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

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Articles

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NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

Japan's "Military Logistics Base" Policy after the Second Sino-Japanese War and Joseon's Trade with China

Song Kue-Jin
Korea University

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Japan's "Military Logistics Base" Policy after the Second Sino-Japanese War and Joseon's Trade with China

After the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, Governor-General Minami Jirō proposed the Military Logistics Base Policy and increased the significance of Joseon as a supply base for Japan's war in China. As supply to China grew, the Joseon-Manchuria Liaison, which handled economic exchanges between Joseon and Manchuria, came to include China by expanding into the Continental Liaison, thus highlighting the importance of exports to China. Around the same time, the Joseon Trade Association established branch offices in a number of places across China, and organized sample fairs, often to develop trade promotion measures. In addition to economic matters, the association concurrently discussed military pacification work and morale-boosting support for the Japanese Army. Joseon's exports to China maintained a trend of steady quantitative growth thanks to continuous policy developments to meet with the objective of supporting Japan's mainland invasion. This was only possible because it drove the Joseon people into hardship through the control of supplies to them.

Keywords: Second Sino-Japanese War, Military Logistics Base (兵站基地), the Idea of Unity in Joseon and Manchuria (鮮滿一如論), Joseon Trade Association (朝鮮貿易協會), the Joseon Trade Association's Report (朝鮮貿易 協會通報), Joseon East Asia Trade Company (朝鮮東亞貿易株式會社), Joseon's exports to China

Japan's "Military Logistics Base" Policy after the Second Sino-Japanese War and Joseon's Trade with China

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1. Introduction

Following the Manchurian Incident, the Japanese military separated Manchuria from the rest of China and established Manchukuo. As the Japanese government diplomatically recognized Manchukuo, the League of Nations decided to impose sanctions against Japan, leading to its withdrawal from the League. The Ottawa conference of British colonies and autonomous dominions also aggravated competition between rival economic blocs. In particular, major countries failed to narrow their differences at the International Economic Conference of 1933. Accordingly, each country focused on its own self-sufficiency and raised trade barriers by increasing tariffs and constricting import quotas, import licensing systems, and foreign exchange management, thus darkening prospects for Japan's international trade.[1]

This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the government of the Republic of Korea (NRF-362-2008-1-A00001).

1 Preferential treatment for the United Kingdom and the British colonies was further strengthened at the "British Empire Economic Conference," held in Ottawa, Canada, for one month from July

In the midst of fierce competition between rival economic blocs, Japan embarked on the Second Sino-Japanese War. A quick occupation of northern China was followed by the occupation of Nanjing and Shanghai in December 1937, signaling victory for Japan. However, the situation reached a deadlock and more sanctions were imposed. Facing added political and economic pressure, Japan went on to launch the Pacific War by bombing Pearl Harbor.[2]

Affected by the Second Sino-Japanese War, Joseon underwent significant changes in all aspects of daily life.[3] Since the war began, Japan formulated the policy of turning Joseon into an "advanced frontline military logistics base" (大陸前進兵站基地). Suzuki Takeo, a professor of Keijo Imperial University, argued that this policy of turning Joseon into a military logistics base would enhance the status of Joseon's economy and lead to its growth.[4] Nonetheless, as Japan was using Joseon as a stepping-stone to occupy China and conduct a war, its interests focused on how to obtain and deliver the necessary supplies.[5] To this end,

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21, 1932. This meeting sparked the "tariff war," in which each country continuously increased their tariff rates thereafter. See Song Kue-jin, "Segye gyeongje gonghwang jeonhu 'Yeongjegug gyeongje hoeui' wa Joseon ui dae 'Yeongjeguggwon' muyeog" [The 'British Empire Economic Conference' and Joseon's Trade with 'British Empire Territories' before and after the Great Depression], *Yeoksa wa damnon* 56 (2010): 565-594.

2 See Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 2nd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999).

3 See Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie, eds., *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931-1945* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); Janis Mimura, *Planning for Empire: Reform Bureaucrats and the Japanese Wartime State* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011).

4 Suzuki Takeo, *Chōsen no keizai* [The Economy of Joseon] (Tokyo: Nippon Hyōronsha, 1941), 274-310.

5 See Pang Kie-chung, "1940 nyeon jeonhu Joseonchongdogbu ui 'Sincheje' insig gwa byeongcham giji ganghwa jeongchaeg—Chongdogbu gyeongje jibae siseutem ui teugjil gwa gwanlyeon hayeo" [The Understanding of Japanese Government-General in Korea on the 'New System' around 1940 and the Policy to Reinforce Military Logistics Bases—In Relation to the Characteristics of the Government-General's Economic Control System], *Dongbang hakji* 138 (2007): 97-152.

the Japanese Government-General of Joseon (hereafter, the Government-General) made the smooth supply of war resources the goal of Joseon's trade and implemented trade control policies to achieve this goal.[6]

Meanwhile, Japan recruited collaborators and set up a puppet regime in the occupied territory. The puppet regime consulted with customs tax advisors and induced an agreement to separate the Tianjin Tax Authority from the Chinese government and to make the customs advisors report directly to the puppet regime. This led to the lessening of import duties; the export tax also dropped gradually. It also prompted the revision of import duty rates on January 22, 1938, and on June 2 the introduction of a minimal or zero import duty for daily necessities.[7] This favorably affected Joseon's exports to China, achieving significant growth in trade with China irrespective of the realities of the Joseon economy.

Although China, like Japan, was a major trading partner for Joseon during the colonial period, there has been little research in Korean academia into Joseon's trade with China.[8] Chinese studies have made

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6 Song Kue-jin, *Ilje ha ui Joseon muyeog yeongu* [Study on Joseon's Trade under Japanese Occupation] (Seoul: Goryeo daehakgyo Minjok munhwa yeonguwon, 2001), 177-193.

7 Song Kue-jin, "Ilje ha dongbuga gwanse munje wa Joseon ui dae 'Junggug' muyeog" [Customs Duties in North East Asia and Joseon's Trade with 'China' during the Japanese Imperial Era], *Hanguksa yeongu* 160 (March 2013): 198.

8 See Song Kue-jin, "Ilje ha gwanse jeongchaeg ui byeonhwa ga Joseon ui dae Junggug muyeog e kkichin yeonghyang" [The Change of Tariff Policy of Empire Japan and Its Effect on Trade between Korea and China], *Asea yeongu* 47, no. 2 (June 2004): 243-281; Song Kue-jin, "Ilje ha Joseon gwa Manjugug ui muyeog e gwanhan yeongu" [A Study on Choson's Trade with Manchukuo under the Rule of Japanese Imperialism], *Jungguk hakbo* 52 (December 2005): 351-375; Song Kue-jin, "1930 nyeondae ihu Joseon ui dae Junggug muyeog" [Choson's Trade with China since the 1930s], *Dongyanghak* 39 (February 2006): 93-116; Kang Jin-a, "Sigminji Daeman gwa Joseon ui dae Jung muyeog gujo bigyo" [The Comparative Studies about Sino-Taiwan and Sino-Korean Trade during the Colonial Period under the Japanese Rule], *Daegu sahak* 81 (November 2005): 123-163. The author has previously analyzed Joseon's trade during the colonial period with China, including Manchukuo and Kwantung Province. In this article, China, after the establishment of Manchukuo in 1932, refers to the mainland excluding Manchuria. After the Sino-Japanese War, the trade between Joseon and China took place mainly in the areas occupied by the Japanese Army and ruled by the puppet government.

only limited references to the subject as Sino-Joseon trade did not occupy a substantial portion among China's trade volume with other countries.[9] In particular, there have been few studies on the period following the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, when the Logistics Base Policy resulted in the transformation of Joseon into a supply base and the promotion of Sino-Joseon trade. This research aims to fill this lacuna, and to illustrate how food and other products were supplied during the Second Sino-Japanese War.

2. The Advancement of a Military Logistics Base Theory and the Deployment of Supply Provision Policies

After the Manchurian Incident, the Kwantung Army conceived the concept of local procurement and developed a five-year plan for Manchurian industries.[10] Minami Jirō, the Governor-General of Joseon, presented the "idea of unity in Joseon and Manchuria" (鮮滿一如論) upon his inauguration in order to strengthen Joseon's political and economic cooperation with Manchuria.[11] He promoted the idea of operating "military logistics bases for continental advancement" and tried to solidify

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[9] See Zheng Youkui, *Zhongguo de duiwai maoyi he gongye fazhan* [Foreign Trade and Industrial Development of China] (Shanghai: Shanghai Shehui Kexueyuan Chubanshe, 1984); Sun Yuqin, eds., *Zhongguo duiwai maoyishi* [History of Chinese Foreign Trade], vol. 2 (Beijing: Duiwai Jingji Maoyi Daxue Chubanshe, 2004).

[10] See Kobayashi Hideo, *'Daitō A kyōeiken' no keisei to hōkai* [The Development and Collapse of the 'Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere'] (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobō, 1975), 66-78.

[11] Applying the framework of "cooperation" to fully grasp the circumstances of the time would be insufficient, considering the conflicting interests that existed between Japan (the Department of Commerce and Industry and the military) and the Government-Generals of Japanese colonies, not to mention those between Joseon and Manchukuo, as well. Nevertheless, the author has chosen to delve into aspects of cooperation rather than conflict through this paper. See Song Kue-jin, "Iljeha 'Seon Man gwangye' wa 'Seon Man illyeo ron'" [The Relationship between Chosun and Manchuria under the Japanese Imperialism and the Idea of 'the Unity in Chosun and Manchuria'], *Hanguksa yeongu* 146 (September 2009): 245-278.

the relationship between Japan and Joseon in order to invade the mainland. The supply lines connecting the homeland defense base to the field forces and supply bases were originally premised upon the idea that the homeland bases bore responsibility for logistics. In this case, the main supply base moved from the Japanese "homeland" to the "mainland" Joseon.[12]

The idea of operating "military logistics bases for continental advancement" was a sophisticated strategy that went beyond the concept of local procurement employed after the occupation of Manchuria. At first, it was developed as a means to support a "broad sense of national defense" (廣義國防) and to enable smooth logistics, not only during the war, but also in times of peace. However, the term "advancement" was added to differentiate Joseon from Manchukuo, and to emphasize the significance of Joseon as the supply base for the Japanese invasion of the mainland.[13]

The term "military logistics base" was first officially used by Minami at the Rotary Convention and general meeting of the Japan-Manchukuo Industries Association (日滿實業協會) in May 1938. However, Minami did not clearly explain at the time the reason for using this term. It was in August 1938 at the "Conference of the Heads of the Departments of Industry" (産業部長會議), held after the Department of Industry established subdivisions in each province, that he clearly explained the importance of Joseon as a supply base for the Second Sino-Japanese War.[14]

> First of all, we need to clearly understand the role of Joseon as the advanced frontline supply base of the Empire. Joseon is making

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12 Suzuki, *Chōsen no keizai*, 296-297.

13 Zenkoku keizai chōsa kikan rengōkai Chōsen shibu, *Chōsen keizai nenpō* [Annual Report of the Joseon Economy] (Tokyo: Kaizōsha, 1939), 402.

14 Ibid., 403.

> achievements in the smooth logistic supply of a significant volume of military supplies, such as food and general merchandise, in the Sino-Japanese War. We need to diversify Joseon's industries, especially its defense industries, so that it can continue to supply on its own in the event that the situation escalates and the maritime supply route from Japan is cut off.

In fact, Manchukuo could have been a more appropriate site as a supply base for military operation in that "unity in Joseon and Manchuria" could be promoted to integrate the Sino-Japanese Economic Bloc into a single entity. However, in his descriptions of supply bases for the Empire's continental advancement, Minami only mentioned Joseon. His suggestion was criticized for focusing on Joseon's circumstances that uniquely appealed to Japan and thus not properly taking into account Joseon's place in Japan's relations with China and Manchukuo.[15] An economic staff member of the Joseon Army argued as below at a round table of the Japan-Manchukuo Economic Cooperation (日滿經濟提携座談會), which was jointly organized by the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in May 1938.[16]

> We say that Joseon, Manchukuo, and Japan are one entity. However, each has unique issues. From the viewpoint of military supply, there is no doubt that northern China and Manchukuo are more appropriate, since a supply base should be located close to the military operation. However, there is no industry established there. The right industry needs to take root in the right place with enough potential to grow

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[15] Ibid., 403. Manchukuo and Joseon were rivals in claiming a status within the Japanese Empire. Those who professed the significance of Manchukuo would deprecate Joseon. Through editorials, Suzuki Takeo, a prominent theorist based in Joseon, criticized views that discounted Joseon and instead underlined its importance.

[16] Ibid., 405.

> economically (…). As the only territory that is a part of the Empire on the mainland, Joseon maintains public order and serves the Empire wholeheartedly. Furthermore, light industries are developing smoothly and Joseon's own needs are inducing various heavy industries to develop rapidly.

Although Manchuria was the closest within Japan's sphere of influence in terms of military operations, it was unstable and undeveloped, whereas a wide range of economic power in agriculture, commerce, fisheries, industry, mining, and others areas, alongside retaining public order and cooperation with Japan, made Joseon a more advantageous option. In fact, the most important supply available from Joseon was food, including rice. The volume of rice exported to China and Manchukuo quickly increased after the Second Sino-Japanese War. In Tianjin, not only importers, but also people at the Japanese consulate, Bank of Chosun, Tianjin Bank, and even Army agencies, cooperated for the import of Joseon rice. This was because rice from Joseon was closely related to the military operations.[17]

Minami turned the idea of military logistics bases into a policy and organized the "taskforce team of the Government-General" (朝鮮總督府時局對策調査會) in September 1938. This taskforce aimed to invite leaders in politics, government, military, and business from Joseon, Japan, and Manchukuo to explore various alternatives in order to overcome pending economic issues and to restructure Joseon's industries.[18] In the opening address, Minami stressed the importance of Joseon as a supply base as follows.

> Assuming the future state of affairs, if Joseon implements continental

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17 Song, "1930 nyeondae ihu Joseon ui dae Junggug muyeog," 110.

18 Pang Kie-chung, "1930 nyeondae Joseon nonggong byeongjin jeongchaeg gwa gyeongje tongje" [Policy for the Uniform Advancement of Agriculture and Industry and Economic Regulation in the 1930s], *Dongbang hakji* 120 (June 2003): 113.

> politics, we must perceive that we have a significant responsibility over Joseon in peacetime and wartime, as it is our empire's only foothold and has a special mission as a supply base (…) We therefore request deliberation on all matters.[19]

Minami asked for a review of all areas but maintained his emphasis on food, industry, and mining issues involved with supplies.[20] The council's conclusions were presented in its report titled "Advisory Report by the Taskforce Team of the Government-General of Joseon" (朝鮮總督府時局對策調査會諮問答申書). In this report highlighting the agenda of the supply base Minami was promoting and its implementation, the issues regarding food, industry, and mining were described as "an increase in rice production," "an expansion of the defense industry," and "an aggressive development of underground resources."[21]

In this meeting, the representatives from the Government-General and the Joseon capitalists emphasized the need for Joseon's economic development as a supply base and demanded active support from the Japanese government. The taskforce team of the Government-General sought to use policy briefings for investment promotion, while the number of invitees from the business sector increased sharply. Despite critical views expressed on the proposition to expand Joseon's defense industry by Japanese government officials and attendees from Manchukuo who were advocates of a Manchuria-centered development, the meeting ended in an overall accommodation of the Government-General's position.[22]

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[19] Chōsen sōtokufu, *Chōsen sōtokufu jikyoku taisaku chōsakai kaigiroku* [Meeting Minutes of the Government-General of Joseon's Taskforce Team] (Keijō: Chōsen sōtokufu, 1938), 10.

[20] Ibid., 17-18.

[21] See Chōsen sōtokufu, *Chōsen sōtokufu jikyoku taisaku chōsakai jimon tōshinsho* [Advisory Report by the Taskforce Team of the Government-General of Joseon] (Keijō: Chōsen sōtokufu, 1938).

[22] Pang Kie-chung argues that this was because, while the Japanese government had been working

After this meeting, the military logistics base policy was put into practice by expanding the supply of materials to China. The Joseon and Manchukuo governments often held liaison meetings for cooperation. Such meetings were later expanded into mainland liaison meetings (大陸連絡會議) that included China to explore concrete action plans for turning Joseon into a supply base during the Second Sino-Japanese War. In particular, the mainland liaison meeting held in April 1942 after the Pacific War began attempted to develop close economic links between Chinese regions, particularly for material exchange, in order to contribute to the Pacific War effort.[23]

3. Measures to Promote Exports to China

In order to supply materials smoothly to China while still following the trade control policy imposed from after the Second Sino-Japanese War began, exports to China had to be actively undertaken. Export promotion was a critical element in economic development: the Government-General had emphasized exports to China even before the war. As such, the Government-General actively supported the Joseon Trade Association (朝鮮貿易協會) by setting up branches in major Chinese cities, introducing and advertising goods from Joseon, and brokering trade. The Joseon Trade Association surveyed the regional economy of northern China and reported the results to traders. The association also dispatched its staff to the region and conducted the Northern China Economic Survey (北支經濟

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on a Manchuria-centric economic bloc and policies to expand production capacity, it was nonetheless difficult to reject the idea behind the Military Logistics theory, even though the government was "uncomfortable" with Minami's production expansion plan. Pang Kie-chung, *Ilje pasijeum jibae jeongchaek gwa minjung saenghwal* [Imperial Japan's Fascist Policies of Colonial Rule and the Life of the People] (Seoul: Hyean, 2004), 115.

[23] Kawai Akitake, "Senman ichijo yori tairiku ichinyo e" [From 'Unity in Joseon and Manchuria' to 'Continental Unity'], *Chōsen gyōsei* 21, no. 6 (June 1942): 7.

調査).[24] It often organized sample fairs where product samples were displayed to introduce, advertise, and promote mass trade in northern China. In 1936, the sample fairs exceeded expectations by tripling what they had achieved the previous year, much to the excitement of the association members.[25]

Immediately after the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Joseon Trade Association set up an office in Tianjin to conduct trade research, gather information, advertise Joseon news, and introduce and broker goods from Joseon.[26] The office was also to organize sample fairs. The Government-General organized round-table meetings for those who had returned from attending sample fairs in Tianjin. Such meetings were also held in China as well for those engaging in trade between Joseon and China.[27] In March 1939, the Joseon Trade Association organized a Trade Survey and Research Conference to systemize trade with China. This was attended by representatives from a wide range of organizations, including the Government-General, the Central Laboratory (中央試驗所), the Office of Trade and Industry Promotion (商工奬勵館), representatives of Gyeonggi Province, the Japan-Manchukuo Industrial Association (日滿實業協會), Bank of Chosun, Mitsui Corporation, and the Joseon Postal Boat Company (朝鮮郵船會社). Under the Joseon Trade Association's advisement, the conference held discussions on urgent matters in trade promotion related to the association's operation plan for 1939, and arrived at the decision to focus on exhibiting Joseon supplies in China.[28]

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[24] "Senden, shōkai, chōsa oyobi assen jōkyō" [State of Promotion, Referral, Survey and Intercession], *Chōsen bōeki kyōkai tsūhō* 2, May 1936, 19.

[25] Ibid., 68.

[26] "Hokushi Chōsen bussan shutchōsha hōkoku zadankai" [Round Table for Reports on the Trade of Joseon Goods in Northern China], *Chōsen bōeki kyōkai tsūhō* 20, November 1937, 43-57.

[27] "Zai Hokushi Chōsen kankeisha zadankai" [Round Table for Those Involved in Trade between Northern China and Joseon], *Chōsen bōeki kyōkai tsūhō* 24, March 1938, 14-30.

[28] "Bōeki chōsa kenkyūkai no kaisai" [Trade Survey and Research Conference Held], *Chōsen bōeki kyōkai tsūhō* 36, March 1939, 52.

In September 1939, the Government-General jointly organized sample fairs in central and northern China with the Joseon Trade Association and the Joseon Chamber of Commerce (朝鮮商工會議所) to promote Joseon goods. Officially, the sample fair was being held for economic purposes including trade, but facilitating Japan in its war efforts was also one of the fair's important objectives. This can be confirmed by the fact that the Joseon Trade Association's own description of the sample fair's objectives not only mentioned the promotion of trade with China and survey of the local economy, but also cooperation on military pacification work and boosting the local Japanese military's morale.[29]

As trade with China increased, pressing issues were urgently raised on maintaining and repairing ports in Joseon, using sea routes, and increasing regular sea routes. Prior to the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese Empire had already been repairing sea routes to China to promote trade. The few existing sea routes were self-supporting but insufficient, prompting the Government-General to add subsidized routes. Running along subsidized routes prior to the Second Sino-Japanese War were a 1,159 ton ship called the *Jangsanhwan* operating between Tianjin and Incheon as well as a 1,010 ton ship named *Hoeryeonghwan* by the Joseon Postal Boat Company traveling as far as Tsingtao. Most trade exchanges had been conducted in the form of transit trade through Dalian, which utilized a railroad system with stops at Fungtian and Shanhaiguan.[30] Sea routes using ports at Tianjin and Tsingtao were advantageous in terms of freight charge, but the high-tariff policy China operated served as a constraint.

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[29] "Chōsen butsan Chūshi oyobi Hokusi mihonichi sokubaikai kaisaini kansuru uchiaikai [Meeting to Organize Sample Fairs of Joseon Goods in Northern and Central China]," *Chōsen bōeki kyōkai tsūhō* 42, September 1939, 53.

[30] Shibuya Reiji, "Chōsen bōeki to kinjō to sono jochō hattensaku" [Trends in Joseon's Trade and Trade Promotion Plan], *Chōsen bōeki kyōkai tsūhō* 34, January 1939, 5.

After the Second Sino-Japanese War, a pro-Japanese government was installed in northern China. This government lowered the tariff rate, thus making sea routes to Tianjin and Tsingtao favorable. The result was increased trade for Joseon using the sea routes.[31] Joseon was able to increase further its trade with Tianjin, Chefoo and Qingdao as the status of Dalian became weak with the transfer of the railway system's head office and major operations respectively to Fungtian and Xinjing.[32] Consequently, the Government-General increased or extended the existing routes in 1938 and 1939. When the Government-General also established a company to specifically focus on sea routes and oversee Joseon's shipping operations in trade with China, the issue of assuring the safety of ship operations and their appropriate control surfaced, all of which ultimately depended on port expansion.[33]

From April 1941 onward, the Government-General stepped up its effort to improve the facilities of the sea routes from Joseon to northern and central China.[34] From June 1941, the North China Transit launched a shipping service, as did the Joseon Postal Boat Company with another that connected the above route with the Joseon railway system. For this, three steamers by the names of *Busanhwan*, *Pyeonganhwan*, and *Gyeonganhwan* shuttled between Tsingtao and Incheon six times a month.[35] As large-scale ships became scarce due to the impact of the war

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31 Kudō Sanjirō, "Chōsen no bōeki to sono shōrai" [Joseon's Trade and Its Outlook], *Chōsen bōeki kyōkai tsūhō* 22, January 1938, 9.

32 "Bōeki chōsa kenkyū zadankai [Round Table for Trade Survey and Research]," *Chōsen bōeki kyōkai tsūhō* 25, April 1938, 21.

33 Chōsen ginkō chōsaka, *Chōsen no tai-Sasō bōeki ni tsuite* [On Joseon's Trade with China] (Keijō: Chōsen ginkō, 1939), 36-37.

34 Chōsen sōtokufu, *Chōsen sōtokufu teikoku gikai setsumei shiryō* [The Report by the Government-General of Joseon for the Imperial Congress], vol. 6 (Tokyo: Fuji shuppan, 1994), 282.

35 "Kahoku kōtsūsen to Chōsen yūsen to no renraku" [Communication among Ferries Connecting Joseon and Northern China], *Chōsen bōeki kyōkai tsūhō* 64, July 1941, 28.

in 1942, commercial ships began to transport major supplies.[36]

In November 1942, stakeholders of trade between Joseon and Chefoo held a meeting in Seoul to review comprehensively for the first time the overall trade between Joseon and northern China. Major traders who dealt with Joseon or Chefoo and large northern China trading houses in Seoul were invited to this Joseon-Chefoo trade conference. The conference aimed for the economic development of northern China by closely integrating its economy with that of Joseon through trade. The conference participants attempted to provide adequate supplies for the Japanese military stationed in China.[37]

At that time, representatives from Chefoo argued that transportation was not the fundamental problem. They pointed out that, since regular steamers between Chefoo and Incheon were already in service, logistic matters could be resolved by exploiting the existing routes without having to develop a new route for material exchanges with various parts of Joseon. This argument was partly based on the increase they saw in different sea transportation routes after the Second Sino-Japanese War broke out, but was also due to Chefoo's confidence during the early phase of the Pacific War when Japan emerged triumphant.[38]

The Joseon East Asia Trade Company (朝鮮東亞貿易株式會社) organized the Joseon-Shandong Trade Conference (朝鮮對山東貿易懇 談會) held on February 8-9, 1943, to discuss trade and shipping-related issues. Representatives from Shandong strongly demanded that Joseon deliver general merchandise, including food, and even presented a timetable.[39] This cemented Joseon's role as a supply base for the Second Sino-

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36 "Minsen no tai-Chōsen kō no gutaika" [Reification of Civilian Vessels' Travel to Joseon], *Chōsen bōeki kyōkai tsūhō* 76, July 1942, 24.

37 Chōsen tōa bōeki kabushiki kaisha, *Chōsen bōeki* 2, February 1943, 51-55; Chōsen tōa bōeki kabushiki kaisha, *Chōsen bōeki* 3, March 1943, 37-42.

38 *Chōsen bōeki* 2, 51-52.

39 Ibid., 99-100.

Japanese War, with the Joseon economy's most important function being the supply of food (mostly agricultural and fishery products) to the Japanese army dispatched to Shanghai in China, so measures were taken to relieve the limitations on material movement, thus easing demand while maintaining key supplies.[40]

In addition, the Government-General organized trade round-tables and sample fairs of Joseon products in Dalian, Qingdao, Jinan, Nanjing, and Shanghai for 22 days from February 15 to March 8, 1943, to "promote the orderly management and mutual exchange of industry culture." For a further boost in trade, they organized in each region meetings with local government officers and private sector representatives as well as sample fairs to introduce and promote Joseon's products. Under the prevailing circumstances of limited supplies and controlled bilateral trading, they tried to focus on resolving the bottleneck caused by controlled trading. They had the Joseon East Asia Trade Company present a small selection of samples among goods that could be supplied without causing trouble.[41] The Shandong economy became increasingly dependent upon Joseon in trying to overcome various difficulties the escalating war was causing. They felt that profit-seeking free trade alone would not be enough for bilateral trade between the two countries to withstand the entangling circumstances of the northern Chinese economy, and called for a special measure.

4. Expectations, Concerns and the Reality of Trade with China

After the Second Sino-Japanese War, rosy expectations were dominant with the prospect of a Chinese market of 400 million people, which

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[40] Chōsen tōa bōeki kabushiki kaisha, *Chōsen bōeki* 4, April 1943, 227.

[41] *Chōsen bōeki* 3, 125.

looked much more attractive than that of Manchukuo alone.[42] Arguments were being made that trade with China was more important than with Manchukuo.[43] However, because Joseon was primarily an agricultural country trading with another of the same kind, it would face a multitude of limitations. The Joseon Trade Association emphasized trading with northern China, but the actual volume of trade was far from substantial since products supplied from Joseon were only military related goods.[44]

This mix of expectation and concern was not necessarily contradictory, as was pointed out in the editorial by Kudō Sanjirō, managing director of the Joseon Trade Association. Kudō raised concerns that China was still an agricultural country in terms of its industrial development cycle and that Joseon, despite its rapid industrialization, could not yet be defined as an industrial state, either. Both countries shared problems of having a lack of capital and an excess of labor. The absence of financial interdependence made it even more difficult for them to promote trade. Nevertheless, since production bases in central and northern China had been destroyed by the Second Sino-Japanese War and caused a growth in demand for reconstruction and supplies for the Japanese Army, Joseon would need to be responsible for the supply of goods, resulting in a growth in its trade with China.[45]

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[42] Shibuya Reiji, "Chōsen bōeki no shinsei-zei to hatten taisaku" [Trade Growth Measures for Joseon under Newly Developing Circumstances], *Chōsen bōeki kyōkai tsūhō* 46, January 1940, 5.

[43] The integration with the Manchuria economy was further emphasized by actively exporting Joseon goods to northeast Manchuria. Suzuki Takeo criticized the view that stressed the importance of China. He categorized Manchukuo as northern Manchuria, southern Manchuria, and Joseon. See "Bōeki chōsa kenkyū zadankai" [Round Table for Trade Survey and Research], *Chōsen bōeki kyōkai tsūhō* 25, April 1938.

[44] Ibid., 21.

[45] Kudō Sanjirō, "Jihen-go no Chū-hokushi keizai to Chōsen bōeki no shōrai—Jihen-go no Chū-hokushi shisatsu no kansō" [The Future of Joseon Trade between Central and Northern China after the Sino-Japanese War—Central and Northern China's Appreciation for the Inspection since the Sino-Japanese War], in *Chōsen bōeki no shinkō mondai to Chū-hokushi keizai no dōkō* [The Development Issues of Joseon Trade, and the Trends of Central and Northern China's Economy] (Keijō: Chōsen bōeki kyōkai, 1938), 111-112.

Table 1. Trends of Joseon's Trade with China during the Sino-Japanese War

	Exports		Imports		Balance	Total	
	Value	Index	Value	Index	Value	Value	Index
1937	4,842	100	10,368	100	-5,526	15,210	100
1938	22,155	458	12,217	118	9,938	34,372	226
1939	33,566	693	10,334	100	23,232	43,900	289
1940	39,160	809	17,454	168	21,706	56,614	372
1941	42,145	870	38,833	375	3,312	80,978	532
1942	42,405	876	29,257	282	13,148	71,662	471
1943	47,646	984	37,800	365	9,846	85,446	562
1944	35,020	723	26,555	256	8,465	61,575	405

Sources: Chōsen sōtokufu, *Chōsen bōeki nenpyō* [The Year Book of Joseon Trade]; Research Department of the Bank of Chosun, *Chōsen keizai nenpō* [Annual Economic Review of Korea] 3 (1948), 44-45.

Trade between Joseon and China grew more than sevenfold between 1937 and 1944. Joseon's trade deficit of 5.5 million yen in 1937 crossed over to a surplus of 9.9 million yen in 1938, thanks to rapid growth in exports. In 1939, the trade surplus amounted to 23 million yen.

Japanese scholars who have studied the Joseon economy in that period have postulated that Joseon attained a status equal to Japan through emancipation from its dependent position following the Manchurian Incident and the Second Sino-Japanese War, which brought fundamental changes that enabled Joseon to contribute to completing the Manchuria-Japan Economic Bloc, and thus affected Joseon trade.[46] However, Joseon's trade dependency on Japan deepened even after the Second Sino-Japanese War and Joseon's role in the colonial trade system, as the supplier of food and raw materials and buyer of finished goods, remained unchanged.[47]

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[46] See Suzuki Masabumi, *Chōsen keizai no gendankai* [The Current Phase of the Joseon Economy] (Keijō: Teikoku chihō gyōsei gakkai Chōsen honbu, 1939); Suzuki, *Chōsen no keizai*.

[47] See Song, *Ilje ha ui Joseon muyeog yeongu*.

Table 2. Top 10 Export Products to China (year 1939)

	Product	Value (yen)	Ratio
1	Rice	13,336,965	39.67%
2	Minerals	3,246,194	9.65%
3	Flour	1,944,427	5.78%
4	Fruit	1,907,618	5.67%
5	Ginseng	1,570,997	4.67%
6	Liquor	1,230,531	3.66%
7	Tobacco	1,147,604	3.41%
8	Fisheries	1,134,904	3.38%
9	Timber	887,894	2.64%
10	Grains	752,210	2.24%

Source: Chōsen sōtokufu [Government-General of Joseon], *Chōsen bōeki nenpyō* [The Year Book of Joseon Trade] (1939).

This is well illustrated in the table above, which shows that foods comprised more than 50% of the total value of Joseon's exports to China. In particular, the Chinese demand for Korean rice grew, and rice accounted for almost 40% of the total export value to China in 1939. This was because the demand for rice rapidly increased in proportion to the Japanese expatriate population in China.[48] Yet, this rice was not only for Japanese people. As the taste preference among the Chinese changed, Chinese interest in Joseon rice increased to the extent that rice exports to China were expected to grow even higher.[49] According to Table 3, Joseon rice comprised only 0.74% of total imports in terms of volume. However,

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[48] Suzuki Masabumi said the proportion Joseon rice occupied among military supplies had increased with the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War, and anticipated it to continue to grow due to the advantages rice from Joseon had over those from Japan or Taiwan. Joseon was considered advantageous compared to Manchukuo, northern China, or even Japan, where the intensive cultivation methods on agricultural land had reached saturation point. Suzuki, *Chōsen keizai no gendankai*, 524.

[49] "Hokushi oyobi Chūnanshi ni okeru beikoku no shōhi narabi ni yu inyū jōkyō" [Grain Consumption in Northern, Central and Southern China and the State of Grain Import and Export], *Chōsen bōeki kyōkai tsūhō* 31, October 1938, 18.

Table 3. Quantity and Value of Rice Imports in Tianjin Maritime Customs (January-April 1938)

	Quantity		Value		A/B
	A (100 tons)	Percentage	B (1,000 yuan)	Percentage	
French Indo-China	41,207	11.02%	264,467	10.89%	6.42
India	33,382	8.92%	189,341	7.80%	5.67
Japan	55,160	14.75%	449,806	18.52%	8.15
Joseon	2,760	0.74%	27,692	1.14%	10.03
Hong Kong	10,801	2.89%	65,879	2.71%	6.1
Thailand	220,468	58.94%	1,351,495	55.66%	6.13
Singapore, Straits, Etc.	5,080	1.36%	32,767	1.35%	6.45
Kwantung Leased Territory	4,992	1.33%	44,932	1.85%	9
Others	215	0.06%	1,880	0.08%	8.74
Total	374,065	100.00%	2,428,259	100.00%	6.49

Source: Chōsen bōeki kyōkai [The Joseon Trade Association], *Chōsen bōeki kyōkai tsūhō* [The Joseon Trade Association's Report] 31, October 1938, 15.

it comprised 1.14% in terms of value. This was because the price of Joseon rice was high. Of all the rice imported to China, the price of rice from Joseon per 100 tons was the most expensive.

Since Chinese people preferred Joseon rice despite its high price, Japan decided that Joseon rice was to be provided to the Japanese in principle and set up the Beijing Joseon Rice Exporters and Importers Union (北京鮮米輸入業者組合).[50] Upon the request of Joseon rice importers in Tianjin, the Tianjin branch of the Joseon Trade Association arranged a meeting between representatives from the Japanese Consulate, the Army Special Force, Bank of Chosun, and Tianjin Bank to facilitate mutual cooperation for rice imports from Joseon. The fact that political and economic organizations participated, not to mention a military

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[50] "Pekin senmai toriatsukai gyōsha no kaigō hōkoku" [Report on the Meeting of Grain Traders in Beijing], *Chōsen bōeki kyōkai tsūhō* 37, April 1938, 24-31.

agency, as well, shows Joseon rice had a direct relevance to the Second Sino-Japanese War.[51] The reason rice started to be exported from Gunsan port to Tsingtao port was to supply it to the Japanese Army occupying Shandong.[52]

Exports of flour, fruit, ginseng, liquor, and grains also increased rapidly.[53] This was closely related to Japan's policy to supply food to China. In the case of flour, records indicate that domestic demand for Joseon flour increased rapidly as the policy of restricting exports to the Yen Bloc came into effect after September 1939.[54] The fact that flour exports to China in 1939 increased so much may mean that China had been excluded from such export controls on flour. Ginseng was an important export item to China, enough to have been placed in a standalone category independent from food or general merchandise among other export items.[55] Fisheries decreased in 1938, but experienced resurgence in 1939. Most of the apples that Shanghai imported from September to December 1942 were from Joseon.[56] Tobacco increased in price but decreased in volume. Mixed grains were imported to Joseon as a replacement for rice as its rice was exported to China, but Joseon's simultaneous increase in grain exports suggest that much of this was lost

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51 Song, "1930 nyeondae ihu Joseon ui dae Junggug muyeog," 110.

52 Kim Tae-woong, "Ilje ha Gunsanbu hwagyo ui jonjae hyeongtae wa hwaldong yangsang" [The Presence and Activities of the Overseas Chinese in Gunsan under Japanese Colonial Rule], *Jibangsa wa jibang munhwa* 13, no. 2 (November 2010): 429.

53 Joseon flour only targeted Manchukuo and did not allot attention to entering the market of northern China due to production capacity issues. However, once the Second Sino-Japanese War began, sales by Joseon were restricted and the destination of exports was shifted to northern China. *Chōsen no tai-Sasō bōeki ni tsuite*, 18.

54 Kawai Akitake, *Chōsen kōgyō no gendankai* [Current Status of Joseon Industries] (Keijō: Tōyō keizai shinpōsha Keijō Shikyoku, 1943), 302.

55 "Nakasina Chōsen yunyū haikyū kumiai setsuritsu ni kansuru ken [On the Establishment of a Distribution Association of Imported Joseon Goods in Central China]," *Chōsen bōeki kyōkai tsūhō* 58, January 1941, 19.

56 Chōsen tōa bōeki kabushiki kaisha, *Chōsen bōeki* 1, January 1943, 27.

to further sale and export and did not reach the Joseon people. As for exporting minerals and timber, while their prices increased sharply, the growth of their volume was not as significant compared to that of food.

The Second Sino-Japanese War inevitably and significantly influenced Joseon's exports to China. After the beginning of the war, supplies of food and raw materials were insufficient even for domestic consumption. In order to continue exporting to China, Joseon had to cut down on its consumption. Consequently, rationing was implemented. The following quotation vividly illustrates the circumstances of the time.

> If the demand for rice [in Joseon] before Japan joined World War II was 1/5 of Japan, the ration distributed in Joseon during the war was so insufficient that people had to suffer hunger. I heard many times that the first word a baby learned, and the final word an old man would say, was "Haiku" (ration). Rice (to be exact, rice-replacements, such as corn or sorghum) distributed by ration coupons did not last any longer than two weeks. Fish, eggs, and other foods were provided only to the Japanese. (…) In Seoul, it was not unusual to spot people who were sallow due to malnutrition.[57]

Per-capita food consumption of the Joseon people under Japanese occupation continued to decrease. Prior to the Second Sino-Japanese War, this was mainly due to exports to Japan. After the war, exports to China were another factor contributing to the decrease of per-capita food consumption by the Joseon people. Statistics covering the years between 1910 and 1945 indicate that food consumption dropped by more than one-half by the end of that period. Hence, the increase of trade with China

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[57] Fanja Isaakovna Šabšina, *Singminji Joseon eseo eoneu Reosia jiseong i sseun yeoksa hyeonjang girok* [A Record of Historical Scenes in Colonial Joseon Written by a Russian Intellectual], trans. Kim Myung-Ho (Seoul: Hanul, 1996), 179-181.

meant even greater hardship for the people of Joseon.[58]

5. Conclusion

After the beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War, Governor-General Minami Jirō implemented the Military Logistics Base Policy and increased the significance of Joseon as a supply base for Japan's war in China. The Governor-General of Joseon took various export promotion measures to enable Joseon to fulfill this role, and these measures succeeded in dramatically increasing exports to China, despite difficult circumstances.

Unlike the Kwantung Army's position after the Manchurian Incident, Governor-General Minami advanced the idea of Joseon-Manchuria Unity. This theory emphasizing the importance of Joseon faced some criticism in Japan but gained acceptance as the war continued. Minami organized a taskforce team under the Government-General for the restructuring of Joseon's industries and particularly focused on the sectors of agriculture, manufacturing, and mining. Minami's intention to attract investment through this meeting gained a degree of acceptance. As supply to China grew, the Joseon-Manchuria Liaison, which handled economic exchanges between them, expanded into the Continental Liaison that included China, thus highlighting the importance of exports to China.

After the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Joseon Trade Association

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[58] Song, *Ilje ha ui Joseon muyeog yeongu*, 220. No consensus exists among scholars on whether the living standards of Joseon people had improved during the Japanese colonial rule. The author's research indicates that the volume of food consumption by an absolute majority of Joseon people had steadily dropped from the inception of colonial rule and plummeted drastically during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Kimura Mitsuhiko has launched full-fledged research on the living standards of Joseon people during the colonial period. See Kimura Mitsuhiko, "Standards of Living in Colonial Korea: Did the Masses Become Worse Off or Better Off Under Japanese Rule?," *The Journal of Economic History* 53, no. 3 (September 1993): 629-652.

established branches in a number of locations across China, and often organized sample fairs and round-table talks, all to boost Joseon's trade to China. In addition to economic issues, the association simultaneously discussed military pacification work and morale-boosting support for the Japanese Army. Exports to China were used as a means to execute war. The rise in material exchange raised the issue of increasing regular shipping services, so the Government-General chose to focus on developing subsidized sea routes, more so than self-supporting ones. Many discussions also took place on expanding ports. As large ships had become scarce since the Pacific War, commercial ships were used to transport critical military supplies. To administer exports to northern China in a comprehensive manner, a round-table meeting was held in Seoul for those involved in trade between Joseon and China. Also discussed at this meeting were various measures to provide conveniences for the Japanese Army. At the Joseon-Shandong Trade Conference held in 1943, Joseon faced strong requests to provide food and general merchandise. Around that time, the Japanese Army was reorganizing its system for critical supplies and removing certain restrictions that had been previously imposed upon moving critical supplies in an effort to ensure the smooth provision of resources to China.

After the Second Sino-Japanese War, a mix of expectations and concerns were voiced regarding trade with China, and the two were not contradictory. Kudō Sanjirō was concerned that there would be difficulties in increasing exports with the trade structure remaining unchanged. At the same time, however, he hoped for a growth in exports to China as the country was in need of supplies. This expectation materialized into a more than sevenfold increase in exports between 1937 and 1944. Scarce as it was in Joseon, food, including rice, comprised the majority (rice alone comprised almost 40%) of exports to China. Flour, fruit, ginseng, liquor, fisheries, and grains were all listed among the top ten most exported items. Of course, some raw materials, such as minerals and timber, were exported, as well, but the main export items to China

were food, which Joseon itself lacked.

The effort to promote exports through trade policy without making qualitative changes to the industrial structure of Joseon met with intrinsic limitations. Still, Joseon's exports to China maintained a trend of steady quantitative growth thanks to continuous policy developments to meet the objective of supporting Japan's invasion of the mainland. This was only possible because it drove the Joseon people into hardship through the control of supplies to them.

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Bridging East Asia's Revolutions: The Overseas Chinese in North Korea, 1945-1950

Charles Kraus
George Washington University and the Wilson Center

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Bridging East Asia's Revolutions: The Overseas Chinese in North Korea, 1945-1950

This article draws on documents captured by United States forces during the Korean War to explore the history of the Overseas Chinese community in North Korea from 1945 through 1950. Although a little known and seldom studied community, the Overseas Chinese in Korea reveal that the Chinese Communist Party and the Korean Workers' Party were well connected almost immediately after 1945. This community also demonstrates that the internecine conflict between the Communist and Nationalist parties spilled across the physical boundaries of the Chinese state and that grassroots actors such as the Chinese diaspora were important players in the Cold War.

Keywords: Overseas Chinese, Sino-North Korean Relations, Chinese Civil War, Cold War, Captured North Korean Documents

Bridging East Asia's Revolutions: The Overseas Chinese in North Korea, 1945-1950

Charles Kraus
George Washington University and the Wilson Center

As political, economic, and social actors, the Overseas Chinese have long fulfilled diverse roles on the Chinese, East Asian, and world stages.[1] Above all, the Chinese diaspora has served as an important conduit for Greater China's engagement with the wider world. Because of their significant civic, commercial, and international activism, Overseas Chinese communities have rarely been ignored by international statesmen and stateswomen. Generations of leaders and thinkers, including Sun Yat-sen, the so-called founder of modern China, have sought to benefit from the wisdom, energies, and resources of the

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1 See especially Philip A. Kuhn, *Chinese Among Others: Emigration in Modern Times* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008) and Hong Liu, ed., *The Chinese Overseas*, 4 vols. (New York: Routledge, 2006).

Overseas Chinese.[2] As a result, these outlying subjects are firmly embedded within many of the central narratives of modern Chinese history, including China's Cold War experience and its international relations in the latter half of the twentieth century. Indeed, the Overseas Chinese, tethered to civil rivalries, international alliances, and global competitions, were objects of, and intimate partners to, the Cold War from its very outset.[3]

In North Korea during the late 1940s and early 1950s, the geographic and temporal focus of this article, the Overseas Chinese were indeed wedded to multiple layers of the Cold War. In unpacking the story of the Overseas Chinese in Korea from 1945 to 1950, three broader issues and debates are tackled in this article. First, emphasizing that the Overseas Chinese were an important but heretofore unrecognized fixture of the relationship between China and North Korea, this article enters—and hopefully extinguishes—the long-simmering debate about the extent of relations between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) in the "interwar" years.[4] The CCP and the

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[2] Jianli Huang, "Umbilical Ties: The Framing of the Overseas Chinese as the Mother of the Revolution," *Frontiers of History in China* 6, no. 2 (June 2011): 183-228.

[3] Glen D. Peterson, "Socialist China and the Huaqiao: The Transition to Socialism in the Overseas Chinese Areas of Rural Guangdong, 1949-1956," *Modern China* 14, no. 3 (July 1988): 309-335; Glen Peterson, "House Divided: Transnational Families in the Early Years of the People's Republic of China," *Asian Studies Review* 31, no. 1 (March 2007): 25-40; Meredith Leigh Oyen, "Allies, Enemies and Aliens: Migration and U.S.-Chinese Relations, 1940-1965" (Doctoral dissertation, Georgetown University, 2007); Tracy C. Barrett, "A Bulwark Never Failing: The Evolution of Overseas Chinese Education in French Indochina, 1900-1954," in *China on the Margins*, ed. Sherman Cochran and Paul G. Pickowicz (Ithaca, NY: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 2010), 221-242; Taomo Zhou, "Ambivalent Alliance: Chinese Policy towards Indonesia, 1960-1965" (Cold War International History Project Working Paper no. 67, Wilson Center, 2013); Hongwei Fan, "The 1967 Anti-Chinese Riots in Burma and Sino-Burmese Relations," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 43, no. 2 (2012): 234-256; Kosal Path, "The Sino-Vietnamese Dispute Over Territorial Claims, 1974-1978: Vietnamese Nationalism and Its Consequences," *The International Journal of Asian Studies* 8, no. 2 (2011): 189-220; and Steven Phillips, "National Legitimacy and Overseas Chinese Mobilization," *Journal of Modern Chinese History* 7, no. 1 (May 2013): 64-86.

[4] Though the Korean Workers' Party was not founded until June 1949, for the sake of convenience

KWP worked tirelessly together to channel the political, economic, and cultural activities of the Overseas Chinese in North Korea into strengthening party-to-party and country-to-country relations and to supporting the communist position in the Chinese Civil War.[5] Together they carried out land reform, founded a network of Chinese-language schools, circulated information on the situations in China and Korea among Chinese nationals, demanded material support for the Chinese Red Army, and brought together Chinese and Korean peoples for grassroots meetings, playdates, and other exchanges. These activities prove decisively that the two parties were well connected in the period between the end of World War II and the beginning of the Korean War.

These new details on Sino-Korean exchanges are significant for several reasons. The Chinese-language evidence presented here contrasts with the typically Soviet-dominated portrait of North Korea's early history and foreign relations, and shows the importance Chinese and North Korean leaders attached to one another during this time.[6] Simultaneously, the evidence shows that the Sino-Korean relationship was not defined by high-level military cooperation alone. The Sino-North Korean partnership also grew out of people-to-people exchanges and social and cultural cooperation, strands of the relationship rarely

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this paper uses the term to refer to both the party and its various forerunners, including the Korean Communist Party and the North Korean Workers Party. Similarly, the term "North Korea" itself offers simplicity at the expense of precision: the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was not officially founded until September 1948.

5 The best three studies on the pre-1950 Sino-Korean relationship in Chinese, Korean, and English are: Shao Yong, ed., "Jiefang zhanzheng shiqi dongbei yu Chaoxian de guanxi [The Northeast's Relationship with North Korea during the War of Liberation]," in *Shixue lunheng* (Shanghai: Shanghai sanlian shudian, 2004), 309-313; Yi Jeong-seok, *Bukhan-Jungguk gwangye, 1945-2000* [North Korean-Chinese Relations, 1945-2000] (Seoul: Jungsim, 2000), 31-105; and Zhihua Shen and Danhui Li, *After Leaning to One Side: China and Its Allies in the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2011), 52-57.

6 Andrei Lankov, *From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea, 1945-1960* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2002).

taken seriously by scholars today.[7] Although these facets do not explain China's intervention in Korea in October 1950, the question at the heart of most scholarly inquiry on this period, the fact that the Chinese-North Korean alliance was constructed partially at the grassroots level is useful for understanding both the durability of the relationship, as well as some of the problems—such as those related to the citizenship of the ethnic Chinese in Korea and the ethnic Koreans in China—which it would face during the Cold War.[8]

Second, the vigorous involvement of the Chinese Communist Party in Korea after 1945 suggests that the international scope of the Chinese Civil War was wider than we have presumed. The fear that Overseas Chinese, in Korea and beyond, were ideologically and materially supportive of the Guomindang (GMD) invigorated and gave urgency to the work of Ding Xuesong (丁雪松) and other leading Chinese Communist cadres in Korea, who earnestly desired to build a reliable base of support for the CCP among the Overseas Chinese.[9] Though beyond the scope of this article, it is equally important to note that the Nationalist Party, represented by Ambassador Shao Yulin (邵毓麟) in Seoul, was just as obsessed with the political persuasion of the Overseas Chinese in Korea.[10] Many previous studies have documented how the

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7 Adam Cathcart and Charles Kraus, "Internationalist Culture in North Korea, 1945-1950," *The Review of Korean Studies* 11, no. 3 (September 2008): 123-148.

8 Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

9 Ding Xuesong, *Zhongguo diyiwei nv dashi: Ding Xuesong huiyilu* [China's First Female Ambassador: The Memoirs of Ding Xuesong], ed. Yang Dehua (Nanjing: Jiangsu renmin chubanshe, 2000), 173.

10 This topic awaits much more in depth exploration in the Taiwanese archives, though we can begin to piece together Nationalist strategy in South Korea from Shao Yulin, *Shi Han huiyilu: Jindai Zhong Han guanxi shi hua* [My Mission to Korea: A Personal Record of Modern Sino-Korean Relations] (Taipei: Zhuanji wenxue chubanshe, 1980), as well as John J. Muccio to the Secretary of State, 16 December 1949, 895.4016/12-1649, in *Records of the U.S. Department of State relating to the Internal Affairs of Korea, 1945-1949* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1986). According to Australian documents, Ambassador Shao's priorities in Seoul were two-

Chinese Civil War became bound up with the international rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States, but the international dimensions of the conflict were much broader than the existing literature has heretofore revealed.[11] Echoing the observation which Chinese statesmen V. K. Wellington Koo made in October 1949 (but for altogether different reasons), then, the evidence presented here makes it clear that this was "not altogether an internal civil war."[12] The struggle for the hearts and minds of this transnational community extended the Chinese Civil War beyond China's geographic borders.

Lastly, and returning to the theme with which this article opened, this article builds on other recent scholarship about the Overseas Chinese to demonstrate that the diaspora was indeed important to Chinese foreign policy during the Cold War. Many works now foreground the Overseas Chinese in discussions of the People's Republic of China's (PRC) relationships with the United States, Vietnam, and Indonesia, among other countries.[13] Standing at the intersection of social history and diplomatic history, these studies valuably show the reciprocal dynamic between high-level diplomacy and the on-the-ground experiences of the Chinese diaspora. The Overseas Chinese, according to this recent wave of scholarship, were both affected by and capable of shaping Cold War structures, including the strength and durability of socialist alliances. The

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fold: first, "to negotiate for the repatriation of Koreans in China," and second, "to attend to the welfare of about 40,000 Chinese at present living in Korea." See Nanking Chancery, Australian Legation, to the Secretary, Department of External Affairs, 15 July 1946, A1838, 3707/40/90 Part 1, "China—Relations with Korea," National Archives of Australia (NAA), Canberra, Australia.

11 Odd Arne Westad, *Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War, 1944-1946* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) and Odd Arne Westad, *Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).

12 "Notes of a Conversation with Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, 4:30 p.m., 14 October 1949, at the Indian Embassy," 5, in "Various Interviews, 1949 #81-90," Box 130, V.K. Wellington Koo Papers, Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Columbia University, New York, NY.

13 Zheng Yangwen, Hong Liu, and Michael Szonyi, eds., *The Cold War in Asia: The Battle for Hearts and Minds* (Boston: Brill, 2010).

case of Korea suggests this much and even more: the Overseas Chinese were not just involved in foreign relations, but they were also "present at the creation" of some of the PRC's most important and enduring alliances.[14]

Sources on the Overseas Chinese in North Korea

Making these three inter-related arguments is only possible today because, in 1950, the United States Army seized hundreds of thousands of documents, books, magazines, and photographs from North Korea. These records are deposited within Record Group 242 in the National Archives, College Park, Maryland, and are the only accessible North Korean archive in the world.[15] While many scholars have worked with this collection to reassess the North Korean revolution and the origins of the Korean War, the surviving Chinese-language materials contained within, such as those written by Overseas Chinese, have never before been utilized.

It is these documents which encouraged this study, but interpreting them does require some care. Suzy Kim reminds us that much of the North Korean archive "centralize[s] and homogenize[s] what was actually a complicated revolutionary process involving conflict, negotiation, and compromise," and discovering "authentic" voices within the captured documents, including the writings of the Overseas Chinese, is immensely challenging.[16] The Chinese-language materials were, after all, generally written by Chinese cadres for communist-leading bodies in China and North Korea. This author-audience dynamic dictated what

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[14] The phrase "present at the creation" is of course borrowed from the title of Dean Acheson's memoirs.

[15] Records Seized by United States Military Forces in Korea, National Archives Collection of Foreign Records Seized, 1941-, Record Group 242, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD. (Hereafter RG 242.)

[16] Suzy Kim, *Everyday Life in the North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013), 13.

could (and could not) be said within the documents, and greatly circumscribed the range of narratives and analysis that could be offered. Taking the documents as a fully accurate representation of this period, then, would be naïve. Nevertheless, whatever doubts we have about the reliability of the information contained within the captured Overseas Chinese materials, if assessed at a broader level, they still do depict the critical involvement of this community in alliance building between the CCP and the KWP in the 1940s, that the conflict between the Chinese Communist Party and the Guomindang spilled across the physical boundaries of the Chinese state, and that grassroots actors such as Overseas Chinese were important players in China's Cold War-era foreign relations.

The captured Chinese documents are paired here with other primary materials, including the memoirs of Ding Xuesong. A native of Sichuan Province, Ding lived in Korea from 1945 through 1950, playing an intermediary but irreplaceable role in Sino-North Korean relations. Though her responsibilities shifted during her five-year stay in North Korea, Ding's work with the Overseas Chinese and, particularly, her efforts to reestablish Chinese schools remained one consistent thread in this stage of her career. Adding to Ding's vivid recollections, a handful of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) "Information Reports" also dwell on the Overseas Chinese at some length, as do reports produced by the Soviet Red Army in Korea and the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. It is from this diverse array of sources that this article begins to reconstruct the bridge between East Asia's two revolutions.

Colonial Footpaths

While Overseas Chinese communities thrived around the globe during the Ming Dynasty, large scale Chinese migration to Korea only began late in the nineteenth century when the Qing forcibly opened up Korea to

"multilateral imperialism."[17] Called the "foot soldiers of informal empire" by Kirk Larsen, the introduction and growth of the Overseas Chinese reflected the Qing Dynasty's privileged position over the Joseon Dynasty. Beginning in the 1880s, statistics ballooned; Korea's tiny population of 162 Overseas Chinese in 1883 grew rapidly over the next several decades and reached 11,818 by 1910. According to Larsen, the recurrent political and economic instability in North China had meant that "life at home had grown intolerable" for many Chinese in the waning decades of the Qing Dynasty.[18] Chinese communities thus grew in Korea as the Qing Dynasty edged closer toward its ultimate demise.

The Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910 did not preclude the continued growth of the Overseas Chinese population. Indeed, by 1922 approximately 30,826 Overseas Chinese lived in Korea, nearly a three-fold increase over just a decade's time.[19] Nevertheless, the relationship between the Overseas Chinese and the Japanese colonial state was in general quite poor, and the Governor-General in Korea looked upon the Chinese with extreme suspicion. In 1924, for example, the General Affairs Department conducted an "investigation" (*chōsa* in Japanese, *diaocha* in Chinese, 调查) of "the Chinese People of Korea." The report provided detailed statistics about the Chinese population, its geographic distribution, and its socio-economic position. The General Affairs Department claimed in the preface that the growing population and business acumen of the Chinese meant that not only were they coming into economic "competition" with Koreans and Japanese, but that the

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17 Kirk W. Larsen, *Tradition, Treaties, and Trade: Qing Imperialism and Chosŏn Korea, 1850-1910* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2008).

18 Ibid., 258-263. See also Sheena Choi, *Gender, Ethnicity, Market Forces, and College Choices: Observations of Ethnic Chinese in Korea* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 58-59.

19 Zhang Qixiong, ed., *Riben zhimin tongzhi xia de Chaoxian huaqiao: Chaoxian zongdu fu baogao shu 'Chaoxian de Zhongguo ren'* [The Overseas Chinese in Korea under Japanese Colonial Rule: The Korean Governor-General's Report 'Chinese of Korea'], trans. Zu Yunhui (Taipei: Zhonghua Minguo hai wai Hua ren yan jiu xue hui, 2003), 18-28.

Chinese were likely to "win" the battle for economic resources. As a result, the authors of the report sought an "understanding of their [the Overseas Chinese] general situation" in order to carve out advantages for the colonial state.[20]

Relations between the Korean population and the Overseas Chinese were perhaps even more strained, particularly as the demographics of the Overseas Chinese shifted during the concurrent periods of "Cultural Rule" in Korea and Japan's increasing bellicosity in Northern China. As political crises in China accelerated in the 1920s and 1930s, more and more lower class Chinese from Shandong arrived in Korea. In place of affluent traders and businessmen, the new generation of Overseas Chinese was largely peasant-farmers, while a smaller number were restaurateurs and simple laborers.[21] On several occasions, competition over economic resources between Overseas Chinese and local Koreans morphed into direct violence. Corresponding with the Wanpaoshan Incident (or, the Manbosan Incident) in China's Jilin Province in the summer of 1931, anti-Chinese violence erupted in Korea on July 5.[22] The Chinese Nationalist government referred this incident to the League of Nations, but, fearing for their safety, many Overseas Chinese voted with their feet and returned to mainland provinces. Although the size of the Overseas Chinese population did quickly recover and continue to grow, these and other bitter memories dating from the late imperial and colonial eras would not be easily erased. How the Chinese Communist Party and the Korean Workers' Party overcame this history of mistrust and turned the Overseas Chinese into a bridge between East Asia's revolutions is the

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[20] Ibid., 4. Despite the best efforts of the colonial apparatus, Chinese trade networks remained resilient throughout the colonial period. See Choi, *Gender, Ethnicity, Market Forces, and College Choices*, 59.

[21] Choi, *Gender, Ethnicity, Market Forces, and College Choices*, 60-62.

[22] The best study of the incident is Michael Kim, "The Hidden Impact of the 1931 Post-Wanpaoshan Riots: Credit Risk and the Chinese Commercial Network in Colonial Korea," *Sungkyun Journal of East Asian Studies* 10, no. 2 (2010): 209-227.

question to which this article now turns.

From Colonial Conflict to Cold War Cooperation

By 1945, some 40,000 Chinese nationals made their home in the present-day territory of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).[23] The reactions of this sizable Overseas Chinese community to the onset of liberation in the summer and autumn of 1945 remain largely unknown. While much of the community likely welcomed Japan's defeat on August 15, 1945, there are no surviving Chinese-language memoirs describing either dismay or euphoria at the sight of the Soviet army arriving in North Hamgyeong, Sinuiju, or Pyongyang.[24] On the other hand, Soviet records

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[23] Precisely how many Overseas Chinese made their home in the present-day territory of the DPRK in 1945 has long been subject to debate. However, I reached this number after combing through dozens of contemporary reports and estimates and weeding away the outliers. See "Activities of Chinese Residents in Korea," 3 June 1949, CIA Records Search Tool (CREST) no. CIA-RDP82-00457R002800480001-2, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland; "Evaluation of Citizens of All Walks of Life," 30 October 1945, Central Archive of the Russian Ministry of Defence (TsAMO); Colonel Hrenov, "Report on the Situation in Wonsan and the Work Done by the Military Command," 12 November 1945, TsAMO; Ding, *Zhongguo diyiwei nv dashi*, 172; "Chinese Nationals in North Korea," 6 October 1949, CREST no. CIA-RDP82-00457R003300730002-0; "Chinese Representation in North Korea," 16 October 1950, CREST no. CIA-RDP82-00457R005900780009-7; "Chinese Residents of North Korea," 18 January 1951, CREST no. CIA-RDP82-00457R006700430012-2; Yang Yuping, *Wang zhengquan yu Chaoxian Huaqiao* (*1940-1945*): *Dongya zhixu zhiyi yanjiu* [The Wang Regime and the Overseas Chinese in Korea, 1940-1945: A Study of East Asian Order] (Taipei: Daoxiang chubanshe, 2007), 21-22; Mu Dezheng, "Chaoxian huaqiao jiaoyu de lishi huigu" [On Overseas Chinese Education in Korea: Past and Present], *Huaqiao Huaren lishi yanjiu* 4 (2001), 59; and Sun Yumei and Yang Zhaoquan, *Chaoxian Huaqiao shi* [A History of Overseas Chinese in Korea] (Beijing: Zhongguo Huaqiao chuban gongsi, 1991), 302.

24 For the experiences of Koreans, Chinese, and Japanese citizens and soldiers during and following the arrival of the Soviet Red Army in Manchuria and North Korea, see Lori Watt, *When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and Reintegration in Postwar Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009), 82, 109, 109-110, 115; Adam Cathcart and Charles Kraus, "Peripheral Influence: The Sinŭiju Student Incident of 1945 and the Impact of Soviet Occupation in North Korea," *Journal of Korean Studies* 13, no. 1 (Fall 2008): 1-27; Michael Kim, "The Lost Memories of Empire and the Korean Return from Manchuria, 1945-1950: Conceptualizing Manchuria in Modern Korean History," *Seoul Journal of Korean Studies* 23, no. 2 (December 2010): 195-223; Adam Cathcart and Charles Kraus, "Nation, Ethnicity, and the Post-Manchukuo

suggest that at least a handful of Koreans used the brief political vacuum following Japan's surrender to gain retribution against resident Chinese. An October 1945 report on areas outside of Cheongjin revealed that while Soviet troops and officials had been greeted warmly by local youth leagues, soldiers in North Hamgyeong Province had made a disturbing discovery on October 18: the bodies of three Overseas Chinese were found hanging inside of a home.[25] While the report does not speculate who was responsible for the deaths of the Chinese or divulge any possible motives, political reprisal or conflict over economic resources—namely grain—seem to have been at the center of the incident.

Even in the face of these disconcerting episodes, the Chinese Communist Party did not dwell on the Overseas Chinese in North Korea, at least not until its grip over Manchuria, the "anvil of victory" in the Chinese Civil War, was at serious risk of coming undone.[26] Though the party stayed afloat in the Northeast following the Siping Battle of March 1946, it was not much later until the CCP's gains in Southern Manchuria began to unravel.[27] Indeed, by the end of 1946, the CCP had been pushed to the edges of defeat by a resurgent Nationalist Party. Much of the leading kernel of the Northeast Bureau, including Chen Yun and Xiao Jinguang (肖劲光), was holed up in snowy Qidaojiang, a small village some sixty kilometers from the North Korean border. Situated far from the region's rail network and its major urban centers, here Chen and his comrades-in-arms could not help but weigh whether to concede defeat in

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Order in the Sino-Korean Border Region," in *Key Papers on Korea: Essays Celebrating 25 Years of the Centre of Korean Studies, SOAS, University of London*, ed. Andrew David Jackson (Boston: Global Oriental, 2013), 79-99.

25 Colonel Ignat'ev, "Report on the Situation of Agriculture and National Education in North Korea," 30 October 1945, TsAMO.

26 Steven I. Levine, *Anvil of Victory: The Communist Revolution in Manchuria, 1945-1948* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).

27 Harold M. Tanner, *The Battle for Manchuria and the Fate of China: Siping, 1946* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013).

the pivotal South Manchurian front.[28]

As the political-military situation deteriorated, the CCP quietly recognized that rural revolution alone would not propel the Party to victory in South Manchuria. In June 1946, the CCP therefore began to search intensively for foreign support. In addition to the obvious desirability of obtaining Soviet aid, the Northeast Bureau of the CCP also concluded that "North Korea is a covert rear area which could offer support for the war in South Manchuria" (*yi bei Chaoxian wei yinbi de houfang lai zhiyuan nan Man zuozhan* 以北朝鲜为隐蔽的后方来支援南满作战).[29] To tap into this rich hinterland which lay beyond the legal reach of Guomindang forces, a number of Chinese Communist personalities sojourned to Pyongyang to negotiate cross-border assistance in the summer of 1946.[30] These feeler missions miraculously succeeded, and Zhu Lizhi (朱理治), a Jiangsu native and Tsinghua University graduate, and Xiao Jinguang (肖劲光), a Hunanese who had trained in the Soviet Union in the 1920s, were invited to Pyongyang to open the CCP's Office of the Northeast Bureau in Korea (*Dongbei ju zhu Chaoxian banshichu* 东北局驻朝鲜办事处) late in the summer of 1946.[31] Disguised as a simple

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[28] Harold M. Tanner, "Guerrilla, Mobile, and Base Warfare in Communist Military Operations in Manchuria, 1945-1947," *The Journal of Military History* 67, no. 4 (October 2003): 1177-1222.

[29] Ding Xiaochun, Ge Fulu, and Wang Shiying, *Dongbei jiefang zhanzheng dashiji* [Chronicle of Major Events in the Northeast War of Liberation] (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi ziliao chubanshe, 1987), 203.

[30] Allegedly, Zhou Baozhong asked his wife Wang Yizhi travel to North Korea in June 1946 to take part in a series of meetings in Pyongyang. In the North Korean capital, Wang was reunited with Kim Il-sung and Choe Yong-geon, with whom she had become well-acquainted during the guerrilla war against Japan. As described in Zhou's official biography, Wang Yizhi reported on the gains the Guomindang had been making in the civil war, particularly in South Manchuria. Listening to Wang's plight, Kim and Choe agreed that the CCP could ship more supplies through Korea and evacuate personnel across the border. See Zhao Sufen, *Zhou Baozhong jiangjun zhuan* [Biography of General Zhou Baozhong] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1988), 518-520, and Zhao Sufen, "Zhou Baozhong nianpu (1902 nian-1964 nian)" [Chronicle of Zhou Baozhong, 1902-1964], *Zhonggong dangshi ziliao* 25, March 1988, 261.

[31] Zhonggong Henan shengwei dangshi yanjiushi, ed., *Jinian Zhu Lizhi wenji* [Festschrift for Zhu Lizhi] (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 2007), 239-242; Wu Dianyao and Song Lin, *Zhu*

commercial operation, the "Pyongyang Limin Company" (*Pingrang limin gongsi* 平壤利民公司), the Office of the Northeast Bureau in Korea became a major hub for supporting the war effort in South Manchuria. Under Zhu's capable leadership, the office expanded rapidly, developing a field network all over North Korea in just two short years and forging close partnerships with a number of Korean and Soviet officials. This office, and the support lent by North Korea, would help the Chinese Communist Party to eventually turn the tide of war against the Guomindang in South Manchuria in 1947.[32]

An important convergence, at the same time that the CCP was fighting a life and death struggle in South Manchuria, the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) began its thoroughgoing but cautious socialist transformation of Korea.[33] Though we have very little insight into the internal deliberations of the KWP, we know that the North Koreans were hesitant to carry out land reform among the Overseas Chinese in 1946. While the agrarian reform law announced that land would be seized from Japanese institutions and individuals, collaborators and "traitors to the Korean people," and those Koreans in possession of more than twelve acres, no mention was made of lands owned by Chinese nationals.[34] According to Chinese sources, the Koreans sidestepped this issue in its official promulgation, instead tendering a request for the Office of the Northeast Bureau in Korea to add the Overseas Chinese to its portfolio.[35]

Lizhi zhuan [Biography of Zhu Lizhi] (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 2007), 457.

32 Ding Xuesong et al., "Huiyi dongbei jiefang zhanzheng qijian dongbei ju zhu bei Chaoxian banshichu" [Recalling the Northeast Bureau's Office in North Korea during the War of Liberation in the Northeast], *Zhonggong dangshi ziliao* 17, March 1986, 200.

33 Charles K. Armstrong, *The North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 71-86.

34 "The Korean Central Year Book, 1950," A/AC.39/INF.12/Add.7, 22 September 1951, in S-0689-0001-03, United Nations Archives and Records Management Section (ARMS), New York, NY.

35 Zheng Yijun, *Guiqiao Peng Guanghan de wangshi, jinshi* [History of Peng Guanghan, a Returned Overseas Chinese] (Hong Kong: Xianggang shehui kexue chubanshe youxian gongsi, 2005), 215. See also Sun and Yang, *Chaoxian Huaqiao Shi*, 304-305.

To coordinate the multi-national, multi-party administration of the Overseas Chinese, Korean leaders Kim Il-sung and Pak Il-u partnered with Zhu Lizhi to first establish an Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee within the Central Committee of the KWP. More important for the next three to four years, however, was the invitation extended to Ding Xuesong to invigorate the grassroots organization of the Chinese by founding the Overseas Chinese Federation (*Huaqiao lianhe zonghui* 华侨联合总会; OCF) in October 1946. Bound to both China and Korea in personal and political ways, Ding was an obvious choice to head this CCP front organization. She had joined the Chinese Communist Party in 1937 and was resident in Yan'an for eight years where she spearheaded several women's brigades and took on other organizational responsibilities. Beyond her impressive résumé, Ding had married into Korea in 1941. Her husband was a Korean man named Jeong Yul-seong (Zheng Lücheng 郑律成), and over the years Ding had become personally acquainted with Kim Il-sung, Pak Il-u, Mu Jeong, and other leading Korean personalities.[36]

Headquartered in Pyongyang, the OCF penetrated down to the village level throughout much of northern Korea, allowing the CCP to effectively reach thousands upon thousands of Overseas Chinese.[37] When Guomindang representatives were allowed into United Nations-occupied North Korea in the autumn of 1950, they were alarmed at the depth of the CCP's presence, announcing that "the Association [the OCF] not only operated on a national, provincial, Gun [county], municipal and Myun level, but was also active in forming occupational, youth and women's groups."[38]

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[36] Ding, *Zhongguo diyiwei nv dashi*, 156-167.

[37] Ibid., 170.

[38] Letter, O.N. Smyth, adviser to Australian Delegation, UNCURK, to the Secretary, Department of External Affairs, "The Chinese Community in Korea," 21 February 1951, A1838, 3707/40/90 Part 1, "China—Relations with Korea," NAA.

The CCP's robust presence in Korea was necessary because, despite that several major rivers separated Ding Xuesong and her Pyongyang-based colleagues from the Manchurian frontlines, the imperative of fighting (and winning) a civil war left an indelible imprint on their work with the Overseas Chinese. Shortly after being catapulted into founding the OCF, however, Ding Xuesong discovered that the Overseas Chinese community was reluctant to put its full energies behind the Chinese Communist Party. Based on her fieldwork and early observations, Ding formed the opinion that the Overseas Chinese community was "wary" of the CCP and generally supportive of Jiang Jieshi's Nationalist Party.[39] Surveys completed by the Nationalist Embassy in Korea during the UN occupation of Pyongyang in the autumn of 1950, even if offering self-fulfilling conclusions, reaffirmed that "there was no pro-Communist activity amongst most of the North Korean Chinese."[40] Liu Qian, an Overseas Chinese living in Pyongyang in the 1940s, also recalled that the Overseas Chinese community was materially rich but politically and socially uncultured, allegedly the result of the absence of CCP influence.[41] Another author, Zheng Yijun, states that "Guomindang spies had a definite influence among the Overseas Chinese" in North Korea.[42] These views, although oversimplifications of what was certainly a much more complex political reality, demonstrate how political leaders on all sides of the Chinese Civil War obsessed over the fate of the Overseas Chinese.

A desire to build an international alliance between China and Korea also invigorated Ding Xuesong's CCP-supported work. Cognizant of

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[39] Ding et al., "Huiyi dongbei jiefang zhanzheng qijian dongbei ju zhu bei Chaoxian banshichu," 206.

[40] Letter, O.N. Smyth, adviser to Australian Delegation, UNCURK, to the Secretary, Department of External Affairs.

[41] Liu Qian, "Chaoxian Huaqiao de diyi ge geming yaolan" [The First Cradle of Revolution among the Overseas Chinese in North Korea], *Liaoning Wenshi Ziliao* 28, November 1990, 169-170.

[42] Zheng, *Guiqiao Peng Guanghan de wangshi, jinshi*, 215.

colonial-era antagonisms, Ding believed that the Chinese in Korea were not only pro-GMD and anti-CCP, but they were also quite ambivalent toward the Korean Workers' Party. Hesitant to "cooperate" with local authorities, Ding added that the Overseas Chinese generally maintained their historically ingrained "prejudice" (*chengjian* 成见) against Koreans.[43] Upon its founding, the OCF therefore not only prioritized the short-term task of land reform, but also the long-term objective of forging amicable relations more generally between Chinese, Koreans, and the party-state.[44]

The Overseas Chinese Federation at Work

Towards these ends, Ding tightened the organization and control of the Overseas Chinese in 1946 and 1947. She began to lobby the CCP to dispatch more mainland based cadres to the OCF, and when these long-distance efforts failed, Ding personally traveled to Dalian to wrest communist personnel from that city's party secretary.[45] Fortunately for Ding, other experienced CCP cadres arrived in Korea at this time purely out of coincidence, including Peng Guanghan (彭光涵) and his wife Wu Zhao (吴昭). Peng had spent his youth in Malaya, and he returned to China only in 1940. A true international, the CCP tapped into Peng's overseas experiences to strengthen the Party's networks across greater China during the Civil War era. After a brief stint in Inner Mongolia in 1945 and Harbin in 1946, Peng turned southward again, desiring to return to his family and work mobilizing the Overseas Chinese in Malaya. The

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[43] Ding, *Zhongguo diyiwei nv dashi*, 173; Ding et al., "Huiyi dongbei jiefang zhanzheng qijian dongbei ju zhu bei Chaoxian banshichu," 206.

[44] Zheng, *Guiqiao Peng Guanghan de wangshi*, jinshi, 215-216.

[45] Although little is known of their backgrounds or personalities, Ding's persistence resulted in the arrivals of Wang Jingye and Wang Fei, who assumed the top leadership posts in the Overseas Chinese Federation from 1946 until 1948. See Sun and Yang, *Chaoxian huaqiao shi*, 321.

logistical hurdles caused by warfare in Northeast China, however, did not allow him to journey so far. After a prolonged layover in Dalian, the CCP gave up on finding Peng transportation to Hong Kong. Intending to return to Harbin, Peng traveled through North Korea in July 1947 only to have his work orders altered by Zhu Lizhi at the Office of the Northeast Bureau in Korea. For the next ten months, Peng served as the OCF's propaganda chief, a role which he would perform with great aplomb.[46]

Propaganda was at the center of the Overseas Chinese Federation (OCF)'s work. One of its first maneuvers was to begin publishing a Chinese-language newspaper known as *Democratic Overseas Chinese* (民主华侨 *Minzhu Huaqiao*), a publication which drew on radio reports and CCP dispatches sent from the Northeast to provide up-to-date coverage on the Chinese Civil War.[47] In addition, the OCF also began to translate speeches made by Korean officials and other important documents produced by the KWP into Chinese for circulation in Korea and beyond.[48] Wu Zhao, Peng Guanghan's spouse, for example, worked with An Hyo-sang (安孝相)—a capable writer who later helped to publish the works of Lu Xun in Korean—to translate Kim Il-sung's works into Chinese.[49] In the afterword to another translated Korean publication which was later reprinted in Shanghai and Beijing, the Chinese publishing house thanked the Overseas Chinese Federation for its work to bring greater attention to the situation in Korea, a topic on which nary

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46 Zheng, *Guiqiao Peng Guanghan de wangshi, jinshi*, 215.

47 Ibid., 217.

48 Bei Chaoxian Huaqiao lianhe zonghui xuanjiao bu, *Bei Chaoxian zhuyao zhengce faling xuanji* [Selected Important Policies and Laws of North Korea] (Dalian: Guanghua shudian, 1948); Zhang Jing, *Chaoxian gaikuang* [Situation of Korea] (Pingrang: Minzhu Huaqiao she, 1948); Minzhu Huaqiao she, *Chaoxian minzhu zhuyi renmin gongheguo xianfa: 1948 nian 9 yue 8 ri di 1ci Chaoxian zuigao renmin huiyi tongguo* [The DPRK Constitution: Passed by the First Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea on September 8, 1948] (Pingrang: Minzhu Huaqiao she, 1949).

49 Zheng, *Guiqiao Peng Guanghan de wangshi, jinshi*, 217.

a single book had been released.[50]

In his role as Propaganda Secretary, Peng Guanghan also sought to increase the amount of published material in Korean on the Chinese Civil War. Peng established liaison with several Korean news correspondents and began to act as a consultant for journalists writing columns and reports on developments in China.[51] Although it is impossible to know how important Peng's direct involvement was, the Chinese Civil War did indeed become an important and widely reported on subject in the North Korean media.[52] In her memoirs, Ding Xuesong wrote of a similar process of dispatching Chinese cadres to North Korean news agencies to "assist them with writing news related to China [in order to] allow the Korean people and Overseas Chinese to understand the situation of the Chinese War of Liberation in a timely manner."[53] One of the most important documents translated into Korean and circulated in Pyongyang was Liu Shaoqi's classic pamphlet *Internationalism and Nationalism*.[54]

The Overseas Chinese Federation's efforts to mobilize the Chinese population to support the CCP in the Civil War extended well beyond spreading propaganda and obtaining vocal pledges of allegiance. When the Federation collected a reported 1,818 letters of support from Overseas Chinese to be delivered to communist armed forces, for example, it simultaneously exacted a haul of several million *yuan* to be paid to the CCP.[55] As thousands of wounded Chinese soldiers were

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[50] Note to Shanghai edition included in Xu Zhe, *Chaoxian wenti* [The Korean Problem], trans. Wu Yinghao (Beijing: Dazhong shudian, 1950), 185.

[51] Zheng, *Guiqiao Peng Guanghan de wangshi, jinshi*, 217.

[52] Adam Cathcart and Charles Kraus, "Internationalist Culture in North Korea, 1945-1950."

[53] Ding, *Zhongguo diyiwei nv dashi*, 174.

[54] Liu Shaoqi, *Gukjejuui wa minjogjuui e daehayeo* [Internationalism and Nationalism], trans. Minzhu Huaqiao (Pyongyang: Minzhu Huaqiao she, 1949).

[55] Ren Guixiang, *Huaqiao yu Zhongguo minzu minzhu geming* [The Overseas Chinese and China's National Democratic Revolution] (Beijing: Zhongyang bianyi chubanshe, 2006), 437-438; Sun and Yang, *Chaoxian huaqiao shi*, 324-325.

brought to Korea from Shandong and Southern Manchuria in 1946 and 1947, Overseas Chinese citizens in Nampo and Pyongyang also often assumed the responsibility to care for them.[56] Finally, the Overseas Chinese Federation also organized a number of visiting delegations to Chinese Communist controlled areas in the Northeast and successfully recruited a number of young male Overseas Chinese to join the Red Army.[57] As a gesture of thanks for the community's small but earnest support, the CCP later arranged for a representative from the Overseas Chinese in North Korea, Zhao Lingde (赵令德), to attend the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in Beijing in September 1949.[58]

The OCF was also an erstwhile intermediary for the emerging North Korean state. A 1947 census catalogued Overseas Chinese residents in North Korea, resulting in the creation of thousands upon thousands of personal dossiers. While completed by the North Korean People's Committee, it was the OCF that helped to facilitate the completion of this census. The dossiers contained basic biographical information about the respondents, but interestingly, the Overseas Chinese were also asked about their "hopes" or "wishes" (*xiwang* 希望) for the future. In Hamheung, the most common responses included "for North and South Korea to be unified and for business to develop," "the establishment of an independent Korea," and "the complete

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[56] Sun and Yang, *Chaoxian huaqiao shi*, 323.

[57] Ren, *Huaqiao yu Zhongguo minzu minzhu geming*, 438; Sun and Yang, *Chaoxian Huaqiao shi*, 323-324; Ding, "Huiyi dongbei jiefang zhanzheng qijian dongbei ju zhu bei Chaoxian banshichu," 206.

[58] Ren Guixiang and Zhao Hongying, *Huaqiao Huaren yu guogong guanxi* [Relations between the Overseas Chinese and the GMD and the CCP] (Wuhan: Wuhan chubanshe, 1999), 245, 255. While Zhao was not of the ranking leaders of the OCF, Li Fuchun had previously met Zhao during his short trip to the Port of Rajin in 1948 and found him to be an "able young man" (*ganlian qingnian*). See Hao Zaijin, *Xieshang jianguo: 1948-1949 Zhongguo dangpai zhengzhi rishi* [Talking about the Founding of the Nation: The Political Diary of a Chinese Partisan, 1948-1949] (Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 2000), 114.

independence and unification of Korea." One thirty-two year old wrote that he wished "good things upon the Chinese people," while another respondent praised the "Republic of China." The most heartwarming (and non-standardized) response, however, came from a young man named Jiang Kexiu (姜克修). Born in Shandong in 1909, Jiang came to Korea in 1928 and immediately went into business. Relatively successful until the onset of World War II, Jiang was then reduced to working in a kitchen and lost a substantial share of his prior income. Hesitant to endorse the political-revolutionary tenor of the times, Jiang wrote that he wished simply "to live" (*shenghuo* 生活).[59]

Overseas Chinese Education

It was the realm of education where the lion's share of the Overseas Chinese Federation's resources was funneled, though this arena too was closely aligned with the organization's broader emphasis on supporting the communist parties in both China and Korea.[60] Funding for schools came largely from taxes collected by the OCF, although budgetary shortfalls were routinely taken care of by the North Korean government.[61] One captured letter dated June 13, 1947, indicates that Kim Il-sung himself may have sponsored a specialized school system for the Overseas Chinese. Addressing the "Chairman of the North Korean People's Committee," or Kim Il-sung, the Overseas Chinese Federation requested government aid to repair elementary schools, noting that the decrepit facilities were "proving a great handicap." The Federation asked for financial assistance for repairs and to provide a bus service for students, pleading that "these are matters of intimate concern to the educational

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[59] All dossiers were found in "Registered Foreigners in Hamheung, South Hamgyeong Province," RG 242, Shipping Advice (SA) 2005, Item 9/48.

[60] Mu, "Chaoxian huaqiao jiaoyu de lishi huigu," 59.

[61] Ibid.

welfare of the Overseas Chinese."[62]

Local governments throughout North Korea were also intimately involved in the revival and expansion of Overseas Chinese education. A report from the North Hamgyeong branch of the OCF in particular demonstrates the extent of Chinese "outreach with local governments" (*dangdi zhengfu de lianxi* 当地政府的联系). In the cities of Hoeryeong and Cheongjin, the local governments had provided materials for building repairs; in Seongjin (also known as Gimchaek), the local government provided school uniforms; and in Rajin, the government provided Korean-language teachers. The provincial report concluded that Korean schools and Chinese schools were receiving equal treatment from local governments in North Hamgyeong and that the convening of several joint Chinese-Korean cadres meetings had helped to achieve "a deeper Sino-Korean relationship" (*Zhong Chao de guanxi geng shenke le* 中朝的关系更深刻了).[63] In North Pyeongan, the provincial government also provided aid to the Overseas Chinese schools, including subsidies, assistance with construction and repair work, and grain rations. The OCF cadre, in a report presumably destined for the CCP's Northeast Bureau, appreciatively concluded that the Korean government "is very concerned about Overseas Chinese education" and offers assistance "without regard to nationality" (*shi bufen minzu de* 是不分民族的).[64] While this type of language was probably used to paper over and obscure a much grittier reality, it does still demonstrate the institutional support the Overseas

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[62] Letter from the Overseas Chinese General Association in North Korea to the Chairman of the North Korean People's Committee, "Request for Funds to Repair the Buildings of the Overseas Elementary School and to Purchase School Buses," 13 June 1947, translated and printed in "Overseas Chinese Schools in North Korea," 2 April 1951, CREST no. CIA-RDP82-00457R007100330001-0.

[63] "Xianbei dao jiaoyu gongzuo zongjie" [Summary of Education Work in North Hamgyeong], 25 February 1949, in RG 242, SA 2006, Item 12/23.

[64] "Xuexiao zhengguihua Pingbei dao" [School Standardization, North Pyongan Province] in RG 242, SA 2006, Item 12/23.

Chinese Federation was receiving from North Korean officials.

With robust backing from the central and local governments, the Overseas Chinese Federation excelled at conducting ideological education in these schools. In North Pyeongan Province, for example, the OCF directed instruction toward the Chinese Civil War, aiming to reveal the "Guomindang's typical wrongdoings" (*Guomindang suo zuo dianxing eshi* 国民党所作典型恶事) and the "Communist Party's services to the people" (*Gongchandang de ti laobaixing fuwu* 共产党的替老百姓服务).[65] Textbooks and other teaching materials were delivered from the Northeast as they became available, and the works of Mao Zedong became a central text utilized in class discussions.[66] Patriotic education had been so successful in North Hamgyeong that OCF staff noted a desire among teachers to "organize" a "tour group to the motherland."[67] Whether or not Mao's teachings were actually embraced, the struggle between China's warring factions had clearly entered classrooms across the Yalu and Tumen rivers.

Though education was often inwardly focused on the Chinese Civil War, schools also mediated cross-cultural exchange between Chinese and Koreans. Beginning in 1949, for example, Chinese schools in Cheongjin and Nanam "taught students Hangul writing" (*xuexi Chaoxian wenzi* 学习朝鲜文字).[68] In Pyongyang, the OCF reported that it had made strides

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[65] "Xuesheng zhengguihua Pingbei dao," RG 242, SA 2006, Item 12/23.

[66] Sun and Yang, *Chaoxian Huaqiao shi*, 310-311; Mu, "Chaoxian Huaqiao jiaoyu de lishi huigu," 59-60.

[67] "Xianbei dao jiaoyu gongzuo zongjie," RG 242, SA 2006, Item 12/23. The emphasis on democratic education also had its drawbacks, as revealed by various North Hamgyeong reports. According to parent complaints, some students had become imbued with "ultra-democratization" (*jiduan minzhuhua*). Students argued that they could not be forced to complete their homework, would behave inappropriately, and would lecture their parents on "democracy and freedom and equality." See "Xianbei dao jiaoyuan dui jiaoyu gongzuo quedian zongjie: fujian ziliao" [Summary of Shortcomings in Teachers' Work in North Hamgyeong Province: Attachments], 25 February 1949 in RG 242, SA 2006, Item 12/23.

[68] "Xianbei dao jiaoyu gongzuo zongjie," RG 242, SA 2006, Item 12/23.

to institute what it called "Sino-Korean Children's Parties" (*Zhong Chao ertong lianhuanhui* 中朝儿童联欢会). These playdates "strengthened the goodwill between Chinese and Korean children, [helping them to] recognize the mistaken conflict between one another in the past." OCF staff in the de facto North Korean capital described with some hope that "mutual contact between one another [Chinese and Koreans] is gradually becoming more frequent."[69]

The North Hamgyeong bureau of the OCF also revealed that "Sino-Korean Children's Parties" had been held in Cheongjin, Rajin, Nanam, Hoeryeong, Unggi (now Seonbong), and Museon, involving a total of 1,930 Chinese and Korean students. A report written by Overseas Chinese in Cheongjin added that "students and the heads of families were both very satisfied. [The party] improved the relationships among Chinese and Korean students." In Nanam, where an astounding 1,168 students participated, the cross-cultural gathering had also "improved the relationship among students."[70]

In Hwanghae Province, the local OCF branch had held eleven Sino-Korean Children's Parties by 1949. The Chinese cadres in this city wrote optimistically that the meetings helped to "eliminate" (*chu diao le* 除掉了) the "hatred" (*choushi* 仇视) between Chinese and Koreans. The mixed populations in Hwanghae had allegedly come a long way to "strengthen intimate unity" (*qiang le qinmi tuanjie* 强了亲密团结) and, as a result, there was greater incentive to "frequently convene Sino-Korean Children's Parties." Chinese administrators in Hwanghae announced that "the relationship between Chinese and Korean children is better than in the past."[71] The North Pyeongan report on a Sino-Korean Children's

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69 "Pingrang tebie shi Huaqiao lianhehui jiaoyu tianxie" [Tables from the Department of Education, Pyongyang Special City Branch, Overseas Chinese Federation], in RG 242, SA 2006, Item 12/23.

70 "Xianbei dao jiaoyu gongzuo zongjie," RG 242, SA 2006, Item 12/23.

71 "Xuexiao zhengguihua Huanghai dao" [School Standardization, Hwanghae Province] in RG 242, SA 2006, Item 12/23.

Party noted similar results: with 616 students in attendance, the party had successfully reduced the once common "bullying" (*qiwu* 欺侮) of Chinese students by Koreans. "Even adults had all been cursed at by Korean children" (*jiu lian daren dou shoudao Gaoli xuesheng de maren* 就连大人都受到高丽学生的骂人), but these meetings were allegedly eroding the antagonisms once common during the colonial era.[72]

These tales of success, cooperation, and mutual trust, while highly interesting, were most likely exaggerations offered to please superiors in Pyongyang and Northeast China. Nevertheless, Overseas Chinese education did undergo a well-documented revival prior to the Korean War. While one surviving record of the OCF offers statistics for only 27 schools, we know that there were in fact closer to 50 Chinese elementary schools in 1949, nearly four-times the number in operation in 1945.[73] The number of students enrolled in elementary schools peaked at around 3,000, although some reports suggest that there were as many as 5,000 students prior to the Korean War.[74] Furthermore, two Chinese-language middle schools were opened in Pyongyang and Sinuiju through the collaboration of the OCF and the North Korean government.[75] The Overseas Chinese, as these statistics reveal, had become an important fixture in the relationship between the CCP and the KWP.

Having revived and rehabilitated the Overseas Chinese school system, the management of these schools formally returned back to the hands of the North Korean government in March 1949.[76] In one of her

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72 "Xuexiao zhengguihua Pingbei dao," RG 242, SA 2006, Item 12/23.

73 Jiaoyu bu [Ministry of Education], "Bei Chaoxian ge dao Huaqiao de xuexiao yuezhong diaocha baogao" [Month-End Investigative Report on Overseas Chinese Schools in Every Province of North Korea], January 1949, RG 242, SA 2006, Item 12/26. The higher estimate of Chinese schools comes from Sun and Yang, *Chaoxian Huaqiao shi*, 311.

74 Far Eastern Section, Korea, "Briefs," 24 November 1948, in A1838, 3707/40/90 Part 1, "China—Relations with Korea," NAA.

75 Sun and Yang, *Chaoxian Huaqiao Shi*, 311.

76 Ibid., 312. See also Jiaoyu bu [Ministry of Education] "Guanyu Zhongguo ren chuji zhong

last acts as an OCF administrator, Ding Xuesong facilitated the transfer of the Overseas Chinese Federation's school property to the DPRK Ministry of Education and wrote to Kim Il-sung to thank him for his personal involvement in the founding of dozens of Chinese schools.[77] Though it was really the twin imperatives of fighting a civil war and forging an international alliance—not the footwork of one man—that hastened the successful expansion of Chinese education in Korea, Ding could not help but acknowledge the gracious assistance of this newly founded nation's young premier.

Conclusion

The CCP and the KWP had become intimately connected with one another after 1945, and it was the tireless efforts to regulate the political, economic, and cultural activities of the Chinese diaspora which brought the two communist parties closest together. Collaboratively, the CCP and the KWP carried out land reform among Chinese nationals, established some fifty Chinese-language schools, distributed Chinese and Korean language publications, and brought together Chinese and Koreans for exchanges across the northern half of the peninsula. While these connections do not explain or rationalize China's decision to intervene in the Korean War in October 1950, they do alert us to an ongoing CCP-KWP dynamic during the early Cold War years which extended well beyond military cooperation. From this collaboration, it is also clear that while the Soviet Union was an important player in North Korea during the "interwar" years, it was not North Korea's only foreign partner. This may

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xuexiao guicheng" [Regulations for Chinese Junior High Schools], 8 April 1950, in RG 242, SA 2006, Item 12/22.

77 Letter from Ding Xuesong to the Finance Minister of the DPRK, "Request for Aid in Returning the Loan Made for the Building of the Overseas Chinese Middle School," 15 March 1949, in CREST No. CIA-RDP82-00457R007100330001-0.

seem like a trivial point, but North Korea's China connection necessitates that we treat this country as an emerging postcolonial nation-state, not a puppet state, in the study of its infancy and early history.

Beyond alliance building, the life-and-death political struggle fought between China's warring factions from 1946 through 1950 (and beyond) also gave shape to the Chinese Communist Party's policies and activities in Korea. The resources, energies, and passions expended on organizing the Overseas Chinese in North Korea sprang forth directly from the internecine conflict between the CCP and the GMD, suggesting that the Chinese Civil War was not simply a military confrontation fought snuggly inside of China's borders. Rather, it was a battle for the hearts and minds of Chinese nationals waged on a global scale, including inside the classrooms of Overseas Chinese schools in North Korea. The international dimensions of this conflict, then, were not limited to the involvement of the Soviet Union and the United States. The global reach of the Chinese Civil War awaits additional research.

The bridge connecting two of East Asia's earliest Cold War-era revolutions, it was during this period that the Overseas Chinese became enshrined within Chinese Communist diplomacy. In Indonesia, Vietnam, and beyond, the Overseas Chinese would also become intimately involved with developments in China's foreign relations. Though their lives were impacted by the top-level decisions made by senior officials, the Overseas Chinese just as often shaped the agendas and activities of high-level diplomats. In North Korea, the Overseas Chinese also happened to be "present at the creation" of one of Beijing's most important, enduring, and problematic relationships.

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The Australian-American Alliance, Recognition of China and the 1954-55 Quemoy-Matsu Crisis

Andrew Kelly
University of Western Sydney

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The Australian-American Alliance, Recognition of China and the 1954-55 Quemoy-Matsu Crisis

This article examines two critical Cold War events—diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China (PRC) from 1949 onwards and the 1954-55 Quemoy-Matsu Crisis—through the lens of the early Australian-American alliance. Although Canberra and Washington both employed hard-line isolationist policies toward mainland China, Australian policymakers thought seriously more than their American counterparts about the possibility of recognizing Beijing as a means of preventing future PRC aggression in Northeast Asia. This trend continued throughout the 1954-55 Quemoy-Matsu Crisis when Australia also urged the United States to exercise restraint in the Taiwan Straits in fear of both countries being drawn into a wider war with China. Through exploring the interplay between Australia and the United States toward these issues, this article demonstrates that the early Australian-American relationship was far more intricate and two-sided than much of the existing literature suggests.

Keywords: Australia, the United States, China, Taiwan, 1954-55 Quemoy-Matsu Crisis

The Australian-American Alliance, Recognition of China and the 1954-55 Quemoy-Matsu Crisis

Andrew Kelly
University of Western Sydney

Introduction: The Historiography of the Early Australian-American Relationship and China

"Without any inhibitions of any kind," Australian Prime Minister John Curtin decreed famously after the Japanese attacks at Pearl Harbor in December 1941, "I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom." In this brief moment, Curtin signalled that the future of Australian diplomacy and strategy was set to rely heavily upon the United States.[1] Solidifying a close and cordial relationship with the

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1 "Australia Looks to America: Mr Curtin's Message, New Plan for Pacific Strategy," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, December 29, 1941. See also Joseph M. Siracusa and David G. Coleman, *Australia Looks to America: Australian-American Relations since Pearl Harbor* (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 2006); David Day, "27th December 1941: Prime Minister Curtin's New Year Message, Australia Looks to America," in *Turning Points in Australian History*, ed. Joseph M. Siracusa and David G. Coleman (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2009), 129-142. While Curtin's address has certainly attracted scholarly attention, David McLean points out that Australia had been "looking to America" three decades prior to December 1941. See David McLean, "From British Colony to American Satellite? Australia and the USA during the Cold War," *Australian Journal of Politics & History* 52, no. 1 (March 2006): 68.

United States did indeed become a top priority in Canberra during the 1940s and early 1950s, not least because British defense capabilities in the Asia-Pacific had diminished so significantly over the same period that London was no longer capable of adequately protecting Australian interests. To rectify this vulnerability, Australia ably secured formal American support through signing the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) in September 1951. Along with New Zealand, this treaty committed each signatory to meet the common danger in the Pacific theatre.

Although ANZUS aimed to address Australian and American regional security concerns, there has been a longstanding historical misconception that because the United States was a global superpower and Australia a small power, Canberra was subordinate to Washington. Studies that advance this conclusion also suggest that Australia struggled to draw independent conclusions on major foreign policy issues. For Alan Renouf, former Head of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Australian Ambassador in Washington during the mid to late 1970s, statements like those by Curtin epitomized Australia's reputation of being an "American client state." "There has been little innovation of originality in Australia's attitudes abroad," Renouf remarked, "Like a child, Australia has shown a marked inclination to 'stay with mother,' first Britain and then the United States."[2] Renouf's critical and almost humiliating conclusions on Australia's overreliance on the United States were not uncommon. L.G. Churchward, Joseph Camilleri, H.G. Gelber, Glen St. John Barclay, and Coral Bell all characterized Australia's relationship with the United States in a similar fashion.[3] Even as recently

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2 Alan Renouf, *The Frightened Country* (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1979), 3-14.

3 L. G. Churchward, *Australia and America, 1788-1972: An Alternative History* (Sydney: Alternative Publishing Cooperative, 1979); Joseph A. Camilleri, *Australian-American Relations: The Web of Dependence* (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1980); Harry G. Gelber, The Australian-American Alliance: Costs and Benefits (New York: Penguin, 1968); Glen St. John Barclay, *Friends in High Places: Australian-American Diplomatic Relations since 1945* (Melbourne:

as 2013, David McLean suggested that along with Australia's response to the U.S. war on terror, the Asian Cold War was "marked by unquestioning Australian support for the United States."[4]

This orthodoxy has since been widely challenged. For instance, in Joan Beaumont's view, this "pervasive" understanding is "grossly simplistic."[5] Traditional interpretations largely overlook the complex and competing views within the Australian Department of External Affairs, but more importantly, they overlook many instances where Australian policy was created independently and shaped by strategic calculations of its own interests. As Greg Sheridan described in 2006, the Australian-American relationship "has been misunderstood to assume that it is always run by the Americans and the Australians just go along, agreeing to whatever the Americans want to a greater or lesser degree."[6] Some historians have started using case studies to reshape this historical paradigm, although further examples are conspicuously lacking.[7]

In the context of reshaping the historiographical debate over Australia's relationship with the United States, this article examines two interconnected post-war issues that offer different conclusions to the existing literature. The first is Australian and American views over

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Oxford University Press, 1985); Coral Bell, *Dependant Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1988).

4 David McLean, "Too Much Memory: Writing the History of Australian-American Relations during the Howard Years," in *Australia and the World: A Festschrift for Neville Meaney*, ed. Joan Beaumont and Matthew Jordan (Sydney: University of Sydney Press, 2013), 237-258. See also Dennis Phillips, *Ambivalent Allies: Myth and Reality in the Australian-American Relationship* (Ringwood, Australia: Penguin, 1988); Norman Harper, *A Great and Powerful Friend: A Study of Australian and American Relations between 1900 and 1975* (Saint Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1987).

5 Joan Beaumont, "Making Australian Foreign Policy," in *Ministers, Mandarins and Diplomats: Australian Foreign Policy Making 1941-1969* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2003), 3.

6 Greg Sheridan, "Inside the Australian-US Alliance," *The Sydney Papers* 18, no. 3-4 (2006): 207.

7 See, for example, Laura Stanley and Phillip Deery, "The Menzies Government, the American Alliance and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *Australian Journal of Politics & History* 59, no. 2 (June 2013): 178-195.

whether or not to recognize the People's Republic of China (PRC) from late 1949 onwards. Although both Canberra and Washington opted initially not to recognize the PRC, private Cabinet and External Affairs Department papers suggest Australia was more willing than the United States to reconsider recognition during the 1950s as a means of preventing future PRC aggression. This oversight leads into the second example this articles explores: an examination into the 1954-55 Quemoy-Matsu Crisis fought between the PRC and the Republic of China (ROC). Throughout the crisis, Canberra was again more willing than Washington to consider recognizing the PRC. Moreover, in contrast to State Department and U.S. military opinion, the Australian Department of External Affairs consistently opposed defending the offshore islands in the fear that Australia and the United States might be drawn into war with China. Although Australian policy choices vis-à-vis China were at times restricted by the U.S. position, this in itself is not sufficient grounds to suggest Australia was a completely subservient ally to the United States. Moreover, such short-sighted conclusions also fail to address adequately the unique Australian views and the overall complexity of Australian foreign policy during the early Cold War.

Overall, much of the Western literature on the recognition of China and the offshore islands has focused on Sino-American relations and nuclear brinkmanship. These studies also examine these issues as part of their broader implications for U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War.[8]

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[8] Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, *The China Threat: Memories, Myths and Realities in the 1950s* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012); Warren I. Cohen and Akira Iriye, eds., *The Great Powers in East Asia: 1953-1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); Gordon H. Chang, "To the Nuclear Brink: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis," *International Security* 12, no. 4 (April 1988): 96-123; Gordon H. Chang and He Di, "The Absence of War in the U.S.-China Confrontation over Quemoy and Matsu in 1954-1955: Contingency, Luck, Deterrence?," *The American Historical Review* 98, no. 5 (December 1993): 1500-1524; Bennett C. Rushkoff, "Eisenhower, Dulles and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis, 1954-1955," *Political Science Quarterly* 96, no. 3 (October 1981): 465-480; H. W. Brands Jr., "Testing Massive Retaliation: Credibility and Crisis Management in the Taiwan Strait," *International Security* 12, no. 4 (April

Adding to these studies, this article examines the American response to China in relation to Australian diplomacy, an overlooked U.S. allied power in the Pacific. Moreover, it expands upon the Australian literature, which has generally viewed Canberra's early response to China as a smaller and separable issue in the development of Australian foreign policy.[9] Through exploring Australian and American approaches to China from 1949 to 1955, this article offers new conclusions about the interplay and intricacy in the early Australian-American post-war relationship. It also provides a broader understanding of Western responses to mainland China during one of the most volatile periods in Northeast Asian history.

Australia and the United States Ponder Recognition of China, 1949-1954

After a protracted civil war between the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Republic of China (ROC), CPC Chairman Mao Zedong announced the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, 1949. In turn, ROC leader Jiang Jieshi lost mainland China and retreated to Taiwan. As Cold War tensions continued to rise between the United States and the Soviet Union, a major Communist Government in Northeast Asia presented an uncertain and disruptive challenge for the West. Mao's victory especially provoked extensive debate over whether the United States and its allies should continue supporting Jiang's Government or instead recognize the PRC through opening normal diplomatic and trade relations in Beijing as well as supporting its claim

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1988): 124-151.

9 Bell, *Dependant Ally;* Barclay, *Friends in High Places*. For more specific studies on the Australian response to China and the offshore islands, see Garry Woodard, "Australian Foreign Policy on the Offshore Island Crisis of 1954-5 and Recognition of China," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 45, no. 2 (November 1991): 242-263; David Lee, "Australia and Anglo-American Disagreement over the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis, 1954-55," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 23, no. 1 (January 1995): 105-128.

for China's seat in the United Nations.

Although there were early suggestions in Washington that peaceful co-existence with mainland China might be reached, the State Department looked set to shape its policies on the premise that Beijing was entrenched firmly in the Soviet bloc and should not yet be awarded recognition. In an address to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 12, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated that the "Chinese Government is really a tool of Russian Imperialism in China … that gives us our fundamental starting point in regards to our relations with China."[10] While Acheson's comments made prospective U.S. recognition policies for China appear somewhat straightforward, the decision was complicated by many American policymakers (including Acheson) continuing to doubt whether U.S. diplomatic support for Jiang was useful. In his own words, Acheson argued at a later Committee meeting that the United States had "got to a point where in fact there is nothing more constructive that is coming out of this [Nationalist] Government." In the end, as both a stalling tactic and short-term compromise between these options, Acheson suggested that the U.S. should adopt a "wait, look, and see policy" toward China.[11]

In the aftermath of Mao's announcement, Canberra likewise reconsidered its position on China. Initially, Ben Chifley's Labor Government appeared entirely prepared to recognize Mao's Government. In October, the Australian Diplomatic Mission in Nanjing was recalled. Some of the Australian Staff returned to Canberra, while others established themselves in Hong Kong "with the clear inference that both the Embassy and the Government were leaving them as a kind of forward post from which a cadre group could quickly be moved to Beijing when

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[10] Supplemental Notes on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 12 October 1949, President's Secretary's Files, Box 140, Harry Truman Papers, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library.

[11] Wilson Miscamble, *George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1950* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 229.

recognition was granted."[12] The Department of External Affairs then called a meeting in Canberra for all high-ranking diplomats and policy officers shortly after the Nanjing Mission was recalled. The attendees at the meeting agreed unanimously that the PRC be recognized.[13]

At the same time, Britain was making its final preparations to announce that it was ready to recognize the PRC, believing that Beijing was the legitimate government of mainland China whether London approved of Mao's Government or not. British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin wrote to U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson on December 16 to inform the State Department that the Foreign Office was preparing to announce its decision to award recognition to the PRC in the New Year, even in light of Acheson's protestations that there was "no need" to do so and that Britain would "not gain any favours from the China Communists."[14] Concerned by British movement toward PRC recognition, the State Department hoped to at least maintain some degree of Anglo-American policy solidarity vis-à-vis China while the situation in Europe remained tense and uncertain. While falling short of recognizing the PRC, Deputy Under Secretary of State Dean Rusk assured British officials on January 2, 1950 that the United States "did not intend to become engaged in the defense of Formosa (Taiwan)."[15] Three days later, U.S. President Harry Truman announced publicly a hands-off U.S. policy for Taiwan that entailed no military or advisory aid for Jiang Jieshi's Government. Seemingly satisfied that this U.S. policy

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12 Henry Stephen Albinski, *Australian Policies and Attitudes toward China* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), 26.

13 Yi Wang, *Australia-China Relations Post 1949: Sixty Years of Trade and Politics* (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2012), 9.

14 Bevin to Acheson, 16 December 1949, National Archives and Records Administration of the United States (hereafter NARA), RG59, 893.001/12-1649; Acheson Memorandum, 13 September 1949, NARA, RG59, 893.01/9-1349.

15 Rusk Memorandum of Conversation, 2 January 1950, Foreign Relations of the United States Series (hereafter FRUS) China 1949 vol. IX, 256.

would curtail any serious Anglo-American rift on tensions between mainland China and Taiwan, Britain announced finally on January 6 that it recognized officially the PRC as the legitimate government of China and was prepared to enter into diplomatic relations.

Australia chose not to follow Britain's immediate decision to recognize the PRC. The Chifley Government had been voted out of office in place of the Liberal-Country Coalition led by Robert Menzies in December 1949, thereby stalling any immediate Australian decision over whether or not to recognize mainland China. After taking an outspokenly anti-Communist position during the election campaign, Menzies appeared less willing to award recognition to the PRC than his predecessors. When Menzies received a telegram about Britain's impending recognition announcement courtesy of British Prime Minister Clement Attlee on December 17, his government replied that Australia "was not in favour" of recognition. The main reason, according to the Australian message, was that the country was "not convinced that recognition would offer [Australia] any compensating advantages for what appear to be certain obvious disadvantages," citing its belief that the PRC will act recklessly and in defiance of international law.[16] Menzies appeared adamant on this issue, yet he could not completely silence the "considerable body of opinion" in the Department of External Affairs in favor of a more realistic approach to China leftover from the Chifley Government. Even Menzies's new External Affairs Minister Percy Spender recommended that Australia should "unload the Nationalists as soon as practicable, leaving the way clear for the admission of the PRC [to the United Nations] later on."[17]

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16 Attlee to Menzies, 17 December 1949, National Archives of Australia (hereafter NAA), A8138, TS3107/33/1/1 part I; Baker to UK Secretary for Commonwealth Relations, 20 December 1949, NAA, A1838, TS3107/33/1/1 part I.

17 Cablegram to Menzies, October 16, 1950, as quoted in Robert O'Neill, *Australia in the Korean War* 1950*-53: Strategy and Diplomacy* (Canberra: Australian War Memorial and the Australian Government Publishing Service, 1981), 132. Percy Spender also emphasized on March 9, 1950,

Despite these reservations over a non-recognition policy toward mainland China, the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 and PRC intervention later that November confirmed fears in Canberra and Washington that communism was an aggressive threat to free world nations. In response, Truman rejected any possibility of recognition and approved a National Security Council (NSC) recommendation to impose "strict political and economic sanctions" on the PRC as well as throw its support behind Jiang as the legitimate government of China.[18] Fighting alongside American forces in Korea, Menzies approved similar political and economic sanctions and declared publicly his support for Jiang's embattled regime. For Menzies, restoring peace in Northeast Asia was decidedly crucial for the long-term security of Australia.

Although Australian and American policy coincided in regards to responsive action in Korea, Australia's new approach to China was by no means as rigid as the United States. From a purely strategic perspective, once war broke out in Korea, the U.S. was quick to station its Seventh Naval Fleet in the Taiwan Strait to prevent the PRC from escalating the war to Taiwan. Regional bases, including those on Taiwan, were also reinforced in an effort to secure the American position in Northeast Asia. At the same time, the Menzies Government gave little consideration to the strategic importance of Taiwan when hostilities in Korea demanded Canberra's full attention. A month after war broke out, Menzies requested his Chiefs of Staff to clarify areas of strategic importance for Australia in the Asia-Pacific. This report concluded in September 1950 that although "Taiwan should not be allowed to fall into Communist

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that Australia had no quarrel with the PRC and would co-operate if Beijing behaved responsibly. See "Casey Statement, 9 March 1950," *Current Notes on International Affairs* 20, no. 2 (1950): 157; Woodard, "Australian Foreign Policy on the Offshore Island Crisis of 1954-5 and Recognition of China," 244.

18 United States Department of State, "James Lay Memorandum, 20 December 1951," in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951*, vol. VII, part 1. Korea and China (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1983), 1385.

hands easily … it is not a high strategic priority."[19]

Over and above minimal strategic interest in Taiwan, Australia was reluctant to politically support Nationalist China. "The Australians … are very anti Chiang Kai-Shek (Jiang Jieshi)," a New Zealand report concluded in mid-1952, "Spender, had he thought it possible, [would] have de-recognised the Taiwan Government."[20] Even after the Korean War broke out and Washington established an embassy in Taipei, the Menzies Government chose not to set up a similar diplomatic mission even though the ROC had representation in Canberra. Spender's replacement as External Affairs Minister, Richard Casey, contemplated similarly after he took over the portfolio in April 1951 that Australian interests might be served better by simply recognizing the PRC rather than continuing to support the Nationalists. "I think that [recognising the PRC] probably would ease the acid attitude of Beijing," Casey wrote in his diary shortly after Chinese intervention in the Korean War.[21]

Casey speculated that the reason the U.S. was taking such a hard-line toward the Chinese must be based on domestic pressures. "It seems impossible," Casey penned on December 8, 1951, "that any State Department man of consequence still believes in Nationalist China … they are all bound up in the toils of domestic politics."[22] Truman's domestic troubles with its China policy were indeed serious. Problems began with Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy, who relentlessly accused the Truman Administration of being soft on China after it failed to prevent Mao's victory in the Chinese Civil War. Support for McCarthy's tough anti-Communism stance was supported by the China

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19 Australian Strategy in relation to Communist expansion in the Pacific, Southeast Asia and the Far East area during the Cold War Period, 14 September 1950, NAA, A7941, C4 Part 1.

20 New Zealand Report on Australian Views toward China, 5 May 1952, Archives New Zealand, External Affairs, 264/3/14 Part 8.

21 Richard G. Casey, *Australian Foreign Minister: The Diaries of R. G. Casey, 1951-1960*, ed. Thomas B. Millar (London: Collins, 1972), 65.

22 Ibid., 64-65.

Lobby, a loose coalition of businessmen, labor leaders, journalists, scholars, missionaries and politicians that opposed any form of recognition of the PRC and demanded that the U.S. strongly support Nationalist China. While McCarthy and the China Lobby held considerable political influence in the United States, recognizing the PRC in the short-term appeared very unlikely. As Nancy Bernkopf Tucker described recently, the U.S. Government "feared" McCarthy and the China Lobby because of their constraining effect on policy options vis-à-vis China.[23]

Across the Pacific, the Menzies Government did not have similar problems with domestic opinion on China. There was simply no substantial public outcry in Australia to stand firmly against the PRC and support the ROC. Instead, like Casey, the Australian public appeared to support movement toward recognizing the PRC in the hope that it might mitigate hostilities in Korea. Newspaper articles in the *Courier-Mail, Newcastle Morning Herald, Daily Advertiser, The Mercury* and *The Canberra Times* published between 1949 and 1953 all urged that PRC recognition was either "likely," "expected" or even "inevitable."[24]

Much like public opinion on recognition, there were discernible differences between official Australian and American trade policies with the PRC. While the United States continued to oppose all trade with the PRC as part of its non-recognition policy, Australian-PRC trade continued to develop in the absence of diplomatic relations. Bilateral trade started from a small base with a total volume of A$3.9 million in 1949-1950, but rose more than tenfold to A$41 million by the end of the decade.[25] The trade of strategic materials was banned under a 1951

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[23] Tucker, *The China Threat*, 44, 50-51.

[24] "Recognition of China Inevitable," *Newcastle Morning Herald*, July 8, 1952; "Recognition of China Expected," *The Courier-Mail*, December 30, 1949; "Recognition of China," *The Mercury*, September 8, 1953; "Recognition of China Urged," *Daily Advertiser*, December 2, 1953.

[25] Wang, *Australia-China Relations Post 1949: Sixty Years of Trade and Politics*, 12; Burton

United Nations resolution, but other major materials were traded including wool, wheat, kitchenware, toys and agricultural machinery. Henry Albinski described Australian-Chinese trade without diplomatic ties as a "very successful exercise in realpolitik." A stiff strategic materials policy helped "placate" the Americans and their hard-line position on China, yet the continued trade of non-strategic goods became simply a case of Australia "having [its] cake and eating it too."[26]

While at the time opening diplomatic relations with mainland China offered Australia little more than the possibility of moderating China's international behavior and improving Anglo-Australian relations, Australian-PRC trade relations did allow the interchange of people-to-people contacts on top of goods and services. For example, even though the Australian Government stressed publicly that it would not interfere with private non-strategic trade, Albinski cited several incidents of Australian Trade Commissioners visiting the PRC as well as exchange visits between the Reserve Bank of Australia and the People's Republic Bank of China during the early 1950s.[27] As Yi Wang pointed out, these visits had "clear inter-governmental implications despite the lack of recognition."[28] The clearest implications were for Australian foreign policy, because the Australian Department of External Affairs was "responsible for what could or could not be shipped" on the non-strategic goods trade list.[29] The Department's role in this decision making process not only demonstrated the inextricable link between Australian trade and

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Kaufman, "Eisenhower's Foreign Economic Policy with Respect to East Asia," in *The Great Powers in East Asia: 1953-1960*, ed. Warren I. Cohen and Akira Iriye (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 105.

[26] Henry S. Albinski, "Australia and the Chinese Strategic Embargo," *Australian Outlook* 19, no. 2 (August 1965): 117-128.

[27] Ibid. See also Albinski, *Australian Policies and Attitudes toward China*.

[28] Wang, *Australia-China Relations Post 1949*, 15.

[29] Ibid; Edmund S. K. Fung, *The Politics of Trade in Australia's China Policy, 1966-1971* (Nathan, Australia: Centre for the Study of Australian-Asian Relations, Griffith University, 1982), 7.

diplomatic policies toward China, but that the Department also favored some measures—such as the approval of select goods for export to China—that constituted part of formal recognition.

After an armistice was signed in Korea on July 27, 1953, the United States continued to support Jiang in the hope that it would put further pressure on the PRC. The new Republican Administration—led by the charismatic and widely popular former Supreme Allied Commander Dwight Eisenhower—followed the previous Administration's example and remained steadfast in its determination to keep Taiwan out of Communist hands and oppose recognizing the PRC. According to an NSC policy statement on November 6, keeping Jiang's regime afloat continued to be a high U.S. interest for three important reasons: (1) U.S. support for the Nationalists strained Sino-Soviet relations and put considerable pressure on the PRC, (2) Taiwan served as a vital base for both covert operations on the Chinese mainland and for the defense of South Korea and Japan, and (3) psychologically, continued American support for the Nationalists kept morale high on Taiwan and in other non-Communist governments. With these considerations in mind, Taiwan formed an "essential element" of the U.S. Far East defense position.[30]

The Australian Government, however, still did not consider Taiwan to be a high strategic priority. As far as Canberra was concerned, any strategic importance Taiwan held was because Jiang's presence focused the PRC's attention across the Taiwan Strait rather than in Southeast Asia. In other words, as long as Taiwan remained in Nationalist hands, the PRC posed a less immediate threat to Australia. An underwhelming brief for the Australian delegation at the 1954 Geneva Conference exemplified this position, concluding that Taiwan was merely "of value,"

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[30] United States Department of State, "Statement of Policy by the National Security Council, 6 November 1953," in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, vol. XIV, part 1. China and Japan, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1985), 307-330.

and added that

> In enemy hands, Taiwan would facilitate a Communist advance into the Philippines. In the hands of the Chinese Nationalists, it is a continuing threat to the Chinese Communists who find it necessary to retain substantial armed forces on the adjacent mainland.[31]

By mid-1954, it was clear that the Menzies Government and Eisenhower Administration were not in complete agreement over the best course of action on China. The Australians were not convinced that American policies toward China were completely practical and instead considered that recognizing the PRC might reduce tensions in Northeast Asia. Australian-American disagreement on these issues was exposed further during the 1954-55 Quemoy-Matsu Crisis. Even after changing American policies, the Australian Department of External Affairs argued consistently against defending the offshore islands in the hope that doing so might prevent the escalation of a wider war with China. The Australian position also stemmed from broader differences with the United States over its continued opposition to recognizing the PRC and supporting the ROC.

A Horrible Dilemma: The 1954-55 Quemoy-Matsu Crisis

On September 3, 1954, PRC forces began shelling Quemoy and Matsu, two small Nationalist-held islands adjacent to the Chinese mainland. Even though by sheer geographical size and position alone it would be

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[31] Brief for Australian Delegation to the Geneva Conference, undated in Stuart Doran and David Lee, eds., *Documents on Australian Foreign Policy: Australia and Recognition of the People's Republic of China, 1949-1972* (Canberra: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2002), 79-82.

unthinkable that a global war might erupt over such small islands, there was a very real possibility that any miscalculation could spark a war with China, and by extension, the Soviet Union. Domestic and global concerns over potential American recklessness in the Taiwan Straits were especially high because of Eisenhower's "New Look" global defense policy which centered upon nuclear brinkmanship.[32] As Gordon Chang noted, critics at the time warned Eisenhower against "bringing the country to the verge of war over real estate of little consequence."[33]

With these potentially disastrous consequences in mind, the attacks raised difficult questions. Was this a prelude to an amphibious invasion? Would the United States commit to defending islands of negligible strategic value so close to the Chinese mainland? American policy long established its determination to prevent Taiwan and the Pescadores falling into Communist hands, but to do this, Eisenhower's Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) thought that it was important that these offshore islands also remain in Nationalist hands. Others, such as Australia, Britain and the majority of the American public, were not so convinced to defend, as U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles put it, "a bunch of rocks."[34]

Eisenhower appeared certain—at least during the initial stages of the crisis—that the offshore islands could not possibly be defended by the United States. After Dulles presented the "horrible dilemma" that confronted the United States to the NSC on September 12, Eisenhower stressed that "Quemoy is not our ship." According to Eisenhower, defending Quemoy by force would lead to war with China. Public opinion seemed to support this position. Eisenhower went on to tell the

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[32] Robert J. McMahon, "US National Security Policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy," in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Origins*, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, vol. 1 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 288-311.

[33] Chang, "To the Nuclear Brink," 96.

[34] United States Department of State, "Department of State Conversation, 19 January 1955," in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957*, vol. II. China, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1986), 47.

NSC that he had constantly been receiving letters from the American public saying "please do not send our boys to war" and "do we really care what happens to those yellow people out there?"[35]

Political opinion aside, most U.S. military planners argued that the offshore islands were important to the defense of Taiwan. A JCS report, submitted to the President on the afternoon of September 3, recommended that current American policy toward the Taiwan Strait area be changed to assist in the defense of Quemoy as well as nine other offshore islands. The JCS Chairman Arthur Radford, a strong-minded admiral with a wealth of experience in Pacific naval planning, argued strongly for the U.S. to defend the islands. He recommended to the State Department that the United States should commit to defending Quemoy and Matsu, even with the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Not all Chiefs of Staff agreed with Radford's radical approach, but along with the Chief of the Air Force Nathan Twinning and Chief of Naval Operations Robert Carney, most JCS members concluded that defending the offshore islands was important and any withdrawal would have a considerable psychological effect on Nationalist morale.[36] In opposition, Army Chief of Staff Matthew Ridgway and Secretary of Defence Charles Wilson thought that any psychological effect did not outweigh the alarming consequences that could ensue if the United States committed to defending these islands. Ridgway argued that defending Quemoy was "not substantially related to the defence of Taiwan," whereas Wilson simply saw no worthwhile reason for the U.S. to defend those "doggoned little islands."[37]

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[35] United States Department of State, "NSC Meeting, 12 September 1954," in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, vol. XIV, part 1. China and Japan, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1985), 621-622.

[36] United States Department of State, "Anderson to Eisenhower, 3 September 1954," in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, vol. XIV, part 1. China and Japan, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1985), 556-557.

[37] United States Department of State, "NSC Meeting, 9 September 1954," in *Foreign Relations of*

In Canberra, opinion was unanimous that defending the offshore islands was out of the question. Even before the outbreak of hostilities, Casey drew a line between the defense of Taiwan and the offshore islands. On August 25, he told Spender, now Australian Ambassador in Washington, that there was a "distinction" between the two and he "hoped that the U.S. could see that."[38] Thomas Critchley, Head of Australia's East Asia Section in the Department of External Affairs, echoed Casey's concerns over American policy. According to Critchley, "[The offshore islands] problem was critical … because of the dangers of U.S. involvement."[39] He was particularly concerned that ANZUS obliged Australia to respond if the United States was attacked in the Taiwan Strait. In this event, any Australian failure to respond would be catastrophic for its relationship with the United States, even if Canberra was "left free" of any strict military obligation to defend the offshore islands.[40]

Casey and Critchley's position did not change once the attacks began. In fact, Australian policy closely matched British policy toward the islands. British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden told Dulles on September 17 that Quemoy and the other offshore islands had "no conceivable strategic importance," and hoped to keep "as much water as possible" between the PRC and ROC.[41] To achieve this, Eden argued that Jiang should evacuate Nationalist troops stationed on the offshore

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the United States, 1952-1954, vol. XIV, part 1. China and Japan, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1985), 588; United States Department of State, "National Intelligence Estimate, 10 September 1954," in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, vol. XIV, part 1. China and Japan, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1985), 608-609.

38 Casey to Spender, 25 August 1954, NAA, A1838, 519/3/1 Part 1.

39 Critchley Memorandum, 25 August 1954, NAA, A1838, 519/3/1 Part 1.

40 Critchley Memorandum, 19 October 1954, NAA, A1838, 519/3/1 Part 1; Harper, *A Great and Powerful Friend*, 280.

41 Australian High Commissioner's Office to Canberra, 17 September 1954, NAA, A5954, 1415/3.

islands. There was a strong feeling in Canberra that Australian interests were best served by following the British example. "We agree with the United Kingdom," Attorney-General John Spicer told Casey on September 16, "with the proximity of the offshore islands to the Chinese mainland … fighting [for the islands] would be difficult to justify."[42] Australian reluctance to assist in the defense of the offshore islands was due at least in part to serious concerns about the possibility being drawn into a wider war in Northeast Asia while Communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia presented a more immediate security threat. Even a recent commitment to collective regional defense through the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in September 1954 did little to assuage Australian concerns. In short, tensions in the Taiwan Strait at the time came as an unwelcome distraction to Australia's preoccupation on Southeast Asian security.

Meanwhile, the United States took considerable initiative to resolve the crisis. Initial plans centered on an American and British sponsored United Nations resolution named Operation "Oracle," which called for a return to the status quo in the Taiwan Straits. As part of this project, New Zealand became responsible for proposing the resolution to the United Nations. Dulles and Eden, the architects of Oracle, hoped that the resolution might lead to a "coming together" of Anglo-American disagreement in the Far East while simultaneously presenting a difficult situation for the Soviet Union over whether or not to veto the resolution.[43] Anglo-American differences, however, began to surface over the scope of the project. While Britain hoped that Oracle might become a means to settle wider differences with China, the United States

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[42] Spicer to Casey, 16 September 1954, NAA, A5954, 1415/3.

[43] "NSC Meeting, 12 September 1954," 619-620. For an excellent examination into New Zealand's role in the Oracle project, see Scott Kaufman, "Operation Oracle: The United States, Great Britain, New Zealand, and the Offshore Islands Crisis of 1954-55," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 32, no. 3 (September 2004): 106-124.

explicitly wanted the cease-fire resolution contained only to the present fighting over the offshore islands. As Radford argued on October 29, "discussions in the UN … has as its ultimate aim the creation of a situation which will lay the groundwork for UN acceptance or U.S. or allied assistance to the Nationalist Chinese in holding the offshore islands."[44]

Casey had his own concerns over pursuing Oracle. For such a deft and experienced diplomat like Dulles, Casey did not understand why his American counterpart could not see that potentially serious issues could occur if a UN resolution was pursued. For one, Casey thought the prospects of a successful UN submission would be "so remote as to throw in doubt value of [the] exercise." Even in the unlikely event that a resolution was passed, it was neither clear how the full co-operation of the Nationalists in neutralizing the islands could be obtained, nor how it would be implemented. So far as Casey and the Australian Government were concerned, there was also a disconcerting possibility that a Soviet veto could "stimulate pressure" in the United States to defend the offshore islands.[45]

By late 1954, the United States was moving ahead with one of its other plans: a binding commitment to defend Formosa and the nearby Pescadores. A mutual defense treaty between the United States and Taiwan was eventually concluded on December 2 and later ratified by the U.S. Congress, guaranteeing that the U.S. would defend Formosa and its "closely related territories" even with the use of nuclear weapons. It also required Jiang to consult with the United States before launching any

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[44] United States Department of State, "Radford Memorandum, 29 October 1954," in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, vol. XIV, part 1. China and Japan, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1985), 818. See also Rosemary Foot, "Search for a Modus Vivendi: Anglo-American Relations and China Policy," in *The Great Powers in East Asia: 1953-1960*, ed. Warren I. Cohen and Akira Iriye (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 150-153.

[45] Casey to Spender, 5 November 1954, NAA, A5954, 1415/3.

attack on the Chinese mainland, thereby preventing the Nationalists from dragging the United States into an unwanted war. As Dulles had hoped, the wording over the commitment to defend the offshore islands was left unclear. He had proposed "fuzzing up" the wording of the treaty in an NSC meeting one month earlier, arguing that doing so would "maintain doubt in the minds of the Communists as to how the United States would react to an attack on the offshore islands."[46]

Once Eisenhower announced publicly his intention to defend Taiwan—and, if he thought it necessary, its "closely related territories"—Casey grew concerned that a war over the offshore islands may eventuate. For the mindful Australian External Affairs Minister, it was just as dangerous as a possible UN resolution. "We are considerably concerned," Casey told Spender, "it seems equally foolish and dangerous to contemplate [war] in the defence of islands whose security value is, to say the least, doubtful." In summation, he "[did] not regard these islands as worth the risk of war."[47]

Casey, a long-time advocate of a more realistic approach to China, explored alternatively the possibility of recognizing the PRC in an effort to reduce tensions. He wrote to Menzies on December 10 suggesting that on balance, the "majority of the Australian press seemed to be in favour *for* recognition" of the PRC. He also stressed that even though free world nations should not condone Communist aggression, current relations with Beijing were not on a satisfactory basis.[48] When drafting an announcement on the current situation in East Asia, Casey also reasoned that "the conduct of international affairs is made more difficult so long as

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[46] United States Department of State, "NSC Meeting, 2 November 1954," in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, vol. XIV, part 1. China and Japan, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1985), 828-829.

[47] Casey to Spender, 21 January 1955, NAA. A5954, 1415/3.

[48] Stuart Doran and David Lee, eds., "Letter from Casey to Menzies, 10 December 1954," in *Documents on Australian Foreign Policy: Australia and Recognition of the People's Republic of China, 1949-1972* (Canberra: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2002), 87.

the PRC is not recognised and so it would be logical to change this situation."[49] Although Casey concluded that the offshore island crisis should be settled first and then consider "recognition later," he clearly thought that recognizing the PRC might in some way reduce tensions or prevent future Chinese aggression. Casey's statement was never publicized, but his comments suggest that he was entirely willing to consider PRC recognition as tensions escalated in the Taiwan Straits.

There was strong support in Australia for Casey's suggestion. From both the public and the federal opposition, Casey was encouraged to pursue recognition in exchange for a cease-fire in the Strait. For example, an article written by the journalist John Bennetts published in *The Sunday Times* in early 1955 suggested that Australia, the United States and Nationalist China should abandon any interest in the offshore islands as a quid pro quo for recognition of the PRC. For "assurances and demonstrations of goodwill and peaceful intentions" in the Taiwan Straits, Bennetts wrote in late January that Communist China should be "offered eventual membership of the United Nations and general recognition as the lawful Government of mainland China in return."[50] Reports also emerged that Labor backbencher Allan Fraser accused Casey of not "seeking to exploit every opportunity for negotiation with Red China" while the offshore island crisis remained unresolved. Fraser told the press that Casey should be "prompting the recognition of the Chinese mainland Government as a means to pave the way for a long-term settlement."[51]

In Beijing, Mao's response to the recent U.S.-ROC defense treaty

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[49] Stuart Doran and David Lee, eds., "Letter from Casey to Menzies, 28 December 1954," in *Documents on Australian Foreign Policy: Australia and Recognition of the People's Republic of China, 1949-1972* (Canberra: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2002), 91.

[50] John Bennetts, "Australia Moves Fast to End Red China Crisis," *The Sunday Times*, January 30, 1955.

[51] "Casey Accused of Playing-up Hostility and Hatred," *The Canberra Times*, March 31, 1995.

was particularly aggressive. On January 10, 1955, he ordered an attack on the Tachen Islands. Eight days later, PRC forces also attacked and captured nearby Ichiang Island. The Tachens themselves were approximately 320 kilometres north of Taiwan, far outside the original area the U.S. considered strategically important for defending Taiwan. Nonetheless, Eisenhower and Radford thought these attacks indicated the PRC's "clear intent" to capture all offshore islands, with the ultimate purpose of taking Taiwan and the Pescadores.[52] To combat this, the U.S. convinced a reluctant Jiang to evacuate the Tachens in exchange for a private commitment to defend Quemoy and Matsu in the event of a full scale attack. This drastic change in American policy confirmed that Dulles's original plans had "backfired" and demonstrated further, according to Wilson, that U.S. "diplomatic efforts … had failed."[53]

In Canberra, escalating tensions forced Casey to outline Australian policy publicly. In an address nearly a month after the Tachens were first shelled, Casey stated the Australian Government's desire for "disengagement" from the offshore islands, as these were clearly part of Chinese territory. This position sat uneasily with his U.S. counterparts, who had determined so recently to hold Quemoy and Matsu. Although Casey recognized in his statement that the situation was "in the hands of President Eisenhower more than anyone else," his timing and policy position affirmed Australian discontent over defending the islands.[54]

For nearly six months, Australian offshore island policy had been

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[52] United States Department of State, "State Department Meeting, 19 January 1955," in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957*, vol. II. China, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1986), 50.

[53] United States Department of State, "NSC Meeting, 20 January 1955," in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957*, vol. II. China, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1986), 71; United States Department of State, "Wilson to JCS, 22 March 1955," in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957*, vol. II. China, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1986), 285.

[54] "Press Statement, 7 February 1955," *Current Notes on International Affairs* 26, no. 2 (1955): 128.

consistent and well established. It was, rather, the recent change in American policy that was causing concern in Canberra. Fearing that the Americans might drag it into an unnecessary war, Australia looked to consult further with Britain and other Commonwealth nations during the Prime Minister's Conference in London from January 31 to February 8, 1955. During the Conference, Eden agreed firmly with Casey's recent statement that encouraging Jiang to disengage from the offshore islands was the best course of action. A disengagement policy reflected what he told Dulles previously about the offshore islands holding "no conceivable strategic importance." Feeling that this summarized neatly the "consensus of opinion" from the conference, Eden asked Menzies to write to Dulles and outline the position reached at the Prime Minister's Conference. It held three key points:

i. Further resolutions and debate in the Security Council at present would do harm;
ii. Discussions should continue between Washington and the British Commonwealth countries regarding ways to keep the offshore islands out of armed conflict;
iii. Australia and Britain were very much opposed to the risk of war over the offshore islands, yet recognized the difficult situation President Eisenhower was in and commended him for his coolness and judgment.[55]

Menzies's letter provided the State Department with a clear warning that Britain and Australia were moving away from supporting a UN solution to

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[55] United States Department of State, "Eisenhower to Churchill, 10 February 1955," in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957*, vol. II. China, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1986), 259; United States Department of State, "Aldrich to the Department of State, 4 February 1955," in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957*, vol. II. China, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1986), 212-213.

the crisis. In response, Eisenhower wrote to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and noted that while he appreciated British efforts to avoid a rift in Anglo-American relations, he argued that the British did not understand fully the Communist's "constant pressing on the Asian frontier."[56] Churchill, however, remained steadfast on his government's position on China and later informed Washington that Whitehall no longer supported Oracle.[57] Without London's support, the United States could not realistically hope to find a solution to the crisis via the United Nations.

Following the Prime Ministers Conference, Dulles met with Spender on February 11 to discuss the Australian and Commonwealth position on Taiwan and the offshore islands. Spender opened the meeting by first relaying the consensus of opinion reached in London. In outlining the Australian position, he stressed that

> It is causing us deep concern … we cannot see that [the offshore islands] are either vital, or even important, to Taiwan-Pescadores defence. It is, therefore, hard for us to see why they are made a policy issue. Our view is that the correct aim is disengagement from the islands … these views are not dissimilar to those already expressed by Canada, the United Kingdom and New Zealand.[58]

Dulles was not surprised by the Australian position. It was, as he pointed out, similar to the views reached in the NSC meeting in mid-September 1954. Nevertheless, he told Spender that the U.S. now considered that withdrawing from the offshore islands would have a substantial

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[56] Eisenhower to Churchill, 10 February 1955, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Box 9, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library.

[57] United States Department of State, "Dulles to British Embassy, 26 March 1955," in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957*, vol. II. China, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1986), 404.

[58] Spender to Canberra, 12 February 1955, NAA, A1838, TS519/3/1 Part 3.

psychological effect on Taiwan and nearby areas. Dulles also shared with Spender that the JCS thought the islands held strategic importance because (1) it blocked two natural harbors and, (2) its proximity to the Chinese mainland made it a useful staging area for potential counterattacks. In short, Dulles stressed that the United States had been "reluctantly compelled" to move from its original position (which generally coincided with current Australian policy) to its present position.[59]

Neither Spender nor Dulles wanted war in the Taiwan Strait. They both agreed on the strategic necessity of keeping Taiwan and the Pescadores out of Communist hands, but disagreed on the way that it should be done. For Dulles, it was important to highlight that although the U.S. had determined Quemoy and Matsu be defended, there was considerable flexibility in any decision to do so. In his view, the decision "was entirely ours."[60] Spender—and, for that matter, almost all other Commonwealth nations—seemed unconvinced by this reasoning. American Ambassador to the United Kingdom Winthrop Aldrich had recently informed Washington that Australia and Britain were deeply concerned that they might be dragged into an unnecessary war with China. He told the State Department that a recent Walter Lippman article called "Toward a Cease-fire"—based on the agreements reached at the Prime Ministers Conference—argued that "sound American policy would be to do what is being done in the Tachens to Quemoy and Matsu." In other words, Australia and Britain believed the ROC and the U.S. should evacuate all offshore islands. This, according to Aldrich, summarized the Commonwealth position to an "extraordinarily exact degree."[61]

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[59] Ibid.

[60] Ibid.

[61] United States Department of State, "Aldrich to the Department of State, 11 February 1955," in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957*, vol. II. China, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1986), 265.

Consistent with the summary Aldrich gave to the State Department, Eden rejected flatly Dulles's view that evacuating the offshore islands would seriously affect Nationalist morale. Even if it did, he told Dulles on February 26 that "further deterioration in morale is preferable to breaking up the alliance." Eden's words presumably meant that if push came to shove in the Taiwan Strait, London would not support Washington on the offshore island issue.[62] Fearing further rifts between Washington and its allies, Dulles took the opportunity to remind Casey and his New Zealand counterpart Tom McDonald at a SEATO meeting in Bangkok on that "if fighting broke out in the future over Taiwan, Australia and New Zealand would be concerned as partners of ANZUS."[63] It was a disconcerting situation for Australia to be in. If Canberra supported Washington, it risked isolating itself from Britain and the Commonwealth. If Canberra supported London, it would both marginalize its relationship with Washington and question the usefulness of ANZUS.

Prompted by these Australian-American-British divisions, Menzies visited the United States to discuss possibilities for bringing the crisis to an end. Upon meeting with Dulles in Washington, Menzies asked him to explain the difference between the U.S. position and that of Casey and Eden's. According to Dulles, there were two elements informing these differences: a misunderstanding of the U.S. approach and questions of judgment as to the best way to achieve the same objective. Dulles stressed that the British House of Commons did not understand that psychological and political factors were just as important as military considerations and that these factors were shaping the U.S. position. He also suggested that there could be no categorical assertion whether the

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62 Barclay, *Friends in High Places*, 77.

63 Casey, *Australian Foreign Minister*, 206-207.

U.S. would or would not defend the islands.[64]

Menzies sympathized with Dulles's difficult position, yet American ambiguity sat uneasily against Australian policy. There was little doubt in Canberra that efforts should be made to ensure Taiwan did not fall into PRC hands, but the offshore islands presented an entirely different question. Concerned by recent developments, he asked Dulles about the possibility of a ROC withdrawal from the offshore islands in exchange for a group of nations guaranteeing the defense of Taiwan (Australia, Britain, New Zealand, and any other Commonwealth nation willing to commit to this scheme).[65] Dulles quite liked this idea. He thought the suggestion had "merit" and would "give further thought" to the proposition. He even told Menzies that he had proposed a similar idea to Eden, but received no response.[66] The unfortunate reality—at least as far as Dulles and the Americans were concerned—was that Jiang was unlikely to agree to such a plan. The Generalissimo had already secured a guarantee from the United States, and any offshore island evacuation would work against his plans to recover the Chinese mainland. Drawing on new historical evidence, a 2013 article by Hsiao-Ting Lin confirmed that Jiang's primary goal was not a U.S. security guarantee, but the "means by which to rearm his forces so as to strengthen his position to launch a military recovery of the mainland."[67]

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[64] United States Department of State, "State Department Meeting, 14 March 1955," in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957*, vol. II. China, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1986), 368.

[65] Stuart Doran and David Lee, eds., "Menzies, Cablegram to Canberra, 17 March 1955," in *Documents on Australian Foreign Policy: Australia and Recognition of the People's Republic of China, 1949-1972* (Canberra: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2002), 99.

[66] "State Department Meeting, 14 March 1955," 370-371.

[67] Hsiao-Ting Lin, "The U.S.-Taiwan Military Diplomacy Revisited: Chiang Kai-Shek, Baituan, and the 1954 Mutual Defense Pact," *Diplomatic History* 37, no. 5 (November 2013): 972. Chiang's persistence notwithstanding, the British Foreign Office also made it clear that it did not favor Menzies's proposal. London cabled Canberra in mid-April, stating that the proposal's "disadvantages outweighed its advantages." This reply, according to Tange, was particularly "depressing." See UK Views on Guarantee for Formosa, 13 April 1955, NAA, A816, 19/306/244.

Fortunately for Australia and the United States, tensions eased on April 23, 1955 when PRC Premier Zhou Enlai announced that China did not want war with America and that Beijing was willing to enter into negotiations. Albeit sceptical of Chinese intentions, the Americans agreed and entered into ambassadorial talks in Geneva, thereby ending the 1954-55 Quemoy-Matsu Crisis. Knowing the weight of domestic and international opinion against any American action in the defense of the offshore islands, none were more relieved than President Eisenhower that the crisis did not escalate to war with China. As he told Dulles just two weeks before Zhou's address, "there is much opposition to becoming involved militarily in the defence of the offshore islands." He was surely glad that he never had to decide between intervention and abandonment in the Taiwan Strait; or, in Eisenhower's own words, the "inevitable moment of decision between two unacceptable choices."[68]

Alongside American trepidations, Menzies was uncertain whether Zhou's offer to negotiate was genuine or not. Either way, he recognized that future hostilities with the PRC were still likely. Just like when Casey considered recognition might prevent recurring PRC aggression, Menzies thought future tensions in the Taiwan Strait could be settled if the PRC was part of an international discussion toward recognition. He took this idea one step further, proposing to the State Department that the PRC attend a Four Power Conference to address current Sino-American differences. Menzies's proposal was based on three facts:

i. The danger of fighting over the offshore islands and the possibility that this could develop into a major war;
ii. The difficulty of doing anything about the offshore islands while an atmosphere existed of Communist threats to attack the

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[68] Eisenhower to Dulles, 5 April 1955, Ann Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, Box 5, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library.

offshore islands and Taiwan;

iii. The necessity to take action to avoid a conflict in a way which would not seriously affect anti-Communist morale in Taiwan and Southeast Asia.[69]

Menzies undoubtedly created the proposal with offshore island differences in mind, but he was also thinking more broadly about PRC recognition. Washington, however, was not convinced that Menzies's proposal addressed its own interests. Dulles first told Spender on May 3 that the idea was "unfavorable" and the American public would be very much opposed.[70] U.S. Ambassador to Australia Amos Peaslee was even more vocal about his dislike for the plan, stating that he was "astonished" and "disturbed." According to Peaslee, the Australian Government was "180º off course" with this idea.[71]

While U.S. diplomats responded coldly to Menzies's proposal, many within the Australian Department of External Affairs expressed continuing doubts over American policies and attitudes toward mainland China and Taiwan. Casey, for one, told the Assistant Secretary at the Australian Department of External Affairs James Plimsoll on April 13 that "we're not as convinced as the Americans are of Jiang and his forces." He suggested further that American policy was based on a "lie" and that they were "prisoners of their past attitudes." "For Jiang and his Taiwan forces," Casey stated bluntly, "common-sense prompts one to believe that they must be a factor of declining importance in the scheme

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[69] Record of Conversation between Tange, Critchley and Peterson, 5 May 1955, NAA, A1209, 1957/5035.

[70] Stuart Doran and David Lee, eds., "Cablegram to Canberra, 3 May 1955," in *Documents on Australian Foreign Policy: Australia and Recognition of the People's Republic of China, 1949-1972* (Canberra: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2002), 103.

[71] Record of Conversation between Tange, Critchley and Peterson, 5 May 1955, NAA, A1209, 1957/5035.

of things … as time goes on, Taiwan will decline."[72]

Convinced that the External Affairs Department should reconsider its China policy, Casey commissioned a major study for the Cabinet in June 1955 titled "The Situation in East Asia: Taiwan and Recognition of China." Although the report concluded that Australia was not yet ready to recognize the PRC, it did state that the prospects of finding long term peace in the Far East through potential recognition were now greater than they had ever been. This was due at least in part to Beijing's recent softer diplomacy, which suggested a "genuine [Chinese] desire for a policy of live and let live." In other words, Casey thought that even after the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis, Mao's Government was beginning to act more responsibly and Western powers should award recognition together accordingly in the nearby future. So far as recognition and representation in the United Nations was concerned, the report concluded that the issue was "perhaps now one of timing rather than of principle."[73]

Conclusion

While there were obvious similarities in principle, early Australian attitudes and policies toward China were not secondary to U.S. objectives. Official Australian policy did take a similar position to Truman and Eisenhower's hard-line approach to mainland China, yet many Australian diplomats thought seriously about the possibility of moderating this position by recognizing the PRC in order to reduce tensions in Northeast Asia during the early 1950s. Australia also pursued trade relations with the PRC, chose not to open a diplomatic base in Taipei, and argued consistently that the Nationalist-held offshore islands were not worth defending in order to help prevent the escalation of a wider war with

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[72] Casey to Plimsoll, 13 April 1955, NAA, A1838, TS519/3/1/ Part 4; Casey to Plimsoll, 12 April 1955, NAA, A1838, TS519/3/1/ Part 4.

[73] The Situation in East Asia: Formosa and Recognition of China, 29 June 1955, NAA, A4906, 404.

China. Although political flexibility vis-à-vis China was at times restricted by the U.S. position, these unique, complex and independent Australian views and actions relating to China suggests that the early Australian-American relationship was far more intricate and two-sided than much of the existing literature suggests.

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Burying the Dead in East Asia

Jennifer Lind
Dartmouth College

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Burying the Dead in East Asia

Countries seeking to reconcile—for strategic, economic, or other reasons—have created compatible historical narratives as part of the reconciliatory process. This involves demonstrating respect and empathy for one another's suffering. Whereas compatible narratives among Germany and its neighbors reflect their efforts at reconciliation, history problems between Japan and South Korea reflect their continued strategic distance. This article describes the harmonization of the French and German narratives of World War II, and outlines the strongly divergent narratives of Japan and South Korea. If someday Seoul and Tokyo decide that reconciliation is strategically important, they will need to change the way they remember the war—they will need to mourn each other's dead. The article concludes by offering elements of a shared narrative that Japan and South Korea might craft in order to support political reconciliation.

Keywords: Japan, South Korea, reconciliation, memory, apology, history, alliance, cooperation

Burying the Dead in East Asia

Jennifer Lind
Dartmouth College

After the U.S. Civil War, the bodies of soldiers, from North and South, lay scattered across the American countryside. As the United States began its process of reconstruction after the war, to remedy this desecration, Washington worked to collect, identify, and bury its war dead in the nation's first national cemeteries. That is, the Northern war dead. Confederate soldiers were deemed traitors, terrorists, so their bodies were left to rot. As Drew Gilpin Faust has powerfully chronicled, this policy had powerful and lasting ideational and institutional effects that divided the country, fueled powerful resentment, and can still be felt today.[1]

After World War II, the countries of East Asia similarly mourned only their own war dead. Japan focused on the "Pacific War," remembering its victimization in the atomic bombings rather than the invasions and atrocities its army carried out on the continent.[2] The

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1 Drew Gilpin Faust, *This Republic of Suffering: Death and the American Civil War* (New York: Knopf, 2008).

2 James J. Orr, *The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001); John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999).

Republic of Korea (ROK) remembered hardship and suffering during the years of Japanese occupation, including Japan's program of cultural annihilation, forced labor, and the women rounded up by the Japanese to serve as wartime sex slaves.[3] Just as mourning divided the American North and South after their terrible war, East Asia's divisions are reflected in differing memories of the war years. The region remains rife with resentment, distrust, and suspicion, and frequently experiences enervating diplomatic crises over historical issues.[4] In particular, Japan and the ROK, despite their numerous shared interests and values, have tense relations and are eschewing cooperation.[5]

This article explores the connection between reconciliation and historical narratives. It argues that the process of reconciliation, initiated for strategic or other reasons, requires the creation of compatible historical narratives. As part of this, countries must recognize and show empathy for one another's suffering. Reconciliation between Germany and its contemporary partners is reflected in their shared narratives of the war. By contrast, the ongoing "history problem" between Japan and South Korea reflects their strategic distance. If someday conditions change such that Seoul and Tokyo decide that reconciliation is

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3 On the "comfort women" see Yoshimi Yoshiaki, *Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in the Japanese Military during World War II*, trans. Suzanne O'Brien (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); C. Sarah Soh, *The Comfort Women: Sexual Violence and Postcolonial Memory in Korea and Japan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

4 On the region's "history wars," see Jennifer Lind, *Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008); Alexis Dudden, *Troubled Apologies Among Japan, Korea, and the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008); Thomas U. Berger, *War, Guilt and World Politics after World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Yinan He, *The Search for Reconciliation: Sino-Japanese and German-Polish Relations since World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

5 On history issues impeding Japan-ROK cooperation see "A Lost Deal for South Korea and Japan," *The New York Times*, July 7, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/08/opinion/sunday/a-lost-deal-for-south-korea-and-japan.html?_r=0; Jeffrey W. Hornung, "The Silent Treatment Won't Stop Japan," *The National Interest*, May 22, 2013, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-silent-treatment-wont-stop-japan-8496. Also see Jeffrey W. Hornung, "South Korea's Irresponsible Diplomacy With Japan," *The Diplomat*, September 12, 2012.

strategically important, each side will need to change the way they remember the war. They will need to mourn each other's dead.

Section 2 of the paper builds the theoretical logic of this argument. Section 3 provides empirical support, describing war memory in post-World War II West Germany and France, and showing how their recognition and respect for one another's victims fit into a broader reconciliatory narrative that supported political rapprochement. Section 4 turns to the Japan-ROK relations, describing Japanese and South Korean memory of the war, and showing how both sides neglect to display empathy for the suffering of the other. Japan has demonstrated some through apologies and other gestures, but this has been accompanied by a rival narrative that downplays, denies, or denigrates Korean suffering. South Koreans, for their part, have shown little in the way of acknowledgment or empathy for Japanese wartime suffering. Section 5 concludes.

"Our Blood is the Same Color": Mourning, Threat, and Reconciliation

Far from being primordial or unchanging, national identities and memories are constructed and changeable.[6] Leaders create identities and remember the past in ways that support their political goals. Facing security threats, leaders mobilize their people for war by crafting a hostile narrative toward adversaries.[7] Such narratives emphasize an adversary's

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6 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Revised (New York: Verso, 2006); Hugh Trevor-Roper, "The Invention of Tradition: The Highland Tradition of Scotland," in *The Invention of Tradition*, ed. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 15-41.

7 Barry R. Posen, "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power," *International Security* 18, no. 2 (October 1993): 80-124; Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); Stephen van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," *International Security* 18, no. 4 (April 1994): 5-39.

history of predation, and the suffering the adversary inflicted. They focus on a country's own victims, and demonize the foreign perpetrators who harmed them as imperialists or monsters. Any suffering that the adversary might have endured in the past is ignored. In addition to mobilizing a country to fight foreign adversaries, hostile narratives can serve important domestic political goals: they may divert attention from domestic problems, legitimize a leader's rule, and create support for defense spending (which, in authoritarian countries, is frequently used for domestic repression).[8]

Sometimes, though, reconciliation with a former adversary is desirable. After all, alliances (known as external balancing) are a powerful means for addressing threats in the international system.[9] However, countries pursuing an alliance will find this process complicated if they engage in demonizing or scapegoating one another. Denying or glorifying past violence fuels distrust and threat perception.[10] Cooperation calls for reconciliation—leaders must build domestic support and trust in the other country so that their people will view it as an appropriate ally and partner.

Political scientists have thus argued that countries seeking cooperation and reconciliation must "harmonize" their historical narratives.[11] To improve relations, narratives must be cognitively consonant rather than dissonant. Namely, one country's narrative must be compatible with the other country's pre-held beliefs about themselves, their country, and the world. The narrative must attend to what negotiation and mediation experts call a country's "core concerns" or

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8 Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind, "Pyongyang's Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North Korea," *International Security* 35, no. 1 (July 2010): 44-74.

9 Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979).

10 Lind, *Sorry States*.

11 Charles A. Kupchan, *How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); He, *The Search for Reconciliation*.

"core interests"—its sense of autonomy, appreciation, affiliation, and status.[12] Attending to such concerns will "build rapport and a positive climate for problem-solving negotiation."[13]

Central to a country's identity are the accomplishments of its heroes, and the suffering its people have endured. Recognition and respect for such actors and their experiences is thus a core concern for any group or nation. Ignoring or disrespecting core concerns, including valued national symbols and experiences, is thus counterproductive to reconciliation. As Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton argue, "Trampling on those interests tends to generate strong negative emotions."[14] Failing to acknowledge a country's suffering—or worse, belittling or disrespecting it—will sustain distrust and impede cooperation.

In the Middle East, deeply hostile relations are reflected in an unwillingness to respect other countries' suffering. Israelis are outraged by Tehran's lack of recognition of Jewish suffering in the Holocaust. Prominent Iranian leaders have denied the Holocaust, calling it a myth used to justify the creation of Israel.[15] As one *Jersusalem Post* op-ed argued,

> Tehran's denial of the Holocaust and its statement that it is a 'great deception' ignite Israeli anger. Its statement that Israel was founded upon 'a lie and a mythical claim' touches the innermost cultural nerves of the Israeli habitus, and Ahmadinejad's statement that 'this germ of

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12 Roger Fisher, William Ury, and Bruce Patton, *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In*, 3rd ed. (New York: Penguin, 2011), 32.

13 Ibid.; Jay Rothman, *From Confrontation to Cooperation: Resolving Ethnic and Regional Conflict* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1992), 153; Jodi Halpern and Harvey M. Weinstein, "Rehumanizing the Other: Empathy and Reconciliation," *Human Rights Quarterly* 26, no. 3 (August 2004): 561-583.

14 Fisher, Ury, and Patton, *Getting to Yes*, 32.

15 Thomas Erdbrink, "Reporting Iran's News, But Speaking for One Side," *The New York Times*, September 27, 2013; Alan Cowell, "Iran's Leader Repeats His Denial of the Holocaust," *International Herald Tribune*, September 19, 2009.

corruption will be wiped off' reawakens old horrors.[16]

Efforts at reconciliation in the Middle East are supported by calls for empathy for the other peoples' suffering. One author dispraised fellow Muslims for ignoring the Holocaust. "Only 'our' tragedies matter," lamented Mehdi Hasan: "Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Chechnya roll off our tongues." To reduce threat and promote trust, Hasan argues, "On Holocaust Memorial Day let us stand side by side with our Jewish brethren and together mourn the deaths of six million innocent souls."[17] Furthermore, in civic groups designed to promote reconciliation among Israelis and Palestinians, participants learn about the tragedies experienced by the other side. According to these groups, "it is critical to learn the other side's narrative, because the only hope for ending the bloody struggle is through empathy and reconciliation." Says Ben Kfir, an Israeli participant who lost his daughter in a Palestinian attack: "Our tears taste the same; our blood is the same color."[18]

Reconciliation and Mourning in Post-World War II Europe

At the end of World War II, years of war and occupation left the French bitter and fearful toward their former German conquerors. Nevertheless, strategic conditions encouraged Paris and Bonn to forge a path of reconciliation and partnership in European economic institutions and in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). French and West German recognition of one another's suffering was part of a broader reconciliatory

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16 Gad Yair and Behzad Akbari, "Iran and Israel: Humiliation, fear, post-trauma and reconciliation," *Jersusalem Post*, August 27, 2012.

17 Mehdi Hasan, "I Am Shamed by Muslim Attitudes to the Holocaust," *The Times*, January 27, 2012.

18 Rina Castelnuovo, "Bereaved," *The New York Times*, July 13, 2013.

narrative that supported their rapprochement.[19]

France and West Germany after World War II found themselves in strategic conditions that encouraged cooperation and reconciliation. Europe's conventional military balance overwhelmingly favored the Soviet Union as the Soviet army was occupying the eastern portion of Germany and was poised to invade west. Soviet military dominance meant that NATO's early plans to severely limit West German power were infeasible. The reality was that, without German military forces, NATO could not defend itself against the Soviet threat. Yet, empowering the West German military represented a major change for French and NATO policy. As Marc Trachtenberg writes, "If West Germany was to be a real partner in military terms, she could no longer be treated as an occupied country. Political relations would have to be recast and put much more on a basis of equality and mutual respect."[20]

During the 1950s, the threat of war was constant, with frequent crises over Allied access to Berlin. The American strategy for containing the Soviet Union—given U.S. conventional inferiority—was, in the event of a Soviet invasion, to immediately use nuclear weapons.[21] These war plans created great alarm among NATO's European members, given that the nuclear war would be fought over their territory.[22] Paris and Bonn found the U.S. strategy so alarming, they drew together in search of an alternative. Over the years of 1958 and 1962, culminating in the signing of the Élysée Treaty, the two countries, led by Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer, pursued official rapprochement. Over these years

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19 On the reconciliatory French narrative, see Jennifer Lind, "Getting to No: Narratives and Reconciliation in Japan-ROK Relations" (Paper Prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, August 28-September 1, 2013).

20 Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 102-103.

21 Daryl G. Press, *Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 84.

22 Ibid., 94.

the two countries would transform their memories of the war and would recognize the suffering of the other side.

1. West German Memory and Mourning

In the early years after the war's end, West Germany took responsibility for the war and paid reparations to Israel in 1952.[23] Still, its narrative of the war overwhelmingly emphasized its own victims—the prisoners of war languishing in Soviet prison camps; the ruined, bombed-out cities; the 15 million expelled Germans from Eastern Europe.[24] Then, in the 1960s, the West Germans began to more clearly acknowledge—within their leaders' statements, textbooks, commemoration, and legal trials—the suffering that they had inflicted upon Europe. Bonn began prosecuting perpetrators of World War II human rights abuses. Between 1960 and 1979, the Bundestag held four important debates that resulted in extending (and later repealing altogether) the statute of limitations on crimes of murder, which permitted ongoing prosecutions for wartime violence.[25] The Bundestag also continued to expand reparations paid to victims.

West Germany also began educating its youth about the suffering Germans had inflicted upon their neighbors. Bonn participated in multilateral UNESCO textbook commissions, and textbooks began to reflect greater coverage of German atrocities. Concentration camp sites were memorialized with educational exhibitions.[26] West German

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[23] Description of West German memory drawn from Lind, *Sorry States*, chap. 3.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Jeffrey Herf, *Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 338; Harold Marcuse, *Legacies of Dachau: The Uses and Abuses of a Concentration Camp, 1933-2001* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 214.

[26] Rudy Koshar, *Germany's Transient Pasts: Preservation and National Memory in the Twentieth Century* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 246. On German education, see Lind, *Sorry States*, chap. 3; Marcuse, *Legacies of Dachau*.

historiography shifted away from emphasizing the suffering of Germans, and began to focus more on German crimes—a significant departure from previous scholarship.[27]

Leaders began apologizing for past atrocities and issuing apologies. Willy Brandt famously knelt at Poland's Warsaw Ghetto memorial in 1970, and Helmut Schmidt visited Auschwitz-Birkenau to mourn its victims.[28] In 1985 on the fortieth anniversary of Bergen-Belsen's liberation, Chancellor Helmut Kohl gave a speech in which he enumerated, and exhorted Germans to remember Nazi crimes.[29] West German leaders began to observe May 8 anniversaries of the German defeat as occasions to mourn and apologize for German-inflicted suffering.[30] Notably, Bundestag President Richard von Weizsäcker gave a famous speech in 1985 that detailed the suffering of specific victims of German aggression. "We remember especially the six million Jews who were killed in German concentration camps," von Weizsäcker declared, "We remember all of the peoples who suffered in the war, especially the unspeakably many citizens of the Soviet Union and the Poles who lost their lives." The President went on to enumerate many other victims: Germans; Sinti and Roma; people who lost their lives for political or religious convictions; and people who died in resistance movements.

After unification, Germany continued to remember and mourn the suffering it inflicted on its victims. Leaders offer frequent apologies, and

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[27] Saul Friedlander, "Some German Struggles With Memory," in *Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective*, ed. Geoffrey H. Hartman (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 26-42; Marcuse, *Legacies of Dachau*.

[28] See Herf, *Divided Memory*, 346; Dennis L. Bark and David R. Gress, *A History of West Germany: Democracy and its Discontents, 1963-1988*, 2nd ed., vol. 2 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 446.

[29] Geoffrey H. Hartman, ed., *Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 244.

[30] In addition to von Weizsäcker, May 8 speeches were given by Federal president Gustave Heinmann (1970) and President Walter Scheel (1975). On May 8, see Jeffrey K. Olick, "Genre Memories and Memory Genres: A Dialogical Analysis of May 8, 1945 Commemorations in the Federal Republic of Germany," *American Sociological Review* 64, no. 3 (June 1999): 381-402.

commemoration (notably the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe and numerous other monuments in Berlin) reflects candid admission of atrocities.[31] At the Neue Wache memorial in Berlin, a plaque which reprints von Weizsäcker's speech specifically recognizes those who suffered in World War II (See Figure 1). Teaching contemporary history is prominent in German education. As Yasemin Soysal writes, textbooks provide "extensive and negative coverage of the Nazi history as a time of violence, persecution, death, and destruction."[32]

We remember all nations/peoples who suffered in war.

We remember their citizens, who were persecuted and lost their lives.

We remember all of the innocent people who lost their lives in war and because of the consequences of war at home, in captivity, and during the expulsion.

We remember the millions of murdered Jews.

We remember the murdered Sinti and Romany Gypsies.

We remember all of the people who were killed because of their ancestry, their homosexuality or because of sickness and disability.

We remember all of the murdered whose right to life was denied.

We remember all of the people who had to die because of their religious or political convictions.

We remember everyone who became a victim of tyranny and went innocently to death.

We remember the women and men who sacrificed their lives in the resistance against the tyranny.

We honor everyone who preferred to go to their death than compromise their conscience.

We remember the women and men who were persecuted and murdered because they resisted the totalitarian dictatorship after 1945.

Figure 1. Plaque at the Neue Wache Memorial, Berlin

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[31] James A. Young, "Berlin's Holocaust Memorial," *German Politics and Society* 17, no. 3 (Fall 1999): 54-71.

[32] Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, "Identity and Transnationalization in German School Textbooks," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 30, no. 2 (June 1998): 57.

The French recognized and praised West German's candid and empathetic narrative of the war. Upon unification, the French did worry that German remembrance might become less self-reflective. For example, Daniel Vernet of the newspaper *Le Monde* wrote, "This seems to be the hour in which Germans rediscover themselves as victims."[33] Nevertheless, this was not the case. On the dedication of the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, an article in *La Croix* commented that sixty years after the war's end, Germany showed that "she observes her past squarely and that her democracy rests on the conscience of the Shoah."[34] *Le Monde* praised "the acceptance within Germany of its historic responsibility vis-à-vis the victims of Nazism."[35]

2. French Memory and Mourning

As a victim, not a perpetrator, the French might have been excused for focusing on their own wartime tragedies, and for refusing to remember German suffering. The Germans, after all, were to blame for the invasion and occupation of France, and for the maelstrom they unleashed on Europe. However, as the French and West Germans pursued reconciliation in the late 1950s, the French began to demonstrate respect and empathy for the Germans.

Early on, de Gaulle and Adenauer in 1962 held a joint mass at Reims Cathedral to commemorate suffering in two world wars and to foster a spirit of reconciliation. That year, de Gaulle also made a famous speech to German youth at Ludwigsburg during his visit to Germany. "I

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[33] Daniel Vernet, "Analyse de l'autoflagellation a l'autocompassion," *Le Monde*, January 16, 2003; also Marcel Tambarin, "L'Avenir Du Passé: La Polémique Walser-Bubis," *Allemagne d'aujourd'hui* 149 (September 1999): 32.

[34] Blandine Milcent, "L'Allemagne veut regarder son passé en face et au Coeur de Berlin," *La Croix*, May 10, 2005.

[35] Henri de Bresson and Georges Marion, "Depuis soixante ans, les difficiles étapes qui ont mené à une commémoration commune," *Le Monde*, June 5, 2004.

congratulate you for being young Germans, which means you are the children of a grand people," he said, "Yes! A grand people, who at times committed in the course of their history great errors…but who also enriched the world, who bequeathed it a rich spiritual, scientific, and philosophical heritage." His remarks were said to have "immense emotional impact." "De Gaulle," said one commentator, "taught Germans to recover their national pride."[36] In other words, instead of discussing Germans in a manner that threatened their core values, de Gaulle enhanced Germany's core values (its national esteem and pride).

Later, the French continued to recognize German wartime suffering. In 1984, French President Francois Mitterrand gave a speech in Volgograd (formerly Stalingrad) during a visit to the Soviet Union. "The world has changed," he declared. "Enemy countries" had been called upon to build with the others "Europe and peace." The French president praised Soviet efforts during the war, but did so in a way that showed respect for Germany. Namely, Mitterrand said the Soviet contribution to the Allied war effort was their tying down of "four million fine, brave Germans."[37] He also spoke of the German enemy as victims. "Let us not forget those soldiers who were then on the opposite side," he said, "but with whom, as survivors, we have become reconciled —Germans, Rumanians, Italians, Hungarians—all those who suffered and fell on this soil far from their homes, absurd victims of a suicidal system."[38] Helmut Kohl praised Mitterrand's speech, conveying his "thanks for what you said about German soldiers in Stalingrad." He commented, "Your remarks are inspired by the Europe of today. It is also a matter of Franco-German relations, and that will have a tremendous

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[36] Quotes from Cécile Leconte, "Resurgence De La Question Identitaire en Republique Federale," *Allemagne d'aujourd'hui* 149 (September 1999): 102-103.

[37] Seth Mydans, "Mitterrand, Despite Criticism, Sees Better French-Soviet Ties," *The New York Times*, June 23, 1984.

[38] Seth Mydans, "Mitterrand Visits Stalingrad Sites," *The New York Times*, June 24, 1984.

Figure 2. Ceremony at Verdun Cemetery, 1985

effect."[39] The following year, Mitterrand and Kohl joined hands to commemorate the French and German war dead together at Verdun cemetery. This event—and the famous photo of the pair—formed a key focal point of Franco-German reconciliation after the war (See Figure 2).

On the fiftieth anniversary of the German surrender, May 8, 1995, Mitterrand gave remarkable impromptu remarks in which he emphasized the bravery of German soldiers during the war. "I have not come to underline the defeat," he said, "because I knew how much strength there was in the German people, its qualities, its courage, never mind what uniform it wore or even what motivated the soldiers who were about to die in such great numbers." Mitterrand said, "They were courageous. They were prepared to die. For a bad cause, but what they did had nothing to do with that. They loved their country."[40] Mitterrand's remarks

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[39] Tilo Schabert, *How World Politics Is Made: France and the Reunification of Germany*, ed. Barry Cooper, trans. John Tyler Tuttle (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2009), 37.

[40] See de Bresson and Marion, "Depuis soixante ans, les difficiles étapes qui ont mené à une commémoration commune"; Craig R. Whitney, "Mitterrand Criticized for Words on German War Dead," *The New York Times*, May 12, 1995.

triggered outcry back in France, with many protesting that the only brave Germans were those who had resisted the Nazi regime, rather than those who carried out its violence.[41]

Contemporary French rhetoric has followed Mitterrand's lead in honoring German suffering during World War II. Nicolas Sarkozy said on Armistice Day in 2009 that the two countries were commemorating not one people's victory over another, but an ordeal that was "equally terrible on both sides." He commented, "German orphans wept for their slain fathers in the same way as French orphans. German mothers felt the same pain as French mothers as they stood before the coffins of their fallen sons."[42] The reconciliatory narrative acknowledged and honored both French and German heroism and suffering.

Blood of Different Colors: Japan and South Korea

After the end of World War II, both Japan and South Korea found themselves navigating a new world. Japan was exhausted and destroyed by years of terrible war—its people dead, hungry, or scattered across Asia; its military smashed, and its sovereignty lost to the United States, which was now governing Japan through an occupation authority. Koreans, for their part, were recovering from thirty-five years of annexation and occupation by Japan, and all the violence and trauma that was part of that devastating experience. More devastation—in the Korean War—would soon come.

In stark contrast to the case of the West Germans and the French, the external security environment did not encourage rapprochement between Japan and South Korea after the war. To be sure, Seoul confronted dire strategic conditions, but it solved its security problems

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41 Whitney, "Mitterrand Criticized for Words on German War Dead."

42 Alan Cowell and Steven Erlanger, "France and Germany Use the Remembrance of a War to Promote Reconciliation," *The New York Times*, November 12, 2009.

through alliance with the United States. Alliance with Japan was not an option after 1945 because it had been demilitarized by the United States, and was under military occupation until 1952. For its part, Tokyo was terrified of being dragged into a Korean crisis, and in the early postwar years was repudiating American efforts to create a regional NATO-like alliance that included South Korea.[43] Alliance with the United States was thus the best option for South Korea in its security competition with the North. Thus, strategic conditions in East Asia did not encourage reconciliation between Japan and the ROK.

1. Japan's Memory and Mourning

Japan's memories of the war focused for many years exclusively on Japanese victimhood.[44] The postwar narrative blamed the war on a small military cabal, who had hijacked the country and carried out a misguided policy that had been devastating to Japan. According to this view, the Japanese people were victims of this cabal.[45] This "renegade" view exonerated the many people in Japanese politics and society who had been complicit or in favor of the war such as the Emperor, industrialists, and other elites. It is a view that continues to be a common framing of the war's origin. In the early years after the war, Japan exclusively mourned its own victims of the war. In its reparations policy, Tokyo remunerated only domestic victims. Three million Japanese—who had become refugees or had been ethnically cleansed from the dissolved empire—had arrived destitute in Japan, were politically mobilized, and were

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[43] John Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System* (London: Athlone Press, 1988), 50-51.

[44] This survey of the Japanese narrative has been drawn from Lind, *Sorry States*.

[45] Steven T. Benfell, "Why Can't Japan Apologize? Institutions and War Memory since 1945," *Harvard Asia Quarterly* 6, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 4-11; Dower, *Embracing Defeat*; Orr, *The Victim as Hero*.

demanding state assistance. The Japanese government compensated them, war veterans, and victims of the atomic bombings (*hibakusha*).

By contrast, victims of Japanese atrocities received no reparations. Although Korean victims of forced labor immediately began demanding unpaid wages, Tokyo paid compensation not to the victims, but to the corporations who had brutalized them: thirty-five companies divided an indemnity of fifty-six million yen (about $560 million) for losses sustained during the war.[46] Tokyo denied the existence of forced laborers as the government of Kishi Nobusuke claimed that "voluntary contract labor" had worked in wartime factories. Not only was Korean suffering not acknowledged, some Japanese argued that Koreans had benefited from Japanese occupation and governance. While negotiating normalization with Seoul in the 1950s, Japanese diplomat Kubota Kenichirō responded to Korean reparations demands by arguing, "Japan also had the right to demand compensation from Korea because for 36 years Japan has changed Korea's bare mountains to a flourishing country with flowers and trees."[47]

Japanese commemoration in the early years also mourned only domestic victims of the war. Starting in 1963, Japan held an annual National War Dead Memorial Service on August 15, the day of the surrender. This service had been unofficially conducted since 1958 by the Japan Veterans Friendship League and the Japan War-Bereaved Families Association, who celebrated the day in order to "enshrine the heroic spirits of all those who died for the country in the War of Greater East Asia."[48] Chief Cabinet Secretary Kurogane Yasumi told the press that the

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[46] William Underwood, "Mitsubishi, Historical Revisionism and Japanese Corporate Resistance to Chinese Forced Labor Redress," *Japan Focus*, February 11, 2006, http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=9703.

[47] Lee Won-Deog, "Perception of History and Korea-Japan Relations," in *Korea and Japan: Past, Present and Future*, ed. Young-sun Ha (Seoul: Center for International Studies, Seoul National University, 1997), 83.

[48] Herbert P. Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan* (New York: Harper Collins, 2001), 658.

ceremony showed "the entire nation's sober desire to offer its sincere tribute to the more than 3 million whose sacrifice has given us today's peace and development." At the ceremony, "the emperor read a message of regret, condolence for bereaved families, and appreciation to the dead."[49] Foreign victims are not commemorated on this or any other day.

The Hiroshima Peace Park and its museum built in 1952 commemorate Japanese victimhood in the atomic bombing. An annual ceremony remembers Hiroshima victims every August 6. The defining symbols of the park are the ruins of a domed building, and the statue of a young girl, Sasaki Sadako, who died in 1955 of leukemia caused by radiation. Sadako and her 1,000 origami cranes have become a symbol of the Hiroshima attack and Japanese victimhood known to schoolchildren all over the world. Furthermore, Tokyo's Yasukuni Shrine also commemorates Japan's suffering and loss. The shrine honors Japan's war dead, and has generated controversy because it is a Shinto religious shrine, and because among those honored, there are the 13 men convicted as Class-A war criminals in the Tokyo Trials. Several Japanese leaders have abstained from visiting out of respect to neighbors and domestic critics and many Japanese people favor honoring the nation's fallen at the less controversial, secular Chidorigafuchi cemetery.[50] Neither site highlights the suffering Japan inflicted upon others.

For many years, Japanese textbooks did not acknowledge foreign victims. Discussion of atrocities (and hence of foreign victims) was actively stricken from textbooks as per the orders of the Ministry of Education (MoE) textbook screeners, who evaluated textbooks not only for accuracy, but also for patriotism.[51] Historian and textbook author

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[49] Orr, *The Victim as Hero*, 139, 137.

[50] Jennifer Lind, "Beware the Tomb of the Known Soldier," *Global Asia* 8, no. 1 (Spring 2013): 87-93.

[51] Nishi Toshio, *Unconditional Democracy: Education and Politics in Occupied Japan, 1945-1952* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1982); Ienaga Saburo, "The

Ienaga Saburo was told to delete references to rape by Japanese troops. He was informed by the MoE that "The violation of women is something that has happened on every battlefield in every era of human history. This is not an issue that needs to be taken up with respect to the Japanese Army in particular."[52] Thus, for many years after the war—reflected in leaders' statements, textbooks, commemoration, and reparations policy—Japan mourned only its own victims.

Over time, Japan's memory would expand to include the suffering of the Chinese, Koreans, and others in conquered territories. Japanese leaders began apologizing to other countries in the 1960s. Though early statements were rather vague, later ones were more forthcoming about Japanese violence and the suffering it caused. Notably, Nakasone Yasuhiro gave a speech at the United Nations in 1985, regretting "the untold suffering the war inflicted upon peoples around the world and, indeed, upon [Japan's] own people."[53] (The *Los Angeles Times* noted, "Nakasone's apology was unusual in a hall where many other commemorative speakers have used the occasion to attack their country's foes and to defend their own policies.") Later, Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro's 1993 apology delivered in South Korea explicitly detailed the wrongs done to Koreans by the Japanese. He said,

> During Japan's colonial rule over the Korean Peninsula, the Korean people were forced to suffer unbearable pain and sorrow in various ways. They were deprived of the opportunity to learn their mother tongue at school, they were forced to adopt Japanese names, forced to provide sex as 'comfort women' for Japanese troops, forced to

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Glorification of War in Japanese Education," *International Security* 18, no. 3 (December 1993): 113-133; Orr, *The Victim as Hero*.

52 Kim Hyun Sook, "History and Memory: The 'Comfort Women' Controversy," *Positions* 5, no. 1 (1997): 79.

53 "Nakasone, at U.N., Offers Apology for World War II," *Los Angeles Times*, October 23, 1985.

provide labor. I hereby express genuine contrition and offer my deepest apologies for my country, the aggressor's, acts.

Hosokawa was also the first prime minister to invite representatives from other nations to participate in Japan's annual National Memorial Service for the War Dead on August 15, referring to Asian war victims as well as Japanese in his speech.[54] Over the years, in that service, it became routine for Japanese leaders to discuss the suffering of Asians during the war, and to offer Tokyo's remorse and condolences. For example, Abe Shinzō said in 2007, "Our country caused considerable damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly Asian countries. … On behalf of the (Japanese) people, I offer deep remorse and express my heartfelt condolences to those who were killed."[55] An important Japanese apology was Murayama Tomiichi's given in 1995, fifty years after Japan's surrender. The Murayama statement acknowledged that Japan "caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries." Successive governments have referenced the Murayama statement as Tokyo's official policy.

In Japanese education, educators sought to increase awareness of Japan's past atrocities, and their efforts were facilitated by the MoE reforms.[56] In 1982, Tokyo added the conciliatory "Asian Neighbors' Clause" to MoE guidance, requiring textbook screeners to take into consideration the views of Japan's former victims. Other MoE guidance required officials to screen books only for facts rather than patriotic content. Textbook coverage of the war and greater discussion of Japanese atrocities has thus increased. Yet, many books continue to be vague on such topics. One study finds that within commonly used textbooks, there

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[54] *Asahi Shinbun*, November 7, 1993; Wakamiya Yoshibumi, *The Postwar Conservative View of Asia* (Tokyo: LTCB International Library Foundation, 1998), 254.

[55] "Abe shows true colors in war memorial speech," *The Asahi Shimbun*, August 16, 2013.

[56] Ienaga, "The Glorification of War in Japanese Education"; Orr, *The Victim as Hero*, 89-105.

are some discussions of the Nanjing Massacre, forced labor, and the imperial sex slaves. However, "One clear lacuna is the almost complete absence of accounts of Japanese colonial rule in Korea."[57] Additionally, the MoE for many years censured textbook coverage of Japan's Unit 731 atrocity of carrying out gruesome medical experiments on Chinese and Allied civilians and prisoners of war. Although litigation led by Ienaga resulted in this restriction being lifted, Japanese textbooks have yet to discuss this topic.[58]

Japan's leaders also drew some attention to foreign victims through commemoration. Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki in 1991 visited Tapgol Park in Seoul, which remembers Korean independence movement leaders, and bowed before the memorial there.[59] Ten years later, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō visited a former prison in Seoul that the Japanese had used to torture and execute Korean independence activists. He laid a wreath and in his statement said, "When I looked at things put on display [in the museum], I strongly felt…regret for the pains Korean people suffered during Japanese colonial rule. As a politician and a man, I believe we must not forget the pain of [Korean] people."[60] Over time, then, Japan's memory of the war has expanded to include the people who suffered as a result of Japanese occupation, invasions, and atrocities.

Despite Japan's increased attention to past victims, its neighbors remain frequently dismayed about Japanese remembrance because of two features of the Japanese narrative. The first is the reluctance among moderate conservatives to engage in contrition given their preference for

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[57] Daniel Sneider, "Divided Memories: History Textbooks and the Wars in East Asia," *Nippon.com*, May 29, 2012, http://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a00703/.

[58] Sonni Efron, "Japan's High Court Rules Against Rewriting History," *Los Angeles Times*, August 30, 1997.

[59] Paul Shin, "Japanese Prime Minister Says Visit Promotes Better Relations," *Associated Press*, January 10, 1991.

[60] "PM Koizumi Visit ROK President Kim Dae-Jung; Protesters Rage," *Mainichi Shimbun*, October 15, 2001.

a more "patriotic" nationalism. This is a common feature within any democracy. Moderate conservatives in countries all over the world favor narratives that emphasize positive aspects of their country's past, and oppose historical narratives that draw attention to past atrocities.[61] As part of such an effort, in his second stint as Prime Minister, Abe discussed possibly re-examining and replacing the Murayama apology and the Kōno statement with a more "forward looking" statement.[62] At the 2013 war memorial ceremony on August 15, observers noted that Abe withheld the traditional remorse and condolences extended to Asian victims. Abe instead highlighted the suffering and sacrifices of Japanese people. "I will never forget," he said, "that the peace and prosperity we are enjoying now was built based on the sacrifice of your precious lives."[63]

Similarly, conservatives in Japan have objected to South Korea's installation of a statue across from the Japanese embassy in Seoul—the statue of a young Korean "comfort woman" with an empty chair beside her. Tokyo's position is that this statue is illegal, because the 1961 Vienna

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61 On struggles among liberals and conservatives in domestic debates about repentance and history teaching see Mitt Romney, *No Apology: The Case for American Greatness* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2010); Martha C. Nussbaum, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism," in *For Love of Country*, ed. Joshua Cohen (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996), 2-20; Gary B. Nash, Charlotte Crabtree, and Ross E. Dunn, *History on Trial: Culture Wars and the Teaching of the Past* (New York: Vintage Books, 2000); Robert Guyver, "The History Working Group and Beyond: A Case Study in the UK's History Quarrels," in *History Wars and the Classroom: Global Perspectives* (Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing, 2012), 159-186; Thomas Sowell, "Does Patriotism Matter?," *National Review*, July 2, 2008, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/224921/does-patriotism-matter/thomas-sowell.

62 Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Kōno Yōhei on the result of the study on the issue of "comfort women," Ministry of Foreign Affairs (August 4, 1993) at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/women/fund/state9308.html; also "Abe eyes statement that would supersede 1995 government apology," *The Asahi Shimbun*, January 5, 2013.

63 Ayako Mie, "By Omitting Words, Abe Speaks Volumes," *The Japan Times*, August 15, 2013; Ida Torres, "PM Abe Omits Remorse over Japan's WWII Actions in Anniversary Speech," *Japan Daily Press*, August 15, 2013, http://japandailypress.com/pm-abe-omits-remorse-over-japans-wwii-actions-in-anniversary-speech-1533961/.

Convention on Diplomatic Relations stipulates that host countries should not "impair the dignity" of embassies. Chief Cabinet Secretary Fujimura Osamu criticized the construction of the monument as "extremely regrettable," while Japan's ambassador to South Korea, Bessho Kōrō, said that the statue "was not helping solve the problems in Japan-South Korea relations."[64] The conservatives' rejection of this symbol—their perception of the statue as an assault on Japanese dignity—reflects that they view those victims as outside and indeed, inimical to a patriotic Japanese historical narrative. As it is to be argued below, the statue and Tokyo's reaction to it illustrates tremendous distance in Japanese and South Korean mourning.

A second and much more inflammatory feature of Japanese remembrance is a tendency among far-right conservatives not only to demur from a confrontation with past atrocities, but to actively deny them. For example, in the Nakasone cabinet, Education Minister Fujio Masayuki challenged the view that Japan had engaged in aggression in its conquest of Korea. He argued, "Japan's annexation of Korea rested on mutual agreement both in form and in fact. As such, the Korean side also bears some responsibility for it…." Thus, Fujio concluded, "A large portion of the blame should be allocated toward Korea also."[65] Several Japanese conservatives, notably Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintarō, have declared the Nanjing Massacre a "myth" or "fabrication" made up to tarnish Japan's image. Furthermore, the sex slaves of the Imperial army, referred to in Japan as "comfort women," attract particular attention among Japanese conservatives. Some insist, despite historical evidence and survivor testimony to the contrary, that the women were prostitutes

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[64] Gil Yun-hyung, "Japanese Ambassador Says Comfort Woman Statue Is 'Not Helping,'" *The Hankyoreh*, April 18, 2013, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/583456.html.

[65] Published in *Bungei Shunjū*, October 1986, 122-133; also see Lee, "Perception of History and Korea-Japan Relations," 107.

who worked willingly for money. Diet member Okuno Seisuke expressed this view in 1996, concluding that the women thus deserved no special reparations and this view has been echoed by numerous other prominent politicians and opinion leaders.[66] In 2007, Prime Minister Abe Shinzō declared there was no evidence that the women were coerced. This view remains widespread today in Japan, and continues to trigger diplomatic rows when expressed.[67]

In sum, Japan's memory of the war has focused on its own victims: soldiers who perished, atomic bombing victims, and other Japanese stories of suffering. Over the years, Tokyo would increasingly acknowledge the suffering of people in neighboring nations who suffered from Japanese violence. However, Japanese contrition has led to conservative backlash in which some conservatives argue for moving forward from the past, while others actively disrespect or deny victims' suffering.

2. South Korea's Memory and Mourning

South Koreans have mourned only Korean victims of the years of war and occupation, showing no acknowledgement of Japan's wartime suffering and conquest. This has been part of a narrative that emphasizes Japanese brutality and untrustworthiness.[68]

From the early years after the war, Koreans focused on the

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66 Russell Skelton, "Seisuke Okuno: 'Comfort Women "Did It for Money,'" *Sydney Morning Herald*, June 6, 1996.

67 On Abe see Colin Joyce, "Japanese PM Denies Wartime 'Comfort Women' Were Forced," *The Telegraph*, March 3, 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1544471/Japanese-PM-denies-wartime-comfort-women-were-forced.html. On the controversy over Osaka mayor Hashimoto Tōru see "Japan WWII 'Comfort Women' Were 'Necessary'-Hashimoto," *BBC News*, May 13, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-22519384; Jennifer Lind, "The Limits on Nationalism in Japan," *The New York Times*, July 25, 2013.

68 Discussion of the South Korean narrative toward Japan has been drawn from Lind, "Getting to No."

suffering that Japan inflicted upon them. "They invaded our land, slaughtered our patriotic brethren like flies without any feeling and took our youth to battlefields, hard labor, and death," blasted a 1948 *Chosun Ilbo* op-ed.[69] Vitriolic rhetoric by South Korean President Syngman Rhee reflected intense distrust of Japan, as did scholarly writing at the time. Chong-sik Lee reported that Koreans after the war "share[ed] the feeling that the Japanese are not to be trusted," and that they harbored "deep-seated suspicion or fear of Japanese motives."[70] As Victor Cha argues, central to the South Korean identity that developed after the war was "anti-Japanism." Cha notes that the principal holidays of the Republic of Korea (ROK)—Independence Day on March 1 and Liberation Day on August 15—"celebrate Korean patriotism through remembrance of the struggle for independence from Japanese colonial rule."[71]

South Korean history textbooks that discuss the wartime period emphasize Korean suffering. "The majority of the photos are of Korean historical figures who fought for Korea's political independence, leaders of the Korean Liberation Army, or people who suffered because of Japanese colonization policies such as comfort women or student soldiers." Individual Japanese people, except for Governor-General Itō Hirobumi, are "invisible." The suffering of any Japanese people is rarely mentioned and "any positive influences of the Japanese occupation…are not discussed."[72] One study of textbooks in East Asia finds that the

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[69] Quoted in Cheong Sung-hwa, *The Politics of Anti-Japanese Sentiment in Korea: Japanese-South Korean Relations Under American Occupation, 1945-1952* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 6.

[70] Lee Chong-Sik, "Japanese-Korean Relations in Perspective," *Pacific Affairs* 35, no. 4 (December 1962): 321-322.

[71] Victor D. Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 20.

[72] Suh Yonghee and Yurita Makito, "International Debates on History Textbooks: A Comparative Study of Japanese and South Korean History Textbook Accounts of the Second World War," in *Contemporary Public Debates Over History Education*, ed. Eirēnē Nakou and Isabel Barca (Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing, 2010), 162.

"narrative of the wartime period" taught to South Korean young people is nearly entirely focused "on the oppressive experience of Koreans under Japanese colonial rule and on tales of Korean resistance to their overlords." The study argues:

> The larger wartime context for Japan's increasingly desperate and forced mobilization of Koreans for the war effort—namely the quagmire of the war in China and the mounting retaliatory assault of the Americans after 1942—is not provided. South Korean textbooks barely mention the outbreak of war in China in 1937 or the attack on Pearl Harbor, and in the case of the main textbook published by the government there is no mention at all of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.[73]

Korean commemoration similarly focuses on Korean suffering. As noted earlier, citizens' groups installed a statue outside the Japanese embassy that remembers the victims of the wartime sex slave program.[74] A poised young woman in traditional Korean dress sits in a chair with an empty chair beside her. The statue commemorated the 1,000th "Wednesday protest" in front of the Japanese embassy where protests are conducted by supporters who urge Japan's full recognition of the atrocity.

Other landmarks in Seoul glorify Korean violence against Japan. A statue of Admiral Yi Sun-shin (1545-1598) stands along with a reproduction of one of his "Turtle Boats" that was instrumental in the defeat of the mighty Japanese navy in the sixteenth century. Another South Korean hero is Ahn Jung-geun, who assassinated Itō Hirobumi, Japan's first prime minister, in Harbin, China in 1909, and has come to

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[73] Sneider, "Divided Memories: History Textbooks and the Wars in East Asia." Results of the study covered in this article have been published in Shin Gi-Wook and Daniel C. Sneider, eds., *History Textbooks and the Wars in Asia: Divided Memories* (New York: Routledge, 2011).

[74] The women's rights movement in South Korea, and the scandal of sex tourism in the 1980s, led to these characters being included in Korea's wartime narrative only recently. Soh, *The Comfort Women: Sexual Violence and Postcolonial Memory in Korea and Japan*.

symbolize Korea's independence movement.[75] Ahn is commemorated in a memorial hall in Seoul erected in 2009 (the one hundredth anniversary of his death by execution) at the former site of a Japanese Shinto shrine. At a recent soccer game in which the ROK national team was playing their Japanese counterpart, Korean fans unfurled massive banners of Yi and Ahn.[76]

In a gesture reflecting particular hostility, Seoul has used the heroic narrative of Ahn (regarded by Japanese as a terrorist or assassin) as it has reached out to Japan's adversaries. Representatives from both North Korea and South Korea participated in a ceremony at the Ahn Jung-geun memorial hall in Seoul. "Today we carry Ahn in our hearts," said Father Ham Se-ung. "The hearts of 80 million Koreans, North and South, are Ahn's tomb."[77] South Korea has also used Ahn's symbolism as it has deepened its relations with China at a time when Sino-Japanese relations are worsening. In 2013, Chinese and Koreans dedicated a memorial hall at Harbin, China, at the train station where Ahn assassinated Ito.[78]

A prominent part of the South Korean narrative is expression of the view that Tokyo has not acknowledged its violence against Koreans, and that it must do so before it can be a trustworthy partner.[79] In 1964, shortly before normalizing relations, ROK President Park Chung-hee said, "The Japanese people, especially Japanese leaders, should reflect on what they did to us during the past 36 years." Park argued, "Japan's normal reflection on and legal expression of its regret for its past aggression

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75 Nozomu Hayashi and Akira Nakano, "S. Korean President Proposes Memorial of Anti-Japanese Hero in China," *The Asahi Shimbun*, June 20, 2013, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/AJ201306290072.

76 "Korean Fans Raise Banners of Anti-Japan Heroes at East Asian Soccer Final," *The Asahi Shimbun*, July 29, 2013, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201307290096.

77 Gil, "Japanese Ambassador Says Comfort Woman Statue Is 'Not Helping.'"

78 Emily Rauhala, "104 Years Later, a Chinese Train Station Platform Is Still the Site of Anti-Japanese Rancor," *Time*, January 30, 2014, http://time.com/2609/104-years-later-a-chinese-train-station-platform-is-still-the-site-of-anti-japanese-rancor/.

79 Drawn from Lind, *Sorry States*, chap. 2.

should precede any cooperation with Japan on our part."[80] A half-century later, South Koreans continue to make similar statements. At the Korean Independence Day celebrations in 2012, President Lee Myung-bak speculated about a visit to Korea by the Japanese emperor, and demanded that he visit the graves of Korean independence fighters. Lee famously visited the disputed Dokdo/Takeshima islands, saying that his visit there was justified because "Japan does not understand the difference between offenders and victims." That August, Lee demanded a Japanese apology for the wartime sex slaves.[81]

President Park Geun-hye in 2013 called upon Japan to apologize in order for the two countries to have close relations. In particular, she stressed the issue of the wartime sex slaves. "These are women who have spent their blossoming years in hardship and suffering, and spent the rest of their life in ruins…. And none of these cases have been resolved or addressed; the Japanese have not changed any of their positions with regard to this." The South Korean president commented, "If Japan continues to stick to the same historical perceptions and repeat its past comments, then what purpose would a summit serve? Perhaps it would be better not to have one."[82]

In sum, the Japanese and South Korean historical narratives strongly diverge. Both countries remember only their own war dead and wartime suffering and their narratives are offensive to each other. South Koreans are distressed by Japan's omissions and outraged by denials of atrocities. The Japanese object to South Korean remembrance such as the comfort woman statue and the glorification of a man (Ahn Jung-geun)

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80 Quoted in Kwan Bong Kim, *The Korea-Japan Treaty Crisis and the Instability of the Korean Political System* (New York: Praeger, 1971), 45.

81 "Lee Demands Apology over War Sex Slaves," *The Japan Times*, August 16, 2012.

82 "Japanese Must Apologize for Brutalities, Insists Park," *The Standard*, November 4, 2013; Lucy Williamson, "South Korea President Park: 'No Purpose' to Japan Talks," *BBC News*, November 4, 2013.

they consider a terrorist.

Burying the Dead in East Asia: Toward Shared Mourning

As noted, strategic conditions in East Asia have not favored close Japan-ROK relations. This may continue, in which case these divergent narratives and frequent bilateral disputes over history are likely to continue. However, domestic and international political conditions in East Asia may change such that in the future Seoul and Tokyo will seek to improve their relations in service of external balancing. Such a strategic shift could result from increased threat perception of China, or from U.S. termination of its East Asian alliances, or both.[83] The shift would need to be profound enough to change the current cost-benefit analysis of political leaders in both Seoul and Tokyo, who both receive domestic political gain from non-reconciliatory narratives, and would be exposed to political risk if they adopted a more reconciliatory narrative that acknowledged the suffering of the other side.[84]

If Japanese and South Korean leaders decide that closer political cooperation is in their interest, they will need to harmonize their historical narratives. As argued earlier, narratives that attack another actor's identity or "core concerns" generate strong negative emotions,

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[83] As Victor Cha argues, Japanese and South Korean leaders sought to improve their relations at times when the United States was perceived as drawing away from the region. Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism*.

[84] On the domestic political costs of reconciliation, regarding controversy over Willy Brandt's *Kniefal* at the Warsaw Ghetto, see Gerd Knischewski and Ulla Spittler, "Memories of the Second World War and National Identity in Germany," in *War and Memory in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Martin Evans and Kenneth Lunn (Oxford: Berg, 1997), 243. On criticism of Mitterrand for praising German soldiers see Whitney, "Mitterrand Criticized for Words on German War Dead." For a theoretical treatment on the domestic political costs of reconciliation, and the domestic political benefits of more nationalistic narratives, see Lind, "Getting to No"; and Lind, *Sorry States*, 179-198.

and obstruct reconciliation.[85] The current narratives in Japan and the ROK attack the other country's sense of identity and core concerns: Japan outrages Koreans because it frequently remembers the past in ways that do not show empathy for their suffering. Most gallingly, Japanese conservatives have suggested that Koreans were not victimized (e.g., that Koreans desired annexation and/or benefited from it, or that the wartime sex slaves were willing prostitutes who made handsome profits from their work).[86] For its part, South Korea's narrative also threatens core aspects of the Japanese national identity: it ignores Japanese hardship and suffering during and after the war, and casts the men whom the Japanese believe to be heroes as monsters and war criminals.

To harmonize the two countries' historical narratives, the two sides would need to recognize and demonstrate empathy for each other's suffering. South Koreans must acknowledge the pressures and threats facing Japan in the early twentieth century that led Tokyo to perceive a national security threat (doing so would not be an endorsement of the aggressive policy Japan adopted in response). South Koreans would also need to acknowledge Japan's losses—in human life, territory, and autonomy—that the Japanese endured during the years of war and occupation. South Korea's narrative of the wartime era would need to have cognitive consonance with Japan's own identity, and attend to Japan's core concerns. The same is true, of course, in the reverse. A Japanese framing of the conflict (i.e., the "renegade view") is useful for reconciliation, so long as it acknowledges that not only Japanese but Japan's neighbors suffered tremendously from the renegades' policies. To date Japan's narrative has emphasized Japanese victims. South Korean, Chinese, and others who suffered from Japanese violence are not adequately acknowledged or identified with.

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85 Fisher, Ury, and Patton, *Getting to Yes*, 32.

86 Julian Ryall, "Stupid and Nonsensical: Japanese right rages at 'comfort women' honour," *South China Morning Post*, August 28, 2014.

Given current conditions, it seems improbable that Japanese and South Korean leaders might ever together visit Seoul's statue honoring the wartime sex slaves. Still perhaps someday, facing a different strategic environment, a Japanese leader will respectfully drape a scarf around her neck or bow his head before her. And perhaps someday a South Korean leader will visit the Hiroshima memorial and honor the Japanese (as well as the many Koreans) who suffered from the attack. As highly improbable as this seems in today's conditions, it would have seemed equally improbable in 1945 that someday Germans would commemorate the Normandy landing along with the Allies and yet, such shared commemoration has become commonplace.[87] Perhaps someday, Japan and South Korea will be able to bury the dead together as in Western Europe.

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[87] On German participation in the Normandy landing anniversary ceremonies see Lind, "Getting to No," 30-31.

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Book Reviews

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

A Sense of Place: The Political Landscape in Late Medieval Japan

by David Spafford
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2013

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Reiner Hesselink
University of Northern Iowa

One place all of us who study Japan think we know is the city of Tokyo and the Kantō plain. Do we not see it from the air when we land at Narita? Have we not crisscrossed it east-west, north-south as we go about our business visiting the libraries, archives, and research institutes of the area's universities? We are experts on taking trains and subways, busses, and taxis around town. Some of us even know how to drive cars through that concrete madness, that ocean of human settlement, where people calculate ground prices per square foot. It is hard to imagine that this city is barely four centuries old, mind boggling to think that most of the crowding dates only from the last one hundred and fifty years.

The book under review is about this area *before* it became Japan's largest population center. It describes a place we do not recognize, except perhaps on its very edges, the outskirts of today's megalopolis in Kamakura in the west, Chichibu in the north, and Utsunomiya in the east. Everything in between has been irrevocably altered. Landmarks have disappeared, rivers have been rerouted, and the rest has been covered in cement, asphalt, and the steel of train rails. On page 50 of *A Sense of Place: The Political Landscape in Late Medieval Japan*, there is a

somewhat nostalgically tinted photograph of a grassy area in Musashino Park, taken by the author, who comments that it was all he was able to find of the one distinguishing feature the plain was known for during most of its history. The grasses of Musashino have gone the way of the Neanderthal man and the Dodo.

In his choice of place and period, David Spafford has not made things easy for himself. The Kantō plain between 1450 and 1550 was an area that had lost most of its defining framework of the past. With the imperial state long gone and the Muromachi polity only weakly represented, the plain was left without a social center. And, as Hayden White has argued in his essay "The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality," where there is no social center there can be no coherent historical narrative.[1] It is not surprising, therefore, that Spafford has opted to present his history of the Kantō as an anti-narrative account, in which each chapter highlights certain aspects of the area he has distilled from the sources.

The first chapter, "The Grasses of Musashino," deals with how the Kantō was perceived by its contemporaries, the title of the chapter pointedly echoing a literary tradition that dates back to the Nara period. In the second chapter, "Disputes over Land," the author treats the primary concern over the documents of this period remaining today. The third chapter, "Two Was Better than Eighteen?," tracks an example of the process by which successful local warriors were forced to abandon much of their ancestral land rights in order to consolidate their holdings into defensible units. His fourth chapter, "No Longer the Age for Camping," is about the paradox that with a castellan revolution bringing fortresses to the Kantō plain, many warriors simultaneously remained tied to the temporary encampments of their overlords. In his fifth and last chapter,

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1 See Hayden White, *The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 1-25.

"The Pointillist Plain," Spafford analyzes the language of borders, boundaries, and military frontiers and is surprised to find so little of it in the corpus of contemporary writings.

The political fragmentation of the plain, he concludes, made clear delineation of authority itself impossible, and so all borders, boundaries, or frontiers had become fuzzy and hard to make out. Instead of mentioning borders, medieval Japanese used rather the verb *kosu* (to cross over) when they traveled from one point to another on the plain. To a speaker of a European language, one wonders whether the unfamiliar use of the verbs *iku* or *yuku* (go to your territory) and *kuru* (come into my territory) in modern Japanese also derives from this same historical situation of endlessly divided authority during the medieval period.

The importance of this book is that it is the first book-length treatment of the Kantō (in a language other than Japanese) *before* the establishment of the Tokugawa polity. Inevitably, perhaps, it contains traces of its pioneering use of Japanese scholarship, with which the author shows great familiarity. His readers, however, are not likely to be as well versed in the scholarly literature and as familiar with the sources, events, and people that make up the medieval history of the Kantō. This makes *A Sense of Place*, at least for this reader, extremely slow going. Obviously, Appendix A "Springs and Autumns in the Kantō" is meant to help in this respect, but, without this being explicitly stated somewhere in the beginning of the book, that function remains hidden behind its literary allusion to a Chinese classic of annalistic history. One may wonder whether most of the information contained in it could not have been woven into the fabric of the text itself.

This takes us to our last consideration of this wonderfully learned book. Where do we go from here? Who is the next historian to come along and engage with Spafford's work? The sad fact is that this monument of scholarship, unless translated into Japanese, is doomed to remain unread by the vast majority of those it is in dialogue with, i.e. the medievalists of Japan, except the four or five of them who can read

English. This is, of course, true for most scholarship on Japan produced overseas, but particularly so for that on Japanese history. Such work is impossible without the research, publications, and direct help of Japanese scholars. Yet, these same scholars remain in dialogue only with each other and routinely ignore everything that is published in languages other than Japanese. In that respect, Japanese history remains one of the most myopically insular fields of scholarship in the world.

Dividing the Realm in Order to Govern: The Spatial Organization of the Song State

by Ruth Mostern
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2011

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Yongguang Hu
James Madison University

The movement of digital humanities has been gaining momentum in recent decades. Every year scholars organize numerous conferences, workshops, panels, lectures, and seminars worldwide to discuss and demonstrate how to utilize digital tools to facilitate research in history, literature, and philosophy. Not only is historical evidence gathered, converted, examined, and presented in revolutionary ways, hypermedia also helps researchers to produce online visual projects to retell stories of the past. Digital humanities further provide opportunities for scholars from different fields to conduct interdisciplinary research in order to identify new patterns in human society. Some of their findings are often impossible to discover by using traditional methods. Ruth Mostern's *Dividing the Realm in Order to Govern: The Spatial Organization of the Song State* is a fine example of this kind of digital scholarship. By incorporating computational tools such as historical geographic information systems (GIS) and statistical analysis into history study, Mostern offers insightful arguments on the complicated relations among spatial organization, political policies, and socio-economic transformations in Song China (960-1276). It is a pioneering work which

can inspire new areas of studies in the future.

This book is built upon *The Digital Gazetteer of the Song Dynasty*, a relational MySQL database freely available online, established and maintained by Ruth Mostern and her student Elijah Meeks at the University of California, Merced.[1] According to the prologue of the book, it is "a database that records information about all of the provincial circuits, prefectures, counties, and towns that existed at any given time during the Song dynasty, and all of the occasions when they were promoted, demoted, split, merged, renamed, or re-assigned jurisdictions" (9). While reading this book, the reader can access the online data on its website to check the author's conclusions. This is one of the benefits of digital history: since the data are open to the public, anyone can browse, test, and verify the methodologies and results. According to Mostern, this database is based on *An Alphabetical List of Geographical Names in Sung China*, published by Hope Wright in 1958 (263). This alphabetical list itself is based on three sources, namely, the *Songshi* (宋史), *Taiping huanyu ji* (太平寰宇記), and *Yuanfeng jiuyu zhi* (元豐九域志). Mostern expands its contents by collecting information from other sources, such as *Song huiyao jigao* (宋會要輯稿) and several contemporary Chinese reference works (266). The end product is a highly useful digital tool that can facilitate historical research in countless ways.

Through analyzing the database and a variety of textual sources including local gazetteers, chronological histories, government documents, and scholarly works, Mostern proposes her thesis on Song geography and its spatial organization: "long-term shifts in population distribution, medium-term changes in ideas about sovereignty and their geopolitical context, and short-term politics and crisis intervention all intersect to create a political landscape" in the Song period (259).

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[1] Ruth Mostern and Elijah Meeks, *The Digital Gazetteer of the Song Dynasty*, accessed on September 30, 2014, http://songgis.ucmerced.edu/.

Mostern uses two approaches to support this thesis. First, she discusses the definition of "territory" in the minds of Song rulers, politicians, and intellectuals and examines how the government and private writers described territory from political, geographical, economic, and cultural perspectives. Second, she also pays attention to trace the changes of practices in terms of spatial organization in China between the early tenth century and the late thirteenth century and identifies three major time periods in which the Song state either was an active planner or had to respond to external and internal challenges when it initiated new jurisdiction changes. It is in these changes that Mostern demonstrates the unique contributions that her digital database brings to this study as she persuasively questions, revises, and expands existing narratives on Song geography and society.

This book is divided into two parts, each of which corresponds to one of the approaches introduced above. Part I, entitled "The Meaning of the Territory," is comprised of three chapters. It can be viewed as a "long introduction" to Mostern's study and lays out the foundation of the detailed temporal and spatial analysis in later chapters. Chapter 1 briefly introduces the historiography of territorial studies in Chinese history. Mostern mentions that she has been heavily influenced by G. William Skinner, who first suggested a macro-region theory for imperial China in the 1970s; Charles Tilly, a Europeanist who followed Skinner and reminded us of the different agenda that military and civil activities of a regime had in terms of spatial distribution; and Robert Hartwell, the key figure in shaping the Tang-Song transition theory in the West and who influenced a whole generation of scholars from the 1980s to the present. However, instead of accepting all of the above without reservation, Mostern points out possible problems that these theories may have. The historiographical section is highly important and will be addressed later in this review. The author argues that Song statesmen actively used spatial policy to solve problems from within and without. Unlike other dynasties which always introduced intensive spatial changes in their

early decades, the Song witnessed continuous activism throughout its three hundred years (32).

The prominent historian Deng Guangming (鄧廣銘) once proposed "four keys" for Chinese history study: institutional history, historical geography, chronology, and bibliography.[2] Unlike American scholarship, Chinese, Korean, and Japanese scholarship are famous for their institutional focus and detailed examination of related sources. The second chapter in Mostern's book rather follows this legacy and presents a clear analysis of every level of Song local government, starting from circuits, to prefectures, counties, and even towns (鎮 *zhen*), cantons (鄉 *xiang*), and neighborhoods (廂 *xiang*). The author points out that the prefectures were the most important administrative units in the Song. They were political and economic centers, making decisions for taxation and fiscal management. Prefectures in the frontier were also important military commanding units. Counties, on the other hand, were less important as they were only used for extracting revenue from the society. Mostern thus reveals a prefecture/county or military/civil dichotomy in the Song period. She also traces the origin of "town" in history, showing that towns were established as garrisons at the beginning and only gradually became an administrative unit under counties in recent centuries.

Chapter 3 discusses the compilation and writing of map guides, geographies, and local gazetteers in the Song. Mostern argues that most of these activities followed a Persistence and Transformation (沿革 *yan'ge*) tradition, which adopted a historical perspective to introduce all political landscape changes in a certain region from the earliest time to the present. Mostern further states that the chapter on the Tribute of Yu (禹貢 *Yugong*) in the Book of Documents (尚書 *Shangshu*) serves as the

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[2] Zhang Qifan, "Sanshinian lai Zhongguo dalu de Songshi yanjiu (1978-2008)" [Three Decades of Research on China's Song (1978-2008)] in *Songxue Yanjiu Jikan* [Song Studies Quarterly], vol. 2 (Hangzhou: Zhejiang daxue chubanshe, 2010), 529-564.

earliest model of geographical writing and "profoundly influenced Song writers" (66). These two arguments may only reflect part of the picture. The Persistence and Transformation account can be found in nearly every local gazetteer in imperial China, but whether that can be viewed as a tradition in local history writing is questionable. A typical gazetteer includes many other contents, such as maps, overviews of government institutions, customs, scenery, heritage sites, schools and academies, religious sites, lists of degree holders, biographies, and poems, essays, and accounts of travels. There is no need to single out Persistence and Transformation as *the* model. Of course, the central thesis of Mostern's book is how various factors changed the political landscape during the Song period, thus the Persistence and Transformation argument works well for this purpose. In addition, it is beyond doubt that the Tribute of Yu is one of the earliest geographical surveys in Chinese history, but the compilation of map guides and gazetteers was also influenced by the Ritual of Zhou (周禮 *Zhouli*), the Classic of Mountains and Seas (山海經 *Shanhai jing*), *Yuejue shu* (越絕書), *Wu Yue chunqiu* (吳越春秋), and *Huayang guozhi* (華陽國志).[3] The last three titles in the list were early examples of local histories compiled before the sixth century. It is highly possible that other similar works were also available in the Han and Jin periods, however, there are no extant copies today. The Tribute of Yu is but one of the models that later writers followed.

Mostern's major contribution in this chapter is her revision of the Fiefdom narrative in traditional English-language writing. This theory suggests that imperial Chinese thinkers always viewed the world in a model that focused on "centers of power radiating outward from the capital" (73), thus other regions in the empire were often ignored in historical accounts. Mostern demonstrates that Song local gazetteers

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[3] Huang Wei, *Fangzhi Lunji* [Collected Essays on Gazetteers] (Hangzhou: Zhejiang daxue chubanshe, 1983), 1.

actually contain accurate descriptions of the extent of jurisdictions; local scholars depicted their regions with abundant details and recorded the history from their own perspectives. Therefore, the perception of the empire as a hierarchical territorial network, in which only the center was the focus, was not a proper view. Mostern's argument also works well with the Localist model advocated by Robert Hymes.[4]

The second part of the book, titled "The History of Territory," is comprised of three case studies of active territorial changes in China from the early tenth century to the late thirteenth century. They mainly concern with the intensive jurisdiction adjustments in the Five Dynasties and early Northern Song periods (907-1005), the period of reforms (1040-1127), and the early Southern Song (1127-1142).[5] Here we can see the usefulness of the Digital Gazetteer developed by Mostern and Meeks. By using statistical analysis methods, the author identifies the three periods of state activism, and then further investigates them through close reading of traditional textual sources. Chapter 4 surveys the monumental developments in the Tang-Song transition and displays how the rulers of the Five Dynasties and early Song intentionally relied on spatial changes to gradually convert military commissions to civilian governed prefectures in the tenth century. Warned by the shrinking power of Tang emperors and the unstable political and social order after the An Lushan (安祿山) Rebellion in the 750s, these governments carefully adopted a number of tactics to weaken the power of regional military lords and re-established a court-governed civil system. Mostern also provides a detailed discussion on the transformation of each region's political landscape in the empire throughout this time period. Mostern convincingly demonstrates how prefectures and counties were used

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4 Robert Hymes, *Statesmen and Gentlemen: The Elite of Fu-chou, Chiang-Hsi, in Northern and Southern Sung* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

5 Mostern uses different years in her section titles, but what the reviewer lists here points to the real focus of her discussion.

differently to meet different agendas. The principle was “to increase the number of prefectures in regions where troops were likely to be needed” and, at the same time, to abolish counties “where tax and labor extraction was at a maximum and administration consumed too many resources” (164). This argument resonates well with the prefecture/civil dichotomy Mostern proposes in Chapter 2.

Similarly, when Fan Zhongyan (范仲淹, 989-1052) and Wang Anshi (王安石, 1021-1086) came to power in the Qingli (慶曆, 1041-1048 and for Fan’s reforms, 1043-1044) and Xining (熙寧, 1068-1077) periods, these statesmen attempted to correct through spatial organization the financial troubles the empire was facing. In chapter 5, Fan Zhongyan’s efforts were short-lived, but Wang Anshi’s new policies profoundly influenced Song politics, society, culture, and political landscape. Wang Anshi’s commitment to an expansion policy and his alliance with Wang Shao (王韶, 1030-1081) regarding the military actions in northwest China brought the highest number of spatial changes for the concerned period. The author summarizes Wang Anshi’s spatial changes as “reducing units in the core and expanding them on the periphery, empowering circuits, and diminishing the role counties” (209). In other words, Wang Anshi abolished counties and prefectures in the central regions and founded more prefectures along the Song-Xia border. Maintaining jurisdictions was costly at that time, so reducing the number of counties and prefectures could save financial expenses. Many of them were merged into the heartland of China. At the same time, military-centered jurisdictions such as garrisons, forts, and prefectures were established in the northwest. During the reign of Huizong (徽宗, r. 1100-1126), the Cai Jing (蔡京, 1047-1126) government again shifted its attention to the frontiers. Their colonization policy not only helped to extract resources from the local population, but also aimed to incorporate non-Han tribal territory into the Chinese realm.

The last chapter of the book briefly examines spatial innovations after the fall of the Northern Song. In the late 1120s and 1130s, the

Southern Song government moved to Hangzhou (杭州) after losing one third of its territory to the Jurchens. This retreat facilitated a new wave of reorganizing the political landscape in southern China. The most important new element in its policy, according to Mostern, was "conditional abolition," a temporary effort which downgraded prefectures to counties in order to relieve the local fiscal burden created by wars and military presence along the Song-Jin border. These counties could be reinstated as prefectures once the situation was improved. "Conditional abolition" provided certain levels of flexibility for the court as it solved immediate issues of warfare, finance, and relocation. After the Shaoxing (紹興) Treaty in 1142, both the Song and Jin entered a static period of spatial policies. That silence was maintained until the Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century.

Overall, Mostern demonstrates her masterful skill in integrating digital methods with historical research and shows how the Song government and governments of the Five Dynasties actively initiated spatial changes to their political landscape in order to strengthen central authority, consolidate state-building, defend themselves from outside threats, and provide more fiscal resources in times of emergency. She successfully shows a new form of scholarship, which can be modeled in the future by historians in other fields.

It is worth noting that Mostern questions Hartwell's famous theory on local administration in this book. Hartwell once claimed that "the expansion of the densely populated areas of the empire created administrative difficulties leading to a localization of central authority that manifested itself in the evolution of the province and an enhanced independence of the district [county] at the same time that the bureaucratization of the central government was brought to a halt" (24). However, what Mostern demonstrates is more complicated. As a local unit mainly useful for resource extraction, counties did not gain independence in the "Tang-Song transition." On the contrary, counties were regularly abandoned in various parts of the empire whenever the

court sought new ways of cutting expenditure. These stories can be witnessed in every chapter of the second part of this book. Mostern further admits that she follows Luo Yinan (羅禕楠)'s suggestion to study the complex relations between the central and local leadership of the Song (24). Ever since Hartwell introduced Luo's Tang-Song transitional framework, which itself is based on the scholarship of Naitō Konan (内藤湖南, 1866-1934), Chinese scholars have repeatedly questioned Luo's theoretical assumptions and concrete evidence.[6] However, the majority of American Song historians still accept Hartwell's localist model and rarely reevaluate the evidence of that claim. Mostern is one of the few American scholars who has paid attention to Chinese critiques. She realizes that prefectures were associated with military affairs and counties were important in a civil administration context. The number of prefectures continued to rise throughout the Northern Song period, a phenomenon that cannot be explained by Hartwell's theory. Mostern's final conclusion is more persuasive and complicated.

A pioneering work in the field, this book may still have some limitations in its methodologies, contents, and format. The first question involves the quality of the data. In this respect, the author expresses confidence in the appendix: "The conclusions and generalizations that this book has drawn from the data are valid, even if the precise numbers may diverge slightly from historical reality" (268). This argument is likely to be more or less true because state gazetteers and the *History of Song* should provide enough information on the political landscape of different periods of the Song dynasty. Yet, these sources may not be able to show short term changes if a work compiling certain decades does not exist. Some spatial changes could be missing. Furthermore, Mostern may

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[6] For example, Huang Kuanchong, *Songdai de jiazu yu shehui* (Taipei: Dongda tushu gongsi, 2006), 258-270; Tao Jinsheng, *Bei Song shizu: Jiazu, hunyin, shenghuo* (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 2001), 313-319; Shen Dengmiao, "Yetan Mingdai qianqi keju shehui de liudonglu," *Shehui kexue luntan* 9 (2006): 81-93.

want to discuss beforehand the quality of the data that have been used to compare activities of the Song to those of other dynasties. Otherwise, this would not be a valid claim since other data may be biased.

This book is published by Harvard University Asia Center as a Harvard-Yenching Institute monograph. Therefore, for the convenience of its readers, most of whom are specialists in Chinese history, it might have been better to have used footnotes instead of endnotes and provide Chinese texts for all quotations. The maps, figures, and illustrations in this book are highly helpful as they substantially increase the readability of the texts. On the other hand, each map used in the text should be accompanied by a section of legends, so that the reader may easily interpret it and follow the author's narrative. The author does explain the meaning of those big, small, shaded, and hollow dots on each map, but it is still necessary to indicate them whenever a new map is introduced. Of course, these minor issues usually come from decisions made by the publisher rather than the author.

Dividing the Realm in Order to Govern utilizes a comprehensive geographical database to examine the political landscape of the Song period. With a sound thesis, clear structure, and jargon-free writing style, the book is a pleasurable read. It reveals a new way of conducting historical research by using digital tools and computational methods. Not only is the work important to Song historians, but anyone interested in digital humanities may gain precious insights. Historians are encouraged to follow Mostern's model to study other dynasties in late imperial China. The tremendous amount of information in Ming-Qing gazetteers will surely change our understanding of spatial management and policy making in late imperial China.

Books and Boats: Sino-Japanese Relations in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries

by Ōba Osamu and translated by Joshua A. Fogel
Portland, ME: Merwin Asia, 2012

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Yulia Frumer
Johns Hopkins University

Books and Boats is a translation of *Edo jidai no Nitchū hiwa*, written in Japanese by Ōba Osamu, and published originally by Tōhō Shoten in 1980. At the time of its publication, this seminal book sent waves through academic and non-academic worlds alike, shattering commonly held views concerning the supposed Japanese isolation during the Edo period and its subsequent cultural "leap" at the beginning of the Meiji period. By 1980, Ōba Osamu had already spent decades researching the book trade between China and Japan in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and had published numerous academic works on the subject. However, the 1980 version was different. This time Ōba Osamu set for himself the goal of shattering gross historical misconceptions perpetuated by common opinion. Addressing a general audience, he aimed to change the minds of people who held dearly historical myths, as if they were proven facts. In the introduction to the book he writes: "There are many fans of ancient history because of all the novels that have been set back then, but this has nothing to do with scholarship in the sense that there is solid ground on which to work. The more I doubt my own general historical knowledge nurtured on fiction, the sooner nothing will be left. Thus, in my view,

historical scholarship begins at the point when general historical knowledge is first demolished" (4).

Yet, we should not think that by "general historical knowledge" Ōba meant the knowledge held by ignorant masses vis-à-vis enlightened academics. In 1980, the commonly held opinions Ōba sought to demolish were based on multiple axioms still deeply rooted in academic domains of history as well. These axioms dictated that during the Edo period Japan was culturally and economically isolated under the sakoku policy; that the only contact Japanese of the time had with the outside world was with Dutch merchants on the artificial island of Dejima, near Nagasaki; and that Japan was able to undergo a historical miracle, and thanks to this very limited contact with the West, transform itself into a modern, Western-style nation that quickly assumed scientific and industrial leadership, first in Asia and later across the globe. Every one of these historical assumptions denied not only the importance of, but even the very existence of cultural and economic ties between Edo Japan and Qing China.

This exclusion of Sino-Japanese interaction from general historical knowledge is precisely the facet Ōba Osamu sought to dismantle. In the book, he argues that Japanese trade with China through Nagasaki was not only much more extensive than Japanese trade with the Dutch, but also that such trade was immensely significant for cultural development in Edo Japan, serving, among other things as a central vehicle for the subsequent modernization of Japan in the Meiji period. This argument is noteworthy on its own, especially given the time when it was promulgated. No less noteworthy is Ōba's method of proving his point. Rather than digging for explicit statements by Edo scholars concerning the significance of Chinese culture, he looked at the material realities of the Nagasaki trade. Focusing on the leads provided him by numbers, quantities, licensing, and censure procedures, etc., Ōba set out to untangle the knot of entangled international relationships in the Edo period of Japan.

The book is divided into two parts. The first deals specifically with book trade, while the second, entitled "Interpersonal Contacts," focuses on the movement of other culturally and economically significant elements— animals, medicinal plants, and people. The first part starts with an autobiographical chapter in which Ōba states his intention to demolish the general historical narrative, according to which the main cultural influence on Japan during the Edo period was the so-called Dutch studies. Ōba asserts that many historical assumptions about cultural developments in the Edo period have been derived from misconceptions about the Japanese seclusion policy retrospectively dubbed *sakoku*. The term meaning "nation in chains" was coined by Englebert Kaempfer, who visited Japan at the end of the seventeenth century and translated into Japanese only in the beginning of the nineteenth century. It is true the Japanese were not allowed to visit foreign countries under these policies, but, according to Ōba, it was simply that—a prohibition on travel abroad. It neither meant that Edo Japanese were oblivious to foreign cultures, nor that they were passive in their reception of those cultures. In fact, Ōba maintains that following the trade of goods, such as books, reveals a very active Japanese government during the Edo period in shaping the kind of knowledge that arrived in Japan through the Chinese trade.

One of the major claims in the book is that, in spite of the general association of Nagasaki port with the Dutch East India Company (VOC), the Nagasaki trade was mainly based on Asian, and more specifically Chinese, imports. According to Ōba, upon calculating the number of ships, looking at their size and the size of their cargo, exploring the origins of goods on Chinese ships, and counting the number of Chinese individuals who came and lived in Japan (Ōba assembled a list of at least 400 people whom he deemed "the most influential"), the Dutch trade pales in comparison to the vast scale of Japan's trade with China. It was not only the quantity of goods, but also the fact that there were numerous books among the commodities, which makes the Chinese trade crucial to

our understanding of Edo history.

By looking at how the book trade was managed, Ōba makes several important claims. First of all, the book trade makes it clear the Edo Japanese were by no means the passive recipients of foreign cultures they are often portrayed to be. Generally speaking, since the Edo administration only allowed licensed merchants to bring goods into Japan, they could force Chinese merchants to comply with Japanese requests for specific goods. This meant the Japanese could press their demands for specific commodities, as well as specific books, actively managing what was brought into Japan from China.

The management of book trade by the Edo authorities is often portrayed only in restrictive terms, for example in terms of censorship. Indeed, the system that was supposed to prevent the spread of Christian literature in Japan was rather well-established. However, confronting the popular image of the early Edo period book ban as a firm barrier against foreign knowledge, Ōba shows that the censorship failed to prevent the circulation of foreign books. Forbidden fruits were difficult to resist, and lists of banned literature the government circulated to bookshops and libraries often turned into lists of bestsellers, created by none other than government attention itself. Ōba describes the creative ways shopkeepers encoded original titles under different, albeit easily understood names, and thus advertised the sale of what were supposed to be books forbidden from circulation. Numerous references to the officially blacklisted foreign books in Japanese literature testify to the fact that the supposedly iron wall of censorship was rather permeable, and something more like a sieve.

In a sense, the censorship system actually facilitated the spread of contents from banned books. The major question for Japanese censors was whether a newly imported book should be allowed to the public, banned altogether, or, perhaps, allowed only after certain parts were blotted with black ink. However, in order to make such a determination, imported literature had to be read, and carefully at that. Thus, the bureau

established for the purpose of examining books and potentially preventing their circulation actually became a place of learning. Entrusted to the Mukai family of scholars, the bureau's task was not only to watch out for unwanted content, but also to look for literary, professional, and cultural gems.

Active requests for Chinese professional literature, as well as hunts for occasional rare books, shows a continued high regard in Edo Japan for Chinese knowledge, contrary to the popular opinion in Ōba's time, according to which the status of China as a cultural authority sharply diminished in Japan following the fall of the Ming and the rapid development of Edo culture. Dwelling on this last point, Ōba unraveled the history behind the importation and interpretation of the Qing legal code in Japan following competing requests by the powerful lord of the Kaga domain and the eighth shogun Tokugawa Yoshimune.

Books, however, were far from the only agent of knowledge transfer. The second half of the book focuses on non-textual mediators of knowledge. It tells us a story of elephants brought from Siam to Japan, following the request of the Japanese shogun, of enormous quantities of medicinal plants that were not only imported but also exported from Japan, and, most importantly, of humans who traveled to Japan and had an enormous impact on Edo culture.

One of the most astonishing aspects of this book is that the historical truths skillfully presented by Ōba should have been clear all along, given that they were supported by well-known examples. The elephant travel is a famous story, but before Ōba's book, it was not taken to be an indication of ongoing trade on a massive scale involving multiple countries. It is well known that the Obaku sect of Zen was established by a Chinese monk, and that the influential Nanpin school of painting was named after the Chinese artist Shen Nanpin who worked in Japan. Yet those famous cases never provoked speculation as to whether, maybe, there had been others like them. Ōba Osamu showed there were—the books, drugs, animals, and humans coming from China to

Japan were not just anecdotal examples, they were transformative. Reading the book, one cannot escape the feeling that the vast and fertile Sino-Japanese trade, the mere existence of which Ōba needed to prove, was in fact a secret laid open.

The book is not without flaws, nevertheless. One of Ōba's assertions, bold for his time, is that the Sino-Japanese trade in books not only existed, but also played a much more significant role in the subsequent modernization of Japan in the Meiji period than trade with the Dutch. However, Ōba's proof of this claim falls short of his promise. The majority of the materials in the book deal with the late seventeenth century and the first half of the eighteenth century, focusing specifically on the Kyōhō period (1717-1736). Evidence from later periods, on the other hand, is scant and rather anecdotal. A reader unwilling to accept Ōba's claim could simply argue that later periods saw much more cultural import from Holland, and that even if the quantity of commodities brought by Dutch ships was smaller, the intellectual impact of geographical atlases, books of anatomy, scientific instruments, maps, specimens, and so forth was much more transformative. This is not to say that Ōba was entirely wrong in his assertion, but is just to point out that the nature of his sources does not allow a sufficient backing of this claim. A much stronger point could have been made by looking at the importance of the Chinese medical materials in the development of natural history throughout the Edo period, by examining the explicit references to Chinese medical treatises in so-called translations of Western anatomy, or by looking at Edo period astronomical practices that relied heavily on astronomical treatises written by Jesuits active in China or by their students and imported to Japan in the course of the eighteenth century. In the last case, especially, the role of Chinese-language treatises in the work of astronomers from the most West-oriented Edo period is undeniable. Still, it must be noted that, although written in classical Chinese and using Chinese astronomical concepts and terminology, such sources were explaining Western astronomical practices and tools.

It would also be unfair to the reader not to address the question of representations of influences. When reading Ōba's work, one cannot avoid the feeling that it was the Chinese influence alone that shaped the intellectual climate of the period, while the Dutch trade was marginal. Ōba, of course, was writing in the period when even the existence of Sino-Japanese trade, let alone its cultural significance, was firmly ignored, and it is thus quite understandable that his aspiration to repair this historical injustice inspired him to drive the argument all the way in the opposite direction. Therefore, for a modern-day reader, it is important to read the book in light of its times and to recognize its substantive contribution to history, namely charting out the material realities of the trade with China and the importance of Chinese culture during the Edo period, all the while being mindful not to slip into the equally disturbing position that mirrors the imbalance of the "general historical knowledge" Ōba was striving to demolish. The Edo period saw a fertile and changing scholarly culture in Japan that drew inspirations from a variety of material and textual sources, many of which came from abroad. This wonderfully rich and complex intellectual landscape exemplifies how crucial outside sources were, as they provided new tools, images, and inspirations, but the amalgam created by Edo scholars did not discriminate based on the national origins of knowledge alone.

This brings us to one crucial point that has to be kept in mind while reading this book—the differences in intellectual climate and prevalent ideologies between the time of Ōba's work and today. Ōba was writing against narratives that portrayed Japanese modernization as Westernization. He was writing against *Nihonjinron*—theories of Japanese uniqueness. He was also writing against particular forms of nationalism that sought to distinguish Japan from other East Asian countries. Today, there exists the danger of feeding another kind of nationalism, one hailing "Asian" values and aiming to demarcate East Asia from the rest of the world. It is now necessary to stress that identities and cultures are ever evolving and contain global influences,

for better and for worse.

Books and Boats is a book of enormous significance and should be read by any aspiring scholar of early modern Japanese and East Asian history. However, it should be studied in conjunction with other books that not only show the scope of Edo period international interactions—with China and Holland, as well as with Korea, Ryūkyū, Russia, and other countries, but also explore what Japanese scholars and amateurs alike did with the knowledge and pieces of material culture they acquired through this international communication.

Finally, it should be noted that in *Books and Boats* Joshua Fogel has managed a masterful English translation of the original Japanese. Translations always require editorial choices, and the most difficult of them is when to adhere closely to the original text and when to modify it to fit the foreign readers' knowledge. Fogel achieves a great balance between those. On the one hand, Fogel preserves both Ōba's own semi-autobiographic and conversational style, and the official, concise tone of the numerous documents cited in the text. On the other hand, Fogel chooses to makes some major changes to better convey Ōba's message to the contemporary, English-speaking reader. For example, he chooses to translate the title of the book as "Books and Boats" rather than "The Secret Story of Sino-Japanese Relations." The existence of such a relationship is no longer a secret today, yet the crucial importance of materiality for any historical investigation, and especially for those focused on intellectual history, remains of scholarly import today. The sequence of the chapters has also been slightly rearranged, separating the book-related chapters from the ones dealing with non-textual commodities. This step is extremely helpful to the reader in following the argument about book trade. Nevertheless, one wonders whether this division inadvertently creates a hierarchy between books and other commodities, such as between texts and non-textual artifacts, which also played an extremely vital role in the process of knowledge transmission.

In conclusion, the long needed English translation of Ōba Osamu's

Edo jidai no Nitchū hiwa is a captivating read, which weaves personal angles and anecdotes together with an array of invaluable primary sources. It makes an extremely important argument concerning Edo period intellectual history by exploring the material realities surrounding it. This is an undeniably invaluable piece of research for both scholars and educators, and, in conjunction with other sources, should find a place on any syllabus that introduces students to Edo period cultural and economic trends.

Technology of Empire: Telecommunications and Japanese Expansion in Asia, 1883-1945

by Daqing Yang
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2010

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Hyungsub Choi
Seoul National University

In recent years, there has been a surge of historical studies on the operation, ideology, and legacies of the Japanese "empire." Building on the work of the earlier generation of scholars on the topic, these studies tend to focus on the material and technological infrastructures of imperial Japan and their interplay with political development and ideological debates.[1] With *Technology of Empire: Telecommunications and Japanese Expansion in Asia, 1883-1945*, Daqing Yang, associate professor of history and international affairs at George Washington University, is perhaps one of the pioneers of this recent group of young scholars. Based on his 1996 doctoral dissertation from Harvard University, the book focuses on the network of Japan's telegraph and telephone systems that spanned much of Asia during the first half of the twentieth century, comprising Japan, Taiwan, Korea, parts of China, and later Southeast

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1 Aaron Stephen Moore, *Constructing East Asia: Technology, Ideology, and Empire in Japan's Wartime Era, 1931-1945* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013); Takashi Nishiyama, *Engineering War and Peace in Modern Japan, 1868-1964* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014); Hiromi Mizuno, *Science for the Empire: Scientific Nationalism in Modern Japan* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009).

Asia. The book is comprehensive in its coverage, even going back to the pre-Meiji period as a chronological beginning point.

In the author's words, *Technology of Empire* is "a study of Japanese imperialism from the standpoint of telecommunications" (400). It is difficult to imagine a better window through which to examine and analyze the inner workings of an empire than the vast expansion of the telecommunications network. Indeed, the importance of technology—especially communications technology—as a tool of imperialistic expansion is well known and has been heavily discussed by renowned scholars in the past. The classic on this topic is perhaps a series of books written by historian Daniel Headrick.[2] However, Yang seems to build upon Headrick's impressive scholarly corpus and take it a step further. In Yang's story, telecommunications technology is not merely a tool of imperial expansion or a reflection of the empire. Although he does not make it explicit, he seems to view the telecommunications network as *constitutive* of empire-building. From the perspective of Japanese planners at the Ministry of Communications (MOC) and elsewhere, the blueprints for the telecommunications network (334) may well have been the most concrete and explicit form of the imagined imperium in the 1930s and 1940s.

Yang opens his story with the radio speech of Emperor Hirohito on August 15, 1945, in which he announced Japan's unconditional surrender to the Allied Forces. Apart from the fact that this was the first time most ordinary Japanese people actually heard the voice of their emperor, the significance of this event was in exposing the unprecedented scale and scope of the telecommunications network the Japanese empire wielded

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[2] Daniel R. Headrick, *The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics, 1851-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Daniel R. Headrick, *The Tentacles of Progress: Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 1850-1940* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Daniel R. Headrick, *The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981).

by war's end. As Yang notes, the speech was "relayed and broadcast simultaneously in nearly the entire Asia Pacific region," so that most of the Japanese troops and colonists heard the emperor's voice "at precisely the same moment" (2). How did Japan manage to build such a network? To answer this question, Yang goes back to the 1880s, when Japan first emerged as a nascent empire following the successful modernization campaign of the Meiji Restoration, and traces the complex processes through which the island nation gradually expanded outward—first into Taiwan in 1895 after the First Sino-Japanese War, then into the Korean peninsula and further out into the continent.

In explaining the process of network (and simultaneously, empire) building, the book's ten chapters follow a roughly chronological trajectory, beginning with the introduction of telegraph technology to Japan with the arrival of United States Navy Commodore Matthew Perry in 1854. Part I, entitled "Genesis, 1853-1931," serves as a background for understanding the early history of telecommunications technology in Japan. Expansion outside of Japan's main islands began in 1883—the year noted in the book's subtitle—when the burgeoning empire signed an agreement with the Danish firm Great Northern Telegraph Company (GNTC) to lay a submarine cable across the Korean Strait. This task required considerable skill and experience, both of which Japan lacked at the time. Thus, Japan was obliged to grant GNTC a twenty-year monopoly over the nation's overseas cables for the company's services. This must have been perceived by Japanese planners as a shackle on the emerging empire, for when Japan acquired Taiwan as its first "formal" colony in 1895 following the First Sino-Japanese War, one of its first projects was to purchase a cable-laying ship (*Okinawa maru*) from Britain to connect Okinawa and Taiwan with the main islands of Japan. By 1915, Japan owned and operated a sizable network of submarine cables connecting its main islands to Pusan, Taihoku, Dalian, Shanghai, and Fuzhou, which had important implications for warfare, colonial expansion and control, as well as commercial business operations.

Part II ("Technology, 1931-1940") focuses on the interplay between technological and political imaginations of the Japanese empire in the 1930s—the period of rapid expansion of the network. Japan's expansion of its "informal" empire in Manchuria, unlike the "formal" colonies of Taiwan and Korea, brought about new challenges to managing the telecommunications network in the area. The key player was the Manchurian Telegraph and Telephone Company (MTT), which was a unique "semi-private, joint-venture enterprise" (95). Considering the parallel development of railway and telegraph technologies in other parts of the world, it was not surprising that the Southern Manchuria Railway Company, as well as the Kwantung Army, was closely involved in the operation of MTT. The challenge was to maintain Japanese control over the strategically important telecommunications network, while projecting to the outside world the image of a voluntary and friendly relationship with the new Manchurian state. As many scholars have pointed out, Manchuria in the 1930s served as a unique laboratory for untried colonial policies, the experience of which sometimes fed back into the metropole.[3] The organizational experiment of the "national policy company" in the field of telecommunications was no exception to this general observation.

If Japanese bureaucrats tinkered with the appropriate institutional framework to govern its expanding telecommunications network, the engineers did so with electrical technologies that made long-distance communication possible. The early twentieth century was a period of rapid technological change, especially in electrical technologies, not only in Japan but around the world. The Japanese engineering community was by this time a close contender for world leadership, based on the

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[3] See, for example, Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998); Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).

successful Western-style modernization campaign since the late nineteenth century. After World War I, however, the Japanese engineers realized the importance of science and technology "independent" from those of the West.[4] The rise of such nationalistic sentiment in various fields of technology among Japanese engineers served as an important background for the story of the "non-loaded cable" (NLC) that Yang discusses in great detail in Chapter 4. The NLC was a solution not only to the economic problem of increasing "demand on [Japan's] limited foreign reserves" (125), but also to the political and ideological need to display the superiority of Japanese technology over its Western counterparts. Furthermore, spreading NLC technology throughout Japan's sphere of influence in Asia served as an integral component in legitimizing the informal empire by displaying the superiority of "Japanese" technology. In short, the notion of the "Co-Prosperity Sphere" found material embodiment in the telecommunications technology NLC.

As the Japanese empire further expanded into China after 1937 and to Southeast Asia after 1940, governing the complex telecommunications network emerged as a central issue—which is the main topic of Part III ("Control, 1936-1945"). In order to be effective, the technological imperative of telecommunications required some level of standardization and centralized control by the MOC. As the MOC bureaucrat Matsumae Shigeyoshi argued, "Electricity travels at the same speed as light. Clearly…something that transmits at such a high speed must be handled as a single entity. As the most important issue for the construction of Greater East Asia at the hands of Japan, it is a matter of course that [all telecommunications companies] must be absorbed into the nerve system of Japan" (315). This imperative came into colorful conflict with the

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[4] Tetsu Hiroshige, *Kagaku no shakaishi: Kindai Nihon no kagaku taisei* [Social History of Science: The Scientific Structure of Modern Japan] (Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha, 1973), 84-106.

colonial agencies, especially the Government-General of Korea, which wished to claim autonomy and control over the infrastructure installed within the Korean peninsula. Various new institutional arrangements were made to ensure effective governance of the network, such as the International Telephone Company, North China Telegraph and Telephone Co., and Japan Telegraph and Telephone Construction Co., among others. Throughout the 1930s and early 1940s, MOC's vision was to create a "single corporation to manage all trunk cables and circuits in the empire" (314), which remained an elusive dream given the conflict of interests (with colonial agencies as well as the military) and organizational complexities associated with a unified entity. The result, by the late 1930s, was a patchwork of regional organizations, each controlling their spheres of influence within the growing Japanese empire. Just as this empire expanded in a haphazard manner with no master blueprint, the telecommunications network also developed in an ad-hoc fashion.

How this diversified governance structure for the imperial telecommunications network fared during and after the final showdown of the Pacific War is the topic of Part IV ("Network, 1939-1945"). That total war would seriously disrupt the fragile technological system was perhaps not difficult to expect. Indeed, by late 1943, telecommunications within the Japanese empire slowed down substantially due to "severe congestion problems" (367)—eventually leading to a "nervous breakdown" and, by war's end, a complete "meltdown" of the system. However, the total failure of the telecommunications network in the final stages of the war did not necessarily mean that it left no postwar legacies. A large part of the remaining infrastructure, institutional models for system governance, and trained technical and bureaucratic personnel was carried over into postwar Japan and set the stage for its postwar recovery. For example, the MTT served as a useful model of a public corporation when the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers planned for the Japan Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation in 1952. Perhaps more significantly for Japan's former

colonies (both formal and informal), the telecommunications network of the failed empire was revived to a great extent during the postwar years, a process in which Japanese engineers played important roles in China and Southeast Asia. As Yang points out, "the total defeat and disintegration of the empire did not wipe the slate of Japan's techno-imperialism clean" (397).

As *Technology of Empire* makes clear, the story of Japan's telecommunications network during the age of empire is not just about the cables and electrons passing through them. In a real sense, tracing how the communication function was achieved, maintained, and ultimately failed is to examine the emergence and downfall of the Japanese empire. On the one hand, the network was a tool of imperial expansion; on the other hand, it also provided political and ideological legitimacy for the Japanese expansion. In this sense, the telecommunications network was both a tool and ideology of the Japanese empire—the language of "techno-imperialism" is intended to make this point (400). The book convincingly shows that a close examination of technological infrastructure, its operation, and its surrounding rhetoric can reveal much about the political history of empire. This should be seen as the main contribution of Yang's work.

This hefty volume, in all of its 446 pages, covers a diverse array of topics, from technical details and bureaucratic infighting to institutional innovations and the role of telecommunications in modern warfare. As such, the book will have something to offer for a broad set of audiences. Those in the fields of history of science and technology (especially communications technology), Japanese history (both imperial and postwar), and history of war immediately come to mind. Those with some background knowledge in the conventional history of the Japanese empire would surely be able to appreciate how the story could be told from the unique perspective of the telecommunications network. Historians of modern Korea will realize that colonial Korea played a pivotal role in the development of the telecommunications network in

imperial Japan. Also, this book will be beneficial to readers interested in the methodological issues of transnational or global history, an approach that has been in vogue among professional historians for some time. The manner in which Yang exhaustively covers primary and secondary sources for a full scope of the Japanese empire over an extended chronology is truly something to be admired.

A final word for scholars who aim to use this book as a springboard for further investigation: *Technology of Empire* potentially sets the stage for future works on the history of technical infrastructure in Taiwan, Korea, China, and Southeast Asia, and how the legacies of formal and informal colonies were felt in the postcolonial era. Yang touches upon these issues in his final chapter (Chapter 10), but more detailed research would certainly be required to gain an estimation of the full extent of their ramifications—both good and bad. Korean readers may be particularly interested in the subtle imprint that the Japanese empire left in post-liberation Korea in the field of telecommunications.[5] Korean scholars may be quick to dismiss the Japanese influence by pointing to the Korean War that leveled most of what existed before 1950. However, technical infrastructure—be it telecommunications cables, electrical systems, transportation infrastructure (roads, bridges, tunnels), or water and sewage systems—are especially well known for their obduracy. For example, the extensive experience civil engineers and technicians had with hydroelectric dams during the colonial period influenced the preference of postcolonial South Korean engineers for dams over the thermoelectric alternative.[6] Also, it is worth noting that the Internet trunk

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[5] Korean readers may be interested in reading Yang's chapter in a book that focuses on colonial Korea. See Daqing Yang, "Colonial Korea in Japan's Imperial Telecommunications Network," in *Colonial Modernity in Korea*, ed. Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999), 161-190.

[6] Aaron Stephen Moore, "The Yalu River Era of Developing Asia: Japanese Expertise, Colonial Power, and the Construction of Sup'ung Dam," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 72, no. 1 (2013): 115-139.

line between South Korea and Japan still runs through the very spot in Pusan that once crossed the Korean Strait in 1883 via a submarine cable.[7] Thus, paying closer attention to the continuities and discontinuities of technological infrastructures through the colonial and postcolonial periods in Korean history may lead to a true understanding of the transnational history of the environment we live in and largely take for granted. The reviewer hopes that Yang's book will stimulate further investigations in this direction by Korean scholars.

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7 For the readers' amusement, a global map of submarine (Internet) cables is readily available on the web. See http://www.submarinecablemap.com/ to browse the location of the Korea-Japan Cable Network.

Wartime Shanghai and the Jewish Refugees from Central Europe: Survival, Co-existence, and Identity in a Multi-ethnic City

by Irene Eber
Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter, 2012

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Zhou Xun
University of Essex

There is no shortage of books on the subject of Jewish refugees in wartime Shanghai. This most recent volume, *Wartime Shanghai and the Jewish Refugees from Central Europe: Survival, Co-existence, and Identity in a Multi-ethnic City* by Irene Eber, stands out, however. What makes this book different from others on this topic is its impressive research across multiple archives and languages.

Placing the work within a part of Holocaust history, Eber poses important questions that many other scholars working on Jewish communities in China have failed to ask. Throughout the book she explores the complex question of who Jews are, demonstrating that there was not a single group of Jewish refugees who went to Shanghai. While some came from Germany, others were from Poland, Austria, and many other corners of central Europe. Such refugees arrived in Shanghai by different routes and means. Although they themselves identified, and were identified, as Jews, they spoke different languages. Furthermore, they shared little with each other in terms of culture. Based on arrays of archival material, Eber goes further to make a convincing argument that different Jewish organizations conflicted over matters of evacuation and

aid. This book possesses the further strengths of presenting a detailed and meticulous study of German Jewish policies, which forced Jewish emigration, and covering German-Chinese and German-Japanese diplomacy in the late 1930s.

In addition, this book includes several useful appendices which provide a list of journals and newspapers published in Shanghai for the Jewish communities between 1939 and 1946 (Appendix 2), a partial list of German- and English-language autobiographies and memoirs of wartime Shanghai (Appendix 4), and a list of documentary films about wartime Shanghai (Appendix 3). Such information makes the book a valuable resource for students interested in the subject.

There are a few shortcomings in this otherwise excellent book. The text contains numerous spelling errors in Chinese and Japanese personal names. For example, on page 43, in footnote 14, Song Qingling's name is spelled incorrectly. Nevertheless, Eber has authored an important study of Holocaust history and Jewish history by shifting the focus away from the conventional Eurocentric lenses. Being an accomplished scholar of Chinese studies, Eber's illuminating account of wartime Shanghai and its unique history and multi-ethnic cultural diversity makes the book an important and welcome contribution to the existing scholarship on Shanghai as well as on the repercussions of World War II on the city.

Imperial Eclipse: Japan's Strategic Thinking about Continental Asia before August 1945

by Yukiko Koshiro
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013

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Reo Matsuzaki
Trinity College

Yukiko Koshiro's *Imperial Eclipse*—a study of Japanese military planning during the crucial years preceding the end of World War II—is an important and timely contribution to the scholarship on Japanese foreign policy. While several notable books have been published in this area in recent years, the approach Koshiro takes is particularly unique, and its controversial conclusions are bound to invite heated debates. In contrast to the excellent books by Richard Samuels and Kenneth Pyle, both published in 2007, which focus on Japan's complex relationship with the United States (as well as Great Britain), Koshiro's emphasis is squarely on Japanese strategic thinking on the Soviet Union.[1] Moreover, while most works on pre-1945 Japanese foreign policy, including those by Samuels and Pyle, seek to explain how Japan mismanaged its diplomatic affairs in the 1930s and found itself in a disastrous collision course with the United States, Koshiro aims to explain how Japanese military planners

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1 Kenneth B. Pyle, *Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose* (New York: Public Affairs, 2007); Richard J. Samuels, *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007).

sought to get Japan out of the war in 1945 and lay the foundations for a favorable postwar strategic environment. Most importantly, contrary to Samuels and Pyle, who explain the strategic rationale behind Japan's close embrace of the United States since 1945 (also known as the "Yoshida Doctrine," after postwar Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru), Koshiro challenges the very premise that alliance with the United States was seen by wartime policymakers as the best option for Japan in the final months of World War II. She argues that Japanese military planners had imagined a role for postwar Japan as an autonomous actor that, in partnership with Communist China, would balance both the Soviet Union *and* the United States to keep Asia free from Western domination.

The book is organized into three sections, each aiming to challenge a commonly accepted narrative on Japanese foreign policy. The first section is on how Russia (and later the Soviet Union) was perceived in Japanese popular culture, as well as by intellectuals and policymakers prior to and during World War II. Under siege here is the notion that there was something "natural" about Japan's alliance with the United States in 1945—that is, the notion that since the late nineteenth century, Japan was on a steady path of cultural, economic, and political integration with the Anglo-American countries. From this perspective, Japanese anti-Western behavior in the 1930s was an aberration which was subsequently corrected once Japanese society was liberated from militarist control by the United States. Yet, as Koshiro argues, this interpretation of Japan's relationship with Western countries was a product of American mythmakers and their allies within the postwar Japanese government led by Yoshida. In fact, the Japanese saw themselves as more intricately linked to Eurasia compared to the Pacific Rim. In contrast to the United States, which was culturally alien to Japan, Russia felt more immediate to the Japanese given its blend of European and Asian racial and cultural influences.

In support of this claim, Koshiro notes that while Yoshida Shōin (1830-1859), the foremost samurai intellectual during the late Tokugawa

period, found inspiration in American culture, his mentor, Sakuma Shōzan, saw Russia as providing a better developmental model for Japan. Russia, then the Soviet Union, again emerged in the 1920s as a model for Japan, particularly among leftist intellectuals and progressive bureaucrats in the Home Ministry. It was not just the Japanese elites, who were inspired by the Soviet Union, Koshiro argues; the influence of Russia on Japanese mass culture was indeed comparable to, and in some ways more significant than, that of the United States and Western European countries. In support of this claim, Koshiro examines immigration patterns of individuals from the United States, Western Europe, and Russia/USSR. She notes that while most Americans residing in Japan were educators and missionaries, Russians tended to be employed as dockworkers, rickshaw pullers, and other blue-collar occupations. Americans also had minimal social interactions with the Japanese, Koshiro argues, and the level of intermarriage between Americans and the Japanese was low. In contrast, Russians were far more integrated into Japanese society.

This more sociological analysis is buttressed with an examination of Japanese intellectual discourse, and in particular, the prominent role Russians played in Japanese pan-Asian ideology. While Americans and Western Europeans were the clear racial other in Japanese cultural imagination and in scholarly debates of the 1930s and 1940s, the Russians were regarded as a hybrid European-Asian race with much affinity to the Japanese, and therefore could live harmoniously with the other Asian races within Japan's colonial empire. Russians, in fact, were depicted as model subjects in Manchuria, whose behavior should be emulated by other non-Japanese groups comprising the multi-ethnic "state" of Manchukuo. In short, there was nothing natural about Japan's integration into the U.S. alliance system in the 1950s. Japan's detachment from Eurasia was very much a product of postwar politics, rather than a continuation of a path Japan had pursued since the black ships first arrived in Tokyo Bay.

Moving on from a sociological and cultural analysis of Soviet-Japan relations, the second section (comprised of two chapters, one on China and the other on Korea) helps to set the stage for Koshiro's main argument that, rather than being blissfully ignorant or thoroughly irrational, Japanese military planners in the final months of World War II were proactive strategists, who carefully planned for Japan's inevitable defeat. Most importantly, these middle chapters highlight the sophisticated nature of Japan's intelligence apparatus, especially when it came to its analysis of political conditions in China and Korea. In particular, Koshiro's discussion of China is illuminating. She writes, "North China Area Army intelligence analysts had early indications that Chinese and Soviet communists had disparate goals… Far from a conciliatory gesture to Moscow, Tokyo's appeasement of the CCP reflected its expectation that Mao had the power to check both Soviet and U.S. ambitions and keep Asia for Asians" (87). It was not just that the Japanese correctly predicted how the Cold War would unfold in East Asia; Koshiro's analysis suggests that an anti-hegemonic alliance between Japan and China should not be dismissed as a pipedream of Mao and Japanese communists during China's isolation in the 1960s. It was a real possibility that Japanese policymakers contemplated prior to 1945, but was never pursued by Japan's postwar leaders.

The heart of the book lies in the three chapters comprising the final empirical section on strategic analysis and planning during the period preceding Japan's unconditional surrender. As Koshiro writes, the basic question confronting Japanese military planners was that of "to whom ought Japan surrender, in which theater, and at what time?" (155). Specifically, by answering these questions, we may better understand the logic behind two key decisions made by Japanese military planners in 1945 that have since been maligned by scholars as both strategically inept and highly costly in human life: the first to remove divisions from the Soviet-Manchuria and Soviet-Korea borders in the months prior to Soviet Union's abrogation of the neutrality pact; and the second to wait

until August 15 to surrender. Yet, contrary to conventional wisdom that holds that these decisions were indications of gross foolishness, Koshiro posits that they reveal Japanese wartime policymakers to have been true masters of *realpolitik*, whose strategic visions were left unrealized by Konoe Fumimaro, Yoshida Shigeru, and other Japanese politicians who played a prominent role in fashioning Japanese foreign policy in the months and years following Japan's defeat.

The first "strategic blunder" was for the Imperial Army to remove more than ten divisions and units from the Kwantung Army (stationed in Manchuria) to southern military theaters in 1944 (such as the South Pacific, the Philippines, and Okinawa), only to follow this with the redeployment of seven regiments from the northern frontier to Japan proper as well as to the southern tip of the Korean Peninsula. These actions (which left the long border with the Soviet Union precariously vulnerable to an attack by the Red Army), when combined with seemingly desperate attempts by Tokyo to solicit Stalin to mediate peace between Japan and the United States in 1945, have been typically interpreted by historians as demonstrating how divorced Japanese policymakers had become from reality. Such an interpretation, Koshiro argues, fundamentally misunderstands Japanese strategic thinking. Japanese military planners in fact *desired* Stalin to declare war on Japan and for the Red Army to capture Japan's continental empire, so as to "thwart America's singular takeover of Japan's colonial empire and its hegemony of postwar East Asia" (201). Similarly, Japan redeployed troops from the Soviet-Korea border in the north to the southern portion of the peninsula in order to defend against a possible invasion of Korea by the United States. The aim was to prevent American takeover of the entire peninsula and to engineer a divided Korea.

The delay in Japanese surrender until August 15, well after Japanese policymakers knew that the war was lost, also follows the logic of preventing domination of East Asia by either the United States or the Soviet Union, Koshiro argues. The standard narrative of the timing of

Japan's surrender is one of Japanese elites desperately holding on to the hope that American difficulty in invading Japan proper would convince the United States to negotiate a conditional surrender. In turn, Japan finally surrendered on August 15, 1945, because either (i) the utter destructiveness of the atomic bombs convinced Japanese policymakers that further resistance was futile, or (ii) the unexpected entry of the Soviet Union in the Pacific War led to the fear that the Red Army would march into Tokyo and demand the division of Japan into American and Soviet zones of occupation. While Koshiro agrees with scholars who see the Soviet entry as the primary trigger leading to Japan's surrender, the strategic logic behind this decision she provides is novel: "Ending the war *before* the Soviet attack had no place" in Japanese strategic thinking, "[s]ince Japanese planners and strategists had developed a vision for postwar East Asia *as the outcome of* anticipated Soviet participation in the war" (224). In other words, Japan waited eagerly for the Soviet Union to attack Manchuria and Korea in order to end the war in a manner that ensured that no single power would fill the vacuum in East Asia left by the collapse of the Japanese Empire.

While the book is an important contribution to the scholarship on Japanese foreign policy, Koshiro's monograph, like any other, is not without its shortcomings. First, it must be pointed out that many of the claims the author makes are based on light documentary evidence. The author's controversial interpretation of the timing and logic of Japan's surrender, for example, is derived from circumstantial evidence interpreted through the framework found in an opinion paper written by Colonel Tanemura Sakō. While Tanemura was an important member of the Army War Operations Plans Division, there is no evidence that his private opinion was actually reflected in government policy. This shortcoming, nonetheless, is one that could not have been avoided given the nature of the subject matter. Japanese officials engaged in systematic destruction of written records pertaining to war planning, especially those concerning the final months of the war. Hence, basing a study of

Japanese strategic actions on readily available documents would lead us to a biased interpretation—in fact, one that Japanese military planners wanted us (be it the Japanese public or U.S. occupiers) to hold.

The second shortcoming concerns the first empirical chapters on the place of Russia within Japanese cultural imagination and intellectual discourse prior to 1945. As noted above, Koshiro provides evidence suggesting that Russians were far more integrated into Japanese society as compared to other Western immigrants, but she fails to emphasize that the Russian population was concentrated in Japan's peripheries: Hokkaido, Sakhalin, northern Korea, and Manchuria. This contrasts to foreign residents from the United States and Western Europe, who resided in the principal Japanese cities, such as Tokyo, Yokohama, and Kobe. More problematically, Koshiro uses pan-Asianist writings of the 1940s as evidence of Japan's cultural closeness to Russia in comparison with the United States and Western Europe. However, much of this literature was government propaganda intended to justify Japan's expansion into Northeast Asia starting in the 1930s.

Furthermore, as Oguma Eiji has demonstrated, rhetoric on Japanese national identity typically followed Japanese strategic decisions. For example, while academic discourse in the late nineteenth century portrayed the Japanese as being a *tanitsu minzoku* (racially pure people), in the aftermath of Japan's annexation of Taiwan (1895) and Korea (1905), the dominant view shifted to that of a *kongō minzoku* (racially mixed people).[2] As such, Japanese discussions of the Russians being Asian-like in spirit may reveal very little about "natural" Japanese dispositions. It is much more likely to have been a product of Japanese government officials and sympathetic intellectuals attempting to justify

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[2] Oguma Eiji, *"Nihonjin" no kyōkai: Okinawa, Ainu, Taiwan, Chōsen shokuminchi shihai kara fukki undō made* [The Boundaries of "Japanese": Okinawa, Ainu, Taiwan, Korea from Colonial Domination to Recovery Movement] (Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 1998); Oguma Eiji, *A Genealogy of "Japanese" Self-Images*, trans. David Askew (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2002).

the Soviet-Japan neutrality pact, as well as encouraging Russians living in Manchukuo to assist the Japanese in ruling over the other native inhabitants of this fake country. In general, a more critical discussion of Japanese wartime racial rhetoric would have been desirable.

Despite these shortcomings, *Imperial Eclipse* presents a bold interpretation of Japanese strategic thinking prior to the conclusion of World War II and is a book that should be read by any scholar interested in Japanese military history and foreign policy. Most importantly, this book provides us with an image of what Japan as a "normal nation" could look like at a time when Japanese foreign policy is at a major turning point. If Koshiro is right, Japanese wartime strategic thinkers imagined that the best course of action for postwar Japan would be that of an "offshore balancer" in East Asia, similar to how Great Britain kept continental Europe divided and balanced prior to World War II. During the Cold War, this role would have been best played by Japan allying with China and keeping U.S. and Soviet ambitions in East Asia at bay. In the current geostrategic environment, where China has replaced the Soviet Union as America's primary rival in East Asia, one could imagine Japan playing the role of an offshore balancer by positioning itself between these two great powers and working with other Asian countries, such as India, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia to prevent the region from being dominated by any single power. Douglas MacArthur, Yoshida Shigeru, and other postwar Japanese leaders have succeeded in making it seem that a close alliance with the United States is the best, or most natural, course of action for a "normal" Japan. Koshiro's analysis forces us to question this assumption, and imagine a more geo-strategically fluid East Asia where Japan could play an independent role in contributing to regional peace and stability.

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