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

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Articles

Naval Memorials in Germany and Japan: Narratives of a "Clean War" Represented in Public Space

Sven Saaler
Sophia University

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Naval Memorials in Germany and Japan: Narratives of a “Clean War” Represented in Public Space

The objective of this paper is to examine the strategies adopted in postwar Japan and Germany to construct positive images of war, or images that suggest that the conflicts involved were, at least in part, "clean" wars. While these two countries are usually considered rare cases of states that have addressed their wartime past in highly critical ways, both have supplemented self-critical reflection with selectively defined "positive" elements designed to help their citizens deal with the realities of a history of aggressive war, war crimes, and genocide.

Keywords: historical memory, naval memorials, reconciliation, historical revisionism, Japan, Germany

Naval Memorials in Germany and Japan: Narratives of a "Clean War" Represented in Public Space

Sven Saaler
Sophia University

1. Introduction

The twentieth century is often referred to as the "century of war." The first half of the century was characterized by "hot wars" and the second half by the Cold War; both periods saw large numbers of people killed in armed conflicts. While the toll of human suffering and loss throughout the twentieth century cannot be overlooked, this period also witnessed continuous efforts by political and military authorities to soften the impact of war through favorable coverage in the popular media and through policies of commemoration and memorialization during the postwar period.[1] It is said that the first victim in a war is truth. Yet, even in the process of reshaping memory *after* a war, for governments, military authorities, and large sectors of society, the truth counts for less than the desire to remember and transmit "bright" stories of past wars, as historian

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1 Cf. Susan L. Carruthers, *The Media at War* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000); Paul Rutherford, *Weapons of Mass Persuasion: Marketing the War Against Iraq* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004).

George Mosse has so aptly observed in the case of World War I.[2] Mosse's observations have lost none of their force in the twenty-first century, as will be shown below.

The objective of this paper is to examine the strategies adopted in postwar Japan and Germany to construct positive images of war, or images suggesting the conflicts involved were—at least in part—"clean" wars. While these two countries are usually considered rare cases for having addressed their wartime past in highly critical ways, Germany generally more so than Japan, both have supplemented self-critical reflection with selectively defined "positive" elements designed to help their citizens deal with the realities of a history of aggressive war, war crimes, and genocide.[3] This paper attempts to show that, in both cases, these "positive" elements often come from the history of naval warfare.

In what follows, an examination will unfold on how naval memorials in both countries have been constructed and utilized to reshape the image of war in the public consciousness and to build positive narratives around at least one sector of military forces involved as having fought an honorable and "clean" war. Because Germany and Japan were both responsible for countless war crimes, including atrocities against civilians and genocide, it has been difficult for either country to construct a positive image in postwar public memory of their involvement in World War II. From time to time, both countries have witnessed the emergence of "historical revisionism"—political and intellectual movements aimed at presenting and rewriting national history in a more favorable light. The most well-known examples of this phenomenon are the "historians' debate" (*Historikerstreit*) in 1980s

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2 George L. Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

3 For a recent comparison of strategies adopted by Japan, Germany, and Austria to address their wartime pasts see Thomas U. Berger, *War, Guilt, and World Politics after World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

Germany and the movement of historical revisionism that has been active in Japan since the 1990s.[4] However, revisionist views of Japan and Germany's wartime history have generally been rejected by society at large.[5] Nevertheless, a trend has been apparent in both countries to single out particular episodes from their history of naval warfare and present them as part of a narrative of "clean" war. After discussing some recent cases in which similar strategies were employed, a number of German and Japanese monuments that commemorate sailors killed in naval battles will be reviewed and a search will be made for their place in creating popular historical consciousness and war memory in postwar Germany and Japan.

2. War and the Media in the Twenty-First Century

Beginning with the Second Boer War (1899-1902), the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), and the First and Second Balkan Wars (1912-1913), the "century of war" that characterized the twentieth century built to a climax with the First and Second World Wars, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. Although warfare has taken a different turn as we enter a new millennium, war as a method of resolving conflict shows no sign of

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4 See James Knowlton and Truett Cates, trans., *Forever in the Shadow of Hitler?: Original Documents of the Historikerstreit, the Controversy Concerning the Singularity of the Holocaust* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1993); Richard J. Evans, *In Hitler's Shadow: West German Historians and the Attempt to Escape from the Nazi Past* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989). For the case of Japan, see Sven Saaler, "Chapter Three: History and Public Opinion," in *Politics, Memory and Public Opinion: The History Textbook Debate and Japanese Society*, DIJ Monograph Series, vol. 39 (Munich: Iudicium, 2005).

5 See Saaler, "Chapter Three: History and Public Opinion." Having said this, a new wave of historical revisionism is gaining traction in Japan as this paper is being written, strongly supported by none less than the Prime Minister, Abe Shinzō. Cf. Hayashi Hirofumi, Tawara Yoshifumi, and Watanabe Mina, "*Murayama Danwa-Kōno Danwa" Minaoshi No Sakugo* [The Error of Revising the "Murayama Declaration" and the "Kôno Declaration"] (Kyōto-shi: Kamogawa Shuppan, 2013); Sven Saaler, "Sengo no Nihon to Doitsu ni okeru 'kako no kokufuku' [The Process of 'Overcoming the Past' in Postwar Japan and Germany]," *Nihon no Kagakusha* 48, no. 8 (2013): 18-23.

abating. We are now faced with a situation in which war has become a perpetual phenomenon in the form of the so-called "war on terrorism." While wars were traditionally declared by one state against another, and the ensuing armed conflict was fought by regular military forces, the lack of a clearly defined opponent in the "war on terror" has particularly led the West into a quagmire of "never-ending war ."[6]

Despite anti-war demonstrations throughout the West and Japan regularly voicing opposition to this new type of warfare, they have failed to challenge the pervasive influence of the most firmly entrenched supporters of war in our time—a certain strand of politicians obsessed with issues of "national security," pro-war pundits, military establishments, and industrial complexes. In the United States, Europe, and Japan, media institutions have failed to make any serious attempt to oppose war. Often, this is a result of pressure or "guidance" from governmental and/or military authorities. In fact, pressure by governments to control the media is growing. In December 2013, the Japanese Diet passed the "Bill on the Protection of Designated Secrets," tightening its control over classified material, particularly on foreign and security affairs, and equipping itself with an array of tools to suppress investigative journalism. While freedom of the press in Japan has generally been given a low rating among the industrialized democracies, these most recent developments will undoubtedly lead to further deterioration in press freedom in the country.[7]

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6 This very fact has led to the emergence of doubts over the legality of this new kind of warfare. Because war can only be declared by states against other states in the framework of international law, some scholars consider the concept of declaring a "war on terror" to be mere rhetoric and irrelevant. See, for example, Chalmers Johnson, *The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic*, (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004). Kindle edition. Furthermore, at the time George W. Bush declared his "war on terror," Osama bin-Laden, the leader of the terrorist group Al-Quaida, had already declared war on the United States. Cf. Chalmers Johnson, *Dismantling the Empire: America's Last Best Hope*, (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010). Kindle edition.

7 According to the figures compiled by the NGO "Reporters without Borders" (http://www.

As a result of the tightening controls on information by political and military authorities in Western countries as well as Japan in recent years, the media has generally opted to portray modern warfare as "clean," and thus bolster the image of a given conflict as a "just" war among the general public and worldwide opinion.[8] This kind of distortion is of course not unique to the twenty-first century: strategies for rehabilitating the image of war have remained remarkably consistent over time. In particular, a strong emphasis on the supposedly "clean" side of *naval* warfare has a long pedigree stretching from the twentieth century until the present day.

The first question to be addressed is: Why should naval warfare become singled out as a means of establishing a positive narrative of a "clean" war? First, this phenomenon stems from a number of perceived differences in the popular image of ground warfare as opposed to war at sea, and in the organizational structure of the army and the navy. The following distinctions in particular can be noted:

- Symbolism of color: While the army is associated with fighting in "dirt" and "mud," the navy fights in "water," a symbol of purity. Furthermore, in contrast to the navy's white uniforms, army personnel usually wear uniforms of a "dirty" brown or khaki color.
- Remoteness of naval battles from the home country: In general, naval battles take place on the open sea, far from countries engaged in conflict. News of such naval battles reaches public knowledge only intermittently.

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reporter-ohne-grenzen.de/), Japan was ranked as follows in terms of freedom of the press: 28 in 2002, 44 in 2003, 43 in 2004, 37 in 2005, 51 in 2006, 37 in 2007, 29 in 2008, 17 in 2009, 12 in 2010, 22 in 2011/12, and 53 in 2013. These figures indicate that the information policy of the center-left government of the Democratic Party of Japan (2009-2012) contributed to a marked improvement in the freedom of the press in Japan, while the advent of a right-wing government under Prime Minister Abe Shinzō in late 2012 led to a sudden decline.

[8] Cf. Carruthers, *The Media at War*; Rutherford*, Weapons of Mass Persuasion.*

- Number of casualties: Land battles have a reputation for producing enormous casualties and damage, whereas losses sustained in naval engagements are perceived as being relatively light.
- Methods of combat: Naval battles, until the present, are perceived as being "noble" in character, following "chivalrous" rules.
- War crimes: Naval warfare is considered to be largely free of atrocities and war crimes. Evidence of this perception can be found in the Nuremberg War Crime Trials (1945-1946) and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE, Tokyo Trial, 1946-1947), where only a very few naval officers stood trial and none were included among those sentenced to death.[9]
- Modernity and tradition: While the navy is often seen as a "modern" and "advanced" organization which values new technology and military logic, the army is viewed as instead prizing "tradition" and "spirit," an institution where blind obedience replaces reason.

When we look at the recent example of the 2003 Iraq War fought by the West as a part of their "war on terror," the distinctions involved in these conventional images of the navy and army become apparent. Constrained by geographical conditions, large numbers of ground troops were committed to this war in a country almost landlocked. Nevertheless, it was through the United States navy and air forces that images of fighting entered public consciousness, with planes taking off from aircraft carriers to launch attacks. Apart from a few scenes of U.S. tanks shelling and destroying distant Iraqi tanks that seemed to show little resistance, and

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[9] Among the 24 defendants of the Nuremberg trials (1945-1946), through which the leadership of Nazi Germany was prosecuted for crimes committed during the 1939-1945 war, only two were naval personnel. Neither was among the twelve defendants sentenced to death. Admiral Carl Dönitz was indicted for his role in ordering "unrestricted submarine warfare" and received a sentence of ten years in prison. Erich Raeder, Commander in Chief of the German navy from 1928 to 1943, was sentenced to life imprisonment, but was released in 1955. The 28 defendants at the Tokyo trials (1946-1947) included 15 army officers and only three naval personnel.

U.S. troops bringing down a statue of Saddam Hussein, the media rarely showed U.S. and British ground units engaged in combat with the Iraqi army. On the other hand, the media frequently broadcast images of the U.S. Navy launching cruise missiles and of "smart" bombs hitting targets in Iraq. These are the images still likely to remain in the minds of many.[10] Moreover, it was from the deck of the aircraft carrier USS *Abraham Lincoln* that President George W. Bush proclaimed victory to the world's media after alighting from a fighter plane.

The preferential treatment given to naval activities during the conflict was a result of the U.S. government and military's attempt to deploy "weapons of mass persuasion" and to construct a positive image of the war.[11] The American mass media feared that reporting on "dirty" land battles might trigger an anti-war response by the American public—precisely what had happened during the Vietnam War.[12] Thousands of American soldiers had lost their lives in that conflict, and each time images of the war dead were broadcast in the media, they added fuel to the anti-war movement. As a result, the American government and military have become extremely sensitive to the way casualties are reported and have strengthened their regulation of the media in this area.[13] Accordingly, during the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War, the American government enforced rigid controls on information, and graphic battle scenes and images of dead and bloodied American soldiers were subject to censorship. In response to this overt government control of the media, a number of intellectuals decried the decay of American democracy and predicted the demise of republicanism.[14] A similar debate

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[10] Rutherford, *Weapons of Mass Persuasion*, 56. See also John W. Dower, *Cultures of War: Pearl Harbor, Hiroshima, 9/11, Iraq* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2010), 117, chap. 5 passim.

[11] Rutherford, *Weapons of Mass Persuasion*.

[12] Ibid., 67, 151.

[13] Carruthers, *The Media at War*.

[14] Chalmers Johnson, *Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic* (New York: Metropolitan

broke out in Japan in late 2013, following the passing of the "Bill on the Protection of Designated State Secrets."[15]

Now, Germany and Japan will be considered as to how, in the postwar period, these two countries employed strategies aimed at popularizing positive images of naval warfare in order to deflect attention from war crimes, genocide, and public memories of a war marked by an exceptional degree of brutality.

3. Naval Memorials in Postwar Germany

The twentieth century witnessed ever-increasing numbers of civilians suffer under wartime conditions, in addition to military personnel. As a result of the advent of "total war," the effects of armed conflict ceased to be limited to professional military personnel, and encompassed civilians and ordinary citizens now mobilized as soldiers in armies of previously unimaginable size. Prior to the nineteenth century, wars had mainly been fought by mercenaries and professionals under the leadership of the aristocratic class. In this military culture, little consideration was given to the war dead. Fallen soldiers were usually simply buried on the battlefield, or their corpses burnt in order to prevent the spread of disease. No special consideration was given to preserving their "memory," at least not that of the rank and file.

From the nineteenth century, ordinary citizens began to play a larger role in European warfare. A decisive milestone in this development was the policy called *levée en masse*, or mobilization of the masses, which was initiated by a revolutionary government of France following

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Books, 2006).

15 "Kill the Secrecy Bill," *The Japan Times*, November 21, 2013, sec. Editorial; "Mr. Abe's Undemocratic Secrecy Bill," *The Japan Times*, October 25, 2013, sec. Editorial. For similar criticism of attempts by the government of Great Britain to limit the scope of investigative journalism, see "British Press Freedom Under Threat," *The New York Times*, November 16, 2013, sec. Editorial.

the French Revolution of 1789. The increasing numbers of commoners giving their lives for the state or "nation" required new ways of dealing with the war dead and of disposing their bodies, but also new ways of mourning, commemorating and memorializing fallen members of the new citizen armies. Especially as a result of the Napoleonic Wars in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, governments throughout Europe began building "war memorials" to honor, memorialize, and commemorate their war dead.

The custom of honoring fallen soldiers spread rapidly after World War I (1914-1918) when numbers of the war dead reached unprecedented heights of almost 20 million in total. As the enormous extent of casualties and destruction sustained during the war became more widely known, European governments invented new forms of memorial and commemorative markers in an attempt to explain and justify death on such a vast scale, and invest the conflict with significance in the minds of the public.[16] The unprecedented number of fallen soldiers made it necessary to erect large numbers of grave markers and monuments to honor them. In addition to building memorials in soldiers' hometowns, there was a move to create institutions dedicated to preserving their memory in the capitals of Europe. Because of the high number of fatalities some countries suffered, and because it was impossible to identify many of the war dead, the idea of the "tomb of the unknown soldier" was developed. This new form of memorial was adopted throughout the 1920s in Great Britain, France, Italy, Greece, and a number of other countries. The fact that the war dead could no longer be honored individually attests to the fact that the belligerent states were no longer capable of managing the consequences of the wars they had started.

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[16] On changes in commemoration of the war dead following World War I, see Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers.*

Figure 1. Douaumont

Major symbols of this crisis for civilization were the enormously costly battles fought in Belgium and France. In 1916, Germany launched an all-out offensive around the French city of Verdun. Ten months of intense trench warfare killed 150,000 German soldiers and 170,000 French soldiers.[17] In the Battle of the Somme, the death toll was even higher.[18] Today, war cemeteries around Verdun, particularly the ossuary of Douaumont holding the remains of thousands of unidentified soldiers, remain as a testimony to the tragedy of World War I.

In sharp contrast to the battles of Verdun and the Somme as symbols of the brutality and carnage of World War I, naval battles fought in the same war have retained a relatively "clean" image in public

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[17] In addition, more than 200,000 French and 190,000 German troops were wounded at Verdun. Today, the Battle of Verdun is remembered as an archetype of the tragedy of war, and the battle site is now an important cultural monument for Europe and its efforts for peace among nations.

[18] Over the battle's duration of five months, 200,000 French, 420,000 British, and 430,000 German soldiers lost their lives.

memory. In Germany, however, the elements making for a positive image of naval warfare were not present at first. Throughout the war, the German navy failed to fight any decisive battle against Great Britain's Royal Navy, its main enemy. Despite investing heavily in creating a large-scale navy during the first decade of the twentieth century, the majority of the German fleet remained rusting in their bases until the end of the war. The battle of Jutland in 1916, the only large-scale encounter involving German and British naval forces, failed to create a decisive victory for either side. While its expensive battle fleet remained inactive, the German navy in World War I was chiefly engaged in pursuing its blockade of Great Britain with cheaply produced submarines. However, the strategy of unrestricted submarine warfare around Great Britain's coasts would eventually lead to complications and incidents, resulting in an outcry from the international community. Germany's sinking of the USS *Lusitania*, an American passenger vessel, in 1917 led the United States to enter the war. Such incidents did nothing to improve the image of the German navy's performance in World War I. The navy's image was further tarnished from a mutiny by German sailors in the naval port of Kiel near the end of the war in November 1918. This rebellion acted as the fuse which set off the 1918-1919 "German Revolution" and eventually led to the collapse of the German Empire. Conservatives in postwar Germany decried this "revolution" as part of the nation's betrayal by "unloyal" and "un-German" elements, a claim that would develop into what came to be known as the "stab-in-the-back-legend."[19] Against this background, it was difficult to construct a "clean" and heroic image of the German navy in post-World War I Germany.

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[19] On the "stab-in-the-back legend" in Germany, see the classic work by Joachim Petzold, *Die Dolchstoßlegende: Eine Geschichtsfälschung im Dienst des deutschen Imperialismus und Militarismus* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1963). See also more recent discussions in Rainer Sammet, *"Dolchstoß": Deutschland und die Auseinandersetzung mit der Niederlage im Ersten Weltkrieg (1918-1933)* (Berlin: Trafo-Verlag, 2003); Alexander Watson, "Stabbed at the Front," *History Today* 58, no. 11 (2008): 21-27.

Nevertheless, in 1925, a proposal was presented for a national monument to sailors killed in the war.[20] Why was such a memorial proposed? First, notwithstanding the navy's poor performance during the war, it was not that difficult to encourage the public to accept an image of a "clean" naval war because of the overall differences between land and naval warfare discussed above. Second, in an atmosphere where numerous war cemeteries and memorials were being built for the victims of land battles, the navy was concerned to claim a memorial for those who had died in naval warfare.

Eventually, the "Memorial in Honor of the German Navy" (*Marine-Ehrenmal*) was built on the outskirts of Kiel, near the town of Laboe following a ten-year construction period.[21] The unveiling ceremony took place in 1936.[22] After World War II ended in Europe in May 1945 with Germany's unconditional surrender, the memorial was confiscated by British forces. Accepting that the Laboe monument had no direct connection with Nazi ideology, nor with glorifying war, the British returned it in 1954 by placing it under the control of the German Naval Association Deutscher Marinebund, where it remains to the present day.[23]

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[20] Thorsten Prange, *Das Marine-Ehrenmal in Laboe: Geschichte Eines Deutschen Nationalsymbols* (Wilhelmshaven: Brune, 1996), 5. A number of small, local memorials had been built prior to 1925 in north German port cities. Ibid., 12-13.

[21] Prange, *Das Marine-Ehrenmal in Laboe*, 19-22.

[22] Ibid., 112-116.

[23] For details on the Marinebund, see http://www.deutscher-marinebund.de/.



Figure 2. The Laboe Naval Memorial

The Laboe monument is dominated by a central 72-meter tower.[24] Since the majority of German naval personnel killed in World War I were submarine crewmen, this tower is suggestive of the shape of a submarine as well as a ship's sail. The design of the memorial was the result of a public competition and the funds to build it were donated from around the country, collected by the German Naval Association.[25]

In addition to the tower, the German naval memorial consists of a public square and a historical exhibition space. Within the tower, visitors enter the "Hall of Honor" (*Ehrenhalle*), which had originally been located in the area now occupied by the permanent exhibition before the war. At the center of the Hall of Honor, there is an inscription reading

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[24] For visual impressions, see the various pamphlets and visitor guides to the memorial: *Das Marine-Ehrenmal*, 3rd ed. (Wilhelmshaven: Deutscher Marinebund e.V., 1962); *Das Marine-Ehrenmal Des Deutschen Marinebundes* e.V., 4th ed. (Wilhelmshaven: Deutscher Marinebund e.V., 1974). See also the memorial's website, which includes a visual tour: http://www.deutscher-marinebund.de/geschichte_me_english.htm.

[25] Prange, *Das Marine-Ehrenmal in Laboe*, 32-58.

"They died for us." Flanking this legend, the numbers of those who died in naval warfare during both world wars are displayed as "1914 to 1918—35,000, 1939 to 1945—120,000."

Next to the tower is a square for holding ceremonies, below which visitors will find the "Consecration Hall" (*Weihehalle*), containing a "Register of Honor" inscribed with the names of the 35,000 naval personnel killed in World War I. The hall is decorated with German naval flags dating back to the founding of the nation, along with a place for floral tributes as well.

Situated behind the tower at the opposite end of the square is the "History Hall" (*Historische Halle*), a permanent exhibition of German maritime history.[26] The memorial's pamphlet dating from the 1960s places a strong emphasis on the continuity of Germany's maritime history from antiquity to the modern period.[27] This publication shows that the 1960s version of the exhibition attempted to create a glorified image of German naval actions by, for example, portraying the 1916 Battle of Jutland in a positive light and treating German submarine warfare in World War I in an upbeat manner.[28] Even in the context of World War II, the exhibition praises submarine warfare as "highly successful due to the fighting spirit of the crewmen."[29] In addition, it portrayed in a heroic light naval missions to evacuate German nationals residing in Eastern Europe just before the end of World War II.[30] As this version of the exhibition was conceptualized in the anti-communist atmosphere of 1960s West Germany, it would have been relatively easy for visitors to accept at face value this narrative of fellow Germans being rescued by the navy as they fled from the Soviet Red Army.

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[26] For more information on how the "History Hall" has changed over time, see Ibid., 149-159.

[27] *Das Marine-Ehrenmal*, 3rd ed. (1962), 10.

[28] Ibid., 25.

[29] Ibid., 29.

[30] Ibid., 15.



Figure 3. The covers of the 1960s (left) and the 1970s (right) pamphlets

From the latter half of the 1960s and into the 1970s, however, "coming to terms with the past" made rapid progress in West Germany, a process that did not leave the Laboe memorial untouched.[31] During the student protests of 1968, the monument was inscribed with protest graffiti, and criticized as "revisionist" and glorifying war. The memorial area was even briefly occupied by students of Kiel University.[32] From that time, various local administrative bodies considered changing the character of the Kiel monument from a "memorial glorifying the Navy" into a "peace memorial."[33] In particular, the memorial's inscription "They died for us" became a stone of contention. This phrase is commonly found on war memorials, not only in Germany. Critics of the

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[31] On this process, see Geoffrey H. Hartman, ed., *Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986).

[32] Prange, *Das Marine-Ehrenmal in Laboe*, 197-198.

[33] Ibid., 199.

Laboe memorial have pointed out that the referent of the word "us" is unclear. In the context of World War II, it is usually assumed in Germany that the war dead perished from aggressive Nazi policies. However, the inscription in the Laboe memorial seems to imply that the sailors died for a vaguely defined group of members of the German nation who survived the war. A publication produced by a group of German university students in 1985 notes that the monument has functioned as both a Mahnmal, a memorial displaying a warning to future generations, and as a site for "hero worship." In their opinion, the wording "they *believed* that they were going to die for us," would be more accurate, since the sailors did not know anything about the German nation's future, and thus could not have possibly died for those that would survive the war.[34] Eventually, the memorial received a new dedication in 1996 with the intention of emphasizing its role as a peace memorial: "Memorial to all those who died at sea and for peaceful navigation in free waters."[35]

Tracing changes in the exhibition from the 1960s through to the 1970s makes it apparent that the exhibits and their accompanying descriptions also underwent a drastic revision. In contrast to the 1964 edition of the pamphlet, the 1974 printing did away with the traditional gothic or old German altdeutsch font. The later pamphlet no longer emphasizes modern Germany's connection to ancient "Germanic tribes," and contains only a brief reference to the navy's role in the World War II evacuation of Germans from Eastern Europe.[36] These revisions reflected the changes to the memorial itself as noted above. The 1960s edition filled one whole page with the phrase "They died for us" in large gothic letters, whereas in the revised version, those words were replaced with a

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[34] Laboe-Gruppe der Evangelischen Studentengemeinde Kiel, ed., *Sie glaubten, für uns zu sterben das Marine-Ehrenmal Laboe: Stätte der Mahnung oder der Heldenverehrung?* (Kiel, 1985).

[35] Heinrich Walle, "Das Marine-Ehrenmal Laboe: Gratwanderung von Touristenattraktion Zu Totengedenken," *MarineForum* 85, no. 9 (2010): 50-52.

[36] *Das Marine-Ehrenmal Des Deutschen Marinebundes e.V*, 4th ed. (1974), 12.

less confronting phrase in roman font—"They died on every ocean."[37] These revisions prepared the memorial for its re-invention into a "peace memorial" and to receive the above-mentioned new dedication in 1996. Despite these developments, one commentator pointed out in 2010 that "until a few years ago, the exhibition still retained elements of imperial navy propaganda."[38]

In 2014, the German naval memorial, together with the adjacent U995 submarine display (established in 1971), continues to attract large numbers of visitors.[39] Over the 50 years between 1954 and 2004, the memorial drew 140 million visitors and remains one of the most heavily visited tourist attractions in the region.[40] No doubt influenced by the naval memorial's popularity, the Federal Air Force of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) erected a "Memorial in Honor of the German Air Force" in 1962, and in Ehrenbreitstein Fortress in the city of Koblenz, the Federal Army erected a "Memorial in Honor of the German Army" in 1972. The chronology is significant: erecting a naval memorial in the 1920s and 1930s and upholding it in the postwar period was a relatively simple matter, but it was not until the 1970s that a memorial for the German *army* was built.

The debate about how best to commemorate and honor German soldiers killed in battle surfaced again at the turn of the twenty-first century. This time, the discussion was over troops dispatched overseas, particularly the thousands of soldiers Germany had sent to Afghanistan as a part of NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). More than 50 German soldiers have so far lost their lives in the line of

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37 Ibid.

38 Walle, "Das Marine-Ehrenmal Laboe," 51.

39 *Das Marine-Ehrenmal Des Deutschen Marinebundes e.V*, 4th ed. (1974), 165.

40 Dieter Hartwig, "Das Marine-Ehrenmal in Laboe: Kontinuität und Wandel einer nationalen Gedenkstätte," in *Nordlichter: Geschichtsbewußtsein und Geschichtsmythen nördlich der Elbe*, Beiträge zur Geschichtskultur 27 (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2004), 413-438. Walle, "Das Marine-Ehrenmal Laboe," 50-52.

duty in Afghanistan—the first instances of "war dead" in postwar Germany.[41] Following a long debate, the concept of "postwar war dead" has gained acceptance in Germany. In 2009, the "Memorial in Honor of the Federal Armed Forces" (*Ehrenmal der Bundeswehr*) was built within the grounds of the Ministry of Defense in Berlin.[42] Whether this development suggests that Germany will be a stronger participant in military operations around the globe in the future, or whether it represents a localized reaction to the fact of German casualties in a particular theatre of war, remains to be seen.

4. Naval memorials in Japan

Of the many memorials in Japan commemorating naval battles, there are three that stand out. Two of them are dedicated to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905: the Memorial Ship *Mikasa* in Yokosuka and the series of memorials commemorating the Battle of Tsushima on the Tsushima islands. The third memorial is related to World War II: the Yamato Museum in Kure, which commemorates the construction and wartime service of the Japanese battleship *Yamato*. This giant warship was sunk in 1945 while launching a *kamikaze* suicide attack, with over 3,000 of its 3,300 crewmen lost. The museum has garnered an unexpected popularity in recent years, partly due to the appearance of the *Yamato* in postwar Japanese film and popular culture.

4a. The Yamato Museum

The Yamato Museum in Kure opened in 2006 and has since logged

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41 http://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/DE/Afghanistan/afghanistan.html.

42 Website: http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK9pPKUVL301JTUvOzUPL3UjKLUvFygfEG2oyIA6T6FxA!!/.

around one million visitors every year.[43] Of the memorials and history museums in Japan, the only others that can boast a similar number of visitors are the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, the Edo-Tokyo Museum in Tokyo, and the memorials and museums in Okinawa.[44] In an apparently contradictory pattern of behavior, many people take in the display of destructive military power in the Yamato Museum and then continue their "sightseeing" at the Peace Memorial in Hiroshima, the city destroyed by an atomic weapon in the same year the *Yamato* was sunk. The *Yamato*'s popularity is related to the rise of conservative historical revisionism in Japan from the 1990s, and also to the commercialization particularly of the *kamikaze* image and the battleship *Yamato* in popular culture. Historical revisionists have continued their attempts to change the contents of Japanese school history textbooks and thus fundamentally alter Japanese views of history. They have also frequently attacked the history textbooks currently in use in schools, and published textbooks of their own which claim that Japan's wars—in particular World War II—were not wars of aggression, but of self-defense.[45]

Although the revisionists' efforts over the past 15 years have generally ended in failure, they have had some impact on Japanese society. Notably, the Japanese image of the *kamikaze* fighter and war in general has undergone some change. This is visible, for example, in the constant stream of films celebrating *kamikaze* units and the *Yamato* in particular.[46] For instance, the 2005 film *Otokotachi no Yamato* (Men of

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[43] There is a tendency for history museums to emphasize their long "tradition," despite the fact that the majority of history museums date from the 1980s and later. In Japan, the National Museum of Japanese History (often abbreviated to *Rekihaku* in Japanese) opened in 1983. Most of Japan's remaining memorials and history museums were built between the 1990s and 2000s.

[44] A majority of the visitors to the Okinawa memorials are junior high and high-school students. Visitor numbers were provided to the author by the museums surveyed. On the Okinawa memorials, see Julia Yonetani, "On the Battlefield of Mabuni: Struggles over Peace and the Past in Contemporary Okinawa," *East Asian History* 20 (December 2000): 145-169.

[45] See Sven Saaler, *Politics, Memory and Public Opinion* (Munich: Iudicium, 2005).

[46] For a more detailed treatment on the role of *Yamato* in postwar popular culture in Japan, see

the Yamato) was made on a 25-billion-yen budget and earned the largest amount of revenue of any Japanese film released that year. The year 2009 saw the release of *Uchūsenkan Yamato fukkatsuhen* (Space Battleship Yamato Returns), and in 2010, *Uchūsenkan Yamato* (Space Battleship Yamato), starring Kimura Takuya, was produced with a 20-billion-yen budget. *Uchūsenkan Yamato* had been a popular science-fiction anime series since the 1960s, but it had been terminated with the 1983 production *Uchūsenkan Yamato kanketsuhen* (Space Battleship Yamato, the Final). However, *Yamato*-related movies achieved a new popularity in the 1990s. Involved in the planning, production, and funding of several of these films was former Tokyo mayor Ishihara Shintarō, now a member of the Japanese Diet. Ishihara, a notorious populist and right-wing ultranationalist, had previously lent his support as "general production advisor" and scriptwriter to the 25-billion-yen film *Ore wa kimi no tame ni koso shi ni iku* (I Will Die Only For You) from 2007, another movie glorifying *kamikaze* pilots. Although this film cost 18 billion yen to produce, it was a failure at the box office, earning less than 10 billion yen.

Ishihara was also responsible for the original script of *Space Battleship Yamato Returns* in 2009. The continuing popularity of the *Yamato* series reveals that the image of a "noble naval war" has permeated the consciousness of the Japanese public. One further aspect of popular attitudes to the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) is its association with "technological advancement." In the twenty-first century, the IJN

Hiromi Mizuno, "When Pacifist Japan Fights: Historicizing Desire in Anime," in *Mechademia 2: Networks of Desire* (Minneapolis, MN: University Of Minnesota Press, 2007), 104-123. While writing this paper, the movie "Eternal Zero," which portrays the last days in the life of a *kamikaze* pilot, became a major success. It remained on top of Japan's box office for eight consecutive weeks since its release on December 21, 2013. In the first seven weeks after its release, it earned 6.98 billion yen (see http://www.filmbiz.asia/news/eternal-zero-tops-japan-bo-for-8th-week). On the ongoing debate surrounding the movie, see Mark Schilling, "Debate Still Rages over Abe-Endorsed WWII Drama," *The Japan Times*, February 20, 2014.

has come to be seen as a "modern," "progressive" and technology-driven organization. By building a giant battleship such as the *Yamato*, the navy intended to demonstrate Japan's technological prowess. In postwar Japan, the notion of Japanese technological superiority still holds a great deal of weight. However, two important points have been overlooked in the adulation bestowed on the *Yamato*. First, the battleship was already outdated by the time it was completed—the heyday of "great battleships" had waned after World War I. What is probably more important is that although the ship might have been a technological achievement of some sort, it was, above all, a killing machine. In this regard, it was similar to the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, a city very close to the naval town of Kure, the *Yamato*'s home base. Like the *Yamato*, the atomic bomb that destroyed two Japanese cities has also been hailed by some as a technological achievement to be celebrated.

These ambiguities notwithstanding, today the *Yamato* has become a symbol of technological advancement and has been associated with the idea of postwar Japan's resurgence as a "technology superpower." Removed from its historical context, the *Yamato* has been memorialized as an exemplar of Japanese technological achievement. Thus, despite the currency of its unofficial name "Yamato Museum," the institution is officially known as *Kure-shi Kaiji Rekishi Kagaku-kan*, the Kure City Maritime History *Science* Museum. The primary objective of the *Yamato* exhibit is not to reflect on the war, but rather "through the battleship *Yamato* [to convey the] importance of technological advancement and peace."[47] Although the phrase "to convey the importance of […] peace" is also included in the museum director's official message on the museum's website and in the explanation of the museum's "concept," the main focus is on "technological advance" and the extent to which prewar Japan's advanced level of technological development contributed to the

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47 http://www.yamato-museum.com/concept/message.html, accessed March 15, 2013.

country's postwar economic growth.[48] The terms "peace" and "splendor of science and technology" (*gijutsu no eikō*) are transposed in the English and Japanese versions of the museum's visitor guide. In the Japanese version, science and technology are mentioned first, whereas in the English version, "peace" takes first place: "We wish to convey to the future the history of 'Kure' which made the Battleship Yamato, the importance of peace and the splendor of science and technology." However, the museum's English-language visitor guide accessible online contains no further explanation of "the importance of peace," but rather focuses on the history of maritime technology in Kure.[49] This is a reflection of the historical reality that the battleship *Yamato* had no relation to peace, but was a warship of terrible destructive power.

4b. Mikasa

Another historical episode that has contributed to the construction of a positive image of naval warfare in Japan is the Russo-Japanese War, and especially the Battle of Tsushima (1905). To commemorate this naval battle, the warship *Mikasa*, the flagship of Admiral Marquis Tōgō Heihachirō during the Battle of Tsushima, was turned into a memorial in 1920. It was later moved to its current location at Yokosuka in 1926 where it was turned into a memorial and "preserved as a symbol of the pride and confidence of the Japanese people."[50] The name Tōgō became widely known after this celebrated engagement, helping Japan gain a reputation as a great military—and especially naval—power. Like the allure surrounding the *Yamato*, the Battle of Tsushima retains a positive image in Japan.

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48 http://www.yamato-museum.com/concept/policy.html, accessed April 15, 2014.

49 http://www.yamato-museum.com/concept/pdf/ref09_3_eng.pdf, accessed April 15, 2014.

50 See the website of the Mikasa Memorial: http://www.kinenkan-mikasa.or.jp/siryou/mikasa.html, accessed March 12, 2012.

This is reflected in the development of the number of visitors to the memorial. Annual visitors to the memorial ship *Mikasa* reached a high-water mark of around 300,000 in 1962, but declined steadily into the 1990s, dropping below 100,000 for the first time in 1994. Between 1994 and 2008, numbers stabilized at around 100,000 visitors. However, as a result of the growing popularity of the Battle of Tsushima in popular culture, visitor numbers rose throughout the 2000s. Partly responsible for this was the centennial of the Russo-Japanese War and, closely related, the growth of popular films and television dramas dealing with this crucial military conflict. The novels of writer Shiba Ryōtarō (1923-1996) are particularly noteworthy in this context. Shiba's novels, many of which have spawned highly popular TV dramatizations, have strongly influenced the general public's historical awareness. For example, between 2009 and 2011, Japan's national television station NHK broadcast a dramatization of one of Shiba's most popular works, *Saka no ue no kumo* (Clouds Above the Hill), garnering wide attention in society and sparking heated discussion.[51] The main characters are two servicemen, one an army officer and the other a naval officer, whose story served to emphasize the image of a "clean" naval war.[52] Hardly surprising, visitor numbers to the *Mikasa* swelled during the years that *Clouds Above the Hill* was broadcast on NHK—from 117,000 in 2008 to 156,000 in 2009, reaching a new peak of 175,000 in 2011.The Memorial itself explicitly attributes this increase to the popularity of the television

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[51] Shiba's lengthy novel was published in English in 2013: Shiba Ryōtarō, *Clouds above the Hill: A Historical Novel of the Russo-Japanese War*, ed. Phyllis Birnbaum, trans. Juliet Winters Carpenter and Paul McCarthy (London and New York: Routledge, 2013). On other memorials relating to Shiba, see Tatsushi Hirano, Sven Saaler, and Stefan Säbel, "Recent Developments in the Representation of National Memory and Local Identities: The Politics of Memory in Tsushima, Matsuyama, and Maizuru," in *Japanstudien: Jahrbuch Des Deutschen Instituts Für Japanstudien*, vol. 20, 2008, 247-277.

[52] See the website of NHK Matsuyama, http://www.nhk.or.jp/matsuyama/sakanoue/; http://www.nhk-ondemand.jp/program/P200900052300000/index.html, accessed March 12, 2007.

serialization.[53] As expected, after the end of the show, visitor numbers slightly declined to 167,000 in 2012 and 2013.

The debate over the depiction of the Russo-Japanese War in popular culture has to be seen against the background of the vigorous discussion in Japan in recent years over such issues as the nature of popular historical consciousness and the history textbook controversy. While the main point of contestation here is how Japan's role in the Asia-Pacific War (1931-1945)—the East Asian theater of World War II—is to be interpreted, the image of the Russo-Japanese War as presented in NHK's *Clouds Above the Hill* also drew sharp reactions from Japanese historians.[54] Shiba's image of the war in this novel was largely uncritical: he emphasized the heroism of the main characters and depicted the conflict as a "clean" and honorable affair. Shiba's glorification of Japan's military prowess and his neglect of the role played by Korea in his stories has led to criticism of what has been termed "the Shiba view of history" (*Shiba-shikan*) by historians.[55] In his defense, Shiba as a novelist was not engaged in recreating historical events; his "fictional" world does not accurately depict—or even attempt to depict—historical facts as such. Nevertheless, a number of Japanese historians have strongly

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[53] Kōeki Zaidan Hōjin Mikasa Hozon-kai, *Heisei 24do jigyō hōkokusho* [Activity Report, 2012], n.d, 8.

[54] See Sven Saaler, "Bad War or Good War?: History and Politics in Postwar Japan," in *Critical Issues in Contemporary Japan*, ed. Jeff Kingston (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), 137-148.

[55] Nakatsuka Akira, *Shiba Ryōtarō no rekishikan: Sono "Chōsen-kan" to "Meiji Eikō-ron" o tô* [The Shiba View of History: A Critique of Its View of Korea and of the Idea of a "Glorious Meiji Era"] (Tokyo: Kôbunken, 2009); Nakatsuka Akira, Yasukawa Junosuke, and Daigo Satoshi, *NHK Dorama "Saka no ue no kumo" no rekishikan o tō: Nisshin sensō no kyokō to shinjitsu* [A Critique of the Historical Viewpoint of the NHK Drama "Clouds above the Hill": Fabrication and Truth Regarding the Russo-Japanese War] (Tokyo: Kōbunken, 2010); Nakamura Masanori, *'Saka no ue no kumo' to Shiba shikan* ['Clouds above the Hill' and the Shiba View of History] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2009); Harada Keiichi, *'Saka no ue no kumo' to Nihon kin-gendaishi* ['Clouds above the Hill' and the Modern and Contemporary History of Japan] (Tokyo: Shin Nihon Shuppansha, 2011).

criticized NHK for "using public funds to spread a distorted view of history."[56]

Shiba himself had anticipated such criticisms of *Clouds Above the Hill*, fearing reactions that his narrative might be charged with glorifying militarism or used for this purpose, and he spoke out explicitly against turning the novel into a television or film drama.[57] It is important to note here that, despite constructing a bright image of the Russo-Japanese War, Shiba strongly opposed the glorification of the Asia-Pacific War (1931-1945). In an essayistic piece published in 1997, he wrote:

> That war [the Asia-Pacific War, 1931-1945] caused suffering for many non-Japanese peoples. Although there may have been no explicit intention of territorial expansion […], it was a war of aggression (*shinryaku sensō deshita*). But it was the U.S., Britain, France, and Holland on whom Japan declared war: it attempted to seize the oil reserves in those nations' overseas territories. To that end, Japan attacked the British stronghold in Singapore and American bases in Corregidor [in the Philippines]. Thus, at that time the Japanese people understood the war was a fight against the Euro-American powers. […] Some [seek to defend Japan's actions in Asia by arguing] that as a result of the war, the countries of Southeast Asia were able to gain their independence. However, even if this were true, Japan's real intention in Southeast Asia was […] to secure oil. In order to protect its access to oil supplies, Japan attacked the neighboring American and British bases, and built defensive bases throughout the region. If Japan's actions had really stemmed from the noble [literally, holy] intention of liberating countries from colonialism, it would first have had to give up its own colonies in Korea

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56 Nakatsuka, Yasukawa, and Daigo, *NHK Dorama 'Saka no ue no kumo' no rekishikan o tō*, 162.

57 Nakatsuka, *Shiba Ryōtarō no rekishikan*, 21.

and Taiwan.[58]

While "the Shiba view of history" is centered on the Russo-Japanese War as this passage illustrates, Shiba was strongly critical of Japan's policies of aggression during the Asia-Pacific War. As a result of his popularity in Japan, the Shiba view of history—or at least this aspect of it—has come to function as a bulwark against historical revisionism, a movement which aims to affirm and promulgate the "noble intent" of the Greater East Asia War.

4c. Battle of Tsushima / Tsushima War

Another memorial institution gives us a certain insight into the complex nature of the Russo-Japanese War. Between 2004 and 2005, a number of memorial events marked the 100th anniversary of the conflict. They included the erection of a series of memorials and commemorative stones on Tsushima, the island group midway between Japan and Korea that gave its name to the Battle of Tsushima. Whereas in Japan, the 1905 naval battle is usually called the "Battle of the Japan Sea" (*Nihon-kai kaisen*), this name has never been recognized in Tsushima itself, whereas in English, local people refer to it as the Battle of Tsushima (*Tsushima kaisen*) or even as the "Tsushima War." In order to publicize their claim to the name "Battle of Tsushima," the locals planned a memorial to the war on the island in 2004 and completed it the next year.[59]

The group behind the planning, fundraising, and building of this memorial went under the name of the "Tsushima Committee for the Advancement of History and Honorable Commemoration." From the

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[58] Shiba Ryōtarō, *Kono kuni no katachi* [The Shape of This Country], vol. 4 (Tokyo: Bungei shunjū, 1997), 241.

[59] For details, see Hirano, Saaler, and Säbel, "Recent Developments in the Representation of National Memory and Local Identities."



Figure 4. The Monument of Peace and Friendship, Tsushima

materials that the group has publicly released, the memorial evokes a strange combination of local nationalism and what might be described as a universal humanism.

One of the group's slogans is "Friendly Wings," a phrase referring to the respect the Russian and Japanese commanders extended to each other during the conflict. An image on the front cover of the group's pamphlet attempts to illustrate this: it shows the victor, Admiral Tōgō, following Western "knightly" tradition by visiting his wounded Russian adversary, who is being treated in the hospital. The same motif was also used on a memorial built in 2005 (see Figure 4). The pamphlet also emphasizes stories of local residents who rescued stranded Russian sailors following the battle. Based on this "bond" between Russian sailors and Japanese civilians, as well as that linking the Russian and Japanese naval commanders, the Tsushima group has attempted to appeal to universal values and provide a model that might contribute to the improvement of current Sino-Japanese relations.

Such emphasis on a universal humanism, however, is undermined by other parts of the group's pamphlet, which demonstrates an unsettling

nationalism arguing that the Battle of Tsushima should serve as a source of revitalization for a "weak Japan."[60]

> One hundred years ago the small, almost unknown nation of Japan was forced into conflict with the then great military superpower Russia. The Japan Sea and the shores of Tsushima became the site of a large-scale, decisive battle. Japan's complete and unparalleled victory in this conflict sent out massive shockwaves and sparked reaction around the world. [...] Just thirty odd years after the Meiji Restoration, Japan had fully realized its reputation as 'Bushido Nippon.' [...] We lament the fact that today Japan has lost its confidence, and we would like to see it regain the courage and moral fiber it once had. Therefore, as proud Japanese citizens [...] we believe that by passing on the memory of May 27 [the date of the battle of Tsushima] to the youth of today and the future, our country, *Nippon*, will be empowered to regain the hopes and dreams it once had.

In this statement, the Tsushima group uses phraseology strongly reminiscent of Shiba's writings in an attempt to create a positive image of the decisive naval battle of the Russo-Japanese War and to stir up nationalist sentiment in contemporary Japan. The group also demonstrates proximity to Shiba's writings by putting the phrase "Last Chapter of Shiba Ryôtarô's Clouds Above the Hill" (*Shiba Ryôtarô gensaku 'Saka no ue no kumo' Saishû-shô*) on the cover of the pamphlet.[61] Nevertheless, attempting to boost nationalism by referring to a war that took place more than 100 years ago evidently has its limitations in contemporary Japan. The commemorative ceremony that took place at Tsushima in 2005 and

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[60] Takesue Yasuo, *'Bushidō Nippon' 'shin no nashonarizumu,' hokori aru 'Nihon-dzukuri' wa, Tsushima kara*... ['Bushido Nippon,' 'True Nationalism,' 'Creating a Proud Japan'—from Tsushima…] (Unpublished pamphlet, 2005).

[61] Ibid.

the erection of the memorial to the Battle of Tsushima attracted little attention at the national level, demonstrating the difficulties involved in seeking to inspire contemporary Japanese through memories of a far-off conflict.

5. Conclusion and Prospects

The memorials discussed in this paper share a tendency to present naval warfare in a positive light and to portray sea battles as chivalrous and "clean" affairs. In both Japan and Germany, naval memorials are primarily intended to address a domestic audience and offer visitors a narrative they can readily identify with. Such memorials are the expression of a particular strand in the politics of memory that aims at reconfirming national integrity following a costly war or reframing national identity. The main strategy used by the architects of naval memorials to achieve this aim is to reassure the public that the war dead died a meaningful death, and that they gave their lives for the survival of the fatherland and its future prosperity. In Germany, early inscriptions on naval memorials typically stated that the war dead died "for us," i.e., for postwar visitors to these monuments. Japanese memorials emphasize the chivalry of sailors and naval officers and the technological achievements of the engineers who built the warships that took part in the battles commemorated. In none of the memorials discussed here can we find any reflection on the causes of war or any mention of its darker side, an aspect of war from which naval forces were not exempt as we know today. The potentially divisive character of such memorials is clear, and the changes made to the German naval memorial during the 1970s reflect the reality that interpretations and representations of naval warfare are subject to criticism and contestation and to change over time.

From what has been said above, it is also evident that such memorials are poorly suited to pursuing an agenda of reconciliation with former opponents. Their narrow focus on attributing meaning to the

deaths of "heroic" sailors rather than questioning war itself reduces their function to a purely domestic one. In an international setting, such memorials can readily become a source of conflict. Logically, there should always be at least two sides involved in discussions of how a particular conflict should be interpreted and commemorated. If historical reconciliation is to be made a priority by a government or a body charged with administering a given memorial, then it needs to take into account (although not necessarily fully adopt) the historical viewpoints espoused by "others" such as former wartime enemies or particular groups of victims. Adhering to a one-sided interpretation of history that ignores outside perspectives will obstruct the process of reconciliation and the re-establishment of friendly relations between former enemy states.

Naval memorials are particularly prone to such narrowness of vision, as pointed out in the introduction. In general, naval memorials tend to celebrate the "heroism," "honor," and "courage" associated with sea battles. While a consideration of naval memorials outside Germany and Japan is beyond the scope of this paper, upon its closing, it might be worth drawing attention to the modification of existing memorials in other countries with the aim of promoting an agenda of reconciliation. For example, when the USS *Arizona* Memorial commemorating the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 was remodeled in 2010, the accompanying exhibition was also revised to include varying historical interpretations and perspectives.[62] Before crossing over to the *Arizona*, positioned offshore in such a way that it appears partly submerged, visitors have the option of entering a small exhibition room that the ticket-entrance staff strongly "recommend" them to see. Far from promoting a one-sided view of American history and Japanese treachery, this new display presents some historical background to the Pearl Harbor

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[62] See http://www.hawaiimagazine.com/blogs/hawaii_today/2010/11/29/Pearl_Harbor_new_visitor_center_opening_December_7; http://news.yahoo.com/pearl-harbor-memorial-host-japan-tea-ceremony-101137517.html; http://pearlharborvisitorcenter.com/mission.htm.

attack, including the history of *Nikkei*-Japanese in Hawaii. These changes were partly prompted by a desire not to offend the memorial's numerous Japanese visitors since Japan is after all an important ally of the United States in the Pacific region. Previously, the USS *Arizona* had been known to Americans and the world only as a reminder of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Day of Infamy," December 9, 1941, when Japanese fighter-bombers attacked the United States fleet out of a clear blue sky. However, in order to foster peace and improve relations with Japan, the view of history that had long held sway has been reexamined even in this highly sensitive location, and the ship is now being used to facilitate reconciliation between former enemies. Such a change of direction suggests that a nation's historical memorialization of its most celebrated naval battles need not function as a permanent impediment to peace and reconciliation in the contemporary world.

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Constraint Novelty: Literature and "National Concordance" in Manchukuo

Ying Xiong
Free University of Berlin

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Constraint Novelty: Literature and "National Concordance" in Manchukuo

Manchukuo has attracted academic attention in recent decades for its ideological novelty of "national concordance." Drawing upon the examples of the writings of Japanese writers such as Ōuchi Takao, Kitamura Kenjirō, Yamada Seisaburō, and Kawabata Yasunari, as well as those of Chinese writers such as Tian Bing and Yi Chi, this article seeks to reveal that rather than a consistent discourse, "national concordance" in Manchuria was inherently constructive. With the influx of Japanese emigrants in 1937, Chinese literature and its Japanese translations served as a means of colonial governance to produce colonial identities and relations within the ideological scope of "national concordance." Within this constructed literary space, depiction of the "White Russian" community became a contested field in which Japanese and Chinese authors sought to articulate their different political views.

Keywords: Manchukuo, colonization, Chinese literature, translation, White Russian

Constraint Novelty: Literature and "National Concordance" in Manchukuo

Ying Xiong
Free University of Berlin

Although Manchukuo, the Japanese colonial territory in northeastern China, existed for less than fifteen years, it represents an excellent example of the complexity of colonialism and colonial governance in the twentieth century. Over the past few decades, Manchukuo's ideological novelty in its accommodation of transnationalism has attracted considerable academic attention. Prasenjit Duara, Rana Mitter, Louise Young, Hyun Ok Park, Komagome Takeshi, and Suk-Jung Han, among others, have enriched the narrative of Manchukuo's history tremendously. Their efforts have successfully shifted the study of Manchukuo from that of a nation-centered paradigm that prioritized Manchukuo's "puppet" nature to one of transcultural and transnational perspectives that emphasize the regional and de-territorial forces. The role of culture and ideology in the building of a "transnational" Manchukuo has also been recognized. The new scholarship tends to highlight the imperative to theorize the concept of colonialism—a term that was often defined narrowly and linked to territorial expansions that relied on violence and killing.

A further step, however, leads to the question of *how* within the

transnational and pan-Asian ideological framework colonial governance by means other than elimination and suppression could have operated. In what follows, by using the writings of a group of Chinese and Japanese authors, an attempt is made to show how the rhetoric of "national concordance" was constructed according to specific colonial agendas and how it led to the further consolidation of colonial rule in Manchukuo. Chinese literature and its Japanese translation, authorized by the "national concordance" rhetoric, worked as an apparatus to promote Japanese migration to Manchuria after 1937. Yet, in the very deployment of colonial power, and through the depiction of "White Russians" in literature, the Chinese writers found a way to voice their opinion on "national concordance." This was in sharp contrast to that of their Japanese counterparts, who also found the image of the "White Russians" a useful vehicle of expression. Instead of pitting the constructs of transnational and national, and resistance and collaboration against each other, this article aims at revealing the interplay between these forces and the way in which colonial power sought to govern.

Constraint Novelty: "National Concordance" in Manchukuo

As early as the late 1980s, Manchukuo's critical position in Japan's modern history persuaded academics such as Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie to distinguish it from other forms of Japanese imperialist dominations. Different from both the "Japanese colonial empire" and the "informal empire" gained through the unequal treaty system, Manchukuo was considered a part of "Japan's Wartime Empire" in Northeast Asia. It was viewed as the beginning of an "ill-considered" adventure "beyond the boundaries of the formal empire," and a turning

point in the "rational" Japanese expansion since the Meiji period.[1]

In contrast to the above opinion, Prasenjit Duara interprets the history of Manchukuo as a deviation from Japan's older mode of colonial governance in Korea or Taiwan. "No matter how imperialistic the intentions of its builders, Manchukuo was not developed as a colony, but as a nation-state," Duara argues.[2] For its highly advanced urban industry and economy, Manchukuo should be "distinguished not only from pre-modern states, but also from most nineteenth-century colonial states."[3] Similarly, Louise Young has focused on Manchukuo's "bravery," backed by the formal colonial institutions such as the Kwangtung governor general and other informal controls, such as market dominance and cultivation of a collaborative elite.[4]

Among Manchukuo's many acclaimed "particularities," its ideological capability to implement "regionalism," "Asianism," "transnationalism," and even "globalism" or "cosmopolitanism" within the same colonial space stands out.[5] Founded in 1932, Manchukuo was propagated as a land of the "Kingly Way" (王道) that was characterized by the "concordance of five nations" (五族協和).[6] The Declaration of

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1 Mark R. Peattie, "Introduction," in *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945*, ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 57.

2 Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 1.

3 Prasenjit Duara, "Nationalism, Imperialism, Federalism, and the Case of Manchukuo: A Response to Anthony Pagden," *Common Knowledge* 12, no. 1 (2006): 60.

4 Louise Young, *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998), 11.

5 See Han Suk-Jung's discussion on the "nationalization of transnationalism" in Manchukuo. Han Suk-Jung, "The Problem of Sovereignty: Manchukuo, 1932-1937," *Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique* 12, no. 2 (2004): 464-470.

6 This paper's author prefers to translate *gozoku* as "five nations" rather than "five races" or "five ethnicities" from the acknowledgement that the adoption of *gozoku kyōwa* in Manchukuo was largely a response to rising national aspirations and to thoughts of national self-determination after 1918. Therefore, *minzoku kyōwa* is rendered as "national concordance" and *gozoku kyōwa* as "concordance of five nations."

Manchukuo Foundation stated that there should be no differences between those living within this new territory, and people of all nations including the five nations—Han Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Japanese, and Koreans—were to be treated equally, as long as they wished to permanently reside in Manchukuo.[7]

This rhetoric of "national concordance" was in full accordance with Manchuria's demographic makeup, in which the Chinese were the dominant population.[8] Throughout the 1920s, between 800,000 and one million Chinese—predominantly from the provinces of Shandong and Hebei—crossed the Great Wall and moved to Manchuria.[9] Before the foundation of Manchukuo, more than 30 million *Manjin* were already living in the Manchurian area.[10] In contrast, by 1936, only 4,245 individuals from 2,367 Japanese households relocated to Manchukuo although the first wave of Japanese immigration had started in 1932.[11] The large-scale Japanese migration occurred after 1937. In 1940, however, there were only 820,000 Japanese people among Manchukuo's total population of 43,203,000.[12] In addition to the Chinese and Japanese, there were other national groups, as well. For example, in 1939, roughly one million Mongols and an equal number of Koreans, in addition to "White Russians" and communities of Germans, Jews, Ukrainians, Poles, and Crimean Tartars co-habited this region.[13]

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7 Manshūkokushi hensan kankōkai, ed., *Manshūkokushi* [The History of Manchukuo] (Tokyo: Manmō dōhō engokai, 1970), 219.

8 The population consisted mostly of Han Chinese and Manchu people, who were lumped together by the Japanese under a category known as *manjin* (満人).

9 Yamamuro Shin'ichi, *Manchuria Under Japanese Domination*, trans. Joshua A. Fogel (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 10.

10 Ibid.

11 Takumushō daijin kanbō bunshoka, ed., *Takumu tōkei Shōwa jūichi-nen* [Statistics of Exploration in 1936] (Tokyo: Takumu daijin kanbō bunshoka, 1938), 225.

12 Lori Watt, *When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and Reintegration in Postwar Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009), 31.

13 John J. Stephan, "Hijacked by Utopia: American Nikkei in Manchuria," *Amerasia Journal* 23, no.

In addition, the adoption of "national concordance" in Manchukuo was a result of various international pressures. Following the end of World War I, the decline of colonial control in Asia, combined with rising nationalism in what would later be known as the Third World, changed the global power balance. Anti-imperialist movements attained new heights in East Asia starting with the March First protest in Korea in March 1919 and China's May Fourth Movement in the same year. An absolute annexation such as those that took place in Taiwan and Korea would have been an anachronistic move. Instead, it was more advisable to preserve the language, religion, culture, and customs of the peoples that lived in the state. Even the dethroned Qing Emperor became an effective means to accommodate Chinese nationalism, to mobilize Chinese local elites, and to support the tenuous sovereignty that had been undermined by the Lytton Commission.[14]

The path to realizing "national concordance" in actuality was fraught with many challenges. For example, there was never a law of nationality to clearly define the subjects of Manchukuo. According to Mariko Asano Tamanoi, classifying who was to be considered Manchurian involved multiple and sometimes contradictory parameters.[15] For example, although they were considered a part of the five nations, the Korean people faced ambiguities. Like their Japanese counterparts in Manchukuo, the Koreans continued to hold dual "nationalities"—in both Japan and Manchukuo. They were required to

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3 (January 1997): 2.

14 For research on the ideological and cultural means adopted by the Manchukuo government, see Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity*. Rana Mitter, *The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance, and Collaboration in Modern China* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000). Warren Smith, *Confucianism in Modern Japan* (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1973). Komagome Takeshi, *Shokuminchi teikoku Nihon no bunka tōgō* [The Cultural Integration of the Colonial Japanese Empire] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1996).

15 Mariko Asano Tamanoi, "Knowledge, Power, and Racial Classification: The 'Japanese' in 'Manchuria,'" *The Journal of Asian Studies* 59, no. 2 (May 2000): 255-256.

register in the family registry system organized by the Government-General of Korea. They paid taxes to the Manchukuo government, while being mobilized into the voluntary army by the Government-General of Korea.[16] After 1935, the education affairs of the Japanese people in Manchuria were entrusted to the Japanese Foreign Ministry, while the administration of Korean people's education was transferred to Manchukuo.[17] The Korean people living in Manchukuo were torn between Manchukuo's "concordance of five nations" and the colonial policy of "Japan and Korea are one body" (内鮮一体) that was especially favored by Minami Jirō (1874-1955), who was the Governor-General of Korea between 1936 and 1942.[18] In contrast, the "White Russians" did not even constitute Manchukuo's "five nations," yet became a frequent theme in many different writings and researches during the late 1930s and early 1940s. Consequently, their history and status were frequently reported, which seems to suggest that "national concordance" was a rhetorical exercise at best.

Manchukuo's "national concordance" was further undercut by the national conflicts that constituted a regular part of daily life. As Louise Young has suggested, labels such as "corruptibility," "lack of patriotism," and "banditry" were frequently used to cast aspersions on Chinese nationalism, to exploit cheap labor, and even to justify the killing of civilians.[19] This unequal relationship, however, was not just between the Japanese and Chinese people. Rather, it existed among various nations.

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16 Hyun Ok Park, *Two Dreams in One Bed: Empire, Social Life, and the Origins of the North Korean Revolution in Manchuria* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 134-139.

17 Tanaka Ryūichi, "'Manshū kokumin' no sōshutsu to 'Zaiman Chōsenjin' mondai [The Birth of 'Manchukuo's National Subjects' and the Issues of 'Korean People in Manchuria']," *Higashi Ajia kindaishi* 6 (2003): 29-30.

18 Ibid., 32-37.

19 Louise Young, "Rethinking Race for Manchukuo," in *The Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, ed. Frank Dikötter (London: Hurst & Company, 1997), 165-167.

For example, in 1938 many Chinese workers from the provinces of Hebei, Shanxi, and Henan were recruited in Manchukuo as "coolies." Without a local identity, they usually worked under the supervision of Korean people, while the Japanese themselves seldom pariticipated in construction work.[20] As the present paper will later show, this form of multilayered national inequality was encapsulated in the writings of many Chinese writers. "National concordance" in Manchuria was subject to a bigger crisis when the great migration policy was adopted in August 1936 by the Hirota cabinet.

Against this background, colonial governance had to be enhanced across multifarious domains, and the cultural and literary dimension that has been largely underestimated thus far can be seen as a likely area where colonial governance could have been applied. Colonialism, or imperialism, is not just a system of military enforcement, bureaucratic mechanisms, legal institutions, and economic enterprises, but also an engine of cultural mobilization and literary expression. During this time, writers and translators were equally entrapped in the ubiquitous net of colonial power and participated in colonial governance.

Here, the concepts of governmentality and governance from Foucault are borrowed. By doing so, this paper aims to study the dimension of colonial governance that did not necessarily rely on deduction or suppression. In Foucault's theory, governmentality, or the so-called art of governance, takes the population as its direct object, and sets as its aim the welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health and so on.[21] In this paper, Foucault's concepts are introduced into the colonial context. As Foucault suggested, it was, among other factors, the establishment of

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[20] Liu Chunying, "Dayaxiya yu 'dadongyazhanzheng' [Pan-Asianism and the Greater East Asian War]," *Ribenxue luntan* 190 (2008): 51-52.

[21] Michel Foucault, "Governmentality," in *The Foucault Effect*, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 94.

colonial states since the sixteenth century that yielded a problem for governments in the first place.[22] By introducing Foucault's concepts into Manchukuo, Foucault's question of "how to govern others, by whom the people will accept being governed"[23] turns into a concrete question of how to govern different nations residing in Manchukuo under various international and internal constraints.

Aided by Foucault's concepts, colonial power can be conceived beyond the narrow definition of deduction, subtraction, or suppression—in a word, a right of seizure that depends on prohibition and punishment; rather, it also takes the form of producing or enabling the existence of the colonized "other" as well as colonial relations.[24] As this paper will show, Chinese literature and the "White Russian" community were to some extent supported rather than purely suppressed in the late 1930s and early 1940s. However, this does not mean that colonial power was by nature benevolent; it rather invites reflection on such power's devious route. Resistance is accordingly no longer limited to a single form of opposition to colonial suppression. Rather, as Foucault suggested, where there is power, there is resistance, and resistance never exists outside the power relation.[25] It was through the deployment of colonial governance that colonial resistance uttered its voice.

Chinese Literary Space Constructed

Despite Manchukuo's policy of "national concordance," in the early stages of Manchuria's literary development there was virtually very little interaction between Japanese writers and their Chinese counterparts, and

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[22] Ibid., 88.

[23] Ibid., 87.

[24] Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality,* trans. Robert Hurley, vol. 1 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 136-137.

[25] Ibid., 95.

this remained largely the case until 1937. In the early days of Manchukuo, Japanese and Chinese writers not only lived and worked in different areas of Manchuria, but also tended to favor different literary forms. Japanese literature in Manchuria cultivated traditional literary genres such as *haiku*, *tanka*, and poetry, while Chinese literature in Manchuria, influenced by the May Fourth Movement, was rooted in short stories and novels. The development of Japanese-language literature in Manchuria was geographically associated with the development of the South Manchurian Railway Company (SMR), extending along the railway lines and concentrated in the hub cities of Dalian and Changchun (later Shinkyō) whereas Chinese literature thrived mainly in Harbin where policing and screening systems were lax.[26] By 1928, Chinese literature in the form of poetry and novels had already begun to flourish in Manchuria. The first literary group "Poplars" (白楊社) was founded in Jilin in 1920 by Mu Mutian (1900-1971), who later came to be a well-known symbolist poet of China.[27] Eight years later, another literary group was formed under the name "Beyond the Borders" (關外).[28]

However, the foundation of Manchukuo marked the start of censorship and regulation. Books, magazines, newspapers, broadcasting, and films were initially regulated by the propaganda department within the so-called Finance and Politics Bureau (資政局). However, the Bureau

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[26] See Okada Hideki, *Bungaku ni miru "Manshū koku" no isō* [The Manchukuo Phase Seen from the Perspective of Literature] (Tokyo: Kenbun shuppan, 2000), 114. "Shinkyō" (新京) was the name used to refer to the Chinese city Changchun (長春) under Japanese occupation. Changchun was renamed Shinkyō in 1932, shortly after the establishment of Manchukuo, and served as the capital of Manchukuo until Japan's defeat in August 1945. After that, it was re-named Changchun, its original Chinese name. In this article, "Changchun" is used to discuss activities that happened before 1932, while in other cases the Japanese name "Shinkyō" is used to keep the original historical meaning.

[27] Ōuchi Takao, *Manshū bungaku nijūnen* [The Twenty-Year History of Manchurian Literature] (Shinkyō: Kokumin gahōsha, 1943), 337.

[28] Ibid., 339. The group's name alludes to the division of China by the Shanhaiguan (山海關, the mountain-sea barrier) into "inside"and "outside" (where Northeast China lies).

was disbanded in July 1932 and the task of propaganda and censorship was entrusted to the Information Sector within the Management and Coordination Agency of the General Affairs State Council (国務院総務庁情報処), which was eventually expanded and re-named the Propaganda Agency of the General Affairs State Council (国務院総務庁弘報処) in 1937. Authorized by the Publication Law of 1932, the police had the right to destroy any content they deemed as "dangerous."[29] The police arrested and murdered many Chinese writers in the years between 1934 and 1936 and Chinese literature in Manchuria lost its vibrancy.[30]

Meanwhile, in October 1935, in order to enhance propaganda in Manchukuo, the Kwangtung Army came up with the idea of establishing the Association for Propaganda (満洲弘報協会).[31] It controlled not only publication houses, but also newspapers and many small newspapers were forcibly disbanded. Before 1935, local newspapers, such as *Shengjing Times* (盛京時報), which blended Japanese ownership with Chinese management, were the main forums for the publication of Chinese-language literature. With Japanese interference, Chinese writers lost the space where they had once published their works and views.[32] Faced with such difficulties, Chinese-language literature subsequently ground to a halt.[33]

Yet, the situation took a sharp turn in 1937. After a long period of silence, the renaissance of Chinese literature started with the establishment

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29 Xie Xueshi, *Weimanzhouguoshi xinbian* [New Account of the History of Manchukuo] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2008), 370.

30 Ibid., 379.

31 "Kyōryoku na genron kikan junbi no hitsuyō: Kōhō kyōkai setsuritsu ni tsuki Itagaki sanbōchō setsumei [The Necessity of Setting Up Propaganda Offices: Chief of staff Itagaki Seishirō's Explanation Regarding the Establishment of the Association for Propaganda]," *Manshū nichinichi shinbun*, September 1936.

32 Norman Smith, *Resisting Manchukuo: Chinese Women Writers and the Japanese Occupation* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2008), 41.

33 Ōuchi, *Manshū bungaku nijūnen*, 350.

of three literary journals between 1937 and 1938: *Brightness* (明明 *Mingming*), the *Journal of Arts and Literature* (藝文志 *Yiwenzhi*), and *Manchurian Romanticism* (滿洲浪曼 *Manshū roman*). Ōuchi Takao's two collections of translations of Chinese works in 1939 and 1940 were also published during this period.[34] Many Chinese literary works as well as Ōuchi's translations made their debut in these three journals.

Born in 1907 in Fukuoka, Ōuchi moved to Changchun in 1921. In 1925, he was admitted to the East Asia Common Culture Academy (東亜同文書院) in Shanghai. During this period, Ōuchi gravitated toward a Chinese literary group named the Creation Society and enjoyed close personal interactions with Chinese writers who used to study in Japan.[35] Ōuchi joined the SMR immediately after his graduation in 1929, during which time he also edited the *Manchurian Review* (滿州評論 *Manshū hyōron*).[36] Influenced by his early interactions with Chinese writers and the overall pan-Asianist atmosphere at the East Asia Common Culture Academy, Ōuchi constantly criticized Manchukuo's early policies. He was accused of having broken the Peace Preservation Law in 1931 and 1933, respectively, and was repatriated to Japan, as recorded in *The Japanese Communist Movements in Manchuria*.[37] Eager to make a contribution to Manchukuo's "national concordance," Ōuchi devoted himself to translating Chinese literature after 1937.

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[34] The Japanese character adopted by the journal was "曼," rather than "漫," which was equivalent to the word "romanticism." However, since there is no better word than romance by which to translate "浪曼," "Manchurian Romanticism" is used in this paper, while fully recognizing the limitations of its use.

[35] The Creation Society was a literary organization founded in Japan in 1921 by Chinese overseas students. It marked a new trend of revolutionary literature after 1928. In February 1929, it was forced to dissolve under Kuomintang pressure.

[36] For a brief biography, see Okada Hideki, "The Realities of Racial Harmony: The Case of the Translator Ōuchi Takao," *Acta Asiatica* 72 (March 1997): 61-80.

[37] Kantō kenpeitai shireibu, *Zaiman nikkei kyōsanshugi undō* [The Japanese Communist Movements in Manchuria] (Tokyo: Kyokutō kenkyūjo shuppankai, 1969), 244. Yet, Ōuchi was not a communist and he called himself a humanist.

In addition to the three journals and Ōuchi's collections of his translations, in 1938, a bilingual "National Collection" that published not only Chinese classical works, but also works of modern Chinese writers, was launched in Manchuria. In 1939, the third issue of *The Yearbook of Manchurian Literature and Arts* (滿洲文藝年鑑) for the first time demonstrated a willingness to incorporate the works of Chinese writers. From then on, not only did Chinese and Japanese intellectuals gain a shared space for publication, but they also had occasion to interact directly with one another in journal editing and publishing roles.

The Manchurian literary arena in the late 1930s and early 1940s, which was in principle a difficult period for people living in colonial Taiwan and Korea, was more productive than usually assumed, due to Japanese promotion of Chinese literature and literary interactions between the Japanese and the Chinese people in Manchuria. Yet, the fact that Japanese and Chinese authors interacted more frequently after 1937 was not a sign of Manchukuo's loss of control in cultural affairs. It instead reflected the fact that imperialism in Manchukuo was not solely based on the means of negating the existence of others. The colonial government exhibited its control by constructing colonial identities and relations within the society. This period of growth of literary translations of Chinese works coincided with a crucial moment in the development of Manchurian cultural identity.

According to the "Treaty between Japan and Manchukuo regarding the living conditions, taxation and other matters of Japanese subjects in Manchukuo" that was signed by Manchukuo and Japan in 1936 and 1937, Japanese people could travel freely between Manchukuo and Japan with rights over land and property in Manchukuo.[38] At the same time,

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[38] "Manshūkoku ni okeru Nihonkoku shinmin no kyojū oyobi Manshūkoku no kazei tō ni kansuru Nihonkoku Manshūkoku kan jōyaku [Treaty between Japan and Manchukuo Regarding the Living Conditions, Taxation and Other Matters of Japanese Subjects in Manchukuo]," n.d., File No. A03022067100, Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, http://www.jacar.go.jp.

waves of Japanese farmers, bureaucrats, and intellectuals were transferred to Manchukuo. By 1937, Manchukuo had undergone far-reaching administrative reforms, starting with the retirement of many influential figures that had founded Manchukuo, along with the arrival of a new generation of leaders including Hoshino Naoki (1892-1978), Tōjō Hideki (1884-1948), and Matsuoka Yōsuke (1880-1946) transferred from Tokyo. The influx of Japanese migrants and the new leadership subsequently triggered a debate over "Manchurian literature" (満洲文学) in 1936 and 1937, demonstrating an identity crisis among Japanese people living in Manchuria. For example, many Japanese authors, including Ōuchi, opined that the literature of Manchukuo had its own value and was distinct from Japanese literature. Yoshino Haruo (1901-), the journalist for *Manshū nichinichi shinbun* and the Secretary-General of a semi-official literary organization called the Manchurian Literary Association (満洲文話会), not only differentiated Japanese literature in Japan from Japanese literature in Manchukuo, but also argued that Manchurian literature should be written by people living in Manchukuo rather than by visitors.[39] The debate over "Manchurian literature" could be regarded as a response to the relinquishment of Japanese civilian extraterritorial rights over Manchukuo.[40]

Developing Manchurian cultural identities was then a crucial task for the state of Manchukuo. As part of legitimizing the projected image of an independent cultural identity, Manchukuo in turn needed a corresponding notion of an independent Manchurian literature. Chinese literature became indispensable to Manchurian cultural identity, and more broadly, to Manchukuo's future legitimacy. In the words of Kanō

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[39] Amano Masami, "Henyō suru bungaku: Manshū bungaku ronsō o megutte [Changing Literature: On the Manchurian Literature Debate]," in *"Shōwa" bungakushi ni okeru "Manshū" no mondai dai-2* [The Issue of Manchuria in the Literary History of the Shōwa Period No. 2], ed. Sugino Yōkichi (Tokyo: Waseda daigaku kyōiku gakubu Sugino Yōkichi kenkyūshitsu, 1992), 54.

[40] Ibid.

Saburō, "It is useful to define the essence of Manchurian literature through its interaction with Chinese literature, and draw on the elements that can secure Manchukuo's independence."[41] As such, after 1937, the rhetoric of independent Manchurian literature and cultural identity reached an apex in its discourse, leading to a wave of state-sponsored literary activities.

With the official plan to restore Manchurian culture, a large sum of money was offered to support the literary activities of Chinese living in Manchukuo by the Manchukuo-Japan Cultural Union, which was founded by the Cultural Affairs Department of the Japanese Foreign Ministry in Shinkyō in 1933. It had allocated a financial largesse to support the publication of *Journal of Arts and Literature* since 1939, the year it commenced. It had also sponsored the publication of *Manchurian Romanticism* and covered other expenses for the purpose of intellectual interchange.[42] In 1937, the Manchukuo-Japan Cultural Union funded the meeting of the Symposium of Arts held from September 4 to October 9 of that year.[43] One major topic of the Symposium was promoting Chinese literature in Manchukuo and the development of literary journals.[44] In short, the development of Manchurian literature was to a large degree influenced by the Manchukuo-Japan Cultural Union, which in turn, received money from the Japanese Foreign Ministry in Tokyo.

Although legitimized by the "national concordance" and dictated by the imperative to build an independent Manchurian identity, the

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41 Kanō Saburō, "Manshū bunka no tame ni [For the Sake of Manchurian Culture]," *Manshū hyōron* 21, no. 5 (May 1941): 13.

42 "Man-Nichi bunka kyōkai kiyō e shokuinhyō sōfu Shōwa jūgonen gogatsu [The Summary Report of the Manchukuo-Japan Cultural Union and the List of Staff]," n.d., File No: B05016056800, Sheet No. 11, Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, http://www.jacar.go.jp. Also see Ishida Takuo, "Geibunshi to Man-Nichi bunka kyōkai [Journal of Arts and Literature and the Manchukuo-Japan Cultural Union]," *Chūgoku tōhoku bunka kenkyū no hiroba* 1 (October 2007): 15-21.

43 The summary report of the Manchukuo-Japan Cultural Union, Sheet No. 43.

44 Ibid.

"transnational" literary space was only limited to Chinese literature. Mongolian literature and Korean literature failed to find equal stature, although the widely defined Korean literary field in Manchuria encompassed many writers, such as An Su-gil (1911-1977), Kim Tong-in (1900-1951), Kim Cho-gyu (1914-1990), and Imamura Eiji, and contained a rich body of content ranging from anti-Japanese writings to works celebrating Manchukuo's founding.[45] The development of Chinese literature was by no means a random occurrence, but rather was partially sanctioned by Japan's international agenda. It took place against the backdrop of the Japanese Army seriously considering a confrontation with the Soviet Union around 1938, at which time the idea of Sino-Japanese cooperation (日華提携) became the new slogan of the times. In 1940, when Konoe Fumimaro's government conceived a future position for Japan at the center of a New Order of Greater East Asia, the official position was to publicly promote a Japan-Manchukuo-China partnership.[46] With the support of this policy and backed by substantial financial sponsorship, Chinese literature enjoyed a revival of sorts.

This renaissance, however, belied the significant gap between reality and rhetoric, as demonstrated by Chinese writer Wang Ze's sarcasm: "No one in Manchuria would deny the existence of Japanese literature, but the existence of Chinese literature has been recently discovered by the Japanese."[47] As such, the space of Chinese literature

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[45] Kawamura Minato, *Bungaku kara miru "Manshū": "Gozoku kyōwa" no yume to genjitsu* [Manchurian Seen in Literature: The Dream and Reality of Five Nation in Concordance] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1998), 110-121. The birth and death date of Imamura Eiji was unclear.

[46] Tachibana Shiraki, "Kyōwakai no shinro kakutei ni kansuru kanken [My View Regarding the Future of the Manchurian Concordia Association]," in *Shiraki chosakushū dai-2-kan* [Collected Writings of Tachibana Shiraki, vol. 2], ed. Tachibana Shiraki Chosakushū Kankō Iinkai (Tokyo: Keisō shobō, 1966), 191-192.

[47] Wang Ze, "Man-Nichi bungaku kōryū zatsudan [Conversation on the Literary Interactions between the Chinese and Japanese]," in *Manshū rōman dai-5-shū* [Manchurian Romanticism, vol. 5], ed. Lu Yuanming, Suzuki Sadami, and Ryū Kenki, reprint of 1940 edition (Tokyo: Yumani shobō, 2002), 87.

after 1937 was constructed as a way to combat the Manchurian cultural identity crisis. It ensured that there would be steady Japanese migration into Manchukuo, and would strengthen the bonds being formed between Japan, Manchukuo, and China. It also highlighted the colonial power's capacity to not only eliminate the culture of the colonized other, but also to produce, transform, and construct colonial relations according to its own political needs. Literature, as a field of colonial governance, helped Manchukuo attain its stability and wealth.

The Surrogate Nation in Chinese Literature

The Japanese population constituted the dominant power in Manchukuo. They not only occupied important positions throughout governmental organizations and various institutions, but were also better paid than people from other nations. However, in almost all the Chinese writings in Manchukuo, it is interesting to note that there was no major Japanese protagonist. Chinese writers tended to avoid depicting Japanese characters. If a Japanese character was written into a scene, the writer was expected to reveal his or her attitude toward the Japanese people as well as Manchurian reality.[48] More often than not, Chinese writing preferred to dramatize the lives of "White Russians" in exile instead. For example, Chinese writers such as Jue Qing (1917-1960), Tian Bing (1910-?), Yi Chi (1913-?), Xiao Jun (1907-1988), and Shu Qun (1913-1989) all included "White Russians" in their writings. This was an easy way for the Chinese writers to voice their opinions toward the reality of Manchukuo.

When Manchukuo was founded, more than 75,000 Russians were living in the area, referred to by the colonial state as "foreigners."[49]

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[48] Okada Hideki, *Weimanzhouguo wenxue* [Literature of Puppet Manchukuo] (Changchun: Jilin daxue chubanshe, 2001), 159.

[49] Guang Yang, "Lun weimanzhouguo Chao, Ri wailai minzu yu guojifa de nanchan [Korean and Japanese Nationality in Northeastern China and the Failure of Manchukuo's Nationality Law]"

Among them, approximately 30,000 were so-called "White Russians" who had "lost" their nationalities and the rest were considered citizens of the Soviet Union.[50] Most had occupied the area in the final years of the nineteenth century due to the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway. By the mid-1920s, joined by refugees from the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the ensuing Russian Civil War in the early 1920s, the number of Russians in Harbin alone grew to 150,000, while some 35,000 Russians lived in other settlements in Manchuria.[51] When China officially recognized the Soviet government, in order to keep their jobs at the Chinese Eastern Railway, many Russians opted to become either Chinese or Soviet citizens. Those who refused to declare their allegiance were re-classified by the colonial government as "White Russians," who together with the earlier refugees, came to form the stateless "White Russian" community.

This transitional historical period is captured in Shu Qun's short story "Children without Countries," which depicts the interactions among Chinese, Korean, and Russian students at the Chinese Eastern Railway School in Harbin. At the end of the story, in the wake of the founding of Manchukuo, the Russian students choose to return to the Soviet Union, while the Chinese and the Korean students seek refuge in Shanghai. Historically, Shanghai in the 1930s was a haven for many exiles from around the world, among which many were "White Russians." In fact, there was even a wave of "White Russian literature" in Shanghai's literary arena in the 1930s. Chinese left-wing writers, however, often portrayed these Russians as traitors of the Bolshevik Revolution.[52]

(Master's Dissertation, Yanbian Daxue, 2005), 7.

50 Ibid.

51 John J. Stephan, *The Russian Fascists: Tragedy and Farce in Exile, 1925-1945* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978), 37-40.

52 See Mark Gamsa, *The Reading of Russian Literature in China: A Moral Example and Manual of Practice* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 84.

Chinese writers in Manchuria, in contrast, were inclined to emphasize that Russians in Manchuria were simply people who had no protection from the state, and were, therefore, worthy of pity. For example, Xiao Jun wrote about young Russians who sneaked into ships without tickets on their way back home. The Russian protagonist in Shu Qun's "People without Nationalities" sings the refrain: "Beneath the cloud, I have my country, my sweet home. In the rain, there is my flower. Yet, the blossom fell and the heart has been broken, in this remote land," while the children ask the question "Why do we seem to be the only people in the world that do not have a country?"[53] "Wild Geese Flying Southward," a piece by another Chinese writer, Yi Chi, written during the Chinese literary boom, depicts the hard life of "White Russian" dairy farmers. The protagonist Andrei Lennon is an immigrant to Manchuria who earns his living by selling dairy products. Another character named Alexander works for the Manchukuo government and persuades Lennon to join the cooperative society, informing him that there is no protection of White Russians' private property anymore. And yet, Lennon's fate is not decided by Alexander, but by the person who is in uniform and silently stands behind him. The man in uniform symbolizes the presence of the silent Japanese authority that Chinese writers were unable to portray directly.[54] The identity of "White Russians" and the conflict with the authority symbolized by the uniform is emphasized throughout the entire story. In the end, the protagonist asks bitterly, "Where is the place that we White Russians can call home?"[55] The story fully reveals the living predicament the "White Russians" experienced in Manchukuo.

After the founding of Manchukuo, the government established the

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53 Shu Qun, "Wuguoji de renmen [People without Nationalities]," in *Shu Qun daibiaozuo* [Representative Works of Shu Qun] (Beijing: Huaxia chubanshe, 2010), 93-96.

54 Okada, *Weimanzhouguo wenxue*, 159.

55 Yi Chi, "Yan Nanfei [Wild Geese Flying Southward]," in *Mingming* [Brightness], ed. Xianzhuang shuju, reprint of 1937 edition (Beijing: Xianzhuang shuju, 2008), 201.

so-called Bureau of White Russians in 1934 to assist in the assimilation of the Russian population in Manchukuo. Yet, the Russian population diminished noticeably after 1935 when the Soviets sold the railway to Japan.[56] This was "an inevitable result of the economic policy of Manchukuo," which introduced monopolies that suffocated private business.[57] The reality of the stateless Russian community aroused the sympathy of Chinese writers who tended to identify their own plight with this destitute group. However, how were these sentiments translated into Japanese? The answer may lie in Ōuchi Takao's translation of Tian Bing's short story "Alyosha."

In "Alyosha," the Chinese protagonist makes his way to a city (known only as "S") and stays at a hotel where he meets a Russian boy by the name of Alyosha. The boy wants to trade a pair of old boots for a drink for his father. From the servants in the hotel, the protagonist hears the tragic story of Alyosha's family. Alyosha's father, a Russian aristocrat in decline had escaped to "X," and sold himself to his present master. He works in his master's vineyard where the conditions are horrible and the work exhausting. The father, who is an alcoholic, often steals from his master and then asks Alyosha to trade the stolen goods for alcohol. Alyosha's sister, who is driven to prostitution, sells herself for a mere "twenty cents" for each encounter. In exchange for food, Alyosha's mother has casual sexual relations with a Chinese man who works in a lime factory that produces construction materials. The Chinese worker, however, refuses to provide for Alyosha as well. The boy has to then either live with his father or wander the streets where he is easily subjected to bullying.[58]

In the original text, there is a scene in which Alyosha enters a shop

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[56] George C. Guins, "Russians in Manchuria," *Russian Review* 2, no. 2 (April 1943): 83.

[57] Ibid., 84.

[58] See Tian Bing, "Aliaoshi [Alyosha]," in *Mingming* [Brightness], ed. Xianzhuang shuju, Reprint of 1937 edition (Beijing: Xianzhuang shuju, 2008), 325-326.

and attempts to trade a pair of old boots for alcohol. The shopkeeper says he will consider it only if Alyosha's sister is willing to trade her body. The shopkeeper rails against Alyosha: "What the hell are you thinking? Your father is a bastard. Go home quickly and tell your sister to save a place for me."[59] Ōuchi, on the other hand, changes these words into "what the hell are you thinking? Go home quickly and tell your sister to come here."[60] In this exchange, the expression "to save a place for me" implies that the shopkeeper wants to visit the prostitute, which is not translated. Instead, it is replaced by "Tell your sister to come here." Thus, without reading the original Chinese version, readers will not understand the shopkeeper's true intentions.

In another scene, in which Alyosha's mother's abject poverty drives her into sexual relations with the lime worker, the original text reads: "In order to have a bowl of food, his wife has gone with a Chinese, a lime worker."[61] Ōuchi's translation reads: "His wife gets food from a Chinese in a lime factory."[62] How Alyosha's mother survives is completely omitted. The Chinese words "gone with a Chinese" (便跟了一個中國人) imply a partnership between a man and a woman. Even though Alyosha's mother goes with a Chinese and can buy food to fill her stomach, Alyosha's situation remains unchanged. In the story, it reads, "This was because the lime worker's salary is too low and he [the Chinese worker] simply does not like him [Alyosha], let alone want to bring him up. To him [Alyosha], the lime worker is also a distant person."[63] Ōuchi's translation reads: "This was because the lime worker's salary is too low

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59 "混蛋你尋思什麼，你爹那個老王八。快回家告訴你姐姐給我留地方。" See Ibid., 325.

60 "馬鹿奴、何を考へてるんだ、此奴、早く家に帰って姉さんにやって来いといへ." See Ōuchi Takao, "Aryōsha," in *Tanpopo: Manjin sakka shōsetsushū: dai ni shū* (Tokyo: Yumani shobō, 2000), 301.

61 "他老婆為了弄点飯吃，便跟了一個中國人，燒石灰的工人。" Tian, "Aliaoshi," 326.

62 "彼の妻は食ふ物を石灰工場の支那人から貰ったりした." See Ōuchi, "Aryōsha," 303.

63 "這也是因為燒石灰的工人收入太少，從根本上，不喜歡他，更不肯養活他的關係。在他也覺得燒石灰的工人是生疏不相吻合的一個人。" See Tian, "Aliaoshi," 326.

and he [Alyosha] really does not appeal to him."[64] The phrases "he simply does not like him," "let alone want to bring him up," and "the lime worker is also a distant person" are not found in Ōuchi's translation. Wittingly or unwittingly, Ōuchi omits any reference to the discord between the Chinese and the "White Russians."

The omission of Alyosha's sister and mother's behavior in Ōuchi's translation might have been due to do his awareness of the "immorality" of these depictions and his willingness to consciously engage in self-censorship in the translation to avoid a repeat of his early unhappy experience of breaking the Peace Preservation Law and being subsequently repatriated. Norman Smith points to the fact that from the late 1930s onward, the Manchurian government managed to create the image of a self-sacrificing and obedient woman through all sorts of positive reinforcement and negative critiques. Women were urged to abandon their luxurious and intemperate lives and direct their energies towards family life and contribute to the war effort.[65] This was not so different from Japan's own regulation of "sexual content" after 1938 in its promotion of a morally stable home front.[66] In February 1941, the colonial state announced the so-called Eight Abstentions (八不主義), which forbade any content concerning "love lust," "recreational love that denigrates chastity," "abnormal sexual desire," or actions of "adultery."[67]

While Ōuchi's translation measured up satisfactorily to the moral standards of colonial rule, his translations also explored the metaphorical nuances associated with "family" and "father" in Chinese writing. In the original Chinese text, the shopkeeper says to the protagonist: "You think

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[64] "これ石灰焼き労働者の収入が余り少なかったかだであるが、それを本当に喜ばなかったからである。" See Ōuchi, "Aryōsha," 304.

[65] Smith, *Resisting Manchukuo*, 33-35.

[66] Barak Kushner, *The Thought War: Japanese Imperial Propaganda* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2006), 62-64.

[67] Smith, *Resisting Manchukuo*, 50.

this guy [Alyosha] is not handsome? He has two fathers!"[68] In other words, the shopkeeper wants to infer that Alyosha's mother has become the Chinese worker's mistress; therefore, Alyosha has two fathers. However, in Ōuchi's translation the expression of "two fathers" implying Alyosha's mother's unfaithful relationship is omitted. He translates this as: "Haven't you heard that his sister is ＊＊＊＊. She does not seem so ugly."[69]

The complex connotations surrounding "family" and "father" have a long history in Chinese literature, something Ōuchi knew well. He once wrote in 1941: "The family and its related problems are easily seen when one reads the recent literary works of Chinese writers in Manchukuo. Ten years ago, it was a typical theme in Chinese literature and this was also true for movies and dramas."[70] Ōuchi once introduced the famous May Fourth writer Ba Jin (1904-2005), who wrote *The Family* (家) in 1931.[71] In modern Chinese literature, family did not exist as a simple social unit; *family* was bound with patriarchy. Family and state were viewed as paired concepts having tight unity. Ōuchi refers to the popularity of family novels (家族小説) in Manchukuo, commenting on their rich reservoir of material for literary writings.[72] However, Ōuchi did not disclose all the intentions of Chinese writers, who, while writing family stories, resorted to metaphors as a means of expressing views that were political. Tian Bing's sarcastic way of writing "two fathers" may serve as a metaphor for the history of Manchukuo, similar to Shu Qun's characterization of "White Russians" as "people without nationalities."

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[68] "他姐姐沒聽說嗎，兩角錢一下，別看這傢伙樣不幾，兩爹呢。" See Tian, "Aliaoshi," 325.

[69] "お聞きになった事ありませんか、これの姉さんは＊＊＊＊なんですよ、これみたいに不様じゃありませんよ。" See Ōuchi, "Aryōsha," 301.

[70] Yama, "Mankei to kazoku seido [Chinese People and the Family System]," Manshū hyōron 21, no. 18 (November 1941): 31. Yama is Ōuchi's pseudonym.

[71] Huang Yang, "Shina kankei sūsho [Some Books Concerning China]," *Manshū hyōron* 23, no. 4 (July 1942): 28. Huang Yang is also Ōuchi's pseudonym.

[72] Ibid.

Translation has always been central to colonial encounters. According to Lydia Liu, translation was "indispensable to the processes of global circulation of colonial language theories, universal history, scientific discourse, material culture, and international law for the past few hundred years."[73] It was an instrument for establishing and perpetuating the superiority of colonial cultures over the colonized.[74] In fact, the history of colonialism can even be perceived as a history of translation, a history of moulding people's perceptions of self, of others, and the differences that lay between.[75] In Manchukuo, where Japanese demographic status possessed little clout, translation after 1937 was an integral part of colonial governance, installed by the state so that "national concordance" could maintain its lustre and an independent Manchurian cultural identity could stand the trial. However, although the development of Chinese literature was manipulated by the colonial power and mediated by Japanese litterateurs, Chinese writers found a way to voice their opinions in the very deployment of colonial power. Yi Chi's "Wild Geese Flying Southward" and Tian Bing's "Alyosha" were both written during the period of Japanese promotion of Chinese literature after 1937. The portrayal of the "White Russians" became the de facto contested field where both Chinese writers and Japanese translators, under the auspices of colonial government, competed for meaning and nuance. As a function of colonial governance, translation also faced its limits in colonial power.

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[73] Lydia H. Liu, "Introduction," in *Tokens of Exchange: The Problem of Translation in Global Circulations*, ed. Lydia H. Liu (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999), 3.

[74] Susan Bassnett and Harish Trivedi, "Introduction: Of Colonies, Cannibals and Vernaculars," in *Post-Colonial Translation: Theory and Practice*, ed. Susan Bassnett and Harish Trivedi (London: Routledge, 1999), 17.

[75] Ibid.

"National Concordance" Reinvented

The lives of "White Russians" appeared not just in Chinese writings, but also became a frequent theme in Manchukuo's Japanese-language literature around 1940, despite its earlier absence. Three anthologies promoting literature of Manchukuo's various nations were published between 1940 and 1942. They are the *Anthology of Short Stories of Japanese*, *Chinese and White Russian Writers in Manchukuo* (日満露在満作家短編選集) that was edited by the former leftist writer Yamada Seizaburō, and a two-volume series of *Anthology of Literature of Each Nation in Manchukuo* (満洲国各民族創作選集) that was co-edited by Kawabata Yasunari, Kitamura Kenjirō, and the Chinese writer Gu Ding (1914-1964). Although entitled "literature of each nation," the editors only included works by Japanese, Chinese, and "White Russian" writers. For example, the first volume includes pieces from Chinese writers such as Liang Shanding (1914-1997), Gu Ding, Yi Chi, Shi Jun (1912-1949), and Wu Ying (1915-1961). Among them were Ōuchi's translation of Liang Shanding's story and the writings of "White Russian" writers such as Arseny Nesmevelov (1891-1945). Notably, there was not a single piece from a Korean writer.[76] The consistent absence of Korean literature in Manchukuo's blueprint of "national concordance" since 1937 reflected not only the discrepancy in Manchukuo's political rhetoric and reality, but also the imperialist logic of constructing and rearranging colonial relations according to its own needs.

In addition to these anthologies that included writings of "White Russian" authors, many Japanese authors also cast their sights on the lives of "White Russians" in Manchukuo. For example, in 1940, Yoshino Haruo published his short story "Ivan's Home" and Kitamura Kenjirō,

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[76] Annika A. Culver, *Glorify the Empire: Japanese Avant-Garde Propaganda in Manchukuo* (Toronto: University of British Columbia Press, 2014), 183.

the chief editor of *Manchurian Romanticism*, serialized his novel *New Year Scrolls* in *Manshū nichinichi shinbun*. This celebrated novel depicts how the Chinese and "White Russians" collaborated with the Japanese people in Manchukuo.[77] Ōtaki Shigenao (1910-1990) published another "White Russian" theme novel *Light and Land* in 1942.[78] In the same year, Fujiyama Kazuo (1889-1975), the former Manchukuo official who had drafted the "proclamation of Manchukuo's Independence," published *Romanovka Village*. Ōtaki and Fujiyama's books were both published by the Society of Manchurian Settlement (満洲移住協会), which was a semi-official organization established in 1937 with the exclusive goal of promoting Japanese migration to Manchuria. Two years later, Yuasa Katsue (1910-1982), the former left-wing writer who had spent his childhood in Korea, published a novel entitled *The Village of White Russians*.[79] Around the same time, several reports as well as research on the lives of "White Russians" in Manchukuo were published, including *The Story of the Romanovka Village*, *Romanovka Village*, and *The Economy and Lives of White Russians*.[80] The early 1940s marked an unprecedented interest in Japanese writings on the lives of "White Russians" in Manchukuo. The Sino-Japanese literary interactions that started in 1937 developed into a literary space that encompassed the Japanese, Chinese, and "White Russians" in the 1940s.

As mentioned above, Manchuria in the early days attracted Chinese writers, many of whom settled in Harbin where they worked for the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Russians, who figured prominently in some of the writings, also tended to live in Harbin, a cosmopolitan city in the 1920s influenced by Russian architecture and city planning. Japanese

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77 Han Lingling, "Manshūkoku ni okeru Kitamura Kenjirō no sōsaku [Writings of Kitamura Kenjirō in Manchukuo]," *Nihon kenkyū* 48 (September 2013): 186.

78 Kawamura, *Bungaku Kara Miru "Manshū,"* 160.

79 Ibid., 159.

80 Han, "Manshūkoku ni okeru Kitamura Kenjirō no sōsaku," 186.

authors, in contrast, tended to focus on three distinct "White Russian" communities: the Cossack villages in the Sanhe (三河) region, the Romanovka villages (ロマノフカ村), and the Kuanchengzi area (寬城子).

In the early 1930s, the Manchukuo government invited some 8,000 Russian peasants to the Sanhe region, many of whom chose to leave the Primorsky region of the Soviet Union and move to Manchuria in opposition to Soviet collectivization of farmlands.[81] These Russians adjusted well to the Manchurian climate and successfully developed a livestock industry. The Romanovka village, which was located at the then so-called Liushuhezi village, was in close proximity to the Hengdaohezi railway station. In late 1936, 26 households consisting of about 150 Russians were brought to this area, officially leading to the establishment of the community. The new settlers lived off the land, hunting and raising livestock.[82] By the spring of 1945, the population had increased to more than 200 residents, and the village enjoyed a modest living in which each household was said to own a minimum of three horses and two cows.[83] Their strong adaptability attracted Japanese attention and thus was set as the example for the newly arriving Japanese migrants. In 1938, the SMR established the Manchurian Exploration Research Institute (満洲開拓科学研究所) next to the Romanovka village to study the customs of Russian families. The Kuanchengzi community was located near the Kuanchengzi railway station at Manchukuo's capital Shinkyō, an area that was inhabited by many Russian railway workers due its proximity to the Chinese Eastern Railways where many of these Russians worked. After the railway workers left, however, exiled "White Russian" officers and aristocrats re-occupied the region, which once

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81 Yukiko Koshiro, *Imperial Eclipse: Japan's Strategic Thinking about Continental Asia before August 1945* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2013), 75.

82 Fukuda Shinsei, *Hokuman no Roshiajin buraku* [The Russian Communities in Northern Manchuria] (Tokyo: Tama shobō, 1943), 80-81.

83 Koshiro, *Imperial Eclipse*, 76.

again captured public attention around 1937 when Shinkyō began to experience a housing crunch due to the inflow of Japanese emigrants.[84]

Bringing attention to the "White Russian" communities became a part of colonial governance, whose aim was to direct the conduct of Japanese migrants in the 1940s. In September 1939, the Japanese and Manchukuo governments issued the *Principles of Exploring Manchuria*, which officially announced the start of a new phase of migration to Manchukuo. The official language before 1939 was *imin*, but was shifted to *kaitakumin* soon after. Beginning in 1940, many Japanese farmers were sent to Manchukuo, organized in the form of either "group settlements" (集合開拓) or "bloc settlements" (集団開拓). The former contained dozens of households while the latter contained hundreds of households.[85] The Japanese rural settlers, who were mostly scattered along the border with Siberia, were used by the colonial government as a human buffer zone to prevent the encroachment of the Soviet Union and to deter the guerrilla warfare from the Chinese resistance movement.[86] It was a risky experiment for the colonial state, which had little experience in handling such large-scale population mobilization. The original plan of moving one million farmers over the course of two decades was ambitious, but only some 300,000 Japanese farmers actually migrated to Manchuria. Many returned quickly to Japan because they could not withstand Manchukuo's bitter cold and primitive conditions.[87]

In addition to all sorts of economic incentives such as providing livestock, crop mix, seed, and fertilizer, the colonial government also felt the need to prescribe a type of ideological diet for the population. The success story of the "White Russian" community was used as an apt

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84 Han, "Manshūkoku ni okeru Kitamura Kenjirō no sōsaku," 193.

85 Hasegawa Kōyō, *Manshū kaitaku no enkaku to gaibō* [The History and General Picture of Manchurian Exploration] (Tokyo: Manshū ijū kyōkai, 1942), 37-39.

86 Young, *Japan's Total Empire*, 46.

87 Ibid., 45.

model for instructing Japanese emigrants on how to make a living under Manchukuo's unique natural and economic conditions. Rather than emphasizing the stateless drifting status of the Russians, as the Chinese writers were often wont to do in the late 1930s, the Japanese writers of the 1940s instead sought to convey that the "White Russians" were dissatisfied with the Soviet Union and therefore succeeded in establishing new lives in Manchurian farmlands. For example, Yoshino Haruo's "Ivan's Home" portrays a Russian farmer who fails in an urban setting. Ivan moves to the city as a railway worker, but is no longer able to support himself when the railway station is abandoned. In order to find a job, he moves into the Kuanchengzi community near the capital and becomes a drifter, forming a sharp contrast to his happy earlier life in the farmland.[88]

A similar example is Kitamura Kenjirō's *New Year Scrolls*, in which the Japanese military officer Ōno Kōtarō tells a pair of Chinese brothers how the North-Eastern Army led by Su Bingwen (1892-1975), seduced by money, ruthlessly attacked the "White Russian" settlers in Manchuria in late 1932, and how the "White Russian" family had saved his own life in a military attack. The Russian settlers in Kitamura's literature are depicted as collaborators with the Japanese Army. Out of appreciation, Ono agrees to take the girl Natasha and her husband to Manchukuo's capital, Shinkyō. Yet, Natasha's husband dies in Shinkyō because he is unable to adjust to city life and Natasha eventually returns to the farmland. Through the experience, Ono realizes that the best choice for "White Russians" in Manchukuo is to work in agriculture and thereafter devotes himself to assisting agricultural immigrants into the

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[88] Sugimoto Masako, "Hakkei Rojin wo meguru 'te ku su to': Yoshino Haruo no 'Ivan no ie' to Ishizawa Eitarō no 'Kisō' [Text on White Russian: Yoshino Haruo's 'Ivan's Home' and Ishizawa Eitarō's Competition]," in *"Shōwa" bungakushi ni okeru "Manshū" no mondai (san)* [Manchurian Issues in the Literary History of the Shōwa Period, vol. 3], ed. Sugino Yōkichi (Tokyo: Waseda daigaku kyōiku gakubu Sugino Yōkichi kenkyūshitsu, 1996), 61-65.

Sanhe region.[89] Kitamura demonstrated a clear mission to "enlighten" the Japanese emigrants, as he criticized the Japanese settlers, saying "regardless of whether they are settlers in big cities or farmers in farmlands, they cannot adapt to the Manchurian natural environment. Once they have chances, they will return to Japan. They have no love for this land."[90]

In addition to the "White Russians," Kitamura also depicts a pair of Chinese brothers, Zhen Zao and Duo Zuo, who commit to Manchukuo's "national concordance" in divergent ways. The younger brother Zhen Zao follows Ono's instructions to work on "White Russian" farmlands, while the older brother Duo Zuo, although he remains in Shinkyō, decides to adopt the Japanese lifestyle.[91] At the end of the novel, Duo Zuo receives a letter from Zhen Zao at the Chinese Spring Festival and imagines a prosperous spring at the remote farmland.[92] The romanticism conveyed in Kitamura's novel is also palpable in Ōuchi's play *Flowers Bloom in Spring*, in which a young Chinese graduate in Shinkyō eagerly accepts a job in the remote countryside, believing that "as long as it is within Manchukuo, anywhere is the same."[93] With the influx of Japanese settlers, the Manchukuo government was in great need of young people willing to explore the remote areas of northern Manchuria. Filled with romanticism, the writings of Ōuchi and Kitamura provided the best explanation to "national concordance" in the early 1940s.

Kitamura's *New Year Scrolls* was highly praised by Kawabata

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89 Kitamura Kenjirō, "Shunren [New Year Scrolls]," in *Senka Manshū ni agaru* [Wartime Fire Kindled in Manchuria], ed. Agawa Hiroyuki (Tokyo: Shūeisha, 1962), 214-304.

90 Ibid., 301.

91 Ibid., 291.

92 Ibid., 304.

93 Ōuchi Takao, "Yangchunhua kai shi [Flowers Bloom in Spring]," *Xin Manzhou* 3, no. 8 (August 1943), 113.

Yasunari.[94] Kawabata not only actively searched for publishers in Tokyo for Kitamura's piece, but also wrote the preface for it. In his opinion, its success lay in its show of "national concordance." Kitamura claimed that there was no other writing about Japanese interaction with other nations, even within the best of Japanese literature because Japanese writers were unaccustomed to this theme.[95] However, through the portrayal of the Chinese brothers and the "White Russian" family, Kitamura underlined the key point to Manchukuo's legitimacy: the ideology of "national concordance."

As this paper demonstrated earlier, the original emphasis of "national concordance" in the late 1930s lay in "Sino-Japanese cooperation" and "Japan-Manchukuo-China partnership." Yet, when it came to the early 1940s, it also encompassed the "White Russians" even though the Russian population was never really accounted for as a significant component of Manchukuo's early slogan of "concordance of five nations." As Kitamura's *New Year Scrolls* suggests, anti-Japanese military attacks formed a great threat to the Japanese control of Manchuria. The Manchukuo Army launched all sorts of "anti-bandit" operations throughout the 1930s, targeting not only the Northeastern

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[94] Kawabata Yasunari visited Manchukuo twice in 1941, first in April and again in September as a member of the "Pen Platoon" on invitation from the Kwangtung Army. See "Nihon pen butai zaimanchū nittei [The Schedule of the Trip in Manchuria]," *Manshū nichinichi shinbun*, September 8, 1941. The so-called "Pen Platoon" was organized around 1938 by Kikuchi Kan, the founder and editor of *Bungei shunjii*. From that point on, writers such as Kawabata, Kobayashi Hideo, and Hayashi Fusao among others were frequently dispatched to various occupied territories to promote Japanese culture and enlist the support of the local intelligentsia. Regarding the imperialist mobilization of literature in metropolitan Japan, see Ben-Ami Shillony, *Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 116-120. As demonstrated by Kitamura's case, writers in Manchuria were encouraged to use the metropolitan's publication sources. Ōuchi's translation collections were also published in Tokyo by the Sanwa Publishing House (三和書房).

[95] Yasunari Kawabata, "Manshūkoku no bungaku [Manchukuo's Literature]," in *Kawabata Yasunari zenshū* [Collections of Kawabata Yasunari], vol. 32 (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1982), 622.

Army, but also communist guerrilla groups.[96] The Su Bingwen attack portrayed by Kitamura was only one of those numerous military conflicts, and, therefore, the Japanese were in desperate need of any possible manpower to consolidate its Manchurian borders. As a result, the "White Russians" in Manchuria were mobilized. They were first recruited in the early 1930s to protect the railways, important roads, and the gold fields.[97] From 1939 onwards, and especially during the period of 1940-1941, they were recruited into the army and trained in covert warfare to sabotage the Soviet Union.[98] In the 1940s, there was official hope that the Russian émigrés could even play a role as the sixth national group other than the Manchu, Han Chinese, Mongol, Korean, and Japanese peoples in Manchukuo.[99] Beginning with Su Bingwen's military attack and concluding with "White Russian" farmlands, Kitamura's *New Year Scrolls* clearly demonstrates the Russian peoples' mission in Manchuria.

Kitamura's writing and Kawabata's preface were written during a time when "national concordance" was critical, not only for Manchukuo, but also for the future of the entire Japanese empire. By 1942, Japan had already conquered Singapore, and acquired territories in Southeast Asia where national and racial components were extremely complicated. Manchukuo served as a space for the realization of romantic ideals that were unattainable in metropolitan Japan, and more importantly, it was set as the example for the occupied territories in Southeast Asia.[100] As Kawabata has disclosed in his preface:

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[96] Regarding the military conflicts and "bandit problem" see Philip S. Jowett, *Rays of the Rising Sun: Armed Forces of Japan's Asian Allies 1931-45,* vol. 1, China and Manchukuo (Solihull, UK: Helion and Company Ltd, 2004), 18-24.

[97] Ibid., 28.

[98] Ibid., 30.

[99] Koshiro, *Imperial Eclipse*, 74.

[100] Culver, *Glorify the Empire*, 171.

> Japan has now even progressed southwards in its war, yet there is no other country but Manchukuo that constructs its state and develops its culture with other nations. Pan-Asian ideals will be first realized in Manchuria because if they are not attained here, then it might be assumed that they cannot be attained anywhere, and we are working on them with the Han Chinese people. […] The day may eventually come when Japanese writers migrate to the countries in the South and develop literature together with other nations.[101]

In the early 1940s, Manchukuo's cultural consolidation functioned as a model for the vast Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, and the rhetoric of "national concordance" was supposed to resound within the empire. The inclusion of Russian emigrates in the rhetoric of "concordance of five nations" after 1940 layered the original pan-Asianism with additional universalism and cosmopolitanism, helping it to develop in the direction of Eurasianism.[102] Different from Chinese writers' use of the "White Russians" as a surrogate protagonist in their writings, Japanese attention towards the Russian community was directed by the urgency to promote Japanese migration into Manchuria and to mobilize possible resources to combat the Soviet Union.

Conclusion

In the course of this paper, an attempt has been made to briefly outline the development of Chinese literature promoted by the Manchukuo government in the late 1930s and early 1940s. In this process, literature

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[101] Kawabata Yasunari, "Manshūkoku kakuminzoku sōsakushu daiikan senja no kotoba [Editors' Words to the First Volume of Anthology of Literature of Each Nation in Manchukuo]," in *Kawabata Yasunari zenshū* [Collections of Kawabata Yasunari], vol. 33 (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1982), 101.

[102] Koshiro, *Imperial Eclipse*, 73.

and translation were no longer purely an aesthetic issue, but became a part of colonial governance through which the colonial power managed to keep the colonial society functioning. The present paper's analysis demonstrates that rather than exclusively question the legitimacy and sovereignty of Manchukuo, an equally effective way to study the history of Manchukuo is to direct more attention to the question of *how* Manchukuo's control and legitimacy were retained through the disposition and placement of what Foucault calls *things*, which not only concerns the placement of populations, that is the Japanese and Russian migrants, but also their ways of living, means of substance, habits, customs, modes of production, and relations with other nations within the colonial society.[103] The ideological and spiritual status of the colonized was also under colonial supervision. The colonial power was no longer to rely on a single form of negation or killing, nor did it have all-pervasive control over its population. As the Chinese writings and Ōuchi's Japanese translation show, it was through state sponsorship that Chinese writers had a chance to generate a form of counter-politics whose effects appeared even more evident due to the contrasting existence of Japanese translation.

When discussing Joseph Conrad's novel *Nostromo*, Edward Said suggests that Conrad was both anti-imperialist and imperialist, and at the same time progressive, while also deeply reactionary. He could see the imperialism of the British and American owners of the San Tomé silver mine doomed by their own pretentious and impossible ambitions, but he could not see an alternative to this cruel tautology.[104] This apparent paradox could also be applied to Japanese pan-Asianists and former leftists that constituted the "novelty" of the intelligentsia in Manchukuo. They may have felt the need to reform the colonized society, yet were

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[103] Foucault, "Governmentality," 93.

[104] Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994).

unable to imagine an alternative to the deployment of colonial power. A space of literary exchange between Manchukuo's different nations in Manchukuo, underpinned by Ōuchi, Kitamura, Yoshino, and Kawabata, sustained in turn the colonial discourse of "national concordance" and colonial identity, despite the gap that existed between political rhetoric and reality.

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Casualty of the Cold War: The Cairo Declaration and Its Historical Legacy in Northeast Asia

James I. Matray
California State University, Chico

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Casualty of the Cold War: The Cairo Declaration and Its Historical Legacy in Northeast Asia

This paper describes the origins of the Cairo Declaration that United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi of the Republic of China issued on December 1, 1943. It focuses particularly on explaining how this statement summarized Roosevelt's plan for the maintenance of peace and security in East Asia after World War II. The paper advances two major conclusions. First, Roosevelt became concerned at the Cairo Conference about Jiang Jieshi's ambitions to impose Chinese hegemony on its neighbors in the postwar period. Therefore, he decided to propose issuance of the Cairo Declaration to commit Jiang to support national self-determination for those nations the Allies liberated from Japanese domination. Second, the emergence of the Cold War was responsible for creating circumstances that prevented the United States from achieving after World War II the goals it had identified in the Cairo Declaration.

Keywords: Cairo Declaration, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, Jiang Jieshi, Korea, China-Burma-India Theater, T. V. Soong, Madam Jiang, Operation BUCCANEER, "Four Policemen," Harry Hopkins, Joseph Stalin, Teheran Conference

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James I. Matray
James I. Matray, California State University, Chico

During World War II, the Cairo Conference, code-named SEXTANT, took place in Egypt in two phases, first from November 23 to 26 and then from December 3 to 7 in 1943. The United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Generalissimo Jiang Jieshi of the Republic of China (ROC) met to discuss military strategy for the defeat of Japan and the reconstruction of postwar East Asia. It was the high point of collaboration among the three Allied leaders. Discussions at the Cairo Conference focused primarily on determining future military operations in the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater, specifically giving consideration to Jiang's desire for the Western allies to launch amphibious attacks in the Bay of Bengal against Japan to coincide with a Chinese military offensive in Burma. There also was discussion about increasing the amount of economic and military assistance that Anglo-American aircraft delivered to China "over the Hump" from India. More memorable, however, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Jiang issued a press release seventy years ago that sought to cement China's status as one of the four great powers who after their victory in World War II would act in concert to preserve peace and stability in the

postwar world. Regrettably, the Soviet-American Cold War emerged as a barrier to implementation of the Cairo Declaration, leaving unfulfilled the idealistic vision Roosevelt imagined for the future of East Asia.

Overshadowing discussions at Cairo about the Pacific war were Anglo-American preparations for a cross-channel invasion of France that would initiate the final offensives leading to the defeat of Nazi Germany. Reflecting the higher Allied priority on achieving victory in Europe, in the middle of the Cairo Conference, Roosevelt and Churchill left for Teheran, Iran, where they met with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin from November 27 to December 2, 1943, while Jiang returned to Chongqing. In Cairo, before their return, the press received copies of the following public communiqué:

> The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan. The Three Great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land, and air. This pressure is already rising.
>
> The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and The Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.
>
> With these objects in view the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional

surrender of Japan.[1]

Jiang also wanted control over the Ryukyu islands to revert to China, but the Cairo Declaration did not mention the future status of these islands.

Court historian Herbert Feis provided the traditional interpretation in 1957, explaining the reasons for enunciation of the Cairo Declaration:

> In sum, … China was deeded vast areas, great potential influence, and top responsibilities. This was done, the record indicates, because it was deemed morally fair, and because it was thought to be helpful in the war. But this attitude and purpose might not have eventuated in these conclusive decisions so easily and so early in the war had it not been for the hold which two general beliefs had on the American official mind. One was that the Chinese people had the latent qualities to become a great nation, and would, in recognition of the chance being conferred upon them, prove to be reliable and friendly partners of the West. The other was that China would have a sufficiently unified and capable government to control and properly administer its great domain. On these, Roosevelt and Churchill and their advisers, civil and military, risked the whole future of the Far East, and the position and security of their countries in the Far East.[2]

For Tang Tsou, issuance of the Cairo Declaration was no surprise, since it merely reaffirmed the unconditional surrender formula that Roosevelt and Churchill enunciated at the Casablanca Conference the prior January as

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1 U.S. Department of State, "The Communiqué and Its Release," in *Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), 448-449.

2 Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged And The Peace They Sought* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), 532.

the Allied goal in the Pacific war.[3] Arnold Xiangze Jiang, however, speaks for numerous historians when he describes the communiqué as "the most striking demonstration of the international acceptance of China as a great power" to that point in modern history.[4] Advancing another reason for its significance, Gaddis Smith designates it as the "climax of Roosevelt's anti-imperialism and his efforts to flatter" Jiang.[5] Many historians agree with Charles M. Dobbs that the primary purpose of the Cairo Declaration was "to prop up the prestige of Chiang's faltering regime."[6]

By contrast, Bruce Cumings adds hegemonic intent to Roosevelt's motivations in promoting the Cairo Declaration. Its guiding principle, he contends, was the president's "desire to build up China as one of the Big Four Powers, partially as a means of invigorating China's resistance to Japan, but also as an essential part of his own vision of postwar East Asian power relationships." Allegedly, "Roosevelt's constituting a weak and divided China as a great power" was "shrewd pursuit of American interests" since this would provide the United States with another vote in postwar disputes and therefore "would emerge as the most powerful nation in the world and could well expect to dominate multilateral arrangements."[7] Stephen E. Pelz has elaborated on this argument:

Roosevelt's underlying plan for the postwar world envisioned drawing

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3 Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China, 1941-50*, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 58.

4 Arnold Xiangze Jiang, *The United States and China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 109.

5 Gaddis Smith, *American Diplomacy During the Second World War, 1941-1945*, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985), 90.

6 Charles M. Dobbs, *The Unwanted Symbol: American Foreign Policy, the Cold War, and Korea, 1945-1950* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1981), 12.

7 Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947*, vol. 1 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 106-108. See also Warren I. Cohen, *America's Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations*, 2nd ed. (New York: Wiley, 1980), 156; Roland Ian Heiferman, *The Cairo Conference of 1943: Roosevelt, Churchill, Chiang Kai-Shek and Madame Chiang* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 2011), 141.

> Britain and Russia into a condominium to police the world through the United Nations, and in former colonial areas where the interest of the great powers overlapped he proposed to establish multipower trusteeships, which would prepare the colonial peoples for self government, while providing forums for continued great power cooperation.

Postponing discussion of explosive issues related to territorial borders until after winning the Pacific war, the president promised independence to Asian nations under prewar colonial rule to motivate anti-Japanese resistance. To encourage Jiang to keep fighting, Roosevelt treated China formally as an equal and promised return of lost land after the war.[8]

All of these interpretations contain an element of truth. However, historians have not given enough attention to another central explanation for the Cairo Declaration. Roosevelt had expected Jiang to be his partner in ending colonialism in postwar Asia until the first day of the conference when the generalissimo strongly endorsed the issuance of an immediate statement promising Korean independence. The next day, he conveyed fears regarding China's "wide aspirations" for dominance in postwar Asia to Churchill.[9] Suddenly, Jiang emerged as an opponent of trusteeship and international accountability that were the main features of Roosevelt's new order in Asia. Worse, the generalissimo's apparent quest for regional hegemony was the outcome that the United States had sought to prevent in fighting Japan. With his "great power condominium" plan in jeopardy, Warren F. Kimball asserts, Roosevelt proposed the Cairo Declaration as a way to massage Jiang's ego and keep China in the

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[8] Stephen E. Pelz, "U.S. Decisions on Korean Policy, 1943-1950: Some Hypotheses," in *Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1945-1953*, ed. Bruce Cumings (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983), 98.

[9] James I. Matray, *The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), 20.

war, but he hoped that the ROC soon would find a new leader. When Chiang "hung on," Kimball explains, the president was forced "to move to prevent exchanging British, French, and Dutch imperialism in East and Southeast Asia for that of the Chinese." Compelling Jiang and then Churchill to accept the declaration, Roosevelt achieved "his quid pro quo, for the document included a specific renunciation by the Chinese of any intentions to expand in Asia."[10]

That Jiang Jieshi in late 1943 expected the restoration of Chinese hegemony in postwar East Asia was remarkable, given the Guomindang's abysmal military performance against Japan to that point in World War II. Historians have documented how the Sino-Japanese War had reached a stalemate in September 1939 when World War II began in Europe. Nazi Germany's defeat of France and air assault on Great Britain allowed Japan to cut off all land supply routes to Guomindang headquarters at Chongqing. Jiang sent frequent messages to Roosevelt appealing for assistance, but only small amounts of military and economic support arrived and by late 1941, Guomindang surrender seemed a distinct possibility.[11] For Jiang, Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor came as a godsend because he anticipated a huge US commitment of support to achieve military victory in China. Instead, Japanese territorial advances quickly left the Guomindang more isolated, while the US war effort concentrated on Europe. "The fight to liberate China," Warren I. Cohen observes, "was merely a sideshow in the war against the Axis—not an important American priority."[12] In the most recent study of the Cairo Conference, Ronald Ian Heiferman emphasizes how once the

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[10] Warren F. Kimball, *The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 140-142.

[11] For the most recent study summarizing the well known decline of Guomindang military fortunes after the outbreak of World War II in Europe, see Heiferman, *The Cairo Conference of 1943*, 3-4.

[12] Cohen, *America's Response to China*, 162. See also, Michael H. Hunt, *The Making of a Special Relationship: The United States and China to 1914* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 306.

United States and China became wartime allies, "both sides pursued contradictory courses which would ultimately result in hostility, recriminations, and a legacy of bitterness and frustration."[13]

On December 30, 1941, Jiang requested a $500 million loan from the United States. Initiating a pattern, he warned Roosevelt that rejection would force him to negotiate an accommodation with Japan and leave the war. In March 1942, the US president approved the payment contingent on a government bond sale to check inflation. This decision had the opposite effect after Jiang took the money without selling any bonds. Six months later, Jiang raised the ante, demanding deployment of three US divisions to fight in China, 500 warplanes, and shipment of 5,000 tons of supplies per month. Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell, a US military advisor to Jiang, opposed approval, reporting that the generalissimo was hoarding resources in preparation for a postwar showdown with the Communists. Furthermore, Guomindang forces lacked the training, organization, and leadership necessary to contest the Japanese effectively. He urged using aid as leverage to force Jiang to implement reforms and undertake serious military operations against Japan. Roosevelt ignored this advice because, Heiferman argues, he feared that doing so "would drive the generalissimo into the arms of the Japanese."[14] Roosevelt instead sent Lauchlin Currie on a fact-finding trip to China in July 1942. He recommended recalling Stilwell and maximizing support for Jiang, as well as becoming the first to suggest a personal meeting between Roosevelt and the generalissimo.[15]

Gary May has argued that Roosevelt was determined to keep Jiang's forces fighting because of the catastrophic vision that if China fell, Japan would occupy India and then possibly the Middle East,

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13 Heiferman, *The Cairo Conference of 1943*, 4.

14 Ibid., 12.

15 Ibid., 13-15.

linking up with the Nazi military machine and cutting off the Soviet Union. He was aware of the generalissimo's flaws, but thought there was no other leader.[16] Late in October 1942, Roosevelt approved an increase in assistance to China to 5,000 tons monthly and delivery of 500 combat planes.[17] In March 1943, the president chided United States Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall for criticizing Jiang, emphasizing that the United States had to provide aid and support to the "undisputed" leader of China.[18] But demands on US resources were so great that paltry US assistance reached China. In what Cohen describes as a constant Sino-American wartime dance, US leaders made increased aid contingent on aggressive military action, but Jiang responded that he could not do so without more help.[19] Chinese leaders reacted with shock and anger to what they considered American neglect. They believed, Heiferman explains, that after Pearl Harbor, "China would become the main battleground in the struggle against Japan." To force a change in US China policy, Foreign Minister T. V. Soong started a publicity campaign in the United States to build support in Congress and among the public to make "China a first priority theater of the war."[20]

In January 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill met at Casablanca. Not receiving an invitation to participate in this summit infuriated Jiang. T. V. Soong met with several US officials to complain that the generalissimo's absence showed Allied leaders did not consider China a great power. In February, Soong and his sister Madame Jiang at a meeting with Secretary of War Henry Stimson insisted on equal treatment for the leader of

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16 Gary May, *China Scapegoat: The Diplomatic Ordeal of John Carter Vincent* (Washington, D.C.: New Republic Books, 1979), 128.

17 Jiang, *The United States and China*, 105-108; Heiferman, *The Cairo Conference of 1943*, 96; Cohen, *America's Response to China*, 159-162.

18 Jiang, *The United States and China*, 108-109.

19 Cohen, *America's Response to China*, 159-162.

20 Heiferman, *The Cairo Conference of 1943*, 21.

China. That month, Madame Jiang opened a barnstorming campaign in New York City that would end in Los Angeles. Consistently conveying the message that her husband's government was fighting for democracy and therefore deserved unlimited US assistance, Jiang's wife accomplished her goal of building popular support for the ROC. Concerned about rising Sino-US friction, Roosevelt sought advice from Pearl Buck, who explained why the Chinese were so sensitive to diplomatic sleights of any kind. She thought a personal meeting with Jiang might improve his sense of security. Acting on this advice, in May, the president invited T. V. Soong to represent Jiang at the Washington Conference. Also, Roosevelt met with Madame Jiang before she left the United States in late June. Although non-committal in response to her requests for increased American assistance to China and a greater emphasis on the CBI Theater in the war effort, the president did recommend a personal meeting with Jiang for that autumn.[21]

Roosevelt therefore remained committed to the achievement of what biographer James MacGregor Burns defines as his "two aims in China: to strengthen it as a central base for the final attack on Japan, and to treat it as a great power that would be a bulwark of Asian stability and democracy after the war and a focus of American co-operation with Asia."[22] Secretary of State Cordell Hull, in his memoirs, explains how Roosevelt considered it essential to establish China as an equal of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union in the Grand Alliance to ensure the success of the United Nations and realization of postwar peace and prosperity in East Asia.[23] To this end, early in 1943, the United States and Great Britain signed new treaties with the ROC relinquishing

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[21] Ibid., 39-41.

[22] James MacGregor Burns, *Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom, 1940-1945* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), 544.

[23] Cordell Hull and Andrew Henry Thomas Berding, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan, 1948), 1583.

all of their extraterritorial rights in China. In addition, the United States Congress later that year repealed the Chinese Exclusion Act.[24] Another US goal was to persuade the Chinese Communists to join with the Guomindang in forming a united postwar government that would receive Soviet support.[25] "In theory," May writes, "Roosevelt's China policy promised to help China achieve unity and democracy; in reality, the president's course meant the support of a failing dictatorship whose survival depended upon American intervention and assistance."[26]

Churchill rejected the argument that China deserved treatment as a great power. As Cumings observes, he "thought it naïve and illusory, even whimsical," to expect China to play a positive role in postwar East Asia.[27] But the president continued to press the British to accept his position. In March 1943, for example, Feis relates how he pressed his case during a discussion with Foreign Minister Anthony Eden in Washington:

> The President … told Eden [he was] sorry that Churchill, in a speech which he had made the day before, had not mentioned China as among the great powers. The President said that he thought that since China might be of use in policing Japan, he wanted to strengthen it in every possible way. But Eden said he was doubtful whether China could stabilize itself and that it might have to go through a revolution after the war. Moreover, he remarked, "he did not much like the idea of the Chinese running up and down the Pacific."

Sweeping aside these concerns, Roosevelt then explained the central role

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[24] Jiang, *The United States and China*, 107; Cohen, *America's Response to China*, 159. See also Tsou, *America's Failure in China, 1941-50*, vol. 1, 35-36.

[25] Tsou, *America's Failure in China, 1941-50*, vol. 1, 34.

[26] May, *China Scapegoat*, 131.

[27] Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, vol. 1, 106.

that he thought China would have in postwar Asia, suggesting as well,

> that Manchuria and Formosa be returned to China; that Indochina be placed in trusteeship; that Korea also be put under at trusteeship to be directed jointly by China, the United States, and one or two other powers; and that the Japanese mandated islands be internationalized.

Britain thus had several months to consider provisions that Roosevelt would propose for inclusion in the Cairo Declaration.

Even as Roosevelt lobbied Great Britain on behalf of China, the president became increasingly concerned about the survival of Jiang's government. He received regular reports from US diplomats in China about declining morale in the Guomindang bureaucracy and military. Rampant inflation and widespread corruption was fueling rising popular criticism of Jiang's government, leading to concerns that the country could give up its fight or fall to the continuous Japanese onslaught.[28] Moreover, Stilwell privately and in his messages to Washington ridiculed Jiang's abilities and charged him with selfish motives. His pressure to end what he viewed as China's "phony war" against Japan exacerbated their personal quarrel, seeming to foreshadow unwanted cracks in the Sino-American alliance. Contributing as well to growing tensions were difficulties in transporting much-needed supplies to Lieutenant General Claire Chennault, the commander of US air forces in China, thereby precluding the broad air assault the United States had promised. On October 27, Roosevelt proposed to Jiang that they address these problems at a personal meeting including Churchill at a location in the Middle East. His purpose, Feis reports, was "to explain global strategy to which [his] needs were being subordinated, to improve Chinese morale, and to plan military operations which could bring relief to China." Jiang

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[28] Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin*, 247; Heiferman, *The Cairo Conference of 1943*, 163.

quickly agreed, but insisted that his wife accompany him, not least because he spoke no English and needed her to translate.[29]

Roosevelt's decision to meet with Jiang at Cairo was connected to his already scheduled and more important summit in Teheran with Stalin and Churchill. The president hoped to gain the support of his colleagues in establishing the ROC as one of his "Four Policemen." He envisioned the emergence of a cooperative world order in which a dominant power in each major region would be responsible for ensuring peace and stability in that part of the globe. Despite his increasing awareness of the likelihood that the ROC would be weak after World War II, Roosevelt remained convinced that it still would be the most influential nation in postwar East Asia and could provide protection against a renewal of Japanese imperialism and promote decolonization under a trusteeship system. Roosevelt also hoped the ROC would assist the United States in deterring Great Britain and the Soviet Union from exploiting postwar instability to expand their presence in Asia after Japan's defeat.[30] To prepare Jiang for his discussion of these issues at Cairo, Roosevelt sent Patrick J. Hurley to Chongqing as his personal envoy to describe to the generalissimo the president's vision. In his report evaluating Jiang's reactions, Hurley urged support for the ROC's strategy of conserving strength "for maintenance of its postwar internal supremacy as against the more immediate objective of defeating Japan."[31]

On October 5, 1943, Roosevelt summarized his postwar expectations for Asia during an informal discussion with Hull and his State Department staff before his secretary of state left for Moscow to

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[29] Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin*, 247; Heiferman, *The Cairo Conference of 1943*, 11, 51; Gary R. Hess, *The United States at War, 1941-45*, 3rd ed. (Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, 2011), 100.

[30] Smith, *American Diplomacy During the Second World War, 1941-1945*, 53, 55, 87-88; Hess, *The United States at War, 1941-45*, 98.

[31] Jiang, *The United States and China*, 109; Heiferman, *The Cairo Conference of 1943*, 53; Michael Schaller, *The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938-1945* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 148.

attend a meeting of the Allied foreign ministers. The president instructed Hull to seek a definitive agreement favoring wide application of the American trusteeship proposal. Roosevelt hoped that through publicizing the plan, popular support would force British and Soviet compliance. Accordingly, at a meeting in Moscow on October 29, Hull raised the issue of dependent peoples and distributed his proposal. He expressed regret that there would not be enough time to discuss colonial policy in depth. Eden reminded Hull that Great Britain had registered its opposition to the American plan just three days earlier. By contrast, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov agreed that the issue was of vital importance and deserved study and discussion.[32] These exchanges alerted Britain and the Soviet Union that they could expect the United States to raise the issue of trusteeship at the upcoming summits at Cairo and Teheran. Of more immediate importance at the Moscow Foreign Ministers meeting, however, Hull secured inclusion of China in the public declaration issued following the conference that committed the four Allied powers to achieving unconditional surrender of the Axis and formation of a postwar international security organization.[33]

Debate about future military strategy in the CBI Theater dominated the discussions at the Cairo Conference. By then, the US island-hopping tactic had achieved steady movement of Allied forces westward across the Pacific to positions that soon would allow for bombing raids against Japan in preparation for invasion of the home islands. As a result, the defeat of Japan was becoming increasingly less dependent on Guomindang military operations on the Chinese mainland. Churchill and his military advisors therefore opposed committing significant resources to the CBI Theater at the expense of maximum support for the cross-channel invasion of France (Operation OVERLORD). They also pressed

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[32] Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin*, 251; Matray, *The Reluctant Crusade*, 20.

[33] Jiang, *The United States and China*, 109; Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin*, 253; Schaller, *The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938-1945*, 147; Tsou, *America's Failure in China, 1941-50*, vol. 1, 58.

for an assault on Rhodes in the Mediterranean. Jiang, however, was demanding an offensive assault to reopen the Burma Road. Any Guomindang offensive would depend for success, he insisted, on Great Britain staging an amphibious assault on Burma in the Bay of Bengal. Eventually, he added US delivery of 10,000 tons of supplies a month as a condition for the Guomindang staging an offensive. At Cairo, British military leaders voiced immediate opposition to the plan, viewing discussion of the operation, code-named BUCCANEER, as a waste of time. Heiferman blames Churchill for British obduracy, observing that he agreed to "discuss the future of the CBI theater to humor Roosevelt and move the agenda along to more important issues," mainly OVERLORD.[34]

Roosevelt, however, strongly supported China's plan, worrying that its rejection would shatter Guomindang morale and invite military defeat. With reluctance, US military leaders acted in accordance with his desires and strongly advocated for approval of Operation BUCCANEER. Vigorous Allied action to assist China in reopening its supply lines would show that the CBI Theater remained vital to the success of the war effort and the importance of the ROC in defeating Japan. Chinese military officials made it very difficult for the Americans because they could agree to nothing without consulting Jiang. The generalissimo himself, as Michael Schaller notes, "angered everyone by constantly reversing his position on what he favored." Also, the British reminded their American counterparts that in October, Stalin had told Hull in Moscow that the Soviets would join the Pacific war after victory in Europe. Implementing BUCCANEER, they stressed, would delay the defeat of Germany. Both sides were so inflexible that ultimately, Schaller reports, British and US "military planners could hardly have a civil discussion about Asian

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[34] Feis, Churchill, *Roosevelt, Stalin,* 248; *Heiferman, The Cairo Conference of 1943*, 59, 128.

strategy, preferring to trade accusations."[35] Churchill considered BUCCANEER a political rather than military necessity and absolutely refused to endorse it. He was dismayed when Lord Mountbatten met Jiang after he had left Cairo and persuaded him to compromise, resulting in tentative approval of the operation.[36]

Meanwhile, Roosevelt's first meeting after his arrival was a reception he hosted for the Jiangs, which Heiferman claims was his way of giving to "them the 'face' they desired."[37] During dinner with the generalissimo and his wife the next night, he sought from them a commitment of support for his vision of the future of East Asia. The president, Burns writes,

> offered China the leading role in the postwar military occupation of Japan—a role Chiang declined—and extensive reparations; he agreed that the four northeast provinces, Taiwan, and the Pescadores should be restored to China, and that China and the United States would jointly occupy the Ryukyus under international trusteeship; he proposed a vague postwar security alliance between the two nations; as usual he took a strong line against colonialism, even raising the question of Hong Kong.

Roosevelt's rising concerns about Jiang's hegemonic ambitions explain his desire to secure a pledge from the generalissimo supporting a trusteeship in postwar Korea. Jiang had no interest in discussing Roosevelt's postwar geopolitical plans, concentrating instead on pressing for more military aid. He also stressed the importance of approval for BUCCANEER, cautioning Roosevelt against trusting any promise Stalin might give at Teheran about intervention in the Pacific war. After the

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35 Schaller, *The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938-1945*, 150; Heiferman, *The Cairo Conference of 1943*, 81-82.

36 Heiferman, *The Cairo Conference of 1943*, 119, 128.

37 Ibid., 69, 100.

Jiangs left, the president told his son Elliott that the generalissimo was not deploying his best forces against Japan, but against the Communists.[38] Roosevelt wanted China to emerge from the war with the ability to restrain Japan, but he feared that Jiang intended to use his power to seek dominance over East Asia.

Numerous historians have argued that Roosevelt proposed issuing the Cairo Declaration to boost Chinese morale with promises to Jiang of territorial recovery from the disposition of the Japanese empire after the achievement of victory. His motivation, Feis explains, was to end in China "any impulse to bring about a peace with Japan … and … invigorate its combat effort."[39] Roosevelt also was trying to lessen the generalissimo's anger over his refusal to satisfy Chinese requests for more military and economic assistance. All these factors influenced Roosevelt before he went to Cairo, yet there is no evidence that he had decided on the content of the declaration prior to his arrival. The record suggests that the president's initial discussions with Jiang persuaded him of the need to secure from the generalissimo a public pledge of support for anti-colonialism. Indeed, as Cumings reports, "Roosevelt apparently did not consult with the State Department experts on East Asia before the Cairo Conference, for they played no part in composing the Cairo Declaration and in fact read it only when it was published …."[40] How the declaration was drafted indicates that checking Jiang's ambition was a prime reason for its proclamation.

On the evening of November 26, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Madame Chiang completed drafting of the Cairo Declaration in just one hour. The first section reporting discussions on future operations in the CBI Theater was very general, reflecting the deep disagreements existing

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[38] Burns, *Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom, 1940-1945*, 404; Heiferman, *The Cairo Conference of 1943*, 79.

[39] Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin*, 252.

[40] Ibid.; Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, vol. 1, 107.

among Allied leaders about Operation BUCCANEER. US leaders already had spoken with the British about the return of territory Japan had seized in China, which also would be the natural outcome of unconditional surrender. At Cairo, Christopher Thorne reports, the British made a failed attempt to gain inclusion of a provision pledging restoration to European nations of colonial territories in Asia that Japan had captured. His claim, however, that as a substitute they gained the insertion of the pledge foreswearing territorial expansion seems doubtful.[41] Reflecting the improvisation of the Cairo Declaration, the clause regarding Korea manifested itself in different versions. On November 24, Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's close advisor, had prepared the initial US version at the president's request, which stated that Korea should become free and independent "at the earliest possible moment." The next day, Roosevelt changed the wording, substituting the phrase "at the proper moment." The British proposed as an alternative "in due course," which would become the final verbiage.[42] The last paragraph merely reiterated the commitment to Japan's unconditional surrender.

Roosevelt, Edward M. Bennett writes, "wanted desperately" to have a four-power meeting at Cairo, but Stalin did not attend because the Soviet Union was not at war with Japan.[43] He also was complying with

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41 Heiferman, *The Cairo Conference of 1943*, 112-113. Christopher Thorne may be referring to the later sentence in the Cairo Declaration that read "Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed." Christopher G. Thorne, *Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War Against Japan, 1941-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 311.

42 U.S. Department of State, "American Draft of the Communiqué With Amendments by President Roosevelt," in *Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), 399-400; U.S. Department of State, "British Draft of the Communiqué," in *Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943*, Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), 404.

43 Edward M. Bennett, Franklin D. *Roosevelt and the Search for Victory: American-Soviet Relations, 1939-1945* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1990), 107; Pelz, "U.S. Decisions on Korean Policy, 1943-1950," 99.

the Japanese-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of April 13, 1941, that provided for the two nations to maintain "neutrality" if either entered into a conflict with a third power. At Teheran, Churchill asked Stalin if he had read the Cairo Declaration. The Soviet leader replied that while he could make no commitments, he approved of the statement and its contents. Stalin also said he supported trusteeship in postwar Korea.[44] Roosevelt raised the prospect of China serving as one of the "Four Policemen" to deter or fight aggression after World War II. Stalin did not object, but he voiced doubts about China's power and predicted European leaders would object to its asserting governance in Asia.[45] Teheran would have an indirect negative impact on the Cairo Declaration. During lengthy discussion of Operation OVERLORD, the Allied leaders decided that there should be a landing in southern France, code-named Operation ANVIL. Churchill insisted that mounting ANVIL required cancellation of BUCCANEER because there were not enough landing craft for both operations. After returning to Cairo, the Anglo-American feud over BUCCANEER resumed. Ultimately, Roosevelt surrendered, cancelling the planned Sino-British operation in Burma.

Meanwhile, the Chinese felt euphoric upon receiving word of the Cairo Declaration. At last, China had been accepted as a world power and assured an important role in the postwar international partnership. Press reports also expressed gratification that Jiang had gained recognition as a major leader in the world. The Cairo Conference gave the appearance of formalizing the framework of three-power collaboration.[46] But retraction of the Allied promise for British amphibious warfare operations in Burma made the Chinese feel betrayed

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[44] Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin*, 254; Bennett, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Search for Victory*, 113-114; Heiferman, *The Cairo Conference of 1943*, 118.

[45] Tsou, *America's Failure in China, 1941-50*, vol. 1, 59; John K. Fairbank, *The United States and China*, 2nd ed. (New York: The Viking Press, 1962), 264.

[46] Heiferman, *The Cairo Conference of 1943*, 142.

and belittled. As for Korean exiles, at first they hailed the Cairo Declaration's independence pledge, but denounced any suggestion of delayed implementation. For the remainder of the war, Korean nationalists and their expatriate newspapers attacked the Cairo Declaration. Kim Ku, the president of the self-styled Korean Provisional Government located in exile in Chongqing, censured it, as did Syngman Rhee, his representative in Washington, D.C. In time, Korean associations in the United States and Hawaii complained to the US Congress. Korean exiles in China undermined the Cairo Declaration, sending reprints of it to Korea translating "in due course" as "immediately" or "within a few days," arousing the expectations of the Korean people. Some historians have claimed that there was no Korean language equivalent, but Cumings has emphasized that they knew the meaning of the phrase only too well.[47]

During the Cairo Conference, Roosevelt's view of China under Jiang as a postwar great power evaporated.[48] Three reasons explain his decision to begin to disentangle the United States from the ROC. First, at Teheran, Stalin for the first time formally committed to join the fight against Japan after the war ended in Europe. Initial discussions at Cairo confirmed that the CBI would support the main thrust through the Pacific toward Japan. After Japan's Ichigo Offensive in 1944 overran US airbases and advanced on Chongqing, the China sector became isolated and irrelevant.[49] Second, Jiang's performance at Cairo had alienated Roosevelt. Robert Sherwood highlights the generalissimo's "hedging each statement [about the Burma campaign] with reservations and qualifications." Burns reports that the president "found him mercurial,

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47 Matray, *The Reluctant Crusade*, 21; Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, vol. 1, 486.

48 Tsou, *America's Failure in China, 1941-50*, vol. 1, 123-124.

49 Ibid., 69; Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History*, 1st ed. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), 394; Heiferman, *The Cairo Conference of 1943*, 164.

defensive, and heavily dependent on his wife."[50] Third, Madame Jiang's presence made most of the male delegates feel "uneasy." Heiferman adds that her constant lobbying for aid negated "previous efforts to cultivate a favorable image of the Koumintang and its leaders."[51] When Jiang learned about the cancellation of BUCCANEER, he was furious. On December 9, he demanded that Roosevelt provide a one billion dollar loan and 20,000 tons of aid monthly. The president refused, advising that the Guomindang needed to stage military operations against Japan before the United States provided more assistance. Also, he began to seek military and economic liaison with the Chinese Communists.[52]

Potential for failure to achieve the Cairo Declaration's primary goals therefore surfaced even before the end of World War II. Roosevelt should have anticipated this eventuality, given that it was his strong promotion of China's status as a "Great Power" that gave Jiang a seat at the negotiating table at Cairo, rather than its power as an Allied nation. Thereafter, US distrust of China's ability to perform the role Roosevelt had envisioned for it in postwar East Asia signaled a weakening of China's direct influence in international affairs, which significantly undercut prospects for achieving the outcome that the three Allies had defined at Cairo. Nevertheless, US leaders held out hope that China could emerge after the Pacific war as a united and central force for promoting peace and stability in postwar East Asia. Realistically, they had no other choice. Soon after Cairo, the China standing as one of the four "Great Powers" was actually an illusion on a world stage where the Soviets and Americans made the key moves.

By early 1945, Roosevelt no longer worried about Jiang's hegemonic aspirations in postwar East Asia. Instead, Soviet territorial

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50 Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 393; Burns, *Roosevelt*, 303-304.

51 Heiferman, *The Cairo Conference of 1943*, 89, 160.

52 Ibid., 155-157, 162.

ambitions had emerged as a more serious threat to realization of his postwar vision. At the Yalta Conference, his efforts to fulfill the Cairo Declaration continued. Roosevelt gained Stalin's commitment of support for Jiang's government, although this was at the price of promising Soviet economic concessions in Manchuria. He also discussed Korea with the Soviet leader, resulting in an informal agreement for imposing a multinational trusteeship. Cumings has ridiculed Roosevelt's plan for Korea, arguing that it "reflected only the paternalistic, gradualist … idea that deemed no colonial people fit to run their own affairs without a period of tutelage."[53] Roosevelt, however, was convinced that he needed Soviet entry into the Pacific war to defeat Japan, which resulted in his acceptance of Stalin's demands for Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. Given that the United States could not prevent Soviet territorial aggrandizement after military intervention, Stalin's support for the ROC in China and trusteeship in Korea provided the best means for fulfillment of the Cairo Declaration. Six months later, the Allies issued the Potsdam Declaration, promising that "the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out."[54] Unfortunately, by then, Soviet-American discord already was raising barriers to the realization of Roosevelt's idealistic vision.

On April 12, 1945, Roosevelt's sudden death made Harry S. Truman president of the United States. At that time, Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe had begun to alarm US leaders. Almost from the outset, the new president expected Soviet actions in Korea to parallel Stalin's policies in Poland. Within a week after assuming office, he began to search for some way to eliminate any opportunity for a repetition of Soviet expansion. The atomic bomb seemed to provide him with an easy answer. Japan's prompt surrender after an atomic attack would preempt Soviet entrance into the Pacific war, thus permitting the United States to

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53 Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, vol. 1, 106.

54 U.S. Department of State, "Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender," *The Department of State Bulletin* 13, no. 318 (July 29, 1945): 137-138.

occupy Korea alone and removing any possibility for "sovietization." Truman believed that this was the only way to ensure fulfillment of the Cairo Declaration. Implementing its provisions would promote realization of Roosevelt's vision that the new president shared of a peaceful postwar East Asia. But Truman's gamble failed. When Stalin declared war on Japan and sent the Red Army into Korea prematurely on August 12, the United States proposed division of Korea into Soviet and American zones of military occupation at the 38th parallel. Only Stalin's acceptance of this desperate eleventh hour proposal saved the peninsula from unification under Communist rule. Thereafter, the Soviet-American dispute in Europe ruled out chances for a negotiated settlement and a divided Korea became a captive of the Cold War.[55]

Soviet intervention in the Pacific war also threatened to nullify the Cairo Declaration's promises regarding China, but Truman took prompt action to promote its fulfillment. Not only did the United States transport Jiang's troops to Manchuria to accept the surrender of Japanese forces, Marc Gallicchio describes how the Truman administration rushed "troops onto the mainland of Asia," most notably 40,000 US Marines to Beijing.[56] Ironically, these efforts to implement an important provision of the Cairo Declaration would result in the Guomindang suffering the first of a series of military defeats over the next four years climaxing in Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War and the flight of Jiang's government to Taiwan. By late 1949, Truman was certain that the Chinese Communists would invade the island in the near future and destroy the ROC. Accordingly, on January 5, 1950, the president announced publicly that the United States would remain uninvolved in China's conflict, explaining that US military aid and advice would cease.

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[55] James I. Matray, "Captive of the Cold War: The Decision to Divide Korea at the 38th Parallel," *Pacific Historical Review* 50, no. 2 (May 1981): 145-168.

[56] Marc S. Gallicchio, *The Scramble for Asia: U.S. Military Power in the Aftermath of the Pacific War* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), 36, 47.

By early June, US military and diplomatic leaders were reconsidering this policy, urging privately the ouster of Jiang prior to a policy reversal. North Korea's invasion of South Korea on June 25 provided the impetus for action. Two days later, Truman deployed the US Seventh Fleet to prevent a Communist invasion of Taiwan. And so, another promise in the Cairo Declaration fell victim to the Cold War.

In his multi-volume history of World War II, Churchill complained that British and United States military discussions at the Cairo Conference "were sadly distracted by the Chinese story, which was lengthy, complicated, and minor."[57] Sherwood, in his Harry Hopkins biography, is even more disparaging, arguing that the impact of Allied deliberations at Cairo "on the progress of the war or on history was negligible."[58] The accuracy of such dismissive assessments receives support from a brief examination of the fate of the Cairo Declaration, which was the only substantive result of the summit. Although the Allies thereafter brought "unrelenting pressure against" Japan, this did not include Guomindang operations in Burma, let alone Mainland China. Japan would be "stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied" in the Japanese Peace Treaty of 1951, but "Formosa, and The Pescadores" were not exactly restored to the ROC, and Manchuria not at all. Two Koreas now have independence, but only one would appear to be free. Whether the Allies had "no thought of territorial expansion" remains debatable, but the Japanese definitely did not agree to unconditional surrender. After seven decades, it is clear that the legacy of the Cairo Declaration is not its implementation, but its value in teaching yet again the fundamental enduring lesson that world leaders have far less ability to determine the course of history than they think.

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57 Winston Churchill, *Closing the Ring* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951), 328.

58 Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, 393.

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Research Trends

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

The Journal of Northeast Asian History from this issue introduces Research Trends, a new venue for writing on historiographical trends and themes in Northeast Asian history. In particular, Research Trends will treat a variety of complex and transnational issues in global contexts. In so doing, this site will chart constructive historiographies that deepen scholarly interest in local history, regional history, and trans-regional history, all of which are open to comparative studies in East Asia and beyond.

The first article to be published in Research Trends explores the French engagement in the Tianjin Occupation of 1923 and after. The larger topic of Tianjin in the 1920s and 1930s has received less attention in Western scholarship than other issues and themes in China during the first half of the twentieth century. The multi-national political and military presence in the city makes obvious the importance of locating wider windows for viewing the details on the ground. Fresh deployment of archival materials, such as those from French repositories that are used in this article encourage further consideration of textual and inter-textual analysis of French and other European primary sources, and promise to bring into brighter light the research of historians in Europe for consideration vis-à-vis Chinese, Anglo-American, and Japanese research.

The second article offers perspective on the long-term cultural interactions and negotiations among a series of historical agents, who have touched on the waters of the South China Sea—including Western and non-western actors—by examining trans-regional patterning of networks, specifically those of Southeast Asia. Since the end of the Cold War, maritime conflicts and disputes have emerged as a critical global security issue from Southeast Asia to the Kuril Islands. These matters inevitably involve complex multi-state relations between Southeast Asian states as well as between global powers, such as the People's Republic of China and the United States. In the place of contemporary confrontations of nation-states, this article suggests new research directions in long-term co-operation through deepening the understanding of cultural tropes that have long existed and have historically connected human resources and trade networks from Southeast Asia to the global community.

The Place of Japan among Tianjin's Occupiers as Defined through the 1923-1924 and 1930 Combined Action Plans

Mathieu Gotteland
University Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne

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The Place of Japan among Tianjin's Occupiers as Defined through the 1923-1924 and 1930 Combined Action Plans

Tianjin (天津) is both one of the less studied and one of the most important "treaty ports," or Chinese cities opened to trade by treaty. There were nine imperialist nations in the city: Japan, Great Britain, France, United States, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Russia, and Belgium. Of these nine nations, eight owned concessions. This "microcosm" was concentrated in a very small area. The high strategic importance of the city made it threatened by many crises and most Chinese civil wars of the first half of the twentieth century. In this particular context, this article considers what was the role of cooperation/collaboration, and what was the role of rivalry among these imperialist powers to protect and defend their different national interests and concessions. The exclusive military point of view is justified by this very real necessity for foreigners to face grave crises on a regular basis, and the hapax constituted by the high concentration of different national occupation corps in the city, whose mission was to put into force the 1901 Protocol and facilitate a potential new anti-Boxer expedition. This article intends to reveal the real place and role of Japan in the combined action plans for northern China that were elaborated in 1923-1924 and in 1930 during the "warlord era," using documents which have not been studied until now, but are very revealing of the collaboration schemes and the internal hierarchy among occupiers in Tianjin.

Keywords: China, Japan, Tianjin, concessions, imperialism

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Mathieu Gotteland
University Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne

Tianjin's Place in History and Historiography

Tianjin (天津) is a city in northern China situated roughly at mid-distance between the capital of Beijing (北京) and the Bohai (渤海) Sea. From the first establishment of a foreign concession in 1860 to World War II, nine imperialist nations had a military presence: France, Great Britain, the United States, Japan, Russia, Italy, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and even Belgium. Eight of these countries owned concessions, either subsequently or simultaneously, which made Tianjin the most endowed "treaty port" as Chinese cities became open to foreign trade by treaty.[1] The city was also a key location in the Boxer War of 1900, opposing a multinational German-commanded expedition against Chinese xenophobic rioters. The 1901 Protocol that officially ended the war granted a number of occupation

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I am most thankful to my research director of the M.A. thesis on which this article is based, namely Professor Hugues Tertrais, who is now directing my PhD thesis, as well as Mr. Pierre Singaravélou, both of University Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne.

1 See Figure 1. The United States formally had a virtual concession for some time, for which claims had been abandoned after the Boxer War.

points to foreign troops, among which the most points were allocated to Tianjin due to its military and strategic importance.[2]

Until very recently, however, the city was quite neglected within the "concessions studies" and amidst the study of Western and Japanese colonialism in China compared to other Chinese treaty ports such as Guangzhou (广州市) or Shanghai (上海).[3] Even now, a comprehensive study of a national concession in Tianjin only exists in the case of Italy.[4] The Japanese concession was studied under the scope of sociology,[5] and

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2 Article 9 of the 1901 Protocol stipulated, "The Chinese Government has conceded the right to the Powers in the protocol annexed to the letter of the 16th of January, 1901, to occupy certain points, to be determined by an agreement between them, for the maintenance of open communication between the capital and the sea, The points occupied by the powers are: Huang-tsun, Lang-fang, Yang-tsun, Tientsin, Chun-liang Ch'eng, Tang-ku, Lu-tai, Tang-shan, Lan-chou, Chang-li, Ch'in-wang tao, Shan-hai-kuan."

3 Pierre Singaravélou, "Dix empires dans un mouchoir de poche: Le territoire de Tientsin à l'épreuve du phénomène concessionnaire," in *Territoires impériaux: Une histoire spatiale du fait colonial* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2011). Two research groups led respectively in Bristol and Paris by Robert Bickers and Hugues Tertrais focus on the question of Tianjin's colonial history. For studies on Shanghai, see Christian Henriot, *Shanghai 1927-1937: Elites locals et modernisation dans la Chine nationaliste* (Paris: Éditions de l'EHESS, 1991); Frederic E. Wakeman, *Policing Shanghai: 1927-1937* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995); Bryna Goodman, *Native Place, City and Nation: Regional Networks and Identities in Shanghai, 1853-1937* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995); Robert Bickers, "Shanghailanders: The Formation and Identity of British Settler Community in Shanghai 1843-1937," *Past & Present* 159, no. 1 (May, 1998): 161-211; Robert Bickers, *Empire Made Me: An Englishman Adrift in Shanghai* (London: Penguin Books, 2003).

4 Maurizio Marinelli, "Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror: Colonial Italy Reflects on Tianjin (1901-1947)," *Journal of Global Cultural Studies* 3 (2007): 119-150; Maurizio Marinelli, "Making Concessions in Tianjin: Heterotopia and Italian Colonialism in Mainland China," *Urban History* 36, no. 3 (2009): 399-425; Maurizio Marinelli, "Tianjin's Worldy Ambitions: From Hyper-Colonial Space to Business Park," *Open House International* 34, no. 3 (2009): 13-27; Maurizio Marinelli, "The Genesis of the Italian Concession in Tianjin: A Combination of Wishful Thinking and Realpolitik," *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 15, no. 4 (August, 2010): 536-556; Maurizio Marinelli, "Italy And/in China: Remaking the Urban Form and Rewriting History in Tianjin," in *National Belongings: Hybridity in the Italian Experience of Colonialism/Postcolonialism* (Berne: Peter Lang, 2010), 65-87; Aglaia De Angeli, "Italian land auctions in Tianjin: Italian colonialism in early twentieth-century China," *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 15, no. 4 (August, 2010): 557-572.

5 Marjorie Dryburgh, "Japan in Tianjin: Settlers, State and the Tensions of Empire before 1937," *Japanese Studies* 27, no. 1 (May, 2007): 19-34.



Figure 1. Sketch of Tianjin and Its Concessions in 1902

as far as the history of the American presence in northern China, only the early stages have been studied.[6] Much still remains to be done with

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[6] Edward M. Coffman, "The American 15th Infantry Regiment in China, 1912-1938: A Vignette in Social History," *Journal of Military History* 58, no. 1 (January 1994): 57-74.

respect to Tianjin studies in the discipline of historical research.

Key to Figure 1:

In black, the Chinese city; in black dots, the railway line; in red, the concessions' borders; in red dots, the former concessions borders, before extensions; in blue, the river.

1. Japanese concession (1898)
2. Extension of the Japanese concession (1900)
3. French concession (1861)
4. First extension of the French concession (1900)
5. Second extension of the French concession—Laoxikai (老西開) (1915)
6. British concession (1860)
7. "American" concession (then integrated into the British concession)
8. First extension of the British concession (1897)
9. Second extension of the British concession (1901)
10. German concession (1895-1917), then First Special District
11. Extension of the German concession (1900-1917), then First Special District
12. Southern Settlement of the Japanese concession (1900-1903)
13. Austro-Hungarian concession (1902-1917), then Second Special District
14. Italian concession (1901)
15. Russian concession (1900-1920), then Third Special District
16. Belgian concession (1900-1928), then Fourth Special District
17. Western Arsenal (Japanese)

Japan, in this scheme, was one of the few countries which owned concessions in the city before the Boxer War. The Japanese concession was founded by the Agreement of August 29, 1898, following the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, and its territory was extended two

years later.[7] Japan, as well as the other nations involved in the Boxer expedition, was granted in 1901 the right to keep troops at certain points between Beijing and the sea and between the sea and the Great Wall. However, the Japanese military presence was especially strong in the key location of Tianjin (636 officers and soldiers in 1902, as opposed to 896 men in the British corps and 666 men in the German corps) where the military headquarters of different nations were also situated.[8]

Some Historiographical Remarks: A Call for an International Dialogue on the Question of Imperialism in the East Asian Region

Upon submitting the conclusions of this study on the "combined action plans" negotiated by the different occupying powers in Tianjin in 1923-1924 and in 1930 with the purpose of presenting Western historiography to Korean, Chinese, and Japanese scholars, critique can be anticipated, rightfully from East Asian points of view. In order to defend the idea of this paper and explain the process which led to this study and its conclusions, some remarks will be briefly made here. Hopefully, these remarks will be interpreted as an invitation to a larger international debate, which is a dialogue missing in current historiography between the West and East Asia on the question explored here through the study of a city such as Tianjin, one that has truly been an international question since the nineteenth century, which is more than a mere confrontation between the West and East Asia.

The main remark concerning this paper is that it does not intend to

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7 T. O. Matemura, "History of the Development of the Japanese Concession, Tientsin," *North China Star*, August 12, 1920.

8 "Rapport annuel du corps d'occupation de Chine (COC), année 1902" [Annual Report of the French Occupation Corps in China (COC) of 1902], série H, sous-série 11 H (Chine), carton 73 (11H73), Service historique de la défense (SHD).

challenge or deny East Asian historiography as it has been done to date. On the contrary, this paper is an attempt to revive the subject in Western historiography and to open a dialogue between the West and East Asia, as our historiographies remain mainly nation-centric and are not complementing each other on such questions as they could or should. Thus, the point of emphasis here is that this paper is based on a Western perspective and aims at being viewed as a complementary study to East Asian historiography, to the extent that a Western scholar can possibly reach. It is also an invitation to a dialogue between scholars on an international scale.

It is not that Western historiography may be regarded as particularly complementary or inviting. Just as East Asian historiography has largely remained nation-centric, the leadership taken by English-language scholarship in the study of imperialism in East Asia is also a threat to obtaining a global, true understanding of the history of imperialism in East Asia. In China, at least from 1905 and for another 40 years, a strong Japanese-American duality existed, which will be mentioned below. Despite what could be invoked by limiting our examination to only international treaties from that period, Great Britain gradually slipped away from a pro-Japanese position and toward integration into an American anti-Japanese block.

From what has been revealed through French archives, France took a dual position: partly neutral and as a mediator between the two blocks, but also holding a strong pro-Japanese position on certain matters. We know for example that the deep Boxer trauma, which was followed one decade later by the early and efficient pro-Entente position of Japan in World War I, contributed to the elaboration of a very strong but *informal* and mostly *objective* alliance between France and Japan, at least in the microcosm which was the city of Tianjin. Such was the position French officials still remembered as they invited Japan in 1937 to less harsh politics towards French interests in Tianjin and in China during the war.

What is mentioned above is the specificity and interest of a truly

national French point of view on the matter. On the one hand, we have national Chinese, Japanese, and Korean historiographies, paired with English-language academic journals attempting to make them cooperate with and complement each other. On the other hand, we have a Western historiography very widely dominated by research produced in the English language (mainly using American and British archives), leaving no room for further debate by actually forming an anti-Japanese bloc in China during the period being researched. Other imperialisms, ones as strong as those in France, Russia, or Germany, are often overlooked or forgotten due to the variety of languages one is required to master in order to properly and comprehensively address them, but also due to the lack of interest among these respective former imperialistic powers toward such questions, until now at least.

Another point that seems predominant in East Asian historiography is the thought that Japan took independent steps from 1915 onward and became truly independent from its imperialist "partners" in China with the Manchurian War, although a collaborative approach between imperialistic powers officially existed after the Boxer War. Western historiography, hopefully including this paper, as well, could and should nuance that thought, which is a point East Asian scholars might find interesting. Naturally, at least from the Republican Revolution onward in China, Japan (or the Japanese army or navy authorities present in China) took independent steps to strengthen its own imperialism, as did every other imperialist power in the country, including France. In fact, we could also say that the Manchurian War of 1931-1933 officially brought Japan into a special position within the imperialistic system of Tianjin, as other foreign powers wanted to take a neutral stance in the Sino-Japanese conflict. However, this was a very long process that began in 1931 with many ups and downs in the relations between Japan and the other imperialist powers, especially in Tianjin, where, after the armistice of Tanggu in 1933, foreign powers saw no reason to exclude Japan from a collaboration process. As noted above, after the second full-scale

outbreak of war between China and Japan in 1937, French authorities held on to the vestiges of this at least informal alliance and formal collaboration to call upon Japan for better treatment of French interests in Tianjin. That is why this paper takes the view that up until 1931 it is acceptable to talk of a true "equality" (not excluding an underground competition) between the occupying powers of Tianjin, at least in terms of the *form* in which it was kept in principle through each plan here presented, despite the overwhelming Japanese military capacities in China compared to other powers and the large concessions made to Japan in 1930, even by the United States and Great Britain, because such talk exhibits the evolution of Japan's position in the city and furthermore the Western view of Japan as a (possible) ally or at least as a (possible) partner.

The above remarks do not pretend to be exhaustive on the subject, but rather strongly invite international and interregional debate on the question posed through this paper as it has been posed toward historiography at national levels, especially since such complex and sensitive questions involve many powers and actors from all over the world, which the case of the city of Tianjin most clearly illustrates.

Early Collaboration and Cooperation among Occupiers

The major stake in colonial studies regarding the case of "dying empires" such as the Ottoman Empire and especially the Chinese Empire, where many imperialist nations were present, is to determine whether they collaborated, cooperated, or fought to preserve and extend their national interests. A traditional point of view is to consider the colonial expansion as a rivalry for prestige, trade opportunities, and territories, and as a highly competitive enterprise. However, cooperation or collaboration against colonies also occurred, and is now widely recognized among scholars as a part of the colonizing and imperial process. This article aims

to determine which part was for collaboration/cooperation among colonizers and which part was about rivalry. Also, the place Japan occupied in this scheme shall be identified by studying the case of Tianjin in the warlord era through the so-called "combined action plans in Northern China" negotiated and approved by the commanding officers of the main occupying corps in Tianjin, namely, France, Great Britain, the United States, Japan, and Italy in 1923-1924 and in 1930.[9]

The main strategy of foreign imperialisms in China was to divide the empire into so-called "influence zones" more or less precisely and definitely determined by treaty. Thus came Russia's influence over Manchuria, which Japan took over from 1905, as well as Japanese influence over Fujian (福建), German influence over Shandong (山东), French influence over Yunnan (云南), and British influence over the Yangzi (扬子) basin. In these zones, every other imperial power than the one being granted privileges was a rival to be kept away. Northern China, understood as the region of Beijing and the Great Wall in the northeast, was in this respect a kind of *terra nullius*, with no sole recognized master. The siege of the Legations Quarter in Beijing in 1900 and the military expedition which followed brought many masters to the region.

The birth of a new cooperation model among colonizers was justified by the military and strategic importance of keeping such an occupation so as to facilitate a new anti-Boxer expedition if needed; the economic and commercial center that is the city of Tianjin, notably for salt or cotton; and the political advantages of virtually controlling the capital of the Chinese Empire for each of the occupying powers.[10] The numerous foreign concessions in Tianjin after the Boxer War, and their very small territories also brought consular and military authorities to

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[9] Italy was already concerned by the first plan, but did not negotiate it because the country's permanent occupation corps had only been set in place in 1924.

[10] A. H. Rasmussen, "The Wool Trade of North China," *Pacific Affairs* 9, no. 1 (March, 1936): 60-68; *Guide to Tientsin* (Tientsin: Astor House Hotel, 1907), 3-4.

closely collaborate for the sake of defending foreign interests in Tianjin and more widely in the region of northern China.[11]

On a political level, a multinational government, the first of its kind in history, was created in Tianjin from 1900 to 1902 to deal with common issues raised in the administration of any municipality such as those involving security, urbanism, river conservancy, or building an international bridge between the French and Russian concessions. The diplomatic corps in Beijing, as well as the consular corps in Tianjin and the senior-ranking military officers of the most important occupation corps, the so-called "inter-allied conferences," met on a regular basis so as to determine a common attitude toward issues raised by the Chinese. On a military level, and up to 1913, international maneuvers took place around Tianjin and saw Japanese, American, British, French, and German troops virtually fighting side-by-side to prepare for the eventuality of a new Boxer-like xenophobic rebellion in the region.[12]

In fact, the trauma that was the siege of the Legations Quarter in Beijing cannot be emphasized enough in the context of imperialism in China. Even decades after the event, when such a riot was not to be expected again, the first priority of each occupation corps and of authorities of concessions was defending foreign interests against such a xenophobic rebellion. Only World War I slightly changed the configuration of the semi-official alliance system in place in Tianjin.

A much more complex system emerged from the new international situation created thousands of miles away by the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand in Bosnia. In fact, every colonizing nation present in northern China entered the war at some point: seven of them in 1914, Italy in 1915, and the United States in 1917. Blocs such as the Triple Entente and the Central Powers naturally appeared during this

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[11] British (established in 1860), French (1861), German (1895), Japanese (1898), Russian (1900), Belgian (1900), Italian (1901), and Austro-Hungarian (1902).

[12] Photographs of the 1913 maneuvers may be found at http://gallica.bnf.fr

time. Some other more subjective blocs came from racist considerations separating the West from Japan and China, or objective alliances, especially between France and Japan as opposed to China in several crises.[13] The position of Japan at the time was unique. Japan stood between two worlds, the Western colonizing powers and the Asian powers, and risked losing trust from its Entente allies, and more generally from the Western colonizing powers.

It is worth noting that during World War I an urgent issue was already coming to light: Japan, as the geographically closest colonizing nation, was the most able to take over and secure the region. This endowed Japan with extra credit and power from its Western counterparts, especially when the largest part of the Western troops had returned to fight the war on the European front.[14] Despite the already defective Anglo-Japanese official alliance, it was also time for a rapprochement between Japan and France, which became Japan's first ally in this region, and the emergence of a growing duality between

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[13] A good example of racist considerations can be taken from a French report about the Japanese presence in Manchuria: "As you can see, every yellow man is the same," in "Colonel Merienne-Lucas, commandant le corps français d'occupation en Chine, au ministre de la guerre" [Colonel Merienne-Lucas, commanding officer of the COC, to the Ministry of War], August 15, 1917, 11H53, dossier 2, Service historique de la défense (SHD); Mathieu Gotteland, "The Japanese Order Forces in Tianjin, 1914-1940: A French Point of View" (Master's Thesis, University Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne/CHAC, 2013), 40-41. For the alliance between Japan and France, see *ibid.*, 43-44. As for objective alliances in crises, notably through the "Shandong question" (1914-1920), the "21 demands" (1915) on the Japanese side, and the "Laoxikai (老西開) affair" (1915-1917) on the French side, Japanese and French military authorities held special informal meetings, maintained a liaison post, and shared information.

[14] During World War I, Japan became the first occupying power in Tianjin in terms of the size of its occupation corps, whereas a very large part of the European corps was composed of "indigenous" soldiers (Indochinese for France, Indians for Great Britain). An example of this supplementary power Japan gained from the new international situation is when France passed on the formerly Russian-protected part of the railway to Japan during an "inter-allied conference" in 1916. One of the main reasons France chose Japan was because Japan was the most able to protect the said part of the railway, which was to be returned to France at the end of the war. Gotteland, "The Japanese Order Forces in Tianjin, 1914-1940," 37-38.

Japan and the United States.[15] The decision to adopt a specific military point of view on the question of what position Japan held among occupiers during the 1920s in Tianjin is mainly justified by the fragile position in which Western nations were placed in northern China, and the consequently important role of the foreign occupation corps. Such a decision would also be justified by Tianjin being the only treaty port, alongside Shanghai, where foreign land military units were stationed, and the opportunity it represents for historians to determine a hierarchy among occupiers.

Entering the Warlord Era and Elaborating a Closer Collaboration Between Colonizers

The "warlord era" is a common term referring to the period around the 1920s in China, even if the concept of "warlordism" itself as well as the Chinese civil wars existed prior to and after this decade. The era is usually roughly defined to have begun in 1917 with the attempt of imperial restoration by the Manchu general Zhang Xun (张勋) and ended between the "reunification" of China by the Guomindang (國民黨) in 1928 and the beginning of the Manchurian War in 1931. The combined action plans discussed here were designed as a reaction to warlordism and civil wars that especially put all foreign interests and concessions in danger, as an answer that could only be found in international military collaboration. This article's aim, though, is not only to show what kind of cooperation/collaboration existed between the imperialist nations and Japan's particular position in their schemes. It is to also show that rivalry was not

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[15] Japanese-American tensions appeared with the California Land Tenure Law, which is also known as the Japanese Exclusion Act of 1904, the American interruption of the Russo-Japanese War with the signing of the Portsmouth Treaty in 1905, and as the United States began a very pro-Chinese policy (the *Wilhelmstraße* of the German concession of Tientsin was renamed Woodrow Wilson Street after the war). These tensions led to a strong Japanese-American duality about and in China. Ibid., 41-43.

forgotten and was a matter to be kept outside the concessions in Tianjin without being formally recognized in any case.[16]

The 1923-1924 combined action plan was a response to two major Chinese civil wars that occurred in northern China: the Anhui (安徽)-Zhili (直隶) War in 1920 and the Zhili (直隶)-Fengtian (奉天) War in 1922. Only once before 1920, during the Chinese revolution of 1911-1912, were measures of collaboration taken. The railway line from Beijing to the sea was divided into four sectors and foreign troops patrolled within their specifically assigned areas. For the war in 1920, it is safe to admit that Japan supported the so-called Anhui (安徽) clique, after its leader Duan Qirui (段祺瑞) fled to the Japanese concession of Tianjin following his military defeat.[17]

As for the 1922 war, there is evidence implying that Japan and France sided with Zhang Zuolin (张作霖), the Fengtian (奉天) clique's leader, while the United States and Great Britain sided with Wu Peifu (吴佩孚), the Zhili (直隶) clique's leader.[18] On October 3, 1922, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs even had to express a formal protest against its own national General Staff which "sent officers to Mukden to help Zhang Zuolin" (张作霖).[19] Even so, individual national intelligence services were quite aware of these underground activities. This was actually a secret war for China that led the foreign imperialist nations to choose to support one or another particular warlord and where, again, a Japanese-American duality can be found.[20] Nevertheless, even before the

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16 Anthony B. Chan, *Arming the Chinese: The Western Armaments Trade in Warlord China, 1920-1928*, 2nd ed. (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2010).

17 Henry G. W. Woodhead, ed., *The China Year Book, 1925* (Shanghai: North China Daily News & Herald, n.d.).

18 Gotteland, "The Japanese Order Forces in Tianjin, 1914-1940," 52-55.

19 Mukden is today's Shenyang (沈阳). See Chronology May-October 1922, SHD, 11H52, 1, B.

20 In its report about the 1922 war, the French intelligence service did not have any doubts about the actual situation: "The policy of Zhang Zuolin (张作霖) is supported by the Japanese, and Wu Pei Fu's (吴佩孚) policy is supported by the Englishmen and especially by the Americans." See "Rôle

elaboration of the combined action plans, this situation made colonizers collaborate more closely.

As usual and in response to the new crisis caused by the Anhui-Zhili War, an inter-allied meeting was held in July 1920 at the house of the senior commanding officer, the Japanese officer Major-General Minami (南), as it was on most occasions, along with commanding officers of the United States, Great Britain, and France, the three other most important occupation corps in Tianjin.[21] Confronted with an unprecedented situation, their first concern was maintaining among the belligerents respect for the 1901 Protocol, as well as protecting the Beijing-Shanhaiguan (山海关) railway and the foreign concessions of Tianjin. The idea of sending international military trains along the railway line emerged at that time, and for this sake, two trains would be requisitioned in Tianjin and Shanhaiguan between July 15 and July 30. An equal proportion of soldiers from the four corps would board the trains with the mission of affirming the Western presence, calling to observe the 1901 Protocol and repair and protect the railway and telegraph lines. Defense sectors were also allocated to the four occupation corps, wider than their own national concessions and including the Chinese city. The French, on their side, occupied Tianjin's two railway stations. Finally, common instructions were given to the troops of every corps in case Chinese soldiers went through the defense lines: disarmament, internment, and, in case of necessity, use of armed force.[22]

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du corps français d'occupation de Chine au cours de la guerre civile de mai-juin 1922" [Role of the French Occupation Corps in China During the Civil War, May-June 1922], 11H52, dossier 5, Service historique de la défense (SHD).

21 "Résumé des propositions, observations et décisions prises dans les conférences tenues à Tien-Tsin (13-29 juillet 1920)" [Summary of the Propositions, Observations and Decisions Taken During the Conferences Held in Tianjin by the American, British, French and Japanese Occupation Corps Commanding Officers (July 13-29, 1920)], 11H53, dossier 6, SHD.

22 "Major-Général Minami, commandant les troupes japonaises, au consul doyen—consul général

In April 1922, when the Zhili-Fengtian War threatened to reach Tianjin, another inter-allied meeting took place at the house of the Japanese commanding officer. A common attitude was adopted, mainly to collaborate in puttting together three military trains to repair and protect the railway and telegraphic lines. One of the trains could carry up to a total of 250 men assembled in equal proportions from the four corps, who were to inform Chinese commanding officers of their obligations to comply with the 1901 Protocol, and to issue a common protestation against eventual infractions of the Protocol.[23] The retreat of Marshall Zhang's (张) troops to the north brought a real threat to Tianjin, prompting yet another meeting on May 6. Some further measures for international collaboration were adopted through the meeting, which was mainly to establish an international post at the electric station with troops from the four occupation corps in equal proportions.[24]

The 1923-1924 Combined Action Plan in Northern China

Until that point, though, crises had been dealt with case by case through decisions made unanimously in four-sided inter-allied meetings, with a special care for both neutrality in the Chinese conflicts and equality between the foreign occupation corps in collaborating in the observation of the 1901 Protocol and the defense of the concessions. There was reaction to crises, but no prevention of them. The idea to develop a so-called "combined action plan for Northern China" prior to any crisis

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anglais à Tientsin" [Major-General Minami, Commanding officer of the Japanese occupation corps, to the English General Consul in Tianjin], July 17, 1920, 11H53, dossier 1, SHD.

23 "Résolutions adoptées à une conférence des commandants étrangers (26 avril 1922)" [Resolutions Adopted in a Conference of the Foreign Commanding Officers on April 26, 1922], 11H52, dossier 5, SHD.

24 "Rôle du corps français d'occupation de Chine au cours de la guerre civile de mai-juin 1922," 11H52, dossier 5, SHD.

came from the French commanding officer Colonel Sautel in December 1923. To negotiate the arrangement of such plans, however, tremendous difficulties had to be overcome, requiring the commanding officers of the four main occupation corps to turn into diplomats. One can only grasp how herculean a task such negotiations represented and why this was never undertaken before 1923, as it took exactly eight months of multilateral discussions from December 14, 1923, to July 14, 1924, to set the common Tianjin defense plan in place, that is, to set in place a plan which can only answer to one type of crisis in particular. That is why the importance of the Boxer War trauma in Western minds is underlined in this article: a Boxer-like xenophobic riot may be secunded by the Chinese central government. The main aim of the defense plan was to protect foreign civilians against xenophobic violence, and to maintain positions until reinforcements could arrive so as to march on to Beijing and end the war.

This consideration was anachronistic. There was no more central power in China in 1924, and any configuration of occupying Beijing would not help in solving such a crisis. Nevertheless, the negotiation and arrangement of this combined action plan was the biggest step towards closer collaboration between occupiers in Tianjin since the end of the Boxer War. It was also, if not a step towards reconciling Japan and the United States over China, a formal recognition by both parties that international collaboration in defending Tianjin and elaborating a defense plan to do so was too important an issue not to be willing to negotiate and eventually reach an understanding. It had been clearly stated, though, by the French commanding officer that if negotiations took long, "it is because of the constant reluctance and objections from the Americans and the Japanese, in particular, because of their duel in China."[25]

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[25] "Lettre du commandant le corps français d'occupation de Chine au ministre de la guerre" [French commanding officer to Ministry of War], June 12, 1924, 11H67, 12, SHD.

This defense plan systematically formulated some measures that had been taken during the last crisis: inter-allied meetings at the senior commanding officer's house, international military trains to protect and repair the railway and telegraphic lines, the French occupation of Tianjin's "East Station" (the railway stations in Tianjin were in the French-protected part of the line), concerted protest against infractions of the 1901 Protocol, interdiction of Chinese troops from coming within a 20 *li* radius around Tianjin and from alighting trains at stations in Tianjin, strict neutrality of the railway line and the Haihe (海河) River, and the establishment of separate predetermined defense sectors for each of the four occupation corps.[26] The size of the defense sectors reflected more or less the size of these four corps.[27] Having only become permanent in 1924, the Italian occupation corps began participating in inter-allied meetings after that year. So, while Italy did not negotiate the defense plan, it instead asked France to take charge of protecting the Italian concession. Japan had only to bear with protecting its own concession's boundaries.

The sole true novelty surrounding the plan was that the Chinese city would not be defended by the occupying powers any longer. In fact, this plan attempted to deal with a Boxer-like scenario, which meant that defending the Chinese city was like "having 10 soldiers around your house to guard it, and 300 enemies inside."[28] But the "combined action plan in Northern China" did not simply carry a symbolic value, nor was it only a confirmation of previous measures taken at other times of crisis. Based on such a scenario of foreign interests and concessions, and, of course, foreign troops being under attack, it was obvious that the size of

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[26] See Figure 2.

[27] For the year 1925: France 1,560; United Kingdom 1,034; the United States 946; and Japan 800.

[28] "Colonel Sautel, commandant le corps français d'occupation de Chine, au ministre de la guerre" [Colonel Sautel, commanding officer of the COC, to Ministry of War], December 26, 1923, 11H67, dossier 12, SHD.



Figure 2. Sketch of Tianjin and the defense plan of 1924 (drawn after the map annexed to the combined action plan of 1923-1924)

the foreign occupation corps compared to the size of Chinese armies, to which civilian participation must of course be added, would not allow them to hold their positions for very long, even in keeping the city of Tianjin at any cost and subsequently bringing back the soldiers occupying different points along the railway line. Beyond the adoption of measures to be taken, the plan also relied on different reinforcements coming from metropoles. Based on such data, a hierarchy could be established among the occupation corps, which was officially recognized.[29]

Key to Figure 2

In smaller lines: In black, the Chinese city; in black dots, the railway line; in red, the concessions' border; in blue, the river. In larger lines: In purple, the Japanese defense line; in blue, the French defense line; in red, the British defense line; in brown, the American defense line; in black, the defense sectors borderlines.
The signs = are bridges.

1. Former Austro-Hungarian concession, now Second Special District
2. Italian concession
3. Part of the former Russian concession, now Third Special District
4. Western Arsenal (Japanese)

a. International bridge
b. Austrian bridge

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[29] The following table is based upon data found in "Lettre du Commandant le Corps Français d'Occupation de Chine au Ministre de la Guerre" [Letter from the commanding officer of the COC to the Ministry of War], June 12, 1924, 11H67, 12, SHD. This document shows the possibilities of receiving reinforcements from the four main occupying nations with the number of days until arrival in Tianjin, the size of the reinforcements, and their origin.

Days	United Kingdom	United States	France	Japan
1				1 regiment (Dairen)
5				1 division (Metropole)
9				1 brigade (Metropole)
15		1 brigade (Philippines)	2 battalions (Indochine)	1 division (Metropole)
21	Undetermined number (Singapore/ India)			
42		1 division (Metropole)		

As shown in the table above, Japan had an overwhelming superiority, notably due to its military policy, and because the Japanese mainland was very close to northern China, not to mention Japan's military occupation of Manchuria. Any major crisis necessitating reinforcement would be solved within a few days of Japanese intervention, while the American, French, and even more British reinforcements, since Hong Kong (香港) could not send any, would still be on their way to China, and, in any case, much smaller in number. The 1923-1924 defense plan might give an impression of equality between the four main occupiers, or perhaps even be disadvantageous for Japan, because of the size of its occupation corps. However, one should keep in mind that unlike the other three countries, Japan never needed a strong occupation corps in Tianjin to face crises given that it could receive reinforcements from Manchuria or the metropole in less time than these other countries, a fact that was widely recognized at the time. This, we claim, beyond the words of the combined action plan, truly reveals the place of Japan among occupiers in Tianjin in 1924, while the plan is "only" the revealer of a strong collaboration set in place between colonizers, Japan included, for the defense of Tianjin.

The 1930 Combined Action Plan in Northern China

A crisis did not wait long to arise in Tianjin after the elaboration of the 1923-1924 combined action plan. As early as September 2, 1924, Lu Yongxiang (卢永祥), a subordinate warlord of Duan Qirui (段祺瑞), fought against the satellite warlords of Marshall Wu Peifu (吴佩孚) for control of the Shanghai area. After his defeat, on October 13 Lu Yongxiang fled to Japan. This triggered a new civil war in China drawn upon a wide anti-Wu (吴) alliance: Marshall Zhang Zuolin (张作霖), General Feng Yuxiang (冯玉祥), Duan Qirui, and the Guomindang (國民黨). Japan clearly played a large role in this new war and the authorities of the Japanese-controlled South Manchurian Railway forbid Wu to use its lines.[30] On the other hand, in an inter-allied meeting on September 22, a unanimous decision (meaning that the Japanese voted for it) was made for "absolute non-interference" and to strictly accomplish their mission as defined by the 1901 Protocol.[31] The principle of the 1902 note through which Chinese armed troops were not to enter a 20 *li* zone around Tianjin, became officially abandoned after having been valued up until then. Instead, it was decided to officially protest in case of an infraction, and only build protection with a physical barrier for the foreign concessions, more or less along the defense lines from the 1923-1924 plan after a Japanese plan was approved by all.

After October 24, Tianjin was gravely threatened. Some 700 of Marshall Wu's men were stationed in the Chinese city despite official protestations by the commandants, and the Japanese intelligence service believed General Feng was coming to Tianjin to fight Wu there. The commandants then decided to protest to Feng for damages done to the railway, telegraph lines, and telephone lines, and to remind him of the

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30 Woodhead, *The China Year Book*, 1925.

31 "Minutes of the Conference of Commandants," September 22, 1924, 11H53, dossier 2, B, SHD.

1901 Protocol and the 1902 note. They also decided to ask the legal provincial authorities for help in disarming and expelling Marshall Wu and his men from the Chinese city, which is particularly interesting with respect to the issue of imperial collaboration. Conversely, provincial authorities asked the foreign commandants for help in Tianjin when General Li Zongren (李宗仁) and 1,000 of his men threatened to enter the 20 *li* zone.[32]

Due to their lack of men and material resources at the time for the purpose of enforcing treaties, not only did military authorities from various nations collaborate closely, but such collaboration also existed for the sake of neutralizing and demilitarizing the Tianjin area between foreign occupiers and Chinese provincial authorities. It is also worth noting that, aside from whether the 1923-1924 defense plan was put into practice or not, the Japanese, in various ways, actually took the lead among the foreign corps in Tianjin in that time of crisis, despite Japan itself being involved in a Chinese civil war. In times of need, and often when the occupation corps were not strong enough to fulfill their mission, Japan's advantage of having a strong military presence in China beforehand and the proximity of its mainland to Tianjin already translated into an unofficial, but real and efficient Japanese leadership among Tianjin's occupiers only a few months after the negotiation of the 1923-1924 plan.

Only one year later, during the war between Marshall Zhang and Marshall Wu on one side and General Feng on the other, the city of Tianjin was occupied for five months by Feng's army.[33] Although there are no archives in France that mention the measures taken on this occasion by the foreign corps, this event was symptomatic in two aspects. For the first time in the history of Tianjin's occupation, the

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[32] "Minutes of the Conference of Commandants," October 24, 1924, 11H53, dossier 2, B, SHD.

[33] Henry G. W. Woodhead, ed., *The China Year Book, 1926* (Shanghai: North China Daily News & Herald, n.d.).

different national occupation corps were called "allied occupation corps in Northern China" by the British.[34] Although this was not recognized as an official expression, it is in fact very revealing in terms of researching inter-imperial collaboration for this paper's case study. It is also very revealing regarding the feeble state of the occupation corps in late 1925, notwithstanding recurring civil wars touching northern China, because Feng remained for five months in an area forbidden to the Chinese military without having any effective action taken against him.

Awareness of the gravity of the situation provoked by numerous Chinese civil wars for foreign interests in northern China only took presence in different metropoles at the time of the "Northern Expedition" of 1926-1928. This awoke the almost forgotten trauma of the Boxer War in Western minds. In April 1927, an inter-allied meeting was organized in Tianjin to prepare for possible operations of war in northern China. Immediate reinforcements were summoned: the American ship *Ashville*, the Italian ship *Sebastiano Caboto*, 250 men for the Japanese corps, and 130 men for the American corps. They furthermore took this resolution as a common proposition for their individual metropolitan authorities as to avoid the "Sudist danger." They wanted to immediately double the strength of each corps, and if the Sudist expedition were to carry on to the north, to make the collective size of the different corps as large as 20,000 men, including aviation and mechanized infantry (as a minimum program), or 25,000 men (as a maximum program) with their advice leaning toward the maximum program.[35]

While a single minor battle took place around Tianjin on June 28,

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[34] "Lettre du commandant des troupes britanniques en Chine du Nord au doyen des commandants du corps allié d'occupation en Chine du Nord" [Letter from the British commanding officer in North China to the Senior commanding officer in North China], December 13, 1925, 11H53, dossier 2, B, SHD.

[35] Colonel Huntziger, French commanding officer, to Lieutenant-General T. Takata (田形), Japanese and senior commanding officer, April 4, 1927, Diplomatic and consular archives, Nantes, Tientsin fonds, 19.

1928, the city knew no crisis from this "Northern Expedition." The program was unrealistic and did not become realized, the only consequence being a substantial but very temporary increase in the foreign occupation corps' strength in Tianjin. Even so, this event once again reveals the hierarchy among Tianjin's occupiers and the special place of Japan, which was the only country involved in the civil war through its intervention in Jinan (济南). In fact, from being only the fourth largest occupation corps in 1926, Japan assumed the top rank in 1928 with an increase of about 906% in two years. For comparison, the increase of the English corps and the French corps in size during the same period was 162% and 78%, respectively. The Italian and American infantry corps respectively increased in size by about 21% and 4%.[36] These numbers speak to the ability of different foreign occupation corps in Tianjin to quickly reinforce themselves, with the leading place occupied by Japan. The combined action plan of 1930 solidified Japan's position as leader.[37]

An update to the 1923-1924 plan was decided after the events of 1926-1928. The new plan should not only deal with a Boxer-like scenario, but also with the possibility of Chinese civil wars, as already experienced in the Tianjin area in 1917, 1920, 1922, 1924, 1925, and 1928 during the so-called "warlord era." This plan of course was never to be applied in such events, since the plan had been negotiated only one year before the beginning of the Manchurian War. On the other hand, regardless of the relations between China and Japan growing increasingly tense since the "Northern Expedition" and the assassination of Zhang Zuolin (张作霖) in 1928, the possibility of a Sino-Japanese war was not considered.

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[36] Gotteland, "The Japanese Order Forces in Tianjin, 1914-1940," 125.

[37] "Plan d'action combinée des corps d'occupation étrangers au nord de la Chine, 22 décembre 1930" [Combined Action Plan of the Foreign Troops in Northern China of December 22, 1930], 11H67, dossier 12, SHD.

That being said, the plan in itself was already probably the greatest accomplishment toward international collaboration for the occupation of Tianjin and the defense of foreign interests. “The necessity of the narrowest mutual cooperation is recognized.”[38] The plan actually put every foreign occupation in Tianjin under the authority of a senior commanding officer (the Japanese commanding officer for most of the time), except for the counter-orders of one’s embassy. The senior Japanese officer also had under his direct command a new corps called an “international reserve” composed of members and a liaison officer of each corps. International trains, which were not sent on the railway lines during the last three civil wars in 1924, 1925, and 1928, were to be sent between Beijing and the sea. The Italian corps was incorporated in the Tianjin defense plan, as well as different voluntary corps, classified by nationality (Belgians in the French defense sector, Germans in the American defense sector, and Russians in the French, American, and English defense sectors). Defense sectors were only intended to defend the foreign concessions, some parts of the so-called special districts (former concessions), and Germany’s former concession, or the First Special District, which had been considered an American-protected zone since 1916.[39]

Two international detachments were to be sent to the waterworks under Japanese command and to the electric plant under Italian command. As a symbolic “gesture of international solidarity,” the Austrian bridge was to be kept by two men from each corps carrying Japanese, British, French, American, and Italian flags. This furthermore affirmed the central strategic position of Tianjin in northern China, its defense being “vital” as a city to be held at all costs and to be helped by every apt foreign national in case of a Boxer-like event, for example.

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[38] Ibid.

[39] See Figure 3.



Figure 3. Sketch of Tianjin and its defense plan of 1930 (after the map annexed to the combined action plan of 1930 and signed by the Japanese, French, British, American, and Italian commanding officers)

This plan was an acknowledgement of the Japanese supremacy among Tianjin's occupiers. If, formally, the plan only stated that Japan had to defend its own concession and arsenal, as well as command the international detachment at Tianjin's waterworks, then the senior

commanding officer actually received many privileges in this plan, such as direct authority over every occupation corps as well as command of the so-called "international reserve." Regarding this title of "senior commanding officer," it is necessary to understand that at almost no time during the history of Tianjin's occupation was the senior commanding officer someone other than the Japanese commanding officer. These privileges and great power given to the senior officer were in fact given to Japan with the approval of the American commanding officer.

Key to Figure 3

In smaller lines: In black, the Chinese city; in black dots, the railway line; in red, the concessions' border; in blue, the river.
In larger lines: In purple, the Japanese defense line; in blue, the French defense line; in blue dots, the French inner defense line; in red, the British defense line; in red dots, the British inner defense line; in brown, the American defense line; in brown dots, the American inner defense line; in green, the Italian defense line.
The signs = are bridges.

1. Former Austro-Hungarian concession, now the Second Special District
2. Italian concession
3. Part of the former Russian concession, now the Third Special District
4. Former Belgian concession, now the Fourth Special District
5. Western Arsenal (Japanese)

a. International bridge
b. Austrian bridge

A. International post at the electrical plant under Italian command
B. International post at the waterworks under Japanese command

Japan's Rising Power in Northern China and International Imperialist Solidarity

Tianjin is a very special case in imperial history, not to mention in Chinese history. The Boxer War and the trauma thereof in Western minds, the political, economic, and strategic importance of the city, the geographic proximity to the (former) Chinese capital of Beijing, and Tainjin's central position in northern China made this city a very important stake for foreigners. This special situation of Tianjin among "treaty ports" made it a true "microcosm." Many nationalities, political ideas, religions, and social classes were present in the city because of the various concessions and occupation corps. They were all within an ever so small area, regardless of the city's gradual expansion up until 1915. This particular and especially high concentration of foreigners of different origins who, unlike in Shanghai, obeyed national authorities situated in this important and strategic area made it quite necessary to collaborate very narrowly on a diplomatic level as well as on a military level for the sake of defending foreign interests, far more so than in other imperial and colonial territories in and outside China. Furthermore, the Tianjin area saw many crises in the first half of the twentieth century: the Chinese republican revolution in 1912, the Zhang Xun (張勳) coup in 1917, and other civil wars in 1920, 1922, 1924, 1925, and 1928, including a five month occupation by General Feng's army between December 1925 and April 1926. These many crises and their real threat to foreign interests and concessions, as well as to the 1901 Protocol, a product of the Boxer War, made it increasingly necessary for the foreign occupation corps to cooperate in the city.

Rivalry was not missing, but merely hidden and kept away from Tianjin's concessions. This can be seen notably through the large foreign implication in the Chinese civil wars in northern China. What, though, was the real place of Japan in this particular scheme? The spirit of the 1901 Protocol was to grant perfect equality among the different

occupiers on diplomatic and military levels. This can be seen in every decision taken until 1930. The only exception officially allowed to this ground rule was to adapt the responsibilities of each country according to their military strength at the time, which was primarily estimated by the size of each occupation corps. But the difficulties for European and American occupiers in maintaining a strong enough force in northern China, their need to rely on their own "indigenous" soldiers consisting of Indians, Indochinese, Filipinos, and others, and, last but not least, their inability to quickly reinforce their occupation corps in times of crisis made their presence weaker in the context of Chinese civil wars and defense scenarios in which several tens or even hundreds of Chinese soldiers had to be fought. On the other hand, Japan is geographically very close to northern China. Japan had been militarily present there and in Manchuria since 1905, and also in Korea, which was its protectorate from 1904 and then was annexed by Japan in 1910. Japan's military policy tended to always increase expenditures and the size of its army and navy. Through the 1923-1924 plan, which was negotiated for eight months, a will can be observed to maintain a strict equality between the four main occupying nations of France, Great Britain, the United States, and Japan. With the 1930 updated plan, however, the supremacy of Japan among Tianjin's occupiers became recognized. Formally, Japan had not been granted any privileges, but it was officially recognized that the advantages given to the senior commanding officer of Tianjin were intended for Japan, an honorific title that Japan almost always held. And in this 1930 plan, the senior commanding officer was to command a new "6th Corps" known as the "international reserve" in addition to retaining supreme authority over the other occupation corps.

The Place of Japan in Tianjin after 1931: Redefining the Paradigm

However, this recognition was only informal, and short-lived. The place

of Japan among Tianjin's occupiers essentially, and naturally, changed with such events as the 1931-1933 Manchurian War, the so-called "Tianjin Incident" of November 1931, the autonomy of the Tianjin region under Japanese tutelage in 1935, the Second Sino-Japanese War, especially the battle of Tianjin in July 1937, and, finally, the locus of the concessions in the summer of 1939. For these reasons, the combined action plan of 1930 was never actually applied. The first attempt at calling for the plan's application came in November 1931 when the "Tianjin Incident" occured. Japan then stepped back when France, Great Britain, the United States, and Italy claimed that the incident was purely a Sino-Japanese matter and that the other foreign interests in Tianjin had never been threatened by it. The British only allowed a small Japanese detachment to enter their national concession to protect the Japanese consulate and the Yokohama Specie Bank.[40]

On February 10, 1932, a special inter-allied meeting without the Japanese commanding officer present was held at the British military headquarters. A common position of the four corps was agreed upon in the event of a Sino-Japanese incident or a declaration of war issued by either side. They decided that the British, French, and Italian commanding officers would each defend their own concessions. The French would close the international bridge to both Chinese and Japanese troops. And the Italians would be allowed to do the same on the Austrian bridge. If the First Special District was not a disputed area between Chinese and Japanese troops, American infantry would defend it.[41] Collaboration in Tianjin among occupiers had not ended as Japan went to war with China. Only now, Japan's former special position among

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[40] "Colonel Noiret, commandant supérieur des troupes françaises en Chine, au vice-amiral commandant en chef des forces navales françaises d'Extrême-Orient" [Colonel Noiret to Vice-Admiral Chief commanding officer of the French naval forces in Far East, November, 1931], 11H55, dossier 1, SHD.

[41] "Compte-rendu de la conférence du 10 février 1932" [Account of the Conference of February 10, 1932], 11H57, dossier 2, SHD.

occupiers as the only Asian power, as the only non-white power, and as the power directly and officially fighting Chinese troops since 1931 was translated into a detachment from it by the other occupying powers from 1931-1932 onward, even though it formally, but not concretely, remained a Protocol power. From a leading role in an inter-imperial occupation scheme as regulated by the 1901 Protocol, Japan then decided to take a step forward toward actual control of the region, which it achieved in 1935, and was then ostracized by the other occupying powers. In the 1930 plan, every occupying power, including the United States, agreed to grant Japan a special position in Tianjin. From 1931 onward, Japan decided to grant itself this very position without the agreement of the other powers, and after 1937, Japan turned against them.

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Water Works Trans-regionally: Southeast Asian Networks of Migration, Culture, and Trade in the History of the South China Sea

William B. Noseworthy
University of Wisconsin

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Water Works Trans-regionally: Southeast Asian Networks of Migration, Culture, and Trade in the History of the South China Sea

This article examines the history of the South China Sea in the context of migration, culture, and trade. Throughout the history of East Asia and Southeast Asia, portions of the sea have been hotly contested during the early modern period, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and through to the era of World War II and the Vietnam War, leading to the contemporary competing claims by ASEAN members and China over the symbolic Paracel and Spratly Islands. However, the deeper history of the lands along the shores of Southeast Asian history emphasizes a different narrative. Inspired by arguments presented by the great historian Fernand Braudel in his 1949 classic *The Mediterranean*, this article argues that the South China Sea is not a single sea dominated by nationalist competitions, but rather an oceanic space comprised of cultural networks that have dictated the major movements of history through trade and economic exchange.

Keywords: migration, culture, trade, South China Sea, the Mediterranean

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William B. Noseworthy
University of Wisconsin

Introduction

The current territorial dispute over the South China Sea is predominantly staged by terms of contestation among China, Taiwan, and members of the ASEAN, namely the Philippines, Malaysia, and Vietnam. Of all of these disputes, the dispute between Vietnam and China has perhaps received disproportionate attention. Whether this is due to a perceived history of eternal tension between Vietnamese and Chinese culture, or is simply encouraged through the frameworks of certain politicians (particularly in the United States) is up for debate. Meanwhile, taking a historical perspective on the oceanic realm of the South China Sea as a connecting force between East Asia and Southeast Asia makes it clear that migrations, cultural flows, and trade have rather been the dominating trends of this region, even if periods of history have been punctuated with substantial conflicts. Let us begin by choosing the vantage point of observing the South China Sea from an alternative lens: the south central coast of Vietnam.

A refreshing perspective on history can be gained from taking the south central coast of Vietnam as the central vantage point of this

examination. The South China Sea suddenly becomes the "Eastern Sea" (Biển Đông), whereas in the local Cham language, it is simply known as "the sea"—*tathik* (or "tasik" in written Cham). The water networks of the sea stretch southward, wrapping around the Mekong Delta, mixing with the Gulf of Thailand. They further spread outward off over the eastern and southern horizons to mix with the waters of the seas of Sulu, the Celebes, Java, Banda, and Timor before linking with the Andaman Sea and the Philippines Sea. These waters extend inward then as well into the highlands of mainland Southeast Asia, through the alluvial plains of Sumatra, Java, upward along the Red River Delta in northern Vietnam, through the Mekong of southern Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and eventually southern China. They also extend northward toward the ports of Macau and Hong Kong, through the East China Sea to the ports of Korea and Japan. Toward the west, they head past the Bay of Bengal and the Laccadive Sea, and penetrate as far as the "Arabian World" of the Hadramat and the Hijez before turning south to Madagascar and East Africa. Finally, they unfold deeply eastward and outward through Micronesia, Melanesia, and Polynesia, then southeast to Australia and again through the Hawaiian Islands to the ports of California and Latin America. Such is the perspective of certain elements from *The Mediterranean* applied to the South China Sea.[1] It is a spatial turn

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[1] For a similar discussion specifically regarding Southeast Asia, see Heather Sutherland, "Southeast Asian History and the Mediterranean Analogy," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 34, no. 1 (February 2003): 1-20. In this article Sutherland (2003) appropriately points out that, in fact, while the majority of historical evidence weigh our attention to the South China Sea, in reality the Bay of Bengal has been just as important throughout the history of the region. In this piece, Sutherland begins with the Mediterranean metaphor, but then seems to drift into the discussion of the nature of area studies programs and the larger problems of teaching about Southeast Asia in a global context, particularly those scholars of the region face in academic institutions. Hence, Sutherland's article presents an excellent sweep of the literature on Southeast Asia from this perspective. Meanwhile, drawing inspiration from Sutherlands and more deeply, Fernand Braudel's *The Mediterranean* as an analogy for the South China Sea this article seeks to capture the winds of this discussion and sail further. As Sutherland writes, 'The Mediterranean is thus typified by a dynamic balance between interaction and separation, in which a fundamental and

influenced by geographers that has shaped the perspective of historians ever since Fernand Braudel first composed his classic history of the Mediterranean world, written from the experience of a historian imprisoned by conflict. Inspired by the classic work of *The Mediterranean*, the South China Sea can be considered not as a bound region, but by nature a nebulous space that flows into the nebulous space of others. Yet, like the nature of the sea, it is also electric, stimulating the movements of history. The questions we then strive to answer are: How can this vision of the South China Sea reshape our understanding of East Asian and Southeast Asian history? How did these connections shape cultural flows? How did they connect classical Vietnamese, Cham, Philippine, Funanese, and Chen La cultures to others? How do we see the sea as a force that even shaped connections to Angkor in Cambodia and Lan Xang in Laos? And why is it helpful to view the history of the South China Sea through this particular lens?

Upon beginning to think about how to answer the above questions, there are at least four well-thought-out publications that are especially useful, along with a website named "History of the World in 100 Objects" by the BBC and the British Museum.[2] What is noticeable in this fascinating, invaluable collection of publications and website is that there are relatively few objects from locations around the South China Sea. From the perspective of global history, only the shadow puppet of Bima, a representation of the Javanese adaptations of the classical Indian "Mahabharata" stories, and a Borobudur Buddha head that is also from the island of Java "make it" into the consideration of "world history."

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almost unchanging character is overlaid by a kaleidoscope of movement and variegation.' See ibid., 12. Braudel himself made very controversial statements. Nevertheless, the aim of this paper is not to repeat those mistakes, but rather to use the potentially beneficial framework that he provided, since for much of history in Southeast Asia and even arguably up until the present, access to water has been more important than access to land.

2 BBC. "A History of the World in 100 Objects." http://www.bbc.co.uk/ahistoryoftheworld/about/british-museum-objects/

Using such a collection as a reference point, it can be said that the history of the South China Sea is generally ignored from a global perspective. For example, it is fitting that the head of a Buddha is the main feature of Borobudur, but what about the small relief of sailors that appears on the very same monument?[3] The relief of the sailors highlights that without the sea there would never have been a Buddha head in Borobudur. Utilizing frequently ignored details of a frequently ignored region has been the task of scholars of Southeast Asia for some time. Yet, throughout this task, few have forgotten that the sea has been a critical connecting force throughout human history. In the words of Barbara Watson Andaya, it has been a "medium for connecting peoples of quite distant regions through the exchange of people, goods and ideas."[4]

The framework presented by Andaya in combination with Braudel can be used to newly examine the South China Sea from the perspective of a historian of Southeast Asia. This paper relies on four, critical, well-composed, scholarly works that deal with the study of the sea and the region. In loose chronological order, the first is *The Cham of Vietnam*, which covers the rise of the early classical civilization of the Cham along the Vietnamese coast and the rest of the sea.[5] This book can lead well into *Southeast Asia in the Fifteenth Century*, which is really more of an examination of the interactions between South Asian, East Asian, and Southeast Asian cultures with a special emphasis on water networks and trade.[6] This work's study can then be followed by *Mapping the Acehnese Past*, which can be used to re-emphasize the fact that the South China Sea did not stand alone throughout history, alike the connections to East

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3 Barbara Watson Andaya, *The Flaming Womb: Repositioning Women in Early Modern Southeast Asia* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2006), 673.

4 Ibid., 672.

5 Bruce M. Lockhart and Trần Kỳ Phương, eds., *The Cham of Vietnam: History, Society and Art* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2011).

6 Geoff Wade and Sun Laichen, eds., *Southeast Asia in the Fifteenth Century: The China Factor* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2010).

Asia always having been coupled with open trade routes through the straits of Malacca and onward to the Indian Ocean.[7] Using these studies and combining other evidence, the history of the South China Sea and its extended networks can be divided into three periods: 1) Pre-historical to the late-classical, 2) Early Modern to High Colonial, and 3) High Colonial to the modern, or contemporary present. In each of these periods, this paper will argue for exactly three themes: migration, cultural flows, and trade that dominated human concerns and interactions, even in certain times of intense conflict.

By asserting such a frame, this paper intends to contest the notions presented in an otherwise phenomenally well-grounded entry into the theoretical points behind the *maritime disputes of East Asia* by Min Gyo Koo.[8] As Koo describes that "in contrast to other East Asian island disputes, military action has been a viable option to resolve the sovereignty issue in the South China Sea," sovereignty is still discussed in reality, and will continue to be discussed, despite three military clashes in 1974, 1978-1979, and 1987-1988. Rather, such military clashes seem to have simply escalated future debates instead of having resolved sovereignty issues. Hence, in conjunction with Koo's notion that militarization has not aided East Asia, this trend has also not aided Southeast Asia and East Asian relations. Additionally, it should be argued that Koo's study through its "temporal limitations" prevents us from examining the *longue durée* of human history and from seeing that the concept of "maritime possession" is not new, but is taking on new forms in the twentieth century.[9] The essential problem with Koo's approach, specifically regarding the South China Sea, appears to be that he did not

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7 R. Michael Feener, Patrick Daly, and Anthony Reid, eds., *Mapping the Acehnese Past* (Leiden, The Netherlands: KITLV Press, 2011).

8 Min Gyo Koo, *Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia: Between a Rock and A Hard Place*, PDF e-book (New York: Springer, 2010), 3.

9 Ibid., 9.

consider multi-lateral claimants and solutions in relation to the overall framework of his work, despite mentioning the 2002 ASEAN summit.[10] Yet, it must be said that ultimately, such a framework agrees with Koo's conclusions that "the burgeoning efforts to form regional agreements …" are the only means to smooth the "bumpy road."[11] Nevertheless, Koo's study also presents a good review of the contemporary conflict in that the lack of trade relations between Vietnam and China, which counts for less than 1% of China's total trade, was cited as a pre-cursor to China's conflict with Vietnam in 1974 in the Paracel Islands.[12] Hence, in the spirit of placing that "bridge over troubled waters" to which Koo refers, let us begin with an examination of the pre-historical to the late-classical trends of migration, cultural flows and trade.[13]

I. Pre-historical to the Late-classical: Migration, Cultural Flows, and Trade

From the earliest periods of the history of East Asia and Southeast Asia, it is possible to trace migrations that moved explicitly around the waters of the South China Sea, perhaps beginning with the Austronesian migration out of Taiwan. As waves of land and water migrations began to populate the greater areas of mainland and islands in Southeast Asia, trade relationships among the early polities that stretched across the South China, Sulu, and Java seas can be found in archaeological records and early historical accounts as well as the epigraphic tradition that so long fascinated the colonial scholars of the École française d'Extrême-Orient.

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[10] Ibid., 15. "The process of Sino-Vietnamese territorial rapprochement culminated at the 2002 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit where the ten member-states of ASEAN and China signed a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, with the aim of preventing conflict and promoting cooperation in the region."

[11] Ibid., 15.

[12] Ibid., 137-166.

[13] Ibid., 163.

However, Chinese influence was not the only one in the waves: the cultural flows of Indic tradition blended with Chinese culture in the formation of "mandala" polities. From the earliest days of these polities, identity was nebulous and ever changing. Hence, although it is important to recognize that many would make a clear distinction between Vietnam and Chinese peoples in the pre-historic and early historical periods, others such as Liam Kelley would assert that there was not such a clear boundary between the two during certain early historical period.[14] Anderson, Cooke, and Li have recently demonstrated that the space of the Gulf of Tonkin has been rather integrated and interconnected throughout history.[15] Nevertheless, such assertions of Southeast Asian polities as powerful independent participants in global trading networks would eventually become apparent, although it is arguable that this did not forcefully occur until the late classical period or the early modern period. However, before entering this discussion, let us begin with a more detailed exploration of the ecology and geography that shaped the historical flow of the South China Sea from the pre-historical period to the late classical period.

The ecology and geography of the lands surrounding the South China Sea combine to form one of the most unique and diverse landscapes on the surface of the world. The region is well known for active volcanoes, which produced the island chains of Malaysia and Indonesia as well as the 7,000 islands of the Philippines. Soil enriched by volcanic nutrients is critical to many of the alluvial plains that surround the South China Sea. Furthermore, the role of rice agriculture is central to the lands that surround the sea. In fact, rice agriculture may have originated in Southeast Asia before China and today's Laos, connected to the South China Sea vis-à-vis the Mekong River, holding the greatest

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[14] Liam C. Kelley, "The Bronze Pillars," in *Beyond the Bronze Pillars: Envoy Poetry and the Sino-Vietnamese Relationship* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2005), 5-36.

[15] James A. Anderson, Nola Cooke, and Tana Li, eds., *The Tongking Gulf through History* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011).

genetic diversity of rice with at least 54 known varieties. Rice is indeed crucial, and many Southeast Asian societies describe themselves in relation to rice. For example, Vietnam is popularly described as two rice baskets, the Mekong River and the Red River deltas, strung on a pole. According to the tradition of the Austronesian Cham peoples—one of the earliest civilizations to touch the waves of the sea, perhaps as early as the second century CE—it was the goddess Po Inâ Nâgar who taught them rice agriculture.[16] Early accounts of traveling the South China Sea and connected water networks consequentially tend to focus on the variance between dry and wet seasons, punctuated by moments of flash flooding, typhoons, and the occasional tsunami—a theme that resonates even to this day in light of the tragic events in the Philippines as well as the coast of Vietnam in just this past year of 2013. Meanwhile, other portions of the region along the northern shores of the South China Sea tend to have four seasons with climates comparable to the southern and central Appalachian Mountains in the United States or northern portions of the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, long-term climate change has most likely been the culprit in the production of several incredibly arid regions in the Ninh Thuận and Bình Thuận provinces in Vietnam, which would be in direct contact with the shores of the sea throughout history, and in the upper flood plains of the Irrawaddy in Burma. Given the diversity of climate, it is no surprise that the peopling of the shores surrounding the South China Sea has produced substantial ethno-linguistic diversity, as well.

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16 Damnây Po Inâ Nâgar. As has been cited by Andaya, the "Austronesian" socio-political metaphor has historical included a reference to boats. Examples include the "barangay" of the Philippines and the "perahu" of the Malays. See Andaya, *The Flaming Womb*, 676. Incidentally, the Cham are one of the few Austronesian peoples who do not see their socio-political structure as a boat, in accordance with the trend noted by Coedès and cited by Barbara Watson Andaya, but rather in terms of a "tree." Nevertheless, the importance of water to the metaphor of an Austronesian social political society cannot be underestimated. See George Coedès, *The Indianized States of Southeast Asia*, ed. Walter F. Vella, trans. Susan Brown Cowing (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1968); Andaya, *The Flaming Womb*.

The earliest human migrations along the shores of the South China Sea date back to the migrations of *Homo erectus* that entered the region as early as one million years ago. The populations of *Homo erectus* are popularly known as "the Hobbit" and "Java Man" and may be found on the island of Java. However, the greatest number of *Homo erectus* samples in the region may be found today in northern Vietnam. From *Homo erectus* dominant migrations, *Homo sapiens* entered the region by 40,000 BCE, becoming the dominant species of the genus *Homo* along the shores of the South China Sea some 20,000 years before *Homo sapiens* became the dominant species of Europe. The next major wave of migration was the Austronesian expansion, initially a movement of Austronesian speaking peoples out of Taiwan, southward along the Philippine islands, across the Malay islands, and then upward along the coast of Vietnam. Occasionally, and perhaps incorrectly, this migration has been labeled as "diaspora" with the implication that the Austronesians must have been fleeing some condition of strife on the mainland of Asia. Regardless, the Austronesian languages would be the widest dispersed in the world by the end of the late classical period (roughly the fifteenth century), with Austronesian speakers living along all of the shores of the South China Sea throughout Southeast Asia, stretching deeply into the regions of the South Pacific and throughout the Indian Ocean and finally touching the shores of Madagascar. It was Austronesians that founded the earliest trading centers and religious polities on the shores of the South China Sea, dating to the first centuries of the Common Era. Among these earliest centers were the mandalas of Funan (Cham), Srivijaya (Malay), and Majapahit (Javanese).[17]

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[17] Thomaz seems to distinguish Funan from Champa, but nevertheless notes that trade, rather than agriculture, was critical for the economies of "Funan, Champa and Srivijaya." See Luis Filipe Ferreira Reis Thomaz, "The Malay Sultanate of Melaka," in *Southeast Asia in the Early Modern Era: Trade, Power, and Belief*, ed. Anthony Reid (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 70. Sutherland notes that the classical kingdoms are "Pagan, Sukhotai, Angkor, Dai Viet, Srivijaya and Majapahit." See Sutherland, "Southeast Asian History and the Mediterranean Analogy," 9.

An important function of the Austronesian migrations was that they put these proto-urbanized trading and religious centers along the shores of the South China Sea in greater connection to the coasts of southern China (and eventually East Asia and Northeast Asia), as well as south India and East Africa, eventually establishing a trading network formed from the Middle East to Japan. Colonial era and mid-twentieth century historiographical tradition may have suggested that South Asian populations may have approached the region with a military and even explicitly "colonial perspective." More recent interpretations have suggested that it is more likely for Austronesian peoples to have "borrowed" from various traditions, consistently blending and re-blending elements of Chinese, Indic, and Austronesian culture. An example of this can be seen through the adaptation of the southern Brahmi and later Pallava-Grantha families of Indic scripts among the wealth of Cham, Khmer, and Javanese inscriptions. Meanwhile, Geoff Wade (1993) has even suggested that the flows of cultural trade across

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See Shiro Momoki, "'Mandala Champa' Seen from Chinese Sources," in *The Cham of Vietnam:* ed. Lockhart and Trần, 120-137. Momoki notes that the northern proto-Champa polity of Lin Yi likely emerged in the region of Quảng Nam province today, rising primarily through tributary relations with the "Six Dynasties" (221-589) and the Sui-Tang (589-907). Archaeological evidence of roof tiles seems to confirm Sino-Cham relations. Perhaps it was due to geographical proximity, but Lin Yi sent the most tribute to northern courts out of any Southeast Asian polity during these times. Although the Sui eventually sacked and directly administered Lin Yi for a short time in the seventh century, the independence of Lin Yi was likely regained through the Tang dynasty in the seventh century. It was at this time that the term *Campadesa* first appeared, during the reign of King Cambhuvarma (r.-629 CE) and there was then a deliberate "self-Indianization" of the Champa civilization. See also Peter Bellwood, "Southeast Asia Before History: The Late Neolithic and Early Metal Phases in the Austronesian World," in *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia*, ed. Nicholas Tarling, vol. 1, pt. 1, From early times to c. 1500 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 126-135; Anthony Reid, "Introduction: The Lands below the Winds," in *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680*, vol. 1 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), 1-10; William Henry Scott, "The Beyer Wave Migration Theory," in *Barangay: Sixteenth-Century Philippine Culture and Society* (Manila, Philippines: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1997), 10-12; Peter Bellwood and Marc Oxenham, "The Expansions of Farming Societies and the Role of the Neolithic Demographic Transition," in *The Neolithic Demographic Transition and Its Consequences*, ed. Jean-Pierre Bocquet-Appel and Ofer Bar-Yosef (Cambridge, MA: Springer, 2008), 13-34.

the South China Sea led to the Tagalog adaptation of Old Cham adaptations of the Pallava-Grantha family in order to form the now lost pre-colonial Tagalog script.[18]

1. Historical Records

Since the nineteenth century, a primary focus of scholars of Southeast Asia has been on studying written historical records. Justifiably then, studies of epigraphy and paleography have continued through to the present. The evidence gathered from these studies can provide precious glimpses into the history of the lands along the shores of the South China Sea up to the seventeenth century, although the records are punctuated at best and frequently present conflicting narrative accounts. So, to balance studies of epigraphy and paleography, studies of archaeology have been used to fill the gaps between lines of worn stone. Based upon archaeological finds, it has become possible to suggest the spread of trade networks of pottery, early metallurgy, beads, and other luxury items that extended well into the Visayas region of the Philippines, along the Gulf of Thailand and up the coast of what is now Vietnam. By the end of the first millennia of the common era, such networks further extended to the trading centers of Srivijaya (Palembang), Muaro Jambi, Majapahit, and Funan, and later, Water and Mountain Chen La, the Cham Negara of Indrapura and Amaravati and the Vietnamese upriver trading center of Thăng Long. In the Philippines, proto-"barangay" societies would have also developed by then, as well as the early trading centers of the Burmese on the Irrawaddy. As time progressed, the polities of Water and Mountain Chen La moved their centers further upstream and eventually became the civilization of Angkor on the northern banks of the Tonlé Sap, while

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[18] Geoff Wade, "On the Possible Cham Origin of the Philippine Scripts," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 24, no. 1 (March 1993): 44-87.

ceramics began to rise as a critical trade material.[19]

Besides epigraphy, paleography, and archaeology, early Chinese language maps and accounts of travel and trade provide the best details of individual polities around the shores of the South China Sea. Recorded as Lín Yì (Cham), Bo Ni (Borneo), and Bu Tuan (the Philippines), many of the southern centers, including those of Srivijaya, Majapahit, and, later, the Sultanate of Melaka, were recorded through the "northern-civilized" versus "southern-barbarous" dichotomy. At the same time, these centers became critical contributors of trade from the Han dynasty through to the Tang dynasty and beyond. In this network of exchange, however, materials were not the only products that were exchanged. Wade, for example, convincingly argued for the potential influence of Cham scripts on the pre-colonial Tagalog script, while E. D. Edwards and C. O. Blagden made their own arguments for the existence of substantial Chinese loanwords amongst the Cham language.[20] Other studies in historical linguistics have led to the assertions that there are linkages between the Cham, Malay, Javanese, Minangkabau, Tagalog, and Acehnese languages in which their divergence appears to pre-date available historical records.

Even with the linkages between languages that seem to have

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19 Charles Higham, *The Civilization of Angkor* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001), 1-142; Andaya, *The Flaming Womb*, 678; Eric Tagliacozzo, "Export Ceramics in Philippine Societies: Historical and Ethnographic Perspectives," in *Clio/Anthropos: Exploring the Boundaries between History and Anthropology*, ed. Eric Tagliacozzo and Andrew Willford (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), 78-79; Roxanna M. Brown, "A Ming Gap? Data from Southeast Asian Shipwreck Cargoes," in *Southeast Asia in the Fifteenth Century,* ed. Wade and Laichen, 359-378; Miriam T. Stark, "From Funan to Angkor: Collapse and Regeneration in Ancient Cambodia," in *After Collapse: The Regeneration of Complex Societies* (Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 2010), 144-167. See also Ian Glover and Kim Dung Nguyễn, "Excavations at Gò Cấm, Quảng Nam, 2000-2003: Lin Yi and the Emergence of the Cham Kingdoms," in *The Cham of Vietnam*, ed. Lockhart and Trần, 54-81.

20 Wade, "On the Possible Cham Origin of the Philippine Scripts"; E. D. Edwards and C. O. Blagden, "A Chinese Vocabulary of Cham Words and Phrases," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, University of London* 10, no. 1 (January 1939): 53-91.

existed along the shores of the South China Sea, source material in Chinese records from the second through the fifteenth century remains unmatched. Among the most revealing of Chinese accounts are the *Zhufan Zhi* by Zhao Rugua around 1225, the *Song Huiyao Jigao*, the *Daoyi zhilue*, and the *Ming Shilu*. The majority of these texts have already been made available to non-Chinese scholars for centuries. However, it seems that certain texts such as the *Song Huiyao Jigao* were not available to twentieth-century French scholars such as Georges Maspéro (1928).[21] Increased reading of these source materials has greatly improved our understanding of the region. The *Daoyi zhilue* records that the Champa polities were only "eight days away" with a "tailwind" from the northern court. During the tenth and eleventh centuries, a family name of "Pu"—thought to be the Cham "Po" or influenced by the Arabic "Abu"—was in control of trade from "Zhancheng (Indrapura), Sanfoqi (Srivijaya) and Java."[22] The *Song Huiyao Jigao* recorded the Cham practice of buffalo slaughter during which a medium would utter the phrase "A-luo-he-ji-ba." Scholars seem to agree that this is likely a record of the Cham Bani, an Islamic-influenced practice, where a Po Acar invokes "Allahu akhbar" before slitting the throat of the buffalo. The same source notes that the dress of people in this region "resembled the lands of Da-Shi" (Arabia). Hence, Arabic and Islamic cultural traditions are thought to have already spread to this region by the twelfth century, while Kublai Khan stressed the importance of placing a *xingsheng* "mobile secretariat" in the vicinity of Đông Dương (negara Indrapura) to control trade from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean.[23] A final figure that has fascinated many academics would be the

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21 Geoff Wade, "The 'Account of Champa' in the Song Huiyao Jigao," in *The Cham of Vietnam*, ed. Lockhart and Trần, 138-167.

22 Momoki, "'Mandala Champa' Seen from Chinese Sources," 127.

23 Wade, "The 'Account of Champa' in the Song Huiyao Jigao," 143; Momoki, "'Mandala Champa' Seen from Chinese Sources," 127.

fifteenth century Chinese eunuch Muslim Admiral Zheng He (or Chang Ho). Zheng He has received great recent popular recognition in both the Arab world and in China for proving the greatness of these respective cultures, although certain historians have been critical toward an over-emphasis on the importance of Zheng He.[24]

The figure Zheng He is, however, merely symbolic of the historical importance of the Ming dynasty's impact on the lands that surround the shores of the South China Sea.[25] There is a sort of mantra amongst historians of Vietnam that goes, "When China was weak, Vietnam was strong," and, by extension, when the Ming were strong, the kingdom of Đại Việt was weak. However, this pushing and pulling relationship seems to have opened doors for other regional trade centers: the Cham negara of Vijaya at Quy Nhơn and the Sultanate of Melaka, as well as port towns in the southern Philippines. Nevertheless, written accounts by the Chinese regarding the Philippines are relatively sparse, forcing a reliance on archaeological records from much later periods. Based on this evidence, the first trading polity of Bu Tuan began to disperse in favor of the centers of Sulu and Maguindanao with the rise of Ming China. Archaeological evidence from these locations suggests they were involved in long-distance Ming porcelain trade. Digs from Cebu dating back to the same period suggest that not only Ming wares, but also Thai and Vietnamese wares were being exchanged in the Philippines during this time as well.[26]

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[24] For a good map of Zheng He's route see: "Tracing Zheng He" from the National Geographic (2005) at http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/ngm/0507/feature2/map.html

[25] The role of the Ming Dynasty in symbolically creating Southeast Asia is often not given enough attention. Barbara Watson Andaya places the importance on the creation of a "symbolic sea" that separated Ming China from Southeast Asia on a Ming Dynasty map. See Andaya, *The Flaming Womb*, 673.

[26] Laura Lee Junker, "The Long Distance Porcelain Trade," in *Raiding, Trading and Feasting: The Political Economy of Philippine Chiefdoms* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1999), 183-220.

2. The Rise of Melaka and Its Contemporaries

The strength of Ming China would be directly tied to the rise of Melaka during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries as the Sultanate of Melaka replaced the Indo-Buddhist mandala of Majapahit as the keeper of the gates between the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. The former peripheries of Malay Patani (now in southern Thailand) and Ryukyu also began to appear in Chinese documents at this time, as Andaya drew upon the work of many others to suggest that the "Austronesian world" spread as far as from the Philippines to Taiwan, Ryukyu, and northward to Japan by the sixteenth century.[27] For example, a Ryukyu anthology of 1531 includes a passage where a priestess makes mention of the sea spirits of "Japan, China, Java and the *Southern Seas*" during a chant.[28] These spirits of the southern seas were soon to become very real figures with the rise of the Malay Sultanates as trading polities and cultural religious centers, beginning with the Sultanate of Melaka.[29]

The rise of the trade port center of the Sultanate of Melaka in the Straits of Malacca during the fourteenth century had long term impacts on the shape of the water networks of the South China Sea for the centuries that followed. The work of Luis Filipe F. R. Thomaz provides a rather standard reading of Melaka's history, focused only on the state.[30] Meanwhile, Hall (1999) and Taylor (1999) emphasize the continuities

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27 Andaya, *The Flaming Womb*.

28 Ibid., 675.

29 Geoff Wade, "The Patani Region in Chinese Texts from the 6th to the 19th Centuries," in *International Conference the Phantasm in Southern Thailand: Historical Writings on Patani and the Islamic World*, ed. Patric Jory and Jirawat Saengthong (Bangkok, Thailand: Walailak University, 2009); Sun Laichen, "Assessing the Ming Role in China's Southern Expansion," in *Southeast Asia in the Fifteenth Century*, ed. Wade and Laichen, 44-82; Anthony Reid, "Hybrid Identities in the Fifteenth Century Straits," in *Southeast Asia in the Fifteenth Century*, ed. Wade and Laichen, 307-327.

30 Thomaz, "The Malay Sultanate of Melaka."

between Melaka and previous Hindu-Buddhist mandala of Srivijaya.[31] Finally, the work of Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya demonstrates an up-to-date succinct and well nuanced reading of the importance of Melaka as a regional entrepôt and the impact this port had on the greater trade networks of the South China Sea and the oceanic networks beyond.[32]

As the successor to the Hindu-Buddhist Empire of Srivijaya, the Malay Sultanate of Melaka owes its lineage to a local ruler from Palembang who broke away from the Javanese mandala of Majapahit with the support of Ming China. The empire of Srivijaya (670-1025) had been recorded in the accounts of the early Chinese pilgrim I Ching. In this account, the lord of Srivijaya was recorded as the ruler of the mountains and "the lord of the isles" able to commune with the "spirit of the waters of the sea."[33] The unity between the upland regions and the water networks of the sea was thus very real for the rulers of Srivijaya.[34] At this time, Palembang was not technically subordinate to Srivijaya, but rather a vassal of the Javanese mandala of Majapahit. In the 1390s, Paramesvara appeared from Palembang and moved to Tumasik (now Singapore) before he was forced to move by the expansion of the Thai mandala of Ayutthaya to Melaka. While Srivijaya sent tribute to Song China at this time, Melaka formed a formal relationship with Ming China in 1411, according to I Ching. Paramesvara's lineage became famous for their contestation against the Thai, particularly under Tuan Perak.

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31 Kenneth R. Hall, "Economic History of Early Southeast Asia: Champa's Plunder Based Political-Economy," in *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia*, ed. Nicholas Tarling, vol. 1, pt. 1, From early times to c. 1500 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 252-260; Keith W. Taylor, "The Early Kingdoms," in *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia*, ed. Nicholas Tarling, vol. 1, From Early Times to c. 1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 173-176.

32 Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya, *A History of Malaysia*, 2nd ed. (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001).

33 Hall, "Economic History of Early Southeast Asia: Champa's Plunder Based Political-Economy," 197.

34 Taylor, "The Early Kingdoms," 175.

However, a relative shift came with the introduction of Islam. As evident from the neglect in the *Sejarah Melayu* (the Malay Annals) of pre-Islamic history, the conversion of the sultanate represents a certain rupture to social order as Islam represented a new form of social organization to history, religious structures, and even trade agreements.[35] Thomaz has noted that a detailed account of the *Sejarah Melayu* combined with the accounts of the Portuguese, in particular, Tomé Pires, provide a better understanding of Melaka than almost any other fifteenth to sixteenth century Sultanate in the region.[36]

The geography of the straits was undoubtedly a factor in Melaka's rise to prominence. The port was situated with great access to the Indian Ocean, guarding the Straits of Malacca and, most importantly, gave access northward through the South China Sea. Just upriver from Melaka was where Paramesvara (Seri Teri Buana in the *Sejarah Melayu*) built his residence at Bertam. This protected residence facilitated the rise of the *orang kaya* Malay trading elite protected by the *orang laut* (boat people) who were enlisted to patrol the straits and the archipelago outward to the island of Borneo.[37] Seasonal monsoon winds dictated traders who arrived from the Indian Ocean, Java, and the South China Sea to rest in Melaka before the winds would change so that they could return to their home ports. Hence, the *orang kaya* built a complex local administrative law called the *undang-undang Melaka* held in place by four *syahbandar* harbor masters, governed by a *bendahara* principle minister and a system of *temenggung* overseers of import and export duties, controlling trade throughout the region.[38]

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35 Ibid.

36 Thomaz, "The Malay Sultanate of Melaka," 69.

37 Later these *orang laut* became a minority that was nominally protected, but in reality marginalized by the states of Malaysia and Indonesia. However, while the repression of *orang laut* peoples was very old in coastal Vietnam and China, in the Straits of Malacca they were highly revered during the early modern period. See Andaya, *The Flaming Womb*, 670-671.

38 Andaya and Andaya, *A History of Malaysia*, 51.

With the rise of Melaka, the Malay language now spoken in the three states of Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Sultanate of Brunei became the lingua franca of the waters of the region. During this time, the larger language group of Austronesian became the most widely spoken in the world. Thomaz (1993) estimated that the port had a total population of 100,000 to 200,000—several times the population estimates of any comparable ports on the shores of the South China Sea at the time.[39] An estimated 90-95% of income for this population was generated solely through taxes on goods traded through the straits. Yet, the comparable rates of exchange were incredibly low. In his *Suma Oriental que trata do Mar Roxo até aos Chins* (Summa of the East, from the Red Sea up to the Chinese), Tomé Pires noted that up to 84 languages were spoken in the city in a day. According to the *Sejarah Melayu*, there was once one *bendahara* who was "so clever in his handling of foreigners and skilled in the conciliation of the good will of the populace" that the master of ships bound for Melaka would invoke a prayer before weighing anchor that concluded "may we reach Melaka safely and see Pisang Jeram—the stream of Bukit China and the Bendara Sri Maharaja."[40]

The expansion of the Sultanate of Melaka's power continued throughout the fifteenth century until Melaka had subdued most of the key ports and choke points in the archipelago and along the southern waters of the South China Sea. This power allowed Melaka to reject both the Ayutthaya (central Thai) and Majapahit (Javanese) mandalas, even though they still recognized the distant authority of the Middle Kingdom, China. Nevertheless, the territory (*tanah*) of Melaka was never as large as Srivijaya, and many northern Malay polities considered Ayutthaya

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[39] Thomaz, "The Malay Sultanate of Melaka."

[40] Andaya and Andaya, *A History of Malaysia*, 51; Kenneth R. Hall, "Economic History of Early Southeast Asia: Early Economic Development, The Age of the Srivijayan Maritime Empire (670-1025)," in *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia*, ed. Nicholas Tarling, vol. 1, pt. 1, From early times to c. 1500 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 196-201; Taylor, "The Early Kingdoms"; Thomaz, "The Malay Sultanate of Melaka."

more of a regional authority. Through an apparent allegiance with Chinese Muslims and the Rom (Turkish) "Shadow of God upon earth," Melaka became a "yardstick of Islam" in the region as the customary rule of Malaya-Muslim *adat law* became the dominant stems of governance. Melaka became the conduit for Islam into the region, an influence that extended into the societies of the Cham (now Vietnam) and Cambodia, as well as the Philippines and lasted until the present.[41]

The Portuguese conquest of Melaka in 1511 was no doubt devastating and the memory of this conquest would impact the constructions of later concepts of history in the straits. However, it is somewhat overemphasized, given that the port of Melaka itself remained the major entrepôt in the region and predominantly populated by Southeast Asians themselves throughout the sixteenth century until an alliance between the Dutch East India Company (the VOC) and Melaka's successor sultanate of Johor led to the defeat of the Portuguese in 1641. The motivations of the Portuguese were influenced solely by the claims of the explorer Vasco de Gama, who argued to the King of Portugal that through the conquest of Melaka, the spice trade could be diverted out of Malay (read: Muslim) hands and around the Cape of Good Hope (read: into Christian hands). Afonso de Albuquerque, the "principle architect" of the mission, had no less than two conquests under his belt, Goa (1510) and Homuz (1515) before Melaka (August 10, 1511) as the Portuguese forced open a trade network at the barrel of a gun that stretched from the Maluku islands to the eastern Indonesian archipelago and again to Portugal. This conquest may have marked "the end" for Melaka in European eyes. However, it also opened the stage for a series of "successor sultanates" such as Brunei, Perak, and Aceh (Chamic, not Malayic).[42]

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41 Andaya and Andaya, *A History of Malaysia*, 39-71; Hall, "Economic History of Early Southeast Asia"; Taylor, "The Early Kingdoms"; Thomaz, "The Malay Sultanate of Melaka."

42 Hall, "Economic History of Early Southeast Asia"; Taylor, "The Early Kingdoms"; Thomaz, "The Malay Sultanate of Melaka."

By the fifteenth century, the port of the contemporary Sultanate of Brunei had already been recognized as an entrepôt under the Chinese toponym "P'o-Ni." A gift of imperial regalia came from the Sultanate of Johor in the sixteenth century, although contestations between Christians and Muslims created another fault line at the southern reaches of the waters of the South China Sea. The Spanish founded its own outpost in Cebu as of 1565, conquered Muslim Manila in 1571, and expanded again to Brunei in 1578, although this expansion would result in the independence of the Sulu Sultanate from Brunei. Meanwhile, at Perak, a region well-known for rich alluvial tin deposits, the Sultanate of Johor was cited as the link of authority from the Sultanate of Melaka. However, both of these centers would remain relatively small when compared to the rise of the Sultanate of Aceh in the seventeenth century. Although the Sultanate of Aceh attempted to play the Dutch and the Portuguese against each other, the Sultanate of Aceh remained quite powerful, particularly after the collapse of Johor. Although Johor had the rightful claim of the Lakshmana family as descended from Melaka and the advantage of a Dutch East India Company (VOC) trading alliance, regicide in 1699 plunged the Sultanate into disorder. The fall of Johor and the rise of Aceh would then have a long-standing impact on the straits and the trade that flowed through them up until the present, contesting previous interpretations that British rule erased the memory of Melaka while memories of the *orang kaya*, the systems of *daulut* and *adat* customary law, remained in place.[43]

3. A Glance at Early Sino-Vietnamese Relations

Paralleling the above examination of the straits of Melaka and the role of the Chinese and the relationship between later European colonialists as

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[43] Andaya and Andaya, *A History of Malaysia*, 39-71.

well as their attempts to control the waters and the goods that flowed along them are quite similar to the case of the Vietnamese and the Chinese relationship along the shores of the South China Sea. There are deep roots to this historical relationship, continuities, ruptures and it is these trends that inform relations up until the present. Much like Chinese history, a historical trope in Vietnamese history is the "long history of the Vietnamese people." In the case of the Vietnamese, this is phrased as a "long history of independence" in both popular and scholarly venues. During the late classical period, the northern court attracted trade tribute from all corners of the world and the Vietnamese kingdom centered at Thăng Long was not to be left out. Nevertheless, in Vietnamese history, the "1,000 years of Chinese domination" and the independence of the Vietnamese through the 938 CE victory of the Lê dynasty is generally seen as the critical first in a series of victories that would include those over the French in 1854, the Americans in 1973, the Republic of South Vietnam (seen as an arm of Western Imperialism) in 1975 and the Chinese (again) in 1979. This trope can be found as informing the works of such critical historians as Keith Taylor and Nguyễn Khắc Viên.[44]

The history of Vietnam is generally critically memorialized by the "first history": Ngô Sĩ Liên's Đại Việt Sử Kỳ Toàn Thư, a fifteenth-century work that was later used to argue for the link between the south-central Nguyễn Vietnamese dynasty and the historically northern Lê. However, the work gives great credit to the Vietnamese mythos that there were once 100 eggs that became the 100 tribes of the Yueh (Việt) peoples. Many scholars have recorded the Yueh as purely Chinese peoples. However, it might be best to adapt the position that the Yueh were neither Vietnamese nor Chinese, but rather a nebulous population out of which emerged the Vietnamese and other Yueh groups in southern

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[44] Keith W. Taylor, *The Birth of Vietnam* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983); Khắc Viên Nguyễn, *Vietnam: A Long History* (Hanoi, Vietnam: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1987).

China today, while also acknowledging that the Yueh became Chinese as well in a sense over time. In *Beyond the Bronze Pillars: Envoy Poetry and the Sino-Vietnamese relationship*, Liam Kelley has argued that the conception of borders between Vietnamese and Chinese society during the classical periods was not always as clear as it is today. By the fifteenth century, it is possible to assert that the declining Ming presence, combined with a whole range of other immeasurable factors allowed for a positioning that increased Lê power. Meanwhile, Alexander Woodside has argued for the strong application of Chinese models of governance among the nineteenth century Nguyễn dynasty, which would include manifestations of how they would interact with individuals from "beyond their shores," even though the arms trade, trade of technology, cultural imaginings and medical traditions continued to link Vietnamese society to the north well into the late nineteenth century.[45]

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[45] Alexander Woodside, *Vietnam and the Chinese Model: A Comparative Study of Nguyen and Ching Civil Government in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971). Kelley, "The Bronze Pillars"; Insun Yu, "Lê Văn Hưu and Ngô Sĩ Liên: A Comparison of Their Perception of Vietnamese History," in *Việt Nam: Borderless Histories*, ed. Anthony Reid and Nhung Tuyết Trần (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 45-71. Lê Văn Hưu is the compiler of the *Đại Việt Sử Ký* and Ngô Sĩ Liên is the compiler of the *Đại Việt Sử Kỳ Toàn Thư*. The first book was supposedly 33 volumes and finished in 1272. However, since the *Đại Việt Sử Kỳ Toàn Thư* was only 15 volumes and finished in 1479, many scholars believe the initial work was shorter. Ultimately, both were modelled after Chinese histories and absorbed notions of Chinese Confucian ethics and Buddhist morality seen through a Vietnamese lens to uphold history as a lesson in morality. Keith W. Taylor, "Surface Orientations in Vietnam: Beyond Histories of Nation and Region," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 57, no. 4 (November 1998): 949-978. In this article Taylor also demonstrates the "spatial turn" to Vietnamese history, looking at the "surfaces that people inhabit rather than seeing them as teleologically unified." He chooses six conflicts to rethink Vietnamese history: those of Lê-Mạc in the fifteenth century, the Trịnh-Nguyễn wars of the seventeenth century, the Tây Sơn-Nguyễn in the eighteenth, Nguyễn Ánh Gia Long's formation of the Nguyễn dynasty at the turn of the nineteenth, and the French conquest. Even in the northern perspective, Đông Kinh and Thanh Nghệ were still heavily dependent on coastal trade with their populations consolidated predominantly along rivers that fed toward the coast (957). In this article, he identifies the interconnectedness and regionality of Vietnamese geography. In particular, he points out how coastal regions such as Bình Định were centers that allowed for networks reaching into the highlands, in this case An Khê, Plây Ku and across the mountains to Stung Treng and the Mekong by the seventeenth century as there were also overland routes that connected Quy Nhơn to Ayutthaya (now Thailand) (964). See also Tana Li, "The Ming

II. Early Modern to High Colonial Migrations, Cultural Flows, and Trade

In light of the assertions of Vietnamese, Cham, Malay, and Filipino local sovereignty dating from the late Ming dynasty through the high colonial period, it is important not to overemphasize the role that Ming China or Europeans would have had on the waves of the South China Sea and the oceanic space beyond. Nevertheless, it is important to understand that, just like Ming China and even increasingly so throughout the colonial period, moves upon the waves would be characterized increasingly by the dynamics of land-based authorities that sought to control oceanic space. In each port and harbor, there was always room for contestation, particularly between smaller trading cites. However, the dominant trend remained to establish recognized trading relationships, even if the largest of these relationships were no longer in Southeast Asian hands. The beginning of this transition is well seen through a series of critical events and the watershed proposed in Anthony Reid's work *The Age of Commerce*: 1) the decline of Ming China and 2) the rise of early-modern Southeast Asian trading centers such as the Thai at Phra Nakhor Si Ayutthaya from 1350 to 1767, a Thai polity later reorganized further down-river as "Siam," and Nguyễn Đàng Trong Cochinchina, the Vietnamese kingdom that emerged from the sixteenth century and rose to empire status in the nineteenth century before it was incorporated into the French colonies of Indochina as the territories of Annam and Cochinchina.

Although the Vietnamese and Thai "alternatives to the Middle Kingdom" arose during slightly different periods, they produced a unique

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Factor and the Emergence of the Việt in the Fifteenth Century," in *Southeast Asia in the Fifteenth Century*, ed. Wade and Laichen, 83-96; John K. Whitmore, "Paperwork: The Rise of the New Literati and Ministerial Power and the Effort toward Legibility in Đại Việt," in *Southeast Asia in the Fifteenth Century*, ed. Wade and Laichen, 104-122.

series of products, local porcelain in particular. Their trade centers were centered on moral authorities: Theravada Buddhism for Ayutthaya and Mahayana Buddhism/Confucianism in Nguyễn Cochinchina. Within each location, the dramatic increase in maritime connections also benefited from an increase in trade from Japanese vessels that travelled across the South China Sea and locally produced luxury items. Nevertheless, "autonomous" Southeast Asian polities would come into contestation with new powers by the Early Modern period. The gradual rise of Europeans in the region brought a critical shift. After the Portuguese defeat of the Sultanate of Melaka in 1511, the Sultanate that had controlled the trade of the Straits of Melaka, the gateway to the South China Sea for nearly a century, divided the keepers of the straits into the sultanates of Perak and Johor. After the introduction of the Spanish in the Philippines and the Dutch East India Company (VOC) as a Dutch trading power centered upon the port of Batavia (Jakarta), it appeared that Europeans would dominate commerce in the region.[46] Nevertheless, Anthony Reid saw the decline of the "Age of Commerce" as the result of combined environmental and political shifts that linked to or potentially resulted in an economic crisis. In the end, these crises would eventually lead to the increased presence of European vessels on the waves of the South China Sea. At the same time, the presence of Europeans brought on an interest in local literatures. By the mid-twentieth century, scholars had finally accepted that these literatures were acceptable "historical" or at least "historicizable" accounts. Thus, the early modern period was also critical to the rise of the accounts of genealogies (and king-lists), silsilah, genealogies linking individuals back to the prophet Mohammed, and *hikayat* (Malay "stories"), all of which may be used to provide additional accounts of the South China

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[46] Barbara Watson Andaya notes that at the time of the introduction of the Spanish into the Philippines (1521), boats were still the pre-dominant form of transportation. See Andaya, *The Flaming Womb*, 677.

Sea from the early modern period through to the modern period.[47] By this time, the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea would combine to provide a critical conduit for the flow of literary traditions as well as trade. However, literature would not be the only cultural product to move across the waves. Religion and creolization of cultures would become critical factors on the shores of the South China Sea and the oceanic space beyond by the nineteenth century.

Traditional basic historical views of the European encounter with the lands along the shores of the South China Sea have portrayed a direct continuity between missionization on the part of the Europeans and later colonial efforts. Such a narrative has its own merits, as it was adapted by many Southeast Asian historians themselves during the twentieth-century efforts to throw off colonialism. However, more recent scholarship has begun to re-emphasize the interconnectedness of cultures and that many Southeast Asians themselves were critical as personal relationships between Southeast Asians and Europeans formed in Southeast Asian courts. Through the efforts of the early French missions, Jean Marie Despiau eventually became a respected physician in the court of the Vietnamese Nguyễn dynasty. His narrative suggests that missionization was not purely a religious phenomenon. The Nguyễn dynasty had actually been quite wary of Europeans, particularly the French in light of efforts to spread Christianity. However, as the threat of smallpox spread to the upper courts, the first Nguyễn Emperor Gia Long sought a treatment. Despiau on the other hand would have travelled just over a year from France across the Indian Ocean, through the Straits of Malacca, probably with a stopover in Malacca itself, before he reached Nguyễn Vietnam. However, by the time he reached Vietnam, the vaccine

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[47] Teuku Iskandar, "Aceh as a Crucible of Muslim Malay Literature," in *Mapping the Acehnese Past*, ed. Feener, Daly, and Reid, 39-64; Amirul Hadi, "Exploring Acehnese Understandings of Jihad: A Study of Hikayat Prang Sabi," in *Mapping the Acehnese Past*, ed. Feener, Daly, and Reid, 183-198.

for smallpox had not yet been officially released in France. Therefore, he could not have had knowledge of the vaccine before receiving an order from Gia Long's successor Minh Mạng to travel to Macau in 1820. Despiau's voyages then became dictated by a balance of available vaccines and trade winds, as he became the primary medical caretaker of the Nguyễn by his 40s and 50s without a medical degree due to his ability to secure reliable supplies of the smallpox vaccine at Macau.[48] Such interpersonal relationships could also be traced to the sharing of language traditions between Europeans and locals.

As personal relationships were formed during the early modern period on the shores along the South China Sea, a blend of language traditions tended to aid efforts to spread Christianity, some in ways that had not necessarily been expected. In the early Spanish rule of the Philippines, the Chinese language, not Spanish, became the major means of transmission for a series of critically Christian influenced texts.[49] In both the Philippines and Vietnam, many individuals who were important early Christian converts had been learned members of Buddhist society before their conversion. This helps to explain why early Christian literature in Vietnam demonstrates a strong preference for Hán Nôm demotic Vietnamese script based upon classical Chinese characters and *sớ* character phrases that are considered to possess supernatural potency. Nevertheless, the early Maiorica texts also seem to preserve an oratory style that is indicative of the texts being a written form of catechism lectures structured to produce conversion.[50] In the end, the climate

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[48] C. Michele Thompson, "Jean Marie Despieu: The Unjustly Maligned Physician in the Medical Service of the Nguyễn," in *Vietnam and the West: New Approaches,* ed. Wynn Wilcox (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010), 41-70.

[49] Lucille Chia, "Chinese Books and Printing in the Early Spanish Philippines," in *Chinese Circulations: Capital, Commodities, and Networks in Southeast Asia*, ed. Eric Tagliacozzo (Chapel Hill, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 259-282.

[50] Brian Ostrowski, "The Rise of Christian Nôm Literature in Seventeenth-Century Vietnam: Fusing European Content and Local Expression," in *Vietnam and the West*, ed. Wilcox, 19-40.

eventually produced was not Southeast Asian or European, but rather a creolization of intellectual and religious traditions appearing to be unique to the lands along the shores of the South China Sea where figures such as the Vietnamese missionary Philippe Bỉnh (1759-1832) were becoming increasingly prominent.[51]

To say there were missionaries who fit in between the boundaries does not mean that there were not Europeans missionaries who tended to create very slanted views of Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, these accounts can occasionally be used to give historians a good early picture of the way of life on the shores surrounding the South China Sea. The Spanish mission of Gabriel Quiroga de San Antonio (1604), for example, produced one of the most clear travel accounts for a missionary of his time. His work was considered so important that it was translated into French by the civil servant and scholar Antoine Cabaton in 1914, even though his view was one of "Pax-Castillas," contesting French influence and advocating for the rise of Iberian Catholic Christian tradition over local religions as well as the perception of a rising Islamic influence along the waves. This is the very same climate that the well-known French missionary Alexandre de Rhodes would arrive in, as well. In addition to being the senior editor of the Vietnamese-Latin dictionary project, de Rhodes produced one of the most common observations on the Vietnamese coastline of it resembling an "S" and made an important "Early Western Map of Tonkin."[52] From these early beginnings, many foreign missions became teachers and activists in the region, particularly during the mid-twentieth century. The scholar missionaries Gerard Moussay and William Henry (W. H.) Scott both became exemplary

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[51] George Dutton, "Crossing Oceans, Crossing Boundaries: The Remarkable Life of Philipê Bỉnh (1759-1832)," in *Việt Nam*, ed. Reid and Trần, 219-255.

[52] Alexandre de Rhodes, *Rhodes of Viet Nam: The Travels and Missions of Father Alexander de Rhodes in China and Other Kingdoms of the Orient*, trans. Solange Hertz (Westminster, MD: The Newman Press, 1966).

figures of this trend. While Moussay was noted for his contributions to the studies of Austronesian languages Minangkabau and Cham, Scott became one of the first missionaries to spend an extended period of time living and working among rural Filipino populations free of the shades Darwinist assumptions had placed on previous scholars and missionaries. He made his way upriver, teaching English and becoming an expert on Filipino history in general and of the Igorot highland peoples in particular. He then made a consistent effort to advocate for the place of the Igorot in the history of the Philippines, including advocating for their important role in anti-colonial revolts.[53] Ultimately, works such as his tied the understanding of the highland and hinterland regions of Southeast Asia into relationships with the coast.

As missionaries and colonial efforts were rising on the shores along the waves of the South China Sea and the oceanic space beyond, new political centers rose, combined with decreased reliance on trade with northern Chinese courts and an increased emphasis on long distance trade with northern East Asia (Korea and Japan) and the Indian Ocean network (the subcontinent, east Africa, and Arabia). The central Thai authority shifted from Ayutthaya southward along the Chao Phraya, eventually settling at Bangkok and the Vietnamese authority shifted southward as well, from Thăng Long on the Red River to Gia Định and Sài Gòn on the Mekong River, before moving northward again to the central coastal region of Huế. Upstream Hội An became a particularly important trading outpost even as Cham cultural presence remained in the region throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.[54] The second half of the eighteenth century proved to be a challenge for both the Thai and the Vietnamese centers of authority, with the Burmese

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[53] Erlyn Ruth E. Alcantara, "Biographical Note," in *Of Igorots and Independence: Two Essays* (Baguio City, Philippines: ERA Press, 1993), 73-83.

[54] Charles Wheeler, "One Region, Two Histories: Cham Precedents in the History of the Hội An Region," in *Việt Nam*, ed. Reid and Trần, 163-193.

destruction of Ayutthaya in 1767 and the outbreak of the Tây Sơn rebellion along the Vietnamese coastline in 1776. Nevertheless, both the Thai and the Vietnamese central authorities managed to solidify a capitalization upon long distance trade by the early decades of the nineteenth century. They also re-imagined their political identities with the rise of Sino-Southeast Asian concepts of governance and a new wave of Mahayana Buddhist influence that touched across the region. In Ayutthaya, the rise of the Thai authority also brought new forms of international trade embassies as did the rise of the Sultanate of Malacca in the straits of Malacca centuries earlier. The increased establishment of Persian and Indian Muslim trade in particular aided the Thai trade expansion.[55] Luxury items continued to be imported from China, although with arguably less direct political impact during the Thonburi and Early Rattanakosin periods (1767-1854), aiding the eventual solidification of the early Bangkok authority as trading in coins and currency became a major force in local trade centers.[56] Hence, while centers in the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam ascended and the proto-states of Southeast Asia became more clear centers, other older centers became hotly contested battlegrounds. For example, the central Khmer authority spent most of the nineteenth century attempting to maintain a

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[55] Yoko Nagazumi, "Ayutthaya and Japan: Embassies and Trade in the Seventeenth Century," in *From Japan to Arabia: Ayutthaya's Maritime Relations with Asia*, ed. Kennon Breazeale (Bangkok: Toyota Thailand Foundation, 1999), 89-103; Leonard Y. Andaya, "Ayutthaya and the Persian and Indian Muslim Connection," in *From Japan to Arabia*, ed. Breazeale, 119-137. Recommended films regarding Ayutthaya are the popular Naresaun series and Nan Nak—both of which are Thai film productions.

[56] Masuda Erika, "Import of Prosperity: Luxurious Items Imported from China to Siam during the Thonburi and Early Rattanakosin Periods (1767-1854)," in *Chinese Circulations: Capital, Commodities, and Networks in Southeast Asia*, ed. Eric Tagliacozzo (Chapel Hill, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 149-171; Tana Li, "Cochinchinese Coin Casting and Circulating in Eighteenth Century Southeast Asia," in *Chinese Circulations*, ed. Tagliacozzo (Chapel Hill, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), 130-148; Tana Li, *Nguyễn Cochinchina: Southern Vietnam in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, 1st ed (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 126-162.

precious balance between Siamese Thai and Nguyễn Vietnamese authority as the Trans-Mekong trading network became a critical key to trade at the South China Sea and the oceanic networks beyond.[57]

Although autonomous Southeast Asian polities had become increasingly present along the shores of the South China Sea and the oceanic networks beyond from the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries, the arrival of European authority and its deep disastrous impact was undeniable by the end of the nineteenth century. It is arguable that in each center, in Nguyễn Đàng Trong Vietnam, the various Thai-Lao *ban* and *muong* centers, the Burmese mandala, the Malay sultanates, and the "supra-barangay" societies of the Philippines, local authorities never completely lost power, and that colonialism, for all its efforts, was never complete. Additionally, scholarship has traditionally seen a shift from the maritime empires of the Portuguese and Spanish toward the companies of the Dutch, English, and French, before the Dutch, English, and French each attempted to establish more land-based complete colonies. However, the oft forgotten importance of the Ottoman Empire was also critical to maintaining relative independence for the Sultanate of Aceh, while many other local authorities remained in place. By the end of the nineteenth century, this mix of influences was further complicated by the emergence of a (predominantly southern) Chinese diaspora that moved across the waves of the South China Sea to all portions of Southeast Asia and beyond.[58]

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[57] Puangthong Rungswasdisab, "Siam and the Contest for Control of the Trans-Mekong Trading Networks from the Late Eighteenth to the Mid-Nineteenth Centuries," in *Water Frontier: Commerce and the Chinese in the Lower Mekong Region: 1750-1880*, ed. Tana Li and Nola Cooke (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 101-114.

[58] Anthony Reid, "The Age of Commerce, 1400-1650," in *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680*, vol. 2, Expansion and Crisis (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), 1-61; Anthony Reid, "Economic and Social Change, C. 1400-1800: Eighteenth-Century Transitions," in *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia*, ed. Nicholas Tarling, vol. 1, pt. 2, From c. 1500 to c. 1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 156-159; Eric Wolf, *Europe and the People Without History* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997), 232-261, 234-239,

One of the difficulties that contemporary scholars have settled upon in reading Chinese influence into the eighteenth and nineteenth century waters of the South China Sea is that, in a sense, this reading substantially "upstreams" or reads backward into history contemporary ideas about Chinese identity which were not necessarily solidified at the time, particularly in southern China where the majority of migrants were flowing out of China. On occasion, these communities eventually rose as virtually independent trading centers as was the case with Bantaey Maes.

Bantaey Maes is the Khmer name for a region as well as a port-city town that eventually became known to the Vietnamese as Hà Tiên and is situated today nearby the border of Cambodia and Vietnam. As was the case with Dutch New Guinea, Java, and Siam during the Thonburi and Rattanakosin periods, this port rose through the support of long distance trade that stretched across the oceanic networks of the South China Sea and beyond. Meanwhile, a massive increase in the construction of Chinese junks and combined with the arrival of Chinese fleeing an economic crisis in southern China from the eighteenth century established new flows of commodity such as rice, cotton, and fish. At the same time in the Philippines, the Spanish use of the old half Native American, half Spanish term *mestizo* was reapplied to the rise of a half-Chinese trading elite in Manila. The French adapted the term to refer to a half-Chinese *metisage* through "Indochine" (Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia). Sino-Thai, Sino-Khmer, and Sino-Malay communities began to rise across the region. The Thai historian Sarasin Viraphol famously described these phenomena in very charged terms, referring to the "Nanyang Chinese" (southern Chinese) as the "Jews of the Orient," although his point that there were longstanding prejudices against these communities has stood the test of time. Among the many paranoid fears

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252-261; İsmail Hakkıx Göksoy, "Ottoman-Aceh Relations as Documented in Turkish Sources," in *Mapping the Acehnese Past*, ed. Feener, Daly, and Reid, 65-96.

that were prevalent concerning this overseas community was that they owed an eternal alliance to the land they fled, a view commonplace among colonial administrators by the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries.[59]

III. High Colonial to Modern: Building the Borders, Violence, Crossing the Line, and the Disaster of Racialized Politics and the State

Constructing colonial authority, attempting to build borders or a monopoly on violence, and curbing border crossing activities were critical to the events that took place around the shores of the South China Sea from the turn of the nineteenth century through to the mid-twentieth century. It was only by this time the concept of maritime boundaries could truly be solidified. However, this process was not simply a creation of European powers such as the Dutch, the British, the French, the Spanish, and the Americans. It rather arose out of a process of interaction between authorities from Southeast Asia and foreign authorities seeking to control Southeast Asian access to the waters of the South China Sea and the oceanic networks beyond. Advances in mapping technology, policing, and communications technology were combined to consolidate authority over

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[59] Sarasin Viraphol, *The Nanyang Chinese* (Bangkok, Thailand: Chulalongkorn University, 1972); Tana Li, "Ships and Shipbuilding in the Mekong Delta, C. 1750-1840," in *Water Frontier*, ed. Li and Cooke, 119-136. Leonard Blussé, "Junks to Java: Chinese Shipping to the Nanyang in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century," in *Chinese Circulations*, ed. Tagliacozzo, 221-258; Anthony Reid, "Chinese Trade and Southeast Asian Economic Expansion in the Later Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries: An Overview," in *Water Frontier*, ed. Li and Cooke, 21-32; James Kong Chin, "The Junk Trade between South China and Nguyen Vietnam in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries," in *Water Frontier*, ed. Li and Cooke, 53-64; Yumio Sakurai, "Eighteenth-Century Chinese Pioneers on the Water Frontier of Indochina," in *Water Frontier*, ed. Li and Cooke, 33-52; Hui Kian Kwee, "The End of the 'Age of Commerce'?: Javanese Cotton Trade Industry from the Seventeenth to the Eighteenth Centuries," in *Chinese Circulations*, ed. Tagliacozzo, 283-304; Yumio Sakurai and Takako Kitagawa, "Ayutthaya and the Persian and Indian Muslim Connection," in *From Japan to Arabia*, ed. Breazeale, 150-217.

the waves. Yet, while authorities were mostly concentrated on curbing low-level violence, they appear to have been ignorant to the fact that their strategies of insisting upon control and watchfulness were actually institutionalizations of violence instigating regional conflict and deepening internal divisions.

Through expanding attempts by colonial powers to control commodity flows over the waves of the South China Sea, new commodities began to be emphasized: tin, rubber, cane sugar, salt, tobacco, alcohol, and even opium became increasingly popular as taxed commodities.[60] Although in many cases, such as the case of the tin supplies in Peninsular Malaysia, which had been popular since the days of the Sultanate of Melaka, many of these resources were merely shifting in the scale of their extraction and usage. Hence, with the turn towards moral consumption strategies, colonial authorities had little impact on actual consumption of opiates, tobacco, and alcohol. The policing of territories and borderlands recently also increasingly turned toward the notion of water frontiers as state authorities began taking more distinct strategies toward policing borders (VN: *biên*, *cương*, Cham: *cam*). This process, however, began with a project of mapping the boundaries between the British, French, Spanish, Siamese, and Dutch authorities as intermediaries for local control.

The project of mapping the boundaries that came to represent the contemporary states of Southeast Asia did not really come into complete recognition until the mid- to late nineteenth century. First, cartographers mapped the islands and their inland portions, as well as the mainland. However, complaints began to arise about the loss of cargoes, particularly in the case of contested ports such as Batavia. Hence, hydrography became increasingly popular in order to gain a better understanding of shipping lanes and preventing shipwrecks. These two

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[60] Thomaz, "The Malay Sultanate of Melaka," 76.

mapping strategies were combined with seeing-like-a-state impositions of state authority upon local relationships and the establishment of local institutions in order to govern and manage newly mapped regions.

In the case of the Netherlands East Indies, many territories still managed to remain non-incorporated with respect to the colonial framework. Meanwhile, other territories opted to enter into relatively friendly negotiations and collaborative relationships with the Dutch. However, tax tributary relations were often imposed, as was the case with Batavia since it enforced cooperation with local officials. Policing was another issue. Initial forces were ragged and ineffective, plagued by the climate until several advances in technology occurred during the fifty-year period between 1865 and 1915. Medical advances also were importantly introduced during this time to treat diseases from beriberi to malaria. Improvements were made in uniforms, as clothing was adapted to the climate. The introduction of aluminum weapons technology made for lighter arms. Major improvements in communication networks were introduced with staged patrol towers and light-houses along the coast. Zeppelins were even considered as a potential patrol vehicle due to their increased range of visibility and travel, although their cost and the danger of losing individual vessels eventually caused this strategy to be abandoned. Hence, both the land, and more importantly, the maritime borders between British Malaya, French Indochina, Siam, British Burma, the Spanish (and later, the American) Philippines, and the Netherlands East Indies became increasingly solidified between 1865 and 1915. The construction of railroads and roads was also critical to this process, linking port towns and cities together. The establishment of the telegraph system was another important factor. The Dutch had initially relied upon English telegraph lines, but advances in Dutch technology allowed for the construction of their own lines. Maritime frontiers nevertheless remained relatively permeable. In cases such as the Spanish involvement in the Sulu Sea and the Dutch involvement in the Straits of Malacca during the Aceh War in the 1870s, the use of naval blockades were more

thoroughly introduced with mild successes. Nevertheless, the appearance of lighthouses was likely more critical. By simply lighting maritime frontiers, Dutch, British, French, and American authorities dramatically increased their ability for maritime policing actions, an ability that would have a great impact on Southeast Asian states in the post-colonial era, as well. By simply adding lighthouses, policing authorities doubled their abilities to watch borders. These advances were then combined with what Eric Tagliacozzo termed "the human factor": a teaming supply of new missionaries, anthropologists, administrators, and policing personnel who worked together (and against each other) in the solidification of borderland spaces.[61] Through their participation and interactions with peripheries and their communications back to the metropole, they were equally a product of these motions to control space and trade.[62] Nevertheless, it was these efforts that began to spur the disputes that would characterize much of the twentieth century.

From the earliest encounters of traders along the shores of the South China Sea and the oceanic networks beyond recorded in Chinese texts, the issue of piracy stood above and beyond as one of the fears that affected trade. The southern territories of what became later known to scholars as "the civilization of Champa" were frequently characterized as pirates that were threatening Chinese vessels, particularly from the seventh through the twelfth centuries. In fact, the characterization of "pirates on the waves" came be used throughout history.[63] Whether Siamese, Cham, Chinese, Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese, Malay, Buginese, Makassarese, French, Japanese, or Americans, people of any origin could

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[61] Eric Tagliacozzo, *Secret Trades, Porous Borders: Smuggling and States Along a Southeast Asian Frontier, 1865-1915* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005).

[62] Ibid., 27-106; Nicolas Weber, "Securing and Developing the Southwestern Region: The Role of the Cham and Malay Colonies in Vietnam (18th-19th Centuries)," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 54, no. 5 (2011): 739-772.

[63] Hall, "Economic History of Early Southeast Asia: Champa's Plunder Based Political-Economy."

be considered pirates so long as they had maritime tendencies (highland people were rarely considered pirates; they were rather “raiders” or “robbers”). However, there were certain groups that became particularly strongly associated with piracy, such as the Buginese or Makassarese through their association with the Sulu Sultanate and the notorious waters of the Sulu Sea. There were also famous ports and locations that became associated with piracy: Jolo, for instance, and Giảng Bình in the waters between Vietnam and China as well as others. One of the effects of the intrusions of colonial powers and the increase in shipbuilding technology was that pirates also became increasingly active. Even as the colonial police states expanded their concerns over low-level violence along the borderlands of British Malaysia and the Dutch East Indies, active piracy continued. Despite initial reports that borderlands were sites of relative peace and harmony, as defined by the regents that were put in place to observe them, Chinese mining communities, resistance fighters in Aceh, *hulu* (upriver) Jambi peoples on the island of Sumatra, Dayak peoples, and on occasion *orang asli* raiders left their marks as perpetrators of violence in the eyes of Batavia and Singapore. However, as policing networks expanded, reports of rebellion and piracy tended to decrease to reports of petty theft, minor personal attacks, and charges of disorderly conduct. Even though the colonial states of the lands around the shores of the South China Sea and the oceanic networks beyond them were rapidly expanding their control throughout the late nineteenth century, increasingly becoming paranoid about the presence of “foreign Asians,” colonial governance also never fully completed its conquest of local polities. Many regions of Southeast Asia remained semi-independent, as was the case for the Sultanate of Idi. They were allies in name during points when it was convenient. However, they could also be the source of small raiding polities sent to capture arms, trade goods, or other supplies before these raiders slipped back upriver into the protective estuaries of islands and hinterlands. As was the case with Dayak populations, these upriver moving peoples were often under the

governance of Malay *orang kaya* (trading class elites) who by proxy encouraged them to revolt. As such, local revolts pervaded throughout the period of high colonialism. The Dutch tried to incorporate these peoples into the system of colonial governance through the charges of the Outer Island Political Reports, the codification of new legal systems combined with the recognition and codification of local *adat* customary law. However, these efforts could never fully accommodate the moves of local and transnational populations of hajis, nomads, the Minangkabau *rantau*, and others, which caused colonial authorities to remain paranoid.[64]

The paranoia of colonial authorities in the lands surrounding the shores of the South China Sea and the oceanic space beyond continued to instigate violence as these authorities desperately made attempts at new cross-border trade. As the intensity of regulation on trade grew, smuggling became an increasingly lucrative means of producing income. The trade of narcotics, counterfeit monies, and human cargoes dominated these cross-oceanic networks. Smuggling of narcotics along the water networks was not limited to opium, although this has been a fascination of many scholars. It also included the scheduled substances of cocaine and marijuana as well as the commercially scheduled substances of alcohol and tobacco. Nevertheless, opium trade was by far the most lucrative and violent drug trade to touch the water networks of the South China Sea. In addition to shipping narcotics across the frontier, the trade of counterfeit money also became prominent throughout the region. Markets of counterfeiting stretched from Southern China to the Indian Ocean at the very least. Cases levied against counterfeit traders peaked in

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[64] Tagliacozzo, *Secret Trades, Porous Borders*, 108-127, 160-184; James Warren, "The Port of Jolo: International Trade and Slave Raiding," in *Pirates, Ports, and Coasts in Asia: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, ed. John Kleinen and Manon Osseweijer (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), 178-199; Robert J. Anthony, "Giảng Bình: Pirate Haven and Black Market on the Sino-Vietnamese Frontier, 1780-1802," in *Pirates, Ports, and Coasts in Asia*, ed. Kleinen and Osseweijer, 31-51.

the Straits of Malacca in 1894 with an annual total of 351 cases. They peaked again at the vicinity of the Java Sea in 1897 with a total of 519 cases levied. Overall, illegal coins made up a range of between one-sixth and one-twelfth of the market value of total coinage in the year 1899. In addition to counterfeiters and drug smugglers, smugglers in human cargo reached a relative peak during the high colonial period, although this traffic was often criticized by the colonial centers of Singapore and Batavia for its blatant disregard for the civilizing mission. Even so, the trade of prostitutes, slaves, and movements of undocumented laborers was persistent throughout the region. It became clear that the movement across boundaries was an increasing boon to the colonial state. A report of brothels in Singapore in 1877 recorded 40 brothels on a total of 17 streets, a point suggesting illicit human cargoes were concentrated only in certain parts of urban areas out of sight and, hence, out of mind for the moral authority, which also frequented them. Still, attempts were made to curb the trade of illicit human cargoes throughout the colonial period and the trade of human bodies continued to vary greatly with police presence.[65]

As much as the potential threat of piracy in the colonial state seemed to decline with the expansion of the police state and awareness of geo-politics, a certain paranoia of "Foreign Asians" pervaded throughout the lands along the shores of the South China Sea and the oceanic networks beyond from the end of the nineteenth century into the middle of the twentieth century. Anti-Chinese, anti-Japanese, and anti-Arab sentiments were particularly fierce. Although the Chinese communities were by far the most numerous and perhaps the most politically and

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[65] Tagliacozzo, *Secret Trades, Porous Borders*, 185-259; Alfred W. McCoy, "Opium for the Natives," in *The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade*, 2nd rev. ed (Chicago: Chicago Review Press, 2003), 77-126; Anthony Reid, "Economic and Social Change, C. 1400-1800: The Trade in Narcotics," in *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia*, ed. Nicholas Tarling, vol. 1, pt. 2, From c. 1500 to c. 1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 154-155; Wolf, *Europe and the People Without History*, 343-346.

socially influential, they were also a diaspora community that had resulted predominantly out of European-encouraged outmigration along with the Qing dynasty's collapse. By comparison, the Japanese were less numerous and theoretically had at least a more peaceful and cooperative longstanding relationship with the Dutch in particular. However, the general perception of the Japanese in this region shifted dramatically over the course of these years, as they were more consistently viewed through their links to the emphatically rising imperial power of Japan after the Meiji Restoration began in 1868 and what has been often deemed as a surprising victory over the Russian empire in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. Of the many topics to discuss in the formations of the history of the South China Sea is the role mid-level Chinese trading families played in the formation of new social classes. In the Philippines, these classes had become famously known as *mestizos* and formed the basis of the mid-century modern political elite. Other Sino-Southeast Asian groups were particularly prominent in Thailand, Cambodia, and Singapore. Meanwhile, boundaries that were imposed as racial categories became stricter, and as decades of conflict enveloped the region, racial tensions took on new forms. Reflecting backward, certain scholars have argued that labels of nationality, ethnicity, and the understanding that individual humans belong to specific groups are essentially useless, their usage fueled by fear and hatred. Meanwhile, the adaptation and constant re-adaptations of traditions and cultures could be witnessed throughout the region.[66]

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[66] Tagliacozzo, *Secret Trades, Porous Borders*, 128-160; Li and Cooke, eds., *Water Frontier*, 5-8; Byung Wook Choi, "The Nguyen Dynasty's Policy toward Chinese on the Water Frontier in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century," in *Water Frontier*, ed. Li and Cooke, 85-97; Shawn McHale, "Understanding the Fanatic Mind? The Việt Minh and Race Hatred in the First Indochina War (1945-1954)," *Journal of Vietnamese Studies* 4, no. 3 (October 2009): 98-138; Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, "The Historical Development of Thai-Speaking Muslim Communities in Southern Thailand and Northern Malaysia," in *Civility and Savagery: Social Identity in Tai States*, ed. Andrew Turton (London: Curzon Press, 2000), 162-179; Ryoko Nishii, "Emergence and Transformation of Peripheral Ethnicity: Sam Sam on the Thai-Malaysian Border," in *Civility*

Conclusion

This article began with the question of how to use the conception of the South China Sea as a singular oceanic space with networks that stretched outward and beyond into the oceans of the globe and how this would allow us to reshape notions of the history of this space. Using Braudel's *The Mediterranean* as an inspiration, this article then looked at this oceanic space from the very earliest points in human history, moving quickly in a survey fashion, up through the twentieth century. By using this model to reflect upon this history, it has become clear that in writing about the history of the oceanic space, one has to focus predominantly upon the shores and small collections of land along with the meager attempts by humans to control such a space. Nevertheless, this article has demonstrated that attempts to control the space are by no means new, but that they rather stretch back to the days of the classical states of Southeast Asia. With this in mind, it is possible to note that the conception of current East Asian and Southeast Asian states to focus upon military or state intervention as a potential means to solve conflict has not been a successful long-term preventative measure. Rather, increased policing and militarization has always met with a deepening of local divisions and conflicts over resources. Meanwhile, taking the long history as a model, the establishment of trade relations has been a long-term strategy that has proven successful for periods of time in preventing conflict and establishing new trade centers. Given the climate of the region of the waters of the South China Sea and the oceanic networks beyond, it is unlikely that any state will even be able to control these waters. Meanwhile, the introduction of multiple local authorities is also unlikely to decrease the sense of competition. *How, then, does one de-emphasize conflict and re-emphasize trade in the region*?

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and Savagery, ed. Turton, 180-198.

In order to accomplish the above aims, it seems that the protectionist attitude of government and international officials will have to be abandoned or at least be put more mildly. There should also be an emphasis on increasing faith in the ability of ASEAN member states to find their own peaceful trade solutions. In light of these considerations, the easiest way for this process to continue seems to be foremost a decreased emphasis on Chinese military and governmental presence in the region, followed by continued negotiations between ASEAN members to increase trade corporations. There is no doubt that this process will be slow. Certain member states such as Champa during classical times and Cambodia during the twentieth century have traditionally relied upon Chinese support as a counter balance to secure their own place in the region. Meanwhile, American presence has traditionally been used for balancing the security of member states such as the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia, and more recently Vietnam. Hence, it will also be important for American presence in the region to de-emphasize military negotiations, while re-emphasizing trade cooperation. These trade agreements, however, must be approached with an awareness of their connotations. The potential American support of nuclear projects in Vietnam today is an ill-conceived, poorly researched plan, which fails to take into account the potential impacts such an agreement would have for Southeast Asian peoples themselves, the environment of the region, and potential alternative energy sources.[67] Continuing to support trade agreements will be critical. However, it should also be ensured that such trade agreements confine to the wishes of local authorities at all levels from the village up, not simply at the level of international authority. It is only from this perspective that we may begin to gain a better sense of the history of the lands along the

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[67] Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Mark Holt, and Mark E. Manyin, *U.S.-Vietnam Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: Issues for Congress*, Congressional Research Service Report (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, March 13, 2014).

shores of the South China Sea.

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Book Reviews

The Han Commanderies in Early Korean History: A Reconsideration of the Han Commanderies from a Broader East Asian Perspective

edited by Mark E. Byington
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2013

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Park Jun-hyeong
Yonsei University

The first state in Korean history, Old Chosŏn, was destroyed in 108 BC by an invasion from the Han empire. The Han empire established three commanderies within Chosŏn territory, namely Lelang, Lintun and Zhenfan. The next year the Han empire established the Xuantu commandery in the territory of Old Chosŏn's ally Yemaek, thus completing what are now called the four Han commanderies (*Hansagun*). Even before the collapse of Old Chosŏn, the Han empire established the Canghai commandery in 128 BC, taking advantage of the Ye Lord Namnyŏ's opposition to Old Chosŏn's King Ugŏ (右渠王), but this commandery was abolished in 126 BC because of the difficulties in administering it. In 82 BC, Zhenfan was absorbed into Lelang, and Lintun was absorbed into Xuantu. In 75 BC, the Xuantu commandery, under attack from indigenous groups, had its capital moved to Liaodong. The area of the abolished Lintun commandery, which had up to that point been administered by Xuantu, was placed under Lelang control, and was controlled by a commandant of the Eastern Section (東部都尉 *Dongbu duwei*) based in Lelang. In 204 AD, Gongsun Kang combined the seven districts in Lelang south of the district *Dunyuhyeon* (屯有縣) that had been

under the administration of the commandant of the Southern Section and placed them under a newly-established Daifang commandery. Later, Lelang and Daifang both were weakened by the collapse of the Western Jin empire which had controlled them, and Koguryŏ took advantage of this situation to take over Lelang in 313 AD and Daifang in 314 AD. Xuantu had to shift to new territory twice because of attacks from indigenous groups. It was controlled, along with Liaodong commandery, first by the Wei empire and then the Jin empire, before it passed into the control of the Yan state ruled by the Murong Xianbei. In 319 AD, it fell to Kwanggaet'o, the expansionist monarch of Koguryŏ.

Including Canghai, Lelang, Zhenfan, Lintun, Xuantu and Daifang, there were a total of six commanderies established by the China-based Han empire with the purpose of controlling Old Chosŏn and the Yemaek. Because Canghai, Zhenfan and Lintun existed for fairly brief periods, discussion of Han commanderies usually focuses on the Lelang commandery, with some reference to Xuantu and Daifang. The book being reviewed here deals with all six commanderies, but the emphasis is very much on Lelang. Reflecting the importance of Lelang, six out of ten chapters are focused on Lelang.

The Han commanderies were the base from which the Han empire of the Chinese central plain expanded into and controlled Manchuria and the Korean peninsula. Additionally, they acted as the window through which the culture, technology and scholarship of the Chinese central plain spread into Eastern Yi (東夷) society. The Han commanderies encouraged a preference for opulent Han goods among the indigenous leaders of Manchuria and the Korean peninsula as a means for such leaders to secure political power. The importance of Han goods to indigenous leaders is well portrayed through the fact that when Pyŏnhan and Chinhan had difficulties importing mirrors from Han (*hangyŏng*), Lelang responded by producing imitations of Han mirrors (*pangjegyŏng*) for export, signifying that the Han commanderies meant to bring indigenous leaders of the Eastern Yi society under their control.

At the same time, the indigenous leaders of Eastern Yi society had no choice but to vie for power in the context of general domination by the Han commanderies. Koguryŏ developed as a state by merging with neighbouring groups. This development may also been seen in Koguryŏ's use of *Chaekguru* (幘溝婁 cap fort) to unify its window of interaction with the Xuantu Commandery and seize a position of dominance in foreign affairs. The growth of Koguryŏ and other indigenous polities, which is expressed in the sources as "invasions by barbarians" (夷貊所侵 *imaek sochim*), necessitated the abolition of Zhenfan and Lintun commanderies, the relocation of Xuantu commandery, and the reorganization of Lelang commandery through the establishment of commandants for the southern and eastern regions.

Viewed from this perspective, the establishment of the Han commanderies was of considerable import for the development of the early states of the Korean peninsula. Our understanding of the Han commanderies has a significant bearing on how we conceptualize the formation process of the early states. Thus, the publication of *The Han Commanderies in Early Korean History* is of great historical significance. The book provides a general survey of scholarly discussion concerning the Han commanderies with a focus on South Korean scholarship. The publication of this scholarship in English is a valuable contribution, as it brings this work beyond the confines of South Korean academia to Anglophone researchers.

The Early Korea Project has been organized under the direction of Mark E. Byington of Harvard University's Korea Institute with the support of the Northeast Asia History Foundation (henceforward NAHF). The project has published the following books as part of its regular series: *Early Korea, Volume 1: Reconsidering Early Korea through Archaeology* (2008), *Early Korea, Volume 2: The Samhan Period of Korean History* (2009), and *Early Korea, Volume 3: The Rediscovery of Kaya in History and Archaeology* (2011). Additionally, the Early Korea Project has an occasional series, for which it published *State and Society*

in Middle and Late Silla in 2010, as well as *The Han Commanderies in Early Korean History* and *New Perspectives on Korean Art: From Silla to Koryŏ*, both in 2013.

The contents of *The Han Commanderies in Early Korean History* are as follows:

Notably, in a book translated for an English speaking readership, the preface is immediately followed by a section entitled "Conventions

for Classical Citations." This section aids the reader by providing accurate bibliographic information for frequently cited Chinese histories, such as *Guanzi, Shiji*, *Hanshu* and *Hou Hanshu*, as well as Korean histories such as the *Samguk yusa* and the *Samguk sagi*. Also the index at the end of the book uses English, Chinese characters, and where necessary, Korean characters Hangeul, allowing the reader to gain an accurate understanding of how key terms were translated. This is truly useful, not only for English-speaking readers, but for Korean readers as well. Hence, this book's indexing arrangement seems worthy of becoming a standard for English-language translations of Korean papers concerning early Korean history in the future, and even abstracts of such papers.

A total of nine authors, including Byington, contributed papers to the book. Seven are South Koreans, but there is also one Japanese scholar, Lee Sungsi, and of course, there is Byington himself. This may be said to be a pretty balanced selection. In terms of research subjects, the contributing authors are specialists in such diverse fields as Old Chosŏn, Lelang, Koguryŏ, and early Chinese history, but most are scholars strongly associated with research on Old Chosŏn and the Han commanderies. Moreover, each of the contributing authors has at least 25 years of experience in their area, which well vouches for their credibility to be included in the book's selection of authors.

Moving on to a brief consideration of each chapter, the first titled "Scholarly Studies on the Han Commanderies in Korea" by Oh Youngchan and Mark E. Byington criticizes the tendency, associated especially with the Japanese colonial period, to see the Han commanderies as an earlier version of the colonialism of the twentieth century. Instead, the authors, in an objective and scholarly manner, reconsider the role played by the Han commanderies both on the Korean peninsula in particular and in East Asia as a whole. They introduce key textual sources for the Han commanderies, notably the *Samguk sagi*, the *Samguk yusa*, the *Shiji*, the *Sanguozhi* and the *Zizhi tongjian*. They also

describe archaeological sources such as the Stele of the Spirit Shrine of Nianti District, Lelang census documents and various types of seals (印章 *injang*), including clay document seals (封泥 *pongni*). Following this, the chapter surveys the broad trends of Japanese colonial-era scholarship, as well as scholarship in North Korea, South Korea and Japan post-1945.

The first chapter serves as an introduction to the book by providing the broad outlines of scholarship on the Han commanderies to an Anglophone readership. Noteworthy is the particular indication of distortions in research carried out by official scholars within the Japanese colonial apparatus as such scholars linked the Han commanderies with Japan's own colonial project in Korea. While they allow that, post-liberation, Korean scholars have had some success overcoming this tendency as part of a general critique of colonial-era scholarship, the authors are nonetheless concerned about a remaining tendency to equate the two very different historical periods. Considering that some Western scholars still uncritically repeat Japanese colonial scholarship, it is very meaningful indeed that these new understandings of the Han commanderies, and the recent objective scholarship concerning the Han commanderies, are being offered in English.

If the first chapter provides the broad introductory framework, the discussion of particular themes begins with the second chapter. Chapter 2, "Old Chosŏn - Its History and Archaeology" by Song Ho Jung, is a discussion of the history and geography of the state of Old Chosŏn that the Han commanderies replaced. Distinguishing Old Chosŏn into two periods, an early period (8th-5th centuries BC) and a later period (4th-2nd centuries BC), Song Ho Jung explores the historical and archaeological evidence related to both. As a matter of particular dispute is the distinction between Bronze Age culture in Liaoxi and Liaodong; Song considers only the latter to be part of Old Chosŏn culture.

Chapter 3, "The History of Lelang Commandery" by Kwon O-jung, discusses the circumstances surrounding the establishment, abolition and relocations of the various commanderies, with a focus on Lelang,

although he also discusses the establishment of Daifang and the collapse of both Lelang and Daifang. The chapter may be said to provide a general history of the Han commanderies with a focus on Lelang. It can also be seen as providing a preliminary and comprehensive discussion to prepare the reader for the diverse topics discussed in later chapters.

Chapter 4, "The Ruling Class of Lelang Commandery" by Oh Young-chan, argues that indigenous culture continued to be dominant until the first century BC. He points out that, as government of the region by the commanderies prolonged into the first and second centuries AD, indigenous groups began to assume Han culture, resulting in the development of a new culturally hybrid community of Nangnang people.[1] Chapter 5, "The Material Culture of the Lelang Commandery" by Jung In-seung, explores archaeologically the earth fortresses, graves, pottery and other aspects of Lelang culture, and analyzes in detail the influence of Lelang culture on the indigenous groups on the fringes of the commanderies.

Chapters 6 to 8 discuss the relationships between the Han commanderies and the Samhan, Ye, Wa, Koguryŏ, and other peoples surrounding the commanderies. Chapter 6, "The Samhan, Ye, Wa and the Time of the Lelang and Daifang Commanderies" by Lee Sungsi focuses on explicating the relationships formed by Lelang and Daifang with the petty states of the Samhan, the Ye of the Korean peninsula and environs, and of the Wa in the Japanese archipelago. The study approaches the role the Han commanderies played in the growth of these peoples from a perspective that encompasses East Asia as a whole. Because the chapter's author Lee Sungsi is a Japanese scholar studying early Korean history, his opinions are especially noteworthy. Chapter 7, "The Fall of Lelang and the Daifang Commanderies and Its Aftermath" by Yeo HoKyu,

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1 Translator's note: Nangnang is the Korean pronunciation of Lelang. I follow the book in referring to the group as Nangnang people to reflect Oh Young-chan's concept of indigenized Chinese and Sinified indigenous elites within the Han commanderies.

investigates the developments in the governance of the Korean peninsula's northwestern region throughout the expulsion of Lelang and Daifang by Koguryŏ. The author discusses how, after the collapse of the commanderies, Koguryŏ actively accepted émigrés of Chinese origin in order to strengthen its control over the region. Chapter 8, "Koguryŏ and the Reorganization of the Xuantu Commandery" by Lee Seongje, departs somewhat from the received opinion that the Xuantu Commandery's first relocation was due to the attacks by Koguryŏ. Lee emphasizes that Koguryŏ was not controlled by the Han commanderies in the period immediately following their initial establishment. "Koguryŏ's invasions" were in fact part of a process whereby Koguryŏ, as an exterior force, invaded the territory of the commanderies, forcing their reorganization. Establishment of the Chaekguru fortress, a base for trade and diplomacy with Koguryŏ, was a difficult concession for Xuantu Commandery in the face of Koguryŏ's active campaign for expansion. This chapter's value lies in being primarily concerned with Xuantu as opposed to a majority of other chapters tilted toward Lelang.

Chapter 9, "Lelang Commandery and Han China's Commandery-based Rule" by Kim Byung-joon, uses recently excavated wood and bamboo strips and tablets to compare the governance of the Han commanderies in China proper with that in Lelang. Kim argues against the scholarly consensus that Lelang, as a border commandery, was governed differently from commanderies in the central regions of the empire, and claims that Lelang experienced much the same system of governance as did other regions in the Han empire. By comparing the Lelang commandery with other commanderies, both in the core regions and the frontiers of the Han, and thus exploring Lelang within a broader East Asian context, the meaning of Kim's study can be found in looking at Lelang's governance system in a different light.

Chapters 2 to 9 either summarize previously published work by their authors or are in fact translations of works previously published in Korean that underwent revision. By contrast, the last chapter, "Historical

Geography of the Han Commanderies in Korea" by the editor Mark E. Byington, introduces previously unpublished analysis. Since Yi Pyŏng-do's work on the historical geography of the Han commanderies, the South Korean scholarly community has hardly revisited the question of the location of the Han commanderies. Considering the recent excavation of a large number of texts and archaeological artifacts, perhaps as a matter of course there should have been a comprehensive reconsideration, but this has not been attempted, in part because such a reconsideration would require an enormous amount of work, and in truth, because such a project was seen as somewhat passé and unexciting. As a result, scholars have largely satisfied themselves with making small revisions to Yi Pyŏng-do's conclusions. From this perspective, Byington's historical geography of the Han commanderies, beginning with Canghai and including Daifang, is all the more meaningful. Byington's subjects the historical evidence to an objective and rational investigation in order to determine the location of the Han commanderies.

3. Critical Considerations and Suggestions

The Han Commanderies in Early Korean History cannot be expected to encompass all the work done, and all the sources discovered on the subject. Nevertheless, the nine scholars and ten chapters together introduce the key implications and research contributions of recent scholarship on the Han commanderies. This clearly was also the intention of the editor, and is in accord with the broader aims of the Early Korea Project funded by NAHF. The reviewer of this book acknowledges the overall progress the Early Korea Project has made, but with the hope of encouraging even greater success in the future, would like to point out a number of problems and make a number of suggestions.

On page 11, the first paragraph of the first chapter outlines the overall purpose and direction of research on the Han commanderies in

South Korea:

> The Han commanderies established in the last-second century B.C. under Emperor Wu (r. 141 B.C.-87 B.C.) played an important role in the development of societies and polities in the Korean peninsula, southern Manchuria, and Japan. Their establishment disrupted the course of social and political development of the regions in and around their spheres of authority, and their presence triggered significant changes in the social structures and cultures of the peoples who populated those regions. Although these commanderies have often been understood as colonial outposts of the Han empire, it is clear that such a description fails to capture the political and cultural complexities involved when a state-level polity imposes itself upon societies of a less complex order and attempts to establish an equilibrium such that optimal control is maintained at minimal expense. Nevertheless, the specter of twentieth-century colonialism has caused scholars in East Asia to view the Han commanderies in Korea and southern Manchuria in starkly simplistic terms as mechanisms for Chinese colonial control of the Korean peninsula. In recent decades, however, as the colonial experience of the first half of the twentieth century fades into the past, scholarship in East Asia has begun to explore the more nuanced aspects of the Han commanderies and the role they played in the history of northeast Asia and, particularly, the Korean peninsula.

The paragraph is critical of established scholarly methods that understood the Han commanderies by linking them to colonial rule. Instead, it encourages a more objective approach to research on the Han commanderies that is free from the colonial perspectives of the early twentieth-century. However, even without taking a nationalist perspective or mentioning Korea's painful experience of having been under colonial rule by Japan during the early twentieth-century, it cannot be denied that the Han commanderies were a clear example of Eastern Yi society being

dominated by a foreign people of the Han (or Chinese) empire. It is true that official scholars of the Japanese empire intentionally emphasized the period of Han commandery rule to equate Japan's colonial rule of Korea with the Han commanderies' domination of Old Chosŏn and the Yemaek. Of course, we must endeavour to understand this period objectively. But to understand why Koguryŏ struggled so vigorously to drive out the Han commanderies, we must reconsider carefully the role and character of the Han commanderies in the development of ancient states.

Secondly, in the survey of earlier scholarly works in the first chapter, the authors mention on pages 31-32 the research done by the *sirhak* (evidential learning) scholars of late Chosŏn,[2] with the actual scholars themselves, including Han Paek-kyŏm, Yi Ik, An Chŏng-bok, Chŏng Yag-yong and Han Ch'i-yun, mentioned in a footnote. Lee Byeong Do is cited for Korean scholarship amid Japan's colonial rule. This is then followed by an introduction in detail on the research and excavation activities of official scholars of Japanese origin during the Japanese colonial period. Of course, the book is primarily concerned with research during and after the twentieth century, but for a survey of earlier research, it rather seems that the work of the *sirhak* scholars is passed over too quickly.

It is clear that scholarship on the Han commanderies during the Japanese colonial period was dominated by official government scholars of Japanese origin. However, by limiting mention of Korean scholarly contributions during the colonial period to Yi Pyŏng-do, the book downplays excessively the scope of Korean scholarship during that period. The era saw, in addition to empiricist scholars such as Yi Pyŏng-

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[2] Translator's note: The Chosŏn dynasty (A.D. 1392-1910) was named after the state of Chosŏn that was conquered by the Han empire in 108 B.C. The two are now distinguished by calling the earlier state "Old Chosŏn." The more recent Chosŏn is conventionally divided into early and late periods (other scholars divide it into early, middle, and late periods), although precise definition of these periods vary. Broadly speaking, late Chosŏn refers to the seventeenth, eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

do, nationalist historians such as Pak Ŭn-sik, Sin Ch'ae-ho, Chŏng In-bo and An Chae-hong, who most certainly engaged in considerable scholarship on the Han commanderies. It is unfortunate that there was no explication of this aspect of Korean scholarship during the Japanese colonial period.

Thirdly, the book is too focused on Lelang. It is true that, of the Han commanderies, Lelang played a key role. However, although Xuantu commandery played a considerable role in Koguryŏ, Puyŏ, and Yemaek societies, the book includes only one chapter on Xuantu. In this respect, it is worth noting the significant recent contributions by Zhao Hongmei to the subject through his 2006 doctoral dissertation, "Xuantu-jun yanjiu" (A Study of the Xuantu Commandery) at Northeast Normal University, and two books *Han sijun yanjiu* [A study on the Four Han Commanderies] and *Fuyu yu Xuantu-jun guanxi yanjiu* [A study of the relations between Puyŏ and the Xuantu commandery].[3]

Fourth, let us consider criticisms made by some who have claimed that the book reproduces Japanese colonial historiography by placing Lelang in the area of P'yŏngyang instead of in the Liaoxi region of China. The name Lelang continues to appear in historical sources even after Koguryŏ's expulsion of Lelang from the Korean peninsula. There are references from the Northern and Southern Dynasties period to Lelang commanderies established as mobile commanderies (*qiaojun*) or mobile districts (*qiaoxian*) by the Murong Xianbei state of Former Yan. Yet, these were not originally part of the Lelang commandery, but were commanderies moved around China proper to deal with particular circumstances at the time, and have nothing to do with Korean history.[4]

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[3] Zhao Hongmei, *Han sijun yanjiu* [A Study on the Four Han Commanderies] (Xianggang: Xianggang Yazhou chubanshe, 2008); Zhao Hongmei, *Fuyu yu Xuantu-jun guanxi yanjiu* [A Study of the Relations between Puyŏ and the Xuantu Commandery] (Xianggang: Xianggang Yazhou chubanshe, 2009).

[4] Sŏ Yŏng-su, "Daeoe kwan'gye esŏ pon Nangnang-gun," *Sahakchi* 31 (1998): 22-26.

In the case of Lelang, it was first moved to the Daling River basin by the Former Yan, and then moved in the early fifth century by the Northern Wei to the Lulong region in the Luan River basin. After being briefly restored in the Daling River basin in the early sixth century, the commandery made its final move toward Baoding near Tianjin. In 583, the Lelang commandery was eliminated as part of a general restructuring of prefectures and commanderies by the Northern Qi.[5] The Lelang commanderies and other commanderies and districts that survived until the end of the sixth century have nothing to do with Korean history. Those independent historians who argue that Lelang and other commanderies were established in Liaoxi and Hebei after the defeat of Old Chosŏn, and that therefore Old Chosŏn was located in those regions of China also, are not taking into account the historical context discussed above.

Finally, some suggestions can be offered about the continued translating and publishing work done by the Early Korea Project. As previously mentioned, the publication of both the regular series and the irregular series are clearly the responsibility of Mark E. Byington, but the funding for the series is provided by the NAHF. Therefore one cannot ignore the influence of NAHF on the series. Meanwhile, the order of the publication and the subjects of publication are bound to have a significant effect on the understanding English-speaking scholars may gain on the subject matter of the series. It is thus unfortunate that, up to this point, there has been no explanation of why the volumes—on subjects as diverse as Silla, Kaya, Samhan and historical archaeology, and so forth—were published in the order that they were. No outline has been provided informing us of the likely order of future publications. As is very well known, Korean history begins with Old Chosŏn. However,

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[5] Ch'ŏn Kwan-u, "Nanha haryu ŭi Chosŏn," *Sach'ong* 21 (1977); Ch'ŏn Kwan-u, "Nanha haryu ŭi Chosŏn," *Sach'ong* 22 (1977); Ch'ŏn Kwan-u, *Chosŏn sŏnsa. Samhansa yŏn'gu* (Seoul: Ilchogak, 1989), 90-135.

The Han Commanderies in Early Korean History discusses the commanderies established by the Han empire after the destruction of Old Chosŏn. Of course, it is well known that the Han commanderies played an important role in Korean history. However, there is also no question that there was a state called Old Chosŏn. In a project funded by the NAHF in order to expand knowledge of early Korean history among English-speaking readers, it would seem obvious for a volume on Old Chosŏn to be published foremost, so it is unfortunate that this was not the case.

Knowledge and Text Production in an Age of Print: China, 900-1400

edited by Lucille Chia and Hilde De Weerdt
Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2011

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Hang Lin
Universität Hamburg

We know that the Chinese have printed their books for over eleven centuries, but despite such a long history of woodblock printing in China and the importance of this technology in the Chinese history of publishing, no detailed Chinese descriptions of the process of block cutting or printing are extant from before the late nineteenth century. Western observers in nineteenth-century China occasionally supplied illuminating descriptions of the cutting and printing process.[1] In his overview of woodblock printing in the Science and Civilisation in China series, Tsien Tsuen-hsuin notes that "the technical procedures of printing have scarcely been documented in Chinese literature" and so his study had to consequently rely on interviews conducted in 1979 with craftsmen who were still producing woodblock imprints in traditional ways.[2] The

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1 See Walter Henry Medhurst, *China: Its State and Prospects with Special Reference to the Spread of the Gospel* (London: John Snow, 1838), 103-106; Samuel Wells Williams, *The Middle Kingdom: A Survey of the Geography, Government, Literature, Social Life, Arts, and History of the Chinese Empire and Its Inhabitants*, vol. 1 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1882), 599-603; William C. Hunter, *Bits of Old China* (London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, and Company, 1885), 213-215.

2 Tsuen-hsuin Tsien, *Science and Civilisation in China*, ed. Joseph Needham, vol. 5, pt. 1, Paper

interest of Western scholars in the history of Chinese printing and books has lately been continuously growing. However, until fairly recently, scholars researching the history of books have focused overwhelmingly on the publishing boom of the late Ming (明, 1368-1644) and its impact.[3] Although the bibliographic range of Song printing has been the topic of some previous studies, such as works by Ming-sun Poon, Jean-Pierre Drège, and Lucille Chia, only very limited attention has been paid to exploring the first significant phase of printing in China during the Song period (宋, 960-1276) and its long-term role in the social and intellectual history of China. In this respect, the volume under review here, the product of a conference held at the Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, Harvard University in 2007, is a major contribution to scholarship and interpretative discussion.

The contributors of the collection build upon their own research and each of the nine chapters in the volume offers a comprehensive study of a special application of print technology during the period this book covers, the "first 'golden age' of print in China" (1). In his essay "To Count Grains of Sand on the Ocean Floor: Changing Perceptions of Books and Learning in the Song Dynasty" which opens up the book, Ronald Egan examines the personalities of Li Qingzhao (李清照, 1084-1155), Sima Guang (司馬光, 1019-1086), and Lu You (陸游, 1125-1210) to show "how ubiquitous was the impact of the new flood of books the

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and Printing (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 194-201. See also the second chapter of Lucille Chia, *Printing for Profit: The Commercial Publishers of Jianyang, Fujian (11th-17th Centuries)* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2002) for a profound examination of the materials and procedures of woodblock print technology, in particular as practiced by Jianyang printers from the Song period to the Ming period.

[3] See among others K. T. Wu and Wu Kuang-Ch'ing, "Ming Printing and Printers," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 7, no. 3 (February 1943): 203-260; Kai-Wing Chow, *Publishing, Culture, and Power in Early Modern China* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004); Cynthia J. Brokaw and Kai-Wing Chow, eds., *Printing and Book Culture in Late Imperial China* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005); Joseph P. McDermott, *A Social History of the Chinese Book: Books and Literati Culture in Late Imperial China* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2006).

period witnessed upon thinking about reading and writing" (45). In the following essay "Book Collection in Jiangxi during the Song Dynasty," Joseph P. McDermott explores the role the book collections of Song literati played as being a basis for Confucian institutions and centers of learning. Concentrating on seventy known book collections in Jiangxi during the Song period, McDermott convincingly demonstrates that their owners gradually acquired more purchased imprints than copied manuscripts and that these collectors in Jiangxi differed from their contemporaries in the lower Yangzi delta by their interest to "build an institution around the presence of a book collection" (92). Indeed, the continuity and interrelationship between manuscript and print is also a concern in Joseph Dennis's essay "Early Printing in China Viewed from the Perspective of Local Gazetteers," as he deliberately discusses the permeability of manuscript and print and explains that every gazetteer was first compiled in manuscript and that the number of its imprints was often very small.

Under the title "Early Buddhist Illustrated Prints in Hangzhou," Shih-shan Susan Huang, focusing on "a local tradition of visual printing culture" (136), traces the printing and distribution of Buddhist prints from the tenth-century Wu-Yue kingdom (吳越, 907-978) through the Song period and analyzes the spread of sutra recital as part of repentance rites producing a growing market for sales of texts. Lucille Chia, in her "The Use of Print in Early Quanzhen Daoist Texts," forcefully demonstrates how printed texts contributed to the spread of this Daoist teaching between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries, a topic rarely studied up until now. The following two essays by T. J. Hinrichs ("Governance through Medical Texts and the Role of Print") and Hilde De Weerdt ("The Cultural Logics of Map Reading: Text, Time, and Space in Printed Maps of the Song Empire") both explore a specific aspect of printed texts as instruments of political power in China. For Hinrichs, these texts, medical manuals or historical atlases, "aimed not to assist individuals in aligning themselves with powers of the cosmos, but

to educate and transform the common people en masse" (237), or in De Weerdt's words, they were "part of a broader cultural strategy to make sense of spatial disorder" (260). It is worthy to note that De Weerdt cogently notes that paratext, a term championed by Gérard Genette to refer to seventeenth century French imprints, shapes reading in Song China in multiple ways. She deliberately argues that even though paratextual components such as headings and running titles were used in manuscript, competition in commercial printing in the latter half of the Song period led to their normalization.

The last two essays, "Chen Jun's Outline and Details: Printing and Politics in Thirteenth-Century Pedagogical Histories" and "Challenging Official History in the Song and Yuan Dynasties: The Record of the Three Kingdoms," by Charles Hartman and Anne E. McLaren respectively, are more consistent in connecting the world of texts and the world of empire and political conduct. Centering around Chen Jun (陳均, 1174-1244), a disciple of Zhu Xi (朱熹, 1130-1200), Hartman lucidly surveys how Chen Jun brought together and edited his "pedagogical" histories which substitute a firm Daoxue moral narrative of Song history for the earlier chronological treatments. McLaren turns her attention to the intense interest on rewriting *Sanguozhi* (三國志, "Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms"), one of the official standard historal texts during the Song and the Yuan (元, 1271-1368).[4] As the issue of political legitimacy became thorny again under the political and military pressure of the non-Han peoples from the north, the attempts by Song revisionist historians is specially noteworthy because "the increasing use of print led to the proliferation of historical texts, shaped their reception, interpretation, and

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[4] For a more detailed examination of the issue, see also Anne E. McLaren, "History Repackaged in the Age of Print: The 'Sanguozhi' and 'Sanguo Yanyi,'" *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London* 69, no. 2 (January 2006): 293-313; Anne E. McLaren, "Writing History, Writing Fiction: The Remaking of Cao Cao in Song Historiography," *Monumenta Serica* 60 (May 2013): 45-69.

social status" (318).

This volume marks the collaborative effort of the contributors to "further flesh out the diversity of Song printing and book history by exploring the social and political relations that shaped the production and reproduction of printed texts, the impact of new intellectual formations on book production, the interaction between print and other media, implied readership and reading instructions, and the increase of collectors and the growth of collections resulting from the expansion of textual production" (27). In this sense, the volume adds important new dimensions to our existing knowledge of this pivotal period, and the contributing authors effectively place their book at the intersection of several subfields of history, including but not limited to cultural history, social history, and history of technology. Without doubt, this volume significantly advances the field both in terms of content and theoretical sophistication.

But as someone whose focus is further north, I can only be deeply envious. Although historians have begun to venture into the history of book and publishing under non-Chinese rule, the topic still deserves a more comprehensive examination. From the tenth century to the latter part of the fourteenth century, exactly the same time span of this volume, China was partially or wholly occupied and ruled by the Khitans, the Tanguts, the Jurchens, and the Mongols. These peoples were conventionally considered as "barbarians," unlettered and culturally inferior, and most of them have been for a long time largely overlooked by historians. However, they formed an important chapter in Chinese history and contributed, mainly through the Chinese under their rule, toward the extension and improvement of the art of printing. In addition, the specific multi-state relations during the period also clearly shaped the intellectual attitudes toward and government policy on the production and circulation of books, because certain information about geopolitical situations or astrology might pose an intrinsic threat to the rule and legitimacy of the reigning regime if they were allowed to be distributed

freely. These topics have been touched upon in previous scholarship, yet how and to what extent such particular historical context influenced the history of the Chinese book and what long-term impact it had upon the development of print technologies and circulation network of books are still questions to which no clear answers are available.[5] In this respect, Evelyn S. Rawski's pioneering study of printed texts in non-Han languages (Manchu, Mongolian, and Tibetan) under the Qing (清, 1644-1911) and the social and cultural effect of non-Han publishing in the Qing may serve as a paradigm for future scholarship to follow.[6]

Certainly, this should not detract from the originality and richness of this book. There is no doubt that *Knowledge and Text Production in an Age of Print: China, 900-1400* is a splendid achievement. Both scholars of Chinese cultural and social history and historians of Chinese science and technology will find skillful syntheses, intriguing observations, and provocative arguments. For a more nuanced understanding of the interrelation between readership and printing in the Song period and the historical development of Chinese printing and publishing in general, two other recent publications, Inoue Susumu's (井上進) *Chūgoku shuppan bunkashi: Shomotsu to chi no fūkei* (中国出版文化史: 書物と知の風景, A Cultural History of Chinese Publishing: Books and the Landscape of Knowledge) and Yugen Wang's *Ten Thousand Scrolls: Reading and Writing in the Poetics of Huang Tingjian and the Late Northern Song* are recommended to be read in combination.

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[5] See, for example, K. T. Wu, "Chinese Printing under Four Alien Dynasties: (916-1368 A. D.)," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 13, no. 3/4 (December 1950): 447-523; Hilde De Weerdt, "What Did Su Che See in the North? Publishing Regulations, State Security, and Political Culture in Song China," *T'oung Pao*, Second Series, 92, no. 4/5 (January 2006): 466-494.

[6] Evelyn S. Rawski, "Qing Publishing in Non-Han Languages," in *Printing and Book Culture in Late Imperial China* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005), 304-331.

Re-Orienting the Manchus: A Study of Sinicization, 1583-1795

by Pei Huang
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University East Asia Program, 2011

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Edward Rhoads
University of Texas at Austin

In 1967, Ping-ti Ho (何炳棣), the eminent historian of China from the University of Chicago, published a brief but sweeping overview article in *The Journal of Asian Studies* entitled "The Significance of the Ch'ing Period in Chinese History." In it, he highlighted five accomplishments of the Qing, of which the third was as follows: "[T]he Ch'ing is without doubt the most successful dynasty of conquest in Chinese history, and the key to its success was the adoption by early Manchu rulers of a policy of systematic sinicization." He went on to write, "In fact, so sinicized were the Manchus that much of what we regard as the orthodox Confucian state and society is exemplified not by earlier Chinese dynasties, but the Ch'ing period."[1]

Thirty years later, another eminent historian of China Evelyn S. Rawski of the University of Pittsburgh in her capacity as president of the Association for Asian Studies, published in the very same journal an article with an almost identical title, "Reenvisioning the Qing: The

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1 Ping-ti Ho, "The Significance of the Ch'ing Period in Chinese History," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 26, no. 2 (February 1967): 191, 192.

Significance of the Qing Period in Chinese History." Rawski boldly took issue with what she called Ho's "sinicization thesis." Rather than sinicization, she wrote, "The key to Qing success, at least in terms of empire-building, lay in its ability to use its cultural links with the non-Han peoples of Inner Asia and to differentiate the administration of the non-Han regions from the administration of the former Ming provinces." As for the sinicization thesis itself, Rawski dismissed it as "a twentieth-century Han nationalist interpretation of China's past," and recommended instead a "Manchu-centered perspective" on the history of the Qing.[2]

Rawski's challenge soon elicited a rejoinder from Professor Ho, an article published two years later in the same journal entitled "In Defense of Sinicization." In it, he stood by the sinicization thesis and reiterated what he had stated thirty years earlier: "The Manchu court carried out a policy of systematic sinicization, with the implementation of the Ch'eng-Chu (Cheng-Zhu, 程朱) Neo-Confucian orthodoxy as its core, which not only facilitated the metamorphosis of the Manchu tribal-banner state into a unitary centralized empire, but also won the allegiance and dedication of the Confucian elite who saved the 'alien' dynasty by eventually wiping out the ethnic Chinese Taiping rebels in fourteen years (1851-64) of life-and-death struggle."[3]

The exchange between Rawski and Ho created a minor controversy within the field with regard to the sinicization thesis: To what extent did the Manchus, including both rulers and commoners, adopt the ways of life of the Han Chinese? The book under review contributes to the debate. It comes down squarely on the side of Ho and against Rawski as well as others whom the author lumps together as "the New Qing

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2 Evelyn S. Rawski, "Presidential Address: Reenvisioning the Qing: The Significance of the Qing Period in Chinese History," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 55, no. 4 (November 1996): 831, 833, 842.

3 Ping-Ti Ho, "In Defense of Sinicization: A Rebuttal of Evelyn Rawski's 'Reenvisioning the Qing,'" *The Journal of Asian Studies* 57, no. 1 (February 1998): 124.

scholars." In addition to Rawski, these New Qing scholars would include, most prominently, Pamela Kyle Crossley and Mark C. Elliott, and possibly myself. Perhaps the one common element that they all share is the "Manchu-centered perspective" that Rawski advocated.

Pei Huang (黃培) of Youngstown State University in Ohio is well known as the author of *Autocracy at Work: A Study of the Yung-cheng Period, 1723-1735* (1974). His present book is, according to him, the first book-length study of the sinicization of the Manchus. Its aim is "to show how they [the Manchus] adopted Chinese methods of governing and ways of life and what changes occurred among them during the years 1583-1795" (2), that is, from Nurhaci's first victory over his Jurchen rivals in southern Manchuria through the establishment of the Qing state in 1636 and the Manchu invasion of China proper in 1644 to the abdication of the Qianlong emperor.

Huang's book is organized topically. The first chapter on "the ancestry and ethnic composition of the Manchus" focuses on the Jurchens as the ancestral core of the Manchu people, but acknowledges that along the way other ethnic groups were absorbed as well. Consequently, "[d]espite their long ancestral line, the Manchus emerged in 1635 as a new people composed of four ethnic groups: Jurchens, Mongols, Chinese, and Koreans" (54). Chapter 2 traces the rise and triumph of the Manchus in Manchuria, the creation of the Eight Banner organization and the Qing state, and the conquest of China proper under Nurhaci and his two sons, Hong Taiji, and Dorgon.

Chapter 3 examines the "economic forces"—principally agriculture and trade—that early on encouraged the sinicization of the Manchus. The Jurchens were originally hunters, fishers, and gatherers, but by the time they had established themselves in the South Manchurian Plain in the fifteenth century, they had "[i]n all likelihood" become "predominantly farmers" (101). As the Jurchens took to farming, they were able to learn from Chinese fugitives and captives about "the Chinese way of farming" (101), and they soon "developed a way of life similar to that of Chinese

farmers" (118). "The more the progress in Jurchen agriculture, the more the transmission of Chinese culture" (103). Another locale for the transmission of Chinese ways was the frontier markets where "Jurchen and Chinese traders met … exchanging commodities as well as ideas and values that made their products possible" (104). "The more frequent [sic] the Jurchens visited the markets, the more they were exposed to Chinese culture" (108).

Chapter 4 describes two types of inhabitants in pre-conquest Liaodong, or southern Manchuria: frontiersmen and transfrontiersmen. Chinese frontiersmen included those who had been captured and enslaved by the Jurchens; such people "played a unique part in spreading Chinese culture among the Jurchens" (140). Many were enrolled into the Chinese Banner (漢軍 *Hanjun*) units that Hong Taiji had created and "[t] here were countless cases of marriage between the Manchu and the Chinese in the banner system" (141). Transfrontiersmen, as Huang defines the term, differed from mere frontiersmen in that they had crossed the border from one ethnic group to another; in other words, they had "gone native." They would include Chinese who "had adopted the Jurchen way of life" (146), but who nevertheless helped spread Chinese ideas and values among the Jurchens. An example was Dahai (達海), "a famous linguist serving as Nurhaci's secretary who translated Chinese books into Manchu" (148). Aside from Chinese, there were Korean frontiersmen and transfrontiersmen as well and they too "had a role in transmitting Chinese ways of life to the Jurchens because of the close similarity between Korean and Chinese political institutions, religious and ethical concepts, and arts and letters" (155).

Chapter 5 describes the administrative and legal institutions that the early Manchu rulers copied and adapted from Ming China. These institutions, such as the Six Boards and the Great Qing Code, "helped greatly in the sinicization of the Manchus because they functioned in relationship with Chinese norms, mores, and values" (173). Chapter 6, "Transformation of Social Values," looks at some of the social changes

that the Manchus underwent by borrowing, perhaps unconsciously, from the Chinese. These include the gradual abandonment of early marriage, of "ultimogeniture" (i.e., inheritance by younger or youngest sons), and of cremation, the adoption of Chinese-style personal names and, most markedly, the decline of the Manchus' military heritage. "As a consequence of these changes, the Manchus lost their martial virtues and became a privileged, idle, and dissipated class. The transformation of Manchu society completed the changes the administrative and legal institutions [had] left undone" (222).

Finally, Chapters 7 and 8 chronicle the cultural sinicization of the Manchus, as they forgot their native language and instead adopted spoken and written Chinese. Manchu poets, for example, "wrote in Chinese and followed the rules of Chinese poetry" (247). The early Qing rulers also built palaces and "developed [imperial court] ceremonies and regulations after the Ming model" (269), and they embraced the ethical tenets of Song Neo-Confucianism.

This book is, in short, a full-throttle, unabashed defense of Ping-ti Ho's sinicization thesis. Sinicization, according to Huang, had begun before the Manchus overran China proper and, indeed, even before they had acquired the name "Manchu." Thus, when the Jurchens took up agriculture in southern Manchuria and learned the "Chinese way of farming" from captive or refugee Chinese, they were already sinicizing. And the sinicization of the Manchus was all but complete, if not by the time of the Qianlong emperor's abdication in 1795, then by 1865 when an imperial edict by the Tongzhi emperor "allowed them and their officers to leave the banners, choose their occupations, and register as individuals under Chinese officials" (6). The 1865 edict, according to Huang, spelled "the end of the banner system for all intents and purposes" (220). As a result, "[a]doption of the Chinese ways of life by the Manchus meant a reorientation," hence, presumably, the title of the book. "They did not have to be hereditary warriors or confine themselves to Manchu quarters. They were able to join the people surrounding them"

(308).

The book is well sourced and well documented. The bibliography, which runs to thirty-five pages, includes a vast range of published and unpublished archival materials, official compilations, and genealogical records, as well as monographs in Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and English. Only Manchu-language sources are noticeably absent, although the author seems doubtful of their utility or relevance. Referring to the Manchu archives, the author states "While they may contain some important messages, as the 'New Qing' historians speculate, there is also a possibility that these documents do not carry any information about sinicization" (8).[4]

There is, of course, no doubt whatsoever that the Manchus became to a great extent "sinicized." Nevertheless, there were some areas where sinicization never occurred. Even the author takes notice of certain "Manchu traditions [that] lingered in the Qing state structure," notably the Eight Banner system, the Office of the Imperial Household (內務府 *Neiwufu*), and the Court of Dependent Peoples (理藩院 *Lifanyuan*) (303). Yet, there were many other lingering Manchu traditions that Huang either minimizes or ignores altogether, such as the legal distinction between the Manchus (classified as "banner people" [旗人 *qiren*]) and most Han Chinese classified as "civilians" (民 *min*), the "Manchu cities" (滿城 *Mancheng*) in which many, perhaps most, of the banner population were quartered, the institution of dyarchy—or, as Huang calls it, "the principle of numerical equality between Manchu and Chinese appointees" (186)—by which half of all high governmental positions (what I call "ethnic slots") were reserved for officials of bannermen status, and the refusal of Manchu women to adopt the Han Chinese practice of foot-binding. All of these differences continued to the end of the Qing dynasty.

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[4] In the interest of full disclosure, I should confess that, unlike other New Qing historians, I do not read Manchu.

There are also instances of sinicization cited by Huang that were only partially effective. For example, among the "court ceremonies and palace regulations" that the early Qing rulers developed "after the Ming model" were "the court and official robes," which were "also adapted from the Ming originals" (269). In fact, however, the court and official robes of the Qing were quite different in appearance from those of the Ming and reflected the Manchus' equestrian origins.[5]

Another example of partial sinicization concerns Manchu naming practices, which, as Huang writes, "underwent a transformation," with the Manchus adopting Chinese-style personal names "of appropriate sound and with good meanings" (210). "By the end of the dynasty, for both cultural and political reasons, all Manchu clan names had been replaced by Chinese family names" (212). This is an overstatement. For down to the end of the dynasty, most bannermen, unlike the Han Chinese, refrained from using their family name and called themselves only by their personal name—a practice that Huang himself calls attention to in a note about Manchu authors in his bibliography: "the Manchus are always mentioned only by given names" (326).

Yet another area where sinicization was only partially successful was Manchu mourning practices. As the Manchus became sinicized, according to Huang, their mourning practices went "from simplicity to extravagance" and cremation gave way to full body burial (209). Unmentioned, however, is the fact that the Manchus, for whatever reason, did not adopt the Han Chinese practice of mourning the death of a parent for three years (actually, twenty-seven months). Instead, bannermen officials were required to step aside and mourn for only a hundred days, after which they could resume their duties or accept immediate reassignment. The differences between the Manchus and the

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[5] Edward J. M. Rhoads, *Manchus and Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861-1928* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2000), 60-61.

Han in naming and mourning practices, too, persisted down to the eve of the republican revolution.

Huang might argue that such Manchu-Han differences were relatively unimportant, that they were "not enough to prove the separation of the Manchus from the larger population of China" (303). Furthermore, following the 1865 edict, which decreed that "all banner people [*qiren*] who wish to go out and make their own living … be permitted … to venture forth,"[6] Huang writes, "one may assume that the legal and social cleavage between the two groups was further diminished" (304). To the objection, as stated in the reviewer's work *Manchus and Han* that the 1865 edict was merely permissive and did not in fact remove any of the existing Manchu-Han differences, Huang's reply is a dismissive, "It needs to be further studied" (309, n. 6).[7]

Sinicization must also be evaluated in conjunction with its correlate, what the reviewer calls "Manchufication." That is, just as the Han Chinese influenced Manchu ways of life, so did the Manchus affect Han Chinese ways. Huang concedes that "[s]inicization was not a one-way street" and mentions some of the Manchu influences on Han Chinese life: Manchu loanwords in Mandarin Chinese, the adoption by Han Chinese men of the bannerman's riding jacket (馬褂 *magua*), and most obviously, the imposition of the Manchu hairstyle, the queue, upon all adult Han Chinese men (304). Han Chinese women also adopted the Manchu women's gown (旗袍 *qipao*), though this occurred mainly after the Qing dynasty had been overthrown; until then the dress and hairstyle of Manchu women were quite different from those of Han Chinese women. Huang, however, pays little attention to this aspect of the topic. As he insists, "the present study only concerns itself with the Manchu adoption of Chinese culture" (304). Nevertheless, sinicization is a

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6 As quoted in ibid., 35.

7 Rhoads, *Manchus and Han*, 35-36, 68.

relative process, to which a one-sided analysis such as Huang's is ill-suited.

Finally, there is the thorny question of who, after all, were the "Manchus." (There is also the question of who were the "Chinese," but in Huang's book, they are understood, without any explicit discussion, to be the Han Chinese.) Many scholars, including Elliott and the reviewer, define the Manchus by membership in the Eight Banner system. In other words, the "Manchus" may be taken as being synonymous with the "banner people" (*qiren*).[8] As such, they included not only members of the Manchu Eight Banners, but also those of the Mongol Eight Banners and the Hanjun. Huang seems to go along with this definition in some parts of the book. Thus, he acknowledges that the Manchus "were not a homogeneous people" (295), that, as noted above, they were originally "composed of four ethnic groups: Jurchens, Mongols, Chinese, and Koreans" (54) and that, in particular, Chinese frontiersmen in Manchuria, when they were enrolled in the Eight Banners (presumably the Hanjun), "were *treated as Manchus* by the Qing court" (298; emphasis added).

Elsewhere in the book, however, Huang seems to deny that these Chinese bannermen, or Hanjun, should be considered as Manchu at all. Instead, he seems to regard them and their descendants as still inherently Chinese. Thus, when a Hanjun married a member of the Manchu Eight Banners (Baqi Manzhou), Huang treats it as a case of "intermarriage" between two ethnic groups rather than one of "intramarriage" among Manchus. "Intermarriage" as a result "created generations of people of mixed origins, readier than their forebears to adopt Chinese customs and values" (141). Then why should children of such mixed origins necessarily become sinicized? Why could they not just as easily adopt Manchu customs and values and so become "Manchufied?" Huang's

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[8] Rhoads, *Manchus and Han*, 18; Mark C. Elliott, *The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 14-15.

explanation is, “It is true that the Chinese Banners were influenced politically and, to a certain extent, culturally by the Manchus …. But in a prevailing Chinese society … the Chinese Bannermen were able to retain their major traditional values, while the Manchus, in their own best interest, were steadily moving toward the mainstream” (141).

It is by this interpretation that Huang is led to claim that the Kangxi emperor himself was born to a mother of Chinese descent, that in his harem were seventeen “consorts of Chinese descent,” and that of his twenty-four grown sons, seven “were born to Chinese consorts” (153-154). This extraordinary claim, which the emperor probably would not have embraced, is based, in part, on the genealogy of Tong Yangzhen (佟養真, d. 1621), whose family were originally Hanjun, but were later allowed to switch their registration to a Manchu banner. It was Tong Yangzhen’s granddaughter who was the Kangxi emperor’s mother. It turns out, however, that the Tong clan may not have been “Chinese” at all, but were sinicized Jurchens, that is, transfrontiersmen of Jurchen ancestry who had gone over to the Chinese side of the frontier (151, 298). All in all, this book, which is otherwise a thoughtful monograph, epitomizes what Rawski called a “Han nationalist interpretation of China’s past.”

Voice from the North: Resurrecting Regional Identity through the Life and Works of Yi Sihang (1672-1736)

by Sun Joo Kim
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013

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George Kallander
Syracuse University

English-language scholarship produces few monographs on Chosŏn dynasty history each year. A number of factors contribute to this dearth of monographs. From the tightening of budgets among academic publishers and the limited number of graduate students doing premodern or early modern Korea, to the small number of universities hiring scholars researching the era, the field of Chosŏn dynasty history outside of Korea is constrained. Within this small field, however, Harvard University Professor Sun Joo Kim has become one of the preeminent scholars writing in English. As the follow up to her first monograph *Marginality and Subversion in Korea: The Hong Kyŏngnae Rebellion of 1812* (University of Washington Press, 2007) and her edited volume *The Northern Region of Korea: History, Identity, and Culture* (University of Washington Press, 2010), *Voice from the North* is a brilliant piece of scholarship that breaks new ground in English language studies of the Chosŏn dynasty.

Kim's work examines the contest for power among local elites and the center. It is part of the shift of scholarly attention from the center of political and cultural power to the periphery. By deploying a micro view

of a prominent northern scholar, she uncovers the way local literati responded to discrimination from the center and carved out their own power structures in the countryside. Following the life and works of Yi Sihang (1672-1736) of P'yŏngan Province, the work traces the way northern scholars, such as Yi, challenged dominant stereotypes that depicted the north as barbaric, backward, and uncivilized. These regional elites could not attain high positions at the highest levels of the government because of the strong grip capital elites held over access to government posts. But Yi and others around him used writing (prose, poetry, memorials, and tomb inscriptions, for instance) to challenge central discrimination and, in so doing, helped foster an identity not based upon class or other social or economic hierarchies, but upon region of birth.

The book is a concise study, consisting of four chapters with an introduction and conclusion, amounting to 153 pages of analysis. The remaining fifty pages hold two appendixes, extensive notes, a glossary of the *hanmun* (literary Chinese), and a thorough bibliography. In Chapter One, "Remembering Yi Sihang, a Local Elite of Significance," Kim begins her study by examining the life and works of Yi Sihang. Through a meticulous examination of "biographies (*haengjang*), tomb stele inscriptions (*myogalmyŏng*), and genealogies" (15), she traces the lives of Yi Sihang and those regional elite families around him. What emerges from her research is that Yi Sihang epitomized the complexities of the Yangban. He was wealthy, owning several properties passed down to him from his parents and his father-in-law, and he also "accumulated more assets during his service as an official" (44). Yet he was also a Confucian who lived a frugal lifestyle, caring "only about his studies" and using his wealth and status to provide food to the poor, "sick and hungry" (44). He even supported his many relatives. As part of his Confucian worldview, Yi Sihang established a village-level school with the help of other local yangban to support education because "Sihang believed that everyone was capable of learning, regardless of his inborn nature or native place" (46).

While Chapter One establishes Yi Sihang's private life, Chapter Two, "Reciting Life," analyzes his public works to understand how his reputation as a literary scholar brought him close to power in Seoul. We learn that this flirtation with the center was temporary as discrimination against the north prevented him from building status in the capital. As a young student, Yi Sihang studied under such masters as Kim Ku (1649-1704), "a renowned scholar and official who was the magistrate" of a nearby region at the time (58). He passed one state exam after another, attaining the *munkwa* at the age of twenty-eight, but his degree was revoked because of accusations of massive cheating in the scandal of 1699. Kim describes the scandal in terms of the factional struggles of the Chosŏn dynasty as the capital elite intended to consolidate their power at the expense of outside candidates such as Yi. Once his degree was reinstated, however, Yi began his formal career in the government. His list of positions included a traineeship at the Royal Confucian Academy, special commissioner to Kyŏngsang Province, a provincial post in Unsan, section chief in the Ministry of Military Affairs, and a position in a tributary mission to China in 1728.

Chapter Three, "Defending Regional Elite Identity and Culture," extends the themes from the previous chapter. Here, Kim succinctly restates the barriers for men such as Yi Sihang: "Literati from P'yŏngan Province in the late Chosŏn period had long been the target of political and social discrimination by the central elites" (101). But Yi and other literati from his region attempted to counter such discrimination through collective action. One of the more important aspects of this collective regional movement revolved around serious accusations a Royal Secret Inspector leveled against the province in 1714. After accusing them of transgressing Confucian values as barbarians and wild animals, the inspector pleaded with the court to ban local students from taking the state examination as punishment. Such regional discrimination, however, "did not begin with" the inspector, but that "bureaucrats from the center criticized various cultural practices and local conventions that were not

in line with those prescribed by Confucian ideals" (103). Yi Sihang penned the response to the accusations, but he was supported by "all incumbent civil and military officials from P'yŏngan Province who were serving at court" (106). In this response, Yi identified the "slander" as "nothing but retaliation born of personal and familial grudges against the people of P'yŏngan Province" (115). Kim argues that factionalism, for which this period of the Chosŏn dynasty is infamous, did not undermine this "collective movement" (107), suggesting that regional identity trumped political association. Kim interprets this memorial as "egalitarian" (116) in nature and represents local collective resistance to "a process of culturally taming and 'civilizing' marginal people so that they would conform to the ideal set by the center" (118).

In "Invoking the Memory of Kim Kyŏngsŏ," Chapter Four, Kim continues this thread of her argument by examining the collection and publication of histories and other public writings. These "cultural projects" (119) were intended to foster local pride around northern heroes. By looking at the case of Kim Kyŏngsŏ, a general in the 1619 Ming-Chosŏn battles against the Manchu, she illuminates the contested nature of memory, the push and the pull between those who constructed public memory in Seoul and those who attempted to counter this image in the provinces. She states: "I weigh existing narratives … not solely to judge which record is correct but to highlight how historical records can tell us more than the stories written down" (122). Doing so will "help us understand how history was constructed, contested, and reconstructed over and over again" (122). Wanting to curtail the growing military and political power of the Later Jin (the Manchu), Ming dynasty China called upon Chosŏn to deploy troops. Within the framework of the tributary relationship and repaying Ming assistance during the Japanese invasion of the 1590s, the Korean court dispatched roughly 20,000 men, including a crack squad of musket-wielding soldiers. However, the Later Jin routed these Ming and Chosŏn troops, decimating many Korean units. In the fighting, certain Chosŏn generals survived, such as Kim Kyŏngsŏ, a

native of P'yŏngan Province, while others perished in combat such as Kim Ungha. Later hagiographies of Kim Ungha elevated him to the rank of national hero while disparaging those generals who supposedly surrendered to the enemy, survived the battle, and hence were national traitors. Offended by such an interpretation, local P'yŏngan elite rallied to the defense of the image of Kim Kyŏngsŏ, convincing the king to rehabilitate him. By then, however, the image of Kim Kyŏngsŏ as "a man of surrender" (134) was too deeply imbedded in the cultural memory of the dynasty. To further contest this negative image, Yi Sihang wrote poetry in praise of Kim Kyŏngsŏ and a biographical record to exonerate him. Later, other local Confucian officials continued this movement and finally succeeded in convincing the court in 1792 to construct a commemorative shrine for him that would "upgrade [him] to national hero" (139). Local heroes such as Kim Kyŏngsŏ were important because their images were invoked to construct regional identity in order to resist central discrimination.

Voices from the North is much more than merely a study of a single figure. It provides important resources and background on the social, political, economic, and international conditions of mid-Chosŏn history impossible to find in English language scholarship. One example of the breadth of the study relates to marriage practices. Kim devotes a section of Chapter One to uxorilocality. This earlier marriage custom, in which husbands moved into the homes of their in-laws, raised their children in this setting, and permitted wives to inherit the property of their parents, is believed to have been eradicated by the Confucianizaton of Korea in the first half of the dynasty. However, Kim disputes this view. The father of Yi Sihang, for instance, entered into an uxorilocal marriage in the late seventeenth century after Yi Sihang's mother "begged her father-in-law" to permit the arrangement (37). Not only was their move an important filial gesture, but it would ensure financial security as she was the only child and hence, she and her husband would inherit their property and wealth. Yi Sihang too "established uxorilocal residence in P'yongyang

and lived with his in-laws until they died" (39). Kim explains how uxorilocality provided economic and social privileges through inheritance of land and property, especially "a much more desirable home" in the important city of P'yŏngyang. All these sections and subsections of her study help illuminate mid-Chosŏn life on the margins.

Kim's work also helps us think about the power of central authority in ways other than the control of the examination system or the monopolization of bureaucratic appointment. For instance, elite families of Seoul flexed their cultural muscles by collecting "thousands of books, many of which were imported from China" as well as undertaking other practices, such as collecting Chinese antiques and practicing horticulture (49). Kim writes of these as more than just pastimes. For her, they are ways powerful elite families could "facilitate … social networking" (49), building contacts and influence to consolidate their hold over politics.

To offer one minor critique of the monograph, I found the Introduction slightly defensive. As part of her scholarly frame for the study, Kim defends the kind of history she is undertaking with language that comes across as overly dramatic at times. For example, she seeks to "rescue a people and a region that have been crushed to insignificance" (9). The study of such "trivial" people as Yi Sihang and the events of his life, she explains, help illuminate "a sea of changes during his lifetime" (10). All of this is very true, but the tone of her language reveals a defensiveness, a need to explain why she wrote the book. To me, the superb quality of her writing style, the intricate weaving of her arguments, and the meticulous depth and breadth of her research are all the justification she needs to demonstrate that "the microhistorical investigation of a person" (7) matters.

Voice from the North is an important addition to Korean historiography. Written for the specialist in Korean history, it can be dense and theoretical at times, and Kim's arguments are often in dialogue with other studies of the Chosŏn era. Graduate students working in Korean and East Asian history must read it. The monograph will also be of

interest to historians of China, Japan, and those outside East Asian Studies, especially those who do similar work in microhistory.

Völkerrechtsdenken und Außenpolitik in Japan, 1919-1960

by Urs Matthias Zachmann
Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos, 2013

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Juljan Biontino
Seoul National University

It is indeed a rare opportunity to find monographs on the legal history of East Asian countries written outside of the respective country. In 2005, the publication of Alexis Dudden's *Japan's Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power* started to foster an interest in legal issues among scholars of Japanese and Korean history. In 2012, Marie Seong-hak Kim's *Law and Custom in Korea: Comparative Legal History* first tried to fully reconcile the disciplines of history, law, and area studies, an approach shared by the title under review here. This German title, *Völkerrechtsdenken und Außenpolitik in Japan, 1919-1960* roughly translates into English as *The Thought of International Law and Foreign Policy in Japan, 1919-1960*. Even though "Japan" is clearly identifiable as the primary focus of the book, the topic still indicates that Korea, having been a part of the Japanese Empire between 1910 and 1945, as well as China, another target of Japanese expansionism, play a role. However, it is not necessarily for its regional focus that this book might be of interest to the readers of East Asian history. Nor is it for the often-mentioned, deep-running connections on the basic grasp of law historically shared between Germany, Japan, and Korea. It is rather the interdisciplinary approach of this work that delivers

an analysis of legal professional discourse and its historical evolution. Urs Matthias Zachmann seeks to interpret this discourse in terms of political-intellectual history (*sasangsa*), which is what makes this work shed new light on the historical development of Japanese-Korean-Chinese relations, a topic which has continually received much scholarly attention in Korea, as well.[1]

Zachmann has held the Handa Chair in Japanese-Chinese Relations in the Department of Asian Studies at the University of Edinburgh since 2011. In 2006, he received his doctoral degree in Japanese Studies from the University of Heidelberg, and also has a background in Chinese Studies and in Legal Studies. His thesis on Sino-Japanese relations in the late Meiji and Qing periods was published into a monograph in English as *China and Japan in the Late Meiji Period: China Policy and the Japanese Discourse on National Identity, 1895-1904* in 2009 and awarded the JaDe prize the following year. This prize is a German distinction for outstanding accomplishments in Japanese-German Studies. In 2010, Zachmann completed his habilitation in Japanese Studies at the University of Munich, and the publication under review here is the academic result of this effort.

Published in German as part of the series "Studies in the History of International Law" by Nomos, the 419 pages of *Völkerrechtsdenken und Außenpolitik in Japan, 1919-1960* are divided into six chapters framed between an introduction and a conclusion. Further division into numerous subchapters help the reader to draw necessary comparisons between individual chapters, but they also constantly reveal the origins of this work as a habilitation dissertation. The introduction sets the stage by first explaining the contemporary status of law and order in terms of international law and offers a short overview of its history and Japan's

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[1] To offer a few examples, Kim Gi-hyeok, *Geundae Hanjungil gwangyesa* (Seoul: Yeonse Daehakkyo Chulpansa, 2007); Kim Yong-gu, *Manguk gongbeop* (Seoul: Sohwa, 2008); and Choi Deok-su, *Joyak euro bon Hanguk geundaesa* (Seoul: Yeollin chaekdeul, 2010).

role in its development. International law, for which there is no absolute definition, goes beyond the sovereignty of a single nation-state. Its basic principles originated from the traditional conception of states in Europe, but after the Ottoman Empire and Japan successively joined the community of countries abiding by international law its character became increasingly universal. Japan came to be the only non-western nation among the great powers that had a say in deciding the direction international law should take and earned a certain reputation for testing the law with the arousal of "incidents" as small-scale conflicts. The author poignantly shows that Japan often used the collapse of state authority in its neighboring states to legitimize its interventions, substantiating its expansionist efforts with a "humanitarian responsibility" of protecting weaker states and thus using the international law of the day to its advantage.

By approaching the topic from the standpoint of intellectual history, the author takes into account recent developments in legal history. He further claims that international law, as the youngest field of legal studies within as well as outside Europe, is dominated by a strong case of eurocentrism. The central assumption of his inquiry, which led to the chosen timeframe of 1919-1960, is that the passive stance of Japanese specialists taking part in the discussion about international law in that period was not bound by eurocentrism and that the scholars under discussion were actively involved in constructing Japanese foreign policy after 1945. This application of global discourse on international law to the Japanese case only from the onset of the Cold War and the United States-Japanese security treaties fell back to passivity (35).

The first chapter, "Foreign Policy and International Law in Japan, 1603-1910," however, belies the book's title in terms of its timeframe. The reader will find this section to be an extended introduction to the book's main argument. Beginning from the Edo period, Zachmann re-narrates well-known facts regarding Tokugawa foreign policy to conclude that Japan at the dawn of the Meiji period had not been a *tabula*

rasa (41) with regard to international law. He further adds a broad description of foreign policy during the Bakumatsu and Meiji periods, displaying the advent of the treaty port system in East Asia and how Japan became part of it. Finally, Zachmann analyzes the motivations behind foreign policies in the Meiji period between 1871 and 1910, when Japan extended its colonial grasp on Taiwan and Korea.

Here, the author travels beyond the usual narrative of unequal treaties in showing the legal background and legal elements that turned these treaties into their unequal state not only in terms of perception, but also in terms of their entire nature. The introductory remarks are closed with a historical overview of international law in Japan, highlighting the establishment of the Study Group for International Law (*Kokusaihō gakkai*) in 1897 (76). The first chapter's conclusion outlines in three cumulative stages aspects of international law in Japan's development of its foreign policy: a) acquisition of territory (*landnahme*) in the case of Taiwan in 1874; b) recognition/annexation of states in the case of Korea in 1876 and in 1910; and, finally, c) war and peace. Not only in the wars with China and Russia, but also from participating in the war-like subduing of the Boxer Uprising was Japan able to prove itself as the first and only Asian power that had to be admitted to the peace conventions of The Hague in 1899 and 1907. This was at a time when the right to war was still acknowledged by international law, which is what reinforced the Japanese conviction that it was necessary to abide by the rules of how to conduct modern warfare.

The next two chapters both cover war and order in the international realm that was established by the Washington and Versailles conferences. While the second chapter focuses on Japan and the League of Nations, the third chapter focuses on the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928 and its implications for Japan. The world system established in post-Napoleonic Europe came to an end after World War I. The Versailles Peace Conference and the creation of the League of Nations now established a new stage in international law, further forbidding Japan from playing out

its bellicosity and military prowess. Indeed, Japanese involvement in World War I was limited as the Russo-Japanese War was the last concentrated military action for Japan until the eruption of the Asia-Pacific War in 1941 (88). The Briand-Kellogg Pact, a sharp renunciation of war as a means to resolve conflicts among states, was also signed by Japan as a member of the international community among a long list of other signatory countries and further restricted Japan's ability to use war rhetoric.

The thread that weaves all of the following chapters together then emerges as the author traces the Japanese discourse on international law by introducing the works of Japanese scholars active in the periods under research. The discourse during the Taishō period and the early Shōwa period was dominated by two generations of scholars from Tokyo Imperial University, Tachi Sakutarō (1874-1943) and Yokota Kisaburō (1896-1993), both of whom held very different viewpoints on the development of the international law of their times. While Tachi, who had participated in the Versailles Conference, did not see any hindrance for Japan in terms of its right to war, Yokota stood rather firmly on the new stance of war as a crime and an illegal act. In a time marked by the break from a flat model of a community of states under international law to a more hierarchically structured community centered around the League of Nations, this discourse culminated in the argument of war as an indispensable element in an imperfect global community in the wake of the Briand-Kellogg Pact's conclusion. The corresponding restriction in state authority was only reluctantly accepted by Japan. It is in this context that the fundamental critique by Taoka Ryōichi (1898-1985) on the Kellogg Pact coincided in a timely way with the Japanese assault on Manchuria.

The fourth chapter deals with the issue Zachmann calls the "perhaps most irrational decision in Japanese Foreign policy of the Modern period" (347), the Manchurian Incident of 1931 and Japan's decision to leave the League of Nations in 1933 due to an argument

regarding the international acknowledgment of Manzhouguo. The disparity between the disadvantage Japan felt and its objectively dominant position in Northeast Asia may only partially explain Japan's behavior. Also, there had been no treaty that solved basic issues between Japan and China as the Locarno Treaty did for Europe. Along with an offering of the background on Japan's military position in Manchuria, the author reviews reactions of the Japanese public, in which Manchuria was already acknowledged as Japan's "lifeline" (186). Manchuria did indeed only bear a rather abstract value to the Japanese public prior to the Russo-Japanese War, but it was thereafter refashioned into a territory where Japanese ancestors had sacrificed their lives to protect China and Korea. Furthermore, Manchuria also had become a mythical symbol of a new, inexhaustible fountain of natural resources (187).

In terms of the discourse on international law, Japanese scholars had to either defend or criticize Japanese behavior. Tachi developed the concept of a right to national self-defense that already exhibited a new understanding for what was later to become a regional approach to international law. In the meantime, his pupil Yokota adhered to a stricter interpretation of the law in use, criticizing not only the excessive behavior of the Japanese military in Manchuria, but also defending the League of Nations' stance. However, due to social pressure, Yokota soon gave in to the necessity of the times and further toned down his voice. In short, the overall discourse shifted from an attempt at a "Japanese Monroe Doctrine" toward explanations of China's status as a non-entity in order to build up a new "international community" inherent to Japan. The Manchurian crisis became the most crucial challenge for Japanese international law studies, now responsible for drafting and backing a new order in East Asia in terms of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. In analyzing the work of Yasui Kaoru (1907-1980), the author finds a new universalism/cosmopolitanism that actually contradicted the rising ultra-militarism of the time. The author concludes the fourth chapter by further interpreting Japan's behavior as a logical result of the

fact that the newly established institutions of international law, namely the League of Nations and the Briand-Kellogg Pact, did suffer from a global loss of authority during that time.

The fifth chapter deals with thoughts on order and the law of war during the Asia-Pacific War of 1937-1945. Zachmann outlines Japan's project of creating its own regional "East Asian" order of international law. The background and intellectual foundations of such an agenda are first laid out. Due to the presence of several actors, among which there were those who held the often-cited symposia for "overcoming modernity" (*kindai no chōkoku*), the League of Nations was obviously downplayed in Japan as a "European" league, which was a region so very different from Japan and therefore could not be a solution for East Asia. To those outside the field of law, "regional" international law might seem paradoxical, but the author's concise explanations have made it easy to understand as a concept counter to universal international law and one recognizing that geographical necessity might require smaller areas of application. In this context, the above mentioned Kokusaihō gakkai is presented as a think tank backed by all the prominent *zaibatsu* conglomerates of the day. The example of Tabata Shigejirō (1911-2001) further shows that the times did not at all allow much room for different thinking. In a recursion of Yasui, Zachmann is also able to show that it was only after a stage of ideological conversion (*tenkō*) that Yasui gained his reputation as the one who paved the way for the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Despite a difference in their positions and approaches, leading scholars of the day all took part in a discourse on international law that defended Japan's right to wage war, a right it was already exercising through its many campaigns in the Asia Pacific area. In his review of works by such scholars, citing the stance of Tachi Zachmann largely concludes that Japan had been avoiding infringement of the Briand-Kellog Pact by not issuing a declaration of war against China. Examining the discourse in its entirety reveals that ultranationalist positions were merely a fragment of the overall spectrum. Other

cornerstones were set by the liberal relativism in international law as expressed by Kiyosawa Kiyoshi (1890-1945) and the condemnation of air warfare by Taoka in opposition to Tachi. Finally, Yokota warned what the "total war" occurring at that time would mean for international law, namely the end of the traditional law of war that could inevitably come into conflict with the right of war in general. Yet, less critical than before, Yokota on the other hand downplayed Japan's breaches of international law by claiming and emphasizing that such breaches had been made on all sides.

The sixth chapter deals with the unavoidable defeat of Japan in 1945 and reviews the discourses among scholars of international law in dealing with issues of the lost war and the Japanese security dilemma that led to the second United States-Japanese Security Treaty in 1960. Here, Zachmann evaluates Japanese foreign policy since 1868 as one of indisputable aggressiveness, but one also characterized by a strong defensive "siege" mentality. Before the war, only a minority, such as Ishibashi Tanzan (1884-1973), declared the necessity for a "small Japan" (*shō Nihon*). Then during the wake of radical change following the occupation of Japan, demilitarization and democratization on behalf of the United States was when most of the erstwhile "rightist" scholars of international law found their thinking closer to the prewar minority (282). In tracing the question of whether these turnabouts were personal decisions or only necessitated by political conditions of the time, Zachmann further reviews the ongoing discourse among scholars of international law. After mentioning the fates of the aforementioned scholars, Zachmann explains their reactions to the new situation. In fact, the Korean War (1950-1953) was central to the argument concerning Japan's national security and was seen as a baneful example of all future conflicts in East Asia. The Korean conflict led to the integration of Japan into a new military system following the American "reverse course" that turned Japan from foe to friend in a matter of a few years. While this was received with mixed feelings among the aforementioned scholars,

Japan's entry into the United Nations, its re-entrance into the international community, so to speak, was largely supported. However, Tabata warned that the United Nations was no guarantor of security, but simply a forum for peaceful resolution of conflicts. Zachmann duly takes note of how this reentry into the international law arena was accompanied by an inward turn on behalf of Japan, although this may be argued to be too narrow a consideration of international law and failing to see Japan's inward turn in a more complex and macroscopic way. Japan was allowed to keep its emperor system, and despite the all-encompassing change of values that the system went through, this meant a great continuity. On the other hand, Japan had postulated during the colonial period a common ancestor theory with Korea as another means to justify imperial rule. However, after the war, scholars admitted that their research had been biased, and Japan came to embrace a belief in an ethnic homogeneity that further justified its turn inward. This turn also meant that Japan, able to escape a national division, would not have to take responsibility for Korea's division or for the Korean War. These questions might not have been points of concern for the book under review here while it was being written, but they nonetheless seem quite striking and remarkable if one considers recent debates about the abolition of Article 9 and the role of the Japanese Self-Defense Force.

Zachmann's final inquiry is focused on the reactions of Japanese scholars of international law to the Tokyo war crimes trials and the Shimoda Ryūichi case, which brought the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to court in Japan in 1963. While Japanese specialists in international law were rather silent about the Tokyo War Crime Trial (336), at the trial concerning the legality of the atomic bombings the court even requested evaluations from Tabata, Yasui, and a student of Yokota. They all concluded that the new weapons themselves did not violate international law, but their usage violated international law: Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not military bases, and only a targeted bombardment of military facilities should have been allowed—an

important difference from their writings during the war.

In the concluding chapter, Zachmann offers a summary of his research results, and an overall assessment of and outlook upon further development of international law. Japan's defeat and the dawning of the Cold War threw Japan back into the Western order of international law. Japanese specialists went through this change in partly active roles and sometimes in passive roles, but they were always aware of the ideological tone of the day (345). The demands of the time may have forced Japanese specialists to radically change their direction, but Zachmann also managed to trace remarkably consistent strings of argument. It is only at this point that the author re-evaluates the fact that Japan did not declare war on China with the motive of maintaining American support. Finally, the author characterizes the functions of international law as a welcome force that enabled Japan to unfold its power in East Asia, but also as a signal of Japanese willingness to cooperate with Western powers (354).

After all, Zachmann could challenge the established view of Japanese scholars of international law prior to 1945 as pragmatic, state-oriented, Eurocentric, and passive. The first two points are valid only when the practical functions of international law are considered, and these were much more actively used than is commonly acknowledged. Up until now, what had often been understood as a schematic antagonism of "Ampo realism" and pacifist idealism on behalf of the post-war conclusion cannot be upheld considering the continuities in the thinking of the specialists Zachmann selected for his research.

Zachmann's juxtaposition of thought on international law and thought on Japanese foreign policy at the same time is a well-working synthesis of events that occurred over the period under research and how they were perceived and dealt with by the Japanese community regarding international law. Sometimes, it seems as though an analysis of discourses running even deeper would have been feasible and more revealing, and that valuable pages of the book were spent on lengthy

descriptions of background information already well-known to scholars of Japanese history. However, those with a background in law might feel similarly regarding the author's explanation of juristic situations. Thus, the author paid great heed to a broad range of readers, making the book accessible to those who do not fully share his disciplinary background. This can hardly be seen as a shortcoming since the amount of new knowledge the book offers is enormous.

Considering the historical as well as the contemporary roles of international law, the reviewer cannot help but feel how much Japan and Germany still ground themselves on what is considered the very first evolutionary step of martial law, namely that of a "just war" (*bellum iustum*) representative of the middle ages. On this point, the author concludes that the decision to wage war may have been the highest expression of national sovereignty and thus not at all justifiable according to international law. The fundamental rejection of wars of aggression as we find it in today's international law was steeled through historical experience. The book reviewed here can thus be read as an appreciation of international law's contribution to a peaceful future.

Constructing East Asia: Technology, Ideology, and Empire in Japan's Wartime Era, 1931-1945

by Aaron Stephen Moore
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013

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Miriam Kingsberg
University of Colorado Boulder

Aaron Stephen Moore's *Constructing East Asia: Technology, Ideology, and Empire in Japan's Wartime Era, 1931-1945* offers a conceptual history of technology (J. *gijutsu*) during the Fifteen Years' War as a foundation for understanding contemporary Japan's enormous investment in science, planned development, and overseas aid. Rather than imposing his own definition of *gijutsu*, Moore proposes the "technological imaginary" as his object of analysis. Defining this concept as the "ways that different groups invested the term 'technology' with ideological meaning and vision" (3), he particularly focuses on the Marxist and leftist intellectuals, engineers, technocrats, and reform bureaucrats who sculpted Japan's empire in Northeast Asia. Moore argues that the troubling philosophical and material legacies of these groups remain foundational to Japanese impressions of *gijutsu* today, despite generally positive postwar perceptions of technology as a progressive engine of innovation, prosperity, equality, and even democracy. Rooting contemporary perspectives in the "dark valley" of the fascist era, Moore situates his work within a widening current of "transwar" scholarship emphasizing continuity in Japanese society, politics, and the economy across the

traditional chronological breaking point of 1945.

The representation of wartime Japan as "fascist" has long provoked scholars of the modern period. Consonant with current historiographical trends, Moore acknowledges the distinctiveness of the Japanese case but maintains the usefulness of a common label for elements of Italian, German, Soviet, American, British, and French sociopolitical organization in the 1930s and early 1940s. In his definition, fascism constitutes "an ideology and mode of power translated globally into national contexts that combined anti-modern and modern elements for the revolutionary transformation and mobilization of society" (8). Technology, "modernity's most visible product" (3) and a buzzword of the wartime era, offers a particularly useful site for evaluating the impact of expansionism, imperialism, authoritarianism, spiritualism, universalism, and massification, as well as ideas of progress and rationality. While Moore upholds historian Harry Harootunian's representation of fascism as a "'molecular or micropolitical power' throughout everyday life" (9), the technological imaginary in his depiction is strictly superhuman. *Gijutsu* includes solely monumental productions: cities, dams, industrial plants, highways, and the like. New household and individual consumer technologies (such as the sewing machine in Andrew Gordon's recent *Fabricating Consumers*) do not figure within the developmental narrative of a nation mobilizing for war.[1]

Each chapter in Moore's work explores the technological imaginary from the collective standpoint of a different professional or intellectual group. The author begins with Marxists and leftists, who were inspired by the incorporation of science and technology into everyday life in the Soviet Union in the 1920s. Despite the incompatibility of leftist ideologies and state dogmas, the author argues, proponents of both came

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1 Andrew Gordon, *Fabricating Consumers: The Sewing Machine in Modern Japan* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011).

to share a surprisingly similar perspective on technology. From a materialist view of *gijutsu* as physical artifacts of capitalist production, Marxists shifted to a more dynamic stance that celebrated economic, social, and cultural processes that organized all aspects of life, mobilized the masses, and "created" East Asia.

Through the work of Aikawa Haruki (real name: Yanami Hisao, 1909-1953), a leading wartime theorist of technology, Moore explores the role of *gijutsu* in plans for imperial Japan's Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. As a contributor to various technocratic journals and institutions, Aikawa supported the state's effort to centralize science policy, promote the technical education of society, and establish a "Japanese" engineering tradition independent of Western models and based on colonial resources. In addition to mobilizing the empire for war, technology might serve to overcome the evils and contradictions of capitalism and advance the nation along its prescribed revolutionary path to socialism. Countering common perceptions of technology as "something alienated from human life" (53), Aikawa also wrote extensively on *gijutsu* in culture, especially film (a medium in which he dabbled). Like his contemporary Walter Benjamin of the Frankfurt School, he defended mechanical reproduction as the basis of original art reflecting the mass psyche in the modern age—"new *sake* for a new flask," in his words (54).

In 1936, police arrested Aikawa along with thirty-two alleged communist associates. Despite confessing and renouncing all political activity, he never completed the process of "conversion" (J. *tenkō*) to state orthodoxy. Drafted in the final months of World War II, Aikawa deserted to the USSR. Following the defeat of imperial Japan, he participated in the socialist "reeducation" of co-national prisoners of war in Soviet gulags until his death from illness and exhaustion. The idea of technology, Moore concludes, enabled Aikawa to reconcile his own lifelong belief in socialism with the ultra-nationalism demanded of him by the Japanese state.

Moore's second chapter exposes the technological imaginary from the standpoint of engineers. Miyamoto Takenosuke (1892-1941), an engineer in the Japanese Home Ministry who later served on the Asia Development Board and Cabinet Planning Board, supplied philosophical leadership to the profession as a founding member of the Kōjin Club. This organization, also treated in Hiromi Mizuno's *Science for the Empire* (2009) was established in 1920 with the goal of raising the income and status of engineers in a society where law graduates tended to monopolize power and prestige.[2] The Kōjin Club promoted technology as a force for national progress through rational planning and inclusive development. In the 1930s, Miyamoto set forth the idea of "comprehensive technology" (J. *sōgō gijutsu*) to describe planned civil engineering projects and strategic centralized policymaking on the Asian continent that aspired to "uplift" colonial subjects through efficient social management (in contrast to capitalism, an "imprecise" way of organizing production and distribution). For Miyamoto, comprehensive technology involved state cultivation of natural resources, labor, and heavy industry on the mainland for the mutual prosperity of China and Japan. In commentaries on the imperial government's "Outline for a New Order of Science and Technology" (1941), he insisted on a complementary connection between the Japanese and Chinese economies and the latter's potential and eagerness for development. War, to him, obstructed technological progress by alienating the Chinese people from their Japanese occupiers. As Moore shows, although the engineers' vision of comprehensive technology both depended upon and advanced Japanese imperialism in China, they themselves did not necessarily understand their purpose in these terms.

Moore next examines the intentions and achievements of engineers

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[2] Hiromi Mizuno, *Science for the Empire: Scientific Nationalism in Modern Japan* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 19-42.

and technocrats through case studies of specific infrastructural interventions. In Chapter 3, "Constructing the Continent," he explores the conception and implementation of the Liao River Improvement Project in southern Manchuria, the Dadong industrial zone on the Korean side of the Yalu River, and "garden city" planning in Beijing. The fourth chapter takes up two more examples of comprehensive technology under Japanese imperialism: the Sup'ung (Suihō) Dam and the Fengman (Hōman) Dam. Easily the most fascinating and original material in the book, these case studies illuminate the global challenge of water management in the early twentieth century, as well as the significance of the technological imaginary in fascist Japan and its legacy of developmentalism throughout Asia. Built in the context of total war in the late 1930s and early 1940s, the dams claimed a stunning volume of resources, including, in the case of Fengman, half of the annual cement output of Manchukuo. Ranking among the world's largest hydro engineering projects, they were Asia's first multipurpose dams, built to produce cheap and abundant electricity for local industrialization, hold back floodwaters, facilitate river transport, irrigate the fields of Japanese migrant farmers, stabilize the clean water supply, expand fisheries, and even attract tourists. They also functioned as a (literally) concrete justification of the benefits and legitimacy of Japanese power and superiority.

Both dams were located in the borderlands of Manchukuo, where, Moore argues, the shift to a militarized bloc economy led bureaucrats and engineers to articulate a systematic conception of an integrated technological empire. Accordingly, it was in the "puppet state" that technology was given its widest rein in reshaping social, political, and economic life. As scholars such as Louise Young have pointed out, authoritarian politics in Manchukuo enabled Japanese planners to circumvent constraints on innovation in the home islands, including bureaucratic infighting, safeguards of representative government and human rights, and the formulation of science policy by non-scientists.

Moore checks the notion of a "brave new empire" of unfettered possibilities by showing that, even on the continent, engineers never exercised a free hand over their projects. Monumental technologies were not the result of straightforward application of vision to context, but "messy effects" (152) of inexperience, unexpected events, uncooperative populations, clashing and unstable interests, and the implacable challenges of an unfamiliar environment. One engineer memorably likened construction to a "sumo match with nature" (168), acknowledging the uncertainty of outcomes. High modernist planning was never as "durable, systematic, and coherent" (104) as it appeared; rather, its most salient features were ambiguity, contradiction, and contingency. The concealment of these "irrational" realities, it would appear, was also a characteristic of the technological imaginary of wartime Japan.

Environmental engineering in Manchukuo aspired to create a maximally productive and creative utopia, yet the construction process was marked by racism, inequality, exploitation, and violence. Moore's discussion of the treatment of the laborers who built the Sup'ung and Fengman dams spares no details, from the nightly distribution of morphine tablets to Chinese conscripts and prisoners of war forced to shift frozen earth in temperatures as low as minus forty degrees Celsius; to mass death from contagious disease, accidents, suicide, and failed attempts to escape or revolt; to interment in "pits of ten thousand corpses" (C. *wan ren keng*). As one Japanese bureaucrat stated at his trial for war crimes in China in 1954, comprehensive development sought to transform not only the environment, but also workers into "machinic extensions of the Japanese Imperial Army; nonhuman automatons absolutely obedient" (19). Beyond this depiction of abuse and suffering, however, Moore's account of dam-building never quite leaves the realm of the imaginary. Issues including long-term environmental effects, the experiences of users, the training and participation of expert Chinese, and costs and financing are largely unexplored.

Following the discussion of state engineers and technocrats, the fifth (and last) chapter of the book, "Designing the Social Mechanism," focuses on Japan's reform ("renovationist") bureaucrats (J. *kakushin kanryō*). With the support of the Japanese military, this close-knit group of officials incorporated technology into their goal of comprehensive state planning. Corporatist parties, associations, and unions served as critical linkages of a politically, socially, and economically integrated nation and empire. Through these institutions, reform bureaucrats hoped to eliminate the inequalities of laissez-faire capitalism and cultivate self-sufficiency in preparation for total war in the late 1930s. Like many engineers, reform bureaucrats were educated predominantly at Tokyo Imperial University, influenced by Marxism in the 1920s, and attracted to *gijutsu* as a means of increasing their status and influence in Japan, Manchukuo, and beyond.

Building on historian Janis Mimura's *Planning for Empire* (2011), Moore depicts the reform bureaucrats as architects of "techno-fascism": "a fusion of technical rationality, comprehensive planning, and modern values of productivity and efficiency with ethnic nationalism and right-wing ideologies of organicism" (192). Rather than dismissing techno-fascism as a top-down, coercive mode of power, Moore draws attention to its ambitions to restructure society naturally through the reconfiguration of creative processes.[3] The distinguishing feature of the reform bureaucrats, the author argues, was their emphasis on the Japanese "national spirit" (J. *seishin*) as the wellspring of technology, social organization, and life itself. By exploring the infusion of *gijutsu* with a metaphysical dimension, Moore connects the technological imaginary to other utopian projects of the late wartime period, including Pan-Asianism, the quest to "overcome modernity," and the New Order in

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[3] Janis Mimura, *Planning for Empire: Reform Bureaucrats and the Japanese Wartime State* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011).

East Asia and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. He further implicates the reform bureaucrats in a vision of material progress at all costs that enabled and even legitimized war crimes, including the notorious "medical" experiments of Dr. Ishii Shirō's Unit 731. Whereas such atrocities served to discredit techno-fascism after Japan's defeat in World War II, the reform bureaucrats' emphasis on technology as a force of creativity, responsibility, and independence survived past 1945. Most famously, Kishi Nobusuke (1896-1987), the architect of Manchukuo's planned economy, continued to encourage large-scale technological projects, managerialism, and a "flying geese" model of economic development in Asia during his tenure as Prime Minister of Japan from 1957 to 1960.

Moore concludes *Constructing East Asia* with an epilogue summarizing the significance of techno-fascism and the legacy of the wartime technological imaginary in Japan after defeat. Far from alienating the Japanese from technology, surrender prompted an immediate reflection on the need for more comprehensive science as the basis of a "healthy cultural nation-state," in the words of one bureaucrat (227). Early postwar initiatives such as the Science and Technology Agency, the Agency of Industrial Science and Technology, and the Comprehensive National Development Plan retained elements of the wartime technological imaginary including statism, the prioritization of big business over the interests of the people, and indifference to ecological devastation. Meanwhile, engineers and bureaucrats stationed in the former empire returned to Japan to spearhead large-scale infrastructural projects at home and overseas through developmental assistance. Today, although the environmental and human costs of dams and other monumental interventions are increasingly apparent, in the uncritical public imagination technology remains "a powerful horizon to mobilize people's hopes and dreams and diffuse socioeconomic discontent" (233).

Given the centrality of transwar continuities to Moore's argument,

the brevity of his remarks on the period after 1945 leaves the reader hungry for a more thorough explanation on ongoing consequences of wartime technological imaginary. In what ways have early twentieth-century views of technology shaped the emergence of an environmental consciousness in postwar Japan? What kind of relationship did the liberated nations of East Asia and Southeast Asia develop with the ideological and material relics of *gijutsu*? How did Japan's postwar technological imaginary come to include not only larger-than-life projects such as dams and cities, but also middle-class consumer products such as air conditioners, washing machines, televisions, and cars? Where can we locate women within the overwhelmingly male-dominated discourse of science and development? How did the shift from "fascism" to "democracy" make the technological imaginary accessible to new contributors such as artists, fiction writers, journalists, business leaders, and ordinary citizens? And finally, can we expect views of *gijutsu* to change in the wake of the Fukushima disaster of 2011? These questions could easily inspire several other books, and Moore is to be thanked for opening up a fascinating line of inquiry in the burgeoning historiography of postwar Japan.

The Cold War in East Asia, 1945-1991

edited by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa
Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2011
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011

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Kenton Clymer
Northern Illinois University

This book came out of a series of conferences on the Cold War in Asia at the University of California, Santa Barbara from 2005 to 2007. They were sponsored by the university's Center for Cold War Studies. This book is published under the auspices of the highly respected Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC. The book consists of eleven essays on various aspects of the Cold War in Asia, plus a lengthy and informative introduction by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, the author of the prize-winning book *Racing the Enemy*. Together they constitute a remarkable, pioneering work about the Cold War in Asia based on a remarkably broad range of mostly newly available archival materials in Russia, China, Japan, and Korea. This is first-rate international history, even though it is admittedly incomplete.

Interestingly, Korea receives more attention than any other country, with five of the essays focusing either on Korea itself or the country's relations with China, the USSR, Japan, and the United States. China's foreign policy is the focus of two essays, two chapters focus on Soviet policy, while two others focus on Japan. The United States enters in most

of the essays, but only Steven Hugh Lee's chapter on the United States and Korea, 1945-1955, devotes extended attention to American policy. Southeast Asia is mentioned only in passing, although Hasegawa addresses the region, particularly the war in Vietnam, in his introductory essay. Korea is of course important. The most turbulent war in East Asia after World War II took place there, resulting in more than one million Korean deaths. It was also the only divided country in the region (without counting China and Taiwan), and all of the major powers in the region devoted considerable attention to it. Nevertheless, one can question whether Korea is over-represented in this collection. First, then, regarding the book's treatment of the Korean issue, Chen Jian examines China's Cold War orientation, using Korea "as a Central Test Case" (81). The Cold War was already in full swing when Mao Zedong achieved his final victory in 1949. The Korean War emerged in that context and China intervened in the war because North Korea was a "revolutionary country" (83). China's "victim mentality," Chen argues, also encouraged it to support a revolutionary power that wanted to overturn a humiliating international order. This goes contrary to more traditional accounts that emphasize China's concern with its national security as General Douglas MacArthur moved northward toward the China border. Mao, Chen points out, made plans very early in the war, long before there was any threat to his security, to prepare for a military intervention.

Chen also argues further that China's decision-making meant Mao's decisions and that China's alliance with the USSR was the "cornerstone of its war efforts." Stalin, however, was less committed to the alliance, as evidenced when he pulled back from promises of air support in Korea. Still, Stalin fully supported Mao's decision to intervene in the war and Mao always consulted Stalin on negotiating strategy, never moving forward until Moscow was in full agreement. Finally, Chen concludes that despite its closeness to North Korea, the Chinese-North Korean relationship was "never harmonious." Indeed, Kim Il Sung often paid little attention to Mao and there were at least four disputes of

significance between the two revolutionary communist leaders. Chen lists five "implications" that derived from these findings, including an enhancement of Chinese devotion to revolution at home and abroad. Yet the Korean War also made it more likely, Chen argues, that the Cold War would remain cold outside of Korea as both Stalin and Truman opted for caution in a nuclear world.

Steven Hugh Lee then looks at American involvement in Korea from 1945 to 1955. Avoiding a narrow diplomatic approach, Lee looks at this period as one of American occupation and examines it through a social and economic lens, comparing it to earlier American occupations in the Philippines and Haiti, among others. He demonstrates that the Americans in Korea generally favored those Koreans who had worked with the Japanese in the past, while opposing labor unions and other more progressive forces. They assumed that the Koreans wanted an American-style modernization and liberties, while denying the legitimacy of contrary models. This was particularly the case of the Korean policy establishment, which was largely discredited because those in charge were the same people who had been connected with the former Japanese colonial regime. He argues persuasively that the United States wanted to "Koreanize" Korea and then leave. However, they wanted to "Koreanize" the country in a way that many Koreans disliked, thus paving the way for controversy and violence.

Lee's article is tremendously interesting, but his argument that the United States was consciously intent on establishing a "hegemonic" regime that was "also intimately linked to the evolution of the long durée of American's informal global empire" is not entirely persuasive. That the United States often elevated conservative elements, including those with colonial roots, is certain. Though whether the "good" things the Americans did were "influenced by colonial trajectory" (111) is more problematic. After 1950, he argues, Korea became an American protectorate. In this later period, Lee begins to investigate the importance of American NGOs and religious organizations, and devotes much

attention to the spread of Christianity. These are interesting and important topics, but they deserve more in-depth attention than Lee was able to devote in a chapter of a book.

Nobuo Shimotamai next looks at "Kim Il Sung's Balancing Act between Moscow and Beijing, 1956-1972." One of the best chapters in the book, this essay is a very well researched account of Kim's ability to play off Moscow and Beijing against each other over a period of years. Kim emerges as a shrewd international politician, who never completely alienated either of his larger allies. He was motivated by "intense nationalism" (123) and thus could not be entirely dominated by any outside power. Exploring a number of specific cases, including the *Pueblo* incident, Shimotamai shows persuasively that Kim would often pay lip service to one side or the other, but he was just as often insincere.

In a very well written chapter, Gregg Brazinsky next examines the very different trajectories of North and South Korea from 1972 to 1987. In 1972, there was not all that much difference between the two Koreas, but over time South Korea surged well ahead of the North. Even then, there were similarities. The Cold War patrons of both Koreas reduced their support in the 1970s. Both sought stability on the peninsula and strove to rein in extremists. Both also centralized power: South Korea's Park Chung Hee imposed martial law and sought an indefinite extension of presidential terms, while in the North, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il simply eliminated any possible opposition to their rule. Both Koreas also had some success in playing off their supporters. Thus that pattern Shimotamai found in the case of North Korea in the period of 1956 to 1972 extended well beyond that time. The South followed a somewhat similar pattern in balancing the United States with Japan. Japan invested significant capital in Korea and supported Korea when President Jimmy Carter criticized South Korea's human rights record. Nevertheless, significant differences emerged, as well. South Korea ultimately was able to reach out to Moscow and Beijing with some success, whereas North Korea had almost no comparable success with Washington. South Korea

dealt much more successfully with the new global capitalism and was able to obtain cheap international loans. North Korea also got some loans, but mismanaged them and did not pay them back. In the end, South Korea emerged as a thriving industrial country, its firms investing worldwide. Nothing similar happened with North Korea.

Picking up where Brazinsky left off, Sergey Radchencko examines Soviet policy toward both Koreas from 1985 to 1991. South Korea's tremendous economic advancement tempted the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev to improve its nonexistent relationship with the country. This of course ran the risk of alienating the North, with which, despite some tensions over the years, was still a fraternal socialist country of strategic interest to the Soviet Union. Needing financial assistance, the USSR turned first to Japan. Yet, Gorbachev was not willing to give up the Kuril Islands annexed in the wake of World War II, and so the proposed new relationship did not materialize. South Korea was thus a kind of substitute for Japan. Radchencko explores in depth the efforts by both Moscow and Seoul to establish a fruitful relationship. He gives Seoul considerable credit for its "nordpolitik" efforts to court the Soviet Union, which hoped to get Korean investment in the Russian Far East. Such efforts of course ran a distinct risk of rupturing the relationship with North Korea. In the end, this is about what happened. After some hesitation, for example, Gorbachev allowed Russian athletes to participate in the Seoul Olympic Games in 1988, despite failed efforts to make the games a joint North and South Korean event. Then in 1990, Gorbachev spoke informally with South Korean diplomats. Essentially, according to Radchencko, Russia needed the money. In the end, there was a serious break in relations with North Korea, which ended up remarkably hostile to the Soviet Union. Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, who had advised against any closer ties to the South, was seriously snubbed during a trip to Pyongyang and left North Korea earlier than anticipated. Kim Jong Il never replied to a letter Gorbachev sent that was intended to restart the relationship.

Overall, Radchencko is quite critical of Gorbachev for his hesitation and indecision. Sympathetic to both those who wanted a close relationship with South Korea and those who wanted the USSR to remain tied closely to North Korea, Gorbachev managed to deeply alienate the North, while not getting nearly all that he would like to have gotten from the South. Radchencko does give the Soviet leader some grudging credit for being the first Soviet leader "to go beyond bloc logic and to embrace a former foe" (313). However, it was always too little too late. Had he acted decisively at an earlier date, the results would have been much better for the Soviet Union. The contrast with China is striking. China managed to establish mutually beneficial relations with South Korea, without alienating the North. At the same time, however, Radchencko praises South Korea's "nordpolitik" which, he concludes, "is a testament to the importance of understanding the motives and actions of regional players in the multilayered and complicated setting of the East Asian Cold War" (315).

Two of the essays focus on China's foreign policy. Odd Arne Westad opens the book with his essay, "Struggle's for Modernity: The Golden Years of the Sino-Soviet Alliance." Focusing less on diplomatic issues than most of the other essays, Westad examines how Soviet development models influenced China. The Soviet Union's approach to modernization was very influential, he concludes, although the Chinese introduced adaptations that they thought would serve their interests better. China's army was modeled closely on the Soviet model and was used to modernize the country and educate many men, while pursuing general social betterment of the society. Adopting the Soviet education model was much less positive. Bourgeois elements were purged with disastrous results, particularly in higher education. Soviet models of urban planning were ultimately adopted, with modifications. The Chinese communists, having emerged from a peasant culture, were skeptical of cities, even hostile to them. China nevertheless adopted the Moscow urban planning model of 1935. Westad considers this partially,

though not totally, responsible for the destruction of old Beijing, including the unfortunate destruction of the walls that surrounded the capital of which only remnants remain today. China finally looked to the Soviet Union to inform it on how to deal with the country's minority populations, such as the Tibetans and Muslims. The results, he concludes, were mixed: some being positive, in that they gave minority groups more recognition and influence than they had had before, and some negative, such as forcing definition of some groups even against their will. Essentially what Westad seeks to demonstrate is that recent scholarship had focused on crisis and disagreement and has not paid sufficient attention to areas of influence and concord. "For most of the 1950s," he writes, "it is wrong to think in terms of Soviet versus Chinese in China's struggle for a socialist modernity" (56). His essay marks a persuasive beginning in this discussion.

Lorenz Lüthi examines China foreign policy in the 1960s and 1970s. Though in some ways a fairly traditional examination of foreign policy, this excellent chapter mirrors Westad in looking through the "prism of ideology and modernization," although in this case, Lüthi explores the domestic sources of China's foreign policy. Lüthi initially sees two conflicting Chinese approaches to foreign policy. The radical line rejected Nikita Khrushchev's call for peaceful coexistence, instead proposing strong, ideologically driven stances. The radical foreign policy stance emerged from the domestic radicalism of the Great Leap Forward. Among its manifestations were criticisms of such relatively moderate figures as Deng Xiaoping and Lui Shaoqi. The leader of the moderates was Zhou Enlai, who resisted a radical foreign policy even in the face of domestic radicalism. For example, he had no quarrel with China's trading partners that recognized Taiwan, and West Germany and the United Kingdom (part of the Western alliance) were large trading partners with China. In sum, economic pragmatism trumped ideological considerations, and Zhou publicly criticized the Red Guards' interference in China's economy. After the Cultural Revolution, China began to

reengage with the outside world, in part because China had economic needs that could not be met from the Socialist world and also because the outside world was now willing to engage with China. Lüthi explores these issues persuasively and concludes that by the end of the 1970s, China was no longer a revolutionary power, but a country which viewed the outside world in terms of traditional power politics calculations. China's attack on Vietnam in 1979 was an early manifestation of the transformation, he contends. All in all, this is a fine essay based on excellent sources that lays out clearly the larger directions of Chinese foreign policy over two decades.

Two essays also focus on Soviet policy. Ilya V. Gaiduk explores "the Second Front of the Soviet Cold War" and argues that it was the United States, not the Soviet Union, which first saw Asia as a Cold War theater. The Soviet Union gave little more than rhetorical support to the nationalist and independence movements in Southeast Asia, for example, turning most of Asia over to the Chinese. Stalin's attention was focused on Europe, he states, where Stalin hoped to construct a buffer of subservient states to protect Soviet security from a possible resurgent Germany. He was much less interested in, or concerned about, Asia. Stalin did take some interest in Mao's war with the Guomindang, but Gaiduk writes, "this attention was incomparably smaller than that devoted to Europe" (65). Though perhaps sympathetic, Stalin seems to have provided no direct support to revolutionary movements in Indonesia, Malaya, the Philippines, or Burma. There was a stronger, but secret connection with Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam. However, Stalin did not trust Ho and disliked his efforts to court Western countries. Part of the reason for Stalin's caution, of course, was that the USSR was in no position for some time after the devastation of World War II to assist outsiders, even if it wanted to. The end result, then, was that "during the first several years after World War II, Asia was not even the second front of Soviet confrontation with the West" (68). Asian revolutionaries who had hoped for Soviet assistance were deeply disappointed. All they got,

from time to time, was advice.

Gaiduk explores this theme in depth, with particular attention to the Calcutta international youth conference in 1948, which has sometimes been seen as the Asian counterpart to the Soviet Cominform in Europe. Yet, little evidence has surfaced to support this. The most that can be said is that the Soviet delegation (which did not include high ranking personalities) confirmed Soviet moral support for anticolonial Asian struggles then underway in several countries. Instead, the USSR mostly ceded support for the Asian revolutionary movements to China, particularly after Mao's victory in 1949. This pattern extended well beyond Stalin's time, Gaiduk writes. Asia was not however entirely written off, and Khrushchev began to take an interest in Asia, but little resulted before 1956. And even then, European issues dominated Soviet concerns. The "main burden of responsibility," Gaiduk concludes, remained "on Chinese shoulders" (76).

The other essay to focus on the USSR is Valdislav Zubov's discussion of Soviet policy toward the end of the Cold War, from 1985 to 1991. Much as in the earlier years, East Asia was a region of only secondary concern to Gorbachev. Gorbachev did, however, have some interest in Asia. He envied Japanese economic advances and would like to have attracted new investment from Japan and South Korea to help with the Soviet Union's increasingly dire economic situation. Unlike with President Ronald Reagan, Gorbachev did not pursue much personal diplomacy in East Asia. Still, he did bring new people into the government, and his "new thinking" was non-ideological. Despite Gorbachev's attraction to Japan and Korea, he moved first toward China, hoping to repair a badly damaged relationship. The Cold War was still on, and Japan, he thought, could not act fully independently of the United States. China, though it had improved its relationship with the Americans, was only conditionally connected to the United States and could therefore be more flexible. Moreover, Gorbachev had grown up when China was the USSR's best ally and it traumatized him that they

had fallen apart. On the other hand, his generation's relations with Japan had been hostile, going back to World War II. Consequently, he was open to accepting most of the conditions China demanded to normalize relations, including withdrawing forces from Afghanistan and demilitarizing Mongolia. In the end, relations were restored in 1989 for which Zubok gives credit to both sides. Gorbachev resisted the temptation to visit student protestors during the Tiananmen crisis for example, because he wanted a successful negotiation. In the end, "both sides negotiated from a position of state interests, but with the political will to settle the existing disputes" (278).

In contrast to China, Gorbachev's efforts to court Japan did not go well. He was reluctant to meet Japan's condition, viz. the cession of the Kuril Islands that the Soviet Union had acquired after World War II. In this matter, Zubok is critical of Japanese leaders, considering them too intransigent. Had Japan been more flexible, he suggests, a solution could have been reached involving more Japanese influence in the disputed areas, with a full transfer later on. In this instance, then, he takes issue with previous scholars who have laid the blame on Moscow. South Korea, in contrast, managed to work with Gorbachev to negotiate the normalization of relations, bringing considerable economic advantages to his country. Still, like other authors in this collection, Zubok is critical of Gorbachev's diplomacy, noting for example that the Soviet leader's "penchant for procrastination" and his ad hoc approach "contributed to lost opportunities" (283) in his negotiators with Japan. Nevertheless, he praises Gorbachev for his "rapprochement with China" which contributed to "Soviet (now Russian) security and international peace" (285).

Two chapters focus on Japan foreign policy. Kazuhiko Togo's fine contribution, "Japan's Foreign Policy under Détente: Relations with China and the Soviet Union, 1971-1973," discusses Japan's decision to recognize the People's Republic of China (PRC) soon after the shocking reversal of American policy under President Richard Nixon. The lack of

consultation and information about the American change (Japan was only informed about Nixon's visit to Beijing three minutes before it was publicly announced) angered the Japanese. Even so, after Nixon's visit, there was almost universal desire in Japan to go ahead with recognition. The problem was how to deal with Taiwan. Japan was very grateful to Taiwan for giving up reparations claims, and the United States was concerned that Japan's recognition of the PRC not interfere with the United States-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty. Togo discusses in considerable detail how these sensitive issues were finessed. Even today the language remains ambiguous, allowing each side to interpret the agreements in its own way.

Tsuyoshi Hasegawa investigates the response of the superpowers to the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship, 1977-1978. By the late 1970s, rearrangements in relationships among China, the USSR, the United States, and Japan were dramatic. Hasegawa explores this development, with Japan "as the analytical pivot" (214). Like Togo, Hasegawa agrees that Nixon's visit to China was a dramatic shock to Japan, and in response, Japan began to pursue a more independent foreign policy, extending diplomatic recognition to Beijing in 1972. Although recognition came quickly, it was only after serious differences over Taiwan were resolved, as Togo discussed. Japan, wanting to keep relations with China's nemesis, the Soviet Union, on an equal plane with China, hoped to improve that bilateral relationship as well. This was not easy to do because of highhanded Soviet actions. So, there was no improvement until 1976, when a number of leadership changes occurred. In Japan, Takeo Fukuda took over and sought to keep the United States engaged in Asia, while also pursuing good relations with both China and the USSR. In the end, relations with the USSR did not improve, primarily because the USSR would not compromise on the so-called "northern territories," the Kuril Islands that the USSR had absorbed following World War II. There were also problems with China, particularly China's desire to insert an "anti-hegemonic" clause in the

treaty aimed at the Soviet Union. Although Japan did not like the clause, Soviet intransigence on the Kurils, along with the American decision to normalize relations with China, caused Japan to agree to a treaty. Despite Japan's dislike of United States National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski's strong anti-Soviet posture, Japan in the end joined the United States and China in an anti-Soviet coalition. Hasegawa thinks that China was the biggest winner in this shuffling of relationships, although he also believes the United States and Japan benefited as well. The Soviet Union was the big loser. An issue could be taken with one minor point in this chapter. Hasegawa asserts that the United States "did not support China's plan for invading Vietnam" (232) in 1979 to punish Vietnam for its invasion of Cambodia. Although President Carter did express his reservations directly to Deng Xiaoping, the United States did not really object to China's actions and even shared intelligence with the Chinese on an almost daily basis. Brzezinski certainly had no qualms at all about China's action, although the Japanese considered it a "blatant display of hegemonism" (235).

In conclusion, this volume represents major accomplishments. All of the included essays are based on serious research in Asian and Russian primary sources. They deepen our understanding of the inner workings of all of the countries involved and are well written. The treatment of Korea is particularly impressive, though perhaps at the expense of somewhat less attention to China and Japan. All in all, the authors deserve our congratulations for putting together such a stimulating group of essays, and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa deserves our gratitude for putting it all together.

Anarchist Modernity: Cooperatism and Japanese-Russian Intellectual Relations in Modern Japan

by Sho Konishi
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2013

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Robert Stolz
University of Virginia

Sho Konishi's *Anarchist Modernity: Cooperatism and Japanese-Russian Intellectual Relations in Modern Japan* begins with an extraordinary encounter in Hakodate in 1861: a meeting onboard a United States ship between the American ship's captain, the Russian Consul General Iosif Goshkevich, and a Russian passenger heading to San Francisco. The traveler was Mikhail Bakunin (1814-1876), the notorious revolutionary (and ideological rival to Marx) and one of the most recognized anarchists in world history. Yet this extraordinary meeting was also a tale of smuggling. Bakunin had escaped from a Siberian prison and was making his way from Russia to the West via the Far East, stowing away on the new Vladivostok-Hakodate shipping route. After this initial tale of under-the-radar intrigue, *Anarchist Modernity* uncovers many others. In exploring these "Japanese-Russian nonstate transnational intellectual relations" (26) from the Meiji Restoration (1868) historiography to *Tao Te Ching* translations in Moscow, Tolstoyism, and the nonwar movement at the *Heimin shinbun*, and on to cooperative practices and entomology research, *Anarchist Modernity* seeks to uncover an entire world of bustling creative activity that operated largely unseen beneath the state,

beneath institutions such as churches, party politics, or schools, and importantly beneath the language and discourse of Area Studies, East and West, and even the history of global modernity itself. Often centering on the practice of translation, these Japanese-Russian intellectual exchanges stealthily constitute "… a transnationally formulated temporality and corresponding order of knowledge and practice that I call cooperatist anarchist modernity" (3). As these encounters pile up throughout the book, a better picture emerges of the importance of Russian thought in modern Japan. Yet Konishi goes beyond mere cataloging and develops a theory about what these connections mean. The original Bakunin "chance meeting [comes to represent] the beginning of an anarchist vision of progress founded on principles of mutual aid in Japan" (3) that opens the way to a better future. As Konishi shows, without attention to this sustained interaction with Russian thought "feeds the historiographical tendency to view Japanese interest in 'Western thought' as similarly contradictory and random" (297).

Like the introduction, chapter one begins with an extraordinary encounter, or almost. Here the meeting would have been between the future lecturer of Russian at the Tokyo Foreign Language School (TFSL), Lev Mechnikov and the revolutionary leader Saigo Takamori. Though this specific meeting never took place since Mechnikov arrived in 1874 after Saigo had resigned from government service to teach in his private academies in Kyushu, Mechnikov arranged the meeting in Europe with Saigo's brother Tsugumichi.

Missed connections aside, Mechnikov's stay in Japan from 1874-1876 was clearly influential both in Japan and in anarchist circles in Europe. We learn not only that Mechnikov moved anarchism away from the "Bakuninist ruthless destruction of the old order to a vision of universal human evolutionary development," but that he apparently did so based on what he witnessed of the early Meiji Restoration. Mechnikov's history of the Restoration was yet another case of linguistic smuggling. It also stood in contrast to more pessimistic Western

observers from Isabella Bird to Ernest Satow. For Mechnikov, the opening of Japan (*kaikoku*) was a first step in a world historical development toward cooperative living that "resulted from the long-term development of people's everyday life that had made the formation of a new government possible" (60-61). Konishi argues that it was Mechnikov's experience in the early Restoration that pushed him to extend the non-Darwinian mutual aid tradition of Russian evolution to human history and development. One of the joys of under-the-radar chance encounters between intellectual luminaries described in the book is the argument that the later reception of Pyotr Kropotkin's Mutual Aid in Taishō Japan, especially at the Sapporo Agricultural College (chapter four), in some ways echoed the popular Restoration itself filtered through the Japanese-Russian anarchist networks and interpretations. This linking of a non-Darwinian, mutual aid theory of Russian evolutionary thought applied to social progress reappears in chapter six. Here, though, Konishi remains at the level of translation as a transnational practice. As such, he does not delve into the details of what Mechnikov actually saw that for him provided this spark of a new sense of "opening" *kaikoku*. Still it is hardly criticism to say that here and elsewhere throughout the book Konishi points to many other dissertations and books yet to be written.

The details do come in the translation projects of the TSFL's Russian language program begun by Mechnikov. Konishi sketches out the ties between TSFL, Mechnikov, and the Popular Rights and Liberty Movement (*jiyūminken undō*) leaders with ties to the school such as Nakae Chomin. From this focus on Japanese-Russian transnational translation projects, Konishi can offer a history of networks that tie the Populists and Popular Rights movements to Futabatei Shimei (early translator of Gogol and founder of the modern Japanese novel with *Ukigumo*), and Futabatei's students and friends Yokoyama Gennosuke and Matsubara Iwagorō. These last two are often seen as early Japanese social scientists and early "muckraking" journalists of the "social problem" (*shakai mondai*). In Konishi's telling, they were inspired by

Futabatei's translations of Russian depictions of the St. Petersburg poor. Situating them within this Japanese-Russian tradition effects a slight but important change in the development of social science in Meiji Japan as here it is not the high level desire for social facts coming from the conservative and much more statist German Historical School of Lujo Brentano, Gustav Schmoller, and Max Weber. Instead, it is just one more instance of a subterranean, non-state, non-institutional collaboration seeking to create its own distinct theory of modernity and progress. Here we find another theme running through Konishi's book: for Japanese anarchists, Russian Populism represented a critique of Western metaphysics and another path to modernity. That new path was neither a turn to Western assimilation nor a vision of Pan-Asianism, but instead "toward a possibility of an anti-hierarchical, moral society beyond either school (99)." This crucial insight struck me in its similarity to the way another group of Asian revolutionaries looked to Lenin for an internal critique of the West while still allowing for modernization.

Chapter two, "Anarchist Religion," shows more than the occasionally noted but under-examined popularity and significance of Tolstoy (and "Tolstoyism") in Japan. It also deepens the transnational interaction of translation and religious conversion—again often happening outside formal institutions and beneath the surface of terms and language. The chapter begins with an account of Konishi Masutarō, a member of the Russian Orthodox Church in Japan sent by Father Nikolai to study at the Kiev Theological Seminary. In both Kiev and later in Moscow, Konishi Masutarō would lecture on *Tao Te Ching* as a point of contact with Japanese Orthodoxy and the best source for the future (cultural and spiritual) development of Japan. During these well attended lectures at Moscow University and the Moscow Psychological Society, Tolstoy learned of Konishi Masutarō's *Tao Te Ching* Russian translation project and asked to help. Working out of Tolstoy's home, Konishi Masutarō and Tolstoy were drawn to this Chinese text which had "no room either for the authority of the nation-state" or much to the chagrin

of Konishi Masutarō's patron Nikolai "for the institution of the Church" (105). Chapter two shows in fascinating detail how, though some of the terms remained, the meanings of Christianity and *shūkyō* (religion) were drastically altered as the translation collaboration became a joint project to "reconfigure Christianity, elements of Western modernity, and for Konishi [Masutarō], the imperial Confucian moral order in Japan" (112). The goal was a "universal religion" based on ethical practice wholly within the confines of human reason.

Beyond the story of the Russian *Tao Te Ching*, chapter two also explores the breadth and depth of Tolstoyism in Japan. An enormous number of translations appeared in journals such as Tokutomi Soho's *Kokumin no tomo*, the *Heimin shinbun*, and *Rikugo zasshi*. Japanese readers, notably Tokutomi's brother Roka (mentioned in chapter six) undertook pilgrimages to Tolstoy. And, of course, Uchimura Kanzō's "nonchurch movement" (*mūkyōkai*) was strongly influenced by Tolstoy. These stories of conversion to "Tolstoyan religion" and "religious anarchism" go a long way to rectifying the "major lacuna," the historiography of Japanese intellectual history and Tolstoyism. In another pleasant surprise that remains inexplicable from the lofty view of interstate and Church relations—all of this occurred with help from Japanese [Russian] Orthodoxy while Tolstoy was not only denounced, but pictured as burning in hell in Russian Orthodox cathedrals.

As Konishi emphasizes, this theory is one based on Reinhart Koselleck's temporality grounded in lived experience. It differs from both open-ended accumulation and crisis of Western modernity and a rejection of a folkish Pan-Asianism. Konishi argues it is an anarchist spatio-temporality that exists alongside not just standard nation-state based histories, but also against the uneven conjunction of the past and the industrial present (an internally driven modernity examined by Harry Harootunian in *Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture, and Community in Interwar Japan*. Indeed, Konishi has shown that possibly the first introduction of Nietzsche in Japan came in a piece on Tolstoy that

negatively compared the founder of a universal religion of reason against the German example of a "decadent European thought" (127). We rightly know a great deal about this other critique of Western metaphysics from Nietzsche to Anesaki Masaharu, Watsuji Tetsurō, and others. However, we can now also include a very different critique of transnational progress of Kropotkin, Mechnikov, Reclus, Arishima, Ishikawa Sanshirō, and countless other names (more than 600) in the encyclopedia of Japanese anarchism Konishi mentions in the introduction.

This anarchist religion based on human virtue counters the more institutional and didactic project of Inoue Tetsujirō and Nitobe Inazō, who built a theory of the religious or moral national subject around the term *jinkaku* as a hierarchy of person (*jin*) and rank (*kaku*). Richard Reitan has recently examined this latter tradition in *Making a Moral Society: Ethics and the State in Meiji Japan*. In direct contrast to both the national subject (*kokumin*) and the Marxist "masses" (*taishū*) is the account of the creation of both the object of knowledge and the political subject of the "*heimin*" as it developed in opposition to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. In this third chapter, possibly the book's most exciting, Konishi refrains from fully defining the *heimin*. Instead, after showing that the standard translation of "commoner" retains too much of a connection to hierarchy from its roots in the Tokugawa system of rulers and ruled, he lets the myriad expressions of *heimin* instantiate the "invention of the people without the state." These include the pages of the *Heimin shinbun* and *Myōjō*, the famous anti-war poem by Yosano Akiko "Brother, Don't Give Up Your Life," woodblocks by Yamamoto Kanae, and playful cartoons of daily life by Ogawa Usen, many reproduced in the text. This anti-*kokumin* discourse, of course, was not lost on the Meiji state. It shut down the *Heimin shinbun* in January 1905. Soon a "transnational *heimin*" as a basis for a new vision of international society found fascinating expression and built deeper networks including inside the POW camps of the Russo-Japanese War.

Chapter four "The History Slide" (*rekishi no jisuberi*) continues

this discussion of networks of international society. Konishi fully develops the explicitly anarchist vision of modernity, and not just its critique, but a vision of a new path. In this chapter, the multiple threads of collaborations between non-state and non-institutional congeal into a specifically anarchist vision of global modernity that differs from the standard nationalist or Pan-Asianist paths. It is the return of Mechnikov's ideas on the Restoration as a revolution in daily life meditated now by Kropotkin's thoughts on non-Darwinian mutual aid. There is also an interesting theory that the term "winter period" misses much of what was happening, once again, under the surface. The term was used to refer to the lack of "events" in the Japanese left following the crackdown on alternate visions of the future after the execution of Kotoku Shusui, Kanno Sugako, and others in the Great Treason trial of 1911. Instead of great events, Konishi describes a "shift in historicity" from the march of Hegelian Reason to "a theory of social change and moral knowledge and action" as the significance of lived time (Koselleck) made the present a privileged moment of individual intervention in time—something that would become the "rectification of history" (210). The rectification was necessary as contrary to the success story of achieving Great Power status in the victory over Russia for anarchists like Arishima Takeo, Kōtoku Shūsui, Ōsugi Sakae, and Ishikawa Sanshirō. To Konishi's list, one could add Tanaka Shōzō, for whom the war marked the moment of exhaustion of Western modernity. Far from culminating in success, the war marked a moment of retrogression. Through Kropotkin reading groups organized by Arishima at night and "in polemic with" the stated curriculum of the Sapporo Agricultural College, a vision of a new mode of progress based on everyday life of the little people (Tanaka called this actor a "*tada no hitori*") began to form. This mode directly opposed the social Darwinist common sense of international diplomacy.

Chapters five and six on Esperanto clubs and mutual aid-inspired popular science constitute what Konishi calls an "anarchist cultural revolution." In these contexts, the translation projects and the discursive

networks developed to such an extent as to become part of daily life and thought in Japan in the 1910-1920s: "Mechnikov did not know Kōtoku. Kōtoku did not know Arishima. Arishima did not know Tolstoy. Kropotkin did not know Konishi. Nakae Chōmin did not know Kropotkin…. Yet each was related to the others through the sharing and translation of knowledge of anarchist modernity" (243-244). Konishi offers a long discussion of the wild popularity of Esperanto, so popular even those thought of as nativists such as Yanagida Kunio were practitioners. From there, *Anarchist Modernity* moves to making indirect points about a vision of continual change and progress. The discussion most interesting to the reviewer of this title is about the Ainu expert (and brother of the Polish dictator Józef Piłsudski) Bronislaw Piłsudski. For Konishi, Piłsudski sought to "protect" the Ainu from the depredations of modernity as currently practiced, but also without any paternalistic ideas of preserving an unchanging cultural essence. There is more work to do here on the relation of Esperanto to a new vision of the colonial margins, but this sense of change and development without hierarchy is of course part of Kropotkin's Mutual Aid. This same influence also leads to the large translation projects of the last chapter on popular biology and largely non-Darwinian science in chapter six. This last chapter includes a wonderful discussion of the entomologist Jean Henri Fabre, who is obscure in his native France, but to this day enjoys enormous popularity in Japan, including thousands of Fabre figurines sold in 7-Eleven convenience stores.

The final chapter, "Nature in Culture, Culture in Nature: Phagocytes, Dung Beetles, and the Cosmos," is as ambitious and sprawling as it sounds. But in many ways its inclusion is earned by the networks and translation practices that preceded it in the previous five chapters. As Konishi warned (promised) in the introduction, "Only with knowledge of the anarchist notion of progress and Russian-Japanese nonstate transnational intellectual relations does anarchists' dynamic role in translating and popularizing these four scientists (the entomologist

Jean Henri Fabre, Ilya Mechnikov, brother of Lev from chapter one, Kropotkin, and Darwin) make sense." (26) He asks why Japanese anarchists expended so much effort to take on the massive project of translating these thinkers. He answers that they all offered a vision of a non-hierarchical universe without a center, and thus without a node of ultimate authority. Decades before Deleuze and Guattari, for many anarchists at the time, a main model of this horizontal network without power was the rhizome. Further, the vision of evolutionary biology examined here, like Mutual Aid, focused on the necessity and benefits of symbiosis at all levels—from the universal, to the global, to even the individual whose internal processes mirrored those larger systems in requiring dynamic interaction. This last level of symbiosis within the human body was the work of Ilya Mechnikov, the Nobel Prize-winning scientist and brother of Lev Mechnikov mentioned in chapter one.

In the epilogue to *Anarchist Modernity*, Konishi argues again for the breadth and depth of this terrain of cultural production beneath official sanction and support. He pays special attention to the way these anarchist practices found their way into children's literature and were located outside schools in local shrines, farmhouses, churches, "the second floor of the Nakamuraya sweetshop in Tokyo," pubs, *Heimin* clubs, and, importantly, "dormitories within the imperial universities" (330-331). He follows this trend of knowledge production from below in the Free Education Movement, the Children's Free Arts Movement, and finds its influence in popular children's magazines like *Shonen sekai* (Boy's World) and *Akai tori* (The Red Bird) (333) and even in Yanagi Sōetsu and the Shirakaba School.

From here, he moves to a discussion of the differences between the anarchist and the everyday Marxist theories and suggests the "limitations of Marxist theories of everyday life and space that are widely used today by scholars for understanding cultural and social trends in modern history at large" (339). For Konishi, a focus on Marxian analysis—which is not fully defined here—has prevented historians from seeing the world

of life uncovered by Konishi's exhaustive and fascinating uncovering of these translation and conversion practices. Not only is this uncovering due to Konishi's rare skill with both Japanese and Russian sources and a sharp theoretical approach. It is also due to anarchism's admirable devotion for identifying and struggling against authority in all its varieties and refusing to reduce it to class struggle alone. Indeed, this issue formed the crux of a major dispute between Sakai Toshihiko and Ishikawa Sanshirō in the early 1900s, when the two activists argued over the proper role of party discipline and the nature of a revolution. In fact, it is precisely in the next paragraph after discussing the limits of the Marxian everyday that Konishi turns to Ishikawa's own theory of anarchist democracy as "the life a people on the soil." Ishikawa used this phrase as a gloss of his term *domin seikatsu* or *domin kurashi* or finally *demokurashī*.

Still, Ishikawa's extremely interesting and important intervention into the evolutionary and cultural debates of the 1930-1940s lacked a strategy adequate to the specificity of capitalist dynamics following the Manchurian Incident in 1931 when the Kwantung Army made the first move on the establishment of Manchukuo. Ishikawa's confrontation with fascism, according to the reviewer's belief, meant the non-institutional bias of his *demokurashī* that provided such a liberating and even emancipatory spark, linking the individual to transnational and even cosmic in the 1920s, became a problem with the descent into total war of the late 1930s. Ishikawa could posit but ultimately not fully practice his theory of federated communes that would replace the state. We need more work on this anarchist confrontation with fascism not only in Japan but globally, in both historiography and theory. That said, though Konishi does not mention them here, both the local banks based on rural mutual aid examined by Tetsuo Najita in *Ordinary Economies in Japan: A Historical Perspective, 1750-1950* and the extraordinary postwar "production control" (*seisan kanri*) movement offer reasons to continue to take seriously both Ishikawa and Konishi's project in this crucial

period.

Still, while Konishi is clearly right to focus on the majority of Marxist analyses of everyday life as lacking the creative spark of lived experience, especially the dominant Kōza-ha school, there is the decidedly minority Marxian view of everyday life that the reviewer would suggest as adequate to a critique of the language of cooperatists ideology of the Co-Prosperity Sphere. Of course, thinkers like Tosaka Jun come to mind. Tosaka wrote extensively on everyday space and the "principle of everydayness" as a form of cultural criticism until he was imprisoned and forced to stop publishing in 1938. With his analysis firmly set in class struggle and attuned to the mediations and mystifications of capital that trickle down into daily life, in his masterpiece *The Japanese Ideology* (日本イデオロギー論 *Nihon ideorogiron*) Tosaka showed how the Japanization of cooperation stemmed from an imperial hermeneutic that mimicked the money form of capital. To fully critique the explicit use of cooperation and harmony in the Japanese empire, we might need some sort of critical apparatus like Tosaka's—if only to illuminate the distortion (or to use a recent term by Mark Driscoll) the imperial state's "grotesqueing" of the myriad cooperatist practices Konishi has uncovered here.

None of this should be considered a criticism of Konishi's extraordinary book. On the contrary, *Anarchist Modernity* intervenes in a way that can only improve both the anarchist and Marxian critique of power, empire, and everyday life. It represents an intervention that cannot be ignored or casually dismissed as if nothing new had happened in either tradition since the famous Marx-Bakunin debates of the 1870s. *Anarchist Modernity* is timely, as well. As with the new studies of the Japanese empire and fascism mentioned above, Konishi's work resonates with Karatani Kojin's *The Structure of World History: From Modes of Production to Modes of Exchange*. By reading these two together, we clearly see Tolstoyism and "religious anarchism" based on reason as a real movement toward reclaiming in a secular form the imperative to

improved life found in nineteenth century religious movements. Such a re-secularization is a necessary step for Karatani's arrival at a global republic based on reciprocal exchange. The exchanges in both books are much more conducive to low level practices and thus suggest a way to reclaim the political efficacy of the small scale action of Konishi's translation and Karatani's consumer boycotts.

One issue remains: how do we fit anarchist history and analysis into this broader, post Manchurian Incident story? It seems to have much in common with earlier studies of anarchism as the hidden wellspring of practice, from Arif Dirlik's *Anarchism in the Chinese Revolution* to recent work by David Graeber, in which the analysis is largely Marxist, but the anarchist solution comes from an undefined space outside. How do we work out the issues of scale and mediation without either the co-optation by the state as in the Co-Prosperity Sphere or the more recent devolution into libertarianism? *Anarchist Modernity* should be part of an answer. Thus, given the extraordinary history recounted here, it is not a criticism to say that a major debate remains on the adequate scope and scale of cultural and political movements or whether the analysis or practice should be Marxian or anarchist. Indeed, these are necessary, helpful, and productive debates. *Anarchist Modernity* is a very welcome addition to the discussion. In the end, it suggests that we do not have to completely decide. In reading this conclusion to *Anarchist Modernity*, the reviewer is reminded of the likely apocryphal line often attributed to Henri Lefebvre, "I am a Marxist today so that we can all be anarchists tomorrow."

The Challenge of Linear Time: Nationhood and the Politics of History in East Asia

edited by Viren Murthy and Axel Schneider
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Zhiguang Yin
Zayed University

This edited volume addresses a problem which fascinated intellectuals from East Asia for decades. To Japanese scholars in the 1940s, it emerged with the discussions on "overcoming modernity" (近代の超克 *kindai no choukoku*) and later the historical evaluation of the so-called "Greater East Asia War" (大東亜戦争 *Daitōa sensō*). To the Chinese, this question is entangled with the century-long history of modernization and revolution. It was reflected in the reformists' challenge against the Old Text Confucianism (古文經學 *guwen jingxue*) by proposing the New Text Confucianism (今文經學 *jinwen jingxue*) in the late Qing period. We can also spot a similar concern in the impassioned debates that began in the 1930s regarding the characteristics of Chinese society, especially over the issue of whether or not Chinese historical development had experienced a stage of what Karl Marx referred to as an "Asiatic mode of production" (*Asiatische Produktionsweise*). With the beginning of market reform in China in the 1980s, the Chinese society also began to face a new tide of theoretical challenge which soon led to the political ratification of the term "Socialism with Chinese characteristics" (中國特色社會主義 *Zhongguo tese shehuizhuyi*). In recent years, the discussion of "East

Asian modernity" demonstrates a more reflexive relation between Japanese and Chinese scholarships. It reflects, as the editors of this book argue in the beginning, a tension between "the dominance of linear time and progressive history and the concomitant delineation of the nation in Chinese and Japanese historiography."

Even since Western colonial military and commercial expansions began to intensify globally in the nineteenth century, the tendency to form a universal historiography was inevitably integrated into this political transformation of world order. In the non-Western world, on the one hand, this process was accompanied by the emergence of a universal discourse of modernization rooted in a social Darwinian reception of progress. On the other hand, it also triggered the rising awareness of a theoretical resistance against such a universal narrative of modernity. In East Asia, intellectuals began to draw a more complex picture of modernity, or rather, *modernities*, in order to liberate this concept from the framework of linear progress monopolized by Western colonial/capitalist discourse. Through this lasting resistance, countries in East Asia generated their own subjectivity in modern world history. Political reality such as revolution, war, reformation, and nationalism in modern East Asia could then be understood through such a theoretical scope, which transcends the chronological and spatial limitations troubling East Asian nations until today.

The theoretical resistance against a universal narrative of modernization in East Asia also establishes a communicative relation between East and West. The collapse of a Chinese empire and the formation of modern nation-states in East Asia were accompanied by the spread of the modern Western legal system and the decline of colonial hegemony. Hence, the theoretical resistance against Western universalism represents a political struggle for national sovereignty and dominance. Through this perspective, we could then better understand the formation of a modern "world system" as well as the complexity of a modern world order.

The complexity of "East Asian Modernity" is also reflected in the diversified political responses toward Western imperialism among East Asian countries as well as the interconnection among these nation-states. Japan answered the challenge of Western imperialism with Pan-Asianism and an ethnocentric imperial warfare. China initially responded with a more introverted reformation and attempt at revolution, and later with a Maoist ambition to achieve political equality through struggles against imperialism in any form internationally. Another key component of this complexity of East Asian Modernity is Korea. Its national history of modernization was entangled with the decline of the Chinese Confucian order and the rise of Japanese military expansionism in the early twentieth century.

An essential thesis of *The Challenge of Linear Time: Nationhood and the Politics of History in East Asia* is in line with the continuing intellectual quest for "East Asian Modernity." This book can be seen as not only an introduction to English-language readership on such a scholarly discussion in East Asia, but more importantly a contribution toward it. Editors intend to question the role of national "traditions" in the process of searching for modernization under the challenge of the universal discourse of Western "modernity." This book engages in the discussion by attempting to present a dialogue and comparison between Japanese and Chinese historiography. It includes ten papers from scholars who write in various languages other than English. Some of the papers, including Sun Ge's reading of Takeuchi Yoshimi, are introduced to scholarship in the English language for the first time.

The ten papers in this volume are arranged into four themes: Time, History, and Moral Responsibility; The Burden of the Past and the Hope for a Better Future; Recollection of the Past and the Popularization of History; and History and the Definition of Spatial, Cultural and Temporal Boundaries. As typical studies of intellectual history, papers included in this book deal with topics such as scholar societies and intellectual trends (such as the Kyoto School, the Popular Reading Publishing House, and

the Critical Review School), individual intellectuals (such as Tan Sitong, Zhang Taiyan, Liu Yizheng, and Takeuchi Yoshimi), as well as individual works and political movements (such as the Campaign to Criticise Lin Biao and Confucius, the National Learning movement, and the Chinese Daiyi Landlord Mansion Museum).

The first section, including four papers, lays out the theoretical foundation of this book. Naoki Sakai's paper "Negativity and Historicist Time: Facticity and Intellectual History of the 1930s" mainly deals with the concept of negativity discussed by philosophers from the Kyoto School, such as Tanabe Hajime and Miki Kiyoshi. The Kyoto School is known mostly by its social historical studies on the "early modern history of Asia" (近世東洋史 *kinsei Tōyōshi*). "*Kinsei*" as a historical period is chronologically succeeded by "*kindai*." The intention of establishing a "*keiseishi*" specific to East Asia represents the Kyoto School's historicism of rejecting the historical universalism developed in modern Europe. For the Kyoto School, it is important to establish a historiography, which can fully demonstrate the endogenous history of modernization in East Asia. Both the Orient and the Occident experienced the rise of ethno-centric nationalist identity through interactions within their own spatial boundaries and the spontaneous growth of capitalism along the process. Naoki Sakai's paper historicizes this famous periodization and intends to explore the ontological foundation and ideological consequences of the Kyoto School's historical narratives in the 1930s. Sakai demonstrates that the manufacture of Japanese modern subjectivity is a consequence of dialectic interaction. The Hegelian concept of negativity is used in this paper to explain the Japanese intellectuals' broadly struggling relations with the Others as well as their own history. Through this perspective, Sakai intends to shed light on the Japanese intellectuals' paradoxical involvement in Japanese imperial nationalism and anti-fascist struggle at the same time.

Historically, the Kyoto School began in the early twentieth century. At the time, Japan had won the wars against Russia and the Chinese Qing

empire and had successfully installed colonial control over the island of Taiwan and the Korean peninsula. With its military successes, Japan was acknowledged by the West as a major modern power in East Asia and a member of the "Family of Nations." It was under such a legal and political recognition that the theoretical and ideological ambition of establishing an Asiatic identity and its history of modernization parallel to the Occident began to thrive. Chinese intellectuals such as Zhang Taiyan also shared a similar ambition. However, by the time the Kyoto School had gained its name in the 1930s, the pan-Asian ambition in Japan had already taken a turn to a full-scale military imperialist expansion marked by its invasion of the Manchuria area of China. Establishing a modern history of East Asia began as the attempt to resist against the Hegelian historiography of universalism. However, it also became an ideological foundation for the rising Japanese military imperialism supported by a universalistic discourse of Pan-Asianism.

The paradoxical characteristic of Japanese modernisation experience continues to haunt Japanese intellectuals. A famous example is Takeuchi Yoshimi, a key subject of investigation in the respective papers of Sun Ge and Takahiro Nakajima. Interest in Takeuchi Yoshimi among East Asian scholars itself demonstrates the shared concerns of Asian historical narrative. As a politically engaging and conflicting figure, Takeuchi on the one hand roots his literary and political idealism solidly in the resistance against Western universal modernity. Through his discussion on Lu Xun, Takeuchi demonstrates an intellectual ambition similar to the Kyoto School, which aims to illustrate the Asiatic nature and the multiplicity of modernity. On the other hand, Takeuchi was also seen by many critics as a proponent of Japanese pan-Asianism. His famous argument, which views the Japanese imperial *Daitōa sensō* as having dual characters, is heavily criticized for its political incorrectness. Takeuchi was strongly opposed to the Japanese imperialist war against China, yet he was also justifying the war against the United States as a war against Western imperialism. To Chinese scholars, this is

known as the "Takeuchi Yoshimi paradox," which represents the theoretical and political dilemma experienced by generations of Japanese intellectuals in the twentieth century.

Takeuchi was systematically introduced to China in the late 1990s. His study on Lu Xun was the first to be translated into Chinese at the time when China began to argue theoretically for the unique Chinese path of modernization. Sun Ge is among those Chinese scholars who have seen the possibility of engaging in the rising concern among Chinese intellectuals to search for an East Asian modernity by introducing and discussing works from their Japanese counterparts, such as Takeuchi. In this sense, the spread of Takeuchi in China itself reflects the interconnected dynamics within East Asia in the process of modernization. Takeuchi's work "Overcoming Modernity," which is the main subject of discussion in Takahiro Nakajima's paper, was another article which triggered waves of debate in China in the early 2000s.

To many Chinese scholars such as Sun Ge, Takeuchi's paradox reflects a typical urge among Asian intellectuals to be socially engaged. In Sun's paper, she almost views Takeuchi as an intellectual bridge which connects the concerns of both Japanese and Chinese scholars. In this sense, "Takeuchi studies" is not only a regime that links the physical space, but it also chronologically connects the modern intellectual and political history of Tōyō with contemporary East Asia. According to Sun, a contemporary dogmatic categorization of right wing conservatism and left wing internationalism cannot be used to fully comprehend the complexity of Takeuchi. Sun argues that we will not be able to fully comprehend Takeuchi's historicism if we continue to impose a dogmatic evolutionary framework. As she suggests, such an approach is completely unhistorical. Chinese scholars tend to approach Takeuchi through his work on Lu Xun and put these two figures in a comparative perspective. Instead of submitting to metaphysical boundaries, Takeuchi and Lu are seen as intellectuals who are subject to the philosophy of praxis. In his study of Lu Xun, Takeuchi used a religious term,

"conversion" (回心 *kaisin*), to interpret Lu Xun's transition from hoping to be a doctor into the practice of being an intellectual. According to Takeuchi, it was through his experience of disillusion toward Chinese politics and retreat to pure classic Chinese literature that Lu Xun could finally begin the long process of conversion. Conversion suggests a fundamental transformation of value and position through a dialectic process of negation. This process of negation leads to a creation of a subjectivity by revaluating and resisting against the tradition (or to an individual, the existing epistemology) in the flux of social reality. Subjectivity that emerges through this process of conversion is hence unique and free from the limitation of universalism.

We can find an obvious epistemological similarity between Takeuchi's concept of conversion and the Kyoto School's philosophical discussion on negativity. To Kyoto School philosophers such as Tanabe Hajime, the uniqueness of Asian modernity could only be argued based upon the dialectic connection between Asian tradition and its contemporary reality. The linear historiography proposes a universal destiny of historical evolution, based upon which the universalism of Western modernity is constituted. By breaking up with such a linear narrative, and by establishing dialectic connections within Asia both on spatial and chronological levels, they are able to logically argue for the plurality of modernity.

Both Long-hsin Liu's and Tze-ki Hon's papers apply the logic of negation in understanding the revolutionary nature of conservatism and popular tradition in the making of the Chinese narrative of modernity. Tze-ki Hon's article focuses on the issue of national essence (国粹 *guocui*) and its relationship with Chinese modern revolution. Hon demonstrates that in early twentieth century China, such classical learning was not a revival of "imperial learning" that served the monarchy. Instead, it was the national heritage, which served the newly established nation after the revolution. Liu's paper is another case study on Chinese wartime historical writings in the 1930s.

Two papers in this collection deal with Chinese national historical narrative during the early People's Republic period from the 1950s to the 1970s. Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik's paper on the problem of "restoration" in Chinese Marxist historiography begins with the discussion of Wang Gungwu's remark on the Campaign to Criticize Lin Biao and Confucius (批林批孔 *Pi Lin Pi Kong*). Wang argues that "Marxism opened an opportunity for Chinese intellectuals to look at Chinese history as part of world history." However, according to Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, this statement seems to be in conflict with the Chinese communist narrative of establishing the uniqueness of the Chinese past. She points out that through criticism against restoration, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) not only attempts to eliminate the threat of Chinese heritage overwhelming revolutionary result, but also aims to criticize the present by using the past.

Haiyan Lee's work looks at an artistic creation in the 1960s. She uses the Daiyi Landlord Mansion Museum as a case study to argue that the CCP historical narrative of China as a modern state uses "class racism" to replace nationalism as a strategy of nation building. Lee argues that "the ideology of class in socialist China" should be understood through the "prism of the racism-nationalism nexus." However, the use of terminology is problematic in Lee's discussion, which consequently weakens the historical and theoretical foundation of her paper. To the Kyoto School, the historical process of interaction and negation which leads to the possibility of establishing the East Asian modernity happened not only between historical heritage and contemporary reality, but also spatially among different ethnic and social groups in East Asia. The latter hence fuelled the spontaneous growth of nationalism and nation-states in East Asia. The term ethnicity or race in this context should therefore be used cautiously with a conscious historical concern toward East Asia. Lee's article focuses on the stories displayed at the Daiyi Landlord Mansion Museum, especially the series of statues picturing the brutality of the landlord Liu Wencai. Lee

correctly points out that this story serves a political purpose of generating class resentment against both the landlord class and the feudal past of China. Indeed, Maoist China was featured with discourses of class politics, which seem to be universal regardless of ethnicity. However, we should also notice that at the same time of promoting class politics, Maoist China was also actively conducting a social practice of ethno-identification (民族识别 *minzu shibie*). As a key component and initial stage of implementing ethnic policies (民族政策 *minzu zhengce*), one of the guiding principles was to emphasize the uniqueness of Chinese national/ethnical problems (民族问题 *minzu wenti*) in order to prevent dogmatic use of the Stalinist/Marxist definition of ethnicity which was developed in the European historical context. Use of the term "class racism" risks overlooking China's political reality in the 1960s. Hence, this term appears to be a victim of a teleological narrative of universalism.

To conclude, this edited volume is a great contribution to the discussion of the Kyoto School and East Asian Modernity in English-language scholarship. It is worth mentioning that the collection could present a more complete picture if it had included discussions on the colonial experience of Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. As the fruit of a joint conference in Leiden, this book, however, may be the beginning of a series of academic endeavors. After all, as the editors state in the beginning, "International trade and diplomatic relations required that Japanese and Chinese rethink their notions of time and space." A similar inspiration could be applied to the writing of a world history in an even broader geographic scope crossing the East and the West.

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Editorial Office
The Journal of Northeast Asian History
Northeast Asian History Foundation
Imgwang Bldg., 12F
81 Tongil-ro, Seodaemun-gu
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jnah.nahf@gmail.com

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