close conformity with how the dominant group would wish to have things appear."[54] An analysis of the promotion of language unification between the two Mongolian territories through the lens of "public transcripts" it is evident that Ulanhu deployed a political maneuver that "disguised an Inner Mongolian aspiration for cultural unification with the MPR."[55] In reality, Inner Mongolian Mongols wanted language unification because they looked to Mongols living in Outer Mongolia for a cultural connection because of an aversion to any new terms from Mandarin that were introduced to the Mongolian language in Inner Mongolia.[56] In other words, the contempt between Mongols and Han was so strong in Inner Mongolia that there was an official attempt to look to Outer Mongolia for an escape from the aggressive influence that Han had on Mongolian culture through language. Unfortunately, for Mongols living in Inner Mongolia, the plan to unify the two Mongolian languages did not work because of China's national language policies that focused on making Mandarin the standard language for all citizens living within China.

In 1958, the *pinyin* system, which uses Latin letters to write Chinese ideograms, was introduced. This new writing system was fueled by "the belief that ideographic and logographic scripts were barriers to mass literacy and modernization…"[57] The *pinyin* system was established to

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*Anthropologist* 105, no. 4 (2003), 757.

53 James C. Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990), 4.

54 Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, 4.

55 Bulag, "Mongolian Ethnicity and Linguistic Anxiety in China," 757.

56 Ibid.

57 Gulbahar H. Beckett and Gerard A. Postiglione, "China's language policy for indigenous and

address this issue and propel China into modernization. During this time citizens throughout the Chinese territory spoke hundreds of different local dialects which made communication with others from region to region difficult. Not only would the *pinyin* system make *putonghua* (the official standard dialect of Mandarin) accessible to more of the country's population which would then facilitate the increase of both internal and external trade, but a common language would also become a tool to further unite local identities into the overarching, constructed Han identity. The focus on language unification was part of the PRC's new state building practices which looked to language as an instrument that could also absorb the identities of all non-Han people living in China. Mao recognized the important role language played in nation building and, thus, continued the tradition of what Anderson calls "alchemic absorption" through language that was prevalent in dynastic China.[58] Western scholars have come to agree that, in China, language policies are not always separate from political agendas and in Inner Mongolia this has resulted in Mongols who are pressured to learn Mandarin. Despite earlier policies to promote the Mongolian language, Mandarin had become the standard language of education. As a result, by 1963 even students in MMI schools could not be promoted to the next grade unless they passed a Chinese language examination.[59]

During the Cultural Revolution, most Mongol schools were closed and the remaining ones were converted into schools that used Mandarin as the language of instruction.[60] Language unification had a negative impact on ethnic minority languages because through the process of standardizing *putonghua*, "the Han language was promoted to replace

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minority education," in *China's Assimilationist Language Policy*, eds. Gulbahar H. Becket and Gerard A. Postiglione (New York: Routledge, 2012), 22.

58 Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 15.

59 Tsung, *Language Power and Hierarchy*, 67.

60 Ibid.

minority languages as a shortcut for rapid linguistic convergence. This process was greatly accelerated during the Cultural Revolution when the dominant ideology became monolingual: one people speaking one language."[61] The aim for rapid linguistic convergence meant that the aim for standardizing the different dialects of Mandarin turned into a campaign which forced all the people living in China to speak the national language. In the case of Inner Mongolia, Mongols lost the opportunity to learn Mongolian through the education system. Another result of the stringent language policies during the Cultural Revolution was that those who did not learn Mandarin were further isolated from the constructed Chinese identity which made them a target for criticism from the state which was concerned with loyalty, especially during this time period.

As a result of the new language learning environment during the Cultural Revolution, minority cultural transmission through language essentially stopped. In the public sphere, the possibility of any expression of Mongolian identity in Inner Mongolia was halted altogether because of a genocidal campaign during the Cultural Revolution in which Mongols were accused of harboring ethnic aspirations that were anti-Chinese. This accusation stemmed from paranoia within the PRC that looked to non-Han peoples in the Chinese territory as liable to collaborate with external enemies. Bilik writes that Xie Fuzhi, the Minister of Public Security at the time, fabricated the claim that all Mongolian Communist Party members were also secretly aligned with the New Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (NIMPRP).[62] Thus, a campaign against the Mongols, which lasted between 1968 and 1969, was launched. The impact of the campaign halted Mongolian cultural expression and resulted in the death

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61 Becket and Postiglione, "China's language policy for indigenous and minority education," 24.

62 Naran Bilik, "How Do You Say China in Mongolian? Toward a Deeper Understanding of Multicultural Education in China," in *Minority Education in China: Balancing Unity and Diversity in an Era of Critical Pluralism*, ed. James Liebold (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2014), 70.

of many Mongols. According to Bilik, an indictment was brought against the Gang of Four in 1980, citing the wrongful accusation of 346,000 and the death of more than 16,000 Mongols.[63] During my tenure of living in Inner Mongolia, years after the end of the Cultural Revolution, I heard many stories about this genocidal campaign.

Once the Cultural Revolution ended, Mongol cultural expression slowly reemerged and educational policies concerning Mongolian language instruction to were reestablished, but in a social and political environment marked by paranoia and fear. Mongol students could once again receive education in Mongolian (MMI) and learn Mandarin as a class subject.[64] Mongol children who did not have any Mongolian language proficiency would attend schools where Chinese was the language of instruction with an option of taking Mongolian as a subject class.[65] The regional government worked to promote education policies that would reestablish minority language instruction. At the same time, there was also a push for all Chinese citizens to learn Mandarin, which Mongols cautiously resisted because of the recognition that the national stance to learn Mandarin was more of an attempt at cultural colonization by the Chinese state than one of just unifying the nation under one common language. Mongols, who had already experienced a harsh genocidal campaign during the Cultural Revolution, would now face a softer campaign aimed at Mongolian cultural identity.

Deng's economic reforms in the 1980s further affected Mongolian language use because of the national push to learn English along with Mandarin which was part of further modernizing the country. During this time, the Inner Mongolian regional government passed regulations that "Mongol schools must persist in teaching Mongolian language first and

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63 Bilik, "How Do You Say China in Mongolian?, 70.

64 Tsung, *Language Power and Hierarchy*, 68.

65 Ibid.

use MMI as the major model in order that students become Mongolian and Chinese bilingual at the same time as learning a foreign language (English)."[66] These regulations further pressured Mongol students to achieve trilingual literacy if they wanted any chance at competing with Han citizens, who only needed to achieve bilingual literacy, for jobs.

The pressure on Mongols to learn three languages was not well received by Mongol linguists. In 1981, Mongol linguist Chuluun Bagan asserted that bilingual regulations that forced Mongols to learn Mandarin but not Han to learn Mongolian was "tantamount to using a covert administrative measure to restrict and limit the development of the Mongolian language, and it can only accelerate the process of the loss of Mongolian."[67] The concern about a "covert administrative measure," or to use the term mentioned above, a "softer campaign aimed at Mongol cultural identity," in which there is a decline of Mongolian language literacy because of a social environment that promotes Mandarin, remains amongst many Mongolian scholars today. For example, Bulag maintains that "because almost all jobs are controlled by Chinese, university-level knowledge of Mongolian is no different from illiteracy."[68] As a result, Mongols may choose Mandarin as their marketplace language and, in doing so, they "naturally leave their minority language behind."[69]

Ironically, the historical push for the country to speak one language also poses a problem for the Chinese state because of the need to maintain strong ethnic boundaries in a way that would uphold the identity of China as a multinational country. In other words, the Chinese state is caught in a paradox of its own making. By promoting Mandarin as the *lingua franca*

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66 Ibid.

67 Chuluun Bagan, "Jianchi minzu yuyan wenze de pingdeng diwei," in *Nei Menggu zizhiqu minzu yanjiu xuehui* [Inner Mongolian Prefecture Language Association] (Nei Menggu Ziahiqu Minzu Yanjiou Xuihui Shoujie Nianhui Lunwen Xuanji, Huhehaote, 1981), 122-123.

68 Bulag, "Mongolian Ethnicity and Language Anxiety in China," 754.

69 Stevan Harrell, "Linguistics and hegemony in China," *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 103, no. 1 (January 1993), 110.

of China it has, whether inadvertent or deliberate, caused the demise of other languages spoken within its territory. But, if China's ethnic groups do not maintain distinct ethnic languages, then China will be challenged in its own identity. Instead of a nation comprised of other nationalities (*minzu*), the loss of ethnic languages that maintain ethnic boundaries pushes China one step closer to a mono-lingual and mono-cultural state.

Even though there have been policies to promote Mongolian language, many Mongolian parents today urge their children to learn Mandarin so that they will be better equipped to compete in the marketplace. The plight of Mongols concerning language is reminiscent of Bourdieu's analysis of French peasants who chose to learn the official language of the nation-state instead of maintaining specific dialects. This was essentially a choice to participate "in the destruction of their instruments of expression."[70] Mongols are forced to make the same choice because the official language of the Chinese state is a commodity by which competitive opportunities are gained, but at the expense of cultural expression.

Additionally, the connection between Mandarin and economic prosperity affirms that there is a language hierarchy in China and that Mandarin is at the top.[71] In an effort to stave off any further criticism about the dissolution of the Mongolian language, the Inner Mongolia government developed a language policy in November 2004. The policy recognizes the need to "expand the use of the Mongol language" by offering incentives for students in Mongolian language schools, bilingual government workers, and Mongolian media broadcasts.[72] A report in 2006 from the Congressional-Executive Commission on China stated that the

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70 Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 49.

71 Arienne M. Dwyer, *The Xinjiang Conflict: Uyghur Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse* (Washington, D.C.: East-West Center, 2005), 14.

72 Human Rights in China, "China: Minority Exclusion, Marginalization and Rising Tensions," 2007, 27.

Inner Mongolian regional government earmarked significant funds to subsidize university fees for students who received their high school education in Mongolian and to support minority language teaching materials.[73] As one might expect, despite the regional policies, there still is a large gap between policy and practice. One reason for this is because of a lack of available teachers fluent in minority languages. There are simply not enough fluent teachers to staff language classes. Another reason of the dissonance between policy and practice is because of the discriminatory attitudes towards ethnic minority groups within regional education bureaus. As a result, Mandarin continues to be the language of preference throughout Inner Mongolia.

The state's efforts to preserve and promote the Mongolian language through education cannot challenge the social environment that demands Han fluency in order to secure economic and social mobility. Tsung posits that as Mongolian in the education system will continue to decline, the language "will become a token and commercial product in the tourist industry."[74] This is already occurring throughout Inner Mongolia's cultural tourist industry in which the Mongolian language is commodified in order to promote the allusion of a strong Mongolian culture in the region. But the performance of the Mongolian language in the cultural tourist industry does not reflect the reality of Mongolian use in daily life.

## Genghis Khan or Genghis Han?

After more than 800 years since his reign, Genghis Khan still remains a central figure in Mongolian history and cultural identity. Khan united the widespread tribes and launched a campaign of global domination in the

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73 Staff, "Inner Mongolia Government Promotes Mongolian Language," *Congressional -Executive Commission*, August 20, 2006, http://www.cecc.gov/publications/commission-analysis/inner-mongolia-government-promotes-mongolian-language.

74 Tsung, *Language Power and Hierarchy*, 89.

13th century. After his death, Khan's descendants established the Yuan Dynasty which ruled the Chinese territory from 1271-1368. Despite the brutality that is attached to Khan's memory, he remains a historical figure that continues to draw the loyalties of the Mongols as well as interest from journalists, historians, academics, and the entertainment industry. *The New York Times* journalist Nicholas Kristof wrote, "He may have killed people by the millions, but he was also a great nationalist and one of the most brilliant commanders in history."[75] In recent years, Khan has regained interest throughout the world. In Outer Mongolia, for example, one can find the *Chinggis Vodka* brand, which entices European consumers to "try Emperor Genghis Khan's No. 1 Vodka."[76] In the United States, Netflix recently produced a mini-series based on Marco Polo's interaction with the Khan court.[77] And "armchair archeologists" from around the world have joined the "Valley of the Khans," which is a crowd sourcing project, to scour satellite images in the search for Khan's tomb in Outer Mongolia.[78] Khan also remains of great political importance to the Chinese state in which Mongols in Inner Mongolia have been challenged by the Chinese state's rewriting of history that asserts that Khan is a *Chinese* hero and "the only Chinese to defeat the Europeans."[79]

Alicia Campi writes that "China's absorption of Mongolia's founding hero has been a centuries-long process."[80] The Manchu, who

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75 Nicholas Kristof, "Ulan Bator Journal; With Genghis Revived, What Will Mongols Do?" *The New York Times*, March 23, 1990, http://www.nytimes.com/1990/03/23/world/ulan-bator-journal-with-genghis-revived-what-will-mongols-do.html.

76 "Mongolian Spirits," http://mongolianspirits.com/eng/.

77 Lenika Cruz, "Marco Polo": Netflix's Critical Flop that Dared to be Diverse," *The Atlantic*, December 20, 2014, http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2014/12/in-defense-of-marco-polo/383905/.

78 Bulag, *The Mongols at China's Edge*, 234.

79 Ibid.

80 Alicia J. Campi, "Mongolian Identity Issues and The Image of Chinggis Khan," *Woodrow Wilson Center*, October 4, 2006, 32.

ruled during the Qing dynasty nearly 300 years after the end of the Mongol-led Yuan dynasty, earmarked a special budget to maintain Khan's shrine located in what is now Inner Mongolia.[81] By the 1930s, when Japan established control of Manchuria, it also looked to Khan as a way to rally the Mongols against the ruling Republic of China by establishing a Khan mausoleum in Ulaanhot, Inner Mongolia.[82] In 1935, Mao started to strategically build alliances with non-Han living in China in order to battle outside aggressors. He also recognized the position that Khan held amongst Mongols. In order to rally the Mongols against Japan, Mao suggested that they needed to "cooperate with the Chinese Soviet regime and the Red Army" on the grounds that nobody would "dare entertain the thought that the sons and grandsons of Chinggis Khan can be humiliated!"[83] Thus Manchu, Japanese, and Chinese states have each deployed Khan as a means of gaining the loyalty of the Mongols and as tool of state building.

Since that time, the connection that Mongols have been allowed to have with Khan has gone through several phases. In 1954, following the political maneuver of the Japanese to use Genghis Khan to gain the loyalties of the Mongols, the PRC funded the construction of the Genghis Khan Mausoleum in Ordos, Inner Mongolia.[84] Even though Khan's remains have never been located, by building a mausoleum dedicated to Khan within the Chinese territory, the PRC attempted to pacify Chinese Mongols and, at the same time, began the reimagination of Khan as a *Chinese* hero. Khan's acceptance by the Chinese state took a downward turn during the 1960s and throughout the remainder of the Cultural

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81 Campi, "Mongolian Identity Issues and the Image of Chinggis Khan," 32.

82 Ibid.

83 Almaz Khan, "Chinggis Khan: From Imperial Ancestor to Ethnic Hero." in *Cultural Encounters on China's Ethnic Frontiers*, ed., Stevan Harrell (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1995), 265.

84 Campi, "Mongolian Identity Issues and The Image of Chinggis Khan," 32.

Revolution. Like other expressions of cultural identity, any loyalty to Genghis Khan at that time was seen as ethnic nationalism and reinforced the belief that the historical memory of Khan as a Mongol hero could pose problems to the Chinese state. As a result of the strict social-political control of thought and life during the Cultural Revolution, Mongols were forced to silence any cultural distinctions, including their historical allegiance to Khan, because of the risk of being labeled as ethnic nationalists working against the Chinese state.

Once China emerged out of the Cultural Revolution, Khan reappeared as a positive symbol that could once again be lauded as an ethnic and national hero, if for nothing else than to regain the trust of the Mongol people. In 1987, the year of the fortieth anniversary of the establishment of Inner Mongolia as an autonomous region, the Chinese government allocated significant funding to the restoration of the Khan Mausoleum in Inner Mongolia.[85] By that time, the Chinese government had already reclaimed Khan as one of China's historical leaders. Today, Khan remains for the Chinese state an essential symbol in the constructed history that claims that China is the world's longest continuous civilization. In this way Khan is not viewed as a barbarian who ruled over the Chinese people, but rather as a Chinese hero who ruled the world which, in turn, attributes the medieval Mongolian global dominance to China. Further, by rewriting the history Genghis Khan, establishing a strong national discourse, and promoting Khan in various public sites, Khan is also kept in China and out of Outer Mongolia. Whereas Outer Mongolia has capitalized on the search for Khan's remnants through archeological tourism connected to projects like "Valley of the Khans," mentioned above, the Chinese state has looked to Khan to promote the broader tourist industry in Inner Mongolia. Khan's Mausoleum in Inner Mongolia has been touted by the Chinese state as a "must see" tourist

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85 Khan, "Chinggis Khan," 267.

attraction. “The Mausoleum of Genghis Khan” website states that the Mausoleum is included on the list of “40 Best Places to Visit in China” and one of the nation’s “100 Patriotic Education” sites.[86] Thus the Chinese state has also managed to recreate Khan as a figure that can spur on the regional economy of Inner Mongolia through tourism while ensuring that Khan’s identity has a Chinese hero can facilitate proper patriotism.

In China, Khan remains an essential part of the Mongolian culture through which Mongols can be distinguished from others. Mongol scholar Almaz Khan writes, “For the Inner Mongols, Chinggis Khan has come up to serve specifically as a symbol of ethnic/cultural survival of their group in relation to the overwhelmingly dominant Chinese state and society.”[87] Like the commodification of other parts of the Mongol culture mentioned above, the commercialization of Khan is a quandary for Mongols. In one sense, Khan has become a figure that benefits the Chinese state but, at the same time, the export of Khan through the tourist industry allows Mongols to share their history and culture. The rap song dedicated to Mergen, which was mentioned above, captures the sentiment that many Chinese Mongols have about Khan. At the end of the song, the rap artist declares, “We are the Mongols, descendants of Chinngis Khan!”[88] This is an attempt to appeal to the Mongol connection to Khan, who, despite the official state discourse, remains essential to Mongolian cultural identity.

## Between Real and Imagined: Representations of Mongolian Identity

This article has attempted to contextualize the historical shifts in Inner Mongolia since it was established as China’s first “autonomous” region.

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86 The Mausoleum of Genghis Khan, “A Brief Introduction of Khan’s Mausoluem,” http://www.cjshl.com:81/en/.

87 Khan, “Chinngis Khan,” 248.

88 Staff, “Rap Song Dedicated to Mergen.”

In no way is this article inclusive of every policy that has impacted Mongol cultural identity because the history of Inner Mongolia is much richer than can be captured in one article. But, this brief summary elucidates how various state-driven policies and ideologies have impacted Mongolian cultural identity in Inner Mongolia.

Mongols, caught somewhere between real and imagined identities, have been the focus of other scholars. Bulag considers the "language anxiety" felt by many Mongols due to a social and political hierarchy that favors Mandarin over any other language in China.[89] Liu traces the "Mongolian question" through China's transition to a nation-state.[90] And Khan simply asks, "Who are the Mongols?"[91] The common thread among these scholars is the issue of identity with which Mongols in China grapple. Although Mongols have not been as active in violent protests as other marginalized minority groups in China, they are resisting the loss of a distinct cultural identity in a heavily sinicized political environment. This ongoing tension has prompted some Mongols to protest "land grabbing" that is the result of the Chinese state's development of the remaining grasslands. Protests are sites of contention through which Mongols resist further cultural colonization. There are also other modes of resistance amongst Mongols. Material productions, including songs, are important in the resistance of the end of a distinct Mongol identity. Songs can also be read as evidence of the "resourcefulness with which people use symbols to reassert community and its boundaries when the processes and consequences of change threaten its integrity."[92] The attempt to maintain the distinct ethnic identity and imagined community is once

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89 Bulag, "Mongolian Ethnicity and Linguistic Anxiety in China."

90 Liu, *Reins of Liberation*.

91 Almaz Khan, "Who are the Mongols? State, Ethnicity, and the Politics of Representation in the PRC," in *Negotiating Ethnicities in China and Taiwan*, ed. Melissa J. Brown (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1996), 125-159.

92 Anthony Cohen, *The Symbolic Construction of Community* (New York: Tavistock Publications, 1985), 28.

again represented by the rap song mentioned above in which some lyrics read:

> No one can sever the bonds of souls and minds among us.
> We stand together to protest.
> We march together bravely.
> Right Ujumchin, Left Ujumchin, plus Shuluun Huh, and Huveet Shar,
> No matter where we are from, we are always together.[93]

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93 Staff, "Rap Song Dedicated to Mergen."

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# Book Reviews

# *From Warhorses to Ploughshares: The Later Tang Reign of Emperor Mingzong*

by Richard L. Davis
Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2014

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This volume is not simply a chronicle of a historical figure who left a significant legacy in the medieval history of China, but it is also an effective introduction to a relatively unknown historical time period. The Five Dynasties 五代 (*wudai*) Period has long been viewed merely as one of several periods of disunion in Chinese history, and one which lasted relatively short and was extremely chaotic. Even until recently, historians have treated this period as an intermediate period between the two great dynasties of the Tang and the Song. Since it has recently turned out that the birth of a new society and culture which had been generally recognized as a unique phenomenon of the Song dynasty already existed in embryo during the Five Dynasties Period, the perspectives of historians should be reconsidered.

Actually, there were significant changes in the attitudes of the five different regimes toward the legacy of the Tang dynasty. This was also a time of conflict between the two rival military cliques, the Shaanxi military clique which upheld the Tang legacy and the Henan military clique which tried to establish a new tradition. While the Shaanxi military clique defeated the Henan military clique in 923, the successors to these cliques did not look backward and began to prepare for a new period. In particular, Li Siyuan (李嗣源)'s reign during the late Tang period, upon which this volume centers, was a period of great change.

This book consists of six chapters, and includes a preface and an epilogue. Chapter 1, "People and Places," is an introduction to the history of the Shatuo (沙陀) people's history, their family relations, and the main figures of this book. Chapter 2, "Royal Passage," explains the process by which Li Siyuan ascended to the throne. Chapters 3 and 4, "Political Events," use accounts of the significant events that happened during the period of his reigns, Tiancheng (天成) and Changxing (長興), to determine the characteristics of his regime. While Chapter 5, "Institutions, Reforms, and Political Culture," deals with the domestic topics of the regime, Chapter 6, "Volatile Periphery," mainly explains the foreign policies in dealing with the Khitan, with the state of Nanping, and with Sichuan. Finally, the epilogue provides description of the fate of Li's successors.

Li Siyuan was from an uncivilized ethnic Shatuo people of Göktürks and ascended to the throne of Later Tang and ruled over the Chinese people in the Northern provinces in the end. While Li Siyuan's predecessors, Li Keyong (李克用) and Li Cunxu (李存勖), failed to attract willing obedience from the Chinese subjects, Li Siyuan won public support not only by rejecting arbitrary rules based on the nomadic mores but also by imitating the enlightened monarchs of the previous dynasties. According to the detailed descriptions in this volume, Li endeavored to eradicate political corruption aroused by the privileged people and repeatedly expressed his determined will to abstain from luxuries at court and the extravagant lifestyles of the aristocracy. He was, therefore, able to form images as a reliable and committed leader that could appeal to the Chinese people.

As the title *From Warhorses to Ploughshares* implies, the author, Richard L. Davis, focuses on how Li Siyuan searched urgently for ways to escape from the vicious circle of repeated military coups staged by warlords and the political turmoil caused by their political immaturity.

The frequent changes of dynasties and chronic chaos brought about by the recurrent military upheavals created preconceived ideas about the Five Dynasties Period and undermined its historical value as opposed to the relatively high esteem for the contemporary local regimes in the southern provinces. As a result, the low appreciation and respect for the period interrupt proper understanding not only of the Five Dynasties Period but also of the context of the early period of the Song dynasty. Even during this period deemed as a regression in history, in fact, this volume argues that there were enlightened leaders such as Li Siyuan who promoted development and prepared for a new era.

In addition to his great achievement, Davis clearly points out the limitations of Li's political reforms, as well. Although he accomplished a great deal in politics, Li could not systemize his reforms for the next generation to inherit nor foster a competent successor who would continue implementing his policies. When he received the title of emperor at the age of 60, Li did not have sufficient time left to carry out every policy he intended to pursue. As soon as he died peacefully in 933, his successors immediately resumed struggling for power and the Later Tang dynasty in the end collapsed in four years. However, Davis argues that it is still worth paying attention to Li's reforms despite their failure in that Li came up with breakthroughs in the so-called dark ages by presenting the ultimate goal for his Shatuo successors to pursue.

Nevertheless, this research also poses several problems. For instance, this detailed factual chronicle of Li Siyuan does not show distinctive differences from the existing researches on him nor does it reveal new information regarding his life. And as Johannes L. Kurz demonstrated in his review of this volume,[1] Davis dealt with the historical materials in a careless way in many parts of this book. In addition, this

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[1] Johannes L. Kurz, "Book Review—*From Warhorses to Ploughshares: The Later Tang Reign of Emperor Mingzong*," *Journal of Chinese Studies* 中國文化研究所學報 61 (2015), 353-364.

book is rather monotonous since there are no contentious issues for the readers to discuss. Despite these problems, however, the academic quality and the detailed portrayal of this relatively unknown period and figure in Chinese history greatly enhance the merit of this volume. Consequently, it is obvious that this research has provided a significant stepping stone to future studies in this field.

# *The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa Japan*

by Adam Clulow
New York: Columbia University Press, 2014

Noell Wilson
University of Mississippi

Adam Clulow's impressive book, *The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa Japan*, analyzes the Tokugawa shogunate-VOC (Dutch East India Company) diplomatic and juridical relationship between 1608 and 1665. Structured as a study of a series of episodes, or clashes (9), between early modern Japan and the VOC, it characterizes their interaction as one of increasing accommodation and capitulation by the Dutch to Tokugawa officials who would become their Asian masters. This story is a counter-narrative of these protagonists in two ways. Clulow's VOC officials are not foremost merchants but more significantly privateers and quasi-statesmen, often pursuing political influence and promotion through violence and not merely economic gain. Second, his Tokugawa officials are not myopic despots consumed by ensuring internal peace after decades of endemic war, but in fact are skilled and sophisticated negotiators aggressively pursuing concessions from Westerners in their external relations.

As such, this revisionist story of Tokugawa-Dutch bilateral relations will be of great interest to historians of early modern Japan. Yet it gains broader significance because Clulow frames the narrative with three interpretive threads relevant to scholars of broader Asian and global history. First, he suggests that Japanese control over its relationship with the VOC refutes the conventional assumption of Western global supremacy after 1500 (the "1492 schema" of Columbian triumphalism). This argument expands the seminal work of scholars, such as Kenneth Pomeranz and Tonio Andrade, by demonstrating that not only China (the focus of their research), but Japan as well, repeatedly proved dominant in its early modern interactions with European visitors. A second, related argument is that the success of the Tokugawa as the superior party in their relationship with the Dutch reveals a "great divergence" (3), or bifurcation, in the outcomes of contact between European and non-European powers post-1492, depending on the direction of the Europeans' voyages. When explorers such as Christopher Columbus and Hernán Cortés travelled west to the Americas, they seized possession of local territories, subjugating their populations through violence and disease. In contrast, when other Western adventurers such as Vasco De Gama and the Dutch travelled East, to India and Japan, the local, native governments forced accommodation and successfully contained the European scope of influence. Finally, instead of focusing on the VOC as a trading company, the preferred paradigm of much extant scholarship, Clulow defines it as a "hybrid organization," combining the "attributes of both corporation and state" (12), which prompts him to analyze its activities through the core privileges of its 1602 founding charter—diplomacy, violence, and sovereignty. These are themes which invite comparison with the exercise of power across time and space. All three strands inform his meta-project, which is to investigate what the Tokugawa-VOC relationship reveals about the "first age of globalization" in an Asian context.

The three wide-ranging powers granted the VOC in its charter become Clulow's framing devices, with seven chapters arranged under eponymous sub-headings. In section one, "Diplomacy," he explores the period 1608-1638, beginning with the dispatch of the first VOC document to the Tokugawa bakufu and concluding with the participation of Dutch ships in the Shimabara revolt. Over these three decades, Clulow traces the transformation of VOC officials from autonomous foreign ambassadors to loyal Tokugawa vassals as they reconfigure their identity to fit the Tokugawa world view, and thus preserve trade relations. Clulow explains how Toyotomi Hideyoshi's invasion of Korea had severed Japanese ties with surrounding states, rendering the Tokugawa bakufu of the early 1600s receptive to any nation willing to travel to Japan and propose diplomatic relations, such as the Dutch. But the honeymoon in their relations was short lived. By 1627, the Tokugawa rejected the Pieter Nuyts mission's lobby for Japanese recognition of the VOC governor-general in Batavia as a sovereign ruler who could legitimately negotiate with heads of state. After being denied state-to-state relations, the only route for VOC officials to maintain an accepted place in the Tokugawa order was to embrace a subordinate vassal position within the domestic, instead of international, political hierarchy, a stature Clulow compares to that of the fudai daimyo. The primary manifestation of this "subsovereign" position was *hofries*, the annual procession of the VOC mission to Edo to demonstrate obeisance to the shogun, which Clulow likens to the alternate attendance system in an original and extended comparison. The crowning demonstration of loyalty, however, was the supply of gunpowder, cannon, and armed Dutch vessels to force the rebels within Hara castle to surrender in 1638. By the end of this first section, the VOC has conceded the "state" component of its hybrid composition in diplomatic relations and instead secured a permanent place in the Tokugawa order as a loyal vassal eager to render service. This process, however, does not strip Clulow's Dutch of all political agency in Japan. He strikes a clever, if delicate, interpretive balance as he explains this shift as a deliberate strategy of accommodation adopted by pragmatic VOC officials instead of a forced capitulation to Tokugawa demands.

Section Two, "Violence," backtracks chronologically to examine how the Tokugawa restricted VOC privateering campaigns, including those against ships of powerful rival Zheng Zhilong, from the 1609 Dutch arrival in Japan through 1665, when the VOC halted attacks against Chinese shipping to Nagasaki. The Tokugawa did not initially target control of Dutch activities at sea, but as a series of complaints against VOC privateering reached Nagasaki and Edo, the bakufu expanded its juridical control from the decks of ships possessing maritime permits (*shuinjō*), to an ocean ring around the archipelago, and finally to distant shipping lanes in the South China Sea. Drawing on Lauren Benton's groundbreaking work on the patchwork nature of maritime sovereignty, Clulow's analytical trajectory offers important new evidence to challenge the conventional narrative of European dominance of the oceans after 1500 by demonstrating the previously unrecognized power of Tokugawa law over European technological advantage in the form of armed VOC vessels. The first chapter in this section explores how the Tokugawa maritime permit system, in force until 1635, protected regional trading vessels from VOC attack by legitimating their petitions to the Nagasaki Magistrate when assaulted. He then explores the 1615 VOC plunder of the Portuguese *Santo Antonio*, en route to Japan, and the subsequent 1621 bakufu edict prohibiting similar attacks as piracy (*bahan*) to trace the expansion of Tokugawa "legal remit" even to ships that did not possess a maritime pass (167). Chapter 5, "Power and Petition," examines the final stage of the Tokugawa bakufu's three part extension of maritime sovereignty as Nagasaki becomes a center of legal redress for Chinese traders attacked by VOC ships in the 1650s and 1660s. In incidents, such as the *Breukelen* case of 1657, where a VOC ship attacked a Chinese junk off Vietnam, bakufu courts ordered compensation for an assault thousands of miles from Japan. This chapter offers important new evidence for continued Tokugawa engagement with the sea, and gradually extension of its monopoly on violence into oceanic space, even during the post-1635 period of maritime restrictions.

Section Three, "Sovereignty," returns to the 1620s and 1630s to explore the Tokugawa bakufu's checks on VOC sovereign powers in Taiwan. Two primary claims bolster Clulow's argument about the VOC's accommodation to the Tokugawa world view there. First, he reveals how the Tokugawa refused to recognize the VOC as a legitimate ruler in Taiwan because they did not exact tribute from the native population, as the early modern Japanese conception of power relations required. Since the Tokugawa did not recognize the Dutch claims to sovereignty based on a contract with Ming China and an unwritten agreement with the local Siraya population, the bakufu protested when VOC officials exacted taxes on Japanese ships trading at the core VOC commercial site of Tayouan. This clash over definitions of sovereignty culminated in the 1628 seizure of two Japanese vessel and their commander, Hamada Yahyōe, by the Governor of Taiwan, Pieter Nyuts. The VOC only rehabilitated relations with Japan by handing over Nuyts in 1632 for a four-year confinement in Hirado, as an unprecedented concession to continue trade relations in spite of the Tayouan debacle. This extradition relinquished the VOC standing right to discipline its own officials, but it was a temporary compromise confined to a single individual. After four years of house arrest, the Tokugawa released Nuyts upon receiving a stunning 800 pound brass chandelier, on display even today at the Tokugawa Mausoleum at Nikkō.

This is an elegantly structured study, and I am very grateful for Clulow's thoughtful, if provocative, placement of Tokugawa Japan beyond the traditional confines of East Asia, and instead within a broadly conceived "Asia," which extends both south to Indonesia, and then West to India and the Middle East. Yet I remain only partially convinced of Clulow's argument for re-coalescing "Asia" as his primary spatial unit of analysis. Asia as a heuristic device makes sense for a comparative study of VOC policy since the Company operated trading outposts from Europe, across the Middle East to India (South Asia) and Indonesia (Southeast Asia). But the relatively dominant VOC position Clulow describes in each of these sites, and he explores them at length as foils for the case of Japan, suggests that consistent Tokugawa strength in its relationship with the Dutch was in fact an anomaly in Asia, and not the representative encounter of a strong Asia, in the face of European power, that proves Clulow's opening arguments for the "great divergence." Clulow's Japan comes across as an outlier rather than a case study that typifies the experience of Safavid Persia, Mughal India, or the Ayutthayan kingdom of Siam (each employed as comparative example of VOC influence), where the Dutch consistently gained greater concessions than in Japan. Other than Japan, the state that reveals greatest success in containing VOC activities is Ming China, which in the 1620s provides a compelling parallel of another Asian power able both to foil maritime raids of the VOC in 1622 (141) and then to reject the VOC's occupation of the Pescadores in 1624 (209-9). This ambitious framing is a welcome attempt to change the geographical scale of conversation about early modern Japan, but the success of Tokugawa Japan and Ming China in controlling VOC operations suggests that Clulow's most persuasive finding may be for a strong East Asia, and not for a strong wider Asia. As Clulow observes in the section on violence, "Indeed, the Tokugawa/VOC relationship was marked by a striking lack of violence and the absence of the kind of tactics conventionally employed by the company in dealing with Asian states." (142) This is one of many scattered assertions that in fact contradicts initial claims about Tokugawa Japan illustrating a common, strong experience of an "Asian" encounter with the West.

A smaller quibble is the chronological backtracking of the three sections (Section I: 1608-1638; Section II: 1609-1665; Section III: 1624-1636), which makes it difficult to evaluate aggregate change across time. One of Clulow's central arguments is that VOC accommodation and Tokugawa control of the relationship increased across the seventeenth century, but it is difficult to identify the moments of greatest transformation when a single period, such as the 1620s and 1630s, is examined at three separate places in the book. One remedy might have been to reverse the order of the final two sections on violence and sovereignty, altering the sequence of powers as presented in the original charter to make analysis more diachronic.

A final request to both author and publisher when this fine book is released in paperback, and I am sure that will be soon, is that a revised edition include additional maps for relevant sites in Europe, and the Indian subcontinent, if not the Middle East. At the moment, Clulow only includes two maps—one of Tokugawa Japan, and the other of VOC operations in Southeast and East Asia—but without state borders to demarcate the kingdoms and dynasties to which he compares the Tokugawa regime. Increasing the number of maps would help the reader visualize the geographic stretch of VOC relationships across the globe, which serves as Clulow's foils for comparison with Japan, underscoring his claims about a larger Asia. As well, these graphics would make the book a stronger teaching tool in the University classroom.

In spite of these small criticisms, Clulow is a superb stylist, and his carefully polished prose is a pleasure to read. His book makes a seminal contribution to historiography on early modern Japan by extending the recent work of scholars such as Robert Hellyer (*Defining Engagement: Japan and Global Contexts, 1640-1868*, Harvard University Asia Center, 2010) to demonstrate that Japan was not only deliberately engaged with foreign powers, but in fact was often the dominant actor in those relationships. By situating his project within Asia as defined by VOC outposts, Clulow not only expands the spatial context of Tokugawa Japan, but also integrates extended use of Dutch language documents. His linguistic dexterity provides beautifully mined details, such as discussion of the rejection of the 1627 Nuyts embassy due largely to the poorly informed translation of documents which included valedictions such as, *miuchi no mono* ("your obedient servant"). This term was generally used to describe low-ranking vassals, and the Tokugawa interpreted it as proof that the VOC governor-general was not a powerful sovereign leader worthy of state to state relations (86).

In both the introduction and the conclusion, Clulow suggests that his case study of Tokugawa mastery of the Dutch reveals that Japanese capitulation to American demands in the 1850s was not predestined, or the natural continuation of a long standing pattern of Asian subservience to the West. Yet I found this monograph particularly thought-provoking for a different reason. It comes to light just as the globe commemorates the 70th anniversary of the ending of World War II, and Asia celebrates the defeat of Japanese imperialism. Clulow's snapshot of dominant Tokugawa foreign relations suggests that Japan's rise to Asian, and then global, power following the Meiji Restoration was not so surprising or unprecedented as conventionally argued. More significantly for readers of the twenty-first century, this book portrays a Japanese regional dominance based on sophisticated diplomacy and expansive maritime sovereignty buttressed by judicial might, rather than naval prowess. This historical vision of Japanese power—exercised without military force—mirrors the source of Japan's global stature today in important ways. Clulow's Tokugawa officials achieved dominance in relations with proximate external actors—both East Asian and European—without resorting to violence. This is an approach many current observers of East Asia hope twenty-first century Japan will continue to embrace.

# *Grassroots Fascism:*
# *The War Experience of the Japanese People*

by Yoshimi Yoshiaki with annotated English translation by Ethan Mark
New York: Columbia University, 2014

Nick Kaptur
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In *Grassroots Fascism: The War Experience of the Japanese People*, eminent Japanese historian Yoshimi Yoshiaki, eloquently translated here by Ethan Mark, undertakes a detailed and probing survey of the wartime experience Japanese Imperial subjects during the Asia-Pacific War of 1937-1945. Consciously positioning his work as a counter-narrative to top-down histories of the war that emphasized the actions and decisions of elites and that still predominated when this study was first published in Japanese in 1987, Yoshimi focuses exclusively on the memories and experiences of "common people," which he defines as anyone who was not a military officer or a government official.

A work of almost staggering scope and breadth, *Grassroots Fascism* finds Yoshimi incorporating the viewpoints of a vast assortment of these non-elite actors, many of whom hail from demographics often overlooked within Japan's expansive wartime empire, such as Taiwanese aboriginals, Korean conscripts, Ainu and Sakhalin natives, South Pacific islanders, and of course the ordinary Japanese citizens—many of them older and with well-established civilian careers—called up in the last, desperate days of the war to fight (and in many cases die) as poorly equipped foot soldiers in theaters all over Asia. The result is a series of highly evocative vignettes of individual suffering, made only more searing, perhaps, because of Yoshimi's unfailingly clinical tone, that advance his largely unspoken aim of explaining why Japan must never go to war again; a message unspoken only because these painstakingly uncovered voices say it better than any scholar ever could.

Although the individual stories Yoshimi has selected are extremely engaging and even, at times, riveting, the overall organizational logic of *Grassroots Fascism* is a bit hard to pin down. The titles of the four chapters imply that the individual stories will be presented in chronological order, and to some extent they are, but because each story starts at the beginning and many continue all the way through the end of the war, there is much doubling back. Each individual's story covers around three to five pages and follows an identical format: first, the person's name, birthplace, and birthdate is given; next, a few sentences describe their education and what they were doing before the war; finally, Yoshimi provides a detailed account, drawing on their diaries or memoirs, of what they did during the war, typically ending either with their death overseas or their repatriation to the Japanese mainland. Altogether the book presents dozens and dozens of these accounts, strung together with no analysis or argument and not even any transitional text, other than a descriptive subheading such as "From Accessory Merchant to the 114th Infantry Regiment" (173) or "From Girls' High School Teacher to Fourth Mortar Battalion" (200).

However, this seemingly endless parade of personal accounts is lent some sense of coherence by Yoshimi's laser focus on a few central questions that he insists each account must answer. First, he desires to know what each individual thought of the so-called "holy war" that Japan was fighting in Asia and to what extent, and for what reasons, he or she supported it. Second, Yoshimi seeks to elucidate the ways in which each individual benefitted from and/or suffered from the war effort. Lastly, Yoshimi is especially interested to uncover mention of any wartime atrocities committed by the Japanese that the individual may have witnessed or heard about, and what they thought about those atrocities at the time. When Yoshimi does surface a direct quotation from his source material, it is almost invariably in service of answering one of these three main questions. The answers he finds are exceedingly multifarious: while some people were excited and even ecstatic to fight a "holy war" in Asia, others were reluctant or despondent; while some avidly supported the war effort up to the moment of defeat or even beyond, others questioned it from the start or grew increasingly disillusioned over time; while some came through the war relatively unscathed and even benefitted in ways, others suffered greatly or were killed; and while some disbelieved reports of atrocities or sought to justify them by adopting a kind of "war is hell" philosophy, others were deeply scarred by the horrors they witnessed and in some cases even perpetrated.

Although it may seem odd to assert that such multivalent experiences of war would lead to more rather than less coherence, Yoshimi's reluctance to categorize the actions and viewpoints of his subjects into anything other than vague chronological or geographical containers is actually a major strength of this study and underscores one of its major revelations, namely, that despite the great variety in terms of individual backgrounds and life experiences, everyone ultimately supported the war effort, albeit in their own way and for their own reasons, which ranged from devotion to family and community to love of the emperor, to a chance for excitement and adventure, to a desire on the part of ethnic minorities to feel included in the imperial project, and to feelings of superiority to other Asians. In many cases it was several or all of these. In other words, although the "fascism" in *Grassroots Fascism* may have had diverse and various "grassroots," in the end they all came together to form a single patchwork lawn.

However, despite the color and richness of Yoshimi's source base and the personal sagas contained therein, the scholarly impact of his study is somewhat attenuated by some significant methodological shortcomings.

In particular, Yoshimi's approach to his sources seems grounded in a style of "empirical" history that provides "just the facts" at the expense of analysis, and which seems to lead Yoshimi to accept sources at face value, to an extent that most historians today would no longer consider prudent. The vast majority of Yoshimi's sources are either diaries or memoirs. Whereas memoirs, being explicitly composed for public consumption long after events, are widely understood to be among the least reliable historical sources, diaries on the other hand, presumed to have been composed privately during or shortly after events, are typically viewed among the most reliable of historical sources. However, in *Grassroots Fascism*, Yoshimi draws upon these two types of sources interchangeably with little or no effort to distinguish between them in terms of their reliability. Moreover, even when he is using actual diaries, in almost all cases these are not original diaries but published editions prepared and edited for public or family consumption many years after the war. The reader will have great difficulty ascertaining the extent to which these published diaries may have been edited "for clarity" and thus may have allowed retrospective postwar viewpoints to seep into the framing and even the wording of quotations, because Yoshimi seems unaware that this might even be an issue. Although Yoshimi does at times point out where diary entries may have represented false consciousness or misinformation, in all cases he assumes the fundamental reliability of these sources as wholly accurate representations of what people were thinking not years later but at that very moment.

Yoshimi's use of these sources is potentially even further compromised by the fact that he personally interviewed several of his subjects, decades after events, to allow them to clarify what they had written down earlier, and also seems to have sought the permission or, at least, acquiescence of many of his subjects to use their diaries in his work, raising the possibility of introducing errors of memory or additional shaping of recollections for public consumption, as well as the possibility that Yoshimi himself may have felt obligated to portray his subjects in an at least somewhat positive light. Indeed, all of the subjects in *Grassroots Fascism* ultimately come across as victims to some extent, and at least fairly sympathetic. Although many of them witness atrocities and in some cases are forced to participate in them, the worst actors are always observed at a distance, in third person, and the subjects themselves are never the main instigators. Atrocities always seem to happen at some other person's behest. Yoshimi himself, to his credit, clearly and explicitly rejects narratives of victimhood in his introduction and conclusion, but insofar as he relied so heavily on his subjects' own views of themselves, the cumulative effect of the many personal stories he presents is a narrative in which Japanese Imperial subjects are as much victims as the peoples they helped subjugate.

Another issue is the nature of Japanese wartime diaries themselves. As Aaron Moore has carefully chronicled in his recent study *Writing War: Soldiers Record the Japanese Empire* (2013), Japanese servicemen were encouraged and in some cases ordered to keep wartime diaries, as were many civilians. Since these dairies were understood as part of a national project to produce ideal imperial subjects, schoolchildren were trained to write diaries from an early age, people were provided models of "ideal" diaries to imitate, soldiers' diaries were subject to "inspection" by their commanding officers for the sake of ensuring ideological purity, and, in a fundamental sense, these diaries were widely understood to be more public in character than we might ordinarily expect from a private or "secret" diary kept by an individual of their own volition.

Insofar as these sorts of difficulties with sources commonly arise during historical inquiry, and in some cases are insurmountable, Yoshimi should not be blamed for having had to rely so heavily on published material. He may simply have lacked access to many diaries of the worst perpetrators of atrocities, or to secret unpublished dairies that were not already selected and curated for public consumption. But he might have at least acknowledged some of these issues within his text or given some other evidence that he was aware of them.

A second major issue is Yoshimi's treatment of fascism, or rather, the total lack thereof. Given the title "Grassroots Fascism," and the innumerable times the word "fascism" appears in the text itself, one would expect Yoshimi to provide some explication of what he means by this term and how it applies to his argument. All the more so because by the time Yoshimi was writing this book a robust body of scholarship had already arisen contesting the nature of "fascism" in wartime Japan and in some cases calling into question whether the term could even be applied. Yoshimi was surely aware of this scholarship, and of the fact that this term had become highly contested, yet he provides not even a bare-bones definition of the term, let alone any sort of theoretical exegesis. Insofar as Yoshimi provides a scholarly intervention on this front, it would be his frequent use of the term "imperial fascism" (*tennōsei fashizumu*), implying that there existed a Japanese version of fascism distinct from that found elsewhere, and that this distinction had something to do with the Emperor or with the so-called "emperor system" in Japan. However, because he never explains this term, we cannot be sure if it is meant to shoulder any theoretical burden or not.

For the most part, Yoshimi simply assumes that fascism existed in Japan, and asserts that when "ordinary" Japanese subjects supported the war, this was evidence of their "grassroots" support for "imperial fascism." But it is hard to see what is particularly "fascistic" about the words and behavior of these individuals. Although it is true that they all support the war effort, it is difficult to see how their beliefs should be distinguished from ordinary, run-of-the-mill patriotism or state nationalism. Insofar as every major combatant power in the Second World War sought to mobilize the total energies of their people in support of the war effort, the actions and thoughts of these individuals were hardly different from those of citizens and soldiers of the United States, Great Britain, or the Soviet Union—nations which have rarely if ever been called "fascist." It seems that the evidence Yoshimi has marshaled here fits better with the concept of "Total War"—a description of the total mobilization of the spiritual and material resources of a nation that can be equally applied to all combatant nations—although in fairness to Yoshimi this concept was still being developed at the time *Grassroots Fascism* was first published.

As problematic as Yoshimi's non-treatment of fascism is, his notion of "grassroots" is equally under-explicated. Although Yoshimi's limiting himself to non-elites is made clear, his implied argument that fascism arose from the "grassroots" is not well-supported by the evidence he presents. Part of the difficulty is the way Yoshimi atomizes each individual's story into a standalone episode. He focuses intensively on their personal thoughts and views, but seems uninterested in providing any context for these views, and never once raises the question of how or where these views might have been developed or acquired. A typical understanding of fascism in Japan would emphasize the ways the top-down power of the state reached into every corner of daily lives and, in the words of Sheldon Garon, "moulded Japanese minds." Indeed, Yoshimi himself, almost accidentally, provides much circumstantial evidence for the ways in which these individuals were persuaded or even deceived by the state through propaganda, a culture of mutual surveillance, state-controlled women' and veterans associations, and the state-run ultranationalist education curriculum. But these external influences are all mentioned in passing, and never explored in detail.

Another issue is found in Yoshimi's treatment of atrocities. As mentioned, he is extremely interested in uncovering evidence or mention of Japanese atrocities against others, but he completely overlooks atrocities committed by others, especially the United States military, which he unfailingly portrays as kind and humane. Once again, this is not really Yoshimi's fault, as John Dower's definitive excavation of American wartime atrocities in Asia, *War Without Mercy*, was being written at the same time, but in retrospect Yoshimi's account seems a little too credulous of American wartime narratives and even, if anything, biased against the Japanese, which admittedly sounds strange to say, given Yoshimi's own politics.

Lastly, it bears mention that Yoshimi's exclusive reliance on certain kinds of sources limits his ability to paint a comprehensive portrait of how Japanese imperial subjects supported the war effort. In particular, he seems overly interested in the diaries and recollections of male soldiers in the Imperial Japanese Army, especially in China. By my count, only two women were profiled. There were also no voices from the Imperial Japanese Navy, and very view voices from the home front. It seems logical that men called up as soldiers would find some way to rationalize and support the war effort, but it is less clear why older people, women, and children might have done so. Certainly these types of people were keeping diaries too, but perhaps Yoshimi did not happen to find them. It also would have been nice to hear more voices of the colonized. One of the striking findings of Yoshimi's study is the fact that so many colonized peoples also came to support Japan's imperial project. In addition to the stories of Okinawans, Ainu, Sakhalin Islanders, and Koreans who fought for Japan, we also hear mention in passing of Chinese, Indonesian, Filipino, and Burmese collaborators. It would have been nice to hear more of these voices, but Yoshimi was limited to Japanese-language sources. One of Yoshimi's most impressive discoveries was the story of a Chamorro secret agent on Guam, but the only reason he had access to this was because the man later immigrated to Japan and wrote his memoirs in Japanese. To be fair, Yoshimi did an excellent job seeking out the recollections of soldiers with a wide variety of backgrounds, and it seems almost perverse to complain about a study that incorporates so many different voices. Nevertheless, Yoshimi's study would have been greatly strengthened if he had been able to present the stories of an even wider assortment of peoples, and perhaps fewer Japanese soldiers in China.

Ultimately, however, these are all minor nitpicks at what is in fact a deeply researched, eminently readable, and at times even moving book, a book that was undeniably a product of its time, but remains relevant to our time, as well. Moreover, this English edition is blessed with a truly remarkable 40-page introduction by translator Ethan Mark that anticipates some of the methodological quandaries raised here and tries to address several of them based in part on Mark's own nuanced reading of the text as well as interviews that Mark conducted with Yoshimi. The book is also greatly enhanced by Mark's extensive additional footnotes. Whereas Yoshimi's original text assumes a near-encyclopedic familiarity with the events and actors in the Asia-Pacific War, Mark provides detailed footnotes explaining almost every term and concept, along with citations to relevant secondary sources in English, thus allowing even non-specialists to fully engage with the stories of Yoshimi's colorful cast of characters.

The result is a much-welcomed addition to English-language scholarship on World War II in Asia that will be of great interest to an extremely wide variety of readers. *Grassroots Fascism* touches on almost every aspect of the Asia-Pacific War at some point, so specialists of every kind will find something of interest and relevance to their topic. Meanwhile, teachers will find the short, readable vignettes ideal for assigning to students, and general readers will find a highly accessible text of broad sweep and scope.

Timing is everything in history, but also in historical scholarship. As timely as Yoshimi's study was in 1987, when a Japan riding high on the Bubble Economy seemed eager to forget its wartime sins, we are perhaps even more fortunate to see the publication of this superlative English-language translation in 2015, just in time for the 70th anniversary of the end of the Asia-Pacific War, but also at a historical moment when the wartime generation has mostly passed on, a conservative Japanese government is seeking to revive Japan's military, and younger people in Japan are beginning to question whether Imperial Japan's original sins were as bad as they have been led to believe. As Yoshimi shows us in *Grassroots Fascism*, they were probably even worse, and every Japanese person alive at the time and many others throughout Asia as well were deeply implicated in an Imperial project that ultimately laid waste to everything it touched. As memories of the Second World War continue to fade, and the prospect of a new cold war in Asia rears its unwelcomed head, never has this insight been needed more.

# *Cold War Crucible: The Korean Conflict and the Postwar World*

by Masuda Hajimu
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015

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The so-called Cold War history is one of the burgeoning fields in the studies of contemporary history. The literature belonging to this relatively new field, contrary to older and traditional approaches to the Cold War, does not see the conflict simply in terms of the military and diplomatic competition between the two superpowers, but seeks to capture the various dimensions of the era, including domestic politics,[1] economies,[2]

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1 Central works on the Cold War American domestic politics are Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); John Fousek, *To Lead the Free World. American Nationalism and the Cultural Roots of the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003); Colleen Doody, *Detroit's Cold War: The Origins of Postwar Conservatism* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2008); Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, *America's Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2009). For the Soviet domestic society, see Marilyn S. Kushner, "Exhibiting Art at the American National Exhibition in Moscow, 1959: Domestic Politics and Cultural Diplomacy," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 4, no. 1 (2002), Susan E. Reid, "Cold War in the Kitchen: Gender and the De-Stalinization of Consumer Taste in the Soviet Union," *Slavic Review* 61, no. 2 (2002), Denis Kozlov and Eleonory Gilburd eds., *The Thaw: Soviet Society and Culture during the 1950s and 1960s* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013).

2 Nick Cullather, *Illusions of Influence: The Political Economy of United States-Philippines Relations, 1942-1960* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995); Randall W. Stone,

and cultural relations.[3] Also, its focus is geographically broadened to other regions of the Cold War world, such as Asia, Africa, and Latin America, which previous studies generally did not consider as protagonists on the stage.[4] Even Europe is being revitalized in the recent Cold War

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*Satellites and Commissars: Strategy and Conflict in the Politics of Soviet-Bloc Trade* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); Ragna Boden, "Cold War Economics: Soviet Aid to Indonesia," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 10, no. 3 (2008); David S. Painter, "Oil, Resources, and the Cold War, 1945-62," in O. A. Westad and M. Leffler eds., *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Volume III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Oscar Sanchez-Sibony, *Red Globalization: The Political Economy of the Soviet Cold War from Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

3 The literature on the Cold War culture is already rich. A pioneering work is Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1994). Other key works includes; Jessica Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible. American Journalism as Cultural Diplomacy in Postwar Germany, 1945-1955* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1999); David Caute, *The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Diplomacy during the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Uta G. Poiger, *Jazz, Rock, and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Victoria de Grazia. *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); John Connelly, *Captive University: The Sovietization of East German, Czech and Polish Higher Education, 1945-1956* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Kristin Roth-Ey, *Moscow Prime Time: How the Soviet Union Built the Media Empire That Lost the Cultural Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011). For a more cultural-oriented approach, see Christina Klein, *Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).

4 The most influential work is undoubtedly Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War. Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Also see Andrew J. Rotter, Comrades at Odds. *The United States and India, 1947-1964* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000); Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976* (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 2003); Matthew Connelly, *Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Hal Brands, *Latin America's Cold War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010); Jesse Ferris, *Nasser's Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the Decline of Egyptian Power* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012); Robert J. McMahon ed., *The Cold War in the Third World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). For works focusing more on the Soviet side, see Mari Olsen, Soviet-Vietnamese Relations and the Role of China, 1949-64 (London: Routledge, 2006); Vladimir Shulbin, *The Hot "Cold" War: The USSR in Southern Africa* (London: Pluto Press, 2008); Sergey Mazov, *A Distant Front in the Cold War: The USSR in West*

historiography, challenging the old notion that it was just an arena between the two superpowers, not an active player in the Cold War politics.[5] Related to such trends is the recent emphasis among Cold War historians on various transnational and non-state actors in making the Cold War. In the past, many of the Cold War studies were about United States policymakers (these studies were pejoratively called a history of the US Department of State) or Soviet Party leaders. Now journalists, academicians, artists, sports stars, exchange students, missionaries, and even ordinary people are treated as major actors in the Cold War world.[6] Finally, some new studies have begun to question the concept of the Cold War itself, calling for attention to uneven experiences, meanings, and timeframes that the world had in that period.[7] Phrases such as "the other Cold War" or "deconstruction of the Cold War" challenges previous conventional understanding of the Cold War as a single and universal competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The book under review is an outstanding example of such new scholarship. Masuda Hajimu, professor of history at National University of Singapore, does a marvelous job in repainting the early Cold War

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*Africa and the Congo, 1956-1964* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010).

5 John W. Young, "Western Europe and the end of the Cold War, 1979-89," in O. A. Westad and M. Leffler eds., *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Volume III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Jussi M. Hanhimaki, *Containing Coexistence America, Russia, and the "Finnish Solution," 1945-1956* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1997). More broadly, Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006).

6 Matthew Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, *All You Need Is Love: The Peace Corps and the Spirit of the 1960s* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); Penny M. Von Eschen, *Satchmo Blow up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004); Sarah Snyder, *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Martin Klimke, *The Other Alliance: Student Protest in West Germany and the United States in the Global Sixties* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011).

7 Matthew Connelly, *Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era*; Heonik Kwon, *The Other Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

world. His study is neither about the Korean War per se nor about complicated diplomatic relations surrounding the war. Rather, it is a creative combination of political, social, and local histories of the key countries linked with the war in the Korean peninsula, most notably, the United States, Japan, and China. His main argument is that the Cold War was the historical reality imagined and constructed by ordinary people or "the public" after the outbreak of the Korean War, not a given military and diplomatic conflict in the post-World War II years. Before that, there were "a number of disputable perspectives" in the societies and there was no "the Cold War" that the later generations readily internalized as the given international condition in their time. After the summer of 1950, however, "the Cold War" became the reality. In such a tremendous transition, Masuda argues, ordinary people played key roles through their imagination of the East-West conflicts, activities in various kinds of political movements, and, most importantly, participation in local "social struggles and cultural wars" in their domestic society. Those people utilized the Korean War, which produced fear of a third world war by bringing back memories of the Second World War, as an opportunity to quell various kinds of social and cultural demands and return to a previous order. In this sense, the Korean War was a catalyst for the Cold War, but more fundamental to the process was the mood of the "general public."

To prove such original arguments, Masuda seems to have conducted a great deal of archival work in various countries and explored a myriad of documents published in both the Eastern and Western worlds. His main sources are public discourse, such as press materials, memoirs, letters, and other materials. In particular, local newspapers in the early Cold War world are the most critical to him because his main interest resides in the role of local people in making the Cold War reality. Those literary sources are backed by governmental reports, statistics, poll results, and visual materials such as cartoons. When he discusses the relationship between public opinions and policymaking, he considers official governmental documents, as well.

Masuda divides the book into the three parts largely in a chronological order. In the first part, he deals with the postwar world prior to the outbreak of the Korean War. The second part is devoted to an analysis of the "popular attitudes" from summer 1950, when the Korean War broke out, to winter 1950, and an examination of the relationship between them and policymaking. Also, the latter portion of the second part revisits the propaganda activities at that time. The final, third part provides an alternative explanation of the repressions and purges conducted roughly from 1950 to 1951 in the United States, China, Japan, and Great Britain, as well as in Taiwan and the Philippines.

As Masuda's book has many intriguing and new interpretations on those issues, it is worthwhile here to follow the content of the book in a more detailed manner. In Chapter 1, Masuda describes the postwar social atmospheres in the United States, Japan, and China and, most impressively, displays the interplay among them. Immediately after the Second World War, various social and cultural issues, such as race, gender, and labor, came to the fore and some changes in those areas seemed plausible in the countries. However, according to Masuda, the majority of population in the United States reacted to such demands in a negative way and developed a sort of "conservative backlash." Their reaction was clearly expressed in the 1946 mid-term election in which the Republican Party gained a sweeping victory over "New Dealish" Democrats and the Progressive Party. Critical to the process was the development of the "anti-communist" and "(Un) American" discourse set, through which any dissident from the social order could be labelled as a pro-Soviet. Such a right turn in the United States changed Japan, where reform-minded political forces had been rising since the end of the war. After the 1946 mid-term election, however, conservative elements in Japanese society returned, and they made the reform-oriented politics look like "the result of communist manipulation," ultimately paving the way for the so-called "Reverse Course" adopted by the United States occupation administration in 1947. In this sense, the "Reverse Course," Masuda emphasizes, was not simply imposed by

Washington, but "primarily a process of local struggle among Japanese." This right turn seemed like a product of America's policy shift at that time also had a strong impact on China, where it produced anti-American sentiment and an anti-American movement. While the previous scholarship generally linked this phenomenon to the activities of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Masuda challenges such a conventional interpretation, arguing that it was originated and developed at a grassroots level. In postwar America, though, such anti-Americanism in China was not perceived as a grassroots social movement but simply as a sign of the expansion of Moscow. According to Masuda, however, such turns in those countries did not yet create a general consensus. There still existed differing ideas and viewpoints in the United States, Japan, and China before the outbreak of the Korean War. "If nothing unusual had happened in the summer of 1950," those societies would have been quite different from the so-called Cold War ones.

Chapter 2 deals with how the Korean War was differently translated in various countries, such as Korea, the United States, China, and others. In the United States and Western Europe, it brought about the "fear of World War III" as they thought that the war meant a direct challenge from Moscow. However, in China and other countries that experienced colonial rule by a Western power, the war, in particular, America's entry into the Korean War signified the resurrection of imperialism. Such different translations, Masuda stresses, were due to the "local experiences, contexts and political languages and needs," namely, the domestic situations and memories in those countries.

In Chapters 3 and 4, entitled "Cold War Fantasy" and "Politics of Impression," respectively, Masuda challenges the conventional notion in Cold War studies that policymakers' ideas and policy implementation brought about the Cold War which, in turn, had great aftereffects on societies. According to him, rather, the opposite is closer to the historical truth. In many cases, ordinary people were ahead of their politicians. And the active involvement and participation of local people, directly and indirectly, pushed policymakers in certain directions. In the case of the United States, the anti-communist climate in the United States domestic society was critical to the decision to press the offensive into North Korea, namely, crossing the 38th parallel after the Inchon landing. As for the CCP, the "instable" social atmosphere propelled by the American army's advance into North Korea and expressed in ongoing rumors about Chiang Kai-shek's possible counterattack on the mainland, various kinds of challenges to the CCP's rule, and some doubts about its legitimacy pushed the leadership to decide to enter the Korean War. Their decision to advance to the South after their initial victory in the northern part of the peninsula in late 1950 was also taken due to their concern regarding the social atmosphere in China. In short, the CCP's decisions, previously interpreted as products of diplomatic or military considerations, were actually made in order to "hold on to favorable popular impressions" of the CCP.

Chapters 5 and 6 explore the propaganda activities concerning the Korean War which were conducted in the United States and in China from the fall of 1950. American domestic society witnessed the "widespread fear of World War III and the fantasy of the Cold War" after the breakout of the war. According to Masuda, such sentiment was a product less of top-down propaganda directed by the American policymakers than the politics of "truth-making campaign" where ordinary American people played a key role. Because of their old prejudice against Chinese and Asians as submissive and dependent, they continued to see China merely as a tool of Moscow, which was critical in terms of war mobilization. Meanwhile, ordinary Chinese people perceived America based upon their own experiences and memories of Japanese imperialism. A campaign called "Resist America and Aid Korea," which began from late 1950, was not simply imposed by the CCP's leadership but developed largely by local actors who cherished anti-colonial sentiment and tended to equate the United States forces with Japanese imperialism.

Despite such massive popular participation in propaganda activities in the United States and China as well as other countries, according to

Masuda, there was still "an undisputable portion of population" which still held differing viewpoints. "To resolve such disputes in society," each country took "more direct and brutal" measures. These measures are the subject of the third and final part of the book. Chapter 7 briefly touches upon the large-scale massacres committed in Korea during the war, and then moves on to McCarthyism in the United States. Chapter 8 deals with the postwar British labor disputes and the subsequent settlements, and the so-called "Red Purge" in Japan. The purge movement against the "counterrevolutionaries" conducted in China from the fall of 1950 to the summer of 1951 is discussed in Chapter 9.

The final chapter of the main body deals with the "anti-communist" punishments in the former colonies, namely, Taiwan and the Philippines. In all four chapters, Masuda highlights one critical point: those repressions and purges, which have been interpreted merely as an aftereffect of the Cold War, contained "social" elements. They reflected the existing social conflicts, which had deepened from the period of the Great Depression and the Second World War in the cases of the United States and Western countries, or from the "colonial" era in case of other societies, and demonstrated local and ordinary people's choice of "returning to a state of social order and custom." The bipolar Cold War logic was all over the place in those movements, but it was adopted and utilized by ordinary people, in a manner less political than social, to restore and maintain conventional or orderly way of life in their domestic societies. In this vein, the purges came to have broader targets, namely, not just communists, but also any element that seemed to try to block "the return of ordinary life," such as socio-cultural activists, religious sects, peasant rebels, and even common criminals. In short, those movements in the era of the "imagined" Cold War were, according to Masuda, grassroots social punishments to normalize or purify their own societies.

Revisiting key historiographical issues in the early Cold War world, Masuda convincingly presents alternative answers and successfully broadens our understanding of the era by deconstructing the simple Cold

War framework and by wearing domestic and local lenses. His "international" history is truly impressive. Beyond traditional diplomatic relations, his story shows interactions among the different societies and highlights domestic contexts in individual nations. However, there are still several problems that he could have addressed in his book. First, when he uses terminology such as the "general public," "popular attitudes," or sometimes even "social need," further elaborations seem to be needed. Masuda implies that there was a majority group in these societies in the postwar world and it was their decision to return to normalcy and the previous order against the challenges from reform-oriented forces or people who demanded changes. But Masuda never clearly describes who those people were. If they really represented "the majority of the population" or "a large portion of the population," as he puts it, readers might want to know more about their socio-economic status, cultural backgrounds, and political orientations.

While his "international" approach to the societies in the United States, Japan, and China is more than impressive, it is necessary to be more cautious in directly comparing those countries in the postwar years for their political systems and ideas were obviously uneven. In the case of the United States, it certainly had a democratic and "liberal" system in a Western sense, which was probably more sensitive to the public mood, as Masuda suggests. On the contrary, the CCP's leaders belonged to the tradition of Marxism-Leninism in which they saw themselves as a vanguard or an enlightening force of the population, namely, as an organizer or agitator of public attitudes. While I more than agree with Masuda regarding the point that the Communist society (or the actual military dictatorship like postwar Japan) could not completely control the public mood, there should have been enormous dissimilarities between the United States and China in terms of the ways in which public attitudes were manifested and became a factor in forging actual policies. In short, the public sphere in America might be quite different from those in China and Japan in the postwar world. Also, there is another comparison problem. While the "anti-communist" movements of the United States, Japan, and Taiwan can be nicely subsumed under the notion of "returning to order," that is hardly the case for the purge in China from 1950 to 1951. Rather, the Chinese case seems to be closer to a volatile social eruption in the post-revolutionary period, than a "conservative backlash" for social order. It is hard to juxtapose societies coming out of the wartime turmoil with societies driven by (socialist) revolutionary zeal and energy.

Regarding methodology, it would have been more interesting if Masuda had chosen to include a more specific discursive-oriented analysis of his documents in this work. While he certainly owes much to the so-called "cultural turn" of the diplomatic history field, he rarely pushes his project beyond "the social" towards "the cultural." Masuda basically treats languages in a traditional way: they are a tool that actors select and utilize for their own purposes. He does not pay the keenest attention to a constructive power of languages; actors (or subjects) in the postwar world could be possibly shaped and molded by the Cold War discourse sets.[8] Finally, the Korean case should have been more represented in his book, not just because the Korean War is a key event for his book but because Korea was the country in which the United States' "anti-communist" policy was first adopted, that is, much earlier than the "Reverse Course" in Japan.[9] The case would have enriched his picture and made it even more interesting.

These criticisms do not alter in the least the fact that this book represents a significant academic achievement. *Cold War Crucible* is a great addition and resounding contribution to the recent historiography of the Cold War.

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[8] A good example for this methodology is Christina Klein, *Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961* (Berkeley: University o California Press, 2003).

[9] Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).

# *Imagining Japan in Post-War East Asia: Identity Politics, Schooling, and Popular Culture*

by Paul Morris, Naoko Shimizu, and Edward Vickers, eds.
London: Routledge, 2013

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As senior editor Edward Vickers notes in the foreword (xiv), this insightful collaborative volume on East Asian views of Japan is even timelier than it was at its inception with a small group of scholars in 2009. Japan's international role is now intensely negotiated and contested both inside and outside its borders. The work studies what Japan means to its neighbors, how and why those meanings have changed, and how they reflect the identity politics of those nearby nations.

The editors frame the varied contributions with a chapter-length introduction. They observe that Cold War ideological differences have been replaced in a number of nations by intensified nationalism, as in Europe. However, the nations of East Asia remain within the Cold War's geopolitical contours. Meanwhile, Japan's economic rise has given it cultural influence throughout the region. They provide four rubrics for seeing Japan. The "normative other" interpretation makes Japan an Asian model of modernization or a symbol justifying modernizing agendas. Japan as a "dominant other," a legacy from historical experiences of invasion and war, defines Japan as an eternal enemy in order to bolster nationalism or mask domestic trouble. The "distant other" Japan, found in the Philippines, is related to the "dominant other." It is a picture of a disadvantageous historical relationship like that of the "dominant other" but the power of which to intensify Philippine nationalism has either weakened or is unused. The editors also find an "alternative other," that is, a reference point used to emphasize difference between the society viewing Japan and a dominant third entity such as the West or the People's Republic of China. The foreword carefully explains that these broad categories are not mutually exclusive, that "Japan has served as a repository for an enormously diverse range of images carrying an equally diverse range of messages" (20). The first collection of essays in the volume covers "Japan" in popular culture and [non school textbook] public propaganda. While inevitably identifying forms of official control, the section goes beyond sanctioned discourse to explore such influences as consumers and folk beliefs. The second grouping is "Japan" in official discourse, meaning textbooks. An epilogue discusses efforts of the Annual Seminar for History Teachers from China, Japan, and South Korea to achieve mutual understanding, provided by a participant in that endeavor.

Singaporean authorities instituted a Learn from Japan campaign from 1979 until the onset of Japan's post bubble economic stagnation. The goal was not to make citizens more like Japanese, but rather "productive, patriotic, and compliant *Singaporeans*" (29, italics in original). Officials were attracted by Japan's supposed ability to retain its Asian character while becoming an economic power and sought to unify their citizens against individualism and other scourges of Westernization. While practices from Japan were implemented, a greater legacy is found in the existence of a modernized but ostensibly little Westernized Japan as a model to justify authoritarian governance and neoliberal economic policy.

I-yun Lee and Christine Han explore transition in Taiwan from an anti-Japanese posture resulting from five decades of colonial rule to a popular culture import boom in the 1990s. Colonial Japanese assimilation measures and harsh postwar Kuomintang (KMT) treatment of Taiwanese elicited affinity for Japan. The result was a positive view of Japan by the

Taiwanese contrasting with a negative KMT image of the same country. "Nostalgia for the Japanese era thus became a symbol and a resource with which to sustain resistance against the KMT" (52). The KMT relaxed its anti Japan position during the Cold War but reinstated it when Japan followed the United States in recognizing the PRC. Nevertheless latent interest in and consumption of Japanese cultural products remained to ignite a Japan boom as Taiwan's economy grew, particularly after the end of martial law in 1987. Japanese anime, manga, and romantic TV dramas created "an image [of Japan] onto which [Taiwanese fans] projected their desires and wishes, as well as their own rules and logic" (63).

Kinnia Yau Shuk-ting examines Japanese portrayals in Chinese war films, finding in collaborative Sino-Japanese works from the 1980s on images distinguishing "good Japanese" from bad "to promote historically and culturally rooted relationships between the people of China and Japan" (70). China's government in the interest of trade relations sanctioned films separating good Japanese, who were war victims, from militaristic predatory devils. Chinese empathy in such films is intended to show the magnanimity of a rising Chinese civilization. Evil Japanese demonstrate China's heroic struggle against them, but more nuanced Japanese characters open a space for cooperation. They also depict a fantasy of Japanese contrition that, to the Chinese government, remains unexpressed by Japanese officialdom, and illustrate the virtue of Chinese society.

The Philippines differs from many of its neighbors, in Karl Ian Uy Cheng Chua's reading, because it has "refrained from using schooling to transmit a strong sense of national identity premised on a coherent narrative of the national past" (86). Therefore, the author investigates extracurricular images, specifically comic books or *komiks* from the 1940s to the 1970s. While the Japanese as war enemies were portrayed negatively, "post-war depictions of Japanese villainy were accompanied, from the earliest days by emphasis on the dastardly role of native collaborators" (91). The prominence of the Second World War as a stage for Filipino-Japanese interaction survives in personal narratives but has diminished over time in *komiks*. The appeal of Japanese economic development during the corrupt and divisive Marcos era prompted a reconsideration of Japan that popular print entertainment reflects.

Jung-Sun N. Han's contribution analyzes the shifting purposes and meanings of the Japanese Government-General Building in Seoul from the colonial period to its razing for the 50th anniversary of the war's end. The Chosŏn dynasty's Kyŏngbok Palace, destroyed by invading Japanese armies in 1592 and rebuilt nearly three centuries later, was where the Japanese occupation regime built its headquarters. The war- damaged Government-General Building was neglected after the Korean War but became the seat of government under the Park Chung Hee regime after 1961, and was later turned into a museum. Because of Park's prewar identity as a soldier in Japan's army and his need to prioritize economic development, he decoupled the issues of historical repression from the renewal of postwar ties to Japan. The issues of collaboration and reparations, like the ultimate fate of the building, remained unresolved. A directly elected government was established in the late 1980s and Roh Tae Woo, the first incumbent thereof, planned to demolish the Government-General Building and restore the palace. Proponents considered it a symbol of national disgrace and collaboration, a place Japanese visited to celebrate its colonization of Korea, or a curse disrupting the geomantic *pungsu* forces of the nation. Calls to save or move the edifice were based on either the perceived need to preserve evidence of a painful past or the Government-General Building's historic architectural value. It was dismantled starting August 15, 1995, celebrated as the 50th anniversary of Korea's liberation from Japan, but lawsuits delayed the work. Its destruction and the reconstruction of the palace "signify a growing self-confidence among Korea's people in coming to terms with a past freighted with difficult memories" (123). The building that seldom appeared in postwar Korean textbooks while it existed has since its demolishment reappeared in them, now a historical memory bereft of disruptive power.

Part III explores images of Japan in one form of official discourse, school textbooks. Textbooks and curricular contents are popular targets for research on the construction of national Selves and Others.[1] Textbook contents do not show what children actually learn or believe about their or other nations, and say nothing of their influence on the opinions of adults.[2] Nevertheless, the widespread reach of course materials in modern compulsory education systems and their official imprimatur make them an important issue for analysis.

Caroline Rose observes a shift in PRC history textbooks from focusing on the CCP/KMT struggle to greater attention on the war against Japan in the post Mao era. Patriotism that includes some recognition of KMT resistance to Japan became the new ideological centerpiece, particularly in response to the 1989 Tiananmen Incident. Coverage of the Anti-Japanese War of Resistance has diminished since then, although Japan remains a "'dominant other,' the malevolent author-in-chief of China's national humiliation" (131) in school texts. Reforms in the early 2000s made history compulsory for three years rather than one and changed the goal to "holistic development" (quoted by Rose, 132) and cultivation of innovative attitudes, adding more world history and thematic rather than purely chronological treatment of the subject. Some room for difference in detail within government guidelines is manifested in contemporary Chinese textbooks. A reduction in information on the KMT/CCP conflict during the war, to strengthen an image of Chinese unity and patriotism, intensifies the impact of remaining material covering Japanese aggression. Extracurricular anti-Japanese images are prevalent to

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1 Among monographs, see, for example, Julian Dierkes, *Postwar history education in Japan and the Germanys: guilty lessons* (New York, Routledge, 2010); Gotelind Müller, ed., *Designing History in East Asian Textbooks: Identity politics and transnational aspirations* (London and New York, Routledge, 2011); and Gi-Wook Shin and Daniel Sneider, eds., *History Textbooks and the Wars in Asia* (New York, Routledge, 2011). There are also many research journal articles on the subject.

2 See Jones, 187, note 1 in the volume under review.

the extent that "textbooks allude to what are now established tropes of the officially sanctioned narrative of the AJWR" (145).

Paul Morris and Edward Vickers examine changes in Hong Kong's texts from 1996, the eve of its 1997 reversion to Chinese sovereignty from Great Britain, to 2009, when education ostensibly lies under local, not Beijing central government purview. The old boss is similar to the new in that post colonial officials continue, as under Great Britain's control, to govern in tight cooperation with local economic leaders. Pre-reversion texts offered more attention to Japan's identity as a successful modernizer, while later ones have increased coverage of militarism, aggression, and atrocities against China. Postwar Japan was added to texts in 2004. Recent treatment praises Japan's experience of one-party governance in parallel with that of China's Communist Party, faulting the Liberal Democratic Party's weakening in the 1990s as well as the supposed rise of individualism in Japan. Japanese history has "been tweaked to reinforce elements of CCP orthodoxy, such as the benefits of one-party rule" (167). This makes Japan an erstwhile "normative other." While mainland China has occupied the role of an aggressive "dominant other" in the minds of Hong Kong residents, recent texts put Japan in that role satisfying both local elites and Beijing's central rulers.

Content was little altered in Taiwan's textbooks for decades after World War II. Alisa Jones finds that China was long portrayed as Japan's "normative other," as the influence of the Tang dynasty is credited with Japan's becoming a nation. Japan's modernization on Western models is drawn in parallel to the earlier Chinese contributions. World War II focuses on Japanese aggression and KMT Chinese resistance. Coverage of Japanese aggression and atrocities intensified after it recognized the PRC. The change from the meaning of Taiwan as merely a temporary refuge for China's rightful governors increased academic attention to local histories and also transformed the meaning of Japan as a colonizer of Taiwan. The colonial era let Taiwan see a period of relatively benign pre KMT development separate from the mainland "allowing Taiwan to assert ‘historical memories’ separate from…the Chinese national story” (185). School texts after the KMT lost control of the government cover Japan’s oppression and modernization of Taiwan, “free from the anger that colours Korean textbooks” (184). Texts also subtly distinguish between China and Taiwan histories, making the 1937-1945 conflict “a war between two states, neither of which is ‘us’” (185). Japan opens for Taiwan its own historical space between the former and China.

Helen Ting analyzes Malaysian official Malay language and private Chinese language textbooks. Japan’s invasion and occupation differentiated ethnic Chinese as enemies and employed ethnic Malays as proxy administrators to replace the expelled British. This history flavors current treatment of the war era. Chinese language texts call Japan’s action an invasion, while Malay teaching material uses the more neutral terms of “the coming of Japan” (197) and explains its success against British forces. Malay texts link the occupation to the emergence of nationalism, “If anything, the West emerges as a more significant ‘Other’ than Japan” (203). Both sides criticize colonialism but Chinese textbooks are clearer that Japan was the enemy, while national textbooks cast suspicion on the potential threat of domestic communists, among which ethnic Chinese were more numerous.

Officials initially deemphasized national history in Singapore out of concern that the subject would illuminate ethnic differences, but now use it to instill a national identity. Khatera Khamsi and Christine Han find increased attention to Japan’s occupation in social studies texts but decreased attention in history texts. They suggest that “Social Studies, even more than History, is seen by the curriculum development authorities as a vehicle for the official nation-building agenda” (218). Negative portrayals of Japanese soldiers increased after the government’s 1980s “Learn from Japan” campaign ended but texts included admirable characteristics, highlighting British weakness and the perceived strengths of Japan as an Asian power. Tales of multiethnic resistance were added to emphasize national unity. Content on the origins of the war with Japan has decreased, while coverage of the experience of occupation memory increased, showing "a growing emphasis on inculcating a collective memory" (218) in which Japan plays "the roles both of enemy and model" (225).

Mark Maca and Paul Morris report that "the period of Japanese occupation has not been used to create a 'historical narrative' focused on constructing a unified sense of Filipino national identity" (230). It is mainly private publishers that create textbooks, under minimal governmental regulation. While Japan is described as more brutal than Spain or the United States, textbook emphasis on the Philippines' anti colonial wars has weakened, as has content on the Japanese occupation. Postwar cooperation between Japan and the Philippines has gained ground instead. Internationalism is stressed over nationalism. Without the strong administrative institutions of a developmental state, the government lacks the power to lead the education system towards its constitutional goal of strengthening patriotism and nationalism.

In the epilogue, Guopeng Shi evaluates the Annual Seminar for History Teachers from China, Japan, and South Korea. The meeting provides a regular international forum for teachers to discuss politically divisive issues in an atmosphere of "mutual respect and open-mindedness," (253) and motivates teacher-initiated historical research. The need for simultaneous interpretation between three languages, the domestic politics of participating teachers' unions, and national political agendas limit its effectiveness. Participants tend to agree to condemn historical Japanese militarism, but merely "to use history as a blunt instrument" (257) for respective domestic nationalisms. The author believes that to improve mutual understanding, there is a need to turn the gaze inward on one's own national history with as critical an eye as that cast upon the other.

There is little else one could ask of this interesting and varied collection. Indonesia is a significant omission, given its large population, Muslim majority, and experience with Japanese occupation. Another unfortunate, but perhaps unavoidable absence is North Korea (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea). Scholars who work on the DPRK may have limited access to North Korean discourse on Japan. However, given the tense relationship between those two nations and the editors' utilitarian goals for the volume, that is, formulating understandings as the basis "to untangle image from reality, and prevent the war of minds from becoming a war of men," (23) such a study would have enhanced an already rich volume.

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