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The emergence of the empire and the persistence of the "imperial system" that lasted for two centuries represent a unique phase in the political development of ancient Korea. As an empire is an entity whose status is based not on the title of a monarch (that is, emperor) but the creation of an international hierarchy centered upon itself, it will provide powerful rebuttal to the claim that Korea is simply a constituent of the dominant Sinitic civilization, as well as those fixated on monarchical titles that refuse to understand that an empire is a political entity with certain defining features.

It should be noted, however, that the formation of states and empires has much to do with expansion and conquest. Because an ordinary state and an empire are different entities, their policies and strategic perspectives will be different, and empires in Korean history were not exceptions to this general rule. Empires rise, thrive, and inevitably decline. The purpose of this paper is to illuminate how this process unfolded in the ancient Korean empire of Koguryo.

Keywords: Empire, Koguryo, State formation, Three Kingdoms of Korea, Warfare, Gwanggaeto, Jangsu

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Foreword

Sinocentrism, which dominated political and historical thinking in East Asia, has created a singular worldview—a regional political hierarchy with China, or at least large political entities based in modern Chinese territory, at the top. Other states or non-state entities (chiefdoms, tribes) were bound to the Chinese state in a tributary or suzerain relationship, in acknowledgment of China's military and cultural superiority. While such a worldview took a hit with China's defeat to the western powers and its subsequent fall to the status of what Fukuzawa Yukichi would call "the sick man of Asia," China's dominance over East Asia has long been accepted as a historical axiom.

Chinese preeminence in East Asia can also be translated in modern political terminology as "imperial dominance," where a state has such power and achieved a power disparity so great that it creates a concentric force that realigns the region, where the dominant power becomes center with other states and entities forming the periphery (or frontier) surrounding the imperial metropole from which political, economic, and

cultural power radiate outward.

By virtue of its coexistence with China in the political-cultural space known as East Asia, the history of Korea is not commonly associated with anything "imperial." This is probably due to a tendency to equate "empires" as a certain set of stereotypical images—vast territories, emperors, splendid imperial capitals, stolid imperial troopers battling wild barbarians, tributary relationships and so on; things that China is thought to have possessed, but not the dynasties that appeared in Korean history.

But relying on images to describe and define empires is a clear example of allowing the tail to wag the dog. It is the existence of empires that gave rise to those images, not the other way around. Instead of relying on images, this paper will borrow from political science a more precise definition that describes "empires" as political entities that have extended centralized power over vast territories encompassing a multitude of ethnicities, and organized themselves in a manner conducive to maintaining that control over great distances. Utilizing that definition allows greater latitude in determining which states were empires and it also reveals the existence, in Korean history, of a state that satisfies the conditions to be considered an imperial power: Koguryo.

I. The Question of Empire: What are Not Empires?

In order to prove that Koguryo was an imperial power, it goes without saying that we must first elaborate on what an empire is. "Empire" is not a random term ascribed to a seemingly powerful country, but rather possesses certain features. However, there are notions and misconceptions that must be dispelled regarding empires before moving on to the factors that actually qualify a state as one. In other words, understanding what are not empires is an essential precondition to recognizing what are empires. Listed below are types of countries that are often equated with empires, but fail to justify the rigorous definition of imperial status.

1. A state with an “emperor” as sovereign
2. Large territorial state
3. An “imperialist” state
4. Hegemonic power

An “empire” is commonly regarded as a state headed by a sovereign with the title of “emperor.” While many bona fide empires were indeed ruled by “emperors,” the correlation is not automatic. *Princeps, huangdi, khahan, shahan-shah*, or other equivalent titles are assumed by rulers who engaged in territorial expansion and succeeded in establishing an international hierarchy centered on their state; as they believe that their state has attained a status equal to no one, they thus assume a ruling title superior to rulers around them. This has led to some rulers to assume imperial titles in hopes of enhancing their states’ international stature, without first acquiring the requisite conditions of empire. As a case in point, though Jean-Bedel Bokassa declared himself emperor in 1976 and his country (Central Africa) an empire, no one would seriously consider Central Africa an empire. To say that an empire is what it is because it is ruled by an emperor is to put the cart before the horse. It also creates a problem with modern states such as the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that were often referred to as empires, though they were not ruled by monarchs.

The case for equating large territorial states with empires seem to be stronger, as many empires in history did have extensive territories, including Achaemenid Persia, Rome, Han China, Mongol, Romanov Russia, Great Britain, and others. However, such a definition would exclude those states in history that did not possess much in terms of land area but were nonetheless empires. For example, the empire of Sargon of Akkad, considered to be the first empire recorded in history, was not large territorially when compared to later empires; Athens is widely considered to have created a maritime empire following its defeat of the Persians at Salamis; the Portuguese *estados* did not consist of extensive

territory initially but were a network of ports in Africa and around the Indian Ocean. Because empires manifested in many different forms, positing extensive land area as the sole criterion for imperial status is not logical or justified.

There is also a tendency in modern political discourse to assume "imperialism" as the defining feature of imperial status. Although imperialism itself is a term with a multitude of definitions, the imperialism discussed here is the type of imperialism theorized by the likes of J.A. Hobson and Vladimir Lenin, where policies of industrialized, capitalist states are heavily influenced or controlled by financiers and industrialists. Financiers seek opportunities for investment outside of their countries, and industrialists want new markets aside from the saturated home markets. These financiers and industrialists then dictate policy by means of political contributions, and governments send out troops and immigrants to establish overseas possessions. The problem with identifying empires with modern imperialism is not with the latter per se, but with its errant focus. While appropriating the term "empire," the focus of modern theories of imperialism is actually not the political entity (empire) but the economic system (capitalism). Because of this focus on capitalism, theorists of imperialism are not actually concerned with how empires are constructed and maintained, but how capitalists expand their interests to other regions through the state apparatus. This focus on capitalism makes it safe to dismiss modern theories of imperialism from the present discussion on empire, in spite of the fact that empires do include a significant economic dimension.

As opposed to the three points mentioned above, the distinction between an empire and a hegemonic power is slightly more difficult. Both an empire and a hegemonic state have power that far outstrips states in the vicinity. They also seek to use that power to bend states in the vicinity to their will, and hold the region under their sway. Yet despite apparent similarities, there are differences that set empires apart from mere hegemonic powers. In a hegemonic international environment, the

hegemon remains formally equal in status with its neighbors, whereas imperial status dissolves this guise of formal equality and reduces subordinate states to vassalage or client states.[1] In other words, an empire is *superior* in both real and formal terms, and fully displays its superiority in ideology and ceremony, while a hegemon makes no such claims in spite of its strength. This can be seen in Greece just prior to and during the Peloponnesian War, examples being rival city-states of Sparta and Athens. Sparta had unquestioned military superiority over its neighbors in the Peloponnese, and fought to maintain its position, yet its peculiar social structure ensured that it would keep to itself and not intervene in the internal affairs of other states. In addition, the Spartans did not claim formal suzerainty or force formal vassalage upon its neighbors. This was not the case with Athens, which thought itself superior to other city-states by the level of culture achieved as well as by virtue of its (relatively) democratic political system. Herfried Munkler describes Athenian supremacy as follows:

> Athens provided the commander of the fighting forces and the treasurer of the League, determined the size of contributions, dominated commercial jurisdiction and ensured that its own weights and measures were binding throughout the League. It maintained garrisons in the cities of its partners and thus wielded influence over their internal affairs. And finally it moved the League's treasury from Delos to Athens, changed the object of the League's oath of allegiance from "Athens and its allies" to "the people of Athens," and moved the decisions on war and peace from the League assembly to the Athenian popular assembly.[2]

Basically, Athens imposed its standard and way of life upon other city-

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[1] Herfried Munkler, *Empires*, trans. Patrick Camiller (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 6.

[2] Munkler, *Empires*, 7.

states that were not always willing to do so, because Athenians believed Athens stood at the center of the vast network it created in the form of the Delian League. Also, as can be seen in its "negotiations" with the island state of Melos, Athens did not recognize Melos as an equal or even as a neutral. As far as empires are concerned, other tribes or states in the vicinity are either first part of its world or second part of another empire. There is nothing in between, because aside from the fact that a tribe or state not part of its imperial hierarchy can easily add to the strength of a competitor, failure to subordinate a smaller power can represent a loss of prestige for the imperial power. Because prestige lies in the realm of perceived power, a loss of prestige can be seen as a loss of authority or strength even if they were not actually lost. This can trigger a cascade effect where other states or tribes in the imperial orbit seek to become "neutral," in short, remove itself from the imperial hierarchy, which the imperial power will not tolerate, and will often "overreact" to early attempts of its satellites to extricate themselves from the imperial order.

II. What are the Characteristics of Empires?

After a lengthy elaboration of what does not constitute empires, an explanation as to what actually does constitute an empire should follow. Is it merely a state that combines all the factors from above? Is an empire simply a country that is ruled by emperors, possessed of extensive territory, imperialistic in its policy, and hegemonic? In accordance with the adage that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, an empire is not just a conglomeration of the factors above but a holistic system with the following characteristics.

1. Different Peoples Ruled Differently

As one might expect, researchers are not in agreement as to what to call the constituent parts that make up an empire. Michael Doyle divides

empires into two parts, the metropole and the periphery. As Doyle's definition of empires is a modern one, the metropole represents a "ruling country" whereas the periphery is the "subject country."[3] For Alexander Motyl, an empire is composed of a "core" and periphery, offering the following definition: "a hierarchically organized political system with a hub-like structure—a rimless wheel—within which a core elite and state dominate peripheral elites and societies…."[4] Another noted scholar of empires, Shmuel Eisenstadt, uses the terms "center" and "periphery" in his discussion of empires.[5] Though not offering an explicit definition, Stephen Howe also speaks of a "core territory" and "an extensive periphery of dominated areas."[6]

These "multiple layers" separates empires from modern states and is the first defining feature of empires. The concept of "territorial sovereignty," meaning a government has the exclusive right to exercise its authority within clearly-defined borders, does not readily apply to empires. In a state, the government's authority is (or at least should be) identical everywhere. Whatever laws that were instituted in the center, it is expected to be followed exactly down to the tiniest hamlet in the remotest province. However, because pre-modern states were without means of expeditious communication and transportation available today, "extensive territories" combined with "diverse ethnicities" created problems with administration. Forces of imperial authority often took a long time to reach its remote frontiers, where populations were linguistically and culturally different from imperial citizens at the center. Therefore, ruling heterogeneous populations along the periphery required measures and rules adapted to regions that were different from the center.

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[3] Michael W. Doyle, *Empires* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 11.

[4] Alexander J. Motyl, *Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empire* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 4.

[5] S.N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires* (New York: The Free Press, 1969).

[6] Stephen Howe, *Empire: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 14.

People in the center and those in the periphery, in short, were ruled differently. Unlike modern states that try to integrate its population and subsume whatever ethnic identity people have are subsumed within the "national identity"; in an empire, people are allowed to keep their ethnic identity and culture as long as they acknowledge the authority of the emperor.

2. Notions of Superiority

The second characteristic that defines empires concerns images, in that those living in the empire consider themselves culturally superior to those around them, as "barbarians" around the empire failed to achieve the level of civilization found in the empire. This is an attitude that persisted since the time of the very oldest of empires, such as in Old Akkad, which considered the Gutians, a mountain-dwelling people of the present-day Zagros Mountains (Iran) as "subnormal beings, not conforming to the customs and laws of civilization."[7] Jean-Jacques Glassner describes what Akkadians (and Mesopotamians in general) thought of Gutians:

> They lived in non-civilized areas. They had the intelligence of dogs and the appearance of monkeys. Their languages were confused babble. They were ignorant of agriculture, of cooked foods, of fermented drinks, and of table manners. They knew nothing of houses and cities. They did not bury their dead, and, having no scruples, they knew nothing of prohibitions or how to keep their word. They showed no respect for the gods.[8]

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[7] Jean-Jacques Glassner, *Mesopotamian* Chronicles, ed. Benjamin R. Forster (Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2004), 117.

[8] Ibid.

The same attitude prevailed among the royalty of the Inca Empire, who told the Spanish friars after their subjugation by the Spanish that the reason that the first *Sapa Incas* created the realm they called *tahuantinsuyu* (a Quechua term for the Inca Empire, translated as "four realms together") was to bring order to a world full of chaos, and to spread their true religion based on the worship of the sun.[9] In addition, they believed the people of *tahuantinsuyu* to be the most civilized on earth and that it was their duty to bring civilization to "barbarians" around them. Similar attitudes emerged among the Chinese, manifesting themselves in terms such as *zhonghua* (中華) and *zhongguo* (中國) where China was the center that all other states in the vicinity revolved around and paid homage to.

Notions of superiority are just that, a refusal to see those around the empire as equals. Because the builders of empires believe they have created not just a state but a well-ordered world, any country or tribe not of that world have not been exposed to its superior culture, and were assumed to be living in an uncivilized state. It was imperative that empires make other states acknowledge the superior status of the empire and accept a subordinate status within the imperial hierarchy, for this would obviate the cost of sending over officials to directly administer those areas, or worse, maintain a permanent body of troops, which would drive costs even higher. Last but not least, notions of superiority pervade the imperial metropole at all levels of society. This means it is not only royalty and aristocratic elites that bear such attitudes, but are shared by the general population in their interactions with persons from other countries or tribes.

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[9] Gordon McEwan, *The Incas: New Perspectives* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 2006), 31.

3. Frontiers, not Borders

Unlike straight and dark "lines" that march across maps that define borders of modern states, empires were separated from the outside world by "frontiers," which are broad zones where power and influence of the empire exist in different gradations depending on the position within the zone. It should be noted that when clear natural features, such as large rivers, were present, empires often made them *de facto* borders with the outside world. The term "de facto" has been used because ancient borders formed by natural boundaries are still not borders in a modern sense. Where clear natural features are not present, modern states still try to demarcate them with precise measurements and markers. In such areas without a clear natural boundary such as those between the north Asian steppe and China proper, the only signs of imperial authority were garrisons or small market towns few and far between, with people living as before.

Unlike modern borders that require "documentation" and "permission" to cross, frontiers were much more porous. Even for the strongest imperial power, keeping frontiers completely closed to the outside world was simply impossible. Though empires attempted to maintain some measure of control with military garrisons and occasional sallies to drive barbarians away, frontiers were never airtight, with constant movement in and out. Also, since frontiers were places where the application of administrative authority was intermittent, fighting was frequent, and violence was rife. Frontiers were often set in hostile natural environments where farming or trading was difficult; the populations had to fend for themselves in the hostile environment, and thus tended to be tough and independent. Moreover, since the forces of authority were not always present to resolve disputes, the enforcement of law was often taken into private hands.

These frontiers could either be open, meaning it led directly into areas the empire regarded as barbarian zones; or they could be middle

areas that formed between contending empires. In the latter case, frontiers resembled what would be termed in international relations as *buffer zones*, where a state or a region is purposely left alone so that two strong powers do not interact directly and thus reduce chances of conflict. Empires often do not war against each other directly, often preferring a war of words or sometimes employing barbarian tribes against the other empire in what is essentially war by proxy. This happens more often when two empires exist within a larger region, in other word, in a single "world." When one empire engages in a display of power, the other empire will likely not back down, as it would constitute a loss of face toward subordinates in its hierarchy. Combined with the fact that they do not formally recognize each other as equals, when empires go to war, it is often a fight to the finish. Hence, empires do not war on each other unless "everything" is at stake.

4. King of Kings

As empires consider themselves superior to those polities around them, so should their sovereigns. If other countries around them had kings, an imperial sovereign must be referred to by a title that displays superior status. The first of these titles to appear in ancient records was the term *sar saranni*, a word derived from the ancient Assyrian language that means "king of kings." While eventually becoming a mighty empire, Assyria was at first a city-state in competition with other city-states. As the word "*sar*" denoted king or sovereign of a single city-state, when the Assyrians began their conquests and their *sar* (king) became ruler over a number of other city-states, a new term had to be invented. He had become *sar* over other smaller *sars*, which is what *sarsarrani* means. The term was adopted later by the rulers of the Persian Empire and became the more familiar *Shahan-shah*.

In China, when the king of the state of Qin unified the Warring States under a single banner, he believed that the old title for sovereign

was not majestic enough for his achievements. Although the idea of the "son of heaven" already existed as was the title for it, *wang* (king 王), the title was reserved only for the King of Zhou, supposedly suzerain over rulers of the warring states. Rulers of the each of the warring states were originally vassals with titles such as *gong* (duke 公), *hou* (marquis 侯), *bai* (earl 伯), *zi* (count 子), and *nan* (baron 男). However, many rulers would appropriate the title wang for themselves during times of ascendency. Thus all the rulers of the warring states came to be called wang, after which the title lost much of its supreme status. Foregoing the title wang, the king of Qin combined the term *huang* (皇), which denoted demigods of Chinese mythology with *di* (帝), the title for ancient sage-kings, into the title known today, *huangdi* (皇帝), commonly translated as emperor. But it should be noted that the title of a sovereign is an outward feature of imperial status, not an indispensable requirement.

5. Hierarchical International Order

As already explained in the previous chapter, this is what distinguishes empires from mere hegemonic states. Empires do not only create gradations of power within the territory they rule, but also beyond. It can be likened to a pyramid, where the empire forms the apex while its vassals, satellites, and subordinate tribes form the middle and the base depending on their level of power and civilization. The superior status of the empire is ultimately enforced militarily, but there are also institutional and ceremonial devices that affirm such superiority.

One such example is the so-called tributary-suzerain system, whereby the kingship of lesser states is given recognition and legitimacy by empires and the lesser state offers regular payment to the empire. While initially done so due to the sheer power disparity between the empire and the tributary, it later takes on a cultural and ideological dimension, and is done so simply because it is the proper order of things and the way it is. In order to obviate the need for constant military

reconquest, empires attempt to emphasize this hierarchical order and prevail upon the lesser power to accept it as natural. Again, in a hierarchy, there are no equals. An imperial hierarchy is not a collection of "equal" sovereign states, but a rank-order system based on how loyal the lesser state is in serving the empire and adhering itself to it.

III. Early Koguryo's Growth into Empire

Imperial histories are filled with tales emphasizing the predestined nature of their greatness, but empires generally have very humble beginnings. In fact, there is nothing that sets other types of states apart from empires at the starting line. States and empires start out the same way, both expanding at the expense of other political entities. Before the modern era, there was nothing to hold state expansion in check save for military forces of other states. A state that was able to overcome the checks placed upon it and expand on a consistent basis would cross the threshold to imperial status. However, if the state was successfully blocked from expanding beyond a certain point, it would be stopped short of the said threshold. In other words, there was no predestination involved as to whether a political entity would become an empire or not. There was simply no way to predict successful imperial expansion until it had actually occurred. An observation of states that went on to become great empires serves to underlie this fact.

Table 1. Beginnings of Major Empires of the Ancient World

Empire	Started as:	Starting location	Size at beginning	Peak size
Rome	City-state	Capitoline Hill, modern Rome	~1km^2	5,000,000km^2
Carthage	City-state	Modern Tunis	>1km^2	300,000km^2
Macedonia	Small kingdom	North of Greece	~100km^2	5,200,000km^2
Qin	Small kingdom	Western China	~100km^2	2,300,000km^2
Kshatriya-Maurya	Small kingdom	Northern India	~50km^2	3,400,000km^2
Achaemenid Persia	Small kingdom w/in Medea	Present Iran	~500km^2	5,500,000km^2

Source: Combination of various data from Rein Taagepera, "Size and Duration of Empires: Growth-Decline Curves, 600 BC-600 AD," *Social Science History* 3, no. 3/4 (1979), 115-138.

Examples from history further highlight the fact that ordinary states (kingdoms) and empires have the same humble beginnings. Rome was simply one of the city-states of Italy busy fending off Etruscan and Samnite incursions, fighting for its survival. Though it does not appear in this list, the first seventeen kings of Assyria in the Assyrian King List supposedly "dwelt in tents."[10] Macedonia before Philip II was an unknown, semi-barbaric (as regarded by Greeks) kingdom before catapulted into historical prominence by the conquests of Alexander. At the beginning of the Spring and Autumns Period of China (771 BCE), the state of Qin, which would unite all of China under a single ruler in the third century BCE, was just one of the dozens of kingdoms vying for survival.

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[10] Jean-Jacques Glassner, *Mesopotamian Chronicles*, ed. Benjamin R. Forster (Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2004), 137.

1. The Issue of Time Sovereignty

Likewise, there was nothing that made Koguryo different from other kingdoms or political entities in the vicinity when it was founded in 37 BCE. This article, however, will show why Koguryo went on to become an empire while competing states or entities in the vicinity did not. A question that arises when claiming imperial status for Koguryo is: What sets Koguryo apart from the kingdoms of Baekje and Silla, which to get her comprised the so-called "Three Kingdoms" of Korea? The answer to the question lies in time sovereignty whether a polity is given time to expand by virtue of absence of strong powers in the vicinity. Munkler writes that throughout history, rival powers of equal status are usually lacking on the margins of the main political centers, where large wars do not break out and the rise to empire can occur through a series of "small wars" in which the resistance of organizationally and technologically inferior opponents are broken down.[11] Following the defeat of Gojoseon by Han forces in 108 BCE, there was no polity of significance in the northern Korean peninsula and southern Manchuria. Though Han China attempted to establish commanderies in Gojoseon territory, its grip on the region was intermittent at best, with frequent uprisings against Chinese attempts at administration. During this period, the Xiongnu and other northern nomads remained the chief security concerns for China, and the former Gojoseon territory did not receive the same degree of attention. The chaos resulting from the Former Han-Later Han transition (8-23 CE) and Later Han's division into China's Three Kingdoms further impeded China's ability to intervene in the east. The less-than-firm political grip by the imperial power and the lack of strong polities in the region afforded early Koguryo time sovereignty to expand.

This simply was not the case with Baekje and Silla. These two

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[11] Munkler, *Empires*, 35.

states also engaged in expansion, as all early states do. In the *Samguk sagi*, Baekje and Silla are to have come into contact in the first century CE. Of course, many scholars have reservations concerning the credibility of early records in the *Samguk sagi*, especially whether the events actually happened in the dates recorded. These reservations have led some to believe that events of war between Baekje and Silla from the first to the third centuries actually took place in the sixth and seventh centuries but were "retroactively" given an earlier date. Bak Dae-jae claims that charges of retroactivity in the *Chronicles* that pushes events in the first, second, and third centuries to the sixth and seventh centuries is exaggerated, and constitutes a simplistic denial of early records.[12] Bak also posits that some of the battles recorded between Baekje and Silla were actually between Baekje and statelets allied with and that would later merge with Silla, and that those events were incorporated into Silla records as their own.

While the debate over the historicity of early records in the *Samguk sagi* is a legitimate one, ascertaining the exact dates at which the battles between Baekje and Silla took place is not important for the purposes of this article. What is important is the fact that the respective spheres of influence of Baekje and Silla began to overlap before they were able to cross the imperial threshold. Each had essentially become the other's greatest obstacle to expansion and near-constant wars naturally followed. Though the competition had its ebbs and flows, neither Baekje nor Silla were able to completely dominate each other. They would remain locked in perpetual competition, and were denied the time sovereignty necessary for greater expansion. Time sovereignty is a must for continued expansion of a polity until it crosses the threshold of imperial status. Favorable international environment and a weakened Buyeo ensured

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[12] Bak Dae-jae, "*Samguk sagi* chogi gisa e boineun Silla wa Baekje ui jeonjaeng" [Baekje-Silla wars in early records of the *Samguk sagi*], *Hanguksa hakbo* 7 (1999), 13.

time sovereignty for Koguryo. Baekje and Silla's adjacent location and approximate parity in power precluded rapid expansion beyond a certain point, and along with it, imperial status.

2. Koguryo's Early Expansion

Koguryo expanded quickly after its foundation in modern Huanren, China. Koguryo first initiated military action against the kingdom of Biryu, which was conquered in 36 BCE. It was followed by the conquest of Haengin and Northern Okjeo in 34 BCE and 28 BCE, respectively.

The encounter with Biryu is one of the significant events recorded in the *Dongmyeong wangpyeon* (The Lay of King Dongmyeong), an epic prose contained in a collection compiled by Yi Gyu-bo in the late twelfth century. In the epic, King Dongmyeong (Chumo) engages in an archery contest against Songyang, the king of Biryu, and defeats him. When Songyang hesitates about conceding defeat, Chumo subdues the latter by calling rain from the skies and flooding his kingdom. This likely suggests a military subjugation of the natives (Biryu) by the newcomers (Koguryo). However, judging from the fact that Songyang's daughter is married to Yuri, Chumo's son and the second king, efforts were obviously made to incorporate the vanquished. There is a slightly different version in the Baekje Annals in the *Chronicles*, where Chumo marries Soseono, the daughter of the king of Jolbon Buyeo and has two sons by her. This also suggests efforts on the part of Chumo to remain on friendly terms with the native population and integrate them into his new kingdom. Whereas Chumo was careful regarding Jolbon and Biryu, Okjeo was a different story. Okjeo was a collection of tribes/chiefdoms living along the northeastern coast of the Korean peninsula. According to the Chronicles, there is no effort at integration, as they were conquered outright and made part of Koguryo territory. The same fate would befall Eastern Okjeo in 56. Relatively well-organized polities such as Jolbon were accommodated, whereas those deemed inferior were simply

overrun. The early conquests of Koguryo confirm the aforementioned tendency of empires to develop along the periphery of strong states, at the expense of weaker, less powerful polities such as Biryu or Okjeo.

Koguryo also struck against the Xianbi, who were defeated and subjugated in 9 BCE after taking their "fortress" with a successful ruse.[13] As Koguryo was not inclined to pay the costs of administering nomadic territory, it only established indirect rule over the Xianbi. This is significant in that Koguryo gained an outlet to the nomadic steppes, which became a source of horses for its cavalry.[14] The most organized of polities in the vicinity capable of checking Koguryo's early expansion, was Buyeo, from where the Koguryo founder Chumo (Jumong) is supposed to have originated and had remained an enemy after Chumo's escape. Buyeo led a major invasion of Koguryo in 5 BCE with 50,000 troops, but Koguryo defenses stood firm and Buyeo troops retreated after many froze to death at the onset of winter. In 9, Buyeo threatened that Koguryo would not be able to sustain itself lest it serve Buyeo with "propriety and good reason," to which the prince (and future King Daemushin) retorted that the Buyeo ruler "mind his own kingdom first."[15] In 13, Buyeo decided to force the issue through war with another major invasion. But this invasion force was ambushed by Koguryo troops at Hakballyeong Pass and suffered a crushing defeat. Koguryo conquered the Yangmaek in 14, along with territory in the Xuantu Commandery (玄菟郡高句麗縣). King Daemushin would retaliate for the earlier invasion by leading troops into Buyeo in 22. Though the invasion was a military failure, the invaders did manage to kill Daeso, the Buyeo king, and the resulting political chaos meant that Buyeo would not

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13 *Samguk sagi* [Chronicle of the Three Kingdoms], Koguryo Annals, King Yuri, year 11 (三國史記 高句麗本紀琉璃王11年).

14 Bak No-seok, "Koguryo chogi ui yeongto byeoncheon yeongu" [A study on the territorial transitions in early Koguryo], (PhD dissertation, Jeonbuk Daehakkyo, 2003), 15.

15 *Samguk sagi*, Koguryo Annals, King Yuri, year 28 (三國史記高句麗本紀琉璃王 28年).

interfere with Koguryo expansion for over a century.

Koguryo's defeat of Buyeo roughly coincided with political convulsion in China, as the Han Interregnum began when Wang Mang usurped the Chinese throne in 8 to set up the Xin Dynasty, which prompted constant wars against those who sought to restore the Han Dynasty until 23. This impaired the ability of the Chinese metropole to intervene in events along its periphery. King Daemushin continued his campaign to expand territory, conquering Gaema-guk (蓋馬國) in 26 and pressuring the king of Guda-guk (句茶國) to relinquish his kingdom later that year. The Later Han troops from Liaodong Commandery invaded in 28, as the turmoil in China settled down. The Chinese were compelled to retire by a tactical ruse, after which Daemushin established diplomatic relations with Later Han in 32 even as he was attacking the "kingdom of Lelang" (K. *Nangnang-guk* 樂浪國). When the Lelang kingdom was destroyed in 37, the territory of Koguryo had been enlarged far beyond its founding borders. The map below shows the expansion that took place between the foundation by Chumo and the end of the reign of Daemushin. Jo Beop-jong describes Nangnang-guk as one of a number of small statelets established in the Korean peninsula by Chinese immigrants.[16]

The fact that Lelang fell to Koguryo in 37 brings up the question as to whether it was the same Lelang that fell to Koguryo in 313. Lelang in the *Chronicles* is ruled by a "king," which sets it apart from a district ruled by a *taishou* (太守, Han) or a *dayin* (大尹, Xin). Also, records in the *Chronicles* related to Lelang after 37 make no references to the Choi (崔, Cui) clan in relation to Lelang. For example, the Lelang attacked by King Goi (古爾王) of Baekje in 246 is ruled by a *taishou* named Liu Mao (劉茂) and there is also a *taishou* that sends an assassin to kill Baekje's King Bunseo (汾西王) in 304. Baekje obviously came in contact

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[16] Jo Beop-jong, "Wiman Joseon ui daehan jeonjaeng gwa ganghan jehuguk ui seonggyeok" [Studies on war between Wiman and Han and the nature of countries that surrendered to the Han], *Seonsa wa godae* 14 (2000), 185.

with Lelang much later than Koguryo, and there are no references to Lelang as a monarchy in the Baekje Annals, which confirms that the Lelang faced by King Daemushin was not the Lelang that fought with Baekje in the third and fourth centuries. Claims of Lelang kingship could be made in relation to a rebellion by Wang Diao (王調), by reading it as "Diao, king of Lelang" (樂浪土人王調), but such claims are in the minority, as most agree that Wang Diao is a personal name.Wang Diao's rebellion is said to have killed the magistrate (郡守) of Lelang named Liu Xuan (劉憲). The rebellion ended in 30 when Guangwudi (光武帝) sent Wang Zun (王遵) to restore order.[17] Nowhere in the above records appear references to Choi Ri (Cui Li 崔理), who died in 37 as the ruler of Lelang. Therefore, there is little contradiction between the fact that a Lelang statelet ruled by a king fell in 37 and the Lelang Commandery administered by a *taishou* was destroyed by King Micheon's forces in 313. Daemushin had conquered a Chinese statelet, and his territory now abutted those of the Chinese commanderies.

The map below represents territorial expansion during early Koguryo. Horizontal lines indicate Koguryo territory at its foundation in 37 BCE, while the vertical lines show conquests made during the reign of Yuri with the diagonal lines being territory at the end of Daemushin's rule. But such rapid expansion, especially strikes against Chinese settlements, drew a response from the rejuvenated Han dynasty. Aside from quelling a rebellion by Wang Diao in 30, the first Eastern Han emperor Guangwudi (光武帝) launched a seaborne invasion across the Yellow Sea in 44, and succeeded in reestablishing Han presence in areas south of Salsu, often identified with the modern Cheongcheon River in North Korea's Pyeongan Province.[18]

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[17] *Houhan shu*, Biography 76: Benevolent Officials, no. 136: Wang Jing (後漢書列傳 卷76 循吏列傳 第36 王景).

[18] *Samguk sagi*, Koguryo Annals, King Daemushin, year 27 (三國史記高句麗本紀大武神王 27年).



Map 1. Territorial Expansion in Early Koguryo (Bak No-seok, 2003)

3. The Augustan Threshold

The reign of King Taejo (53-146) probably represents the decisive moment in the early phase of Koguryo's expansion. It is a well-known historical fact that empires are not exclusive to sedentary states, as there are numerous instances where nomads conquered vast territories and formed imperial conglomerations. It is also true that nomadic empires generally are not known for their longevity. While the longevity of sedentary empires is by no means guaranteed, they do have a number of

means at their disposal to make their state apparatus more enduring.

Thomas Barfield states that empires are entities that have the ability to "centralize power and to maintain control at a distance."[19] Of course, all states, regardless of size, require some measure of centralization in order to achieve statehood. Be they city-states or large states (empires), power needs to be centralized so that it can be exercised effectively. However, what sets empires apart from small states is the second element stated by Barfield, the ability to maintain such control and authority at a distance. As stated earlier, because communication was difficult in ancient times, the amount of territory a ruler could control was limited. Many rulers chose to control only its chief cities and its immediate environs, as they could not handle the burden of administering large territories. A state can choose to conquer and leave conquered territories for promise of tribute, but this may require periodic reconquest, as there is no permanent sign of authority. The first empire to resolve the dilemma of having to rule large territories was the Achaemenid Persian Empire. Instead of the promise of tribute, the Persians came up with a system known as a *satrapy*. The Persian *Shahan-shah* divided up his empire and sent out officials, called *satraps*, who were given powers to exercise authority in his name. Satraps often came with a complement of troops, and could take military action in case of trouble. The rule by proxy through a system of governors allowed imperial rulers to control much wider areas by obviating the need for constant reconquest. This is succinctly demonstrated by Rein Taagepera, who divides the history of empires into four phases. The size of empires grow with each successive phase, but the greatest growth in terms of size of empires take place between first phase (2850 BCE–700 BCE) and the second phase (700 BCE–1600 CE). The largest state in the world during the first phase, the early Chinese state of Shang (商), had a land area of 1,100,000 km^2, but

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[19] Susan E. Alcock et al., eds., *Empires* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 40.

the Persian empire would rule a total land area of 5,500,000 km^2 by 500 BCE, a feat that was simply impossible for any state during the previous period.[20]

In East Asia, an example of the Augustan Threshold can be seen after the unification of China by Qin. Wang Guan (王綰), a prime minister in the government of the first emperor, Qin Shihuangdi, suggested sending imperial princes to distant provinces for pacification, but the famous legalist minister Li Si (李斯) noted that the enfeoffment of princes in early Zhou China led to their estrangement from the imperial house and eventual descent into chaos, and claimed no one under heaven should be "of a different heart" if the realm is to find peace. Qin Shihuangdi concurred with Li Si, stating that enfeoffment of vassals would be tantamount to "planting the seeds of war again" and applied the Qin system of commanderies (郡) to the rest of China.[21] The governors sent to the commanderies were imperial appointees, meaning the governors were beholden to the emperor for their position and prestige.

In Rome, sending out officials to rule an area in place of the emperor began in earnest after the establishment of the Principate by Emperor Augustus, hence the term Augustan Threshold. The Augustan Threshold is important in that it displays the willingness of rulers to expand their realm beyond what the monarch can control in person. The reason the rule of King Taejo of Koguryo is emphasized is because this is when the expanding Koguryo state appears to have crossed the Augustan Threshold according to a passage in the *Chronicles*:

> Year 46 (98 CE), spring, third month, on his way east to Chaekseong (柵城), the king arrived in Gyesan in the west of Chaekseong and captured a white deer. The king feasted and drank with his officials after arriving

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[20] Rein Taagepera, "Size and Duration of Empires: Systematics of Size," *Social Science Research* 7 (1978), 119-21.

[21] *Shiji*, Annals of Qin Shihuang, no. 6, Shihuangdi, year 28 (史記本紀秦始皇本紀第6始皇二十八年).

in Chaekseong, bestowed gifts on officials (吏) at Chaekseong with appropriate differences according to rank, and had their merits inscribed in stone before returning.[22]

Chaekseong was one of Koguryo's major cities, located along the banks of the Duman (Tumen) River near modern Hunchun, China. This passage points to the presence of officials appointed by the king to govern Chaekseong in his stead, rather than leaving local magnates in power in a tributary relationship.

King Taejo's appointment of officials is natural given the pace of territorial expansion during his reign. Taejo's conquests include Liaoxi (55),[23] Eastern Okjeo (56), Galsa (68), Jona (72), and Juna (74). In 105, Taejo ordered a raid on the Liaodong Commandery, and though his troops suffered a severe repulse, he obviously felt strong enough to challenge Chinese power. In 118, Taejo sent troops under his younger brother in an invasion of the Xuantu and Liaodong commanderies, and succeeded in killing the governor of the Liaodong Commandery along with his two officials. Having defeated Chinese provincial authorities, he went on a tour inside Buyeo to pay homage to Yuhwa, mother of the founder Chumo. Buyeo allowing the entourage of a foreign king inside their territory suggests that Buyeo was not in a position to challenge Koguryo at this juncture. It was such rapid expansion and growth in international power that warranted the posting of officials to govern Koguryo's newly-acquired territories.

But Koguryo's regional dominance would not last, as Han China and Buyeo joined forces to check Koguryo expansion. An attack on Xuantu in 121 was defeated when Buyeo sent 20,000 troops to aid the Chinese, and another invasion force in 122 was again crushed by the

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[22] *Samguk sagi*, Koguryo Annals, King Taejo, year 46 (三國史記高句麗本紀太祖王46年).

[23] The exact location of "Liaoxi" where King Taejo is to have built his ten fortresses is uncertain, and warrants further investigation.

Han-Buyeo alliance. In 123, Koguryo was again sending tribute to the Chinese. But the very fact that Han and Buyeo came together is a testament to Koguryo's growth, which had already crossed the Augustan Threshold and was well on its way to imperial expansion.

4. Consolidation of Monarchical Power

Imperial expansion and crossing of the Augustan Threshold usually means consolidation of the power of the center, which naturally comes at the expense of vassals and local powers. Making regional officials beholden to the monarch by directly appointing them has historically been the strategy employed by every expanding power, but when local powers do not relent, a power contest then ensues over who assumes primacy in ruling the country and such competition can sometimes escalate into civil war. The king of kings or emperors must be able to quell local challenges to his power if he is to exercise his authority effectively. The most representative of such incidences in Koguryo happened during the reign of King Gogukcheon, the ninth ruler:

> King Gogukcheon, year 12 (190), Autumn, ninth month. Lords Eobiryu (於畀留) and Jwagaryeo (左可慮) held power as blood kin of the queen.[24] Their power made their sons and kin utterly arrogant and extravagant. They ravished the daughters of other men and seized land and houses with impunity. The people were resentful and angry. Word about them infuriated the king and they were sought for execution, upon which Jwagaryeo and four other Lords rose in rebellion.…[25]
>
> King Gogukcheon, year 13 (191), Summer, fourth month. Jwagaryeo

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[24] Jwagaryeo's title was *pyeongja* (평자, 評者), a title denoting high rank in each of the *bu* (five constituent units of the Koguryo aristocracy) for which there is no exact English translation, hence the use of the generic term "lord."

[25] *Samguk sagi*, Koguryo Annals, King Gogukcheon, year 12 (三國史記高句麗本紀故國川王 12年).

collected his ilk and attacked the capital. The king raised soldiers and horses from near the capital and vanquished the rebels.[26]

Past literature posits that the passage from the twelfth year of King Gogukcheon's reign is evidence of weak royal power, but nothing could be further from the truth. The two nobles obviously had power bases outside the capital, given the fact that they attacked the capital from outside; but the annals make it clear that their power was boosted significantly by their relations with the queen. The situation might not have been unlike what happened following the founding of Goryeo, where twenty-nine local magnates married their daughters to founder Wang Geon in an effort to bolster their power. But whatever the potency given to early Koguryo aristocrats by their local power bases and their ties to the queen, it did not compare with the forces that could be mobilized by the king.

The entry from year 13 (191) demonstrates that the king had sufficient military power near the capital (and therefore at his disposal) to quell challenges originating in the provinces. In other words, royal power had grown to a point where it could not be overcome by an alliance of provincial aristocracy. While there could be opinions that the lords could have collected their troops from the capital, it would be unreasonable to believe that local aristocrats would raise forces in the capital instead of their respective power bases, which would be much easier. Also, the year 13 entry from above states that the rebels attacked the capital, and not the palace, meaning the capital itself was attacked from the outside. Monarchical power was exercised explicitly when King Gogukcheon made an obscure figure named Eulpaso his prime minister. When the aristocrats took issue with Eulpaso's appointment, the king made it clear that he would not brook any challenges, declaring that "anyone who

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[26] *Samguk sagi*, Koguryo Annals, King Gogukcheon, year 13 (三國史記高句麗本紀故國川王 13年).

disobeys the prime minister will be killed along with the rest of his kin," essentially enforcing his will in the face of noble opposition. Possession of military power and the concomitant ability to dictate policy shows that power was more centralized in early Koguryo than previously believed.

IV. Crossing the Imperial Threshold

Having described in Chapter I the component features of polities known as "empires," I will now attempt to assess whether the state of Koguryo fulfills the criteria of imperial status. Any claim that confers imperial status to Koguryo is necessarily brought into conflict with the traditional view of East Asia, where only Chinese dynasties are considered empires without equals in the region. In *Dong Asia ui jeonjaeng gwa pyeonghwa* (War and peace in East Asia), Yi Sam-seong argues that dynasties that arose in the Korean peninsula voluntarily resigned themselves to the sinocentric regional order. Under this international order based on a system of tribute, chances of conflict between Korean states and Chinese dynasties were reduced.[27] Yi also stresses that although such a relationship confirmed the regional hierarchy and made Korean dynasties vassals, it actually gave the latter independence in terms of domestic policy within what he terms a hierarchic peace regime. However, Yi qualifies this claim by mentioning that the lessening of conflict between China and the Korean kingdoms occurred after the fall of Koguryo, implying a greater frequency of conflict when the Koguryo imperium existed alongside Chinese dynasties.

The scholarly verdict on Koguryo's imperial status is divided. Although being one of the first scholars to bring the concept of a "worldview" (K. *cheonhagwan*), which is commonly associated with

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[27] Yi Sam-seong, *Dong Asia ui jeonjaeng gwa pyeonghwa* [War and peace in East Asia], vol. 1 (Seoul: Hangilsa, 2009), 167.

imperial hierarchies, into the discourse on Koguryo; No Tae-don stops short of calling Koguryo an empire. In his discussion of Koguryo's relationship with peoples in Manchuria, Mark E. Byington makes no references to Koguryo as an imperial power, though his article deals with how Koguryo subjugated other states and tribes in the region.[28] In contrast, Bak Gyeong-cheol and Pankaj Mohan boldly state that Koguryo was an empire. According to Bak, Koguryo first became a "despotic military state" and transitioned into an empire by the middle of the fourth century, firmly establishing its lebensraum in Northeast Asia.[29] Mohan describes a growth process where Koguryo started out as a chiefdom state, expanded into an early state, and finally transformed itself into an imperial state.[30]

Like Mohan, this article also describes Koguryo's imperial expansion as a process. However, there is the formidable problem of identifying when Koguryo actually became an empire. Attempts to ascertain the exact moment when a polity crossed the threshold into imperial status is difficult. Finding exact dates is difficult if not impossible, and the best one can hope for in this regard is a close approximation. For Koguryo, the crossing of the imperial threshold seems to have occurred during the reign of Gwanggaeto (391–413).

In addition to Koguryo imperiality, this article also seeks to prove that the imperial hierarchy that came to signify East Asia's political landscape was incomplete during the historical period under discussion

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[28] Mark E. Byington, "Control or Conquer: Koguryŏ's Relations with States and Peoples in Manchuria," *The Journal of Northeast Asian History* 4, no. 1 (2007), 85-115.

[29] Bak Gyeong-cheol,"Koguryo gunsa jeonryak eul wihan ilsiron: Pyongyang cheondo yihu Koguryo gunsa jeonryak ui jihyangjeom eul jungsim euro" [An essay on observations of Koguryo military strategy: Emphasis on the direction of Koguryo military strategy after the relocation of the capital to Pyongyang], *Sahak yeongu* 40 (1989), 1-2.

[30] Pankaj Mohan, "Gwanggaeto daewangbi e boineun Koguryo wanggwon gwa jeongdangseong" [Royal authority and legitimacy in the late fourth-early fifth century Koguryo], *Koguryo Balhae yeongu* 21 (2005), 524.

and that China was not the sole imperial power in East Asia. East Asia at this point in history was a region in contention, between the nomadic imperial confederations and Chinese dynasties, and from the end of the fourth century onward, eastern powers headed by Koguryo. The "ideal" tributary system, which meant that the Chinese held military superiority over other powers, did not exist at this time.[31] As a case in point, that the relationship between the Xiongnu and the Han during the initial stages was not tributary at all, but was more akin to extortion and appeasement where Xiongnu attacks were averted usually through promises of "gifts." Over the historical period being covered here, China's relationship with the outside world existed in various forms, from outright Chinese rule (northern Vietnam), to parity (Han-Xiongnu, Northern-Southern dynasties), to actual "barbarian" superiority. There was no dominance and hegemony that China would achieve later in history. Manchuria and the Korean Peninsula, was not a part of the sinocentric world order from the fifth to the seventh centuries, due to the emergence of Koguryo as an empire.

1. Conquests Prior to Gwanggaeto

Again, the conquests of Gwanggaeto did not represent a new era or something out of the ordinary, but were merely a continuation of a trend that had started when King Dongcheon (227-248) joined hands with Sima Yi (司馬懿) of Wei China in attacking the Gongsun (公孫) clan of Liaodong, hoping for some Gongsun lands in return for cooperation. When Koguryo was denied, however, Wei and Koguryo went to war in 246. The war opened well for Koguryo, but its two initial victories were reversed when the king's arrogance led him to underestimate the enemy,

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[31] Piteo Yun, "Seogu hakgye jogong jedo iron ui Jungguk jungsimjeok munhwaron bipan" [Critique of Sino-centrism in Western theories of the tributary system], *Asea yeongu* 45, no. 3 (2002), 273.

and the Koguryo capital of Gungnaeseong was sacked by Wei troops.[32] After driving out the Wei forces, King Dongcheon turned his attention south and secured territories in the northeast and north-central Korean peninsula.[33] Koguryo's advance toward Liaodong seemed to have been thwarted for the time being, and off-limits to subsequent expansion. Expansion thereafter took place in other directions. The thirteenth king, Seochon, sent his brother Dalga in subjugating Sukshin (C. Sushen 肅愼) tribes, located northeast of Koguryo territory around the Songhua and the Ussuri rivers, where "many towns were taken" and Dalga became a viceroy (安國君) appointed to the region, indicating the conquest and incorporation of these areas. Expansion accelerated during the reign of King Micheon (300-331), who invaded and stamped out Lelang and Daifang in succession, thus eliminating the last Chinese enclaves in the Korean peninsula, in addition to successful attacks on Xianping (西安平) in Liaodong and Xuantu. King Micheon's successes were apparently reversed during the reign of Koguryo's sixteenth king, Gogugwon. Koguryo's capital was sacked by the Yan (燕) army of Murong Huang (慕容皝), stopping Koguryo's attempts at advancing further into Liaodong. The king attempted to invade Baekje but was defeated in 369, and was killed defending Pyongyang against Baekje troops in 371.

In spite of the defeats, Koguryo territory at this time stretched approximately from the Liaodong peninsula south of the Qianshan (千山) range to the northern Gangwon province area in the Korean peninsula, and from the Songhua River to the mouth of the Tumen River. Expansionism would come to a temporary halt during the reign of the seventeenth king, Sosurim, whose focus was more inward than outward. Sosurim's standout policies include the introduction of Buddhism, the enactment of laws (律令), and the creation of a state academy (太學).

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[32] *Samguk sagi*, Koguryo Annals, King Dongcheon, year 20 (三國史記高句麗本紀東川王 20年).

[33] Bak No-seog, "Seogi 3 segi ui Koguryo ui dong haean jiyeok jinchul" [Koguryo's expansion into the East Coast in the third century], *Jeonbuk sahak* 23 (2000), 84-88.

These policies should be understood in their proper context, as efforts to reorganize and stabilize the country after successive defeats to Yan and Baekje.[34] They should not be considered, as earlier studies suggest, as evidence of Koguryo's earnest establishment as an ancient kingdom, as the centralization of governmental and monarchical powers was already complete by the second century. Though Sosurim did send troops into battle, they were not earnest attempts at expansion, and that policy did not change until 385, when King Gogugyang dispatched troops in an attempt to take Liaodong.

2. Gwanggaeto's Conquests

Gwanggaeto's rule began with a series of wars and swift conquests. In the year that he took the throne, the king struck Baekje with 40,000 troops and succeeded in taking nearly all territories north of the present Han River. Koguryo troops also struck the Biryeo (C. Beili 卑麗), a branch of the Khitan living along the Siramuren River. The king also took Gwanmi Fortress, at present-day Ganghwa Island. Baekje attempts to take back the areas from 392 to 394 were all checked and repulsed.

When the Biryeo tribes did not desist from their raiding, the king mounted an earnest expedition, destroying six to seven hundred hamlets and taking much livestock. The subjugation also had the effect of gaining access to the resources of the nomadic steppe. In 396, Gwanggaeto launched a full-scale invasion of Baekje, driving deep into Baekje territory and eventually encircled Hanseong, the capital. According to the Gwanggaeto Stele in Ji'an, China, the king of Baekje surrendered to Gwanggaeto, paid a tribute of 1,000 rolls of fine cloth and 1,000 slaves, and promised to serve Koguryo "forever" as its vassal.[35] This was in

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[34] Jung Woon Yong, "Trends in Koguryŏ's Relationship with Paekche and Silla during the 4th-7th Centuries," *International Journal of Korean History* 8 (August 2006), 89.

[35] 而殘主困逼獻出男女生口一千人細布千匹跪王自誓從今以後永爲奴客太王恩赦

addition to Koguryo taking fifty-eight fortresses and 700 villages from Baekje. In 397, Koguryo attacked the Yan and conquered the long-coveted area around the Liao River estuary including Yodong Fortress (Liaoyang 遼陽) and Pingzhou (平州). Yan would temporarily recover Pingzhou but it would revert to Koguryo control after Gwanggaeto's campaign of 402, with the Liao River becoming the border between Koguryo and the Chinese dynasties thereafter until 667. In 399, Silla called for aid, pleading that "our castles are full of men from Wa." Gwanggaeto sent 50,000 infantry and cavalry, the largest concentration of Koguryo troops in any record, destroyed the Wa (倭) invaders, and drove on to Gaya, which likely instigated the invasion of Silla at the behest of Baekje. Gaya, especially Geumgwan Gaya, was dealt a severe blow from which Gaya never fully recovered. The Silla king also promised to be a vassal of Koguryo and Koguryo's sphere of influence was successfully extended down to the southern coast of the Korean peninsula.

Koguryo's cause was helped by a *coup d'état* in Later Yan (後燕). According to the *Chronicles of Jin* (*Jin shu* 晉書), a noble named Murong Yun (慕容雲) killed the Later Yan king and took the throne for himself, [36] creating the state of Northern Yan (北燕). Murong Yun's real name was Gao Yun (高雲), whose ancestors came from Koguryo.[37] Hearing of Gao Yun's accession, Gwanggaeto treated him as a countryman. Northern Yan thus became a buffer zone between Koguryo and the Sinitic powers. Gwanggaeto then campaigned against the declining state of Buyeo in 410, taking sixty-four fortresses and 1,400 villages. This severely weakened Buyeo, which Koguryo would incorporate completely into its territory in 494.

Gwanggaeto Stele [gsm.nricp.go.kr/_third/user/viewer/viewer01.jsp?ksmno=2512].

[36] *Jin shu* 124, Chronological records, no. 24, Murong Yun (晉書卷124載記第24 慕容雲).

[37] Ibid.

Gwanggaeto, a name commonly translated as “the expander of the realm,” earned the moniker through his conquests and territorial expansion outlined above. However, in spite of his seemingly impressive series of conquests, he was not unique in his achievements in the long history of Koguryo. Expansion had been a longstanding policy of Koguryo, and Gwanggaeto’s exploits were merely an extension of what had been a general historical trend. What actually sets the reign of Gwanggaeto apart from the Koguryo monarchs that came before him is the fact that he translated his conquests into a multilayered international order with Koguryo at the center. It was during his reign that the display of imperiality of the Koguryo state became actual; militarily, politically, and most importantly, ideologically.

Several lacunae could be pointed out in this regard. First, it can be noted that Koguryo is not the only state that thought of itself as special. All ancient states, to some degree, emphasize their uniqueness and superiority. Second, the international hierarchy that supposedly is the hallmark of empires is found at all levels, even in small kingdoms where the monarch forms a feudal relationship with local lords. But such notions of superiority mean nothing until that state achieves a preponderance of power vis-à-vis other states/tribes in the region; actually imposing that superiority on others and making them acknowledge it. What is more, the imposition and acknowledgment of superiority must take place over a geographically vast area, and over an ethnically diverse population, and the polity has to be successful in sustaining that control for an extended period. This is how a given polity stops being just another state, or a feudal kingdom, and becomes an empire. Koguryo was successful in this regard while Baekje, Silla, and Gaya were not.

3. Post-conquest Maintenance and Imperial Ideology

Though military power provides the ultimate reminder of imperial power,

imperial rulers also recognize the costs associated with wars and sustained military presence. This is where ideologies and ceremonies enter the picture. Ideologies of superiority, born of successful conquest and constituting the "soft" side of imperial power, actually serve a practical purpose. Imperial rulers utilize ideology and ceremony in many different forms, including co-option of local elites along with unilateral taking of hostages for "education" in order to reduce expenses associated with using military force. Ideologies are promulgated and emphasized in relations with other countries for purposes of bringing them in line with the imperial order without overt military action (and related costs), and with associated ceremonies to perpetuate and inculcate them among vassal states.

The story of imperial formation is the same everywhere and throughout history: imperial territories are first conquered militarily, then connected economically and maintained ideologically (and/or culturally). The conquests of Gwanggaeto stretched Koguryo territory as well as spheres of influence very far from its traditional core. Even by more conservative estimates, Gwanggaeto's additions to Koguryo include: the Liao River estuary, the Han River Basin, the central Korean peninsula to the Sobaek Range, present-day Hunchun, some parts of Russia's Maritime Provinces, and beyond Songhua River into parts of northern Manchuria. As Barfield notes, empires are political entities that centralize power and maintain control at a distance. Just as King Taejo dispatched officials to administer his new territories, and as King Seocheon made his brother viceroy over the newly-conquered Sukshin (Sushen), Gwanggaeto also set about establishing firm rule over far-flung territories.

For his northern territories, he created the office of the Governor of Northern Buyeo (K. *Yeongbuk Buyeo susa*) and appointed a man named Moduru to the post. A passage from the epitaph of Moduru found in Ji'an clearly identifies Gwanggaeto as the sovereign at the time Moduru became governor.[38]Also, Gwanggaeto simply returned to Koguryo after

accepting surrender from the Baekje king. Aside from that fact that Gwanggaeto did not conquer Baekje outright because it was militarily impractical to do so, Gwanggaeto found promises of submission and payment of tribute to be sufficient, as they were affirmation of his superior status. In the context of empire, making conquered nations actually accept the conquering sovereign's superior status is often considered more important than the material benefits of conquest. Such imperial policies of accepting submissions and leaving nations alone do appear more "benevolent" than pillage and forced extraction of resources, yet empires also make sure that tribes and nations that submitted do not leave the imperial orbit. A telling proof of this in Koguryo can be seen in Gwanggaeto's policy toward Silla. In addition to fighting and destroying the Wa and Gaya forces at the request of its "ally," Koguryo left garrisons throughout Silla territory,[39] just as Athens posted troops in cities of its supposed allies to ensure loyalty to the Delian League. Also, Koguryo took Silseong, a member of the Silla royalty, as hostage. Silseong later returned to Silla and became its eighteenth monarch, most likely after having been "educated" in Koguryo. Silseong also sought Koguryo aid and approval in eliminating Nulji, a potential rival to his throne whom he had sent to Koguryo as a royal hostage. However, Koguryo aided Nulji in assassinating Silseong, probably under the assumption that Nulji would express gratitude by staying loyal to Koguryo. There are further examples of imperial vassalage involving Koguryo in its relationship with Silla. The ceremonial bowl inscribed with Gwanggaeto's posthumous title found in the Houchong (壺杅塚) tomb is a relic that suggests that Silla held official rituals in honor of Gwanggaeto long

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[38] …如此遝至國上大開土地好太聖王緣祖父■, 介恩教奴客牟頭婁■■, 牟教遣令北夫餘守事…
Moduru Epitaph [gsm.nricp.go.kr/third/user/viewer/viewer01.jsp?ksmno=3085].

[39] Kim Yong-man, "Jido reul jungsim euro salpyeo bon Koguryo yeongto" [Koguryo territories viewed on a map], *Bibliophilie* 12 (2004), 84-103.

after his passing, just as Joseon, a vassal of Chinese dynasties, held rituals to China's emperors.

Figure 1. The *Houmyeong* Vessel[40]

Figure 2. Ink print of *Houmyeong* inscriptions

In addition to binding vassals to the imperial orbit, the soft power of the empire also attracted "barbarians" into the imperial service. The Malgal (Mohe 靺鞨) in Koguryo's northeastern frontier entered the Koguryo military en masse and bolstered Koguryo's military manpower base. In fact, they were a major element in Koguryo's main army of 150,000 that took the field against the invading Tang army in 645. At the Battle of Jupilsan (C. Zhubishan 駐畢山) and other battles, many fought and fell alongside Koguryo troops. Records also indicate that Khitan tribesman, even after some of their fellow tribesman defected to Tang, fought alongside the Koguryo army. In addition, there is the example of the Balhae founder Dae Jo-yeong. Even if he was of Malgal ethnicity, as some suggest, it only serves to underscore Koguryo's "imperial tolerance," as his father Dae Jung-sang rose to a high military rank in the Koguryo army, and Dae Jo-yeong also served in a command capacity.

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[40] The images above (figures 1 and 2) have been downloaded from the public realm.

While much has been made of the Sillan Seol Gye-du's service in the Tang army as a visible sign of Tang openness to foreigners, it is surprising that Dae Jo-yeong's service in the Koguryo army has not been given similar attention.

Imperial ideologies that drive state policy do not exist in a vacuum, but are recorded in histories and state monuments. They form a body of state propaganda with which empires justify their conquests. Most imperial ideologies emphasize that the empire does what it does not out of mere desire for conquest or even simple state interest. Empires have taken upon themselves to right the world gone wrong by bringing order to a chaotic world, as can be seen in the aforementioned example of the Incas. As for evidence of Koguryo's imperial ideology in written form, perhaps the most visible is the Gwanggaeto Stele along with several other epitaphs and relics. The writing on the Gwanggaeto Stele states, "The grace of the *taewang* (great king 太王) reached the high heavens and his martial ardor shook the four seas" (恩澤洽于皇天武威振被四海). Expressions such as "high heavens" (皇天) and "the four seas" (四海) are abstract terms that denote realms beyond the secular world. At least according to the stele, Gwanggaeto's conquests were not exercises of power aimed at the expansion of territory, but the righteous administration of force to create a world in which "the evildoers would be swept away, and the people can go about their livelihoods and live in peace." A realm thus created would be "at peace, the people satisfied and the five grains would ripen bountifully" (掃除■■庶寧其業國富民殷五穀豊熟昊天不). This was the same sort of mission propounded by the rulers of the Roman Empire; the acts undertaken by the Empire were efforts to create a *Pax Romana* where peace and civilization would reign.[41]

The use of the term "four seas" in the Gwanggaeto Stele to denote his realm deserves special mention. The term "four seas" is an abstract

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[41] Munkler, *Empires*, 86.

term that supposedly surrounds the *cheonha*, or all under heaven (*tianxia* 天下), which lays in the middle. The middle here means more than a geographical center, but the center that stands above the "inferior" states. This notion of Koguryo's "*cheonha*" is made clear by the Moduru epitaph, in which Gwanggaeto's ancestor and Koguryo founder Chumo (Jumong) is given divine status as the "son of the sun and moon" (*irwol jija* 日月之子) and "grandson of the River Earl" (*habaek ji son* 河伯之孫); Chumo's birthplace (Northern Buyeo) is described as being "the most hallowed."[42] The message in the stele and the Moduru epitaph is clear: Koguryo is hallowed country ruled by monarchs of divine lineage, and superior to those around them. The derogatory term "Eastern Barbarian" (東夷) used to refer to Silla in the Jungwon Stele, is just one manifestation of such imperial ideology.[43]

V. Consolidation and Southern Independence

Following broad-ranging conquests, empires need to be consolidated. There are many empires that occupied large tracts of territory on the map but that failed to sustain themselves because of the inability of imperial successors to consolidate the empire's territorial gains. Much of the responsibility for solidifying the conquests of Gwanggaeto fell to his son, Jangsu, who had assumed the title *taewang*. The use of the title Great King was an affirmation, on the part of Jangsu, of his superior status over other "kings" in the vicinity. While detractors claim that *taewang* was a posthumous title, it is refuted by the fact that the Jungwon Stele, which contain records of interaction between Koguryo and Silla during the fifth century, is widely recognized as having been erected in 449, during

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[42] 河泊之孫日月之子鄒聖王元出北夫餘天下四方知此國郡最聖
Moduru Epitaph [gsm.nricp.go.kr/third/user/viewer/viewer01.jsp? ksmno=3085].

[43] 教諸位賜上下[衣]服教東[夷]寐錦遝還來節教賜寐錦土內諸衆人…
Jungwon Stele [gsm.nricp.go.kr/third/user/viewer viewer01.jsp?ksmno=2513].

Jangsu's lifetime.[44] As the Great King of his realm, his main priority was to maintain Koguryo's newfound international paramountcy. When necessary, Great King Jangsu did not shy away from overt military action, but policies during his reign placed a greater importance upon political maneuvers. His policies can be divided in terms of direction, northern and southern, each with a different focus. His policy regarding the powers to the north (and west) was a mixture of appeasement, military posturing and diplomatic action; to prevent the emergence of a dominant power that might pose a threat. Jangsu's policies to the south, other hand, was much more forceful militarily and probably aimed at eventual conquest and annexation of the two states (Baekje and Silla).

1. Imperial Reorganization

The work of consolidation also meant reorganization of power internally. The vestiges of Koguryo's tribal origins were phased out even further, with the expansion and integration of the *hyeong* (兄) within the bureaucracy. Formerly denoting tribal leaders serving in government, they were subdivided (*sohyeong* 小兄, *daehyeong* 大兄, and *widu daehyeong* 位頭大兄) as official bureaucratic ranks. The *saja* (使者), who were tax collectors for tribal leaders, also became officials in the service of the monarch.[45] This can be taken as a sign that even more power was being accrued to the king, especially with the king increasing the number of his tax collectors. The most visible effort at national reorganization came with the relocation of the capital from Gungnaeseong to

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[44] Shinohara Hirokata, "Koguryo ui taewangho wa taewangga insik ui hwagin" [The title of Taewang during the Koguryo Dynasty and the development of the perceptions of the Taewang lineage], *Hanguksa yeongu* 125 (2004:6), 4-5.

[45] Gang Sun, "4-5 segi Koguryo ui yeongto hwakjang gwa Pyongyang cheondo" [Koguryo's territorial expansion in the fourth and fifth centuries and relocation to Pyongyang], *Sungmyeong Hanguk saron* 2 (1996), 79.

Pyongyang in 427. As moving the capital usually entailed uprooting those who had become entrenched in the old capital, there would have been much resistance, as seen in the letter that King Gaero of Baekje submitted to the emperor of Northern Wei in 472. The letter is an indication of the political chaos set off by King Jangsu's change of capitals.[46]

Though some believe that moving the capital to Pyongyang is indicative of King Jangsu's southward policy, this probably was not the case. Gungnaeseong was probably chosen as the early capital because it was easily defensible, being located in a river valley at the end of narrow, mountainous trails. The large fortresses that are prominent in Koguryo military history appeared relatively late in its history. According to Toshiaki Tanaka, Koguryo's early defenses were centered on walled gates that blocked narrow mountain roads, especially to the northwest of the capital where the strongest early threats to Koguryo existed.[47] The fact that Koguryo made Gungnaeseong, which could only be reached through mountain pathways, and that it once served as Koguryo's capital is indicative of the priority placed on defense in early Koguryo history.

With territories stretching more than 1,000 kilometers from one end of the realm to another, immediate survival was not what concerned Great King Jangsu. Whereas defense was the primary rationale for the situation of capitals for states that feel vulnerable, imperial capitals place a premium on accessibility. When a small kingdom expands into an empire, the capital is either moved to a more accessible location or is

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[46] 今<璉>有罪, 國自魚肉, 大臣彊族, 戮殺無已, 罪盈惡積, 民庶崩離, 是滅(十亡)㊀之期, 假手之秋也. "Presently, (the Koguryo king) Yon committed many sins and turned his country to ruin, and strong vassals and families slaughter without end. The populace is downtrodden and scattered, and the country sits on the verge of collapse." (*Samguk sagi*, Baekje Annals, King Gaero, year 21 / 三國史記百濟本紀蓋鹵王 21年).

[47] Tanaka Toshiaki, "Seonggwak siseollo bon Koguryo ui bangeo chegye: Wangdo mit dae Jungguk bangeo reul jungsim euro" [Fortress walls and Koguryo's defense networks: Emphasis on Koguryo capital defenses and defense against China], trans. Kim Hui-chan, *Koguryo Balhae yeongu* 8 (1999), 210.

given greater accessibility through the construction of infrastructure such as roadways or canals. One only need to recall the adage “all roads lead to Rome” to realize the importance of accessibility for imperial centers. The capital of the Achaemenid Persian Empire was connected to distant provinces by its network of “royal roads.” Even capitals located in seemingly inhospitable regions, such as the Inca capital of Cuzco or the Aztec Tenochtitlan, were opened through construction of roads. Chinese imperial capitals such as Changan, Jiankang, Luoyang, or Beijing were also located near large rivers or sat astride major road junctions. In contrast with the narrow valley surrounding Gungnaeseong, Pyongyang represented a much more accessible location. It was situated amidst broad plains supported by a major waterway (Daedong River), which facilitated irrigation for the surrounding farmland as well as transportation and logistics. In light of such a relationship between imperial capitals and accessibility, it is no coincidence that the change occurred shortly after the creation of the Koguryo imperium.

2. Northern and Southern Policies

Koguryo was also helped by the fact that the hegemony that China would create later in history was still incomplete at this time. China had not yet formed a state that would dominate the East Asian political landscape. After a brief period of unification by Western Jin (265-317), China proper was divided into north and south, and would not be reunited until 589. To the north, the nomadic world was dominated by the Rouran, or the Ruanruan. It would no doubt have been in Koguryo’s interest to keep both the Sinitic and nomadic powers from becoming a threat. One power that seemed well on its way to a confrontation with the Koguryo Empire was Northern Wei. After its establishment in the late fourth century, Northern Wei rapidly expanded and soon held sway over the northern half of China by the early fifth century. By 435, Northern Yan, which acted as a buffer zone between Koguryo and the western powers, was

nearing collapse after defeat to Northern Wei. Koguryo took action and ensured that the manpower and treasures of Northern Yan did not fall into Northern Wei hands by quickly sending in troops as the capital was about to fall. Koguryo secured both the monarch Feng Hong (馮弘) and much treasure from the Northern Yan palace, leaving Northern Wei with virtually nothing.[48] However, Jangsu sent an emissary to Northern Wei immediately following the incident to smooth relations with the newly-rising power and the potentially volatile situation with the Northern Wei was defused.

When major conflict broke out in 429 between the Rouran and Northern Wei, which came to dominate northern China, Rouran was generally on the defensive and sought out other powers in the vicinity to counter Northern Wei. Koguryo was clearly aware of the threat Northern Wei might pose to its imperium, so it engaged in diplomacy aimed at offsetting Wei power in the region. This is demonstrated by Koguryo's active engagement with the southern Chinese dynasty of Liu-Song (劉宋, 420-479), to which Koguryo sent nine missions from 439 to 462[49] and which marked a long intermission in Koguryo-Northern Wei relations. Rouran attempts to contact other powers were initially unsuccessful until its ascendency under Shouluobuzhen Khan (受羅部真可汗) when Rouran applied military pressure on Wei and established relations with powers in the vicinity in an attempt to encircle Northern Wei. Rouran relations with Koguryo was probably established sometime before 473, when King Gaero sent his letter to the Emperor of Northern Wei, which states that Rouran and Koguryo "had made an alliance with the Ruanruan to the north" (北約蠕蠕). The Rouran-Koguryo alliance is made manifest by the agreement between the two powers to split Didouyu (地豆于) territory in 479. Rouran no doubt wished to apply even greater pressure on Northern

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[48] *Samguk sagi*, Koguryo Annals, King Jangsu, year 24 (三國史記高句麗本紀長壽王 24年).

[49] Yi Seong-je, "5-6 segi Koguryo ui seobang jeongchaek yeongu" [On the Western policy of Koguryo in the fifth and sixth centuries] (PhD dissertation, Seogang Daehakkyo, 2003), 49.

Wei and crushing any tribe that could aid Northern Wei served its purpose. Koguryo's rationale for splitting Didouyu territory with the Rouran was to prevent an attempt by the Malgal from establishing ties with Northern Wei during the Yanxing (延興, 471-476) era of the Northern Wei emperor, Xiaowen.[50]

While keeping other powers (mainly Northern Wei) at bay in the north, King Jangsu implemented a far more aggressive policy toward the south. Jangsu was probably aware of the danger of having hostile forces in multiple directions and decided that some had to be eliminated. Its main threat to the north, Northern Wei, was equally matched militarily, and in the event of war the outcome would be uncertain. However, the two states to the south represented relatively easier targets. During the early part of Jangsu's reign, Silla was a vassal of Koguryo, as can be seen in the aforementioned *Houmyeong* vessel and inscriptions on the Jungwon Stele. But that did not stop King Jangsu from maneuvers that would make Silla a formal Koguryo territory. Glimpses of Jangsu's designs concerning Silla can be seen in articles from *Nihon shoki*. Though articles in the *Nihon Shoki* tend to highlight the role of the Japanese and must be taken with a grain of salt, a *Nihon shoki* entry from 463 shows what Jangsu wanted to do with Silla:

> (Emperor Yuryaku, year 8) … Not long after this that a Goryeo (Koguryo) soldier was returning to his country after earning a respite, and hired a Silla man as his horse driver. The soldier looked back and said, "The day when your country will fall to ours is not far." [Other books write that the soldier said, "Your country will be ours soon."] Upon hearing this, the horse driver fell back feigning stomach illness and ran off to his country, telling everyone what he had heard. The king of Silla realized that Koguryo's protection was a lie, and sent word

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[50] *Wei shu*, vol. 100, Biographies: no. 88, Wujiguo (魏書卷100　列傳第88 勿吉國).

> and told everyone in the country to "kill the rooster in your houses." The men of Silla understood what the king said and killed all the men of Goryeo in Silla. But one Goryeo man managed to escape and ran to his country and told everyone what had happened. The King of Goryeo raised an army and gathered at Chukguryu Castle [other records call it Dogusagi fortress] and spread his camp; they sang, danced, and played music. When the King of Silla heard the songs of the Goryeo army on all sides, he realized that the enemy was inside Silla territory. He sent a messenger to the King of Imna and pleaded. "The Goryeo king is trying to conquer our country. The situation is like a tassel dangling on the banner and the country is in a peril greater that eggs stacked on top of each other. How long the country's fortunes will be is rather uncertain."[51]

If this entry in *Nihon shok*i can be trusted, it means that Jangsu was not interested in merely holding Silla in vassalage, but intended to add Silla to his territory, thus converting an "informal" sphere of influence into actual territory. Koguryo aggression toward the south continued as it took Siljik Fortress (present-day Samcheok, Gangwon Province) in 468 followed by a massive invasion of Baekje in 475. Koguryo's invasion of Baekje was an astounding success, as Koguryo troops occupied the Baekje capital of Hanseong (present-day Seoul). King Gaero was captured and killed, and Koguryo troops drove Baekje far south, forcing it to relocate its capital to Ungjin (present Gongju, South Chungcheong Province) before stopping.[52] Baekje would suffer from political turmoil resulting from the effects of the invasion for several years, including the regicide of Munju on 477, rebellion by the former defense minister in the same year, and the untimely death of the new king (Samgeun) in 479.

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[51] *Nihon shoki*, Emperor Yuryaku, year 8 (日本書紀雄略天皇 8年).

[52] *Samguk sagi*, Baekje Annals, King Gaero, year 21 (三國史記百濟本紀蓋鹵王 21年).

Thus Jangsu thought Baekje was in no position to do anything about Koguryo's full-scale invasion of Silla in 481. Seven Silla fortresses fell to Koguryo and the Koguryo army marched to Mijilbu (present-day Pohang, North Gyeongsang Province), virtually to the gates of the Silla capital of Geumseong (present-day Gyeongju). Silla's collapse was averted when Baekje and Gaya sent troops to aid Silla, and the southern alliance managed to defeat and repel the Koguryo invasion force.[53] Consideration of the international political situation was important in decisions by the Baekje and Gaya to send help, as destruction of Silla and incorporation into Koguryo would certainly have been a precursor to Koguryo's conquest of the latter two states as well. The invasion of 481 was a last concerted effort by Koguryo to conquer the entire Korean peninsula. It was also the last major attempt at conquest in general. Changes in the international power balance in East Asia afterwards would prevent Koguryo from making further such attempts. The events of 481 also mark the end of Koguryo's imperial hegemony in the southern Korean peninsula, which would be replaced by state-against-state competition thereafter.

VI. Costs of the Koguryo Empire

Joseph Tainter writes in *Collapse of Complex Societies* that large political entities usually fail due to what is referred to in economics as "the law of diminishing returns." A rapidly expanding state, after initially enjoying the surplus from conquest and pillage, come to a point where the conquered territories begin to cost the imperial government. Instead of simply taking things by force, the empire now has to send out officials to collect the surplus in the form of taxes. Cities have to be constructed as administration centers and fortresses need to be built for its distant

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[53] *Samguk sagi*, Silla Annals, Soji Maripgan, year 3 (三國史記新羅本紀炤知麻立干 3年).

garrisons. When expansion slows down, conquest no longer "pays for itself." The cost of maintaining and administering the territory no longer comes from loot or tribute, but from tax money in the imperial coffers. In the end, costs of conquered territories exceed the initial gains to the empire.

To take an example from Rome, Roman victory over the Macedonians and the occupation of Macedonia in the second century BCE brought in such wealth that Roman citizens were exempt from taxes. The conquest of the kingdom of Pergamum in 130 BCE led to a doubling of the Roman state budget from 100 million to 200 million *sesterces*. When Pompey took over Syria, the state budget was increased further to 340 million sesterces. Caesar's famed conquest of Gaul brought so much gold into Rome that the value of gold dropped by 36 percent. In essence, each conquest paid for further conquests.[54] But after the conquests were over, the army was expanded in order to defend the suddenly bigger Roman possessions, as the twenty-eight legions (about 200,000 men) at the beginning of the reign of Augustus[55] increased to over 435,000 by the later third century under Emperor Diocletian.[56] Along with the number of troops, their pay would increase as well. The pay for the individual Roman soldier prior to the Principate was 112.5 *denarii*, but was raised to 250 *denarii* under Julius Caesar. It would further increase to 300 *denarii* under Domitian in the late first century and to 450 during the reign of Septimius Severus in the early third century. Needless to say, such increases placed enormous strains on state finances, and led to massive inflation. However, it was a policy that could not be readily reversed given the extent of Rome's empire.

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[54] Joseph A.Tainter, *The Collapse of Complex Societies* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 129.

[55] Adrian Goldsworthy, *The Complete Roman Army* (London: Thames & Hudson, 2003), 50.

[56] Geoffrey Parker, ed., *Cambridge Illustrated History: Warfare* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 65.

As the cost of administration and military conquest rose, Rome became comparatively inactive after the establishment of the Principate regarding new conquests. The last major effort at conquest by the Principate occurred during the reign of Emperor Trajan, when he conquered the Kingdom of Dacia in 106. Though Emperor Marcus Aurelius went to war against the Germanic Marcomanni in the 160s, this was more frontier pacification than earnest conquest. As mentioned in Section II, states continue to expand until they cross the imperial threshold, as ancient states do not have set limits to their growth aside from the power of other states. However, one important check on unlimited expansion does exist—military and economic power available to the state. If a state attempts to expand beyond what its military and economic capability can afford, it constitutes what Paul Kennedy called "imperial overstretch." Though it can happen to political entities at every level, it is most likely to involve empires with more territories and frontiers to defend, where too much resources are diverted from wealth creation and allocated instead to military purposes.[57]

Koguryo managed to expand somewhat even after its debacle in the south, as evidenced by the incorporation of Buyeo in 494. Records in *Tongdian* (通典) note that Koguryo stretched 6,000 *li* (里) from east to west during the Sui period.[58] However, there were no rapid conquests reminiscent of Koguryo's early years or expeditions of Gwanggaeto. Like all empires, the vast territories and the international hierarchy that Koguryo created had become expensive to maintain. Though no exact figures exist on Koguryo's state finances, the cost of its empire can be deduced from other records. As Koguryo expanded into the Liaodong peninsula, a defensive system centered on walled road blocks that blocked off paths to the Koguryo capital was converted into a system

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[57] Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), xvi.

[58] *Tongdian*, vol. 186, Border Defense 2, Eastern Barbarians, second chapter (通典卷186 邊防二東夷下).

based on walled towns and fortresses along the border. These fortresses numbered 200,[59] all of which had to be garrisoned and stocked with food in case of siege. They also represented towns where the local population resided.

The sizes of the garrisons and populations from some of these fortresses can be seen in records on Koguryo's wars with Sui and Tang. When Yodong Fortress fell to Tang forces in 645, 10,000 were killed in battle, with 10,000 soldiers and 40,000 civilians captured as prisoners. In addition, 500,000 sacks (*seok*/*shi* 石) of grain were secured by the invaders.[60] Since it is uncertain what the grains actually were, the assumption here is that they were rice, for the sake of calculation. A traditional "sack" is 160 kilograms, and a simple calculation (160× 500,000) would provide a figure of eighty million kilograms, or 80,000 tons. If we assume the rice to be unmilled, as they frequently were in ancient times, a sack would be 120 kilograms. One half-million sacks of unmilled rice would be 60 million kilograms or 60,000 tons. Assuming that male/female numbers among the 40,000 civilians prisoners were equal (20,000 men and 20,000 women), adding the 20,000 soldiers from the record would add up to 60,000 persons in Yodong Fortress. Food consumption can be gauged by converting the rice into calories and dividing it by the average caloric intake of males (2,500 Kcal) and females (2,000 Kcal). As one gram of rice contains 3.6-3.7 Kcal, an average man would require 675 grams of rice to meet his daily caloric need and 540 grams for an average woman. Thus the amount of rice consumed by 40,000 men in the fortress (675 grams×40,000) in one day would total 27 million grams or 27,000 kilograms in addition to 10.8 million grams[61] (10,800 kilograms) consumed by the women. The

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[59] Kim Yong-man, *Koguryo ui balgyeon* [Koguryo: The discovery] (Seoul: Bada chulpan, 1999), 220.

[60] *Samguk sagi*, Koguryo Annals, King Bojang, year 4 (三國史記高句麗本紀寶藏王 4年).

[61] 540 grams×20,000=1,080,000 grams.

fortress's population of 60,000 would have required 37,800 kilograms of rice (food) daily. This obviously is a very crude estimate, as the populace would be consuming other foodstuffs as well, but it does give us a rough idea.

This calculation can be criticized for use of modern data, thus a second calculation was done utilizing more traditional figures for food consumption. The *Seungjeongwon ilgi* (承政院日記), or *The Daily Records of the Royal Secretariat*, contains comments from Left Secretary (左承旨) Yu Ui-yang during the reign of King Jeongjo of Joseon (1778-1800). Yu states that the Joseon capital of Hanyang has a population of 200,000, and the people consume about 1 million *seok* of rice each year.[62] These figures applied to 60,000 residents of Yodong would mean an annual consumption of roughly 300,000 *seok*. Thus 500,000 *seok* of grain at Yodong would mean sufficient food for 1.6 to 1.7 years.

In addition to Yodong Fortress, other fortresses maintained a considerable complement of troops along with their provisions. Gaemo Fortress, which fell prior to Yodong, is also recorded as having 100,000 *seok* of rice. Other related details from the Koguryo-Tang War include 8,000 Koguryo troops killed at Bisa Fortress (present-day Dalian), and 100,000 troops were stationed in Baegam Fortress and Shinsong Fortresses (present-day Fushun). The population of Yodong Fortress, Gaemo Fortress, and Baegam Fortress, all of which fell to Tang, combine for a total of 70,000.[63] Given that there were over 200 fortresses in the Liaodong area, the cost to maintain them would have been staggering. The fortresses were of different sizes, but for the purpose of this article, let us assume a garrison of 1,000 people. In terms of rice, the garrison alone would consume 20,250 kilograms (675 grams×1000×30 days) monthly. Multiply this figure by two hundred and the total becomes 4.05

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[62] *Seungjeongwon ilgi*, King Jeongjo, year 7, ninth month, ninth day (承政院日記正祖 7年 9月9日丁酉).

[63] *Samguk sagi*, Koguryo Annals, King Bojang, year 4 (三國史記高句麗本紀寶藏王 4年).

million kilograms per month. When this figure is multiplied by the number of months in one year (12), the result is 48,600,000 kilograms—for troops alone. The ratio of troops to male and female civilians at Yodong Fortress being 1:1:1, and applying this to our hypothetical fortress, 1,215 grams must be added to the daily consumption rate. One soldier plus a male and female resident would consume 1,890 grams per day, and the garrison and the population (3,000) would thus consume 56.7 million grams (56,700 kilograms) in one month. This rate of monthly consumption multiplied by 200 hypothetical fortresses of equal size yields a total monthly figure of 11.34 million kilograms, or 11,340 tons per month. A total of 11,340 tons multiplied by twelve produces an annual figure of 136,080 tons.

To put this figure into perspective, let us refer to one of the few agricultural production figures in traditional sources. The chart below lists production of grains in the provinces of Joseon during the reign of King Sejong. According to the list, the total production for the entire country adds up to 72.18 million kilograms or 72,180 tons. This is much less than the aforementioned 136,080 tons that would have been required to maintain Koguryo's 200 fortresses. It should be noted that the 136,080 tons is a hypothetical figure, assuming that fortresses are all of equal size and counting only fortresses in the Liaodong area. Taking fortresses spread over the entire Koguryo Empire and larger garrisons into the equation would likely result in numbers many times greater than the aforementioned 136,080 tons. These provisions would have required periodic re-stocking after each harvest. While historical records indicate that Koguryo still managed to expand into the seventh century, it is highly probable that the expenditures required in maintaining its frontier defenses, the army, and the bureaucratic apparatus was the chief reason that rapid expansion no longer took place after the early fifth century, after which Koguryo declined rapidly following a series of drawn-out wars with Chinese dynasties.

Table 2. Grain Production in the Early Fifteenth Century

Province	Land under Cultivation (*gyeol*[64])	Total Yield: Seok	Yield (*seok*) per *Gyeol*
Gyeongsang	301,147	169,811	.56
Jeolla	277,588 (rice paddies: 110,000)	158,184 (11 *du*[65])	.57
Chungcheong	236,300	90,451 (12 *du*)	.38
Gyeonggi	200,347 (rice paddies: 76,173)	37,390 (3 *du*)	.19
Hwanghae	104,072	41,573 (10 *du*)	.40
Gangwon	65,916	20,099 (13 *du*)	.32
Pyeongan	308,751	54,746 (12 du)	.18
Hamgyeong	130,413	29,244 (8 *du*)	.22

Source: *Joseon wangjo sillok, Sejong sillok*

VII. Conclusion

In the annals of Korean history, Koguryo occupies a unique place. Not only does it seem to provide a lone example of a state that was truly large territorially, but also occupied what is now foreign territory. For some, Koguryo exists as an example of bygone glory that shines as the bright spot upon an otherwise dismal history. Koguryo also exemplifies, for others, everything that is "Korean"; which had martial traditions and by virtue of its military strength, feared none. Both of these perspectives have chosen to focus not on Koguryo as it was, but for the meaning it holds for the present, for what it tells us about Koguryo's role in the crafting of modern Korean identity.

Past research has demonstrated, time and again, that Koguryo was a strong military state. Recent literature, however, has sought to expand on this and take the research on Koguryo in a slightly different direction. According to this perspective, Koguryo had a "worldview" that emphasized its uniqueness and its superior status among states. Such notions of superiority are common in a type of state that appeared

throughout world history: an empire. Empires are differentiated from states and polities for a variety of reasons, including the aforementioned notions of superiority, a monarchical title that affirms such superiority and the international hierarchy over a vast geographical area as a result of their conquests. Most important, empires set themselves apart from other states by their ability to centralize power and maintain that power over great distances.

However, despite highlighting the unique worldview possessed by Koguryo, recent studies stop short of declaring Koguryo what it was: an empire. From the standpoint of political science, Koguryo bears all the hallmarks of an empire. A fragmented China and weaker states or tribes in the vicinity afforded Koguryo the "time sovereignty" necessary for rapid expansion. While it did not attain imperial status for the first several centuries, Koguryo did manage to accumulate much international influence and power. During its progress toward imperial status, Koguryo centralized its power much earlier than previously believed, already crossing what researchers of empires refer to as the Augustan Threshold during the reign of Taejo (53-146). Power thus centralized far outstripped the checks placed on monarchical power by the aristocracy, as King Gogukcheon soundly defeated a coalition of rebellious aristocrats with military resources available near the capital. Even significant defeats such as those to the Murong Yan and Baekje represented only temporary setbacks to continued Koguryo expansion.

The most decisive moment came with the wide-ranging conquests by Gwanggaeto in the late fourth and early fifth centuries, which allowed Koguryo to cross the imperial threshold and become a full-fledged empire. While his conquests secured for Gwanggaeto a permanent place in the annals of Korean history, conquest is not what makes Gwanggaeto a standout among Koguryo's monarchs. As expansion was actually a consistent feature in Koguryo state policy, Gwanggaeto's conquests did not represent anything new. It is not for his conquest of territory that Gwanggaeto should be remembered, but for what his conquests wrought.

The real meaning of Gwanggaeto's conquests lay not in lands he gained but in the new international status he attained for Koguryo. Gwanggaeto actually forged an international hierarchy, conquering and thus bending other polities to the will of Koguryo, and making them acknowledge the superiority of Koguryo. Koguryo's superiority was more than just military, as Koguryo was able to make other states acknowledge its superiority in ideological terms (in the case of Silla) which had the effect of bringing other people into its imperial service (that is, Malgal and Khitan).

Koguryo was able to become an empire not because it was "unique." This is because Koguryo did what any other state would do when faced with a similar international environment. Koguryo chose to expand rather than be content with self-sufficiency, pushing frontiers outward rather than sitting content and insulating itself within a given territory. This happens to be the basic logic that drives all ancient states, because there were no rules forcing states to respect others' territories. Ancient states usually kept expanding until they were checked by the power of another state. For Baekje and Silla, this happened early in their histories, and neither was able to cross the imperial threshold. Koguryo pursued an independent and vigorous foreign policy, with the advantage of time sovereignty, and formed an international hierarchy that the surrounding states were obliged to acknowledge. Its monarchs were referred to as *taewang*, a king superior to other kings in the area. The Sinitic hegemony of later periods did not exist at the time of Koguryo's imperial ascendency, and Koguryo was able to maintain equal status with other "empires" in the region, namely the nomadic empires and dynasties of a divided China. Koguryo was able to claim superiority in its relations with the various nomads and the Japanese, powers the Koreans were unable to claim superiority against for centuries afterwards.

This article presented a systematic examination of the reasons why Koguryo became an empire, how that empire was maintained, and the factors that perpetuated imperial rule. The focus was not on Koguryo's

war victories or valiant defense, but on attributes of Koguryo as an empire operated by a logic that drives other empires. All of the variables that contributed to the establishment of the Koguryo imperium proved to be explainable by historical research and political theory. Whether this article has succeeded or not remains the exclusive opinion of the reader. There is another aspect to Koguryo that this article mentions before concluding. First, Koguryo became a military state simply because it needed to, as it was the only way it could survive. Second, Koguryo was not a simple militaristic state driven by aggressive impulses. Again, all ancient states are aggressive to a degree and Koguryo did what was required, as a state engaged in *realpolitik*, procuring resources and territories by force even at the cost of lives and being on a near-constant war-footing. In short, the benefits of going to war and expanding seemed to outweigh the costs, which eventually made Koguryo the empire it became.

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Salt, Shores, and Shipbuilding: The Geo-political, Inter-personal, and Economic Networks of the Ōtomo Corsairs of Northern Kyushu

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Salt, Shores, and Shipbuilding: The Geo-political, Inter-personal, and Economic Networks of the Ōtomo Corsairs of Northern Kyushu

This article analyzes the history of the various corsair clans under the political rule of the Ōtomo family in the sixteenth century in Japan by taking into account their economic endeavors and the resources at their disposal acquired through the exploitation of several industries at a time when silver, as currency, was making its first appearance in Japan. This is an account of how those clans, especially the principal clans such as the Kibe, Tomiku, Watanabe, and Wakabayashi, ruled the coastline of northern Kyushu while sponsored by the Ōtomo family. The article interprets the historical record in light of their skills as seafarers, merchant-pirates, envoys, and even as Christians in the case of the Kibe, and as a political link between the daimyo at the top of the hierarchical ladder and those of lower station such as merchants and fishermen in the harbor villages of the coast, as well as in transhipment harbors such as Usuki and Saga no Seki.

Keywords: Ōtomo clan corsairs (Tomiku and salt making at Himejima), Kibe (welder, Christians), Watanabe and Wakabayashi (coastal patrols and toll fee barriers, in charge of shipbuilding and lumber trade)

Salt, Shores, and Shipbuilding: The Geo-political, Inter-personal, and Economic Networks of the Ōtomo Corsairs of Northern Kyushu

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Introduction

The Ōtomo corsairs comprised various families that from the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries protected the coast of Northern Kyushu. These clans, to name only a few, included the Kibe, Tomiku, Watanabe, and Wakabayashi. These groups often defined in Japanese documents of the time as coastal patrols (*keigo-shū*) have been interpreted in Japanese scholarship as belonging to the military hierarchy of local warlords (*sengoku daimyō*). These patrols have been also interpreted as navies (*suigun*) in the service of local warlords, but more often have been considered as coastal protection against local pirates (*kaizoku*).

Post-war Japanese scholars such as Amino Yoshihiko have considered people living on the seashores as "sea-people" who turned to piracy during harsh economic downturns.[1] Other scholars, such as

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Udagawa Takehisa, have interpreted these "pirates" as armies in the service of local warlords and therefore as part of the local lord warrior apparatus.[2] Similarly, Sakurai Eiji interprets pirates as economically tied to certain institutions such as temples, and therefore as an appendix to the landed military elite.[3] More recently, scholars such as Saeki Kōji[4] and Yamauchi Yuzuru have interpreted Japanese piracy as a phenomenon that took diverse aspects, from looters to coastal protectors as well as escorts of tribute vessels.[5] Among Western scholars dealing with Japanese piracy, Peter D. Shapinsky has embraced the concept of "sea-lords" by extensively studying the Murakami clans of the Seto Inland Sea.[6] In regard to the coastal patrol of northern Kyushu, scholars working in local history, such as Akutagawa Tatsuo and Fukugawa Kazunori, as well as Takita Manabu[7] and, more recently, Kage Toshio, have studied the pirates of northern Kyushu as part of the military structure of the feudal daimyo houses by either interpreting the phenomenon of piracy as an outcome of

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1 Amino Yoshihiko, *Akutō to kaizoku* (Tokyo: Hōsei daigaku shuppankyoku, 1995), 365-366.

2 Udagawa Takehisa, *Sengoku suigun no kōbō* (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2002), 68-74.

3 Sakurai Eiji, "Sanzoku, kaizoku to seki no kigen," in *Chūsei o kangaeru: Shokunin to geinō*, ed. Amino Yoshihiko (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1994), 113-148.

4 Saeki Kōji, "Kaizoku ron," in *Ajia no naka no Nihonshi*, vol. 3: *Kaijō no michi*, eds. Arano Yasunori, Ishii Masatoshi, and Murai Shōsuke (Tokyo: Sanyōsha, 1992), 35-62.

5 Yamauchi Yuzuru, *Setouchi no kaizoku* (Tokyo, Kōdansha, 2005), 6-10.

6 Peter D. Shapinsky, "Predators, Protectors, and Purveyors: Pirates and Commerce in Late Medieval Japan," *Monumenta Nipponica* 64, no. 2 (Autumn 2009), 273-313.

7 Akutagawa Tatsuo and Fukugawa Kazunori are the editors of several collections of documents published under the serial title *Saigoku bushidan kankei shiryōshū*. This collection deals with the families that established their domains on the coast of northern Kyushu, most of these in the service of the Ōtomo warlords. Takita Manabu is the editor of the *Hennen Ōtomo shiryō* series also used in this article.

poor living conditions during bad harvest seasons, as filling the vacuum of power in certain littoral areas ruled by piratical gangs, or as militaries or navies subordinate to the daimyo that projected the highest authority in the region.[8] I argue here that the coastal patrol clans in northern Kyushu were corsairs in terms of being semi-independent from the Ōtomo warlords, and as such they rose in status and notoriety by exploiting not only their skills as maritime warriors, but also the economic and political networks in their ascribed geographic locations.

The Ōtomo Corsairs

The Japanese term for coastal patrols to distinguish warriors who fought naval battles and protected the shores from "pirates," *keigo-shū*, often presents a dichotomy of characters very clearly defined. In reality, the distinction was rather blurred as there were skilled seafarers who conducted coastal patrols but were also pirates, and maritime warriors who even in the service of warlords committed acts of violence or "piratical acts" on the seas. In reality, coastal patrols and pirates were often one and the same. In my view, those coastal patrols were interchangeable with "pirates," or more accurately "corsairs." Although the latter term originally referred specifically to the Mediterranean "*corsa*," the Japanese coastal patrols were more similar to these privateers than to pirates. Japanese coastal patrols indeed received documents similar to European letters of marque (*hakkyū*) or *lettres de course* in which were written the lands or deeds pertaining to them in exchange for their services. Although those documents are not precisely equivalent to letters of marque, the dependency that they created between the landed lords and their littoral retainers is clear. Even with regard to

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[8] Kage Toshio, *Sengoku daimyō no gaikō to toshi ryūtsū: Bungo Ōtomo-shi to Higashi Ajia sekai* (Kyoto: Shibunkaku, 2006), 91-101.

the Murakami clans, which ruled the waterways and toll barriers of the Seto Inland Sea and were often perceived as the Japanese "pirates" par excellence, the term "pirates" can be contested in view of the fact that contemporary Jesuit missionaries explicitly termed them "corsairs."[9]

Luis de Guzman, in describing the travels of the Vice Provincial Father Gaspar Coelho from Sakai to Kyushu, wrote, "As Father Gaspar Coelho left Sakai to go to Bungo, he went to an island that belonged to a Corsair famous all over Japan who was called Xiximadono…. The corsair received the Father with lots of honor…."[10] Xiximadono was in fact a member of the Noshima Murakami clan, hence a "pirate" of the Seto Inland Sea as interpreted by Shapinsky. The Murakami clan even before the territorial unification of Japan under Toyotomi Hideyoshi, which occurred in 1586 with the subjugation of Kyushu, became retainers of the Mōri clan. Therefore the term "pirate" became inaccurate, as they were now in the service of a landed daimyō. As such were the coastal patrols of northern Kyushu, who being in the service of the Ōtomo warlords for at least two or three generations exploited to the fullest their geo-political as well as their economic environment. It is the premise of this article that economic reasons and geo-political locations permitted a transformation of these littoral clans in northern Kyushu into organized naval warriors in the service of the Ōtomo family. Among all the clans that protected the coastline there were a few that stood out and rose to power from the early fifteenth to the sixteenth centuries: the Kibe, Tomiku, Watanabe, and Wakabayashi.

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[9] Luis De Guzman, *Historia de las missiones que han hecho los religiosos de la Compañia de Iesus, para predicar el Sancto evangelio en la India Oriental, y en los reynos de la China y Japon*, chapter 22 (Alcala: Gracian, 1601), 343.

[10] Ibid., 343-344.

The Kibe Clan's Geo-economic Network

The coastal area of northern Kyushu, from Shimonoseki to the city of Usuki, has an uneven shoreline encompassing a prominent peninsula descending into the gulf of Funai and turning east towards the present-day Usuki. On that peninsula, in Kunisaki and Urabe, the Kibe clan rose to prominence under Ōtomo Mochinao, and between 1456 and 1471, under Ōtomo Chikashige, they became part of a group of close retainers of the Ōtomo with signatory power (also known as *kahanshū*).

In 1468, Kibe Yamashiro no kami went to Korea as a trader authorized (*jukenin*) by the Tsushima daimyo Sō Sadakuni.[11] He may have traded on behalf of the Ōtomo family from the time the Ōtomo participated in the tributary trade with Korea, sending, as tribute sulphur and other commodities. In the *Haedong jegukki*, a Korean record of travels to and from Japan written in the late fifteenth century, there is an entry for Kibe Yamashiro no kami arriving as an envoy with the title of Deputy and possessing a permit granted by Sō Sadakuni.[12] It also recorded that Kibe Yamashiro no kami was originally from Bungo (nowadays Ōita), Usa-shi kibe.[13] Indeed, the Kibe received the rights to the revenue from a plot of land in Usa-shi, as proprietors (*ryōshu*).[14] However, those were not the only land rights that the Kibe clan came to acquire. In fact, by the 1580s the Kibe were in areas of Bungo such as Kunisaki, Hayami, and Hibi, as well as on the nearby island of Kayajima (Kamajima). In addition to being of strategic importance for maritime

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11 Akutagawa Tatsuo and Fukugawa Kazunori, eds., *Saigoku bushidan kankei shiryōshū*, vol. 2, *Kibe monjō* (Tokyo: Bunken shuppan, 1992), 115.

12 Although as suggested by Hashimoto Yū (2005), that embassy may have been a fake embassy to Joseon, this is still evidence that Kibe Yamashiro no kami was by then already in the service of Ōtomo Yoshinaga.

13 Tanaka Takeo, trans. and ed., *Kaitō shokokuki* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1991), 178.

14 Akutagawa and Fukugawa, eds., *Saigoku bushidan kankei shiryōshū*, vol. 2, *Kibe monjo*, 115.

passage to Kyoto and Osaka, two important economic centers of consumption, these territories also had sustainable economies of their own. Since the Kamakura period, northern Kyushu had been a region of salt production particularly on islands such as Kayajima. As well, while salt was typically derived from salt beds, in Kyushu since the twelfth century furnaces were used to extract it from sea water, and the same people skilled in building furnaces were also skilled in producing tools, metals, and weapons from iron and other materials.[15]

In Kyushu, salt production in the Sengoku period was found mainly in Amakusa, Kumamoto, and other locations such as the insular Kayajima. Although the Kibe were connected with the island of Kayajima, and possibly even with salt making, it is not certain that they were involved in the production of iron and iron tools. This is illustrated in documents addressed to Ōtomo Yoshinaga, Ōtomo Yoshiaki (1502-1550), and Ōtomo Yoshishige from the Kibe commanders Yatarō and Kikosuke, and others addressed to a third Kibe commander, Noto no kami of Kunisaki. These documents all show that the Kibe commanders offered such valuable metals as gold, silver, and iron tools and pieces, as well as a variety of long and short swords. It would seem that the Kibe were men skilled in metal working and we know, especially during Yoshiaki's rule, that Kibe Noto no kami sent him as many as five pieces of cut iron or iron currency (*kurokane*) as offerings.[16]

We also know that Kibe Chindai no kuma was acquainted with the rulers of Kayajima, as he received land that previously belonged to Kayajima Tōji[17] on the order of Yoshiaki. Thus, there is ample evidence that the Kibe had connections to both the island and the rulers of Kayajima, and it is reasonable to assume that they may also have played

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15 Hattori Hideo, *Tosushi shishi: Chūsei-kinsei hen*, http.//hd.handle.net/2324/17856, 2008, 13-171.

16 Akutagawa and Fukugawa, eds., *Saigoku bushidan kankei shiryōshū*, vol. 2, *Kibe monjo*, 32, 60.

17 Ibid., 49.

a role in the island's economic production of salt or iron tools. Indeed, evidence exists that the Kibe were involved in metal working much earlier than this. In 1550 in Nakatsu, Kibe Naizōnoshō Shigenori requested a permit to be a metal master from the then-powerful political blacksmiths' association led by Matsugi Hisanao, a man well connected with Kyoto nobility.[18] Again, in 1589, Kibe Shinzaemon, from the Takedatsu-Kibe line of Hibi, received land revenues in Kunisaki (the Ise fief), a forge at Nansannishi no hara, and a residence in Yamano[19] while working first under Yoshiaki and later under Chikaie (1561-1614). This is further proof that some belonging to the various Kibe clans had acquired the status of metal workers.

This is especially noteworthy as the Ōtomo family had commercial relations with the Portuguese by the mid-sixteenth century, and it is possible that they also learned how to build muskets and cannon locally wherever iron ore could be extracted. In fact, by 1552, Ōtomo Yoshishige sent a locally constructed musket imitating Portuguese techniques to the Ashikaga shogun. And while there were other blacksmiths working for the Ōtomo elsewhere in northern Kyushu, the Kibe were under the jurisdiction of the Hachiman shrine of Usa-gun, whose metal workers built cannons for the Ōtomo family in the early Tenshō period (1573-1592).[20]

As previously discussed, the Kibe first began trading with Korea for the Ōtomo, but it is likely that they also began to trade on their own behalf. An inscription on a wooden board found at the Machida Shrine in Kokura (northern Kyushu) indicates that, in 1499, the Kibe family was part of the local mercantile association (*ton'ya*) of the shrine.[21] This

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[18] Nagoya Daigaku Bungakubu kokushi kenkyūkai, *Chūsei Imonoshi shiryō* (Tokyo: Fuji seihan, 1982), 64.

[19] Ibid., 74.

[20] Fukugawa Kazunori, "Bungo Ōtomo shi to teppō ni tsuite," *Nihon rekishi* 353 (1977), 81.

[21] Akutagawa and Fukugawa, eds., *Saigoku bushidan kankei shiryōshū*, vol. 2, *Kibe monjo*, 116.

suggests that they expanded their activities under the Ōtomo, and by the early sixteenth century they dealt internationally with the Korean trade and domestically in metal and lumber, as well. In order to trade they not only had to own ships and be skilled seafarers but also they had to carry weapons to deal with the lawless environment in which they lived as well. Absent weapons, the majority of merchants at sea would be easy prey for pirates and might themselves become pirates, looting other ships when the occasion arose. The Kibe were known to be pirates in the fifteenth century, but by the early sixteenth century several of their members had differentiated their individual activities so that only a few were still involved in serving the Ōtomo as corsairs to protect the coast. However, in the early sixteenth century, surviving documents establish that the Kibe clan was extensively involved in coastal protection under Ōtomo Yoshinaga and Yoshiaki. In 1512, after mutinies aboard two of Ōtomo Yoshinaga's tributary ships from China, Yoshinaga ordered Kibe Yatarō, Kushiku Tōkurō, and Tomiku Sansaburō to hold those ships in a bay in Hyūga.[22] Another document from the 1530s describes how Yoshiaki deployed the Kibe to control pirates roaming the seas close to their shores. On that occasion, the Kibe worked in concert with the Kushiku, Imi, Araki, Takedatsu, Yoshihiro, and Himejima families to patrol the coasts. In 1544, Kibe Kikonosuke was captain of one of the patrol ships that safely carried Yoshiaki's daughter to meet her future husband, a member of the Isshiki family.[23]

The Kibe, therefore, geographically and economically took advantage of their extensive networks among other seafaring clans along the coast of northern Kyushu, and shared a long history with some of those families. This was the case with the Tomiku, who migrated to Kyushu during the Kamakura period and settled first in the Kunisaki

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[22] Ibid., 28-29.

[23] Ibid., 66.

peninsula and later at Isshaku (Saga no seki). By the Sengoku period, the Tomiku were serving under the Ōtomo, as were the Kibe, and were the recipients of land rights over several territories in Buzen (Usa-gun), Chikuzen (Kashii and Sashi-gun), Bungo (Tomiku Ura), Aki-gun, and the Kunisaki peninsula, all in proximity to the Kibe clan.

The Tomiku and Their Kinship Connections

The Tomiku originally served the Ōtomo under the supervision of their close retainers, the Tahara, who by the 1530s had designated the Tomiku deputies of Kunisaki and, in Akitsuki, were made deputies over the quarters of sixty towns.[24] By the 1550s, the Tomiku were part of the Kunisaki group formed by other skilled seafarers such as the Kibe and the Kushiku, but around the same time internal conflict within the clan caused breakaway elements to join others like the Himejima and the Urabe bay groups.[25] Their piratical past is suggested only by association, when they appear in documents to be related to other notorious seafarers and coastal patrols such as the Kibe. However, unlike the Kibe, the Tomiku held higher local governmental posts and had widely spread land revenues throughout Kyushu. The reason for this was that the Tomiku were allied by marriage to the Ōtomo, specifically Tomiku Akihide, was married to a woman of Ōtomo Yoshiaki's family. Akihide and Sansaburō were the main characters defining the Tomiku as the Ōtomo's corsairs, as Akihide rendered his services to Yoshiaki aboard ships controlling the Kunisaki peninsula.[26]

Nishio Kazumi has discussed the value of political marriages between pirate clans like the Murakami and their sponsoring landed

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[24] Ibid., 82.

[25] Ibid., 83.

[26] Ibid., 83.

warlords, namely the Kōno, Kobayakawa, and Mōri during Oda Nobunaga's territorial unification of central Japan.[27] Political marriages were useful to gain authority and status, but they also meant that a certain degree of interaction was created, in particular when there were conflicts and territorial losses and conquest at stake. These interactions were not only military but also economic and personal, although as demonstrated by Nobunaga himself, who even sacrificed his brothers and in-laws, the kinship side of those alliances was rather fragile. Even so, political marriages were sometimes relevant to political survival in the period, as demonstrated by the Ōtomo and their retainers. As the Tomiku clan's status rose, there is evidence that they moved away from patrolling the coast to more land-based official positions, as proved by the Tomiku-Hashimoto clan who settled first in Usuki and later in Kitsuki (Hisasho village) in their newfound role as merchants. However, not all members of the Tomiku changed their secular profession. Hashimoto Shinzaemon, a descendant of the Tomiku-Hashimoto clan, who had served on a carrier as naval captain during the campaigns of Hideyoshi between 1592 and 1598, returned to northern Kyushu as a masterless samurai (*rōnin*) until again becoming a naval captain under the Hosokawa clan in the early years of the Tokugawa shogunate.[28] The Tomiku are just one of the several families of corsairs that at the beginning of the new regime dominated by the "pax Tokugawa" surrendered their status as "corsairs" and "pirates" to mold their skills into newly created positions in the now commercially viable mercantile ships that were trading on behalf of landed lords in certain domains. First, however, this clean transformation did not occur overnight, and second, it may have not been as clear-cut as stated in documents of the Tokugawa era.[29] The need for legitimacy and

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[27] Nishio Kazumi, *Sengokuki no kenryoku to konin* (Tokyo: Seibundō, 2005), 195-204.

[28] Akutagawa Tatsuo and Fukugawa Kazunori, eds., *Saigoku bushidan kankei shiryōshū*, vol. 4, *Tomiku monjo* (Tokyo: Bunken shuppan, 1992), 83.

[29] The *Buke mandaiki*, written in 1644 by a member of the Murakami family, is one such document

legitimization brought even the Murakami clans to write their own biographies during the early Tokugawa years as a way of cleansing themselves of past misdeeds and showing loyalty to their new overlord the Tokugawa shogun.

The Watanabe as Shipbuilders and Leaders of the Manai Group

The Watanabe, based in the adjacent gulf of Beppu, was another family that served the Ōtomo as corsairs. Like the Tomiku and Kibe clans, they received land fiefs and rights directly from the Ōtomo family. Their importance is related to the fact that they managed resources like timber used in ship building and other relevant resources in their controlled territory. Historically the Watanabe clan, like the Kibe, settled in Kyushu as armies sent by the Kamakura bakufu to repel the Mongol attacks in Kyushu. By 1351, the Watanabe clan had settled in northern Kyushu at Hayami, brought by the armies of Imagawa Ryōshun, who had been sent by the Muromachi shogunate to govern Kyushu as supreme military authority (*Kyūshū tandai*). But by 1398 the Watanabe had established a close relationship with Ōtomo Chikayo, and as a result came to occupy a position in the jurisdictional office in the village of Manai. They were granted the revenues of seventy houses in Amabe-gun Nakamura village and of fifty more in Hayami-gun. In time, the Watanabe also came to control the gulf of Funai.

By 1415, however, the Watanabe faced a number of crises. Their station at Manai was burned down by a certain Midainyūdō who had slandered Chikayo.[30] Around the same time they battled the Kimura and Ōga clans and lost Manai, only to regain it by entering the service of the

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still extant and preserved in the Yamaguchi-ken Monjokan (Yamaguchi Prefectural Archives).

30 Akutagawa Tatsuo and Fukugawa Kazunori, eds., *Saigoku bushidan kankei shiryōshū*, vol. 15, *Watanabe monjo* (Tokyo: Bunken shuppan, 1992), 90.

Ōga and Bekki clans, the latter a cadet family of the Ōtomo.[31] By 1484, the Watanabe clan had divided into five lineages: Higashi Akiyoshi, Nishi Akiyoshi, Higashi Seisho, Hirabatake, and Iwakado, to which another family, the Kawauchi, was added. The predominant family within the Manai group was the Higashi Seisho lineage, as they continued to work as corsairs for the Ōtomo family even in a time of internal succession conflicts.

In fact, the Watanabe, by serving the Ōtomo for several generations, gained authority over their controlled area, on both land and sea. In 1518, Ōtomo Yoshiaki fought domestic as well as inter-domain conflicts that gave rise to a system that strengthened alliances between cadet families aided by marital alliances, as was the custom at the time, but also by economic incentives in the form of land revenues and commercial rights. The alliances that formed among the corsairs of the northern Kyushu coast formed precisely the same structure as those of landed daimyo. Around this time, the form that the Manai group took as corsairs working for the Ōtomo changed into a sort of naval militia used for patrolling the coast and conducting raids. Fukugawa Kazunori confirms this in reporting that the Manai group received land and fiefs in the Kunisaki peninsula and in Hayami on the gulf of Beppu that tied them to the littoral. Their military exploits occurred in the mid-1530s during the conflicts between the Ōuchi and Ōtomo clans.[32]

In 1532, Ōtomo Yoshiaki lost the territory of Usa-gun (patrolled by the Kibe, as described above) to the Ōuchi forces who ruled Usa-gun under Sada Asakage.[33] Two years later, Yoshiaki unsuccessfully attacked the Sada and lost the coastal area controlled by the smaller clan of the Yakushiji pirates, who switched sides at their convenience. All those

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[31] Hibi chōshi, *Ōita-ken Tsukumi Hibi-chō*, vol. 2, 622.

[32] Akutagawa and Fukugawa, eds., *Saigoku bushidan kankei shiryōshū*, vol. 15, *Watanabe monjo*, 91.

[33] Hibi chōshi, *Ōita-ken Tsukumi Hibi-chō*, vol. 2, 625.

naval battles were fought by the Manai group, who not only patrolled the shore against enemies, but also protected their ship-building site. In Manai the Watanabe worked in the construction of vessels and for that enterprise they needed timber. Therefore they were in charge of procuring lumber under the Ōtomo's jurisdiction from nearby forests and mountains. From the late fifteenth century, the Watanabe received several awards and prizes. Documents relating to the Watanabe clan report that, for example, a certain Watanabe Tōtōmi no kami was awarded a Chinese character (a *kanji* to change his name) by Ōtomo Chikatsuna.[34] In the same period a certain Watanabe Sakyōbe had received from the Ōtomo the reconfirmation in Manai village of land revenues (*tsubōchi*) for forty towns.[35] And again in 1484, a certain Watanabe Hyōgo no suke was ordered to settle a succession dispute in land belonging to the Kutami when the recipient of land rights died in battle.[36] This is tremendously important, not because they had jurisdictional power over Kutami's land, but because they were put in charge of protecting Ōtomo's economic interests in that area. In fact, until 1501 the Watanabe were in charge of supervising territories under the Kutami clan because of the Ōtomo clan's economic interests in foreign trade and shipping. Stepping back to 1412, it is known that Ōtomo Chikayo possessed a vessel of 1,500 *koku* tonnage called *Kasugamaru*. An extant document recording voyages of the *Kasugamaru* between Kyushu and Hyōgo shows that the vessel was given permission to enter both the toll-fee barriers existing at Hyōgo, and at the delta of the Yodo River, close to the consumer districts of Osaka and Kyoto.[37] Thirty years later, in 1442, the *Kasugamaru* was still in operation and is described in the 1445 records of Hyōgo harbor held by

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[34] Ibid., 350.

[35] Ibid., 355.

[36] Ibid., 355-256.

[37] *Ōita-ken shiryō*, vol. 26, docs. 10-13.

the Tōdaiji temple.[38] By the second half of the fifteenth century, Ōtomo Yoshisuke (or Chikatoyo, 1459-1496), issued an order to Takita Rokurō to levy timber for the construction of ships from all the domains controlled by his retainers.[39] The Takita were Ōtomo retainers controlling the village of Yamakado in Kutami district. Although Yoshisuke requested timber from several places, it is obvious that the order designated Kutami district as the main place of operation. Hence, Kutami was a center to which timber was brought from other mountain locations to be utilized as construction material. In a letter, Ōtomo Masachika, successor of Yoshisuke, reconfirmed that Watanabe Hyōgo no suke was the heir of the land of Kutami and Ichikawa fiefs upon the death of his father, Watanabe Musashi no kami, in battle.[40] Although the document does not specify a date, it is believed to have been issued by the late fifteenth century. But this is not the only document that ties the Watanabe clan to shipbuilding. In 1544, Ōtomo Yoshiaki ordered the construction of several coastal patrol vessels to the Manai group led by the Watanabe clan. In particular, two documents signed by Yoshiaki show that in the space of some two-and–a-half months the ships ordered were completed and fully functional on the seas, and that they were built with the purpose of protecting the coastal areas.[41] In both documents there is reference to the coastal patrol group led by the Kibe. Therefore, there is the possibility that they worked as a team in shipbuilding with the Kibe clan. In effect, both the Kibe and Watanabe clans existed under the Ōtomo family umbrella, and they were also adjacently located. They received

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38 Hayashi Tatsusaburō, *Hyōgo kita no seki irifune naichō* (Tokyo: Chūō kōron shuppan, 1981), 181.

39 *Ōita-ken shiryō*, vol. 26, doc. 47.

40 Akutagawa and Fukugawa, eds., *Saigoku bushidan kankei shiryōshū*, vol. 15, *Watanabe monjo*, 26.

41 *Watanabe monjo*, Ōita Kenritsu Senketsu Shiryōkan collection, doc. 4341 image and doc. 4343 image (photographed by the author).

orders directly from the Ōtomo in the procurement and operation of the coastal patrol ships (Ōtomo resources) as evidenced in the document below, where there is a request to build "*keigo-fune*" or coastal patrol vessels.



Figure 1. Document issued by Ōtomo Yoshiaki to the Manai group; from the Ōita kenritsu senketsu shiryōkan (Ōita Prefecture Ancient Sages Historical Archives).

The Ōtomo were involved directly in supervising the shipbuilding industry left to the Watanabe to manage due to their strategic plans to fend off maritime attacks. One of the major issues, as previously described, was the several attacks by enemy forces, mainly the Ōuchi, who encroached upon Ōtomo territories. Although the construction of ships was an activity related to trade and coastal protection, it required the cooperation of several territorial groups, and this was possible in wartime as all the groups and militia were fighting a common enemy for their livelihood. Another reason is that, as the Manai group comprised

carpenters, they were also able to build wooden fortresses, and due to the sustained attack form the Ōuchi, Ōtomo Yoshiaki also began building fortresses in his controlled territories and coastal areas. By the 1530s, however, he issued an order to halt the construction. The reasons for that order are debated, because Yoshiaki resumed the construction of several fortifications after a few years. Among these was the fortress Shikaetsu, a stronghold controlled by the Watanabe.[42] In a document most likely dated 1535, Yoshiaki issued an order for its construction to the various retainers that were part of his magistrate group residing in the area of Yamaga village, close to Hibi. These retainers were the Kimura, Nagano, Tahara, Yoshihiro, Hayashi, and the powerful Ōga clan.[43] The Shikaetsu fortress was at the border between the provinces of Buzen (partially controlled by Ōuchi forces) and Bungo (controlled by the Ōtomo family) and was intended to fortify the borders against sudden attack. Yoshiaki also fortified the province of Chikugo in order to protect the gulf of Funai, where commercial exchanges were taking place. By 1533 the fortress of Tsunomure, in Yamaga, also underwent construction work.[44]

The funding for this work was provided by the wealthy landowner Hirai Saemon, to whom Yoshiaki had granted revenues from a fief.[45] The use by Yoshiaki of local landowners' funds to build defensive posts had the effect of decreasing funds available to the local retainers in their fiefs. Thus, while building fortresses and ships in the littoral areas, Yoshiaki also reduced the prospect of domestic conflict among the retainers of the Ōtomo clan.

The Watanabe, as corsairs for the Ōtomo, continued to be involved in coastal patrols and shipbuilding, as detailed in a document dated 1548

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[42] Hibi chōshi, *Ōita-ken Hayami Hibi-chō*, vol. 2 (Ōita: Ōita-ken Hayami-gun Hibi-chō, 1986), 385.

[43] Ibid., 365.

[44] Takita Manabu, *Ōtomo hennen shiryō*, vol. 16, 393.

[45] Takita, *Ōtomo hennen shiryō*, vol. 26, 127.

and signed by Yoshiaki wherein he ordered the Manai group to oversee shipbuilding in order to patrol the shores and, as well, to watch for pirates whose vessels lurked in nearby waters.[46] It should be noted that it is not specified who those "pirates" were, as in times of conflict enemy ships were considered pirates rather than "parties at war." Therefore, the term "pirates" used in wartime does usually refer to enemy parties, rather than to looting marauders on the sea. Just because these enemies were engaged in acts of naval warfare that included piratical acts such as looting and taking captives.

The conflict with the Ōuchi intensified during the Tenbun period (1532-1555) until the Ōuchi clan was completely eradicated with the defeat of Sue Harukata at the Itsukushima battle with the Mōri clan. By the mid-sixteenth century, though, the Ōtomo family with Yoshishige had to face more powerful enemies. Until at least 1554, the Watanabe were still in charge of the Kunisaki and Funai coast, as a document dated 1554 shows that Watanabe Jirōsaburō had succeeded as heir to his father, Saburōzaemon, and was reconfirmed in his fief by Ōtomo Yoshishige, Yoshiaki's successor. By 1562, when the Mōri attacked Ōtomo forces to gain the Ōuchi's lost territories in Northern Kyushu, the Ōtomo and the Mōri engaged in several naval battles. In the eleventh month of 1562, Watanabe Sakyōryū received intelligence from Yoshishige on the status of Moji harbor, previously ruled by the Ōuchi but conquered by the Ōtomo, and a strategic passageway on the route to the Seto Inland Sea.[47] The Watanabe, along with several other militias gathered by the Ōtomo, fought the organized pirates-turned-corsairs of the Mōri clan, namely, the powerful piratical clans of the Murakami located on various islands of the Seto Inland Sea. These clans operated alongside the Ōuchi corsairs now recruited into the forces of Kobayakawa Takakage, who led a

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[46] Hibi chōshi, *Ōita-ken Hayami Hibi-chō*, vol. 2, 367.

[47] Ibid., 369.

considerable fleet commanded by the Kurushima, Noshima Murakami, and the Nomi (the latter were pirates and mercenaries close to Hiroshima Bay). The Watanabe and the Kibe were known to the Jesuit missionaries as the Murakami "corsairs," and had connections with the Portuguese merchants. Hence, their networks included the diffusion of religious ideas. The Watanabe, who served under Ōtomo Yoshishige Sōrin, the so-called Christian daimyo, could not be spared from missionary encounters. There is evidence that they came into contact with Jesuit missionaries hosted by Yoshishige in Kyushu. As for the Kibe, with Kibe Pedro Kasui, the Japanese priest who dedicated his life to Catholicism in the early years of the seventeenth century, and whose parents were of pirate extraction, the Watanabe contact with Christianity is unclear due to the paucity of extant documents. In the early letters of Francisco Xavier, the first Jesuit missionary in Japan, there is mention of his stay in Bungo where he was welcomed by the "King of Bungo," Yoshishige, who was baptized with the homonym "Don Francisco" in honor of Xavier. What is known is that the Portuguese were aware of the harbor of Hibi (described in their map as Figi) and they may have converted some of the population during their years of residence in Bungo. As far as the Watanabe's contact with Christianity is concerned the only documents are related to a certain Watanabe Torozaemon Constantino, who settled later in the city of Hakata.[48]

Although the Watanabe continued their service as corsairs, by the 1570s their notoriety was surpassed by another clan who held the major waterways in northern Kyushu: the Wakabayashi.

The Wakabayashi and their Political Networks

The Wakabayashi were another clan of corsairs who arrived in Kyushu

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[48] Matsuda Kiichi, *Nanban shiryō no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Nakauchi shuppan, 1967), 357.

following the troops of the Hōjō in the late Kamakura period. By 1486, they had been granted a boat and a piece of land in Isshaku along with revenues from that land. However, when the Isshaku territory fell under Ōtomo Masachika, the Wakabayashi also began acting as coastal protection units. They prospered under the Ōtomo, and by the Sengoku period (1477-1603) they had land revenues from several places in Kyushu: Ono, Ōita, Amabe-gun in Bungo Province, and Takeno-gun in Chikugo Province. They had become managers of economically scattered fiefs.

Figure 2. View from Kitsuki Castle and Usuki waterways

During the rule of Ōtomo Yoshiaki, Wakabayashi Echigo no kami served in a coastal patrol. Additionally, under Ōtomo Chikaharu, another Wakabayashi (Shigeoki) was awarded fiefs in places close to Usuki, Tsukumi village and Takamatsu. As a dwelling he was given one ship to perform his duties as *kaijō gōyō*, a term that corresponds to maritime

purveyor.[49] In 1571, Wakabayashi Genroku received from Ōtomo Masachika a fishing vessel in the bay of Usuki with which to supply the Ōtomo with fresh fish.[50] His role included patrolling the nearby littoral and protecting it from vessels of unknown origins. Hence, the Wakabayashi began by engaging in merchant fishing. Amino Yoshihiko justly stated that in their early stages pirates were "sea people" (*kaimin*) who needed to provide for themselves and turned to piracy in times of bad harvest or poor fishing.[51] However, that conclusion is debatable, as the primary requirement for even petty pirates was the ability to loot at sea, and in order to do so they must have had a fast seagoing vessel of at least medium size that in optimal conditions was supplied by local retainers, if not by the main daimyō, as was the case with the Wakabayashi. Of this opinion is Fujita Tatsuo, who claimed that the status of "pirates" was not for the seamen themselves, but for their sponsors, the warlords of southern Japan.[52]

Through their coastal patrols the Wakabayashi had gained particular visibility with the expansionist policies and tributary trade of Ōtomo Yoshiaki, who gained access to the trading routes and permits sold by the shogunate to trade with Ming China. While Yoshiaki supported the newly installed shogun (Ashikaga Yoshizumi) advocated by the Hosokawa, he was hostile to the Ōuchi, who supported Ashikaga Yoshitane. The increasing competition in trade between the Ōtomo and Ōuchi clans resulted in increased surveillance of the coastal area and its toll barriers. In 1547, Wakabayashi Shigeoki, located in Isshaku, had risen so far in stature among other corsairs that the "*shige*" character in his name was

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[49] Ōita kenritsu senketsu shiryōkan, *Ōtomo suigun*: *Umi kara mita chūsei Bungo* (Ōita: Ōita kenritsu senketsu shiryōkan, 2003), 59-60.

[50] Ibid., 2.

[51] Amino Yoshihiko, *Nihon chūsei no hinōgyōnin to Tennō* (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1984), 263-267.

[52] Fujita Tatsuo, *Hideyoshi to kaizoku daimyō* (Tokyo: Chūō kōron shinsha, 2012), 24-26.

bestowed on him by Ōtomo Yoshishige himself. Shigeoki earned this honor in maritime battles between 1559 and 1563 against expansion in Northern Kyushu by the warlord of Aki, Mōri Motonari (1497-1571), who had uncontested power over the routes of the Seto Inland Sea, had the alliance of pirates like the Murakami, and possessed the silver mines of the Ōuchi used to finance military expenditures.[53]

In 1568, Wakabayashi Shigeoki protected the harbor of Aio no ura against the forces of the Ōuchi with both arrows and firearms. But by 1572, as Wakabayashi records show, he was still a fish merchant in the town of Saga no seki.[54] By 1586, under Ōtomo Yoshimure, successor of Yoshishige, he was awarded the title of magistrate of Saga no seki. In this role, Shigeoki was responsible not only for the harbor of Saga no seki and its inhabitants, but also for issuing several rulings approved by Yoshimune. He issued a series of edicts for the city, the most famous of which is the promulgation of "Saga no seki's regulations," a set of eleven rules that began with the establishment of tolls to be paid in silver at toll barriers in the two bays of Kami no ura (Upper Bay) and Shimo no ura (Lower Bay), the two villages at either end of the town of Saga no seki. The second rule regarded the standardization of scales to measure goods to be weighed, to conform to the scale used in the town and by the merchants of Usuki, while the third rule concerned the handling of firefighting emergencies. Thus, most of the regulations regard the behavior that foreigners had to maintain once in Saga no seki.

Of particular interest for our present purpose, however, is rule number eight, which dealt with vessels arriving at Saga no seki. It established that trading vessels were to be handled by the local mercantile association in terms of providing dwellings for travelling merchants and setting conditions for the selling and buying of

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[53] *Ōita-ken shiryō*, vol. 35; Ōita Kenritsu Senketsu Shiryōkan, *Ōtomo Suigun*; *Wakabayashi monjo*.
[54] Ōita Kenritsu Senketsu Shiryōkan, *Ōtomo suigun*, 2-3.

goods.[55] At the apex of his fascinating career, Wakabayashi Shigeoki, as magistrate, ruled over all aspects of Saga no seki as a commercial harbor and a prominent passageway for maritime routes that allowed seafarers from the Seto Inland Sea to reach Shikoku, Southern Kyushu, and several East Asian countries. The Wakabayashi family came to control the straight of Saga no seki, one of the two barriers en route to trade in international waters, and there they levied a toll payable in silver. The fact that such levies were imposed in silver denotes that by then the circulation of silver in southern Japan had increased to the point where tolls were exacted in the metal, while daily shopping and payments were still conducted with copper coins imported from the Ming. In 1592, when Toyotomi Hideyoshi, then ruler of most of central and southern Japan, ordered the invasion of Joseon, Wakabayashi Jinnai (under Ōtomo Yoshimune, the son of Yoshishige) offered silver as homage to the conqueror. This demonstrates that by 1592 the Wakabayashi had not only gained military power but had become wealthy as well. They had risen from being fishermen and purveyors to coastal patrol and, indeed, assumed the positions of both magistrate and *hikan*. The position of the *hikan* was bestowed upon men of samurai origin or warriors whose background was of lower birth, or on people of mercantile status and lower samurai who had gained prominence through military enterprises. It was a position of power but not one as recognized as magistrate (*daikan*). The *hikan* controlled harbors and the communities of workers in their areas (*genin*), and therefore had leverage in terms of manpower when it came to gathering soldiers and sailors for imminent battles. They also had accounting capabilities and levied taxes in the harbors that they controlled.[56]

The strait controlled by the Wakabayashi was the easternmost tip of

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[55] Ibid., 66.

[56] Regarding the relationship between *hikan* and harbors, Kishida Hiroshi has demonstrated that this position was not an insignificant one, in regard to his studies on the Sako of Shimonoseki.

land that formed a boundary with the nearby island of Shikoku, where Ōtomo corsairs would often raid and pillage coastal villages. These matters were documented by a middle-class retainer of the powerful Kōno family who, like the Mōri, had marriage ties to the Murakami pirates of the Inland Sea, and by the mid-fifteenth century governed over one hundred retainers and coastal towns.[57] One of those retainers, Doi Kiyonaga, dedicated himself to improving the quality of produce on the land, and, while writing a manuscript on how to reap and sew the fruits of the land, he described the devastating pillaging of coastal villages by corsairs living in Ōtomo territories.[58] Between the 1530s and 1580s, the town of Uwa in Iyo witnessed several raids conducted by the Ōtomo and Iyo corsairs hired by the Ōtomo *in situ* (Saeki, Tsuruhara, Tahara, Usuki, Wakabayashi, etc.) aimed at gaining full control of both sides of the straight and getting some spoils along the way. It was in 1572, when Wakabayashi Shigeoki was dealing in mercantile activities and fighting the Mōri, that Shigeoki twice crossed the straight dividing Northern Kyushu from Shikoku Island on orders from Ōtomo Yoshishige. The apparent purpose was to attack the Saionji family of Shikoku, but in reality, the attack was against Ichijō Kanesada, who had married Yoshishige's sister for political reasons. The Wakabayashi, of whom three members went armed as musketeers, joined the Saeki, Fukae, and Tsuruhara to attack the two fortresses located at Uwa-gun Nagayakisan in a battle in which Shigeoki lost six of his men.[59] Again, in 1578, Shigeoki was dispatched on a mission to deal with the Ito clan, who had rebelled and formed an alliance with the Shimazu. In this campaign, Wakabayashi Shigeoki emerged supreme in a naval battle against his enemies. Two years later, he fought the Tahara, who were close retainers

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[57] Kageura Tsutomu, *Kōno shi no kenkyū* (Matsuyama: Seri kabu gaisha, 2007), 216.

[58] Hokazono Toyochika, *Sengokuki zaichi shakai no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Kokura shobō, 2003), 190.

[59] Ōita Kenritsu Senketsu Shiryōkan, *Ōtomo suigun*, 59.

of the Ōtomo but had rebelled against the rule of Ōtomo Yoshimune. When it was discovered that the Tahara had sought an alliance with the Mōri and Kobayakawa, Shigeoki led more than ten ships to attack the Mōri stronghold in Suō province. He was able to sink one of the enemy ships, losing two of his own family members and three comrades in battle.[60]

Shigeoki may have been a merchant-pirate turned corsair and an admiral who achieved heroic victories in naval battle, but there are additional aspects to his life. By 1587, he had assumed the Buddhist name Dōkan and was married to the daughter of Urakami Dōsatsu. An advantage for Shigeoki in his mercantile activities was that the Urakami family was well-connected to the merchant Nakaya Sōetsu, with whom Shigeoki and Dōsatsu had travelled in 1585 to Kyoto to accompany Yoshimune on a visit to Hideyoshi. Urakami Dōsatsu was a tea connoisseur and master of tea ceremony (*cha no yū*).[61] By association Wakabayashi Shigeoki shared the benefit of participating in these private summits, as the ceremonies were highly regarded, and provided him an insight into the political life of the time. According to the Isshaku Sonji, Urakami Dōsatsu wrote a letter to Shigeoki in which he describes all he had experienced in the tea ceremonies as performed in the presence of the Kanpaku Hideyoshi.[62] The document is, in itself, an explanation of tea caddies and tea ceremony tools used, but it also illuminates the cultural interests of a man such as Shigeoki. His historical image as corsair or merchant-pirate alone might paint him poorly without the understanding that Shigeoki rose from nothing to stand close to the highest political echelons of his day. His leadership and seafaring skills, his military record, as well as his long experience both at sea and in the

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[60] *Saga shishi*, vol. 2 (Saga: Saga shishi hensan iinkai, 1977-1982), 145.

[61] *Ōtomo hennen shiryō*, vol. 1; *Saga shishi*, 143.

[62] *Saga shishi*, 145-146.

political environment of Saga no Seki township, made Shigeoki an outstanding man of his time.

In fact, Shigeoki was just one of several outstanding Wakabayashi men, but he was certainly a deserving representative of the clan. He stands, however, among many anonymous and often historically forgotten personages who rode the wave of the entire epoch. Shigeoki lost his life to illness during the first Korean invasion, and was succeeded by his son Jinnai. Jinnai was born in 1568 and served under Yoshimune in the disastrous (for the Ōtomo) battle of Mimigawa against the Shimazu clan. Being close to Yoshimune, he participated in the Korean invasion, but as Yoshimune was blamed for not aiding General Konishi Yukinaga's troops as they retreated toward the coast, Jinnai's fief was withdrawn by Hideyoshi and he retired quietly in Yamaguchi. Jinnai lived in Nagasaki, where he died in 1637 at the age of seventy. We know that he continued his father's legacy as leader of commercial navy groups (*kaisen*) in the Seto Inland Sea.[63] It is the history of most corsairs and merchant-pirates of the Sengoku period that their skills allowed them to continue their seafaring endeavors under the Tokugawa regime, often as ships' captains under the command of domain lords, or by belonging to commercial associations and being classified as merchants or sailors.

Conclusions

The larger story of these several clans who, by the mid-fourteenth century, had raided and pillaged the coasts of Northern Kyushu begins, then, with their voluntary migration. As the Japanese shogunate needed protection from foreign invaders and had twice experienced threats from the Mongols, several clans following the Hōjō and Imagawa relocated to northern Kyushu. The Kibe and the Wakabayashi, in particular, rose from

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[63] *Saga shishi*, 129-131.

lowly stations to positions as corsairs with close ties to the Ōtomo family forged through their skills. The Tomiku also shared connections to both the Kibe and the Ōtomo, but each of these clans differed in their relationships to their environment and their overlords. As has been shown here, these corsair clans took full advantage of their environment to create economic, geo-political, and interpersonal networks that brought them to the fore as participants in the seashore economy that flourished between the fourteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Chronologically, some clans overlapped others as the Kibe, Watanabe, and Tomiku as coastal patrols and corsairs decreased in importance with the rise of the Wakabayashi and tighter political control under Hideyoshi's unification. However, several clans were able to adapt to the Tokugawa era relatively well by using their seafaring and economic skills acquired in times of conflict and on the coast of northern Kyushu. Their importance is due to their activities on the sea as part of the maritime history of Sengoku Japan. What these corsairs shared under Ōtomo rule was their authority over the territories of the littoral, bestowed upon them by the Ōtomo clan, which included the right to patrol the coast and manage shipping and related industries such as shipbuilding, metal working, gunsmithing, salt production, and woodworking, as well as the right to make policy in their localities. In addition, the Watanabe and Wakabayashi clans stood out politically for having gained the position of *hikan* and the even more prominent position of magistrate. This clearly illustrates that their rule was not only over the sea but extended from coastal harbors of historical note such as Hibi, Saga no seki, Usuki, Tsukumi, Hayami, and Kitsuki.

We have now seen that beyond their geographic locales, these corsairs acquired a mastery of international trade routes and escorted tributary ships to foreign lands. In the case of the Kibe and the Watanabe they even adopted Christianity, a foreign religion at the time. It is difficult to accept their role as mere corsairs acting under orders once we understand that in their daily lives they had to rely on their own

commercial initiatives and economic associations. In the case of the Kibe, Christian communities were a major part of their network, but the Wakabayashi relied more on their mercantile efforts. We have seen how Shigeoki, after his victories against the Mōri armies at sea, returned to his daily livelihood as a trader in maritime goods. Having analyzed the types of networks and activities they did participate in it is misleading to consider these littoral clans as simply warriors and subordinates within any modern concept of a military structure. Although they were maritime warriors, it is far more accurate to consider them corsairs: their raiding and pillaging of other territories was more simply a necessary element of benefitting from the land revenues and rights bestowed upon them by the Ōtomo family in their position as a Kyushu daimyo.

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Colonialism versus Nationalism: The Plague of Hong Kong in 1894

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Colonialism versus Nationalism: The Plague of Hong Kong in 1894

Drawing upon different source materials, this paper examines the significance of the plague of Hong Kong in 1894 in two ways. Firstly, it shows the process by which the colonial power successfully implemented the public health policy in Hong Kong by collaborating with the local Chinese communities. Secondly, it demonstrates how the Chinese in Hong Kong responded to the colonial mandatory measures by resisting them or partially accepting them. This paper highlights the reactions of the Chinese towards the prevention measures implemented by the British, and the controversy about the effectiveness of Chinese and western medicine in safeguarding public health.

Keywords: Hong Kong plague, colonialism, Aoyama-Kitasato-Yersin controversy, Tung Wah Hospital, Chinese and Western medicine

Colonialism versus Nationalism: The Plague of Hong Kong in 1894

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I. Colonialism, Medicine, Public Health, and the Modern State

The plague of Hong Kong in 1894 was not only significant in the history of Hong Kong but also in the history of Asia. Firstly, the plague bacillus that was identified had been mysterious for centuries. The plague in Hong Kong was instrumental in discovering the bacillus and hence laying the foundation for finding an effective cure. Secondly, after the plague started in the Guangxi and Yunnan province of China, infection reached in 1894 Hong Kong, Macau in 1895, Taiwan in 1896, India in 1896-98, San Francisco in 1899, and Australia in 1900-03. As a consequence, a total of 22 million people died by this single disease. Since Asia was ruled during that time by different colonial powers including Britain, France, Japan, and the Netherlands, the plague in Hong Kong was never treated as an isolated case. Instead, it was closely monitored by the British government in London to show how its colonial power implemented a public health policy in the European model and how the indigenous Chinese responded to the mandatory measures.

The history of public health is not a new subject, but among Chinese scholars it is still an unexplored area. In Hong Kong, the research of medical history in general and public health history in particular, are both undeveloped. Current publications on public health focus on personal biographies of the medical profession, and the history of hospitals as medical organizations.[1] With respect to the studies of plague, since 1975 E. J. Proyor, Molly Sutphen, Carney Fisher, and Robert Peckham have published books and articles that examine the origins of plague, its diffusion, its social and political consequences of amelioration, and its impact on public health in Hong Kong.[2] Recently, two doctoral theses dealt with the position of the Tung Wah Hospital during and after the plague.[3] Yet, compared with English language

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[1] Current available publications have focused on individuals and organizations, such as biographies or memoirs of James Cantlie (1939, 1983), Ho Kai (1980, 2000), Li Shu-fan (1964), Li Shu-pui (1996), and Li Song (1987), Harry Fang (2002); the hospital anniversary book of Tung Wah Hospitals (1961, 1970, 1998, 2000, 2010), Drs. Anderson and Partners (1984), Alice Ho Miu Ling Nethersole Hospital (1957, 1967, 1987), Maltilda (1988), Tsan Yuk (1992), Prince of Wales Hospital (1995), Kowloon Hospital (1995), Queen Mary Hospital (1997), Kowloon Hospital (1997), Sanatorium (1997); Hong Kong College of Medicine, Hong Kong University and Medicine Faculty (1987), Hong Kong Tuberculosis, Chest & Heart Diseases Association (1994), Hong Kong College of Radiologists (1995), Chinese University of Hong Kong Medicine Faculty (1995), Hong Kong Neurosurgical Society (1999), Red Cross (2000). For details, see Lee Pui-tak, *An Annotated Bibliography of Hong Kong History* (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 2001), 105-108.

[2] See Molly Sutphen, *Cookie-cutter Epidemics? The Colonial Office and the Plague Epidemics in Cape Town and Hong Kong, 1901-1902* (London: Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 1992); Carney Fisher, "Plague in Hong Kong 1894" (paper presented at the International Conference on Hong Kong and Modern China, University of Hong Kong, December 3-5, 1997); Robert John Collins, "The black death: Hong Kong 1894" (lecture, Hong Kong Museum of Medical Sciences, April 24, 1999); Robert Peckham, "Infective economies: empire, panic and the business of disease," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 41, no. 2 (2013), 211-237.

[3] Hong Zhou, "The Origins of Government Social Protection Policy in Hong Kong, 1842-1941" (PhD thesis, Brandeis University, 1992); Yang Xiangyin, "Colonial Power and Medical Space:

publications, writings on Hong Kong medical history are relatively small in quantity, and they are mainly empirical reports of facts. Most of these writings are personal recollections, which mainly provide empirical data.

In contrast, more attention has been paid to public health among Western scholars. Comparable research on China and India by Kerrie MacPherson, Carol Benedict, Iijima Wataru, David Arnold, I. J. Catanach, and Rajnarayan Chandavarkar show how the British colonial public health policies formed before and after the plague and how the indigenous Chinese and Indians reacted from resistance to partial acceptance to these policies.[4]

This article examines the plague of Hong Kong in 1894 from political and social perspectives. Drawing upon different sources materials, it discusses the cause and discovery of the bacillus, the reactions of the Chinese towards the preventive measures implemented by the British, and the debates between Chinese and western doctors about the plague. This paper will also touch upon the different conceptions of health, disease, hygiene, and living environment in the British colony. In the final section, it will address how colonialism conflicted with nationalism in the debate about public health.

The Transformation of Chinese and Western Medical Services in the Tung Wah Group of Hospitals, 1894-1941" (PhD thesis, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2007).

[4] See Kerrie L. MacPherson, *A Wilderness of Marshes: The Origins of Public Health in Shanghai, 1843-1893* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1987); I. J. Cantanach, "Plague and the Tensions of Empire: India 1896-1919," in Imperial *Medicine and Indigenous Societies*, ed., David Arnold (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), 149-171; David Arnold, *Colonizing the Body: State Medicine and Epidemic Disease in Nineteenth-century India* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Carol Benedict, *Bubonic Plague in Nineteenth-Century China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996); Rajnarayan Chandavarkar, *Imperial Power and Popular Politics: Class, Resistance and the State in India, c.1850-1950* (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); David Arnold, *Science, Technology, and Medicine in Colonial India* (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Iijima Wataru, *Pesuto to kindai Chūgoku: eisei no seidoka to shakai henyō* [Plague and modern China: The institutionalization of public health and social change] (Tokyo: Kenbun shuppan, 2000).

II. The Spread of Plague from China to Hong Kong

Hong Kong became a free port in the 1840s. In the following decades, with the improvement of harbor facilities and the growth of ship building industry, Hong Kong was transformed from a desolate island into one of the most important trading ports on China's coast. Furthermore, Hong Kong's proximity to China gave her an advantage in access to the hinterland. As has been noted in a recent study of Hong Kong economic history,

> Hong Kong was entrepôt port for South China and Southeast Asia, and substantial amounts of its trade were made up of foodstuffs (rice, wheat flour), raw material (cotton, sugar) and fuel (kerosene and coal). … The commodities of greatest predominance in weight are rice, coal and raw sugar imported from French Indo-China, Siam, Japan, Korea and Formosa (Taiwan) and Netherland East Indies (Indonesia); except for raw sugar which is refined in Hong Kong and exported principally to North China, of the other two commodities, rice is almost wholly exported to South China and coal partly to South China but delivered mostly to steamers. It should be clear that from this description that Hong Kong's trade was tied very closely to economic development in South China.[5]

From Table 1 may be seen that the transport between Hong Kong and neighboring Chinese ports were frequent and rapid. Chinese passengers or traders carried provisions from China such as fresh vegetables, fruits, poultry, eggs, and other daily consumables for which Hong Kong was dependent on China. Nevertheless, the import and export of Chinese

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[5] David Faure and Lee Pui-tak, eds., A *Documentary History of Hong Kong: Economy* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004), 2.

Table 1. Chinese Ports Linked to Hong Kong by Junk in 1866

Name of Chinese port	Number of junks engaged	Number of trips each per month	Duration of stay in Hong Kong
Canton	28	3	From 6 to 24 hours
Macao	17	8	From 6 to 24 hours
Kong-moon	9	3	From 6 to 24 hours
Chun Chun	8	3	From 6 to 24 hours
Toong-koon	7	4	From 6 to 24 hours
Sheak-loong	6	3	From 6 to 24 hours
Tai-ping	5	6	From 6 to 24 hours
Namtao	5	10	From 2 to 12 hours
Heong-shan	5	3	From 6 to 24 hours
Sun-chun	5	10	From 2 to 12 hours
Kowloong City	4	Daily	Immediate departure
Sei-heong	5	10	From 2 to 12 hours
Tsung Sheang	2	3	From 6 to 24 hours
Wong-kong	1	15	From 5 to 12 hours
Koo Soo	3	15	From 5 to 12 hours
Chaong-sha	2	3	Uncertain
Tik-hoi	2	3	Uncertain
Tseen-wan	2	Daily	Immediate departure
Tai-pang City	2	10	From 2 to 12 hours
Sha-yu-Chong	2	Daily	Immediate departure
Chaong Chow	3	15	From 5 to 12 hours
Peng-chow	2	Daily	Immediate departure
Tai O	2	Daily	Immediate departure
Mow-chow	2	10	From 2 to 12 hours
Kew-tow	1	10	From 2 to 12 hours
Eem-teen	2	6	From 2 to 12 hours
Tam-shui	2	6	From 2 to 12 hours

Source: "Petition from Chinese merchants, traders and lessees of land, residing in the Colony," *Hong Kong Government Gazette*, 17 November 1866, cited in David Faure and Lee Pui-tak, eds., *A Documentary History of Hong Kong: Economy* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004), 11.

products was the major component of Hong Kong's entrepôt trade. In 1868, the guild of import and export firms called "North-South guild" (南

北行),[6] was established in Bonham Strand. The guild was not only a business association, but also a mainstay of the first Chinese public organization known as the Tung Wah Hospital (東華醫院).

It is worth to ask where the plague of Hong Kong came from. Due to proximity and constant trade, Hong Kong imported plague from Guangdong province, the so-called economic hinterland of Hong Kong. More significantly, the plague came by sea rather than over land. Frequent contacts in the border area had not been happened than in the sea transportation. When the plague started in 1894, Hong Kong's border with China was in Kowloon. It was not until 1898, the Kowloon Peninsula was annexed with Hong Kong. In 1871, Beihai was infected, and then followed by Lianzhou, Qingzhou, Leizhou Peninsula, and Hainan Island. It has been pointed out that plague spread to towns and cities more easily than to villages, and to coastal areas more easily than to interior areas. From 1890 onwards, as China lost the control of ship quarantine, the plague spread quickly through the opened ports of Guangdong, starting from Beihai to Guangzhou, Shantou, Hong Kong, and nineteen more other cities in Guangdong Province.[7] The frequent trading activities among these different cities had been provided as a major channel for the circulation of the disease.

Management of maritime customs constituted an important factor causing the outbreak of plague in China. According to Lin Xinhao, quarantine in Chinese port cities started in Shanghai and Xiamen as early as 1873.[8] But the Chinese authority introduced quarantine measures to other Chinese ports slowly. Gradually, after Shanghai and Xiamen,

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[6] As the name denotes, these firms dealt in the business of transporting products between south and north China.

[7] *Zhongguo shuyi liuxingshi* [The history of the spread of plague in China] (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences, 1982), 1459-1460.

[8] Lin Xinhao, "Jindai haigang jianyi yu Dongnanya huajiao yimin" [Harbor quarantine and migration of overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia], *Haijiaoshi yanjiu*, no. 2 (1998).

quarantine measures were introduced to other Chinese cities: Beihai in 1877, Shantou in 1883, Ningbo in 1894, Tianjin in 1895, Liuzhuan in 1899, Fuzhou in 1900, Hankou in 1902, Guangzhou in 1911, and Yantai in 1912. And in 1930 the National Office of Harbor Quarantine (全國海港檢疫處) was established in Shanghai, and subsequently the quarantine service finally became systematized throughout the country.[9] As Robert John Collins points out,

> This third and last great plague pandemic spread to Hong Kong from an endemic focus in Yunnan province of south China in 1893. Transported along caravan and river routes it reached Canton and Hong Kong in 1894 and Singapore and Bombay by 1896. The spread of epidemic was closely related to land-, river- and sea-borne trade and it is possible to trace its movement from South Asia via the major trading routes to India, the Malay Peninsula, the Philippines and from there, further afield.[10]

Because Hong Kong had close economic ties with China, she was quickly affected by the plague. On May 10, 1894, Governor William Robinson declared Hong Kong as an infected port and started quarantining infected visitors. As a result, the trade between China and Hong Kong was decimated. As plague came through the trading routes, the increase in the speed of transport heightened the threat of the epidemic. Ironically, the movement of goods and people that colonialism fostered helped to spread the deadly plague.[11]

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[9] Yang Shangci, "120 nianlai Zhongguo weisheng jianyi" [Health quarantine in China of the last 120 years], *Zhonghua yishi zhazhi* 25, no. 2 (1995), 78.

[10] Robert John Collins, "The black death: Hong Kong 1894" (lecture, Hong Kong Museum of Medical Sciences, April 24, 1999).

[11] See Myron Echenberg, *Plague Ports: The Global Urban Impact of Bubonic Plague, 1894-1901* (New York: New York University Press, 2007).

III. The Aoyama-Kitasato-Yersin Controversy

1. Why did Japan Have to Study the Hong Kong Plague?

From 1868, Japan restructured its political and social orders. As part of the country's modernization, Japan was active in promoting Asian participation in international medical associations. For instance, the country vied with France in public health issues, indicating its determination to compete with European counterparts in international affairs.

When Hong Kong reported 130 cases of plague on May 15, 1894, the Foreign Office in London urged the Hong Kong government to take immediate action to investigate the matter and to ask for international assistance to solve the problem. At that time, plague was a mysterious disease to both Western and Chinese medicine, which offered generally ineffective treatments. During the 1880s and 1890s, with rapid progress in microbiology in Europe, scientists were refining molecular techniques to uncover the cause of plague. Louis Pasteur in France and Robert Koch in Germany, for example, were the two famous specialists in the field.[12] Because of the 1894 plague, Hong Kong quickly became the global site for conducting research on the disease's outbreak.[13] Two groups of scientists, one from Japan headed by Aoyama Tanemichi (青山胤通, 1859-1917) and Kitasato Shibasaburō (北里柴三郎, 1852-1931), and the other from France headed by Alexandre Yersin (1863-1943), who came from French Indo-China, arrived in Hong Kong at the request of the

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[12] That period is called the golden age of microbiology as the germ theory tells many diseases are caused by specific bacteria. Say for example, gonorrhea, typhoid, tuberculosis, and pneumonia are caused by different bacteria. See the pamphlet wrote by Tom Solomon, "The Hong Kong plague of 1894 and the discovery of the cause of plague," Hong Kong Museum of Medical Sciences.

[13] Collins, "The black death: Hong Kong 1894."

Hong Kong government.

Of the two international teams, the Japanese attracted special attention because their country was going to have war with China over Korea in August 1894. Several reasons may explain the Japanese government's decision to take such an unusual action. First, due to location Japan had concern about the spread of plague in East Asia.[14] Second, the Japanese scientists were invited by the Hong Kong government after the Foreign Office in London advised Hong Kong to do so soon after the outbreak. And third, the international competition of medical science forced the Japanese to be proactive in reaching the site of the plague as fast as possible.[15]

2. The Rivalry between Aoyama Tanemichi and Kitasato Shibasaburō

The controversy among the three international scientists was complicated. The controversy began with Aoyama and Kitasato. The two Japanese experts were both graduated from the Tokyo Medical University (which later merged with the Medical School of Tokyo University). After that they went to Berlin University for further study supervised by Dr. Robert Koch. After they came back to Japan in the late

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[14] It was known that the Japanese consul in Hong Kong Nakagawa Kōjirō reported to the Foreign Ministry the plague attack in Hong Kong on May 12, 1894. See Okuda Otojirō, *Meiji shonen ni okeru Honkon Nihonjin* [The Japanese in Hong Kong during the early years of the Meiji period] (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtukufu nettai sangyō chōsakai, 1937), 322.

[15] Otani Tadashi gave a detailed account of the international communications including steamship navigation, cable telegraph, and postal service of Japan during the late nineteenth century, were placed under the control of Great Britain, see his *Kindai Nihon no taigai senden* [The foreign propaganda of modern Japan] (Tokyo: Kenbun shuppan, 1994), 14-22. It is logical for Japan to send the research team to Hong Kong to cultivate friendship with Britain. Regarding the diplomatic relations of Japan with Britain, in particular, the Anglo-Japan Alliance in 1902, there is a large literature on the topic. Besides, the Governor of Hong Kong Sir William Robinson was on a visit in Japan, and he returned immediately to Hong Kong on May 15, 1894, after the outbreak of plague.

1880s, they had different career paths. Aoyama was soon placed as a professor in Tokyo University (Tōdai 東大) while Kitasato was excluded, which made him critical of the Tōdai clique. The situation became worse when Kitasato criticized another renowned Tokyo University microbiologist, Ogata Masanori (緒方正規), on the discovery of the beriberi bacillus, dealing a blow to the Tōdai clique.[16] In 1892, with the support of senior politician Fukuzawa Yukichi (福澤諭吉), Kitasato established the Institute of Infectious Diseases (傳染病研究所) and later in 1917 the Medical School of Keio University. Thus, before the two men set sail from Yokohama to Hong Kong they were already rivals.

Table 2. Comparison among Kitasao, Aoyama, and Yersin

	Kitasato Shibasaburō (1852-1931)	Aoyama Tanemichi (1859-1917)	Alexandre Yersin (1863-1943)
Birth place	Kumamoto	Tokyo	Aubonne, Switzerland
Home country education	Furushiro Medical School, 1871; Tokyo University, 1875-1883	Tokyo University, 1877-1882	Bachelor of Arts, 1882
Overseas education (supervision)	Berlin University, 1886-1892 (Robert Koch)	Berlin University, 1883 (Robert Koch); Paris University, 1887	Hôtel-dieu Hospital Paris 1882-1887 (Louis Pasteur); École Normal Supérieur (Emil Roux); Berlin University (Robert Koch, Richard Petri, Carl Fränkel), 1888
Specialty	Microbiology	Anatomy, internal medicine	Pathology, infectious diseases
Stay in Hong Kong	June 12-July 19, 1894	June 12-August 21, 1894	June 15-July 31, 1894

16 Sakai Shitsu, "Kaisetsu," in Uzaki Kumakichi, *Aoyama Tanemichi* (Tokyo: Ōzorasha, 1930, 1998 reprint), 2.

Career	Sanitary Bureau of Interior Department, 1883; founded the Institute of Infectious Disease, 1892; founded Kitasato Institute, 1914; founded the Medical School of Keio University, 1917; President of Japan Physicians, 1923	Professor, Medical School of Tokyo University,* 1887; President, 1901; Director of University Hospital, 1892; Adjunct Director of the Institute of Infectious Disease, 1915	Ship physicians in Indo-China; Colonial Health Corps; Pasteur Institute in Saigon, 1891; founded Pasteur Institute in Nhatrang, 1895; founded Hanoi's Medical School
Honors	Member of the House of Peers, 1917; Baron, 1924	4th class medal, 1894; 3rd class medal, 1900; Gakushin Fellow, 1906; Baron, 1917	Nominated for Honorary Director of Pasteur Institute and a member of its Board of Administration in 1934. A private university founded in Da Lat (Vietnam) in 2004 was named as Yersin University
Political patron	Fukuzawa Yukichi	Ōkuma Shigenobu 大隈重信	Nil

*Tokyo University was formed in 1877 with the merger of the Tokyo Medical School and Tokyo Kaisei School.

Sources: Uzaki Kumakichi, *Aoyama Tanemichi* (Tokyo: Ōzorasha, 1998); Nagaki Daizō, *Kitasato Shibasaburō to sono ichmon* (Tokyo: Keiō gijiku daigaku shuppankai, 2001); David J. Bibel and T.H. Chen. "Diagnosis of Plague: An Analysis of the Yersin-Kitasato Controversy," *Bacteriological Review* 40, no. 3 (September 1976), 633-51.

Kitasato and Aoyama arrived in Hong Kong on June 12 and they started working on June 14. However, two weeks later Aoyama became infected after he dissected victims' bodies. Therefore, he was not able to compete with Kitasato. Sakai Shitsu, the writer of Aoyama's biography, argued that his contribution to the study of the Hong Kong plague has been overlooked for two reasons: first, Aoyama had an unexpected infection that prevented him from completing his research; second, the rivalry between Tōdai and the Institute of Infectious Disease led to unfair

treatment of Aoyama.[17]

How did Aoyama view his rival Kitasato? In the investigation report that Aoyama wrote and submitted to Japan's Ministry of Internal Affairs in Tokyo in November 1894, he rarely mentioned Kitasato or any other parties who had cooperated with him, but he did state in the report that a microbiological survey would be submitted separately by Kitasato. He also noted in the report that communication with the patients was extremely difficult because he could not speak either Cantonese or English.[18] However, in another report, "Über die Pestepidemie in Hongkong in Jahre 1894" which was written in German in 1895, Aoyama criticized Kitasato, who had mistakenly identified the round shaped bacillus.[19]

Despite the controversy, it is clear that Aoyama did several autopsies on the victims of different races, while Kitasato found numerous bacilli in the blood from the heart and in organs of victims. On July 10, 1894, Kitasato made a presentation at the Government Civil Hospital in Hong Kong. The result of his investigation was reported by a local newspaper, the *Daily Press*, on July 12. On August 25, 1894, his article "The bacillus of bubonic plague" was published in the authoritative medical journal *The Lancet*. Because of the publicity, Kitasato made the claim that he was the first person to discover the plague bacillus.

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17 Sakai Shitsu, "Kaisetsu," 2-3.

18 See Aoyama Tanemichi, "Honkon hyakushito ryakuhō" [Report on miscellaneous of Hong Kong], dated November 12, 1894, 4, 42; and Uzaki, *Aoyama Tanemichi*, 68.

19 Tsuneseki Keiichi, "Densenbyō kenkyūjo ikan jiken: Kitasato Shibasaburō" [The transfer of the Institute of Infectious Diseases: Kitasato Shibasaburō], in *Sukyandaru kagakushi* [Scandals in scientific history], ed. Kagaku Asahi (Tokyo: Asahi shinbunsha, 1989), 112. It is worth noting that the controversy between Aoyama and Kitasato extended to the plague discovered in Taiwan in 1897; see Nagaki Daizō, *Kitasato Shibasaburō to sono ichimon* (Tokyo: Keiō gijiku daigaku shuppankai, 2001), 28-29.

3. The Rivalry between Kitasato and Yersin

With the help of British authorities, Kitasato was able to set up a laboratory in the Kennedy Town Hospital, where the victims were treated. He had all the necessary facilities for the autopsy provided by the Acting Superintendent of the Government Civil Hospital, James A. Lowson. By contrast, Yersin arrived in Hong Kong on June 15, 1894, three days after Kitasato. He was not given any support and had to build a straw hut near the Alice Hospital to conduct research. To make matters worse, he was refused access to the bodies of plague victims. However, with the help of an Italian missionary who was acting as his interpreter, he bribed English sailors who were carrying away the dead. With their help, he was able to examine the buboes for the bacillus. Following his complaint to the local authority, he was later allowed access to victims' bodies. After careful autopsy, he found a bacillus similar to Kitasato's from the dead victims.[20] It is interesting to ask why Yersin did not receive a warm welcome from the local government as Kitasato and Aoyama did. It can be assumed that the British in Hong Kong did not feel comfortable towards the French expansion in Asia, for they were suspicious to extend their influences in the region. On the other hand, Yersin was depressed by his research project in Indo-China, which had been turned down by the governor. It would seem psychologically logical for Yersin to regain his confidence and prove that he was a competent scientist.[21]

As can be seen from tables two and three, Kitasato received his training from Koch in Germany while Yersin did his study at the Pasteur Institute in Paris, indicating that they came from different academic backgrounds. As quoted from Tom Solomon, Yersin's careful identification of the plague bacillus had been recognized.

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[20] Collins, "The black death: Hong Kong 1894."

[21] David J. Bibel and T.H. Chen, "Diagnosis of Plague: An Analysis of the Yersin-Kitasato Controversy," *Bacteriological Review* 40, no. 3 (September 1976), 636.

> … Over the years there has been much debate as to who deserves the credit for identifying the plague bacillus. Although Kitasato's discovery was a few days before Yersin's and was published first in the medical literature, his description lacked his usual precision. Yersin's accurate description and culture of the plague bacillus has been acknowledged in the taxonomic naming of the bacillus – *Yersinia pestis*.[22]

Why did Kitasato commit such an error in the description of the bacterium? David J. Bibel and T.H. Chen suggest that several reasons be taken into account. First, language may have significantly contributed to the personal rivalry as Kitasato's report was probably translated from either German or Japanese. If it was originally written in Japanese, the imprecise language in the report may have been a result of bad translation. Second, after his report released in August 1894 was severely criticized, Kitasato may have lost confidence for not knowing which characteristic was due to the pneumococcus, yet to deny the data would mean to discontinue the investigation. What do we learn from these Aoyama-Kitasato and Kitasato-Yersin rivalries? Bibel and Chen conclude that the plague studies conducted by Kitasato and Yersin were as controversial as the nature of the plague bacillus itself. They find that Kitasato's description of the bacterium in 1894 was basically correct. They write, "It is only because of the similarity of the plague bacillus to the pneumococcus under specific but common conditions that Kitasato was led to subsequent error and doubt."[23]

As put by a local scholar of Hong Kong society, "It was Kitasato who laid first claim to having identified the plague bacterium, but the

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[22] Tom Solomon, "The Hong Kong plague of 1894 and the discovery of the cause of plague."

[23] Bibel and Chen, "Diagnosis of Plague: An Analysis of the Yersin-Kitasato Controversy," 636-638; 647-648. Bibel and Chen offer a splendid explanation as to why the controversy happened by comparing the findings of Kitasato and Yersin, which gives a technical perspective. For details, please see their article.

final honours went to Yersin and for whom the bacterium is named."[24] In nineteenth-century Hong Kong, as with other places, science was part of international and local politics. Yersin was mistreated by the British colonial government. But surprisingly to many of the colonists, it was he who earned the reputation of discovering the plague bacillus. Obviously, Kitasato had been slighted due to his race though he was the first to announce the result of his plague investigation.

IV. The Conflicts between Western and Chinese Medicine in Hong Kong

1. Resistance and Confrontation

On May 22, 1894, 393 cases of plague were recorded and 320 people had died in Hong Kong. By the end of 1894 the plague had claimed over 2,500 victims, and about 80,000 Chinese had left the colony. Vessels from Hong Kong were quarantined by most countries, resulting in the loss of trade. On the whole, Hong Kong suffered greatly from the plague. When the dust settled, the general opinion of the time was that the plague was mainly caused by the poor living conditions of Chinese. According to Table 3, the mortality rate of Chinese was 70-90 percent, the second highest as compared with the Indians, Portuguese, Eurasians, and British.

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[24] Veronica Pearson, "A plague upon our houses: The consequences of underfunding on the health sector," in *A Sense of Place: Hong Kong West of Pottinger Street*, eds. Veronica Pearson and Ko Tim-keung (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing Co., 2008), 259.

Table 3. Death Rate of Plague in Hong Kong in 1894

Race	British	Eurasian	Japanese	Indian	Portuguese and Malay	Chinese who stayed in Kennedy Town Hospital	Chinese who stayed in Tung Wah Hospital
Death rate	1.66%	100.0%	54.5%	66.6%	60.0%	70%	80-90%

Source: Aoyama Tanemichi, *Honkon hyakushito ryakuhō* 香港百志土略報 [Report on the miscellaneous of Hong Kong] (Tokyo, November 12, 1894), 44.

Due to the fact that plague was particularly prevalent in the Chinese residential areas, measures of immediate quarantine were taken. As a result, conflicts between the Chinese communities and the colonial government occurred. Firstly, the victims being treated in the Tung Wah Hospital were not willing to be moved to the *Hygeia* hospital ship. Secondly, a house-to-house search of victims was implemented by the military. Consequently, the searches met with strong resistance from local residents. Thirdly, there was deep Chinese prejudice against western medicine, and Chinese returned to Canton to look for chances of healing.[25] Chinese left Hong Kong because they had learned of rumors of the ill-treatment of dead bodies. As for why many Hong Kong Chinese left the city, this was mainly due to rumors. There was speculation that once the victims' bodies were sent to the government hospital or the *Hygeia*, they would be shipped off to Europe for making medicine for royal families. Speculation even circulated that eyebrows and livers would be taken from Chinese children for use in the treatment of plague.[26]

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[25] J. Dyer-Ball, "A Chinese view of the plague," *Hong Kong Government Gazette* (1895), 423-425. See also Elizabeth Sinn, *Power and Charity: The Early History of the Tung Wah Hospital, Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989), 159-183, who provides a full account of the early development of the plague.

[26] Correspondence from Robinson to Lord Ripon, dated 23 May 1894, CO 129/263/122. See Hong

On May 23, 1894, 300 volunteers of the Shropshire Light Infantry began the task of inspecting and disinfecting the houses in the Tai Ping Shan (太平山).[27] However, unrest occurred because of the uninvited entry into the local inhabitants' houses as well as the forcible removal of patients. This led the government to position the gunboat Tweed off the coast of Tai Ping Shan with its guns pointed at the area of the shore. With up to 100 people dying each day, a mass exodus of Chinese to China continued as they felt that if they were to die they would like to be buried in their home village. Panic later spread among the Westerners when one of the officers of the Shropshire Light Infantry, Captain Vesey, contracted plague and died. On May 31, the Sanitary Board drew up more by-laws which allowed for the eviction of occupants and the closure of buildings judged unfit for habitation.[28] Chinese houses built in Kau Yu Fong (九如坊), Sin Hing Lee (善慶里), Nga Choi Hong (芽菜巷), Mei Lun Lee (美倫里) were demolished and a brick wall was built to surround these areas. The Colonial Office in London urged the Hong Kong government to close down the Tung Wah Hospital.[29] In 1896, the Sanitary Board received criticism for being ineffective in managing the plague. Worse still, people in the Legislative Council suggested it be abolished.

2. The Tearing Down of Tai Ping Shan Quarters

The sanitary conditions of Chinese in Hong Kong had been a great concern within the government.[30] The Chadwick Report of 1882, was

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Zhou, *The Origins of Government Social Protection Policy in Hong Kong*, *1842-1941*, 137.

27 Jerome J. Platt, Maurice E. Jones, and Arleen Kay Platt, eds., *The White Wash Brigade* (London: Dix Noonan Webb, 1998).

28 Collins, "The black death: Hong Kong 1894."

29 G. B. Endacott, *A History of Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1987), 220.

30 Y. W. Lau, *A History of the Municipal Councils of Hong Kong, 1883-1999* (Hong Kong: Leisure and Cultural Services Department, 2002), 37-39.

fully illustrative about the living conditions of the Chinese in the British colony. They were accused of sanitary nuisances. This report was regarded as significant in early Hong Kong's public health history for it described subjects such as house construction and drainage, the formation of streets, public sewers or drains, water supply, scavenging, and the removal of night soil. Osbert Chadwick had been appointed by the Colonial Office as a possible solution to a long-standing dispute between Governor of Hong Kong Sir John Pope Hennessy (Governor, 1877-1882) and his civil servants, notably the Colonial Surgeon and the Surveyor General. The issues that the Chadwick Report addressed were sores in the dispute, and they arose from precisely the questions of ventilation for congested houses, drains, sewage, and the disposal of human waste, and the appropriateness of water closets for the Hong Kong environment figuring prominently.[31] In the following paragraphs, I quote from David Faure on the interpretation of the Chadwick Report.

> The houses were not congested by the standards Hong Kong became used to. In four houses Chadwick went into in Taipingshan Street, he counted about 10 to 11 people in each basement that was occupied, and between 14 and 20 people on the second floor. Where the ground floor was not used as a shop, it housed up to 30 people. Chadwick calculated how much space each person occupied in cubic measures, and he found that in these four houses, each person might have been given 300 to 400 cu. feet. If we assume that the ceiling was 10 feet, and a substantial amount of space must be subtracted from the overall average to make up the corridors and the kitchens, the bedrooms occupied by these inhabitants would have conformed to his description. "In the house in

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[31] See "Mr Chadwick's Report on the Sanitary Condition of Hong Kong" (November 1882), Colonial Office, Eastern No. 38, CO 882/4, Public Record Office, London. An extract of this report may be found in David Faure, ed., *A Documentary History of Hong Kong: Society* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1997), 29-48.

Kai-ming Lane, like the great majority of dwelling-houses, the upper floor is divided off by board partitions into cabins about 9 feet long and 10 feet wide. Each of these forms the dwelling of an individual family.

Chadwick notes that the population of 106,000 of urban Hong Kong (including non-Chinese people) in 1881 occupied 6,402 houses, averaging 16.6 persons per house. It would seem that the Tai Ping Shan houses represented the extreme of congestion rather than the norm. … Chadwick went into the state of the sewers and the drains in great detail. He insisted on standards and supervision. He commented on the state of the latrines, his precise descriptions bringing home with stark realism the bare necessities of life: As a general rule throughout Hong Kong, in accordance with time-honoured Chinese practice, human excreta are removed by hand, on what may be called the "pail" system. Neither deodorisation or disinfection of any kind is attempted. … In many European houses waterclosets are used in connexion with the town drains, but they are for the use of Europeans only; the method just mentioned being used for the native servants. … As in the Chinese cities of the mainland, the men of the working classes resort to public latrines. … There are 25 public latrines in the city of Victoria, having in all 565 seats, the number in each varying from 2 to 51. These latrines are built and owned by private persons as a business speculation. Their construction and management is supervised by Government, who levy a tax of $0.60 per seat per annum. The latrine owner derives his profit (said to be very large) from the sale of the manure collected, and from fees of 1 or 2 cash paid by those using them, according as paper and cigarette are furnished or not.

Chadwick noted that manure was removed daily from the latrines, as it was from private houses. He also went into the question of cost of nightsoil removal. Nevertheless, he settled in favor of the construction of house drains, arguing that the dry earth system solved only partly

the problem of waste disposal. On the question of hygiene in Chinese houses, a report had been made in 1874 by the Colonial Surgeon. It outlined a sorry state of affairs that had to do with pigs, ventilation, drainage, and the lack of toilets. The Colonial Surgeon discovered 'that pigs were kept in houses all over the town, by hundreds, and that pigsties were to be found under the beds and in the kitchens of first, second, and third floors. … Ventilation was poor. Houses were either constructed back to back with no ventilation except from the front, or were separated only by a narrow and often clogged gully in between two houses. … The average size of the main rooms is 26 feet by 14 feet by 10 feet high, containing eight partitions, averaging 7 feet by 6 feet by 7 feet high, over which a sort of loft is often built to increase the accommodation, and in a room of this description, from 16 to 25 people live. The houses were also dirty, for the brick walls were not whitewashed, wide interstices appeared between wooden planks that made up the upper floors, and the ground floor was made of mud. This construction made washing the floor impossible. These long, dark, poorly ventilated and dirty houses had no toilets. The men went to public toilets and the women and children used chamber pots kept under their beds.'[32]

3. Reform of the Tung Wah Hospital

As compared with the other hospitals including The Medical Missionary Hospital (1843-53), Seamen's Hospital (1843-73), Government Civil Hospital (1849-1937), and Lock Hospital (1858-94), Tung Wah Hospital was the first Chinese hospital for the cure and treatment of the indigent sick to be supported by voluntary contributions.[33] The idea of setting up a

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[32] David Faure, "The common people in Hong Kong history: their livelihood and aspirations until the 1930s," in *Colonial Hong Kong and Modern China: Interaction and Reintegration*, ed. Lee Pui-Tak (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005), 10-19.

[33] Chinese Hospital Ordinance No. 3 of 1870. See Lau Yun-woo, "Managed by Chinese, for

Chinese hospital was supported by the governor Sir Richard MacDonnell in 1869. The idea originated from the upgrading of the Kwong Fook I-Tsz (廣福義祠), a dilapidated receiving house for the dead. The hospital was opened on February 14, 1872. It had 80-100 beds, and was located very close to the I-Tsz.

Current studies on Tung Wah Hospital mostly praise this first Chinese voluntary organization which provided medical and charitable services to the Chinese community and emphasized the specified role played by the local Chinese elites in managing this organization. One may hold reservations on this observation, though. First, the establishment of Tung Wah Hospital proved that Hong Kong's society was hierarchically divided into two different sectors, one for Europeans and one for Chinese. Europeans lived within their own separate area, and the area was clearly demarcated from that of the local Chinese community. Second, as Chinese strongly resisted western medicine and sanitary standards, they preferred to live in a closed community, embodied by the Tung Wah Committee, that was supposed to care for all the needs of the community members. By doing so they would be able to resist intervention from the government.[34]

After the outbreak of the plague, Tung Wah had been criticized for its incompetence in dealing with the crisis. The Chinese patients, whom Tung Wah received, had to be transferred to the Government Civil Hospital.[35] According to the review report conducted by the government, Tung Wah was blamed for: 1) being overcrowded, filthy, insanitary, and dangerous not only to the health of the inmates but to the public of Hong

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Chinese: the founding of Tung Wah Hospital," in *A Sense of Place: Hong Kong West of Pottinger Street*, eds. Veronica Pearson and Ko Tim-keung, 239.

[34] Hong Zhou, *The Origins of Government Social Protection Policy in Hong Kong*, 1842-1941, 134-135.

[35] *A History of Medicine in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Academy of Medicine Press, 2011), 27-28.

Kong; 2) being a not well conducted hospital for the relief and the cure of sick and destitute Chinese; and 3) being without effective administration to provide medical treatment to the sick.[36] The Acting Superintendent of the Government Civil Hospital, Dr. James Lowson commented on Tung Wah:

> The question of dealing with the Tung Wa Hospital must now be seriously considered. I cannot denounce this hot-bed of medical and sanitary vice in sufficiently strong terms. I venture to say that if the question of allowing this to remain was to be submitted to the Public Health Authorities at home they would order its immediate abolition. …[37]

As a consequence, a special commission was appointed by the Governor to conduct an investigation of Tung Wah Hospital. The commission called references from India and Singapore of the management of Chinese hospitals in these two other British colonies. They found out that even the Brahmins in India accepted more western medicine than the Chinese in Hong Kong. And in Singapore, there was no Chinese hospital. The Tan Tock Seng's Hospital was in the European model, indicating all Chinese in Singapore were treated under western medicine.[38] As shown in Table 4, the listed Chinese doctors were all blamed for incompetence in curing their Chinese patients.

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[36] Report on Tung Wa Hospital by T. H. Whitehead, in *Hong Kong Legislative Council Sessional Papers 1896*, xxi.

[37] Report on Tung Wa Hospital by T. H. Whitehead, in *Hong Kong Legislative Council Sessional Papers 1896*, xxiii.

[38] Correspondence from Colonial Secretary of Singapore J. A. Swettenham to the Colonial Secretary of Hong Kong J. H. Stewart Lockhart, dated September 17, 1895. Report on Tung Wa Hospital by T. H. Whitehead, in *Hong Kong Legislative Council Sessional Papers* 1896, lxvi-lxvii.

Table 4. Chinese Practitioners of Medicine at Tung Wah Hospital

Names	Position	Date of entry	Monthly salary
Lam Hok-nin	Doctor (Internal complaints)	July 26, 1886	20 taels*
Lam Tsz-ching	Doctor (External complaints)	March 2, 1889	20 taels
Lam Fuk-bim	Doctor (Injuries)	September 3, 1891	20 taels
Tong Sui-ting	Doctor (Internal complaints)	November 8, 1893	20 taels
Wong Siu-ki	Doctor (Internal complaints)	February 16, 1895	20 taels
Wai Sz-chi	Doctor (Internal complaints)	April 24, 1896	20 taels
Yeung Tsui-ngai	Doctor (Internal complaints)	May 13, 1896	20 taels
Wan Leung-kung	Doctor (Internal complaints)	May 20, 1896	20 taels

*1 tael = 1.39 dollars

Source: Report on Tung Wa Hospital by T.H. Whitehead, in *Hong Kong Legislative Council Sessional Papers 1896*, lxxiv.

It was not until December 1896 that the first Chinese practitioner of western medicine, Chung Boon-chor (鍾本初) was appointed. Chung was graduated from the Government Central School and then received western medical education in Tientsin Medical College. He returned to Hong Kong and joined the Nethersole Hospital as an honorary surgeon.[39]

The Tung Wah Hospital had once been put under threat of being abolished but it cannot be said that the government met with no opposition. Actually, the Hospital tried to stop the government intervention. On November 6, 1895, the hospital's committee asked a solicitor, Victor H. Deacon, to send a warning letter to the Acting

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[39] *Healing with the Scalpel: From the First Colonial Surgeon to the College of Surgeons of Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Academy of Medicine Press, 2010), 23-24.

Colonial Surgeon J. M. Atkinson. That letter reads,

> I am instructed by the Directors of the Tung Wa Hospital to request you to take no steps towards the removal of Chan Kam Shing from the Hospital on the ground that the patient is unwilling to go and elects to remain in the Tung Wa Hospital. …The Directors inform me that you have called to-day at the Hospital in order to remove him; but under the Hospital Ordinance I would remind you that the only power given to the Colonial Surgeon is to inspect the Hospital – clause 14 – and that the Board of Directors has full power to manage and direct Hospital matters – clause 8. If therefore any compulsory removal is contemplated it will be illegal.[40]

The confrontation was not eased until the Tung Wah Hospital took several measures. First, a year later, the Chinese surgeon of Western medicine, Chung Boon-chor, was appointed, as mentioned above. Second, new wards were built so as to separate the contagious patients and the ordinary patients. As a result, more Chinese patients opted for western medical treatment than ever before. By then, Tung Wah was transformed into both a Chinese and a Western hospital.

V. Conclusion

In many aspects, the Hong Kong plague of 1894 can be viewed in a global context. First, while Hong Kong had the merit of being close to mainland China and enjoyed a good economic relationship with the hinterlands, its proximity and close ties to mainland China made it vulnerable to diseases and plague. Second, comparatively, Indians

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[40] Correspondence from Victor H. Deacon to the Colonial Surgeon J.M. Atkinson, dated November 6, 1895. Report on Tung Wa Hospital by T. H. Whitehead, in *Hong Kong Legislative Council Sessional Papers 1896*, lii.

believed more in Western medicine than did the Chinese, and Chinese in Singapore did not ask for a Chinese hospital whereas Hong Kong had to struggle for one. Third, in its outposts in Asia including Shanghai, Hong Kong, Singapore, and India, Great Britain had been successfully implementing public health policies.

As Hong Kong had close economic ties with mainland China as well as trade relationships with its counterpart cities in Asia, flows of capital, people, merchandises, and information in the Asian Pacific region were easily coming into existence. Basically, the framework of the British Empire in Asia was designed for extending networks so as to promote trade among China, Hong Kong, Singapore, and India. Nevertheless, this also facilitated the spread of epidemic diseases such as plague and malaria.

It is not easy to define the term "colonialism" or "nationalism," but it is quite obvious that the rivalry among Aoyama Tanemichi, Kitasato Shibasaburō, and Alexandre Yersin was mainly due to the fact that they belonged to different races, classes, and academic cliques. Colonial bureaucracy also accelerated the competition in public health. These medical practitioners did not receive equal treatment from the Hong Kong colonial government when they first came to Hong Kong to conduct investigations. Aoyama, Kitasato, and Yersin received similar educations from Robert Koch, but they never cooperated with each other. Instead, individuals stood in rivalry against other individuals and institutions, and this resulted in hindering the growth of scientific development.[41] Certainly, both Kitasato and Yersin had identified the plague bacillus, but several years later when India suffered from the

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[41] The Japanese scholar Kani Hiroaki argued that the contribution made by Kitasato can hardly be retrieved from the Hong Kong history writings because of 1894-95; and second, main reasons: first, the feeling of hatred toward Japan after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95; and second, the general dislike of Western medicine. See his "Kitasato Shibasaburō no Honkon" [Kitasato Shibasaburō's Hong Kong], *Mita hyōron*, no. 739 (1973:6), 89-90.

epidemic from 1906 to 1908, the Indian Plague Investigation Committee discovered that the flea functioned as an intermediary between a dead rat and a human. Hence, the Indian case shows that scientific invention should be above race or nationality.

During the late nineteenth century, Chinese were regarded by Europeans as a sanitary nuisance. Thus, there was a gap between the concepts of sanitariness and medicine. In order to protect Chinese, they themselves fought for the Tung Wah Hospital, which was the first Chinese hospital in Hong Kong. However, about twenty years after it opened, the colonial government threatened to close it, and a confrontation arose between the government officials and the Chinese elites. In this sense, modern medicine was implemented through political force. Together with house-to-house disinfection, containment in the *Hygeia*, and the demolition of the Tai Ping Shan area, this aroused great protest from the local Chinese community. It is worth noting here that from the case of Tung Wah Hospital, it looked impossible, but actually Chinese had learned how to retreat from resistance and move forward to acceptance of western medicine. The appointment of Chung Boon-chor was regarded as a compromise between the colonial government and the Chinese elites. Chung had successfully removed all suspicion from both the British colonists and the general Chinese populace. He had showed how western medicine can be mixed with Chinese medicine and cured many of the Chinese patients. There were ways to find a common ground between “nationalism” and “colonialism” when confronting a bubonic plague crisis.

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An Uneasy Balancing Act: The Russian Émigré Community and Utopian Ideals of Manzhouguo

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An Uneasy Balancing Act: The Russian Émigré Community and Utopian Ideals of Manzhouguo

This article analyzes how Russian émigrés celebrated or re-articulated utopian messages emanating from Japanese rulers in Manzhouguo. Some Russians embraced Japan's civilizing role in Manzhouguo for protecting themselves. They reaffirmed Manzhouguo's utopian ideals of harmonious co-existence between Asian and European people under the umbrella of Imperial Japan. Ataman Grigory Mikhailovich Semenov (1890-1946) and the Japan-sponsored Bureau for the Affairs of Russian Émigrés (BREM) oversaw the publication of the Russian-language monthly journal, *Luch Azii* (*The Ray of Asia*). Semenov used this journal to unify different émigré groups in Manchuria for the purpose of anti-communist struggle under Japanese patronage. His ideas represented an uneasy balancing act by White Russians who had to adjust their goals to fit Japan's plans in Manzhouguo.

Keywords: White Russians, Manzhouguo, Grigory Semenov, *Luch Azii*, BREM

An Uneasy Balancing Act: The Russian Émigré Community and Utopian Ideals of Manzhouguo

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This article analyzes how Russian émigrés celebrated or re-articulated utopian messages emanating from Japanese rulers in Manzhouguo (1932-1945). The historical relationship between these two groups has been poorly documented and remains a controversial subject, due to different ideological interpretations by official nationalist historical narratives in Russia, Japan and China.[1] Some Russians perceived the new political

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1 For standard historical accounts of Russian émigré life in Manzhouguo, see Petr Balakshin, *Final v Kitae: vozniknovenie i ischeznovenie beloi emigratsii na Dal'nem Vostoke* [The end in China: The birth, development and disappearance of White Russian emigration in the Far East] 1 (San Francisco, Paris, New York: Sirius, 1958); John J. Stephan, *The Russian Fascists: Tragedy and Farce in Exile, 1925-1945* (New York: Harper & Row, 1978); Victor Nikolaevich Usov, *Sovetskaya razvedka v Kitae: 30-e gody XX veka* [Soviet intelligence in China: The 1930s] (Moskva: Tovarishchestvo nauchnykh izdanii KMK, 2007); Olga Bakich, "Emigré Idenfity: The Case of Harbin," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, 99, no.1, Winter 2000, 60-64; Sabine Breuillard, "General V.

order as an opportunity and embraced the "kingly way" in exchange for protection and well-being. As the largest group of Europeans in Manzhouguo, the Russian community could reaffirm Manzhouguo's utopian ideals of harmonious co-existence between Asian and European people under the umbrella of Imperial Japan. Ataman Grigory Mikhailovich Semenov (1890-1946) exemplified collaboration efforts of the White Russian elite within the leadership of Manzhouguo and of Imperial Japan. He oversaw publication of the Russian-language monthly journal, *Luch Azii* (*Луч Азии* in Russian, or *The Ray of Asia*), which celebrated Japan's civilizing role in Manzhouguo. This article demonstrates how Semenov used the journal to unify different émigré groups in Manchuria for the purpose of anti-communist struggle under Japanese patronage, while the Japanese authorities used Semenov and the Bureau for the Affairs of Russian Émigrés (*Бюро по Делам Российских Эмигрантов в Манчжурской Империи* in Russian, or BREM), which published *Luch Azii*, to turn the Russians into loyal supporters of the Japanese military regime in Manzhouguo. Semenov's ideas, the journal's publications, and the BREM's activities represented an uneasy balancing act by White Russians who had to adjust their self-serving goals to fit Japan's empire-building in Manzhouguo.

Unequal "Partners"

When the Kwantung army occupied Manchuria (1931-1932), they found a sizable Russian émigré community in Harbin and along the Chinese Eastern Railway. This community was shaped by Imperial Russian policies in China, by dramatic revolutions, civil wars, regional warlord politics in the Russian Far East and Manchuria, and international rivalry

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A. Kislitsin: From Russian Monarchism to the Spirit of Bushido," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, 99, no.1, Winter 2000, 121-142.

between Republican China, Soviet Russia, and Imperial Japan. This community was multi-layered, and diverse: the old and well-established railway employees, industrialists, and entrepreneurs lived next to White Russian officers, soldiers, and émigrés who flooded Manchuria after the collapse of the White Russian movement in Siberia and the Russian Far East.[2] The position of the former subjects of Imperial Russia was vulnerable due to the increasing Soviet influence in Manchuria: in 1924 Republican China recognized the Soviet government and they signed an agreement to jointly manage the Chinese Eastern Railway. The new Soviet employers of the Chinese Eastern Railway occupied the positions of the older Russian railway staff. Russian émigrés were "invited" to adopt the Soviet citizenship, but many chose to remain stateless. The Russian émigrés were not protected by any government, had no extraterritorial rights, and faced constant pressure and hostility from either Soviet or Chinese authorities. No wonder that some of the White Russians greeted the Kwantung army with flowers and Japanese flags when the latter entered Harbin on February 5, 1932. Yet, Harbin's Russian press was cautious and stayed away from commenting too much about this event.[3]

The Manzhouguo puppet regime, backed up by the Japanese government and the army, was interested in spreading its influence among the Russians who resided in Manchuria. Behind the establishment of Manzhouguo was Japan's desire to build a new military and industrial base in Manchuria, for the purpose of further expansion to China's interior, Mongolia, and, possibly, the Soviet Far East. Facing a powerful enemy, the Soviet Union, Japan thought to consolidate different anti-

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[2] For the diversity of several generations of Harbin Russians before 1930, see Bakich, "Émigré Identity," 52-59.

[3] Li Shuxiao, ed., *Ha'erbin lishi biannian*, *1763-1949* (Ha'erbin: Ha'erbin chubanshe, 2003), 238; G. V. Melikhov, *Rossiyskaya emigratsiya v mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniyakh na Dal'nem Vostoke, 1925-1932* [Russian emigration and the international relations in the Far East] (Moskva: Vikmo-M, Russky Put', 2007), 270.

Bolshevik and anti-Communist forces among the former Imperial Russia's subjects in Manchuria. These forces could be helpful in supporting the new Manzhouguo state, in reducing the Soviet influence in Manchuria, and in serving as a reserve for future military operations in the Soviet Far East.

Initially, the Japanese colonial enterprise in Manzhouguo concentrated its propaganda efforts on the so-called ethnic harmony of five Asian races: Han, Japanese, Korean, Manchu, and Mongol. Even though the Russians were not part of Manzhouguo's ideology of pan-Asian brotherhood, they came to play important roles in reinforcing Manzhouguo's utopian ideals of a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural state. Instead of erasing the Russian cultural and economic presence along the Chinese Eastern Railway and in Harbin, the Kwantung army, the South Manchurian Railway Company and the Japan-controlled Manzhouguo government chose to patronize several powerful Russian groups and personalities by offering them numerous rewards and employment opportunities. In response, they were expected to be devoted to Japan's civilizing mission in Manchuria and in Asia.

Ataman Semenov became a major Russian proponent of Japanese expansion in Manchuria and a supporter of Manzhouguo's policies. He was one of the most colorful Cossack leaders of the White movement in the Russian Far East and one of the ruthless fighters during the Civil War there. His past was that of a controversial warlord, always on the move, and resorting to cruelty and theft against Reds and Whites.[4] His rift with Admiral Alexander Kolchak in 1918 earned him enemies within the White Russian movement, and exemplified how Civil War loyalties and rivalries would later divide the White Russians in exile in Manchuria and

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[4] On Semenov's anti-Bolshevik activities in 1917-18 and on his relations with the European powers and the White Russian community in the Far East, see George F. Keenan, *Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920: The Decision to Intervene* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 65-71.

other parts of China.[5] After the collapse of the Kolchak government in Siberia, he and his army escaped to Manchuria and Mongolia, continuing armed resistance against the Bolsheviks. As a proponent of Mongol independence, he was mistrusted by Manchuria's warlord Zhang Zuolin and later his son Zhang Xueliang, even though at different times he offered them his mercenary services. The Japanese military cultivated their "friendship" with Semenov during their intervention in Siberia (1918-1922). Semenov and his Japanese supporters had common opinions "about the development of political events in East Asia, about the inevitability of developing communist movement in China and Mongolia, and about the necessity of grand task of uniting the people of Asia and of creating Greater Asia."[6] A decade later, Semenov comfortably resided near Dairen in a villa given to him as a gift by the newly-proclaimed ruler of Manzhouguo Henry Puyi.[7] He still enjoyed prestige among the exiled Cossacks and White Russians in Manchuria. He was also a powerful voice in the Russian community in Harbin and along the Chinese Eastern Railway, where he had his representatives.

Luch Azii as Propaganda Tool

The monthly journal *Luch Azii*, published from 1934 to 1945 in Harbin by M. N. Gordeev, was Semenov's main channel of disseminating pro-Japanese, pro-Cossack, and anti-Bolshevik news and ideas. His name appeared in nearly every issue of the journal. He wrote several editorials and articles which were accompanied by his photos. (Figures 1-2) In July 1934, the first issue of this magazine announced its main goal—to build

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[5] On Semenov's insubordination to Admiral Kolchak in 1918, see Jamie Bisher, *White Terror: Cossack Warlords of the Trans-Siberian* (London: Routledge, 2005), 70-3.

[6] G. M. Semenov, *O sebe: vospominaniya, mysli i vyvody* [About myself: Recollections, thoughts and conclusions] (Harbin: Zaria, 1938), 91.

[7] Petr Balakshin, *Final v Kitae*, 297.

an ideological bridge between the Russians living abroad and Japan, "the source of truth" and of "strong nationhood." The magazine's title reflected its vision to tell "the truth" about the events in Asia, including the establishment of the young Manzhouguo Empire. Siberia's link with the new emerging Asia was emphasized: "We will go hand in hand with great people of Nippon and the Manchu Empire."[8]

Semenov's ideological agenda was in harmony with Japanese expectations. In *Luch Azii* he advocated anti-communist ideas, and opposed dictatorship by any single party and inter-party rivalry. He called all existing parties of the Russian émigrés to join the national united front which he called the "united people's army of *Rossizm* (*Россизм*)" against the Comintern.[9] His ideology of Rossizm (derived from the word Russia, or Россия) was based on restoring the Russian state by the subjects of the former Russian empire with different political views-monarchists, fascists, and republicans-as long as they supported the armed suppression of the Bolsheviks.[10] He favored a strong state backed up by military power.

Semenov's representative in Harbin, General Aleksey Proklovich Baksheev (1873-1946), supported Semenov's reliance on Manzhouguo and Japan by arguing in *Luch Azii* that Russia was a country with deep Asian roots, that the Russians had more Asian than European blood, and that Russian tsars were different from European constitutional monarchs. He argued that since World War I, Russia had been betrayed by its Western allies. He went as far as to claim that for centuries Russia had no friends in the West, and that most recently the only hope came from the Orient.[11] "The Ray of Light" was a metaphor of hope coming from

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[8] *Luch Azii*, no. 1 (1934), 1.

[9] Ataman Semenov, "Vred partiinosti i ideologiya Rossizma" [Harmful partisanship and ideology of *Rossizm*], *Luch Azii*, no. 1 (July, 1934): 19-20.

[10] "Rossizm," *Luch Azii*, no. 2 (1934), 2.

[11] A. Baksheev, "Svet s Vostoka" [Ray from the East], *Luch Azii*, no. 1 (1934), 21.

Japan.

In another article, Semenov paid tribute to Henry Puyi, the last emperor of the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) and the *Kangde* (reign title - Prosperity and Virtue) emperor of Manzhouguo, who "embraced" thousands of Russian Cossacks and offered them patronage and protection. Semenov made a historical comparison between the Russian Cossacks living in Manzhouguo and the *Albazintsy* (*Албазинцы*), the Cossacks from the settlement of *Albazino* along the Amur River, at the court of the Kangxi emperor (r. 1662-1722), despite the fact that the latter had been captured by the Kangxi's troops in 1685 and taken to Beijing as prisoners. He claimed that Russian Cossacks in Manzhouguo would be loyal servants to the Kangde emperor (Puyi), as they had been loyal to the Kangxi emperor several centuries earlier. Semenov hoped that historical links between the Cossacks and Manchu emperors would bring together the people of Manzhouguo and the Cossacks of the former Russian Far East.[12] He downplayed the fact that many Cossacks living north of the western section of the Chinese Eastern Railway and along the Sino-Soviet border did not accept Japanese authority and continued to be loyal to themselves, despite being suppressed by the Japanese armed forces and being harassed by the Soviet border troops. Semenov's challenge was to bring them closer to the Japanese orbit for possible recruitment in exchange for protection and rewards.

Luch Azii demonstrated its pro-Manzhouguo and pro-Japanese orientation in each issue. It was nothing more than a propaganda journal, expressing anti-Guomindang sentiments, praising Japanese military command, and giving voice to the Chinese leaders of the new puppet state. Not surprisingly, *Luch Azii* became a principle information channel (or an announcement board) of BREM, a new organization that aimed to turn Russian émigrés into loyal supporters of the Japanese regime in

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[12] Ataman Semenov, "Kazaki v Manchzhu-Di-Go," *Luch Azii*, no. 2 (1934), 3.

Manzhouguo.[13]

BREM as Big Brother

Established on December 28, 1934, (or the first year of *Kangde* rule in Manzhouguo) under the guidance of the Japanese Military Mission in Harbin, BREM was to unify all former subjects of the Russian empire and their political groupings living in the territory of Manzhouguo. BREM's formal leadership came from different émigré parties and its main official goal was to improve the material and legal status of Russian émigrés and to assist both the White Russian community and the authorities of Manzhouguo in migration matters. *Luch Azii* announced that earlier "declarations of Manzhouguo government about Russian emigrants as being one of five nationalities populating Manchuria, became a reality."[14]

The link between BREM and Semenov was obvious, as three of its early directors, Generals Veniamin Veniaminovich Rychkov (1934-1935), Baksheev (1935-1937), and Vladimir Alexandrovich Kislitsyn (1938-1944), were his former subordinates in the Transbaikal region during the Russian Civil War. They were Cossack leaders, hardened by the battles of World War I and the Civil War. They achieved high military rank and remained loyal to Semenov for the rest of their lives. Rychkov became not only the first head of BREM, but was also in charge of the military department of the Russian Fascist Party until his death in 1935. Baksheev, apart from heading BREM in Harbin and Hailar, later served as the head of the Far Eastern Cossack Union. Kislitsyn, at different

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[13] BREM had its own publishing department, which also published a newspaper Голос Эмигранта (The Voice of the Emigrant), pamphlets and books. See Geogre C. Guins, "Russians in Manchuria," *The Russian Review* 2, no. 2 (Spring 1943), 85.

[14] D. S. (full name missing), "Byuro po Delam Rossiiskikh Emigrantov" [Bureau for the Affairs of the Russian Émigrés], *Luch Azii*, no. 5 (1934), 31.

times, was the leader of Russian Legitimists and of the Union of Servicemen.[15] In *Luch Azii*, Semenov welcomed the establishment of BREM, and mentioned that General Rychkov consulted him about the new organization's future program and activities. Semenov denied direct involvement in the work of BREM by claiming that he resided in the Japanese concession in Dairen, and "was not legally affiliated with the bureau." He wished this bureau to unite all Russian émigrés, and to give them legal rights in Manzhouguo. Semenov felt that BREM would also appeal to those Russians who wanted to give up their Soviet citizenship and to cut their ties with the Communist Party. He called for all the Russian military groups in Manzhouguo to get united in order to protect the state (Manzhouguo) which hosted them.[16] The new organization ideally served Japan's objective to expand control over the Russian émigré community and to recruit the Russians for the needs of the Japanese army.

The establishment of this organization was not accidental. The Japanese authorities saw it as a new stage of reaching out to Russian émigrés in Manzhouguo. Japan's earlier support for the Russian fascist party (known as the Russian Fascist Organization from 1925, the Russian Fascist Party from 1931, and the All-Russian Fascist Party in 1934) and different Cossack organizations was not enough to spread its influence among the Russians.[17] Russian Fascists alienated wealthy Jewish merchants in Harbin by their anti-Semitic propaganda and campaigns of violence. Many old émigrés, urban professionals, and Chinese Eastern

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[15] See E. V. Volkov, N. D. Egorov, and I. V. Kuptsov, *Belye generaly vostochnogo fronta grazhdanskoy voiny* [White generals of the eastern front of the Civil War] (Moskva: Russkiy Put', 2003), 43-44, 111-112, and 177.

[16] Grigory Mikhailovich Semenov, "Ataman G. M. Semenov o put'yakh Russkoi emigratsii v Manchzhu-Di-Go" [Ataman Semenov about the fate of Russian emigration in Manzhouguo empire], *Luch Azii,* no. 12 (1935), 9-11.

[17] For the account of the Russian Fascist organization in Harbin, see Stephan, *The Russian Fascists*, 141-208.

Railway employees did not associate themselves with either fascists or horse-riding Cossacks. Moreover, many Russian émigré organizations were of a civilian nature and were suspicious and hostile towards the military in general and to the Japanese military mission in Manzhouguo in particular.[18] BREM limited the influence of Russian fascists and Cossacks by blending them with other émigré groups and individuals. The Japanese authorities in Manzhouguo used BREM to monitor, recruit, and mold the Russian émigrés across different sectors into willing collaborators.

BREM served Japanese goals very well. Within one year of its operations it registered over 44,000 Russian émigrés. In 1935, its four initial departments were extended to seven (settlement, cultural/educational, legal, administrative, financial, welfare/philanthropy, and military). It oversaw nearly all aspects of émigrés' public and private life, including their employment, housing, education, and relations with Manzhouguo and Japanese authorities. The Bureau controlled its members in matters of employment, the movement within and from/to Manzhouguo. All enterprises in Manzhouguo territory, such as banks, private firms, and factories, had to be registered with the Bureau. The Bureau's directors daily delivered, in person, reports to the Japanese Military Mission, thus providing intelligence about the mood and activities of Russian émigrés.[19] With headquarters in Harbin, BREM had branches in nearly thirty locations in Manzhouguo, including Dairen, Xinjing (Changchun), Manzhouli, Hailar, and Qiqihar. The Bureau's military department was subservient to the Japanese military mission, and prepared young Russian émigrés for espionage and subversive activities in the Soviet Far East. The Japanese army used young Russian émigré soldiers to organize border accidents.[20] The Russian émigrés had

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[18] Balakshin, *Final v Kitae*, 189.

[19] Ibid., 181-182.

to pay respect to the Manzhouguo emperor, the "kingly way," and the Japanese empire while their hopes of liberating Russia from Communism were indefinitely postponed.[20]

Vanishing Hope for Russian Autonomy in Manzhouguo

Russian émigrés' dream of being integrated into Manzhouguo was short-lived. Even though their organizations neither challenged nor threatened Manzhouguo and Japan, they did not become equal partners with either civilian or military Japanese authorities in Manzhouguo. For the Japanese, Russian culture was exotic and alien. Political and cultural sentiments of the Russian émigrés and former White armies came from traditions different from those of Japan and were in different stages of historical development. In the early 1930s, the Russian empire was a thing of the past, and the Japanese empire in Manzhouguo and in Asia was in the making. Imperial Japan was in the process of bringing its own agricultural settlers to Manzhouguo and of creating new economic opportunities for them. The growth of the Japanese population and the needs of the rapidly expanding Japanese empire in Manzhouguo were more important than the livelihood of the subjects of the former Russian empire, which had been Japan's traditional competitor in this region. The idea of restoring the Russian monarchy and White Russian rule in Siberia and the Russian Far East was more utopian than the idea of restoring the Manchu empire in China's northeast, as the Soviet state was centralized and strong, unlike the Republican China weakened by warlord and factional rivalry. The cultural and racial hostility between the Russians and the Japanese was dictated by recent history and by their territorial rivalry in Manchuria, the Korean Peninsula, and Sakhalin Island since 1904.

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[20] Ibid., 183.

The Japanese also viewed the Russian presence in Harbin as part of European influence in Manzhouguo. Their anti-Russian sentiments were an expression of general animosity towards the Europeans who dominated vast parts of Asia through colonial and semi-colonial rule. In 1935, a Swiss adventurer, Ella K. Maillart, traveled on a Vladivostok-Harbin express and was brutally beaten by Japanese soldiers on her way to the dining car. Apparently, the Japanese mistakenly took her for a White Russian woman. She considered her race to be the main reason for the cruelty of Japanese soldiers. She later wrote:

"…I was struck at every step by the hatred of the Japanese for us. They detest us all, us whites, whether we be émigré Russians or Red Russians, Americans or Europeans, Catholic missionaries or Protestant missionaries, and they miss no opportunity of maltreating us. This racial hatred is a primordial fact. It is a fiercer antagonism than any other – and if war were to break out we might well see Bolshevik Russians and émigré Russians on the same side of the barricade."[21]

In practice, the Manzhouguo "state" explored tensions between pro-Soviet, anti-Bolshevik and neutral émigré groups to the advantage of Imperial Japan and its military. White Russians in Manzhouguo were even more vulnerable than Europeans because they were not protected by extraterritorial rights like the Japanese subjects. British writer Peter Fleming, who traveled in China around this time, wrote that "you can beat White Russians up till you are blue in the face, because they are people without a status in the world, citizens of nowhere."[22] As the Japanese influence in Manchuria increased, the Russians found themselves living in uncertainty and fear.

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[21] Ella K. Maillart, *Fobidden Journey: From Peking to Kashmir* (Evanston, Il: Northwestern University Press, 2003), xxi.

[22] Peter Fleming, *News From Tartar: A Journey from Peking to Kashmir* (London and Sydney: Futura, 1983), 26. Peter Fleming met Ella K. Maillart in China where they travelled as foreign correspondents for the European press. In his book he also described Maillart's accident. See page 25.

Japan's increasing control over the economy and trade in Manzhouguo made it difficult for the Soviet Union to maintain the Chinese Eastern Railway's normal commercial activities. The prospect of military confrontation with Japan on occupied Chinese territory did not appeal to the Soviet leadership. In 1935, the Soviet Union sold the Chinese Eastern Railway to Japan, and nearly 20,000 Soviet employees of the railway and their families returned to the Soviet Union.[23] This transaction only temporarily eased the tensions between the Soviet Union and Japan, as the military administration of Japan and Manzhouguo continued to limit any Soviet presence in Manzhouguo and intensified the provocations in the border regions between the USSR, Manzhouguo, and Mongolia.[24] Manchuria's existing and projected railways and related enterprises became monopolized by the South Manchurian Railway Company, which was backed up by Imperial Japan's Ministry of Finance.[25] This trend of growing economic monopolization by Japan radically changed the economy and trade in Manzhouguo, making it more difficult for non-Japanese companies and enterprises to operate independently or simply to stay afloat. While wealthy companies and individuals were mobile and could move their businesses and capital outside of Manchuria, small enterprises and ordinary White Russians were forced to adjust to new regulations established by Japanese authorities and companies or to change occupation. The employment

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[23] The future of the former Chinese Eastern Railway employers in the Soviet Union was uncertain, as among them were former White Russians, or politically neutral subjects of the former Russian empire, who after 1924 accepted Soviet citizenship, and who were suspected of not being loyal to the Soviet state. Many of them were arrested in 1936 and became victims of Stalin's purges in 1937 and 1938. See Svetlana V. Onegina, "The Resettlement of Soviet Citizens from Manchuria in 1935-36: A Research Note," *Europe-Asia Studies* 47, no. 6 (1995), 1044, 1048.

[24] See Report No. 306 of K. K. Yurenev, a Soviet envoy to Japan, to the Consulates of the USSR in Kobe, Seoul, Hakodate, and Dalian on November 15, 1935, in S. L. Myasnikov ed., *Russko-Kitaiskie otnosheniya v XX veke, 1931-1937* [Sino-Russian relations in the 20th century, 1931-1937] , Vol. III (Moskva: Pamyatniki Istoricheskoy Mysli, 2010), 306.

[25] A. J. Grajdanzev, "Profit and Loss in Manchuria," *Pacific Affairs* 8, no. 2 (June 1935), 151.

opportunities for the Russians in Japanese-controlled railway enterprises and services became limited. Unemployment became so severe that BREM had an entire fifth department to coordinate the activities of various philanthropic organizations to raise money and to distribute food for the increasing number of poor Russians and the people of other nationalities in Harbin and other Manchurian cities.[26]

After 1935, contradictions between the utopian goals of Manzhouguo and the increasing suppression of Russian influences demoralized and disillusioned the Russian émigré community. Japan's full-scale war against China (1937-1945) only added to the misery of the Russian community in Manzhouguo. The conditions of wartime gave the Japanese military unlimited power to treat Chinese and Russian populations in Manzhouguo as it wished. The Russian émigré press was censored, Russian schools were closed, and Russian businesses were overtaken by the Japanese. Any Russian émigré questioning the military regime or unwilling to collaborate was arrested, imprisoned, tortured, or killed.[27] Politically neutral Russian émigrés in Manzhouguo felt more and more isolated and depressed. During the 1930s there were multiple reports of suicides among the Russians. The Russians were used and abused by the Japanese authorities. They were also resented if not hated by the Chinese population of Manzhouguo. The Chinese suffered much more than the Russians, because the latter were materially better off. They could still rely on their well-established treaty-port networks both within and outside Manchuria. The White Russians neither sympathized with the plight of the Chinese peasants, nor did they join the underground

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[26] See a report signed by D. S. (full name missing), "Byuro po delam Rossiyskikh emigrantov v Manchzhurskoi Imperii" [The Bureau for the Affairs of Russian Émigrés in Manchurian Empire], *Luch Azii*, no. 36 (1937), 4-5.

[27] A. A. Khisamutdinov, ed., *Kitai i Russkaya emigratsiya v dnevnikakh I. I. and A. N. Serebrennikovykh, 1919-1934* [China and Russian emigration in the diaries of I. I. and A. N. Serebrennikov, 1919-1934], Vol. 1 (Moscow-Stanford: ROSSPEN, Hoover Institution Press, 2006), 295; 297; Balakshin, *Final v Kitae*, 207-22.

Chinese struggle against the Japanese occupation. Some White Russians became willing collaborators of the Japanese regime, despite the fear of possible retributions from the Chinese Nationalist government or the Chinese Communist guerrilla movement. While the well-off Russians lived in fear of robbery, being kidnapped by Chinese bandits, or killed in the violent atmosphere of full-blown war, the ordinary Russians were subjected to daily humiliations and to new regulations of the military regime. Despite the common challenges and uncertainty, the Russian and Chinese communities in Manzhouguo lived isolated lives. Separated by politics, language, social, and cultural differences, they found their own coping mechanisms in dealing with the Japanese authorities, especially in those circumstances when resistance was not an option.

In stark contrast to the harsh conditions of wartime life, the Manzhouguo authorities, *Luch Azii* and BREM continued their propaganda of harmonious relationship between the Russian émigrés, Imperial Japan, and its Manchu state. In 1940, when Imperial Japan celebrated 2,600 years of its imperial history, Ataman Semenov wrote in the January issue of *Luch Azii* that Imperial Japan was a stabilizing factor of "peace and order in East Asia," playing an important role in the future revival of great Russia.[28] The cover page showed the rising sun over the Japanese landscape (Figure 3). In 1942, BREM published a lengthy volume, celebrating the tenth anniversary since the establishment of Manzhouguo. It praised the achievements of BREM in unifying different Russian organizations under the guidance of the local authorities and Japanese representatives. It claimed that the benevolence of the Imperial Japanese authorities reached Russian, Ukrainian, Georgian, Armenian, Jewish, and other non-Asian communities, and each of them preserved their autonomy, culture, and spirit, and received all the necessary

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[28] See Grigory Mikhailovich Semenov, *V druzhbe dvukh narodov – Nippon i Rossii – zalog mira vo vsem mire* [The friendship between Nippon and Russian people is a guarantee of peace in entire world], *Luch Azii,* no. 65 (1940), 1.

assistance from the government of Manzhouguo.[29] In reality, no such harmony existed. The differences between the different Russian organizations in Manchuria could never be resolved. Each individual and émigré organization paid its own price for well-being. Loyalty to the authorities, and a willingness to serve the needs of the Manzhouguo regime determined the degree of official benevolence, but could not guarantee safety. At the height of the most violent and repressive military campaigns of the early 1940s, carried out by the Japanese military in Manzhouguo and in occupied China, very few people, including Ataman Semenov, could claim to live normal lives.

Many of those who could escape did. The exodus of the Russians from Manchuria started in the 1930s, and intensified after 1937. There were several complications for those Russians who decided to leave during the war. Moving from Manzhouguo became increasingly difficult, as the Japanese authorities strictly monitored individual travel within and outside the area. There was an uncertainty about the next destination, as most the Russian émigré networks in China were affected by war. Chinese cities with a sizable Russian population, such as Tianjin, Shanghai, and Hankou, were occupied by Japanese troops. Lawlessness, banditry, and chaos made travel dangerous. Lack of money and statelessness made it difficult for destitute Russian families to consider moving to safer places outside China. Despite these challenges, some of them moved to major coastal Chinese cities and to the British colony of Hong Kong, which was occupied by Japan from 1941 to 1945. Others crossed the Pacific Ocean and settled in Australia and the Americas.

Imperial ideals of Manzhouguo were in contrast to the reality of gradual marginalization of its Russian "minority." Struggle to survive

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[29] Izdanie gosudarstvennoi organizatsii Kiovakai i glavnogo byuro po delam rossiyskikh emigrantov v Man'chzhurskoi Imperii, *Velikaya Man'chzhurskaya Imperiya: k desyatiletnemu yubileyu* [Great Machu Empire: Ten-year anniversary] (Harbin: Tipografiya BREM, 1942), 293-320.

turned the leaders of the Russian émigré community, like Ataman Semenov, into the puppets of the Japanese military mission. As somebody who chose to side with the Japanese, he had no choice but to re-articulate Manzhouguo's utopian ideas. More than that, he helped the Japanese army to organize armed White Russian units in Manzhouguo and in Nanjing.[30] By the end of the Sino-Japanese War, he found his earlier patriotic aspirations to be an impossible dream. When the Soviet army occupied China's Northeast in 1945, he was arrested in Dairen, brought to the Soviet Union, and tried and executed together with Bashkeev, Vlas'evsky,[31] and Rodzaevsky[32] as war criminals and collaborators with Japan. Japan's defeat in the 1945 marked the end of Japan's Asian empire, of Manzhouguo's utopian dreams, and of the Russian émigrés' role in it.

Conclusion

The history of Russian émigrés in Manzhouguo is full of contradictions. On the surface, their social and political organizations, economic activities, culture, and Russian-language publications continued to develop in the 1930s and 1940s. But in reality, every aspect of their lives depended on the good will of the Japanese military authorities. Japan exploited the anti-Soviet and pro-monarchic sentiments of the Russian community in order to cultivate loyal supporters of the highly militarized

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30 Stephan, *The Russian Fascists,* 206-207.

31 Lev Philippovich Vlas'evsky (1884-1946) served under Semenov during the Civil War. He was the head of BREM (1944-45). See Volkov, Egorov, and Kuptsov, eds., *Belye generaly vostochnogo fronta grazhdanskoy voiny*, 65.

32 Konstantin Vladimirovich Rodzaevsky (1907-1946) lived in Harbin from 1925. In the 1930s, he became the leader of the Russian Fascist Party in Manzhouguo. See A. A. Khisamutdinov, *Rossiyskaya emigratsiya v Aziatsko-Tikhookeanskom regione i Yuzhnoi Amerike* (Vladivostok: Izdatel'stvo Dal'nevostochnogo Universiteta, 2001), 257. Semenov and Rodzaevsky subscribed to different ideologies and their mutual antagonism in Manchuria was reflected in the hostility between the Cossacks and Russian Fascists. However, both leaders met the same fate.

regime in Manzhouguo. Ataman Semenov, *Luch Azii*, and BREM played crucial roles in creating an illusion of unity among the subjects of the former Russian empire, and an illusion of their harmonious co-existence with the Asian subjects of Manzhouguo. This illusion was as ill-conceived and unrealistic as the idea of the Manzhouguo itself. As the Second World War progressed, the gap between the propaganda of harmony and the cruelty of the Japanese military campaigns became so evident that even the most loyal supporters of the pro-Japanese regime found themselves trapped in moral dilemmas with limited choices. It is no wonder that memoir literature by the Russians in Manchuria carefully avoids the period of Japanese occupation and there are so many blank spots in individual histories of White Russian leaders.



Figure 1. *Luch Azii* – cover page.

Source: *Luch Azii*, no. 4 (1934)

Figure 2. Ataman Semenov

Source: *Luch Azii*, no.12 (1935)



Figure 3. Special Issue of *Luch Azii* Celebrating 2,600 Years of the Japanese Empire

Source: *Luch Azii*, no. 65 (1940)

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Book Reviews

동북아역사재단
NORTHEAST ASIAN HISTORY FOUNDATION

China and Maritime Europe, 1500-1800: Trade, Settlement, Diplomacy, and Missions

Edited by John E. Willis, Jr.
Cambridge University Press, 2011

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Macau Scientific and Cultural Centre (Portugal)

This book on China's relations with the Europeans who arrived there by sea, which is edited by John E. Wills, Jr., consists of four essays covering different aspects of these relations between 1500 and 1800. The authors are all prominent names in this field with extensive and recognized publications that need no introduction. More specifically, in addition to the editor, contributions come from Willard J. Peterson and the late John L. Cranmer-Byng and John W. Witek, S.J., to whom the work is dedicated. The trading, diplomatic, and religious relations addressed throughout the book are structured chronologically with the two first chapters spanning the late Ming period and the last two the Qing period until 1800.

The book begins with the essays "Maritime Europe and the Ming" by Wills, and "Learning from Heaven: The Introduction of Christianity and Other Western Ideas into Late Ming China" by Peterson. These are followed by "Catholic Missions and the Expansion of Christianity, 1644-1800" by Witek. The book closes with the paper by Wills and Cranmer-Byng entitled "Trade and Diplomacy with Maritime Europe, 1644-c. 1800." This is an interesting work that presents an overview of the

above-mentioned aspects and periods of Sino-European relations from a non-Eurocentric perspective. Although *The Cambridge History of China* was the starting point of the book and the essays were originally prepared for inclusion volumes 8 and 9, only the first two were ultimately published in volume 8 (Denis Twitchett and Frederick W. Mote, eds., *The Ming Dynasty, 1368-1644* [1998]). As Wills explains in the preface, the authors believe this publication makes the essays, which go back to the 1980s, more accessible. The authors sought to revise their original texts, adding references to recent scholarship and updating the bibliography.

The introduction to this book, written by Wills, presents a useful and fascinating contextualization not only of the complex and dynamic Asian maritime world at a time of change, but also of Ming China and Qing China and the various actors involved in these trading, diplomatic, and religious relations. Wills also defines what he considers to be a master concept for an understanding of these relations: "defensiveness." He claims it is a much more satisfactory concept than the classical "tribute system," since it can embrace the various facets of Chinese relations with maritime Europeans. By "defensiveness" he means the tendency toward defensive and restrictive policies on foreign contact that can be witnessed in the variety of regional developments and pragmatic commitments. Europeans from different nations (Portugal, Spain, Holland, England, and other countries) in varying roles (merchants, ambassadors, priests, seamen, and others) and with distinct objectives, intersected and interacted with Chinese from different origins and functions (maritime Chinese, officials, literati, eunuchs, interpreters, craftsmen, and even emperors). Wills underlines that this took place in an increasingly interconnected world in which there was an exponential increase not only of the silver in circulation, but also of tea, silk, and porcelain, not to mention opium, which was enjoying growing popularity towards the end of the period in question. The author notes that all the above played vigorous and effective parts in the shaping of this maritime Asia and the relations analyzed in the four essays.

As in the original text, which is followed closely, Wills' focus in the first chapter is on the relations between maritime Europe and Ming China from the early sixteenth century with the arrival of the Portuguese, who were the first maritime Europeans to reach the Chinese coast. The author's analysis shows how the Portuguese advanced and retreated on the coast of China and their attempts to develop diplomatic relations with the central government. He draws attention to the disastrous results of the initial "aggressiveness" without naval superiority. This gave way to the second phase of "commercial accommodation," which he classifies as a "brilliant success" inasmuch as it enabled the Portuguese to establish themselves in Macau. Not unlike Manila or Casteel Zeelandia, the birth of Macau was a result of the confluence between the European accommodations and concessions and the reciprocal trading and economic interests. Throughout the article, Wills presents the process through which other Europeans, Spanish, and Dutch, entered into trade with China, and also the entry of the missionaries. In this context of encounters between Chinese and Europeans, we note the key role the author attributes to the maritime Chinese, whom he labels experts in mediation across cultural and linguistic barriers. He emphasizes that the meeting between these two worlds of the Europeans and the Chinese as well as the development of "accommodations" between them was largely due to the maritime Chinese, both on the coasts of China and in the foreign ports. Wills is to be commended for the care taken in his updating of the bibliography to use Portuguese authors, such as Rui Loureiro, who have conducted important work in the field of Sino-Portuguese relations. Nevertheless, two central works in the current panorama of studies on these relations are missing: *Macau Poder e Saber. Séculos XVI e XVII*, by Luís Filipe Barreto, (Lisbon: Presença, 2006) and *Um Porto entre Dois impérios* (*Estudos sobre Macau e as relações luso-chinesas*) by Jorge Santos Alves (Macau: IPOR, 1999).

The second essay, written by Peterson, is also a new version of the text in *The Cambridge History* with only occasional alterations made to

the original. It addresses Christianity in Ming China together with other Western ideas, such as mathematics, astronomy and geography. The author shows that much of the knowledge presented in China expressed the Aristotelian scholasticism that prevailed in European universities' curricula at the time, and was already far from being the vanguard of European scientific knowledge. Peterson also describes the active participation of Chinese literati, both converts (for example, Xu Guangqi, Li Zhizao, Yang Tingyun, and Wang Zheng), and sympathizers (for example, Ye Xianggao), in the accommodation process of Christian doctrine and European science to Confucianism and to Chinese culture in general. These literati played a vital role in the strategic question of the composition of books. Sometimes this was done in partnership with missionaries; at other times they developed their own theses and arguments in books they wrote or even in many prefaces signed by them. Despite all the efforts to assimilate this teaching with the terminology and concepts of the Chinese classical texts, Peterson underlines the irony that it was always labeled as "Western Learning" (*Xixue*) or "Westerners' Learning from Heaven" (*Tianxue*). Similarly, however much the missionaries tried to become "men of China," they were unable to prevent the fact that their fascination in the eyes of the Chinese was to a great extent precisely because they were foreign and had come from distant and unknown lands, in other words, their exoticism.

Continuing in the religious domain, the third essay by John Witek addresses the Catholic missions and the expansion of Christianity in Qing China until around 1800. The author provides an interesting overview of the topic, constantly highlighting the Chinese dimension of the missions, and making extensive use of Chinese sources. Mention is also made of his concern about embarking on new lines of research, some of which have since been, or are currently, objects of study. For example, in relation to the Rites Controversy, he calls attention to the need to study the many extant Chinese sources and notes that a definitive appraisal of the matter is otherwise impossible. Yan Mo and his three

essays written in relation to the controversy are unquestionable proof of just how much this analysis has to offer. (Recently, Nicolas Standaert published a book focusing precisely on this, *Chinese Voices in the Rites Controversy* [Rome: BIH, 2012]).

But Witek sets other challenges for future research, such as the comprehensive study of books written in Chinese to explain doctrine and which he believes were of crucial importance to the spread of Christianity in China. Moreover, he notes the importance of understanding the influence the young Chinese, sent to France or Naples for training in the eighteenth century, exerted on their return to China. He also proposes a far-reaching and systematic study of the Manchu Christians and their impact. Little attention has been given to this subject despite the conversion of a number of Manchu princes and their households, as in the case of some of Sonu's sons towards the end of the Kangxi reign and that of his successor (Witek has published an article on this topic: "Manchu Christians at the Court of Peking in Early Eighteenth-Century China: A Preliminary Study," in *Succès et échecs de la rencontre Chine et Occident*, eds. Edward Malatesta and Yves Ranguin [San Francisco: Ricci Institute, 1993]). Witek concludes his essay by stressing that while Ricci and the missionaries who followed him in the Qing dynasty were aware of the need to persuade the Chinese that the West was civilized, they also strived to understand and appreciate the Chinese civilization. He contends that this appreciation of China is in stark contrast to the forced entry of Europeans in Canton at the time of the Opium War in the mid-nineteenth century—an event he claims the Chinese continue to reject, unlike the early entry of the missionaries, which has been the target of growing interest.

Finally, in the fourth chapter Wills and Cranmer-Byng return to the theme of trading and diplomatic relations and present a picture of the Qing Empire's involvement in world trade (until about 1800) with a growing number of European nations. This article is, to a large extent, a synopsis of the work by these two authors over their careers (in books

such as *An Embassy to China*, 1962 [Cranmer-Byng], or *Pepper, Guns, and Parleys*, 1974 [Wills], and *Embassies and Illusions*, 1984 [Wills]). It shows us how that trade came about, as well as the oscillations in the integration of the Europeans in the tribute system and the illusions associated with the embassies. The authors believe that the treatment of foreigners, the management of their embassies, and the changes in policies on missionaries and their converts should all be understood as a set of defensive policies which, though vaguely associated, were aimed at confronting the various challenges facing the dynasty: the ever-growing threat to public order along the coast from ships and sailors; the threat to the Emperor's ceremonial supremacy in the capital; and the threat of political and cultural subversion by the missionaries and their converts. As in the preface, the conclusion of this essay again underlines the key role played byo the Chinese overseas merchants, notably among the "country traders."

The four chapters are complemented by a joint bibliography and an index, which both undoubtedly enrich this work. It is true that we cannot say the contents of this book are completely new as the essays go back to the 1980s. Nevertheless, this work provides us with a very helpful and interesting summary of the relations between China and the maritime Europeans from their first contacts until the turn of the nineteenth century and is an excellent starting point for those embarking on the study of early modern Sino-European relations or for a wider public interested in this topic.

Remote Homeland, Recovered Borderland: Manchus, Manchoukuo, and Manchuria, 1907-1985

by Shao Dan

Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2011

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Suk-Jung Han

Dong-A University

This is a welcome work on Manchuria, one of the most complex regions in East Asian history. In the English-speaking world, Shao Dan's book is connected with the rare lineage of Manchurian studies over the past decade.[1] This book is on modern Manchuria (now called, *Dongbei*, or Northeast, by the People's Republic of China [PRC]), once the sacrosanct homeland of the Qing rulers, then lost territory, now a provincialized area in China; on Manchus (currently called *Manzu* by the PRC government), who once managed the largest territory of China and have fallen to one of its minority groups; and on Manzhouguo (1932-1945), which was a Japanese puppet state, or "an internationally and intentionally repressed historical entity."[2]

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[1] For works on Manchuria published in the twenty-first century, see Prasenjit Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003); Hyeon Ok Park, *Two Dreams in One Bead: Empire, Social Life, and the Origins of the North Korean Revolution in Manchuria* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005); and Janis Mimura, *Planning for Empire: Reform Bureaucrats and the Japanese Wartime State* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011).

[2] Gavan McCormack, "Manchukuo: Constructing the Past," *East Asian History* 2 (1991), 106.

As the author aptly points out, Manchuria is not a part of homogenous China, or an extension of the glorious Middle Kingdom. It originally was the homeland of the Manchus who founded Qing China. Called "the cradle of conflict,"[3] it became a historically contested region from the latter part of the nineteenth century, full of large-scale phenomena, and dramatic incidents, such as the Russian and Japanese encroachments that led to the Russo-Japanese War, the influx of tens of millions of Chinese after the lifting of the centuries-long ban forbidding migration, the fall of Qing China, the subsequent rule of the Guomindang (KMT) and warlord regimes, the Mukden incident, the founding of Manzhouguo, rule by the KMT again, and rule by the PRC. It has a complex history with several regimes and several historical agents, including Han Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Koreans, Japanese, Russians, and others.

Manchuria is a black box for the foundation of contemporary East Asian powers.[4] Through the area's abundant resources, for instance, the Japanese military envisioned the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere and waged a doomed war of civilization against the West in the late 1930s. The so-called Manchurian clique that had managed Manzhouguo became the main pillar of the postwar ruling bloc in Japan. For the Chinese Communist Party, Manchuria became an "anvil of victory" at the final moment of the civil war with its rival, the KMT.[5] Also, it became a space of gestation for future North Korean and South Korean leaders. The former North Korean leader Kim Il Sung, who founded the longest dynastic rule since World War II, and the former South Korean president Park Chung Hee, who led the so-called miracle

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[3] Owen Lattimore, *Manchuria: Cradle of Conflict* (New York: MacMillan, 1932).

[4] Han Seok-jeong, *Manjuguk geonguk ui jaehaeseok: Goeroeguk ui gukga hyogwa, 1932-1936* [Reinterpretation of the state formation of Manzhouguo: The state effect of the puppet state, 1932-1936] (Busan, Republic of Korea: Dong-A Daehakkyo chulpanbu, 2007), chapter 1.

[5] Steven Levine, *Anvil of Victory: The Communist Revolution in Manchuria, 1945-1948* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).

of the Han River, spent their early careers there as a resistance guerrilla leader and a young officer of the puppet state, respectively.

In spite of Manchuria's significance, previous studies, including Chinese official historiography, seldom deviate from the rigid themes subsumed by modern nationalism, such as brutal fascist rule and heroic national resistance. However, as Prasenjit Duara succinctly points out, Manchuria is "a place of paradoxes."[6] Concerning Manchuria and Manzhouguo, it is difficult to disentangle imperialism from nationalism, modernity from tradition, or frontier from heartland. The book nicely surpasses such established verdicts and charts its own voyage.

Composed of three parts, the book largely follows chronological order from early Qing to the late twentieth century. Part one focuses on the Manchus and Manchuria until the 1911 Revolution. Part two concentrates on the lives of Manchus in Manzhouguo and the post-liberation period, when the KMT and then the PRC ruled the area. Part three has two chapters: a biography of the so-called Oriental Mata Hari, a Manchu spy who lived under several identities, and Manchus' memory (largely interviews) of the contemporary Manchus living in Manchuria. This is an ambitious work covering several regimes over a long time span (at the maximum, for more than three centuries in spite of the time period set in the book's title). Relying heavily on archives on the military organization (bannermen) of the Qing government, local gazetteers in Manchuria, Chinese and Japanese sources, interviews, and secondary materials, including a long list of previous publications on pre-modern and modern Manchuria, the book traces the transformation of Manchuria from the Manchus' remote homeland to a contested borderland, then as a symbol of the lost and recovered territory, and then as a mere province absorbing historical tourism.

Raising questions regarding conventional approaches toward

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[6] Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity*, 1.

Manchuria which have been in the subfield of the history of Sino-Japanese relations, or on the prevailing binary view of Japanese imperialism and the heroic anti-Japanese struggle, the book illuminates hitherto vague and invisible spots which could not be captured by grand narratives of nationalism. The book stresses that modern Manchuria is hardly captured by East Asian studies bordered along nation-states or by Chinese nationalism. Following recent revisionist studies on Manchuria,[7] the book deconstructs the Sinification theme in Qing studies (namely, the assimilation of Manchu rulers by Han Chinese) and contemporary Chinese nationalism. It also reevaluates several facets of the state formation of Manzhouguo which have been overlooked in the East Asian history field.

Above all, this book's main contribution is its close-up treatment of Manchus. This is a full-scale compilation of their lives over more than a century. The book searches through the dramatic changes in the Manchus' status from the late Qing period up to the present. This is a great achievement, especially when we consider the fragmentary works on their lives. For instance, Duara's book provides some short discussions of people in Taiwan who experienced the Manzhouguo period. But no other works have endeavored to focus upon their lives.

The fresh starting point of this book is on those Manchus who remained in Manchuria after most Manchu conquerors had moved to the mainland in order to rule the new territory in the seventeenth century. This is the vacuum which other works have neglected. The book contrasts Manchus in Manchuria and Manchus in the mainland, the latter of which have been well documented in other works, such as those by Mark Elliott.[8] The comparison of their lives between two places (or

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[7] See Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity*; Rana Mitter, *The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance, and Collaboration in Modern China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); and Pamela Kyle Crossley, *Orphan Warriors: Three Manchu Generations and the End of the Qing World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).

between north and south) is a stout pillar of the whole project. The book illuminates the salience of the former in various realms. There are a number of intriguing parts, for instance, the failure of the Qing policy to keep Manchus in their holy land due to the Manchu officials' disrespect for Manchuria, their low self-esteem, the perception of their lives in exile, and their indulging in drinking and poem writing.

The book strenuously traces Manchus in Manchuria for a century. Themes include their co-existence with Han Chinese (compared with the segregation of both in the south), the inclusion of Han bannermen (C. *Hanjun*) in their organization which contributed to growing pride among the Chinese soldiers, and their dire poverty in the early twentieth century. In the Manzhouguo period, topics discussed include the hopes of restoration, collaboration (for instance, by General Xi Qia), disillusionment, and the paradoxical deletion of their identity (subsumed by the Chinese language term *Manren*, or citizens of Manzhouguo). The KMT labeled them as pro-Japanese collaborators after liberation in 1945. In the PRC, the Chinese government has acknowledged their participation in anti-Japanese resistance and the state-building process, and the state continues to maintain the Manchu identity in China. This book is a laborious work.

There are rare descriptions of the Manchus' tragedy, too, including their massacre, largely perpetrated in the south, following the overthrow of the Qing dynasty. This may explain their long hesitation to admit their identity throughout China after the 1911 Revolution. Utilizing the saga frame flowing from early glory to downfall, massacre, then hiding, summoning by the PRC, and, finally, to the recent construction of autonomous ethnic administrative units, the book succeeds in delivering emotional elements, reminiscent of Pamela Kyle Crossley's soul-stirring

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[8] Mark Elliott, *The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001).

work on a Manchu literary man who lamented the fall of the Qing dynasty and tried to cherish the Manchu culture.[9]

The book also highlights the long history of government-led borderland studies in China, that is, the devotion of many scholars to sinicizing anthropology and ethnology that could assist the government with claiming and managing borderlands. This section will remind readers of the current efforts of the Chinese government to annex the histories of non-Han kingdoms inside and outside China, such as through the *Dongbei Gongcheng* (Northeast Project) to absorb Koguryo, once a rival of Sui China and Tang China, which existed in Manchuria and in the northern part of the Korean peninsula from the first century BCE to the seventh century.

The treatment of the shifting identity or the ideology related with Manchus is another strong feature of this book. For instance, Manchu leaders redefined their identities beyond the Manchu-Han or banner-civilian framework and within a framework of Chinese-foreigner references in the last years of the Qing period, when China faced imperialist encroachment. Also, leaders of the KMT, who once were strong Han centrists imbued with anti-Manchuism, later strategically dropped the racist discourse in the state-building process after the 1911 Revolution.

Finally, the book argues through the case of the Manchus that identity is fluid, that it is something to be revised and (re)negotiated. This is a theoretical contribution. Updating the current literature on borderlands, identity problems, nationalism, and other related themes, the book successfully proposes that people continue to revise their identity, ethnohistory, and their homeland within different political entities.

This is a point worth mentioning. The author stresses that the "interconnections between pasts and presents decide the continuing

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[9] Crossley, *Orphan Warriors*.

revision of Manchus' history" (280). The book persuasively illustrates how the Manchus redefined their identity from former conquerors to colonized victims, and then to heroes of anti-Japanese resistance and nation building. According to the author, "Reconfiguration of their identity is a continuing process of interactions between the legacy of Manchu rule over the Qing empire, new ideologies of anti-colonial nationalism, and the imported concepts of national identity and ethnic categories" (288).

However, there are some obstacles which slow the smooth voyage of the book. One problem might be earlier studies. Respecting previous research is necessary, but their heavy influence would lessen novelty. For instance, when this book introduces previous borderland studies (such as the state-led anthropology and ethnology in China to annex Manchuria into the Chinese geo-body, and the difference of Chinese and Japanese studies on Manchuria), the book more or less follows Duara's work. The author's strategy is simply broadening Duara's realm. Also, the dramatic biography of the famous Manchu traitor Aisin Gioro Xianyu was introduced by Miriam Silverberg, who contrasted her life with Li Koran, who was an icon of the film world in the Japanese empire.[10] The only difference is the focus on Xianyu.

On Manzhouguo, the book reiterates somewhat historical details which have already been well studied, such as the Lytton Commission, the Concordia Association (J. *Kyōwakai*), the South Manchurian Railway, the Manchurian Film Association (J. *Manshū eiga kyōkai*) and other topics. Students of Manchurian history would rather expect information on Manchus in the Manzhouguo period, for they have been scarcely studied.

Also, the book shows editing problems, although this tendency is

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[10] Miriam Silverberg, "Remembering Pearl Harbor, Forgetting Charlie Chaplin, and the Case of the Disappearing Western Woman: A Picture Story," in *Formations of Colonial Modernity in East Asia*, ed. Tani Barlow (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997).

not unusual among historians. For example, it frequently provides the information of the primary data (largely Chinese sources) in full, though this could be treated in footnotes. The mentioning of tables and chapters (in particular, of local gazetteers in Part III) is too detailed. Lastly, Part III suddenly jumps to the level of biography. It would have been desirable if this part could have been an independent book project.

Despite these problems, it cannot be denied that this book is a rare achievement in the field of Chinese history, in particular, in Manchurian studies. One hopes that the author will examine overseas Manchus in the next project, if possible. It would be another achievement if she could reach Manchus in Taiwan or the United States, following Thomas Lahusen and his colleagues, who searched for Jews who had dispersed all over the world from Harbin in order to reconstruct the world of Harbin, or the "Paris of the East," in the first half of the twentieth century.[11]

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[11] See Thomas Lahusen, "Introduction," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 99, no. 1 (2000), 1-4.

Rediscovering America: Japanese Perspectives on the American Century

by Peter Duus and Kenji Hasegawa
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2011

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Peter Duus and Kenji Hasegawa's edited volume *Rediscovering America: Japanese Perspectives on the American Century* is a delightfully engaging collection of fifty observations of life in the United States from the late nineteenth century to the last year of the Showa era (1926-1989). The editors provide a useful framework for understanding the commentaries by a wide range of Japanese writers who vacillate between overestimating and underestimating the behaviors and character of the American people over a 100-year period. As they note in the introduction, "the 'love-hate' dichotomy hardly does justice to the complexity of modern Japanese perspectives on the United States" (3), while the dynamic of overestimation and underestimation is helpful because it explicitly recognizes that Japanese students, intellectuals, journalists, and others all approached their object of study with preconceived notions of American culture before they made their own particular contributions to the discourse on American life. These commentators also often made explicit comparisons with life in Japan and presented these contrasts to their Japanese readership as a way to introduce, critique, and sometimes even praise American customs,

institutions, and lifestyles.

The book is divided into seven sections in chronological order, with each section covering roughly two decades. While some of the names are familiar to those with a basic knowledge of modern Japan, such as the prominent Christian Uchimura Kanzō, the radical activist Kōtoku Shūsui, the businessman Shibusawa Eiichi, the Nobel laureate Ōe Kenzaburō, and Sony's Morita Akio, one of the most significant features of this volume is that it includes a range of voices that have not generally been presented to English readers. For instance, in the first section entitled "Illusion and Disillusion," which covers the period from 1878-1906, we encounter the Buddhist philosopher Inoue Enryō through a section of his 1889 travel diary called "Religion in America." Inoue presents us with a number of themes that reoccur throughout the century covered in this collection, including his observations of a Darwinian social hierarchy, where non-Christians are thought of "as human beings of a lower order" (28).

Many of the writers comment on the competitive struggles that are central to life in America, where perseverance and hard work are often tied to Christian ideals. An anonymous contributor to the monthly journal *Chūō kōron* in 1921 juxtaposes Japanese notions of loyalty and self-sacrifice to those of Americans, who "work very hard, but since they are reluctant to make personal sacrifices, they follow their own interests" (77). The author extends his conventional dichotomies of national character to a discussion of Japanese immigrants in the United States by concluding that "Japan is a country that serves the idea of loyalty; the United States is a country that practices the reality of democracy. If Japanese immigrants overprize their ideal of loyalty, they are bound to find themselves in trouble" (80). As a way to contextualize such characterizations of national character, Duus and Hasegawa provide helpful introductions to each chapter where they elaborate on the larger historical milieu of the commentaries, such as in chapter three on "*Modan* America," where they note that in 1918 "the first professorial

chair in American studies was established at Tokyo Imperial University," a time when "… the political values associated with American democracy – individualism, equality, freedom, public debate, and fair play – still attracted intellectuals across a wide spectrum" (87). The selections throughout the volume provide interesting insights into how these often noted American characteristics of individualism and liberty are always enmeshed in a more complex social and political context. In particular, many of the writers comment on race relations as a way to question the ideals of American democracy and fair play.

For example, in chapter two, "Students and Immigrants," we are introduced to the father of sculptor Isamu Noguchi, the writer and poet Noguchi Yonejirō, who came to the United States in the mid-Meiji period (1868-1912) and encountered the shock of racism on Market Street in San Francisco. In 1911 he wrote of an early experience in California where he describes being "suddenly struck by a hard hand from behind, and found a large red-faced fellow, somewhat smiling in scorn, who, seeing my face, exclaimed, 'Hello, Jap [!]' I was terribly indignant to be addressed in such a fashion; my indignation increased when he ran away after spitting on my face" (59). Ethnic diversity and racial hierarchy are mentioned frequently as a salient feature of American life, as in conservative critic Etō Jun's piece "America as I See It," which ran in the daily newspaper *Asahi shinbun* in 1963 following a stint at Princeton University funded by the Rockefeller Foundation. Etō's answer to the question, "What does it mean to 'become American'?" is as follows: "To put it succinctly it means using English in one's daily life… Driven to use English in their daily lives, foreigners find themselves on the road to becoming American before they realize it. And then they begin to notice that they are being placed in the American racial hierarchy that puts Anglo-Saxons at the top and blacks at the bottom" (261). A powerful account of the violence associated with American segregation and race relations is presented by famed journalist Honda Katsuichi in his "Traveling Through the Deep South," published in 1970. In explaining

the "lawlessness" of the South during the civil rights movement, he notes, "Since state policemen were all on the 'white side,' they were even more dangerous than ordinary white citizens" (293).

The aggression of America's past is also highlighted in discussions of the westward movement, particularly in one of the wartime excerpts, Sawada Ken's "On the History of American Imperialism" (1941). He explains, "Even before the original thirteen states were fully developed, Americans, driven by the pioneer spirit, opened up the Allegheny Mountains with hunting guns on their shoulders and axes on their belts… In the name of humanity they slaughtered the Indians they encountered… The strong conquered, and the weak were steadily pushed aside." (142) Although Frederick Jackson Turner is never mentioned by name by any of the writers, his frontier thesis permeates the pages in every decade. The most explicit introduction can be found in journalist Maida Minoru's "The Characteristics and Peculiarities of the Americans," from 1925. He states matter of factly, "It goes without saying, the frontier was the most powerful force molding the American spirit of hard work… They were scattered over the mountains, the plains, the rivers, and lakes of their vast territory, living in regions where wild animals roamed… pursuing their own goals unrestrained by others" (99). This kind of geographic determinism and recurring references to the vast landscape are central features in the Japanese imagination of the United States.

At the height of World War II, writer Sakanishi Shiho, who received a Ph.D. from the University of Michigan in 1929, ties the life of American pioneers to the material blessings of the "wide frontier" in her 1944 essay "Why Do Americans Break the Law?" (168). The materialism and capitalist mindset of Americans are also central themes noted by many of the commentators, as in Ashida Hitoshi's "America on the Rise," which was published in *Chūō kōron* in 1925. A noted expert on international issues, he writes, "Materialism has established its tyranny there… and the breadth of America's territory and the wealth of its resources have made materialistic thinking the mainstream and enriched

those who conquered the land" (93). A humorous, biting critique of America's postwar affluence and conformity is found in progressive Oda Makoto's 1961 essay, "The Other Side of American Society." Here, the A&P supermarket symbolizes the uniformity and barrenness of American life, also encountered by Oda in the "PX-like store attached to the American Embassy" in Teheran where "that same familiar smell, that sanitary, harmless, useless smell, flowed into my nostrils" (247). While there are numerous references to the fast pace, vitality, and efficiency of American manufacturing and industry throughout the American century, the aforementioned pendulum of underestimation and overestimation is evident in the last chapter, entitled "America in Decline." This final section includes a glimpse into the life of Shimomura Mitsuko, the first woman correspondent to be sent abroad by *Asahi shinbun*. In New York, she describes the trials and tribulations of dealing with landlords, lawyers, and unapologetic customer service representatives. Frustration and anger resulting from these encounters strengthens her resolve to keep her "eyes open to find out why America, the land of efficiency, speed, and the pioneer spirit, has turned out the way it has" (317).

Sakanishi and Shimomura are two of the handful of underrepresented women in this collection. Nonetheless, issues regarding gender dynamics and the role of women in the United States are frequently mentioned. Meiji era "good wife, wise mother" type figures appear repeatedly in portrayals ranging from the ideal middle class homemaker in "Home Life in America" (1916) by Aoyama Tetsushirō, a student at Stanford University in the 1910s, to the "perfectly devoted spouse" (194) described by Christian social reformer Kagawa Toyohiko in 1945, to the paragons of housekeeping efficiency and political consciousness depicted by feminist Ishigaki Ayako in 1951. In contrast, after traveling through Mississippi, Honda Katsuichi counters this "usual image of the 'American housewife'" as follows: "…[H]ousewives in Negro society are much more likely to think of themselves as mothers than as wives. It is from the ranks of such women that the most powerful

supporters of the Negro movement continue to come." Putting this in the context of the history of slavery, he continues, "Their 'role as mother' extended as well into the families of their white 'masters,' where they took care of white children too" (298-299).

Interspersed throughout the text are a number of cartoons which add a rich visual element to the portrayals of "the Other," such as the 1955 depiction of a Japanese woman with her aloha shirt-clad American companion who towers over a pathetic looking Japanese veteran on crutches, reduced to begging for a living a decade after Japan's defeat. The lively prose and well captioned illustrations make this volume a fine choice for undergraduate classes in Japanese history, U.S.-Japan relations, as well as courses in American Studies and even modern world history. Many of the chosen authors make explicit comparisons between the United States and other Western countries such as England, France, and Germany, and flesh out the global context of events spanning from the Spanish-American War to the Vietnam War. This latter conflict is seen as the turning point in America's declining international influence, and is particularly problematic for the Japanese due to the bases on Okinawa serving as a crucial staging ground for the American military in Southeast Asia. China also surfaces in a variety of contexts, from the time of the Opium War, to geopolitical struggles over its "Open Door," to the twentieth century immigrant Yellow Peril.

Readers may be left wondering in a few places about matters like the identity and background of the first writer, Sugiyama Shigeru, author of "On Relations Among Nations" (1878), a curious void, given the useful introductions in the rest of the volume, or the particular domain of origin (Aizu) of Shiba Shirō, author of the next excerpt from the mid-1880s. In the introduction, it is also somewhat odd to read the editors' remarks on the scant number of Japanese dissidents who sought refuge in the United States during World War II, given the policy of internment and the particular details of the personal experiences of Japanese from across the political spectrum who repatriated during the war, including a

few mentioned in this collection. These, however, are minor issues in an extremely well edited compilation of voices that continue to speak to us in important ways at this point in the early twenty-first century.

Zhaizi Zhongguo (Dwelling Here in China): Asking Questions Again about the Identity of China

By Ge Zhaoguang
Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2011

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Why Does China Matter Now?

There recently have been heated discussions in the Chinese community of academicians, historians in particular, about China and Chineseness.[1] One may argue that the tendency is not particularly surprising considering that discussions about race, nation, gender, and other identity-related subjects have been important parts of the academic movements around the world since the second half of the twentieth century. The question, "What is China?," can, however, become a confusing, even challenging, question because "China" is, in fact, anything that is related with either

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The Korean-language edition of this book is Ge Zhaoguang, *I Jungguk e geohara: Jungguk eun mueot inga e daehan saeroun tamgu*, trans. Yi Won-seok (Seoul: Geulhangari, 2012).

[1] Regarding the discussion and criticism of the concept of "Chineseness," see Zhu Chongke 朱崇科, "Qu Zhongguoxing: jingxing misi ji qita: yi Wang Runhua he Huang Jinshu de xiangguan lunshu wei zhongxin" 去中國性：警醒、迷思及其他——以王潤華和黃錦樹的相關論述爲中心, Ershiyi shiji 二十一世紀 (wangluoban 網絡版) 17 (2003:8); Zhang Longxi 張隆溪, "Zhidi yousheng: ping Ge Zhaoguang xinzhu Zhaizi Zhongguo" 擲地有聲—評葛兆光新著《宅茲中國》, *Kaifang shidai* 開放時代 7 (2011).

the race or the ethnicity of Chinese people.

During the twentieth century the name "China" began to be used with the political, cultural, and national significances it retains today. According to Lydia Liu, who conducted a fine discussion on the subject, Chinese intellectuals at the turn of the nineteenth century were greatly concerned and anxious about the possibility of losing the name of their country.[2] Huang Zunxian, for instance, argued in 1898, "Every country on earth uses a name referring to its entire state, as shown by such countries as the United Kingdom and France. Only China has no such name." He continued to say that the existing names used by foreign countries to refer to the Chinese country, such as "China," "la Chine," "Zhendan" (震旦), and "Jina" (震旦) could not become a proper name to cover all of China, and suggested "Huaxia" (華夏) as an official name for China.[3] Meanwhile, Liang Qichao considered replacing the existing dynasty names with Zhongguo (中國), but Zhang Taiyan criticized this view by saying that the term "Zhongguo" is not appropriate to cover all of China because it has traditionally been used to refer to "the land of the Han Chinese" against the areas outside its border.[4]

The terms Zhongguo and Zhonghua have been used since ancient times. According to Liu, however, "The concept of either 'Zhongguo' or 'Zhonghua' has never had a stable and clear meaning in Chinese discourses throughout Chinese history, from the Warring State Period to the Qing Dynasty through the Han, Tang, Song, Yuan, and Ming Dynasties." That is why Quin Mu gave up the concept of the continuity in the identity of Chinese people, and urged researchers to read historical materials more closely and not to follow the conventional Sinocentrism

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[2] Lydia H. Liu, *The Clash of Empires: The Invention of China in Modern World Making* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 75-81.

[3] Huang Zunxian 黃遵憲, *Ribenguo zhi* 日本國誌, Xuxiu Siku quanshu 續修四庫全書 (Shanghai 上海: Shanghai guji chubanshe 上海古籍出版社, 1995), 745:49.

[4] Zhang Taiyan 章太炎, "Zhonghua minguojie" 中華民國解, *Minbao* 民報 15 (1907:7), 2413.

that regards China as the center of the world and the peoples living outside its boundary as barbarians.[5] It shows that the concept of China has been used in a very flexible and variable manner politically, culturally, and historically.

The question currently raised about "China" is, however, not simply about the name of the state, but a more fundamental question about the identity of China. That is, can we see China as a nation-state, which is the essential character of a modern nation? Or taking another step, is "China" a political concept, or is it a civilizational or cultural concept? How do we understand Chinese nationalism and national identity? There are multiple contexts related to these questions, including the following.

First, the questions are based on critical views related with academic influences from postmodernism, post-colonialism, and orientalism reacting to the ideas of modernism, the nation-state, and nationalism formed in the nineteenth century. These critical views offered new methods of thinking regarding the social system and the identity of a state or nation by converting various phenomena related with modernity into mixed categories through concepts such as interaction, inter-connectedness, and hybridity. The new methods have been particularly helpful in producing new research on China among Western scholars as well as Chinese scholars in the West and in Southeast Asia. What is common in their studies is the shift of view from "China as a unified whole" to questions of ethnic minorities in China, Tibet, and Uighurs, resistance of the Mongol people, Taiwan breaking away from the continent, and the democratic movement in Hong Kong. In his book on the denaturalization of "Chineseness," Rey Chow used the expression "epistemological transition" to capture academic trends in the

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[5] Qian Mu 錢穆, *Zhongguo xueshu sixiangshi luncong* 中國學術思想史論叢 (Taibei 臺北: Dongda tushu youxian gongsi 東大圖書有限公司, 1979), 8:77-200.

studies of China.[6] But Allen Chun offered a better example of the latest trends in scholarship. He argued in an article titled "Fuck Chineseness," "There was in China neither a concept of the same nation prior to the Xinhai Revolution of 1911, nor an idea regarding states as political entities divided by ethnicity." He took one step further and argued that the concept that all Chinese people are of the same nation is "basically a modern creation originated from the idea of the nation itself."[7]

Second, there have been challenges to the historical identity of China based on Chinese Studies in the West, the New Qing History School in particular. Scholars in this school turn to the Qing Dynasty of Manchu people to criticize the conventional unified historiography of China centered on the Han people. Evelyn Sakakida Rawski, for example, argued that the Great Qing Dynasty is different from China, while Pamela Kyle Crossley believed that the imperial ideology of the Qing Dynasty objectified China and regarded it as part of the Great Qing Dynasty. Mark C. Elliott had similar questions, and wondered if it would not be right to identify the Qing Dynasty with China and whether the dynasty was actually a Manchu Empire and China was just a part of the empire.[8] Such questions posed a serious challenge to the conventional idea of "China" and its historical legitimacy.

Third, there have been efforts to emphasize nationalism and Chinese people's own culture following the emergence of China as a world superpower in the post-Mao period, the 1990s in particular, and to

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[6] Rey Chow, ed., *Modern Chinese Literary and Cultural Studies in the Age of Theory: Reimagining a Field* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000).

[7] Allen Chun, "Fuck Chineseness: On the Ambiguities of Ethnicity as Culture as Identity," *Boundary* 23, no. 2 (1996), 111-138.

[8] Evelyn Sakakida Rawski, "Qingdai Manren de Zhongguo renting" 清代滿人的"中國認同, *Qingshi yanjiu* 清史研究 1 (2011); Pamela Kyle Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 341; Mark C. Elliott, "Manwen dangan yu 'xin Qingshi'" 滿文檔案與"新清史", *Gugong xueshu jikan* 故宮學術季刊 24:2 (2006).

reconstruct Chinese identity through, among others, government-sponsored history projects. The effort to establish a unified ideology for the multiethnic country following the decline of the One Great Family of Socialist Nations has led to the development of an ideology that regards the Chinese nation as a unity of multiple origins and, gradually, a theory of China as an integrated special civilization where the Han cultures play a key role.[9] Currently, efforts to write Chinese history from new viewpoints based on China's current territory and population have begun to be highlighted as an important issue regarding academic discourses in China, often raising criticism from and conflict with international academic circles outside China.

Finally, there also have been efforts to create concepts for the description and interpretation of China based on Chinese history rather than views established by scholars in the West and effectively handle the new academic challenges facing China as well as changes brought regarding its status in the world today. These efforts are largely related to the first academic trend. But the difference is that unlike the first, which tends to move toward deconstruction from a stance critical of China or Chineseness, these are aimed at establishing a new definition of the nature of the special historical route that China has trodden and the nature of its political systems while raising questions about the basic concepts that formed perceptions of the world and China in the

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[9] Fei Xiaotong 費孝通, *Zhonghua minzu duoyuan yiti geju* 中華民族多元一體格局 (1988); Fei Xiaotong 費孝通, ed., *Zhonghua minzu yanjiu xintansuo* 中華民族研究新探索 (Zhonghua shehui kexue chubanshe 中國社會科學出版社, 1991); Chen Liankai 陳連開, *Zhonghua minzu yanjiu chutan* 中華民族研究初探 (Zhishi chubanshe 知識出版社, 1994); Chen Liankai 陳連開, ed., *Zhongguo minzushi gangyao* 中國民族史綱要 (Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe 中國財政經濟出版社, 1999); Zhang Lei 張磊 and Kong Qinglong 孔慶榕, eds., *Zhonghua minzu ningjulixue* 中華民族凝聚力學 (Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe 中國社會科學出版社, 1999); Lu Xun 盧勳 and Yang Baolong 楊保隆, eds., *Zhonghua minzu ningjulixue de xingcheng yu fazhan* 中華民族凝聚力的形成與發展 (Minzu chubanshe 民族出版社, 2000); Lu Xiaoheng 盧曉衡, ed., *Sanjiao yuanrong liang'an yiti* 三教圓融兩岸一體 (Beijing 北京: Jingji guanli chubanshe 經濟管理出版社, 2003); Ma Rong 馬戎, *Minzu shehui xuedaolun* 民族社會學導論 (Beijing daxue chubanshe 北京大學出版社, 2005).

nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Scholars who have offered fine books that represent the latter tendency include Wang Hui, who wrote *Xiandai Zhongguo sixiang de xingqi* (*The Rise of Modern Chinese Thought*, 現代中國思想的興起, 2004), and Ge Zhaoguang, the author of *Zhaizi Zhongguo* (*Dwelling Here in China*, 宅茲中國, 2011), In his voluminous book, Wang raises questions regarding implications about China, modern China in particular, and discusses how the modern identity of China, concepts of regions, and the sense of sovereignty were formed or constructed. He then raises a question—how do we understand modern China?—in trying to learn about the foundation that formed the self-identity of Chinese people as modern people.[10]

The "Nation-State" in Chinese History

The basic starting point for discussion in Ge's *Zhaizi Zhongguo* is a reflection upon the description of Chinese history based on the perception frame set by the West. His special interests in this book are focused on "research methods on regions," "discourses on Asia," "the 'concentric circle' theory of Taiwan," "Mongolian history," and "New Qing History." According to Ge, research trends have moved from the concept and history of a single, unified China and raise questions regarding whether there exists identity in Chinese history, civilization, and philosophical ideas. There has been research that describes traditional China, and those descriptions are largely divided into two groups. The first group describes China as an "empire" that is different from the modern nation-state, while the second group depicts China as a nation-state retaining the elements of a modern state. A key factor in the conventional description of history has focused on the question of

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[10] Wang Hui 汪暉, *Xiandai Zhongguo sixiang de xingqi* 現代中國思想的興起 (Sanlian shudian 三聯書店, 2004), volume 1, part 1, see "Daolun 導論."

whether China in the past "was an 'empire' which had no clear boundary as a 'nation-civilization-community' and changed constantly or was a 'nation-state' which had, from the start, a clear boundary, a sense of unity, and a consistent tradition." As for the question, the new research trends noted above stress a history of multiple ethnicities and the influence of foreign races upon the Han Chinese rather than the other way around during the course of history. This research trend tends to deny the current China dominated by the Han and explores the history of decentering by going back to early history. As criticisms became widespread about the methodology of the unilinear history description in the late twentieth century, the dualistic view of Chinese history focused on "empire" and "nation-state" also came under criticism as represented by, among others, Prasenjit Duara's *Rescuing History from the Nation*. According to Duara, the method of describing history based on the view that nation is the subject of history is a product of the process of forming modern states, that is, the process in which another current of real history is suppressed and concealed.[11]

Ge's historical awareness is a critical reflection upon the view that denies the existence of ethnic community in Chinese history, regarding it as a simple result of modern imagination. He raises a question about whether Duara's view in *Rescuing History from the Nation* overly stressed differences between racial, religious, and regional histories or, further, treated too lightly the historical continuity and cultural homogeneity maintained by "China" or "China of the Han Chinese." He then argues that there is a historical difference between the nation-state called "China" and European nation-states. He believes that Benedict Anderson's view that a nation-state as an "imagined community" emerged only in the modern period is based on an analysis of Western

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[11] Prasenjit Duara, *Minjok euro buteo yeoksa reul guchul hagi: Geundae Jungguk ui saeroun haeseok*, trans. Mun Myeong-gi and Son Seung-hui (Seoul, Samin, 2004).

history, and maintains that China formed by the Han Chinese as a modern nation-state had already been established during the Song Period. His view is similar to those of Naitō Konan, Miyazaki Ichisada, and other historians of the Kyoto School in Japan. These scholars in the Kyoto School continued to be interested in their own narratives of modernity of the East in a structure competing with that of the West. As an effort to subvert and overthrow the frame of the European "world history," the Kyoto School reflected nationalist viewpoints, maintaining that the early modern period started in the eleventh century.[12]

Ge's interest in the social changes that started from the Song period focuses on the formation of the Han community in terms of territory, culture, and politics, as well as Song society's similarity to a modern society. He asserts that China after the Song Dynasty maintained cultural homogeneity, common history, and ethics, and clearly defined state organizations and political system. In addition, China had a clear space under its jurisdiction, and a rudimentary sense of "nation" in the areas of the international environment, territorial change, a trade-based economy, and a sense of unity among the people.

Focused on its cultural significance, China's territory based in the regions dominated by the Han Chinese and a sense of nation made the Chinese "nations" after the Song period comparatively more mature. In addition, the institutionalization, secularization, and common sense-ness of Confucianism pushed through a collaboration of three groups. Elites in the state and the government, and the literati class further developed and expanded a sense of civilization based on Confucian ethics from metropolitan areas to rural areas in Song China, from the center to the borders, and from the top to the bottom, helping China achieve

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[12] Naitō Konan 內藤湖南, "Gaikatsu-teki tōsō jidaikan" 概括的唐宋時代觀, *Naitō Konan zenshū* 內藤湖南全集, vol. 8 (Tokyo: Chikuma shobō 筑摩書房, 1976); Miyazaki Ichisada 宮崎市定, "Tōyō-teki kinsei" 東洋的近世, *Miyazaki Ichisada zenshū* 宮崎市定全集, vol. 6 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten 岩波書店, 1992).

civilizational homogeneity early in its history. Therefore, this undoubted "nation" laid a foundation for the historical memories of the Han Chinese and a space for the description as well as the identity of a nation and a state.

It is in this context that Ge sums up the characteristic features of China as a nation-state by comparing it with modern nation-states in the West and Japan which consisted of a single language, race, and culture.

> China was an extension of its past imperial dynasties from first to last when it established a modern nation-state, and inherited the traditional heritage while continuing to change. Therefore, the theory that China can be divided into two periods, one of the traditional empires and the other, when it is a modern nation-state, accords neither with Chinese history nor with the awareness of Chinese people of their nation and the history of its origin. China did not proceed from empires to a nation-state, but maintained a concept of a finite 'nation' within the awareness of an infinite 'empire' and, at the same time, preserved an imagination of an infinite 'empire' within the awareness of a finite 'nation.' The modern nation-state broke away from the centralized traditional empires, but both make an intertwined, coexisting history because there is in the modern nation-state awareness of the centralized traditional empires.[13]

What is notable in Ge's discussion is that he does not see China in the past as belonging to any of the empires or (nation-)states, but as something containing overlapping aspects of both entities. His view is in line with Wang Hui, who maintains that the Chinese empires in the past contained in them the form of a modern state. Wang criticized the conventional dualistic description of Chinese history, one facet of which describes China as an empire and the other as a nation-state. The

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[13] Ge, *I Jungguk e geohara*, 316.

description of China as an empire portrays traditional China as a non-modern and despotic (that is, undemocratic) political system, with a production system linked to the agricultural (that is, non-urban, non-commercial, or non-industrial) culture widespread throughout its vast territory, and as an "imagined community" (that is, non-national and lacking political identity) relying upon multi-ethnicity and cultural stagnancy, and as a self-centered world system or continent based on the tribute system (rather than on formally and equally agreed treaties). By contrast, the description of China as a nation-state maintains that the country has maintained a model of nationalist identity since at least the Northern Song period, a commerce-based economy, an advanced urban civilization, a highly developed administrative system, a model of social mobility replacing social stratification, a society and culture centered on common people, a long tradition of science and technology, a secularized Confucian world view, and international exchange linking all corners of the region.[14]

The empire-(nation-)state dualism appeared along with a view that accepted a modern (nation-)state as the only rational system that accorded with our time, defining the past periods with empire, or a system of negative values. Accordingly, an empire was not regarded as a unique system of governance, but as a pre-modern and old-fashioned system that should be overcome, and was combined with the despotism of the East in the dualism of East and West. In this context, the contrast between an empire and a (nation-)state should naturally be ended with the subjugation of the former by the latter. In other words, for modern China to be recognized as a modern state, it must deny its own empirical character or status. In response, Wang regarded an empire as a unique, historical political system that is clearly different from a (nation-)state and saw Chinese society as a mixture of empire and (nation-)state, thus

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[14] Wang, *Xiandai Zhongguo sixiang de xingqi.*

proposing a new viewpoint for the understanding of the meaning of empire.[15]

According to Wang, the scale and stability of the Chinese empires form a truly exceptional phenomenon compared with all other pre-modern empires. It is the "exceptional" character that helped the Chinese empires to maintain long-term stability in its regions, populations, and political unification in the "pre-modern period." Even in the twenty-first century, China has been able to – and is the world's only country to do so – maintain the territory, population, and political culture it had as an empire in the nineteenth century within the frame of a sovereign state and nation-based society. Unlike as in all other empires that dissolved into sovereign nations, the nationalist movements and the foundation of a nation in modern China were able to directly convert some of the characteristic features and contents of the universalistic imperial system before the nineteenth century to the inner structure of a nation-state. Accordingly, one cannot but pay attention to the historical overlapping of an empire and (nation-)state to understand the nature and identity of China, whether it is traditional or modern, and give answers to the questions raised due to its imperial system.[16]

As discussed to this point, Ge and Wang criticize the movement to define China based on the modern concepts of an empire and a nation-state formed by the West. They have not yet been able to actively propose new concepts that can free them from the existing concepts, but they are sharpening their concepts that can help break away from the modern meaning of an empire and give China, that in the past or that in the present, a more appropriate definition. While Wang pays attention to modern China, which is building a new nation based on the heritage of an empire, Ge is more interested in the process in which China's national

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[15] Wang, *Ibid*.

[16] Wang, *Ibid*.

community was formed and changed throughout history. As a result, Ge defines China in history as follows. First, viewed from a historical context, "China" is still in the stage of fluidity because Chinese dynasties in the past were constantly being divided and united, and the spatial area ruled by the central government of these dynasties often changed. However, this does not mean that there has been no central territory that can support the concept of "China" historically. That is why Ge asserts, "There were always changes around the borderlands, but the capital areas were comparatively stable, formed a basic territory complete with political, national, and cultural zones, and constituted a whole world of history."

Second, the Chinese culture that formed in the course of history is plural, and not a single fixed, unchanging tradition. That is, China has formed its culture through a process of fusion between the Han culture and a variety of foreign cultures. This is, however, far from saying that Chinese culture is a simple hybrid and that Chinese people shared no clear sense of community in terms of culture. Although "China" is a (multi-)national state that expanded from the center (that is, the middle and lower reaches of the Yellow River and the Yangtze River outward), it was able to form a cultural community through a gradual fusion of the Han cultures with various cultures of foreign origin. There were periods of "Conquest Dynasties" or "Rule by Foreign Races" (that is, the Southern and Northern Dynasties, the Five Dynasties, Mongol Yuan, and Manchu Qing), but the cultural tradition based on the cultures of Han people continued to be preserved in the area, helping people share a clear sense of cultural community. China is, therefore, a single body of civilization.

Third, viewed from a political sense, "China" is not the same as any "dynasty," nor is it the "government" of any one family. A government, or a regime, can never be the same as a "state." This means that China, unlike dynasties and governments that continued to be replaced and changed, has been a comparatively stable and uninterrupted political and

cultural community.

In sum, China is a nation of common identity that stably maintained its territory and culture with those of the Han at the center throughout the history of changes and diversity.

Politics of History

As mentioned above, the core of China's tradition of "nation-state" discussed by Ge is related with a political and cultural community sharing a common identity. It shows that there is a certain difference between Ge and others who interpret the continuity of China in terms of culture. The culturalist method aims at overcoming the denial of the continuous legitimacy caused by the diversity and continuous changes brought to the population, regions, and political structure, and assigns great importance to the cultural continuity transcending ethnic identity and dynastic changes. The culturalist method in the description of Chinese history tends to regard China as a society lacking national homogeneity and maintained by the imperial traditions (that is, Confucian culture and the Chinese writing system as part of the imperial language). By contrast, in a community sharing a sense of common cultural identity, which Ge stresses as a cultural foundation for a "nation-state" in the traditional society ethnicity, the Han culture plays a key role. This view is similar to that of Fei Xiaotong, who stresses the fusion of multiple ethnicities with the Han Chinese at the center.[17]

In Ge's view, however, one may find that he tends to stress only the continuity of cultural elements or to perceive culture as if they are natural phenomena. This is, in a sense, a non-historical attitude because the discovery of the continuity in cultural elements and using continuity as a boundary between groups can easily ignore the fact that such continuity

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17 Fei, *Zhonghua minzu duoyuan yiti geju*.

and characteristics forming a community can be formed through the history of a certain period. In this context, we still must pay attention to the view of Duara, his "bifurcation of history" theory, in particular. According to Duara's explanation of the term "bifurcation of history," some of the memories of the past are suppressed or forgotten while others remain to be transmitted or transformed.[18] Benedict Anderson and Ernest Gellner, who understand "nation" as an imagined community of the modern period, also assert that the "nation" is a product and invention of the modern period. Considering Duara's assertion that words such as "race," "family," and "lineage" and various symbols correspond to the modern concept of nation and hence are translated into that word, and that understanding China through history signifies that the historical reality is the same as the reality of the real world, the historian's function should be giving answers to the questions of the real world on the basis of historical materials through consideration of both the historical heritage remaining with us today and the history already buried in oblivion. It is in this context that one can argue that historical studies of the modern period have played the role of politics' vanguard.

In fact, reading the politics of history, or existing historical research in the context of politics or time, forms another important aspect of Ge's book. He vividly portrays the ordeal today's historical research is put to between politics and the academic world by closely analyzing the historical context in which movements of "state learning," such as Shinto in Japan, Asianism, and East Asian historiography, emerged. An academic discourse cannot be completely freed from the contemporary political discourses and demands whether a researcher wants so or not. Ge's academic achievements, including the book under review here, are not exceptional. He once stated regarding the significance of his studies in literature and history that they are "aimed to establish a solid

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[18] Duara, *Minjok euro buteo yeoksa reul guchul hagi*, chapter 2.

perception of the state and nation in the cultural sense, not a government in the political sense, in addition to offering a feast of knowledge and training people's intelligence. That is, while a modern state requires setting up history and minting the present, the tradition of the past provides memories, forms common perceptions, and establishes a sense of unity."[19] He separates government from state in the political sense, but this does not deny the political significance of his academic activities. As mentioned above, one can say instead that both Wang and Ge involved themselves in practical politics actively enough in that they explored the meaning of "China" at a time when the issues of the Chinese nation and regional affairs had developed into a disruptive factor in and outside China just as the country began to rise as a superpower and when nationalism began to appear in China along with the voices of warning against the country. Such a relationship between politics and academic activities, and between politics and history, should not be viewed negatively. On the contrary, as pointed out by Michel Foucault, it is necessary to perceive the relationship between discourses and power as the way that knowledge exists and always examine ourselves in a critical manner.

It would not be very different from a simple research of past history if Ge's exploration of the Chinese nation sharing a sense of common identity throughout history ends just with demonstrating the Chinese nation's existence in history. His exploration would retain its value as historical research only when it could give answers to questions such as the following: Why is the Chinese nation sharing a sense of common identity so important? What meaning does this have regarding the modern Chinese people? How is this related with the direction in which China should move?

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[19] Ge, *Ibid*., 314.

China Seen by Neighboring Countries

Ge's academic research is largely focused on the history of Chinese culture and philosophy, including Daoism and Buddhism. In his latest publications, however, he is interested in understanding China through the interrelationship between China and its neighbors. This is not carried out simply to expand the scope of his research activities and academic interests, but it has a more significant meaning that can be summed up as a shift in China's epistemology.

Critics have often pointed out that many Chinese intellectuals of our time lack Asian viewpoints.[20] One might wonder with respect to the expression "Asian viewpoints" whether Asia can be summed up with a single concept. Similar to Europe or China, Asia seems to lack standards or boundaries, except for those drawn on the map, with which it can tie together all of its differences. In addition, it is also difficult to guarantee that any theory on Asia, or East Asia, offers a more objective historical approach that transcends individual nation-states, ethnicities, and cultures. As Ge points out, academic discussions on Asia to date have not been made by Asia, but by a specific nation-state such as Japan or Korea. Despite this situation, the criticism that China lacks Asian viewpoints hits the mark in pointing out that there is a problem in the way modern Chinese people perceive the world. In other words, they revealed that a majority of modern Chinese people are confined to the simplistic structure of China versus the West when they try to understand the world and themselves. Accordingly, Chinese people formed their identity by imitating, or separating themselves from, the West, which is their Other. Such a fragmentary perception of the self creates an image gravely distorted by the dualistic (that is, West versus Non-West) tool of

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[20] Baek Yeong-seo, *Dong Asia ui guihwan: Jungguk ui geundaeseong eul mudneunda* (Seoul: Changbi, 2000).

perception created by the West. The image of China reflected in such a mirror, therefore, cannot be very different from the one wanted by the West.

Regarding this situation, Ge proposed “looking at China from the viewpoints of its neighbors” as an effort to break away from the conventional perception of China for which it regards the West as its Other, and creating a multifaceted image of China. Considering that, unlike studies on the approaches to China from the northwestern region, there has been little research conducted on the approaches to China from its northeastern region, and Ge asks that researchers pay more attention to the images of China made on the basis of views from the northeastern areas. He has recently discovered from materials related to the Joseon envoys visiting Beijing that the Joseon dynasty had its own image of China which was uniquely different from that China made for itself, trying hard to reform the image of China through its Other (that is, Joseon) in Northeast Asia.

One may conclude that the fresh exploration of China by Ge is not a passive measure to handle the questions raised regarding the unified community of identity of China in the postmodern or postcolonial discourses in the West, but rather an active effort to rebuild the meaning of China from the various viewpoints formed by neighbors which have closer historical relationships with China. These are mutual viewpoints not limited to Chinese history, but they can be profitably exploited to describe the histories of its neighbors such as Korea, Japan, and Southeast Asian countries and promote multifaceted joint research between scholars across the region.

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